TWO COMMENTARIES ON THE

SAMDHINIRMOCANA-SUTRA
BY ASANGA AND JNANAGARBHA
John Powers
Studies in Asian Thought and Religion
Volume 13
The Edwin Mellen Press
Lewiston/Queenston!Lampeter
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Asmiga. _ .
English]
Two commentaries on the Samdhinirmocana-Sutra / by Asanga and
Jnanagarbha; [translated by] John Powers.
p. cm. -- (Studies in Asian thought and religion; v. 13)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7734-9477-4
1;, Powers, John, 1957- . II. Jftiinagarbha, 8th. cent.

English. III. Title.
N. Series.
BQ2095.A82 1992
294.3' 85--dc20 92-520
A CIP catalog record for this book is available
from The British Library.
Copyright 1992 John Powers.
All rights reserved. For more information contact
The Edwin Mellen Press
P.O. Box 450
Lewiston, NY 14092
USA'
CIP
The Edwin Mellen Press
Box 67
Queenston, Ontario
CANADA LOS 1LO
The Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd.
Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales
UNITED KINGDOM SA487DY
Printed in the United States of America
t])eaication
To my mother,
for her encouragement and support.
Contents
Abbreviations
Preface
v
vii
Introduction 1
1. The SarruJhinirmocana-satra and Its Commentaries 1
Part One: A Study and Translation of Asailga'sArya-sarruJhinirmocana-bhllfYa 7
1. Introduction 7
2. Overview of the Cqmmentary 8
3. The Authorship of the Text 13
4. Asailga: His Life and Times 22
5. The Translation 27
Translation of Asailga's Explanation of the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought 29
Introduction . 29
Chapter Two 34
Chapter Three 36
Chapter Four 37
Chapter Five 37
Chapter Six 39
Chapter Seven 40
Chapter Eight 42
Chapter Nine 45
Chapter Ten 48
Two: A Study and Translation of Jfianagarbha's
51
1. Introduction 51
2. The Translation 63
Translation of JiUmagarbha's Commentary on Just the Chapter
o/the Superior Maitreya
Bibliography
Index
67
127
139
.9L66reviations
BeLS: Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques,
Academie Royale de Belgique.
BEFEO: Bulletin de l' Ecole Franfaise d' Extreme-Orient.
AsaIiga's ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par
'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa), Sde dge version (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae
Choedhey, vol. mdo sde ngi, pp. 2-22).
BSOAS: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
D: Sde dge version of the Sal'Jldhinirmocana-sutra.
EB: The Eastern Buddhist.
fA: fndianAntiquary.
IBK: fndogakuBukkyo-gaku Kenkyu.
JA: Journal Asiatique.
JfABS: Journal of the f nternational Association of Buddhist Studies.
JRAS: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
KDBK: Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyo-gakubu Kenkyakiyo.
vi
Two Commentaries on the Sa1?ldhinirmocana-siura
KDBR: Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyo-gaku Ronshu.
Lamotte: Etienne Lamotte, Sa1?ldhinirmocana-sutra: L' explication des Mysteres
(Louvain and Paris, 1935).
MCB: Melanges Chinoises et Bouddhiques.
Peking A: Peking Tripi!aka version of Asailga's
vol. 104.1.1.1-7.5.1.
PEW: Philosophy East and West.
Stog: Stog Palace version of the Sa1?ldhinirmocana-sutra.
TBS: Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the
Birth of Alexander Csoma de Karas. Budapest: Akademai Kiad6.
Tohoku: Tohoku Catalog number CUI Hakuju et al. A Complete Catalogue of the
Tibetan Buddhist Canon. Sendai: Tohoku Imperial University, 1935).
Wonch'uk: Arya-gambh'ira-sa1?ldhinirmocana-sutra-tzkii ('phags pa dgongs pa
zab mo nges par' grel pa' i mdo'i rgya cher ' grel pa). Delhi: Delhi Karmapae
Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, mdo ' grel, vol. ti (118), by
Wonch'uk.
WZKSOA: Wiener Zeitschriftfii.r die Kunde Siid- und Ostasiens.
'Preface
This book began as a part of a project to translate the Sarruihinirmocana-sutra, one
of the most influential texts of Indian Mahayana Buddhism and the primary scrip-
tural source of the Y ogacara school. The initial work was done in India under the
auspices of a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies at the Central In-
stitute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. While in residence there, I had the
good fortune to come in contact with Professor Yeshe Thabkhe, who agreed to
work with me on the translation of the commentary attributed to Jiianagarbha,
which discusses the eighth chapter of the Sa1'J'ldhinirmocana. In addition, he was
kind enough to help with difficult passages in an already-completed draft translation
of the commentary attributed to Asailga, which provides selective discussions on
some important topics in the sutra. As an expert on Indian Buddhist commentarial
literature, his help was invaluable.
Although this work was initially intended as an ancillary part of the translation
project, it soon became apparent that these two commentaries had merits of their
own and were helpful in drawing out the thought of difficult passages in the sutra
and in making decisions concerning the translation of technical terms. Thus, after
completing the translation of the sutra, I decided that a separate book containing
translations of these important commentaries and discussions of their doctrines and
purported authors would be valuable for people interested in Buddhist philosophy
in general, and Yogacara in particular. My hope in publishing this volume is that it
will prove useful for people interested in the sutra and how it has been interpreted
by those who ip.herited it and were faced with the often difficult task of making
sense of its often enigmatic teachings.
I would like to particularly thank Professor Thabkhe for his help and for the
enormous amount of time he spent going over difficult passages, commenting on
the philosophical ramifications of the text, and discussing the ranges of meanings of
viii Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-satra
technical terms. Thanks are also due to Yen. S amdhong Rinpoche, principal of the
Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, for making available the resources of
his school. One of the greatest resources was Yen. Ngawang Sherap, Librarian of
the Institute, who was very helpful in finding rare reference matt<rials, dictionaries,
and manuscripts of the texts.
Another scholar who was of great help in this project was Geshe Palden
Dragpa, Librarian of Tibet House in Delhi, who donated his time and vast knowl-
edge of Indian commentarialliterature. I would also like to offer my special thanks
to Professor Jeffrey Hopkins, my graduate advisor, who read every line of the
Sa'!ldhinirmocana with me, checked every part of the translation with great thor-
oughness and wonderful patience, and who read and emended many parts of the
commentaries in this volume. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the help of Professor
William Magee of the University of Yirginia, whose advice on computer problems,
terminology, and philosophical issues has been invaluable.
I ntroauction
1. The S01!'dhinirmocana-sutra and Its Commentaries
The SarruJhinirmoeana-sutra, one of the seminal works of Indian Mahayana Bud-
dhism, has influenced Buddhist thought in every country to which Mahayana trav-
elled. Its influence is evidenced by the number of texts which quote it and by the
number of commentaries on it. In the Tibetan canon alone, there are four commen-
taries on the sutra: (1) Wonch'uk's Extensive Commentary on the Profound Supe-
rior Sutra Explaining the Thought ('phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par' grel
pa'i mdo'i rgya eher 'grel pa, arya-gambhZra-saJ!Ldhinirmoeana-sutra-.tfkli);l (2)
Ipeking #5517. vol. 106, pp. 1-345; Tohoku #4016. Wonch'uk (Tibetan: Wen tshegs; Chinese:
Yiian-ts'e, 00 t 6 ~ ) was a Korean student of HSiian-tsang (tA ~ ) who lived in Ch'ang-an
during the li'an;dyanasty and wrote in Chinese. This author and his commentary on the
Sfll!Idhinirmocana have been the subject of several articles by IIDA Shotaro: (1) 'The Three Stiipas
of Ch'ang-an", in Papers of the First International Conference on Korean Studies (Soeul: The
Academy of Korean Studies, 1980), pp. 486-7; (2) "A Mukung-hwa in Ch'ang-an - A Study of
the Life and Works of Wonch'uk (613-696)", in Proceedings, International Symposium Com-
memorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation (Soeul, 1975), pp. 225-51; and (3) "Who
Can Best Re-turn the Dharma-cakra?", in IBK #27.1, 1986, pp. 948-51. The history of the trans-
mission of this text from China to Central Asia and Tibet is discussed in John Powers,
"Accidental Immortality: How Wonch'uk Became the Author of the Great Chinese Commentary"
(forthcoming in JIABS #15.1, 1992). My translation of the siitra contains numerous translated
excerpts from this commentary (forthcoming from Dharma Publishing, Berkeley, CA). Regarding
Wonch'uk's dates, see NAKAMURA Hajime, Shin Bukkyo Iiten (Tokyo: Seishin Shobo, 1961),
p. 60. See also the "Enjiki" entry in the Hobogirin catalogue, ed. Paul Demieville et aI. (paris and
Tokyo, 1978).
2 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
Byang chub rdzu 'phrul's Explcmation of the Superior Sutra Explaining the
Thought ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par' grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa,
lirya-sa7Jldhininnocana-sutrasya-vylikhylina);l (3) Jiianagarbha's Commentary on
Just the Maitreya Chapter from the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought Cphags
pa dgongs pa nges par' grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe'i
bshad pa,
ya);2 and (4) AsaiJ.ga's Commentary on the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought
('phags pa dgongs pa nges par' grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa, lirya-sarruJhinirmo-
cana-bhliD'a).3 The Tibetan canon also contains a text that discusses the sets of
reasonings presented in the tenth chapter of the sutra, entitled Summary of the Sutra
[Explaining the Thought] by Way of Valid Cognition of Correct Words (bka' yang
The original Chinese text was in ten chuan, but the only extant version, in the Dai-nihon
Zokuzokyo <* * *_ YI& *,m, mu tsang ching; Hong Kong Reprint, 1922, pp.
134.d - 535.a), is missing the first portion of the eighth chuan and all of the tenth chiian of the
original text. These have been reconstructed from the Tibetan translation of Fa-ch'eng (it J1X;
Tibetan: Chos grub) by INABA Shoju: :Enjiki Gejinmikkyosho Sanitsububan no kanbunyaku
(Kyoto: Hozokan, 1949. See also Inaba's Restoration of Yiian-tse's Chieh-shin-mi-ching-shu
Through Its Tibetan Counterpart (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1972); reviewed by NAGAO Gadjin, in
Suzuki Gakujutsu Zoidan Kenkyu Nempo #9, 1972, p. 95. Inaba discusses his methodology in
his article "On Chos-grub's Translation of the Chieh-shin-mi-ching-shu" (Buddhist Thought and
Asian Civilization, ed. Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott; Emeryville, CA: Dharma Press, 1977,
pp. 105-113).
lpeking #5845, vol. 144, p. 191 - vol. 145, p. 89; Tohoku #4538. No author is mentioned in
Peking, but Sde dge states that it was written by Byang chub rdzu 'phrul, an epithet of King Khri
sronglde brtsan. This text is discussed byEmst Steinkellner, ''Who is Byait chub rdzu 'phrul",
Berliner Indologische Studien, 1989, pp. 229-251. Numerous passages of this text have been
translated or paraphrased in the notes to my translation of the siitra (mentioned in the previous
note).
2peking #5535, vol. 109, pp. 196-211; Tohoku #4033. This has been studied and translated into
Japanese by NOZAWA Josho in his Daijo-Bukkyo Yuga-gyo no kenkyu (Studies in the Yogiiciira
School of Mahiiyiina Buddhism; Kyoto: Hozokan, 1957. This work contains the text of the
"Maitreya" chapter of the Sa1Jldhinirmocana-sutra and the Tibetan and Chinese texts of
Jiliinagarbha's commentary and the commentary on the eighth chapter of the siitra from the
commentary attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul.
3Peking #5481, vol. 104, pp. 1-7; Tohoku #3981. Excerpts have been edited and translated by
Etienne Lamotte, Sa1Jldhinirmocana-sutra: L' explication des Mysteres (Louvain and Paris:
Universite de Louvain & Adrien Maisonneuve, 1935).
Introduction 3
dag pa' i tshad ma las mdo btus pa), attributed to Khri srong Ide brtsan.! In addi-
tion, the Compendium of Ascertainments (vini1caya-slU!lgraha1Jl, rnam par gtan la
dbab pa'i bsdu ba),2 attributed to Asariga, quotes most of the sutra and prefaces
each chapter with short summaries of its main points.
3
In addition to these texts, Bu ston mentions five other commentaries (now ap-
parently lost) in his Catalogue of Translations of Doctrine (chos bsgyur dkar
chag), which are listed by Ernst Steinkellner in his article, "Who is Byan chub rdzu
'pbrul?".4 After Bu ston's time, Tibetan scholars of the Dge lugs pa school created
an extensive tradition of oral and written commentary on the sutra that begins with
Tsong kha pa's Essence of the Good Explanations (legs bshad snying po). The first
section of this work, entitled "Mind Only" (sems tsam), discusses the Sa'!ldhinir-
mocana at length and focuses on its presentations of Buddhist hermeneutics. Tsong
kha pa's work, in turn, has inspired at least twenty other Dge lugs pa sub-com-
mentaries, and the philosophical and doctrinal ramifications of the
na (as presented by Tsong kha pa) are still actively debated today in Dge lugs pa
monastic colleges.
s
There is also a commentary on the sutra dubiously attributed to
Kfikai (KObo Daishi, 774-835, the founder of the Shingon school of Japanese Bud-
dhism), entitled Explanation of the Satra Eludicating the Profound Secret (chieh
Ipeking #5839; Tohoku #4352. This has been briefly discussed by: (1) Ernst Steinkellner ("Who
is Byail chub rdzu 'phrul", pp. 241-3); (2) Giuseppe Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts, part I, (Rome,
1958, pp. 122-5); (3) R.A. Stein, "Une mention du ManicMisme dans Ie choix du Bouddhisme
comme religion d'etat par Ie roi Tib6t.ain Khri-sron-Ide-bcan", in Indianisme et Bouddhisme:
Melanges offerts a Mgr. Etienne Lamotte (Louvain-Ia-Neuve, 1980, p. 333); and (4) Ariane
MacDonald, "Une Lecture des Pelliot Tibet.ain 1286, 1287, 1038, 1047, et 1290. Essai sur la
formation et l'emploi des mythes politiques dans la religion royale de Sron-bcan-sgam-po", in
Etudes Tibetaines dediees a la memoire de Marcelle Lalou (paris, 1971), pp. 367ff.
2Peking #5539, vol. 110, p. 233 - vol. 111, p. 121; Tohoku # 4038.
3These comments are all translated in the section below which discusses Asailga' s commentary on
the sutra. For studies of this text and questions about its formation, see Lambert Schmithausen,
DeT NirviiTJa-Abschnitt in der VinifcayasaT{lgrahaTJi der (Wien: Ver5ffent-
lichungen der Komission fur Sprachen und Kulturen Sud- und Ostasiens, Heft 8, 1969), and
A.layavijiilina (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987).
4 .
Stemkellner, "Who is Byail chub rdzu 'phrul", pp. 245-6.
sr .
song kha pa's text, along with the oral and written traditions that derive from it, are the subjects
of a forthcoming study by Jeffrey Hopkins, entitled Reflections on Reality.
4 Two Commentaries on the Sarrulhinirmocana-sutra
shen mi ching chu <M at),! which contains the Chinese text of
the sutra with interlineal comments.
