1

CASTILLO vs. ESCUTIN FACTS: 1. 2. Petitioner is a judgment debtor of a certain Racquel K. Moratilla. To satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Racquel, her mother, Urbana and sister Perla, were co-owners of a certain parcel of land, Lot 13713. Petitioner sought verification of the ownership of the land. She was able to secure an Orded issued by DAR converting certain several agricultural landholdings including the lot co-owned by the Moratillas to residential, commercial and recreational uses. She was also able to get a certification from the City Assessor of Lipa stating that the lot was covered by a Tax Declaration under the names of the co-owners. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a Certificate attesting that the lot was not covered by a certificate of title whether judicial or patent or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the CARP. Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution said parcel of land. Before the scheduled public auction, she learned that the lot was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Division owned by Summit realty. When she went to the office of Summit Realty, its Vice-President, Orense, did not show her any document to prove ownership of the subject lot. The public auction pushed through on May 14, 2002 and petitioner bought Racquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the said lot. On June 4, 2002, petitioner had the sale recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No. 3344. Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax Declaration 00942-A over the property. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her share in the lot, she found out that, without giving her notice, Tax Declaration 00942-A in her name was cancelled. The lot co-owned by the Moratillas was said to be encompassed and overlapping with Lot 1-B, covered by a transfer certificate of title and a tax declaration under the name of Francisco Catigbac. The TCT in the name of Catigbac bore three entries reflecting the supposed sale on July 22, 2002 of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin who was issued a special power of attorney by Catigbac to sell the land. On July 25, 2002 at 2:30 pm, TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609 was issued in the name of Summit Realty in place thereof. The Deed of Absolute Sale between Summit Realty and Yagin was presented before and recorded by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City at exactly the same date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty. Catigbacs property used to form a bigger parcel of land, Lot 1, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac. After Catigbacs death, Lot 1 was subdivided and parts thereof were sold to different vendees. Summit Reality acquired portions of Lot 1 identified as Lot 1-B. The owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost. Subsequently, Summit Realty filed with the RTC of Lipa City a Petition for the Issuance of New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 in Lieu of the Lost One. The RTC then directed the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac. Summit Realty then requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac which was later on cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty. Petitioner questioned why, despite cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty, it was the formed cancelled title which was used as basis for cancelling petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. After filing her complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriff Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her proindiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City and the annotation of her Affidavit of Adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty. However, respondent Escutin, denied petitioners request. Petitioner then charged public respondend including private respondents, Leviste and Orense, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner avers that respondents were negligent in their administrative functions and impartial towards Summit Realty for having cancelled her tax declaration and issuing a TD in the name of Catigbac knowing that the TCT of Catigbac was already cancelled and therefore not entitled to a new tax declaration.

15. 16. 17. 18.

3.

4.

5.

19. 20.

6. 7.

21.

8.

22.

9.

10. 11.

23. 24.

12.

13.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS: Atty. Escutin, Register of Deeds of Lipa City

14.

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Escutin emphasized that in accordance with Section 56 of PD 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, his duty as Register of Deeds was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon proof aliunde. It was not true that he allowed the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale notwithstanding the absence of the required documents supporting the application for registration thereof as all the required document were submitted. Regarding the certification of the Register of Deeds attesting that Lot 13713 was not covered by a certificate of title, Escutin explained that the Register ofDeeds was not technically equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or participating in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration for the Register of Deeds was not concerned with the issuance or cancellation of tax declarations. Aquilina Mistas, Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the Office and she should not be held liable for the missing documents. Her main function was control and management of all phases of administrative matters andsupport. She had no hand in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration and the issuance of Catigbacs Tax Declaration for such function pertains to another division which she had no authority whatsoever. Thus it was not within her function to demand the presentation of certain documents to support the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration or to cause the annotation of petitioners interest in Catigbacs Tax Declaration. Marietta Linatoc, Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to another, her duty was limited only to the act of preparing a new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to demand the presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer. Neither was it within her jurisidiction to determine whether petitioners interest should have been annotated in Catigbacs TD. The flow of the work mandated her to cancel petitioners TD and to prepare and release Catgibacs TD after the transfer has been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true that the TCT under Catigbacs name was already cancelled when it was presented before the Office of the City Assessor. Leviste, Executive VP of Summit Realty and Orense, VP of Summit Realty Summit Realty had every reason to believe that the property it purchased from Yagin was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis of the latters Certificate of Title over the same. Catigbacs right as registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/ No. 129642 was superior to petitioners which was based on a mere tax declaration. ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration was a violation of Section 109 of PD No. 1529. HELD: The Petition at bar is without merit. Petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration Decree which provides: SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered. Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree. Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one. However, respondents did not only issue a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents did not even annotate petitioners existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new owners duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing titles.