The past and present interest in the sutra bears witness both to the profundity of
its thought and the difficulties involved in trying to understand it. The Sarrulhinir- .
mocana is a multi-faceted and penetrating analysis of some of the most important
topics of Buddhist philosophy, e.g., the nature of consciousness, the path to enlight-
enment, the differences between the perceptions of ordinary beings and those who
are enlightened, and rules for interpretation of scriptures. It has inspired and per-
plexed Buddhist thinkers, both because of its rich insights and thought-provoking
analogies and the portions of the text that are abstruse or that lend themselves to
multiple interpretations. For these reasons, Buddhist scholars in India, China,
Korea, and Central Asia have commented on its thought, and Tibetan and Mongol-
ian scholars continue to debate doctrinal issues raised by the sutra.
Despite the influence of this text and its philosophy, the Sarrulhi-
nirmocana has received surprisingly little attention from Western scholars. Etienne
Lamotte's 1935 French translation has been the only extensive study of the sutra in
any Western language, and my forthcoming translation will be the first in English.
The commentaries on the sutra have received even less attention. The only
work by a Western scholar that discusses them at length of which I am aware is
Steinkellner's "Who is Byrui chub rdzu 'phrul". None of the commentaries have
previously been translated into any Western language, with the exception of the ex-
cerpts of Asailga's commentary translated into French by Lamotte in his Sa1!Idhi-
nirmocana-sutra: L' explication des Mysteres. The only other translation of one of
the commentaries on the sutra of which I am aware is the Japanese translation of
Jiianagarbha's treatise by NOZAWA Joshu, which is accompanied by a critical
edition of the Tibetan text
2
The present study is an attempt to partially rectify this oversight. The commen-
taries translated and discussed below, attributed to Asruiga and Jiianagarbha, con-
tain useful discussions of difficult points and technical terms in the Sa'!ldhininno-
cana and are invaluable aids for anyone wishing to understand the thought of the
lChieh shen mi ching chu (Taiwan, 1975).
2For further infonnation regarding scholarly studies of the Sa'!ldhinirmocana and its commen-
taries, see John Powers, The YogQcQrQ School of Buddhism: A Bibliography (Metuchen, NJ:
Scarecrow Press, 1991).
Introduction 5
sutta and how it has influenced, and been interpreted by, Buddhist authors. They
are quite different in style and presentation: AsaIiga's text is the shortest extant
commentary on the sutta and mainly summarizes some of its important ideas and
passages. Jfianagarbha's commentary is a detailed discussion of the eighth chapter
of the Sarrzdhinirmocana that comments on most of the important passages and
technical terms of that section of the sutta.
If they were indeed authored by AsaIiga and Jfianagarbha (which will be dis-
cussed below in greater detail), they also represent two very different periods of
Indian Buddhist literature. AsaIiga, who lived in India around the third or fourth
centuries A.D., was one of the most influential figures in the early formative period
of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy and is credited in Tibet with being the main
founder of the Yogacara school. Yogacara was one of the two main philosophical
schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhism (the other being Madhyamaka), and
AsaIiga's tteatises, along with those of his brother Vasubandhu, defmed the out-
lines of the thought of Yogacara. Since the Sarrzdhinirmocana is the main scriptural
source for that school, if the commentary that bears his name was actually authored
by AsaIiga, this is an important resource for determining the philosophical and doc-
trinal connections between the sutta and the founder of the school that was inspired
by it.
The other Indian commentary, attributed to Jiianagarbha,l comes from a period
just after the apogee of development of Mahayana thought, around the eighth cen-
lWhether or not this text was authored by Jl'ianagarbha, I think that the style and syntax clearly
mark it as an Indian text. Indigenous Tibetan texts generally read differently than Tibetan
translations of Sanskrit works, and the text attributed to Jl'ianagarbha has the ambiance of an
Indian work. The commentary attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul, on the other hand, reads like
the work of a Tibetan author, and I agree with SteinkeIlner's assessment that this is probably an
indigenous Tibetan work. In his "Who is Byail chub rdzu 'phrul" (pp. 240-1), he point out that in
the Sde dge edition of the Tibetan canon it occurs in the "Miscellaneous" (SM tsOOgs, vols. coo
andjo) section, which contains a number of works by Tibetan authors. Steinkellner, following Bu
ston's Coos bsgyur dkar cOOg, thinks that the probable author was the Tibetan translator Cog ro
Klu'i rgyal mtshah. Bu ston's contention that the author is actually Klu'i rgyal mtshan is also
cited by Ser shul Dge bshes Blo bzang phun tshogs in his commentary on Tsong kha pa's Legs
bshad snying po (entitled Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bris zab don gsal ba'i sgron me;
Mysore: Sere Byes Monastery, n.d., p. 29bA), and he concurs with Bu ston's thought that the
author is the translator (10 tsa ba) Cog ro K I ~ ' i rgyal mtshan (although Ser shu) Dge bshes
incorrectly cites the work in which Bu stan makes this assertion as the Coos' byung rather than
6
Two Commentaries on the Sa7!Uihinirmocana-satra
tury A.D., and is concerned only with the eighth chapter, which is a dialogue be-
tween the Bodhisattva Maitreya and the Buddha. The main focus of the chapter is
meditation, with a particular emphasis on the topics of calming (zhi gnas, samatha)
and insight (lhag mthong, vipa!yana). This is one of the more difficult chapters in
the sutra, both in terms of thought and style, and lfianagarbha's commentary is a
valuable resource for anyone wishing to grapple with the sutra's presentation of
meditation theory and the nature of consciousness. It is a meticulous and exacting
commentary which moves through the chapter line by line, often paraphrasing
questions or answers and providing explanations of key terms and concepts.
Whether or not it was authored by lfianagarbha, it is clearly the work of a scholar
who was well-versed in Buddhist philosophy and psychology, and the number of
oojections to the sutra's ideas and the doctrinal debates that it addresses indicate that
this is a commentary of a relatively late date in the development of Indian Bud-
dhism.
Both of these commentaries has proven to be useful in studying the thought of
the Sa'(ldhinirmocana-sutra. Their approaches and styles are very different, but
taken together they complement each other, and each offers insights into the philos-
ophy of this difficult text. The primary value of AsaJiga's commentary is that it
provides a map through the thought of the Sa'(ldhinirmocana, which serves as a
guide to the relations between sections of the sutra and which gives a good over-
view of the text. Jiianagarbha's commentary provides insightful commentary on one
of the more difficult sections of the sutra, indicates some of the possible and actual
objections that could be raised with respect to some of its doctrines, and presents
fine distinctions of technical terms. It is a masterpiece of traditional scholarship and
provides incisive and cogent explanations for almost every passage of the chapter.
Unlike Wonch'uk's work, which quotes extensively from a wide range of Buddhist
literature, quotations from other sources are rare in Jiianagarbha's text, and most of
the opinions appear to reflect the author's own ideas. Both of these commentaries
provide insights into the meaning of difficult and obscure passages, and they are in-
valuable resources for those who wish to explore the thought of the sutra.
the Coos bsgyur dkar chag). If Bu ston's speculation is correct, this would mean that the probable
time of composition of this text was during the reign of King Ral pa can (who ruled from 815-
838), since according to Tsepon Shakabpa (Tibet: A Political History; New Haven: Yale Uni"
versity Press, 1967, p. 49) this was the time of Klu'i rgyal mtshan's greatest productivity.
Part One:
A Study and Translation of
Asanga's
1. Introduction
According to Tibetan traditions, Asariga is one of the two great "openers of the
chariot ways" (shing rta srol 'byecl) who clarified Mahayana doctrines in accor-
dance with earlier prophecies that foretold their coming.! The other "opener of the
chariot ways" was Nagarjuna, who developed and spread the Madhyamaka school
on the basis of the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras, while Asariga developed and
spread the Yogacara school, relying mainly on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra.
2
Given the importance of this author, the Yogacara school, and the Sal'Jldhinir-
mocana-sutra, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to the commentary
on the sutra attributed to Asariga, entitled Commentary on the Superior Sutra Ex-
plaining the Thought Tibetan: 'phags pa dgongs
pa nges par' grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa).3 Since Etienne Lamotte's partial French
translation in 1935,4 I am aware of no contemporary scholar who has studied this
text, and there is no complete translation in any Western language. This neglect is
probably due to a number of factors, including the brevity of the commentary and
the difficulty of its style. It is a generally very terse work that summarizes large
!This idea is found in Tsong kha pa's Legs bshad snying po (Samath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings
Printing Press, 1973), pp. 3-4.
2 '
See Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 358-9.
3S
de
dge #3891, pp. 1-22; Peking #5481, vol. 104, pp. 1-7.
4'
Etienne Lamotte, SalfUlhinirmocanasiUra: Explication des Mysteres (paris and Louvain, 1935).
This text will be referred to in this study as Lamotte.
8 Two Commentaries on the SaJ?1dhinirmocana-sutra
sections of the sutra with short comments, and parts make little sense on their own
apart from the sutra. It is clearly written for scholarly monks who were deeply
immersed in the complexities of Buddhist philosophy, and this makes the commen-
tary difficult to understand and to translate in places. Judging from the style and
content, along with the fact that the author only discusses certain (generally difficult
or obscure) passages, it may well be that this is a ,text composed or dictated by a
senior teacher for students to provide them with guidelines and insights into a diffi-
cult text. The brevity of the commentary indicates that it was never intended to be a
comprehensive discussion of the whole sutra, and was instead a selective commen-
tary on particular points.
Despite its brevity and terseness, however, it is an invaluable aid to understand-
ing some difficult parts of the SaTfldhinirmocana, and my decision to publish a
translation of it is based on the help that it provided in translating the sutra. The
primary value of the commentary for anyone reading the sutra is that it provides a
map through this difficult text. It mainly focuses on the more difficult passages of
the sutra, but hardly mentions those which are easily understandable. For instance,
the fITst chapter of the commentary is mainly concerned with the introduction to the
sutra (in my opinion one of the most difficult parts of the text), and only a few lines
are -given over to comments on the main topic of the chapter, the designations of the
"compounded" (' dus byas, saTfls"rta) and the "uncompounded" (' dus ma byas,
asaTflSkrta). Because of this focus, it is invaluable as a guide through some of the
murkier parts of the sutra.
2. Overview of the Commentary
Chapter one is the longest section of the BhiifYa, but, as mentioned above, it mostly
discusses the introduction to the sutra, which describes the place in which the teach-
ing of the SaTfldhinirmocana takes place. This is said to be a vast celestial palace
that extends throughout innumerable world systems and that reflects the good quali-
ties of the 'Buddha who created it. The palace is the residence of many advanced
Buddhist practitioners, both llinayanists and Mahayanists. The BhiifYa lists eight-
een perfections that characterize the palace, then lists several divisions of the good
qualities of the Buddha. It then discusses the various attainments of the Hrnayamsts
and Bodhisattvas who reside in the palace. These lists and divisions take up most of
the chapter, and then a short discussion is devoted to Buddha's use of the terms
Asmiga's /frya-sarruJ,hinirmocana-bhIifya 9
"compounded" and "uncompounded". The Bhli!Ya mainly echoes the contention of
the Sarrzdhinirmocana that these are terms designated by Buddha for particular
didactic purposes. The use of these terms is purely pragmatic, and Buddha realizes
that the terms do not express the reality of things, but they are useful for those of
his followers who have not intuitively realized the ultimate (don dam pa,
paramartha).
Chapter two follows the second chapter of the Sarrzdhinirmocana, which be-
gins with a statement that the ultimate is "a character that completely transcends ar-
gumentation". This point is illustrated in the sutra by a story told by the Bodhisattva
Dharmodgata (the main interlocuter of the chapter) of some non-Buddhists whom
he observed debating about the ultimate. The sutra indicates that their understand-
ings of the ultimate were flawed by their adherence to wrong views and that they
were prone to quarrels and acrimony. TheBhIifya indicates that their faulty under-
standing of the ultimate is due to the fact that they rely on teachings by others
(rather than on their own meditative experience), their limited achievements in medi-
tation (which cause them to imagine that they have progressed farther than they ac-
tually have), their exaggerated adherence to their own views and philosophical sys-
tems, and their propensity toward becoming angry with others who do not share
their views. Most of the second chapter of the BhIifya deals with this opening story
and its ramifications for the thought of the sutra, but the rest of the chapter is not
discussed in detail.
AsaiJ.ga indicates that the sutra's third chapter is concerned with Bodhisattvas
on the level of engagement through belief (mas pas spyod pa' i sa, adhimukticarya-
bhami) who, like the non-Buddhists discussed in the second chapter, are unable to
understand the ultimate due to mental obscurations. They do not properly under-
stand imputations or reasonings and "are estranged from sutras of definitive mean-
ing". This appears to mean that they cling to sutras of interpretable meaning while
distancing themselves from sutras that contain Buddha's definitive teachings. As a
result, they understand what is unimportant but fail to grasp what is important, and
this leads them to create confused and mistaken doctrinal formulations regarding the
ultimate. They fail to understand the Sarrzdhinirmacana's teaching that the ultimate
is "a character that transcends sameness and difference", and as a result they pro-
POund doctrines that are at variance with Buddha's definitive instructions concern-
ing the ultimate (which are presumably those contained in the SarruJ,hinirmocana).
10
Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
The discussion of chapter four of the siitra is extremely brief. Asailga charac-
terizes the teachings of the chapter in terms of three kinds of "boastful pride"
(mngon pa'i nga rgyaZ, abhimlina) and then divides the chapter into three parts,
each of which refers to a particular aspect. The topic of boastful pride is an impor-
tant one in the sutra, since it is said to be one of the primary obstacles to direct,
intuitive understanding of the ultimate.
Chapter five of the sutra focuses on the question of why Buddha describes cer-
tain Bodhisattvas as "wise with respect to the secrets of mind, sentience, and con-
sciousness". The Bhlifja divides the fifth chapter into discussions of five types of
obscuration with respect to the secrets of mind. It then briefly discusses the concept
of "basis-consciousness" (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, liZaya-vijiilina), one of the
most important doctrinal innovations of the Yogacara school. The Bhlifja's dis-
cussion mainly focuses on an objection that is often made to this doctrine, that the
basis-consciousness is equivalent to the Hindu litman, which is said to be eternal,
unchanging, and pure consciousness. Asailga replies that the basis-consciousness
cannot be equated with the litman because it is changing from moment to moment
and has no essence apart from the seeds that comprise it. Every mental event de-
posits a concordant seed in the basis-consciousness (for example, if one is angry,
this creates a concordant seed which is deposited in the continuum of the basis-con-
sciousness and which will predispose one toward anger in the future). Since, the
Bhli.yya argues, there is no basis-consciousness apart from these seeds, and since its
constitution is continually changing in accordance with the production of new
seeds, it is completely different from the litman.
The sixth chapter of the sutra begins with a question by the Bodhisattva
GUI)ak:ara, who asks Buddha why he designates some Bodhisattvas as being "wise
with respect to the character of phenomena". Buddha answers by indicating that
there are three characters of phenomena and that Bodhisattvas who fully apprehend
this teaching merit that designation. Each of these characters is a particular qUality in
terms of which phenomena may be viewed, a property that defines phenomena in a
particular way. These are: (1) the imputational character (kun brtags pa'i mtshan
nyid, which includes ideas falsely attributed to phenomena;
(2) the other-dependent character (gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid, paratantra-
the quality that phenomena have of being produced through the power of
causes and conditions external to themselves (rather than by their own nature or
necessarily); and (3) the thoroughly established character (yongs su grub pa'i
ASaliga's Arya-sarruJhinirmocana-bhliD'a 11
mtshan nyid, which the sutta equates with the ultimate.
This character is said to be the absence of the imputations that are mistakenly super-
imposed onto the other-dependent character, and it is also said to be the fmal nature
of phenomena. Asailga states that the discussion of these characters in the sutta can
be characterized according to six instructional purposes. As he develops this idea,
Buddha is said to have taught these three characters in order to benefit Bodhisattvas
in six ways, and each successive part of the chapter is said to lead them to a higher
level of understanding, culminating in a description of how to attain the state of an
"exalted knower of all aspects" (rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa, sarvlikllra-jfilina).
Surprisingly, although the seventh chapter of the sutta is one of the most im-
portant texts for Buddhist hermeneutics, the barely mentions any of the
statements of the sutta that are relevant to this topic. In the sutta, the Bodhisattva
Paramarthasamudgata begins by questioning Buddha about some types of state-
ments that he had made previously which conflict with certain statements made on
other occasions. Much of the discussion of the seventh chapter of the sutta is de-
voted to indicating how the doctrinal conflicts can be overcome and to providing
rules in terms of which Buddhist exegetes may resolve similar problems. Chapter
seven of the Bhli:[Ya indicates that the teachings of the seventh chapter of the sutta
serve as counteragents to four kinds of mistaken conceptions, and it divides Bud-
dha's intended audience into five categories, each of which is characterized by the
level of belief of its members.
Chapter eight of the sutta contains a seminal discussion of the doctrine of
"cognition-only" (rnam par rig pa tsam, vijfzapti-matra), in which Buddha tells the
Bodhisattva Maitteya that the things perceived in ordinary perception are images of
mind and are "cognition-only". This discussion is one of the seminal statements of
Buddhist idealism, and its ramifications are still being debated today in Tibetan
monastic colleges, but the Bhli:rYa does not even mention it, perhaps because the
author thought that the sutta's statements are unequivocal and do not require further
commentary. The Bhli:[Ya states that in the eighth chapter Buddha teaches his audi-
ence about yoga in six ways, and Asailga divides and the chapter into six parts in
accordance with this division. His comments indicate that he that Buddha's
purpose in this chapter is primarily therapeutic. He states that particular statements
in the chapter are directed toward certain mental obscurations and that Buddha
teaches as he does in order to lead his followers toward deeper understanding
12 Two Commentaries on the Saf!!dhinirmocana-sutra
through yogic practice. Buddha then tells them how they can preserve the insight
they gain and maintain a high level of enthusiasm for meditative practice.
The ninth chapter of the sutra focuses on the perfections (pha rol tu phyin pa,
patamita) and the Bodhisattva levels (sa, bhami). The states that the em-
phasis of the chapter is on the training by means of which the perfections are devel-
oped and how this relates to the levels. Asariga states that the sutra presents an
analysis of things that are inimical to cultivation of the perfections, along with dis-
cussions of meditative practices that counteract them. The purpose of this meditative
training is twofold: (1) by developing the perfections, one progresses in merit and
wisdom, overcomes mental obstructions and faults, and thus accomplishes one's
own welfare, and (2) this development in turn enables one to work for the benefit of
others and help them to reach their own spiritual goals.
Although the tenth chapter is one of the longer parts of the sutra and contains a
discussion of the nature and characteristics of Buddhahood (which is the final goal
of Mahayana practice), has only a brief summary. Asariga states that in
this chapter Buddha's teachings serve as antidotes to misconceptions concerning the
nature of the bodies of a Buddha. He adds that all the teachings of the Tripi!aka
serve this function. This is followed by a question and answer concerning "imputa-
tion of what is not real" (yang dag pa rna yin pa kun tu rtogs pa, abhata-parikal-
pa), which seems out of place in this text, since the term does not occur either in the
tenth chapter of the Saf!!dhinirmocana or anywhere else in the sutra. The
divides this into eight categories and then provides short explanations of these and
further divisions. The text ends with a quotation from an unnamed source (which is
not the Saf!!dhinirmocana) which does not seem to have any connection with any
part of the Saf!!dhinirmocana.
This section seems rather out of place in the commentary, and I have not been
able to identify any part of the sutra to which it could intelligibly be connected. It is
also odd that this follows a very abbreviated discussion of an important and lengthy
chapter and that this discussion fails to mention many of the important issues raised
in that chapter.
The section appears to have been tacked on to the perhaps by a later
redactor. It could also be the case that the whole text is a series of notes on the
Saf!!dhinirmocana-sutra and that the discussion moved on to issues not directly
addressed in the sutra. In any case, it is difficult to see how this section could be a
commentary on the Saf!!dhinirmocana.
Asanga's Arya-smruJhinirmocana-bha:fYa 13
The final colophon states that the Bha:fYa was composed by Asanga and that it
was translated by the Indian masters Jinamitra and Snendrabodhi, along with the
Tibetan translator Ye shes sde in response to a request. It does not indicate who
made the request or the nature of the request, nor does it give any indication of the
place and date of the translation.
3. The Authorship of the Text
Anyone who studies a text attributed to a major Indian author like Asanga is im-
mediately confronted by the problem of authorship. Indian literature is replete with
texts attributed to important thinkers, many of doubtful authenticity, and this is par-
ticularly true with respect to Asanga. Unfortunately, the itself provides few
clues that can be used in determining whether or not Asanga was its author. It
mainly summarizes portions of the sutra and divides it into topical sections, and the
commentary contains few statements on distinctively Yogacara doctrines. The con-
cept of "basis-consciousness" (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, lilaya-vijoona), for ex-
ample, is only discussed briefly, and the sutra's statements concerning the doctrine
of "cognition-only" (rnam par rig pa tsam, vijfzapti-mlttra) are not even mentioned.
On the other hand, my study of this text has uncovered no statements that are
fundamentally at variance with other texts generally accepted as being authentically
Asangan, such as the Bodhisattvabhumi, Mahliyana-sa1!Lgraha, or Abhidharma-
samuccaya, and this in itself provides at least some basis for provisionally accept-
ing the traditional attribution of authorship to Asanga. In addition, the syntax and
style of the Tibetan translation mark the text as being clearly Indian, and the au-
thor's understanding and insights into the Sa1!Ldhinirmocana mark him as being
profoundly familiar with its doctrines. For the purposes of the present study, it is
probably not of great importance whether or not Asanga was the author, since the
commentary can stand on its own as an important discussion of the Sa1!Ldhinirmo-
cana-sutra, and the author was clearly a competent scholar well-versed in the phi-
losophy of the sutra who provided a valuable guide to some of its important topics.
These factors alone provide ample reason to study and translate this text, and in the
absence of better textual or doctrinal evidence for determining authorship, there is
no compelling reason to reject the traditional attribution of authorship to Asanga.
Another discussion of the question of the text's authorship that should be men-
tioned in this context is found in Tsong kha pa's Essence of the Good
14 Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
(Legs bshad snying po). Because of the fact that the Compendium of Ascertain-
ments (viniscaya-sa1'(!graha1}!, rnam par gtan la dbab pa'i bsdu ba, which is ac-
cepted in Tibetan traditions as being authentically AsaIigan) quotes most of the
Sa1'(!dhinirmocana and comments on it, Tsong kha pa contends that the composition
of a separate commentary on the sutra would have been redundant, since AsaIiga
had already "extensively commented" on it He adds that taking this to be a work by
AsaIiga indicates "a great absence of analysis."1 He states:
In his Compendium [of Ascertainments], AsaIiga quotes, except for the
introductory chapter of the Sa1'(!dhinirmocana, most of the remaining
chapters and settles well the difficult points; hence, there also does not
appear to be any need for this master's composing a separate
commentary.2
In his commentary on the difficult points of Tsong kha pa's text, Dpal 'byor lhun
grub echoes the same thought and adds that another reason to discount this com-
mentary as being a work of AsaIiga's is that it conflicts with his other works, but he
does not elaborate on his reason(s) for thinking thiS.3
Alex Wayman thinks that the commentary to which Tsong kha pa is referring is
the Arya-sa1'(!dhinirmocana-bharya,4 but if we look closely at Tsong kha pa's ar-
guments it is clear that the commentary he is discussing and the are different
works. There are several reasons that lead to this conclusion: firstly, Tsong kha pa
quotes a passage from the commentary he is discussing that is concerned with the
two truths (bden pa, satya) and the three natures (ngo bo nyid, svabhliva), but this
passage does not appear in any of the three versions of the that I have con-
ILegs bshad snying po, Sarnath edition, p. 43.
2Legs bshad snying po, Samath edition, p. 87. See also A khu blo gros rgya mtsho's Drang ba
dang nges pa'i don rnam par' byed pa' i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'gre/ rin chen
sgron me (Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982), p. 195.4, which mentions a short ten-page commen-
tary attributed to AsaIiga (which may be the Arya-sa1?1dhinirmocana-bhlirya, which comprises
eleven folios in the Sde dge edition of the Bstan 'gyur). A khu bl0 gros rgya mtsho contends that
the attribution of this commentary to AsaIiga is incorrect
3Dpal 'byor lhun grub, Legs bshad snying po'i dka' 'gre/ bstan pa'i sgron me (Buxaduar: Sera
Monastery, 1968), pp. 44.7-46.7.
4Alex Wayman, Analysis of the Srlivakabhumi Manuscript (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1961), p. 34: "It is plain that Tsoil-kha-pa refers to the on the Sa1?1dhi-
nirmocanasutra attributed to AsaIiga."
Asariga' s 15
suIted,! nor is there any passage that remotely resembles it Secondly, Tsong kha pa
states that the commentary he is discussing quotes DharmakIrti's PramliIJa-
viniscaya (which would refute the contention that Asailga could have written the
commentary, since he lived before Dharmakirti), but this citation is also not found
in the B hlifYa. Thirdly, Tsong kha pa refers to the commentary he is discussing as a
"great commentary" (' grel chen),2 but the BhlifYa comprises only eleven folios in
the Sde dge edition of the Bstan 'gyur, and so it is highly unlikely that it would be
referred to as a "great commentary" since Tsong kha pa reserves this term for ex-
tensive commentaries.
The key to discovering the identity of the commentary to which Tsong kha pa
is referring lies in Bu ston's Catalogue of Dharma Translations (Chos bsgyur
dkar chag),3 which indicates that the Arya-sa'!1dhinirmocana-sutrasya-vylikhylina
(' phags pa dgongs pa nges par' grel pa' i mdo'i rnam par bshad pa; attributed to
Byang chub rdzu 'phrul in the Sde dge edition of the Bstan 'gyur) is thought by one
(unnamed) scholar to have been composed by Asailga, but Bu ston thinks that this
attribution is incorrect. One of the reasons that Bu ston gives for this assertion is
that the commentary cites Dharmakirti's PramlilJaViniscaya (tshad mam nges),
and this is also one of Tsong kha pa' s reasons for denying the attribution of author-
ship to Asailga. Also, Bu ston refers to this text as a "great commentary" (' grel pa
chen po), which is a further indication that the text to which both he and Tsong kha
pa are referring is the commentary attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul in the Sde
dgeBstan 'gyur, rather than the one attributed to Asailga.
4
is too short
!These are the Peking edition, the Sde dge edition, and the excerpts included in Lamotte's version
of the Sa1flllhinirmocana-sutra.
2Legs bshad snying po, p. 43.4.
3Putun buklcyoshi, ed. NISmOKA Soshu, Tokyo Daigaku Bungakubu Bunka Koryu Kenkyu
shisetsu Kenkyu Kiyo 4 (1980), pp. 61-92; 5 (1981), pp; 43-94; 6 (1983), pp. 47-201; see
especially p. 55.7-15. See also: Ernst Steinkellner, ''Who Is Byait chub rdzu 'phrul?" Berliner
Ind%gische Studien, 1989, pp. 229-51.
4In his commentary on the Legs bshad snying po (entitledDrang nges rnam 'byed kyi zin bris zab
don gsa/ ba'i sgi-on me; Mysare: Sera Byes Monastery, n.d., p. 29b.4), Ser shul dge bshes Blo
bzang phun tshogs refers to Bu ston's discussion of the commentary attributed to Asailga
(although he incorrectly identifies the text in which the discussion is found as the Chos 'byung
instead of the Chos bsgyur dkar chag; there is no mention of this problem in the Chos 'byung's
discussion of Asailga's works in Obermiller;s translation: History of Buddhism by Bu-ston;
Heidelberg, 1931, p. 140), and indicates that the text to which Tsang kha pa is referring is the one
16 Two Commentaries on the Sa"f(ldhinirmocana-sutra
to be considered a "great commentary", "and its discussion of the sutra is rather
sketchy in comparison to the commentaries of Wonch'uk and Byang chub rdzu
'phrul in that it skips over many important points in the sutra. The only texts in the
Bstan 'gyur that would qualify as "great commentaries" on the Sa"f(ldhinirmocana
are the works of Wonch'uk (almost three volumes in the Sde dge edition) and
Byang chub rdzu 'phrul (most of two volumes in Sde dge), which are by far the
largest and most comprehensive extant commentaries on the sutra. Since Wonch'uk
cites many post-Asanga Indian authors (such as Asvabhava and Sthiramati), as well
as Chinese authors such as Hsiian-tsang, no Tibetan scholar would have attributed
his commentary to Asanga, which leads to the conclusion that the "great commen-
tary" attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul in the Sde dge edition (no author is men-
tioned in the Peking edition) must be the one to which Tsong kha pa is referring.
Although it seems clear that Tsong kha pa's arguments specifically refer to the
commentary attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul in the Sde dge edition of the
Bstan 'gyur rather than to the h l i ~ a , two of Tsong kha pa's points still need to be
considered in relation to the latter text: (1) that Asailga had already "extensively
commented" on the Sa"f(ldhinirmocana in the Viniscaya-sa"f(lgrahmJ-z and that (2)
composing a second commentary would have been redundant. With regard to the
first point, although the Viniscaya quotes most of the sutra and comments on each
chapter, these comments are very terse (generally one to three lines), and the total
commentary on the text would only flll about three pages, thus making it the short-
est extant commentary on the Sa"f(ldhinirmocana. The fact that the Viniscaya quotes
the Sa"f(ldhinirmocana extensively does not entail that it has commented on it ex-
tensively, and so this by itself is not sufficient reason to reject the attribution of this
work to Asanga. Also, the comments found in the Vini1caya are only short sum-
maries of the main ideas of each chapter and, because of their brevity, necessarily
ignore many important points in each chapter, and so it can hardly be argued that
that Bu ston thinks was actually composed by Cog ru Klu'i rgyal mtshan, i.e., the Arya-
sarru!hinirmoeana-sutrasya-vylikhylina ('phags pa dgongs pa nges par' grel pa'i mdo'i rnam par
bshad pa). This also seems to be the text to which A khu blo gros rgya mtsho (Drang ba dang
nges pa' i don rnam par 'byed pa' i bstan beos legs bshad snying po' i dka' 'grel rin chen sgron me;
Delhi: Kesang Thabkhes, 1982, p. 195.4) refers to when he identifies the commentary under
discussion as a commentary in two volumes. This could not be the Bhlirya, which is only eleven
folios in the Sde dge edition of the Bstan 'gyur; the Arya-sarruihinirmoeana-sutrasya-vylikhylina is
the only two-volume commentary on the Sarruihinirmocana in the Bstan 'gyur.
Asanga's Arya-sarrzdhinirmocana-bhlifYa 17
this section of the Viniscaya extensively comments on the sutra and "settles well the
difficult points".