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Petitioners position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments and befuddled reasoning. Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal.[40] Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property.[41] Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.[42] Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration. Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property. Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbacs title to Lot 1-B passed on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the separation of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a certificate of title specifically covering the same. This resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty. Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration. The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942 -A was not because of the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.[43] All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.[44] Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same property. As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence of the same.[45] Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed that, [c]uriously, as to how and when petitioners alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed coowners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent.[46]

Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioners prayer in the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Revie is hereby DENIED. GOMEZ vs. CA FACTS:

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1. Petitioners sought to register certain parcels of land before the CFI (now RTC) of Pangasinan. 2. The lots were among those involved in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran where the Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez as owner of certain lots. 3. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Gomez (father of Consolacion) who together with Consolacions son, Luis Lopez, inherited from her the subject parcels of land. 4. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro, they became absolute owners thereof by virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. 5. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the subject lots in petitioners favor. 6. On October 6, 1981, the court issued an order stating that the August 5, 1981 decision of the court has become final and executory and directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots. 7. Silverio Perez, the Chief of the Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission (now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that several parcels of land which sought to be registered by the petitioners were already covered by homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and the order of October 6, 1981 be set aside, 8. On March 25, 1985, the lower court set aside its August 5 decision and October 6 order. 9. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the SC which in turn referred the same to the CA. 10. CA dismissed the petition stating that prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the respondent Judge has still the power and control over the decision he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a registration or cadastral case takes place only after the expiration of the one year period after entry of the final decree of registration. When the respondent Judge amended his decision after the report of the respondent officials of the Land Registration Office had shown that homestead patents had already been issued on some of the lots, respondent cannot be faulted because land already granted by homestead patents can no longer be the subject of registration. 11. Having been denied their motion for reconsideration, petitioners came to this Court. CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS: Since the decision of August 5, 1981 has long been final and executory it may no longer be reopened, reviewed or set aside. They anchor their claim on Section 30 of PD 1529 which provides that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of a decree of registration and certificate of title. Petitioners contend that Section 30 must be read in consonance with Section 32 of PD 1529 which provides that once the judgment becomes final and executory under Section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. ISSUES: 1. 2. Whether respondnent Judge has jurisdiction to set aside the August 5, 1981 decision and October 6, 1981 order Whether or not respondents from the Land Registration Commission have no other alternative but to issue a decree of registration pursuant to the August 5, 1981 decision and October 6, 1981 order, their duties being ministerial. Whether or not the decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran is the law of the case which held that lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were not public lands and therefore could not be acquired through homestead patents.

3.

HELD: 1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of the 1 year period after the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now the NLTDRA) and the period of 1 year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez should have been submitted to the court a quo before its decision became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary deadline for finality of the court decision. Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render reports is not limited to the period before the courts decision becomes final but may extend even after its finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of decree.

2.

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Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings. 3. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez. The report of respondent land registration officials states that the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez. It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in cadastral proceeding. The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over them in 1928-1929. 2. Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule. 3. The RTC issued an Order granting the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs and directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property. 4. The Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. 5. The LRA Administrator through a letter-reply informed counsel of petitioner that the request cannot be granted because the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 issued by then DOJ Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11 issued to all Registers of Deeds disclosed that as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137), there is a finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919). 6. The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings: i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.] ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. ANGELES vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FACTS: 1. On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. 7. The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA to prevent its alteration and tampering. CONTENTION OF PETITIONER Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,[13] made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that [n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land. According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have

6
made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on what is the valid OCT No. 994. Petitioner contends that [t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect. Petitioner further alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry. Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committees report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court. CONTENTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names. ISSUE: whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents. HELD: We find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request? As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request.[31] There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. The controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994,

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such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court[34] which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand on. Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case: First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.[36] (Emphases supplied.) To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917 and categorically concluded that OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist. The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.