It should be noted, however, that Tsong kha pa's assertion most likely is not
that the comparatively short section of the Viniscaya in which the sutra is exten-
sively quoted settles well the difficult points of the sutra, but rather that the author
does this throughout the whole text of the Viniscaya. If we examine this text, how-
ever, there is a good deal of evidence against this contention. In the Peking edition,
the Viniscaya comprises a total of 576 pages, and aside from the section in which
the Sa1'(ldhinirmocana is quoted (vol. 111, pp. 83b.5-107d.7) there are a total of
111 quotes of Buddha's statements or of sutras.Of these, I could only identify two
as corresponding to lines in the Sa1'(ldhinirmocana. These two occur on p. 71b.8
and p. 71c.7 of the Viniscaya, in a section that quotes a number of questionsdi-
rected at Buddha (apparently from various sutras) asking of what he was thinking
when he made certain statements. The two quotes from the Sa1'(ldhinirmocana are:
(1) "of what was the Bhagavan thinking when he said, 'All phenomena are without
entityness"';1 and (2) "of what was the Bhagavan thinking when he said, 'All
phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally in a
state of nirvilI).a"?
These two questions are part of one extended question asked by the Bodhisat-
tva Paramarthasamudgata near the beginning of chapter seven of the Sa1'(ldhinirmo-
cana.
3
The Viniscaya does not discuss these in detail, but only gives short explana-
tions of the import of the questions. Regarding the first, the text states: "[Buddha]
said this with respect to this and that [phenomenon] for the benefit of trainees,
thinking of the three types of non-entitynesses: non-entitynesses in terms of char-
acter, non-entitynesses in terms of production, and ultimate non-entitynesses".4
After quoting the second part of the question, the Viniscaya comments: "[Buddha]
IThe Tibetan text reads: beom ldan' das kyis ji las dgongs nas ehos thams cad ngo bo nyid med
pa zhes gsungs.
1be Tibetan text reads: beom ldan 'das kyis ji las dgongs nas ehos thams cad rna skyes pa dang
rna 'gags pa dang gzod rna nas zm ba dang rang bzhin gyis yongs su my a ngan las' das pa zhes
gsungs.
3Th'
IS passage is found in the Sde dge edition CD) p. 32.3; and Stog Palace edition (Stog) p. 46.5.
4The text reads:.' dul ba'i dbang gis de dang der ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum las
dgongs nas gsungs te I mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid dang skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa
nyid dang I don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid do.
18 Two Commentaries on the Sarp.dhinirmocana-sutra
said this thinking just of non-entitynesses in tenus of character".1 The Viniscaya
then goes on to cite a number of similar questions, apparently from other siltras, but
does not again discuss the Sarp.dhinirmocana until the beginning of the section in
which it is quoted extensively (peking p. 83b.5).
Aside from these two instances, I have found no other passages in the Vinis-
caya in which statements from Buddha or a siltra are quoted that correspond to pas-
sages in the Sarp.dhininnocana (aside from the section in which most of the siltra is
quoted), nor have I seen any other places where the Sarp.dhininnocana is mentioned
by name, although other works are mentioned by name.
Returning to our previous point, it would be strange that the Viniscaya does not
even mention the Sarp.dhininnocana or any passage from it for the first 331 pages if
it is extensively commenting on the Sarp.dhininnocana and settling well its difficult
points (as Tsong kha pa contends). Moreover, there are over one hundred quotes
from siltras in this section of the Vini.1caya, and if the Sarp.dhinirmocana is an im-
portant topic of discussion there would seem to be no good reason to neglect to
mention it or quote from it.
In fairness to Tsong kha pa, it should be mentioned that the arguments I have
presented are mainly circumstantial and that his main contention is that the Vinis-
caya comments on the Sarp.dhinirmocana and settles well its difficult points, not
that it quotes the siltra. To evaluate the merits of Tsong kha pa's contention fully, it
would be necessary to study the Viniscaya comprehensively, comparing its thought
with that of the Sarp.dhinirmocana to determine whether or not his ideas can be
supported by looking at the text as a whole. Given the size of the Vini.1caya, this
would be a massive undertaking, and such a task lies outside the scope of the pre-
sent study, which is primarily concerned with.the
Since the Vini.1caya only specifically refers to the Sarp.dhinirmocana in the
places cited above and mainly quotes other texts, it would be a monumental task to
study the whole of the ViniJcaya to determine whether or not it is implicitly refer-
ring to the siltra in other places.
2
However, a comparison of the section of the
IThe text reads: mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kho na las dgongs te gsungs so.
problems are compounded by the fact that both texts were originally written in Sanskrit
but now only exist in Tibetan translations. Given this fact, any analysis of grammar, vocabulary,
syntax, etc. is severely hampered, since differences might only reflect peculiarities of individual
translation styles.
Asatiga's Arya-saf!Ulhinirmocana-bhaD'a 19
Viniscaya that quotes and explicitly discusses the sutra with the h a ~ y a could pro-
vide a useful starting point for a discussion of the question of whether or not the
two texts could have been written by the same author.
According to the position of Tsong kha pa cited above, there would be no need
for Asariga to compose a commentary on the sutra in addition to the Viniscaya, and
so according to this principle the attribution of authorship of the Bhl4ya to Asariga
should be rejected. As we have seen above, an examination of the sources cited by
the Viniscaya provides little evidence to support Tsong kha pa's claim, and so a
comparison of the section of the Viniscaya that explicitly discusses the sutra with
corresponding portions of the BhaD'a could provide clues as to whether or not the
texts are in conflict in terms of how they comment on the sutra. If there were impor-
tant doctrinal differences between the ViniCaya and the h a ~ a , this would prob-
ably be sufficient reason to decide that they were not written by the same author, but
when one compares the two texts one fmds a number of similarities. For instance,
in both works the author begins with a statement that the first chapters of the sutra
discuss five characteristics of the ultimate, that it is: (1) an inexpressible character;
(2) a non-dual character; (3) a character that completely transcends the sphere of ar-
gumentation; (4) a character that completely transcends difference or non-difference;
and (5) a character that is everywhere of one taste.! At the beginning of their dis-
cussions of the second chapter of the sutra, both also indicate that it discusses the
ultimate in terms of its relation to argumentation (rtog ge, tarka), and their discus-
sions begin with the statement that the sutra indicates that the ultimate is everywhere
of one taste?
!The Tibetan of the texts reads as follows: Vinitcaya (peking vol. 110, p. 83b): don dam pa ni
mtshan nyid lnga dang ldan pa yin te I brjod du med pa'i mtshan nyid dang I gnyis su med pa'i
mtshan nyid dang I rtog ge'i spyod yullas yang dag par' das pa'i mtshan nyid dang I tha dad pa
dang I eha dad pa rna yin pa nyid las yang dag par' das pa' i mtshan nyid dang I thams cad du ro
gcig pa'i mtshan nyid do.
B h a ~ y a (Sde dge #3981, p. 5.2) reads: de la bcom ldan 'das kyis don dam pa'i mtshan nyid
lnga bstan ste I don dam pa'i mtshan nyid lnga ni I brjod du med pa'i mtshannyid dang I gnyis
su med pa' i mtshan nyid dang I rtog ge'i spyod yullas yang dag par' das pa' i mtshan nyid dang I
gzhan dang gzhan ma yin pa las yang dag par' das pa' i mtshan nyid dang I thams cad du ro gcig
pa'i mtshan nyid do. Except for the use of gzhan dang gzhan rna yin pa in the h a ~ a and tha dad
pa dang tha dad pa rna yin pa in the ViniScaya, the wording is nearly identical.
2compare Viniscaya p. 84b.2: de la rto g ge'i spyod yullas yang dag par ' das pa' i mtshan nyid ni;
and B h a ~ a p. 9.6: gnyis pa ni rtog ge la brten nas don dam par spyod pa.
20
Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
The Vinifcaya prefaces its citation of the frfth chapter with the statement that it
is concerned with "the character of mind" (sems kyi mtshan nyid,
and the begins its discussion by stating that the chapter is concerned with
"the secrets of mind" (sems kyi gsang ba, citta-guhya).l
At the beginning of chapter six, both texts indicate that this chapter focuses on
"the character of phenomena" (chos kyi mtshan nyid, The Vinis-
caya begins chapter seven by stating that this chapter is concerned with. "the charac-
ters of non-entitynesses of phenomena" (chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i
mtshan nyid, dharmiinlim and the the states that the
main topic is "the teaching o{the three non-entitynesses that are antidotes to four
kinds of mistaken conceptions with respect to objects."3
The Viniscaya begins chapter eight with the statement that it is concerned with
"the path of calming (zhi gnas, samatha) and insight (lhag mthong, vipafyanli) that
are subsumed by yoga," and the the begins its discussion of the chapter by
stating that it is concerned with "the path of yoga in terms of six aspects.'>!
Chapter nine of the Vini.scaya begins with the statement that the chapter
"teaches in accordance with the divisions of the vehicle, beginning with the presen-
tation of the vehicle," and the the states that in this chapter "questions and
answers - beginning with what should be known with respect to completing the
perfections - are expressed, because the perfections are included within the Great
Vehicle."s Finally, the citation of the tenth chapter of the Vini.scaya begins with the
statement that this chapter is "a delineation that establishes the activities of Tatha-
1 ViniScaya p. 87b.4 reads: de la sems kyi mtshan nyid ni; Bhii!ya p. 12.4 reads: Inga pa la ni
sems kyi gsang ba la shin tu rmangs pa rnam pa gsum ste.
2Viniscaya p. 88b.2 reads: de la coos rnams kyi mtshan nyid ni. p. 13.3 reads: drug pa la
ni dgos pa drug dang Idan pa'icOOs kyi mtshan nyid bstan teo
3ViniScaya p. 89b.2: de la chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa'i mtshan nyid ni; Bhii!ya p. 14.2:
bdun pa la ni don la log par rtog pa rnam pa bzhi'i gnyen po ngo bo nyid med pa nyid gsum
bstan pa ' di rna brjod na.
4Viniscaya p. 93d.2: coos gdags rnam par dgod pa las brtsams nas I rnal 'byor gyis yongs su
bsdus pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi lam gyi rab tu dbye ba ni; Bhii!ya p. 15.4: brgyad pa la
ni rnam pa drug gis rnal 'byor gyi lam bstan te.
sViniScaya p. 99d.2: theg pa rnampar bzhag pa las brtsams nas theg pa'i rnampar dbye baji Ita
ba bzhin bstan pa ni; p. 18.3: dgu pa la ni pha rol tu phyin pa yongs su rdzogs pa la
mkhas par bya la brtsams nas 'dri ba dang Ian brjod de I pha rol tu phyin pa rnams theg pa chen
pos bsdus pa'i phyir ro.
Asanga's Arya-sarrzdhinirmocana-bhliV'a 21
gatas, beginning with just the presentation of the vehicles," and the Bhiifya states
that the chapter indicates the "antidotes to obscurations with respect to the bodies of
Tathagatas."l
With the exception of the last chapter, the statements of both texts are remark-
ably similar, and they often use the same words to indicate the focus of the chapters.
While this may not prove that the same person wrote both works, it does indicate
that there are no important differences in the views presented in the two texts. To
take this a step farther, the fact that both texts preface their discussions of the chap-
ters with similar statements fits with the idea that both were written by the same
author, since Asa.iJ.ga could have expanded on his brief comments from the Vinif-
caya when he wrote the BhliV'a, or perhaps he condensed his ideas from the
ya when he wrote the Vinifcaya.
z
In any case, Tsong kha pa's contention that
Asa.iJ.ga would not have written a separate commentary in addition to the Vinifcaya
does not seem to be supported by a comparison of the portion of the text that quotes
the siitra and the Bhli.pla.
Similarities between these texts are also found in their formats. They are similar
to each other (and different from the other commentaries on the siitra found in the
Tibetan canon) in that they are mainly "meaning commentaries." This means that
they summarize the meaning of passages and sections, while the other commen-
taries on the Sa1!ldhinirmocana are mainly "word commentaries" which quote
terms, phrases, and passages and then comment on them. The comments of the
Vinifcaya are limited to short prefatory statements before the citation of each chapter
that indicate the central. meaning of the chapter, and the Blzli.rya begins its discussion
of each chapter with a similar statement concerning the focus of the chapter and then
generally provides overviews of smaller sections: Many of these overviews take the
?ViniSeaya p. l04c.S: theg pa rnam par gzhag pa kho na las brtsams nas de bzhin gshegs pa'i bya
ba bsgrub pa'i rab tu dbye ba ni; BhiiiYa p. 21.1: beu pa la ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i sku la shin tu
nnongs pa rnams kyi gnyen por ni.
ZIt should be noted that these considerations would be rendered moot if one accepts Lambert
Schmithausen's contentions that the ViniSeaya is a composite work containing various strata of
authorship. See, for instance, his Alayavijiilina (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist
Studies, 1987) and Der Nirvli1)a-Absehnitt in der ViniSeayasal[1graha1)i der
(Wien: VerOffentlichungen der Komission flk Sprachen und Kulturen Siid- und Ostasiens, Heft 8),
1969
22 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
fonn of divisions of the thought of the section, and these divisions are then some-
times explained individually, but more often are simply stated and left unexplained.
4. Asanga: His Life and Times
As is true of any important Buddhist figure, the events of Asanga's life are shroud-
ed in myth and legend. There is no reliable historical account of his life, since all
such reports are hagiographical and contain numerous stories of wondrous events
and miraculous occurrences. Contemporary scholarly opinion generally places him
in the third of fourth centuries A.D., but beyond that there is little about his life that
can be determined with any confidence.
i
iFor discussions of his dates, see: A.K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1970), pp. 435-7; NAKAMURA Hajime, Indian Buddhism: A Survey With Bibliographical
Notes (Hirakata: Kufs Publications, 1980), p. 264, where he places Asailga at 310-390 A.D.; Alex
Wayman, Analysis of the Sravakabhumi Manuscript (Berkeley, 1961), pp. 19-46; and Sylvain
Levi, Mahi'iyana-sutrallJl!7kara (paris, 1911), pp. 1-7, where he provides a biography of Asailga that
is drawn from the biographies ofParamartha, Hsiian-tsang, and Taranatha
The dates of his brother Vasubandhu have been the subject of much scholarly speculation. A
few of the works that deal with the question of his dates are: Stefan Anacker, Seven Works of
Vasubandhu (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984). and Vasubandhu: Three Aspects (ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin), 1969; D.R. Bhandarkar, "Who Was the Patron of
Vasubandhu?", lA, 1912, pp. 1-3; Erich Frauwallner, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the
Law Vasubandhu, (Rome: Serie Orientale Roma, 1951); FUNAHASm Naoya, "The Latikitvatara-
sutra and the Time of Vasubandhu", IBK #20.1, 1971, pp. 321-326; Padmanabh Jaini, "On the
theory of the two Vasubandhus", BSOAS #21, 1958, pp. 48-53; summarized in Proceedings of
the International Conference of Orientalists, #24, Munich, 1957, vol. 1, pp. 552-554; T. Kimura,
"The Date of Vasubandhu Seen from the Abhidharmakosa", Buddhist Studies in Honor of Charles
Lanman (Cambridge, MA, 1929), pp. 89-92; Marek Mejor, "A Contribution to the Biography of
Vasubandhu from Tibetan Sources", TBS vol. 2, 1984, pp. 159-174; G. Ono, "The Date of
Vasubandhu seen from the History of Buddhist Philosophy", in Buddhist Studies in Honor of
Charles Lanman (Cambridge, MA, 1929), pp. 93-94; N1lel Peri, "A Propos de la date de
Vasubandhu", BEFEO, XI, 1911, pp. 339-390; SAKURABE Hajime, "On Frauwallner's Dating
of Vasubandhu", IBK #1.1, 1952, pp. 202-208; Lambert Schmithausen, "Sautrantika-
Voraussetzungen in Vi'!1satika und Tri'!1sika", WZKSOA #11, 1967, pp. 109-136; and J.
Takakusu, "The Date of Vasubandhu", in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Lanman
(Cambridge, MA, 1929), pp. 78-83; "The Date of Vasubandhu 'in the Nine Hundred"', JRAS,
1914, pp. 1013-1016; "The Life of Vasu-bandhu by Paramartha", Toung Pao, ser. II, #5, pp.
269-296; reprint, EJ. Brill, Leyden, 1904; and "A Study ofParamartha's Life ofVasubandhu and
Asanga' s 23
This does not mean that the traditional accounts of his life should be simply
dismissed. Despite their obvious flaws in terms of historical accuracy, the tradi-
tional biographies may contain some kemals of historical facts, and whether or not
this is so they make interesting reading and tell an intriguing story about the life of a
major Buddhist thinker. They provide information about how Buddhists perceive
Asanga, how his life exemplifies Buddhist paradigms and values, and how Bud-
dhists have viewed the connections between his biography and his thought. The rest
of this section will be devoted to a brief encapsulation of the traditional biographies
of Asailga.
According to Tibetan tradition, Asailga's birth had been predicted in the Lalikii-
vatl1ra-sutra (Peking 775) and the MaiijuSrr-mula-tantra (Peking 162),1 and during
his lifetime he clearly defmed the Yogacara tenet system. In the Dge lugs pa school,
it is held that Sakyamuni Buddha taught four schools of tenets: the two HInayana
systems of and Sautrantika and the two Mahayana systems of
Madhyamaka and Yogacara, but the two Mahayana systems did not flourish during
his lifetime. Thus it was necessary for Nagarjuna and Asailga to open broad paths
for the chariots of these systems originally set forth by Buddha so that others could
follow them.
2
For this reason, they are referred to as "openers of the chariot ways"
(shing rta srol 'byed) in Tibetan traditions.
the Date of Vasubandhu", JRAS, 1905, pp. 33-53. Other references on this and related subjects
may be found in John Powers, The Yogacara School of Buddhism: A Bibliography (Metuchen,
NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1991).
lThe importance of their being prophecied is often mentioned in Dge lugs pa treatises: see, for
example, Legs bshad snying po, Sarnath edition, pp. 3-4. As Joe B. Wilson notes (in The
Meaning of Mind in the Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only, Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia, 1984, pp. 208-9), this idea is discussed by Gung thang dkon mchog bstan
pa'i sgron me in his Yid dang kun gzhi'i gnas rnam bshad pa mkhas pa'i 'jug mgog, in Gun than
gsun 'bum (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek, 1972), voL 2, p. 2a.2.
The passage from the Lankallatara-sutra in which Dge lugs pa exegetes think that ASaIiga's
birth was predicted can be found in P.L. Vaidya's edition (Dru:bhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967), p.
6.5; this is cited and discussed by Joe B. Wilson, The Meaning of Mind in the Mahayana
BUddhist Philosophy of Mind-Only, pp. 208-9. See also Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on
Emptiness, pp. 358-60 and Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice and Theory of
Tibetan Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1976, p. 51).
2See Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 357-60.
24 Two Commentaries on the Sarruihinirmocana-sutra
In traditional biographies, Asanga is said to have been a third level Bodhisat-
tva, I and Taranatha reports that in a previous life his mother had been a Buddhist
monk who was a devotee of Avalokitesvara who had hurt the feelings of another
monk while debating with him, and A valokiteSvara predicted that this would result
in repeated births as a woman.
2
During one of these births, as a Buddhist laywoman
named Prasannaslla, she gave birth to AsaIiga, Vasubandhu, and a third son named
Virificinivatsa, all of whom entered the Buddhist order. Taranatha reports that she
gave birth to two great Buddhist scholars (Asanga and Vasubandhu) as a result of
her prayer to Avalokitesvara that she give birth to boys who would help to restore
Buddhism in India
3
The traditional accounts agree that Asanga was the eldest of the three brothers,
Vasubandhu was the second, and that Virificinivatsa was the third. Taranatha re-
ports that PrasannasIla was a Brahman woman of the Kausika clan, but that the
birth of AsaIiga was the result of a union with a man, while the births of
her other two sons were the results of later unions with a Brahman.
4
The family
lived in the region of present-day Peshawar, in a village called in
Gandhara.
AsaIiga showed an early predeliction toward religious practice, and even as a
child went to the forest to meditate on teachings he received from a tantric teacher
named letari. He received monastic ordination at an early age and soon demonstrat-
ed an unusual memory and great intelligence. He fITst studied under Sarvastivada
teachers, and Paramartha reports that he studied the HInayana scriptures under an
arhat named and that he also read many Mahayana texts, including the Per-
lThis idea is mentioned in Meditation on Emptiness, p. 359, Taranatha's History of Buddhism in
India (tr. Lama Chimpa and A1aka Chattopadhyaya; Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies,
1970), p. 166, and Bu ston's History of Buddhism (tr. Eugene Obermiller), part I, p. 140.
Wonch'uk, however, refers to Asailga as a first level Bodhisattva who directly realized the
meditative stabilization (ting nge dzin. samlidhl) of "light of doctrine" (ehos lcyi snang ba) and
who directly perceived the face (or presence) of Maitreya and asked him to explain the Bodhisattva
levels (j.rya-gambhira-sa1!"1hinirmoeana-satra-pkli; 'phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par grel pa' i
mdo' i rgya eher grel pa; Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang,
1985, mdo grel, vol. ti [118], p. 52.6).
History of Buddhism. pp. 154-5.
3Ibid . pp. 155-6. The three-fold destruction of the Dharma in India at that time is described by
Bu ston. History of Buddhism. pp. 36-7.
4Ibid . pp. 155-6.
Asanga's Arya-sarp.dhinirmocana-bh.lifya 25
fection of Wisdom Sutras.! Unable to fathom their profound meaning, he sought
and received an initiation that began a search to find and receive teaching from the
coming Buddha, Maitreya.
2
He left his teacher and went alone to a cave on a mountain named Kukkuta-
pada, where he remained in meditative seclusion for twelve years. According to Bu
ston and Taranatha, he fIrst prayed to Maitreya and meditated for three years, but
without success.
3
As he was about to leave his cave and give up his spiritual quest
to fmd Maitreya, he noticed that some of the rocks outside his cave had been worn
smooth by the wings of birds who made their nests on the mountain. He decided
that if birds could gradually wear down rocks in this way, this was a sign that
through dilligent religious practice he could attain the diffIcult goal or gaining a
vision of Maitreya.
Thus, he re-entered his cave and renewed his meditation, but after three more
years had still not attained his goal. He again decided to give up his quest, but as he
left the cave he saw some stones that had been eroded by water and, taking this as a
sign that he should not despair, he returned to his cave and his meditation.
After three more years, however, he still felt that he had not made significant
progress, and again decided to renounce his quest As he left his cave he saw a man
who claimed to be making needles by rubbing iron with cotton and who showed
!This is reported in Paramartha's Life 0/ Vasubandhu, translated by J. Takakusu ("The Life of
Vasu-bandhu by Paramartha". T' oung Pao, ser. II, #5, 1904, pp. 269-296; reprint Leyden: EJ.
Brill, 1904). See also Alex Wayman, Analysis 0/ the Srtivakabhami Manuscript (Berkeley, 1961),
p.31.
2Maitreya (byams pa), in Buddhist mythology, is the future Buddha, who presently resides in
T ~ i t a in preparation for his last rebirth, in which he will be a fully actualized Buddha. At present
he is a tenth level Bodhisattva, and according to Wonch'uk (vol. thi [119], p. 174.2) he is called
"Love" (maitreya) "because his nature is endowed with love and compassion". Regarding this
Bodhisattva, see: Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., Maitreya; Princeton, 1986; Lewis
Lancaster, "Maitreya", in Encylopedia o/Religions,ed. Mircea Eliade(New York: Macmillan,
1987), pp. 136-141; SUOURO Shinjou, "On Maitreya", in Bukkyo Gaku, vol. 21, 1987, pp. 1-
28; and INAOAKI Hisao, "Haribhadra's Quotations from Jiliinagarbha's Anantamukhanirhtira-
dharaf}l!lka", in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization
(Emeryville, CA: Dharma Press, 1977), pp. 139-40, which discusses Haribhadra's etymology of
Maitreya'sname in the Abhisamaytilamkartiloka.
3
See Taranatha pp. 156-9 and Bu ston p. 138.
26 Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
Asariga some needles that he had made in this way. Asariga took this as another
indication that he should not give up his quest, and so he returned to his meditation.
He perservered for another three years, but after a total of twelve years of medi-
tation still had not attained his goal, and so he left his cave and went far away. As
he was coming to a town, he saw a dog whose body was being eaten by worms and
which was suffering horribly. He felt overwhelming compassion for the dog, but
realized that if he removed the worms from the dog's flesh then they would die, but
that if he did not then the dog would die. As a solution, he decided to cut off part of
his own flesh so that the worms would be attracted to it and would leave the dog,
and then he went into the town to buy a knife. He returned., knife in hand, but as he
was about to cut off his flesh, the dog transformed into the luminous form of
Maitreya. Asariga somewhat testily asked Maitreya why he had taken so long to
show himself, to which Maitreya replied that up to this point Asariga's mental ob-
structions had been too powerful for him to be able to perceive Maitreya's exalted
form. The combination of his twelve years of dilligent prac)ice and his intense com-
passion for the dog had fmally brought him to a point where Maitreya was visible
tohim.l
Maitreya went on to explain that he had been present in the cave with Asariga
during his twelve-year meditative retreat and showed him the stains on his robe
where Asariga had unknowingly thrown his garbage on him. He then informed
Asariga that he needed someone to expound Mahayana doctrine in the world, and
he brought Asariga to T u ~ i t a heaven, where according to some accounts he spent
six months, and according to others flfty-three years. During this time, Maitreya
extensively taught him the Mahayana doctrine, including the "Five Books of
Maitreya,"2 and Asariga quickly intuitively grasped the meaning of Maitreya's
teachings.
After his sojourn in T u ~ i t a he returned to India, where he began composing
commentaries on Maitreya's works as well as many independent treatises. Among
these were the Compendium of Ascertainments (vinikaya-sa1'Jlgraha1Jl, gtan la
dbab pa'i bsdu ba, a section of the voluminous Levels of Yogic Practice; yogliClira-
ISee Taranathapp.156-9.
2Jbese are: (1) Dharma-dhannata-vibhiiga; (2) Madhyanta-vibhiiga; (3) Mahiiyana-siltraJarpkiiTa; (4)
Abhisamayala'!lkara; and (5) Mahiiyanottara-tantra. See Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on
Emptiness, pp. 780-1.
Asmiga's Arya-sarp.dhinirmocana-bhiifya 27
bhami, mal' byor spyod pa' i sa), the Compendiwn of the Great Vehicle (mahttyii-
na-saf!lgraha, theg pa chen po'i bsdu ba), and the subject of the present study, a
commentary on the Saf!ldhinirmocana-sutra.! His writings and oral teachings,
along "with those of his brother Vasubandhu, became the main sources of a new
philosphical school, which later came to be known as Yogacara. His philosophical
insights and doctrinal innovations have had a profound impact on Mahayana
thought and practice for centuries, and the ramifications of his work are still debated
today in Tibetan Buddhist monastic colleges.
5. The Translation
The main text used in the following translation is the Sde dge text published by the
Karmapa Center in Delhi.
2
This has been compared to the Peking version of the
commentary (P #5481, vol. 104, pp. 1-7), and every quotation from the sutra has
been identified in notes. The pages in both the Sde dge and Stog Palace versions
3
have been given in order that anyone wishing to find the sutra passage in my forth-
coming critical edition of the Tibetan texts of the sutra may easily do SO.4 The page
numbers in brackets refer to the Karmapa Sde dge edition. I have mainly endeav-
ored to translate the text as literally as possible, but in a number of places the terse-
ness of the text required adding explanatory material in brackets or in notes. In all
IThis commentary (peking 5481, Sde dge 3981) was translated into Tibetan around A.D. 800 by
Jinamitra, Sllendrabodhi, and Ye shes sde, and is said to consist of 220 verses in the Lhan dkar
catalogue (number 534 according to the numbering of MarceJIe Lalou - see "Les Textes
Bouddhiques au temps du Roi Khri-srOIi.-lde-bcan", in fA #241, 1953, pp. 313-353) and Bu
ston's Coos bsgyur dkar chag (number 653 according to Nishioka's numbering). It is also
partially edited and translated by Lamotte (Sa1p.dhinirmocana-sutra, op. cit.). Portions of the
commentary are found in appendices at the end of some chapters in Lamotte's text
2Arya-sarrulhinirmocana-bhii!Ya (' phags pa dgongs pa nges par ' grel pa' i rnam par bshad pa; Delhi:
Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, Sde dge ti (118), pp. 1-
22; TOhoku #3981.
3The Sde dge edition referred to is: Delhi: Delhi Choedhey, vol. mdo sde ca; Tohoku
#106; the Stog Palace edition referred to is in The Tog Palace Edition of the Tibetan Kanjur; Leh:
Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978, vol. 63, pp. 1-160.
references to the Sde dge text are abbreviated as D, and the references to the Stog Palace text
are abbreviated as Stog. In my forthcoming critical edition, the two translations of which these are
representatives are arranged in parallel columns, with Stog on the left and Sde dge on the right.
28 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
cases these are clearly indicated, and hopefully they will be helpful in filling in some
of the gaps in the text.
,-
Translation of Asanga's
Explanation of the Superior StUra
Explaining the Thought

Homage to the Prince Mafijum.
Introduction to the Mahayana Stitra Explaining the Thought
With respect to [the passage,] "Thus have I heard ... all sentient beings":l The Bha-
gavan indicates that the ultimate character has five [aspects). The five [aspects] of
the ultimate character are: (1) it is an inexpressible character; (2) it is a non-dual
character; (3) it is a character that completely transcends the sphere of argumenta-
tion; (4) it is a character that completely transcends difference and non-difference;
and (5) it is a character that is everywhere of one taste. With respectto those [five
aspects]: viewing it as an inexpressible character and as a non-dual character is [de- .
scribed in the passage] in the Satra Explaining the Thought, "Bodhisattva Vidhivat-
pariprcchaka asked .... " To expand on this: you should know that the question is
[discussed] elsewhere.
2
lThis passage has been abridged. Most of the first three pages contain a lengthy quote from the
introduction to the sutra, which is unusual in that it is the only lengthy quotation iIi the text.
Other quotations only contain short phrases or words. Since the following discussion does
not discuss specillcs of the passage, it seemed appropriate to omit it.
2It is unclear what the author's meaning is in this sentence, since the text does not specillcally
discuss the question. He may be referring to another text, since is unlikely that he could mean that
this text discusses the question.
The placement of this passage is odd: he quotes the introduction at length and for the next
several pages will discuss it at some length, but the question he mentions comes after the
30 Two Commentaries on the Sarrulhinirmocana-sutra
You should know that the praise of the inestimable palace in the Sutra Explain-
ing the Thought is in eighteen parts: the two sentences [indicate] that it is (1) perfect
in terms of color; (2) perfect in terms of shape; (3) perfect in terms of measurement;
(4) perfect in terms of area; (5) perfect in terns of causes; (6) perfect in terms of
nature; (7) perfect in terms of its master; (8) perfect in terms of servants; (9) perfect
in terms of direction; (10) perfect in terms of resources; (11) perfect in terms of ac-
complishing activities; (12) perfect in terms of non-hilrmfulness; (13) perfect in
terms of being free of opponents; (14) a perfect abode; (15) perfect in terms of the
particulars of the master's abode; (16) perfect in terms of vehicle; (17) perfect in
terms of entrance; and (18) perfect in terms of basis.
The praise of the Buddha [6] is indicated by way of four parts: the accom-
plishment of one's own welfare due to the unsurpassed abandonments and exalted
wisdom of a Buddha; and the accomplishment of others' welfare due to the two,
exertion for oneself and others.
With respect to [the phrase, "The Bhagavan] - endowed with a mind of good
understanding ... ":! There is one part, because [Buddhas] understand with their
minds all of the varieties of existent things.
Alternatively, there are four parts, because: (1) a mind of good understanding is
not habituated to the signs of the internal and external sense spheres (skye mched,
ayatana); (2) a mind of good understanding with respect to profound meanings is
inclined toward the selflessness of phenomena; (3) a stainless mind of good under-
standing completely transcends the state of a Bodhisattva; and (4) an unsurpassed
mind of good understanding is undifferentiated among all Buddhas.
2
This is the ac-
complishment of one's own welfare due to unsurpassed exalted wisdom.
With respect to "understanding that is unobstructed realization'? there are two
parts, because [Buddhas] know the varieties of existents that are objects of
knowledge.
introduction and begins a new topic in the siitra, and so it is unclear why the author mentions it
now.
!D p. 3.4; Stog p. 5.4.
2In other words, all Buddhas are equally enlightened, and there are no differences in terms of depth
of understanding among them.
3D p. 3.5, A p. 6.4 read: sgrib pa med pa'i rtogs pa thugs su chud pa; Stog p. 5.6 reads: "having
full realization due to not possessing obstructions" (sgrib pa mi mnga' bas rtogs par thugs su
chudpa).
ASaliga' S 31
Alternatively, there are three kinds, because: (1) with respect to a realization
that does not have afflictive obstructions, that abandonment is also not diminshed in
the future, and so afflictions do notarise; (2) a realization that does not have ob-
structions, which is matured with respect to those [Le., afflictions] is posited as
being inconceivable; and (3) a realization that does not have the obstructions to
omniscience penetrates the sameness of exalted wisdom that is also unattached and
unobstructed.in the three times.
1
This is accomplishment of one's own welfare due
to unsurpassed abandonment.
With respect to [the phrase,] "endowed with bodies that enter into all worldly
realms'? there are three parts, because [Buddhas] work for the benefit of countless
sentient beings. Those bodies that enter [into all worldly realms] are indicated by
way of: (1) thought, (2) method, (3) non-affliction, and (4) entity.
With respect to that, thought is the eliminator of all doubts. Method [refers to]
activities that are indicated [in scripture], such as rebirth in the realm of and
so forth. [7] Non-affliction is just absence of affliction due to individually, unob-
structedly knowing mundane phenomena. Entity is just what does not arise from all
afflicted conceptions. This is accomplishment of others' welfare through applying
oneself to [helping] them.
With respect to [the phrase,] "having given rise to the wisdom of all Bodhi-
sattvas",
3
there are four parts, because exalted wisdoms of Bodhisattvas give rise to
their own exalted wisdoms. The arising of exalted wisdom is indicated by way of
three aspects: (1) assertion; (2) establishment; and (3) realization.
What is [the first] like an assertion? Because it is asserted that Bodhisattvas are
one with the truth body of Buddhification.
Why is [the second] like establishment? Because the non-difference between
exalted wisdoms of Tathagatas and abandonments is established.
Why is [the third] like realization? Because the state of those two is [character-
ized by] realization of suchness, the realm of truth (eMS kyi dbyings, dhanna-dha-
tu). That realization of the realm of truth is also superior to [realizations of] Hearers
lThese are: past, future, and present.
2D p. 3.6, A p. 6.6 read: 'jig rten gyi khams thams cad du zhugs pa'i sku dang loon pa; SlOg p.
6.1 reads: "endowed with bodies that pervade all worldly realms" ('jig rten gyi khams thams cad
du khYab pa' i sku dang Idan pa). .
3D p. 4.1; Stog p. 6.3.
32 Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
(nyan thos, sriivaka), because it surpasses [other realizations] due to [understand-
ing] the realm of truth. Hearers attain nirvliI.la, but that surpassing due [under-
standing] the realm of truth is said to extend to the limit of the realm of space.
For instance, even at the time of disintegration or at the time of formation [of
the universe,] space is not destroyed. Sirnilary, at the time of manifest, perfect en-
lightenment or at the time of completely attaining nirvliI.la, Buddha Bhagavans also
do not abide in cyclic existence or nirvliI.la.
From the point of view of collections of phenomena, there are also other divi-
sions. The perfections of Tathagatas are said to be of twenty-one kinds: (1) perfec-
tion of mind; (2) perfection of speech; (3) perfection of body; (4) perfection of
nirvliI.la without characteristics and of residence; (5) perfection with respect to ac-
quiring [good] qualities; (6) perfection with respect to questions that are taught in
scripture; (7) perfection in surpassing opponents; (8) perfection in purifying a
[Buddha] land, (9) perfection [8] of abode; (10) perfection of activities; (11) perfec-
tion in terms of emanations; (12) perfection in terms of teaching; (13) perfection in
terms of pursuing activities for [the sake of] sentient beings; (14) perfection in
terms of advice concerning omnipresent paths; (15) perfection in terms of non-af-
fliction with respect to helping and harming; (16) perfection in terms of basis; (17)
perfection in terms of non-discordance; (18) perfection in terms of sport by way of
miraculous displays; (19) perfection in terms of inexhaustible qualities; (20) perfec-
tion in terms of personal existence (bdag gi dngos po, iitma-bhiiva); and (21) per-
fection in terms of nirvliI.la.
With respect to those, perfection of residence has two aspects. As it is said: "In
this life, with respect to residing within emptiness, at that time [i.e., in the past] and
also now Ananda remains often in emptiness." This is because [such] residing in
individual investigation [involves] observing the world six times, day and night.
The praise of Hearers is due to [their] wisdom. That wisdom is also indicated
by way of thirteen kinds of perfections: (1) perfection in terms of non-duality; (2)
perfection in terms of thorough disciplining; (3) perfection in terms of praisewor-
thiness; (4) perfection in terms of height; (5) perfection in terms of size; (6) perfec-
tion in terms of following suitable paths; (7) perfection in terms of quickness; (8)
perfection in terms of going afar; (9) perfection in terms of going well; (10) perfec-
tion in terms of practice; (11) perfection in terms of pacification; (12) perfection in
terms of happiness when meeting [people]; (13) perfection in terms of empower-
ment; and the praise of Bodhisattvas is due to their abiding in a great state.
Asmiga's Arya-sarruJhinirmocana-bhiJDla 33
That abiding in a great state is said to be complete abandonment of nine kinds
of path-transgressions. The nine kinds of path-transgressions are: (1) paths that are
discordant with perfect enlightenment; (2) becoming soiled; (3) becoming [9] im-
peded; (4) wasting; (5) unhappiness; (6) fearfulness; (7) sectarianism; (8) non-reli-
giosity; (9)
The teaching of the five signs of the ultimate is as follows: The Perfection of
Wisdom Chapter says that [the ultimate] is a quality that is respectively: (1) incon-
ceivable; (2) incomparable; (3) immeasurable; (4) incalculable; and (5) equal to the
unequalled. Non-duality and inexpressibility are said to be the antidotes to obscura-
tion with respect to scriptures and realizations that lack superimposition and
deprecation.
Because prior to naming awareness [of that name] does not exist; [and] because
[names] are manifold and are not definite,! non-duality is established. They are
simply terms imputed by the Teacher [i.e., Buddha] and are conventions of various
conceptual consciousnesses. Because [Buddha] designated the three natures by way
of: (1) a conventional consciousness that is not thoroughly established and is pre-
sent in the continuums of Superiors; (2) an ultimate consciousness; and (3) a per-
ception, you should know that the inexpressible character is the main [character].
[The phrase,] "a term that is designated by the Teacher'? [refers to Buddha's]
designating the imputational nature (kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid, parikalpa-
svabhliva). [The phrase,] "an expression is also not something that is without
thingness",3 designates the other-dependent [nature] (gzhan gyi dbang [gi ngo bo
nyid],paratantra[-svabhliva]). [The phrase, "Superiors] perfectly realize the inex-
pressible",4 designates the thoroughly established [nature] (yongs su grub [pa'i ngo
bo nyid], -svabhava]). [The phrase,] "emphatically apprehend'',5
[indicates that] they become entrenched after having emphatically apprehended their
!In other words,there are many different names for the same thing in different languages, and the
designation of a particular thing by a certain sound is merely adventitious, since the name is just a
conventional designation for the thing and is not necessitated by the nature of the thing
designated.
2D
p. 5.6; Stog p. 8.7.
3D
p. 6.1; Stog p. 9.3.
4D
p. 6.2; Stog p. 9.4.
sD p. 7.5; Stog p. 11.5.
34 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
own view. [The phrase,] "emphatically conceive",1 [refers to] people other than
them who apprehend [illusions as real] and do not give up [such ideas. The phrase
- "They subsequently impute conventional designations] due to understanding the
ultimate ... "2 - [refers to] the names [affixed] to whatever is an object. The first
[chapter] has been explained.
Chapter Two
In the second [chapter], in dependence upon [a discussion of] argumentation, the
ultimate is analyzed.
3
Also, there are five faults of those Forders (mu stegs can,
nrthika) who do not understand the ultimate: (1) the fault of searching; (2) the fault
of exaggerated pride; (3) the fault of exaggerated adherence [to one's own view];
(4) the fault of imputation; and (5) the fault of disputation.
(1) They hope to understand the ultimate through merely being taught by
others. (2) When they attain mere calming (zhi gnas, samatOO), [10] they have ex-
aggerated pride thinking, "[1] understand the ultimate" due to merely apprehending
signs. (3) Under the power of designations, they exaggeratedly adhere [to their
views] in accordance with how [the ultimate] is described. (4) In dependence upon
conventionalities of perception and so forth, they posit the existence of a soul and
so forth and subsequently become attached to the positions of themselves and
others, which are mutually contradictory designations. (5) When they become an-
gry, they dispute [with each other], and eventually they quarrel. These five aspects
should be understood as being modes of progressively manifestly establishing the
ultimate and as being successive [stages]. You should know that the five examples
are respectively affixed to the five aspects of the ultimate.
It is like this: beginning with the five types of interest, there is: (1) interest in
eliminating existence; (2) interest in [eliminating] desire; (3) interest in [eliminating]
ID p. 7.5; SlOg p. 11.5.
2D p. 8.3; Stog p. 12.5: "[They subsequently impute conventional designations] due to
understanding in accordance with objects" (' di Itar don ji Ita ba bzhin du I rnam par rig par bya
ba'i phyir).
3Text correction: the Sde edition of A reads: don rnam par dpyod pa; changed to: don dam
pa rnam par dpyod pa in accordance with Lamotte's citation of this passage (Lamotte p. 53) and
Peking A (peking edition of Asruiga's vol. 104, p. 4d.5.
Asa/iga's Arya-saJp.dhininnocana-bhiiD'a 35
conceptuality; (4) interest in [eliminating] conventionalities; and (5) interest in
[eliminating] self-grasping.
"The early periods"l are those [periods] in which the Bhagavan became mani-
festly, perfectly enlightened. [The phrase,] "a [time] that was much earlier'',2 [refers
to a time] in which Buddha manifestly, perfectly enlightened others. [The word]
"were"3 [means that] those [Forders] previously gathered in order to ascertain ex-
actly how phenomena exist. The word "assembled"4 [refers to] those who, having
seen them, assembled [with them]. "Considering"s [refers to] teaching.
Moreover, they thought that their own textual systems were free from superim-
position and deprecation; therefore, they were "weighing"6 [the ultimate character of
phenomena]. They were "closely thinking about"7 [the ultimate character ofphe-
nomena] in dependence upon reasoning. Due to these two, [Le., weighing and
closely thinking about the ultimate character of phenomena,] they taught in accor-
dance with how they thought and whatever they thought
[The phrase] - "they were seeking in that way, but not having realized it,
those whose minds had become different"8 - [means that] their minds had become
separated. [The phrase] - "had two-pointed minds"9 - [refers to] those with
doubts. [The phrase] - "those with bad minds"lo [refers to] others who mistakenly
ascertain [the character of the ultimate]. "Debating"ll [means that 1 they [debated]
with their minds. "Quarreling"12 [means that] they were [quarreling] with words.
"Harmed"13 [refers to] teaching. [11]
In p. 9.6: sngon gyi dus rnams; Stog p. 15.1: sngon gyi gdugs rnams.
20 p. 9.6; Stog p. 15.I.
30 p. 9.6; Stog p. 15.I.
40 p. 9.6; Stog p. 15.I.
50 p. 10.1; Stog p. 15.2.
60 p. 10.1; Stog p. 15.3.
70 p. 10.1; Stog p. 15.3.
80 p. 10.1; Stog p. 15.3.
90 p. 10.1; Stog p. 15.3.
Ian p. 10.1: blo gros ngan pa; Stog p. 15.3: "who had minds that were not in accord" (blo gros
l1li mthun pa).
110 p. 10.2; Stog p. 15.4.
12
0 p. 10.2; Stog p. 15.4.
13
0 p. 10.2; Stog p. 15.4.
36 Two Commentaries on the Sarruihinirmocana-sutra
Moreover, when they propound uIireasonable [doctrines], because they spew
forth harsh speech they strike [each other]. When they propound reasonable
[doctrines], because they have to hide due to rejection and so forth, they are op-
pressed. They are "malevolent"! because of just those two things. '
"Realization''2 is due to the path of seeing (mthong ba'i lam, darsanil-miirga).
"Actualization"3 is due to the path of meditation (bsgom pa' i lam, bhavanii-miirga).
"Relate"4 [refers to] teaching. Moreover, [Buddha] clarifies and opens up [the
meaning of the ultimate]. With respect to that, [Buddha] "clarifies"s by way of
clarifying well [the meaning of the ultimate] due to presenting designations of
doctrines. He "opens Up"6 [the meaning of the ultimate] by way of teaching the
meaning. [Beings who are only acquainted with hot and bitter tastes] "are unable to
investigate, infer, or imagine" [the taste of honey or the taste of sugarF due to the
power of argumentation, the power of inference, and the power of belief.
Chapter Three
In the third [chapter], Bodhisattvas who abide in the level of engagement through
belief (mos pas spyod pa' i sa, adhimukticarya-bhumi) improperly mentally con-
sider the ultimate after having become obscured by the two obscurations: (1) obscu-
ration with respect to imputations; and (2) obscuration with respect to reasonings.
Obscuration with respect to imputations is due to being estranged from si.itras of
defmitive meaning. Obscuration with respect to reasonings is due to not directly
understanding the branches of reasons (gtan tshigs, hetu) and so forth.
With respect to understanding what is unimportant but not understanding what
is important,they reason by way offaulty reasons that lack [correct] consequences.
[Buddha] teaches and establishes the ultimate by way of the extensive passage
!D p. 10.2; Slog p. 15.4.
2D p. 10.3; Slog p. 15.6.
3D p. 10.3; Slog p. 15'.6.
4D p. 10.5: bsnyad; Stog p. 16.1: "explain" (bshad).
sD p. 10.5; Slog p. 16.1.
6D p. 10.5; Slog p. 16.1.
7D p. 11.4; Slog p. 17.4.
Asanga' s 37
ranging from, "Why is this? .. " to " .. .it is not suitable to say, 'The character of the
compounded and the character of the ultimate are not different"'l
By way of distinguishing the subtle, [Buddha] says, "profound".2 Similarly,
you should know that the meanings of those former expressions [12] are concor-
dant. Indicating the supremely subtle is done by way of differentiating between the
vehicles of Hearers and so forth.
Chapter Four
The fourth [chapter] indicates that the character that is everywhere of one taste
3
is an
antidote to the three kinds of boastful pride. The three kinds of boastful pride are:
(1) boastful pride of apprehended objects; (2) boastful pride of apprehending sub-
jects; and (3) boastful pride of different characters.
With respect to those, the indication of the antidote to boastful pride of appre-
hended objects is treated in detail [in the passage,] "Why is this ... purification of the
aggregates."4 The indication of the antidote to boastful pride of apprehending sub-
jects is treated in detail [in the passage,] "Moreover, SubhUti, monks who practice
yoga .. .. "S The indication of the antidote to boastful pride of different characters 'is
treated in detail [in the passage,] "Moreover, Subhuti, just as these aggregates
and. ... "6
Chapter Five
In the fifth [chapter], there are three kinds of obscuration with respect to secrets of
mind: (1) obscuration with respect to nature; (2) obscuration with respect to divi-
sions; and (3) obscuration with respect to answering objections.
10 pp. 13.6-14.5 Stag pp. 20.5-22.4.
20 p. 17.6; Stag p. 26.4.
3This refers ta the statements in the siitta that the ultimate is "a character that is everywhere of one
taste", which "means that it is a quality which characterizes all phenomena and that is
undifferentiated. It is compared ta space (nam mkha'. iikiisa), which is also omnipresent and
undifferentiated.
40 p. 21.1; Stag p. 30.7.
sD p. 21.5; Stag p. 31.5.
6D
p. 22.1; Stag p. 32.3.
38 Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
With respect to those, the indication of the antidote to obscuration with respect
to nature ranges from [the passage,] "Visalamati..." to " .. .in the Formless
Realm. .. ."1
With respect to divisions, there are five kinds: (1) the division of characteristics
(mtshan nyid, lak:ja/)a) [is referred to in the expressions,] "appropriating conscious-
ness" (len pa' i room par shes pa, iidiina-vijfiiioo), "basis-consciousness" (kun gzhi
rnam par shes pa, iilaya-vijfiiina), and "mind" (sems, citta);2 (2) the division of
activities (las, karma) [is indicated by the passage,] "Because that [consciousness]
apprehends and appropriates that body ... ";3 (3) the division of functions ('jug pa,
nisritya) [refers to] eye consciousness, etc. and simultaneous and non-simultaneous
functioning;4 (4) the division of conventionalities (kun rdzob, saf!lvrti) [refers to]
secrets that are the sphere of activity of knowledge of the system of doctrine; and
(5) the division of the ultimate [is indicated by the passage] ranging from, ..... do not
see ... appropriating ... " to ..... do not see the mental consciousness."s [13] This is
because they have the power of non-conceptual exalted wisdom. You should know
that those mysteries that are the objects of activity of non-conceptual exalted wis-
dom are mysteries that are ultimate objects of activity.
With respect to the division of answering objections:
6
Since seeds (sa bon,
bija) are included [within the continuum of mind] and are also included within two
other [categories], you should know that because they are included among secret
things, the other two - mentality (yid, manas) and consciousness (rnam par shes
pa, vijfiiina) - are also included among secret things.? Because it is [comprised] of
all seeds, [the basis-consciousness] is a mysterious basis.
ID pp. 23.7-24.2; Stag pp. 34:7-35.4.
2D p. 24.3-4; Stag p. 35.5-7.
3D p. 24.3; Stag p. 35.5.
4This appears to refer to the passage ranging from D p. 24.4-6 (Stog p. 36.1-3). The siitra lists
five consciousnesses: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue
consciousness, bodily consciousness, and mental consciousness. The last part of the passage in A
differs from the passage in D and Stog: loon cig tu cig car dang cig car rna yin par 'jug pa. D and
Stog read: "functions simultaneously" (loon dg rjes su 'jug pa).
sD p. 26.1-4; Stag p. 38.2-6.
6Tbis is apparently another division in addition ta the previously mentioned five divisions.
7The implication of this passage is that seeds, mentality, and consciousness are all secret or
hidden things because they are not accessible to sense direct perception and are known instead
through meditative perception.
Asanga' s 39
From among these: Because it is not suitable to be taught [to fools]; .because it
is a basis in the sense of having the characteristics of the seeds of functioning con-
I
sciousnesses; and because it does not a basis by way of its own character, it is diffi-
cult to knoW.1
Chapter Six
The sixth [chapter] teaches the characteristics of phenomena having six purposes:
(1) antidotal purpose; (2) instructional purpose; (3) purpose of actualization; (4)
pmpose of method; (5) realizational purpose; and (6) beneficial purpose.
With respect to [the first], the antidotal pmpose is an antidote to the four kinds
of obscuration: (a) obscuration with respect to objects that lack causes. of superim-
position; (b) obscuration with respect to objects that have causes of superimposi-
tion; (c) obscuration with respect to afflictions that cause disintegration of that; and
Cd) obscuration with respect to purification.
With respect to [the second], the instructional purpose is of four kinds: (a)
teaching the meaning; (b) teaching the external; (c) teaching the internal; and (d)
teaching the levels of meditative equipoise.
With respect to [the third], the purpose of actualization actualizes the three
doors of liberation [i.e., emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness].
With respect to [the fourth], the purpose of method is knowing the three na-
tures in dependence upon some [phenomenon].
lit is not a basis by way of its own character because it is simply made up of its seeds, and there
is no substance or permanent subslIatum of basis-consciousness apart from the seeds that compose
it This is an important point, because YogiiCiira thinkers were often accused of positing a basis-
consciousness that is the functional equivalent of the Hindu litman, that is, a permanent,
unchanging essence that is pure consciousness. The concluding verses of this chapter of the
Sa1fldhinirmocana indicate that Buddha did not teach the basis-consciousness to "fools" because
they might consider it to be an iitman, and the commentary is mdicating why it is different from
the iitman. The argument holds that there is no essence or substance of basis-consciousness and
that the seeds created by functioning consciousnesses constitute its character at any given moment
The statement that it is not a basis by way of its own character indicates that it is merely a
COntinuum that changes in accordance with these seeds and has no existence as a separate entity or
Substance apart from them.
40 Two Commentaries on the SarruIhinirmocana-sutra
With respect to [the fifth], the realizationalpurpose is knowing objects that are
phenomena which are objects of knowledge and positing their effects due to having
[knowledge of] all aspects of objects of knowledge.
With respect to [the sixth], the beneficial purpose is attaining "[the state of] an
exalted knower of all aspects (rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa, sarvakiira-jfllina)
[14] because that is said to be manifest, perfect [realization] with respect to every-
thing. You should know that due to knowing that, things (dngos po, bhava) are
said "to be ''phenomena'' (chos. dharma). Since designations with respect to those
[phenomena] are like that, [Buddha] thereby designates "Bodhisattvas who are wise
with respect to the character of phenomena."l
Chapter Seven
In the seventh [chapter] - before stating the teaching of the three non-entitynesses
(ngo bo nyid med pa, nilJ,svabhiiva) that are antidotes to four kinds of mistaken
conceptions with respect to objects - in teaching his indirect thought concerning
the non-entitynesses, [Buddha] indicates that this is an antidote to degeneration due
to the four kinds of mistaken conceptions with respect to objects.
With respect to that, the four kinds of mistaken conceptions with respect to ob-
jects are: (1) [wrongly thinking that] a basis [in Buddha's thought] does not exist
due to not relying on the three non-entitynesses;2 (2) [wrongly thinking that] there is
no thought [behind Buddha's "te"achings] due to abandoning [Buddha:'s] thought
with respect to the three types of non-entityness; (3) [wrongly thinking that] there is
no meaning due to abandoning the meiuring which does not have superimposition
and does not have deprecation; and (4) [mistakenly] not relying [on Buddha's
IThis refers to the main question of the chapter, in which the Bodhisattva GuI]iikara asks Buddha
why he designates some Bodhisattvas as being "wise with respect to the character of phenomena".
The commentary indicates that this refers to those Bodhisattvas whose understanding of
phenomena approaches that of an exalted knower of all aspects, who understands both the
appearances and conventional designations of phenomena, as well as their emptiness.
2This refers to the idea found "in the seventh chapter of the Sarrulhinir7TllJcana that Buddha taught
conflicting doctrines but that there was a reason behind his teachings, and this serves as a basis for
understanding why he appeared to contradict himself in his teachings. The key to understanding
the basis in Buddha's thought, according to the seventh chapter, lies in properly comprehending
his teachings concerning the three non-entitynesses and the three characters (mtshan nyid, laJqa1;Ul).
Asanga' s 41
teachings] due to not relying on fonner and later [teachings,] such as [the state-
ment], "Whatever does not exist by way of its own character does not arise" and so
forth.
Before stating the antidotes to desiring teachings, you should know the differ-
entiations of establishment and the differentiations of belief by way of the differen-
tiations of persons. With respect to that, the differentiations of establishment are as
follows: (1) That which, having the three types of basis, is based on [Buddha's]
teaching [is expressed by the passage,] "regarding that ... those beings who have not
previously generated roots of virtue ... ".1 (2) That which is based on lineage [is ex-
pressed by the passage,] "Paramartliasamudgata ... a person who has the lineage of a
Hearer who proceeds soley to peacefulness ... ".2 (3) That which is based on condi-
tions [is expressed by the passage,] "I describe those Hearers who change with re-
spect to the enlightenment [that they are seeking] as being a type of Bodhi-
sattva. .. .''3
With respect to the differentiations of belief, there are five kinds: (1) those who
come to perfect lineage, those who come to perfect belief, and those who come to
perfect wisdom are the first [type: Buddha says,] "With respect to that, sentient
beings who have generated great roots of virtue ... ";4 (2) with respect to coming to
perfect lineage and belief, [15] those who are separated from wisdom are the second
[type: Buddha says,] "With respect to that, sentient beings who have generated
roots of virtue .. .";5 (3) those who come to lineage and belief and who come to a
little wisdom are the third [type: Buddha says,] "The doctrine that is taught by the
Tathagata works on sentient beings by way of their various beliefs ... ";6 (4) those
with faulty wisdom, who come to perfect lineage and perfect belief, are the fourth
[type: Buddha says,] "Whatever sentient beings other than these sentient beings
- who have not achieved [the levels of the path] ... up to the collections of merit
and wisdom ... ";7 and (5) those who come to perfection in everything and who
'0 p. 36.3; Slog p. 51.7.
20 p. 38.4; Slog p. 54.7.
30 3
p. 8.7; Slog p. 55.5.
40 p. 39.4; Slog p. 56.4.
50 p. 40.3; Slog p. 57.2.
60
p. 40.4; Slog p. 57.6.
70
p. 40.7; Slog p. 58.3.
42 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
come to understand by way of instruction! are the flith [type: for instance,]
Paramarthasamudgata, who teaches the examples of "adding butter" [to cooked
meat], "dried ginger", "the basis for the drawing of a picture", and "space".2 You
should similarly associate [these examples] with: [Buddha's] discourses on ethics
and meditative stabilizations, on wisdom, on conventional [truths], and on ultimate
[truths], respectively.
Chapter Eight
In the eighth [chapter, Buddha] teaches the path of yoga by way of six aspects. He
indicates these by way of delineating designations due to [teaching]: (1) knowing;
(2) not knowing; (3) nature; (4) causes of practice; (5) attainment and methods of
attainment; and (6) not degenerating.
With respect to those, the grouping of calming and insight is nature. Causes of
practice are: (1) perceiving presentations of designations of doctrines; (2) not giving
up aspirations; and (3) the four phenomena that are objects of attainment. Attain-
ment [is described in the passage,] "Maitreya, designations of doctrines that I have
stated .... "3 Methods of attainment [lire described in the passage,j "Bhagavan, at
what point do Bodhisattvas .... "4
You should know that the rest are designations that are delineated. by way of
[the topic of] not degenerating. With respect to that, you should know that designa-
tions that are delineated by way of [the topic of] not degenerating are of many
kinds. With respect to not degenerating in terms of meditative stabilizations (ting
nge ' dzin, samadhi) that are based on non-conceptual exalted wisdom, [Maitreya
says,] "Bhagavan, [16] are the path of calming and the path of insight different or
the same .... "s With respect to not degenerating with respect to realizing non-con-
ceptual exalted wisdom, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, is that image that is the object
!This passage has been translated in accordance with an oral explanation by Geshe Yeshe Thablche,
who equates mgo glengs with bstan pa, "instruction". This refers ta advanced practitioners who
have heard Buddha's teachings and fully understood their meaning.
2D pp. 47.448.3; Stag pp. 67.6-68.7.
3D p. 51.6; Stag p. 73.6.
4D p. 54.2; Stag p. 77.1.
sD p. 53.1; Stag p. 75.5.
Asaitga' s
43
of activity of meditative stabilization which is a viewing consciousness .... "1 With
respect to not degenerating due to not thinking about time in meditating on the three
signs, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, at what point. .. soley cultivate insight. ... ''2
With respect to eliminating satisfaction with mere inferior [attainments,
Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, how many kinds of insight are there .... ''3 This is due to
not being satisfied with [insight] arisen from signs and so forth. With respect to
eliminating degenerated faculties, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, when you say,
'calming and insight that dwell on doctrines .... "'4 With respect to not degenerating
in terms of increasing virtue, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, through calming and in-
sight observing doctrines that are unmixed .... "5 This is because the extent to which
mind subsumes objects of observation is the extent of increase of the root virtues.
With respect to not degenerating in the sense of having antidotes to conceptual-
ity and mental fluctuation, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, at what point do calming
and insight become meditative stabilizations that are conceptual and analytical .... "6
With respect to not degenerating and knowing causes with regard to meditation,
[Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, what is the cause of calming ... .''7
With respect to eliminating boastful pride, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan, [ when]
Bodhisattvas cultivating calming and insight know doctrine and .... "8 This is by way
of indicating the characteristics of thorough individual knowledge of doctrines and
meanings [that arises] due to absence of boastful pride. This is due to [knowing]:
(1) the set of all meanings; (2) the set of all meanings [known] by way of in-
Structions; (3) the set of mental analyses; (4) extensive bases and supports; [17] and
(5) all profound meanings.
The set of all phenomena that are objects of knowledge is said to [include] ap-
prehended objects and apprehending subjects: the varieties of existents and the
ways that they exist.
9
Objects that are apprehended are divided into objects that are
10 p. 54.7; Stog p. 75.7.
20 p. 54.2; Stog p. 77.1.
30 p. 54.6; Stog p. 77.7.
40 p. 55.4; Stog p. 78.7.
So p. 56.1; Stog p. 79.6.
60 p. 57.6; Stog p. 82.5.
70
p. 58.5; Stog p. 83.4.
So
p. 59.1; Stog p. 84.2.
91his refers to a passage beginning on D p. 59.6 (Stog p. 85.2).
44 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-satra
states and objects that are resources. InitiiU mistakenness with respect to these ap-
prehending subjects and so forth is thorough affliction. Initial non-mistakenness is
purification.
Indicating village boundaries - or one hundred of those, etc. is the cause of
expressly denoting innumerable worldly realms.! The set of all meanings [known]
by way of instructions [refers to] doctrinal teachings of Buddhas that are based on
the two truths [Le., conventional truths and ultimate truths]. Afflictive faults are ex-
pressed in those. Qualities of purification are expressed. These qualities of affliction
and purification are produced from conditions, but are not produced from God
(dbang phyug, ISvara) and so forth. These are also included together; they are di-
vided according to the characteristics of compounded phenomena
Similarly, one knows suffering by way of impermanence, sickness and so
forth. In the Hearer Vehicle, one knows suffering and so forth. In the Great Vehi-
cle, one knows [reality] by way of suchness and so forth. These are indicated by
way of the two, grouping and dividing. Also, when answering, [Buddha] answers
by way of partial answers and so forth.
With respect to the fourth [part], the set of all meanings, the basis is letters. The
support is meanings. You should know that these two are the profound teaching
and profound meaning. [These] are extensive due to [the extensiveness of] objects
that are realms, because these are incalculable [in number.
Not degenerating due to merely attaining calming is a result of dilligently seek-
ing knowledge and insight.
2
With respect to not degenerating in terms of through
knowledge with respect to origination of the subtle, [Maitreya says,] "Bhagavan,
how and through what mental contemplation cultivating calming and insight do
Bodhisattvas remove what signs .... "3
With respect to eliminating fear with respect to emptiness, [the sutra says,]
"Bhagavan, in the Great Vehicle ... the full character of emptiness .... "4 [18]
!This refers to a passage beginning on D p. 61.2 (Stog p. 87.3).
2'fhe implication of this is that some might be content with just attaining calming, and this
contentment could keep them from seeking more advanced states of understanding. Calming and
insight are merely preliminaries to attainment of knowledge and insight, and should not be
thought of as ends in themselves.
3D p. 65.3; Stog p. 93.3.
4D p. 67.7;" SlOg p. 97.2.
Asmiga' s 45
With respect to cultivating calming and insight - beginning with nature,
causes, effects, actions, application, objects of engagement - not wasting instruc-
tions given [by Buddha is described in the passage,] "Bhagavan, how many kinds
of meditative stabilization of cahning and insight are included. ... "1
With respect to eliminating non-serious aspiration with respect to meditation:
The meanings of the four sources of subtle signs are to be known through pursuing
[cultivation of] the [four] mindful establishments. The remainder are to be known
through pursuing [understanding of] the sixteen emptinesses.
2
You should connect
the emptiness of the indestructible with collections of two terms.
3
Emptiness of
character [should be connected with] two signs.4 You should know that the remain-
ing [emptinesses] are to be connected with each of these.
Chapter Nine
In the ninth [chapter], questions and answers - beginning with what should be
known with respect to completing the [ten] perfections (pha rol tu phyin pa,
pliramita) - are expressed, because the perfections are included within the Great
Vehicle. With respect to how they are completed: It is by way of the division of the
[ten] levels (sa, bhumi); [Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhagavan, if the ten Bodhisattva
levels are ... .''5
With respect to completing the perfection of giving and SO forth, [Avalokites-
vara says,] "Bhagavan, how many bases of training of Bodhisattvas are there .... "6
With respect to that, beginning with regarding effects, wisdom regarding
10 p. 68.4; Stog p. 98.l.
2These are listed on 0 pp. 66.4-67.4 (Stog pp. 94.7-96.5).
3The meaning of this is unclear, but appears to refer to the passage in the sutra (D p. 67.3; Stog p.
96.3) in which Buddha says, "when one thoroughly knows the objects of pure suchness, then the
signs of the uncompounded and the signs of the indestructible are eliminated by the emptiness of
uncompounded phenomena and the emptiness of the indestructible".
4This appears to refer to the passage in the sutra (D p. 66.4; Stog p. 95.1) in which Buddha says,
"When one thoroughly knows the meaning of the suchness of abiding, then the signs that are a
continuation of production, cessation, abiding, and transformation are eliminated by the emptiness
of character and the emptiness of what is beginningless and endless".
So p. 77.1; Stog p. 111.3.
60 p. 83.5; Stog p. 120.5.
46 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
discordant classes and antidotes, and wisdom regarding names, there are three
questions.
With respect to wisdom regarding divisions of the classes that are discordant
with the levels, there is: (1) the class that is discordant with liberative wisdoms and
(2) the class that is discordant with liberative minds; [AvalokiteSvara says,] "Bhaga-
van, with respect to those, how many obscurations are there? How many discord-
ances of assumptions of bad states are there .... "1
Wisdom regarding divisions of antidotes is due to accumulating the virtues
[resUlting from] entering into the levels. With respect to wisdom regarding the basis
of ripening the continuums of oneself and others, [Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhaga-
van, why is it that, among all births in cyclic existence, a Bodhisattva's birth is
called 'the most excellent' .... ~ [19]
With respect to wisdom regarding methods of perfecting thought, [Avalo-
kiteSvara says,] "Bhagavan, why is it that Bodhisattvas proceed by way of exten-
sive aspirations .... "3 Wisdom regarding methods of ripening oneself and [other]
sentient beings [is explained] in terms of the six bases of training.
4
Wisdom
regarding bases and those who base [themselves on them] is due to [understanding]
the bases [described] in the earlier and later parts of the three trainings. Wisdom re-
garding good methods of elevating and actualizing is the cause of the two, merit and
exalted wisdom
With respect to wisdom regarding training well, [Avalokitesvara says,] "Bha-
gavan, how do Bodhisattvas train in these six bases of training .... "5
Good wisdom should be known [to arise] from: (1) developed constituents; (2)
correctly actualized collections; (3) non-degeneration with respect to vehicle;6 (4) no
uncertainty; and (5) situation. With respect to wisdom regarding perfected col-
lections, [Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhagavan, why are these six bases of training
known to be designated as being six-fold .... "7
1D p. 80.6; Stog p. 116.4.
2D p. 82.7; Stog p. 119.6.
3D p. 83.2; Stog p. 120.2.
4This begins on D p. 83.5 (Stog p. 120.5).
5D p. 84.2; Stog p. 121.5.
6'fhis is probably an admonition against moving from the Mahayana path to a Hlnayana path.
7D p. 84.4; Stag p. 122.1.
Asatiga's Arya-sa1?Uihinirmocana-bhi4Ya 47
With respect to wisdom regarding the additional [perfections, A valokitesvara
says,] "Bhagavan, why are the other perfections known to be designated as being
four-fold .... "l With respect to wisdom regarding arising, [Avalokitesvara says,] ,
"Bhagavan, how should one understand this indication of the order of these six per-
fections .... "2 With respect to wisdom regarding divisions of differences, [Avalokit-
esvara says,] ''Bhagavan, into how many aspects are these perfections divided .... ''3
With respect to wisdom regarding completion, [AvalokiteSvara says,]
"Bhagavan, why are these perfections [called] 'perfections' .... "4
With respect to wisdom regarding groups of designations, [Avalokitesvara
says,] "Bhagavan, what are the individual functions of those five aspects .... "5
With respect to wisdom regarding distinctiveness of qualities, [Avalokitesvara
says,] "Bhagavan, [20] what are the vastnesses of these perfections .... "6
With respect to wisdom regarding continuity, [Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhaga-
van, in what way do Bodhisattvas search for the pleasing fruitional results of endur-
ing perfections and .... "7
With respect to wisdom regarding methods of abiding in the cause, [Avalo-
kitesvarasays,] "Bhagavan, why is it that, just as Bodhisattvas [engage in] the per-
fections, they do not abide in them due to faith in the pleasing fruitional results of
the perfections ... .''11
With respect to wisdom regarding actualization of activities, [Avalokitesvara
says,] "Bhagavan, what are the individual powers of these perfections .... ''9
With respect to wisdom regarding correctly actualized benefits that are grouped
[together, Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhagavan, from what cause do the perfections
lD p. 85.1; Stog p. 122.7.
2D p. 86.2; Stog p. 124.4. This sentence in the commentary is omitted in the Peking edition, p.
7.1.
3D p. 86.4; Stog p. 124.7.
4D p. 87.1; Stog p. 125.7.
sD p. 91.3; Stog p. 131.6.
6D p. 91.6; Steig p. 132.3.
7D p. 92.1; Stog p. 132.6.
8D p. 92.2; Stog p. 133.1 reads: "Bhagavan, why is it that, just as Bodhisattvas engage in the
perfections through faith, they are not similarly intent on the pleasing fruitional results of the
perfections?"
9D p. 92.4; Stog p. 133.4.
48 Two Commentaries on the Sa7JUlhinirmocana-satra
arise; what are their results; and what are therr functions .... "1 You should know that
the results are the objectives of oneself and others.
With respect to wisdom regarding hindrances to benefitting sentient beings,
[Avalokitesvara says,] "Bhagavan, if ... why are there poor people in the world ... .''2
With respect to wisdom regarding not degenerating in terms of engaging in
method, [AvalokiteSvara says,] "Bhagavan, through which perfection do Bodhisat-
tvas apprehend the non-entityness ofphenomena .... "3
With respect to wisdom regarding decrease and increase, [Avalokitesvara
says,] "Bhagavan, [when you say,] 'perfection' ... ."4
With respect to wisdom that eliminates grasping at the continuum of thorough
affliction, [AvalokiteSvara says,] "Bhagavan, how many kinds of latencies of afflic-
tions are there [on] these [levels] ... .''5
With respect to wisdom regarding divisions that are differentiations of deliver-
ances (nges par 'byin pa, nairyaT}ika), [AvalokiteSvara says,] ..... the Bhagavan's
[statement], 'Both the Hearer Vehicle and the Great Vehicle [are one vehicle]' .... "6
With respect to that, for those who imagine the meaning to be only what is literally
. spoken, "superimposition" (sgro 'dogs pa, samliropa) is [imputing] form and so
forth in terms of the imputational character. For others, "deprecation" (skur pa
'debs pa, apaviida) is depreciating the character of all phenomena due to [thinking],
"The entities of all phenomena do not exist."
Chapter Ten
In the tenth [chapter, Buddha] teaches (1) by indicating that the antidote to obstruc-
tions with respect to the bodies of a Tathagata is the truth body, which is the anti-
dote to [imagining] the impermanent to be permanent, and (2) by indicating that the
arising of their births is the antidote to imagining them to be illusory. The [three]
baskets of designations of doctrines are non-mistakenly taught to be the antidotes to
obscurations.
1D p. 92.6; Stog p. 134.1.
2D p .. 93.1; Stog p. 134.3.
3D p. 93.4; Stog p. 134.7.
4D p. 93.6; Stog p. 135.4.
sD p. 94.4; Stog p. 136.3.
6D p. 95.7; Stog p. 138.3.
Asanga' s 49
The eleven characteristics of schematic outlines (ma nw, miitrkli) can be [con-
densed into] five types of characteristics: (1) two are characteristics of teachings; (2)
three are characteristics of thorough investigation; (3) two are characteristics of
results; (4) two are characteristics of hindrances and aids to these; (5) two are char-
acteristics of faults and [good] qualities of those. The are antidotes to ob-
scurations with respect to the objects of activity of Buddhas. You should know that
all of these teachings are also of the mode of teaching of Tathagatas' births.! This
completes [the explanation of] the tenth [chapter].
QUESTION: How should one know imputation of what is not real (yang dag pa
rna yin pa kun tu rtogs pa, abhata-parikalpa)?
[RESPONSE]: It should be known by way of: (1) basis; (2) characteristic; (3)
method; (4) result; (5) cause; (6) final transformation; (7) support; and (8)
divisions.
With respect to that, basis [refers to] Bodhisattvas. Characteristic simply [refers
to] causes of error. Method [refers to] wisdom arisen from hearing, thinking, and
meditating. Result [refers to] attainment of unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlight-
enment which abandons that and to [fulfilment of] the welfare of sentient beings.
Cause [refers to] reasoning, delighting in the arising of Buddhas, hearing excellent
doctrines, taking to mind what is proper, and doctrinal commitments that are con-
cordant with doctrine. Final transformation [refers to] realization of suchness. Who-
ever understands [this] knows the imputation of what is unreal. Support [refers to]
the level of engagement through belief, the frrst [Bodhisattva] level, and the Buddha
level.
Division [refers to] seventeen kinds: [22] (1) the division of arising; (2) the
division of non-arising; (3) the division of apprehending subjects; (4) the division
of apprehended objects; (5) the division of viewing [something] as external; (6) the
division of viewing [something] as internal; (7) the division of having afflictions;
(8) the division of not having afflictions; (9) the division of what is experienced
after birth; (10) the division of what is experienced at other times;2 (11) the division
!In other words, these are the types of teachings that the emanations of Tathagatas give to sentient
beings.
2The term "other times" (Ian grangs gzhan) is in accordance with an oral explanation by
Geshe Yeshe Thabkhe, who equates Ian grangs with stengs or gnas skabs.
50 Two Commentaries on the SaJp.dhinirmocana-sutra
of non-existence; (12) the division of existence and non-existence; (13) the division
of what is real; (14) the division of what is real and what is unreal; (15) the division
of the concordant causes of what is real; (16) the division of indicating what is
here;! and (17) the division of what arises in the past and present and so forth.
These aspects should be understood in accordance with four [statements]: (1)
"The unreal is unreal imputation; (2) the not unreal is simply non-imputation; (3)
non-imputation is not non-imputation; (4) everything is said to be knowable"
This completes the Explanation of the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought by
the Master Asruiga.
This is translated by the Indian masters Jinamitra and Silendrabodhi and the great
revising translator (zhu chen gyi 10 tsa ba) Bande Ye shes sde and prepared [in re-
sponse to] a request.
! According to Geshe Thabkhe, this can also mean "indicating what something is" or "indicating
what something is called".
Part Two:
A Study and Translation of
Jiianagarbha's Arya-maitreya-kevala-parivarta-

1. Introduction
Acconling to Tibetan historical literature, Jiianagarbha flourished in eastern India,
l
and he is associated with the philosophical lineage of Bhavya and
Taranatha states that he was born in 09ivisa and became a student of Sngupta in
Bharpgala (Bengal).3 He is also said to have been a Madhyamika who followed the
philosophical views of Bhavya and who had a vision of A valokitesvara. Taranatha
asserts that Jiianagarbha was a Svatantrika-Madhyamika, along with Bhavya,
Avalokitavrata, Buddhajiianapada, and Ruegg places him in the eighth
century and cites the historian Sum pa mkhan po's assertion that he was a teacher of

lTiiranatha's History of Buddhism in India, tr. Lama Chimpa and AIaka Chattopadhyaya (Simla:
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970), p. 260.
2Ibid., pp. 252-3 and 260.
3Ibid., pp. 252-3.
4Ibid., p. 260. The Blue Annals (tr. George Roerich; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949, p. 34)
only mention him as belonging to the ordination lineage of Nagarjuna, Bhavya, Sngupta, and
that was transmitted to Tibet by Sba Ratna.
sSee David Seyfort Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), p. 69 and n. 225. Malcolm Eckel (Jiiiinagarbha's Com-
mentaryon the Distinction Between the Two Truths; New York: State University of New York
Press, 1987, pp. 5-34) also places him in the eighth century, and NAGASAWA Jitsudo thinks
that he lived from 700-760 (Daijobukkyo yuga-gyo shiso no Hattenkeitai; Tokyo, 1969, pp. 4-16;
reponed in Leslie Kawamura and Keith Scott, eds., Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization;
Emeryville, CA: Dharma Press, 1977, p. 143 n. 16). Ruegg notes (p. 69) that there were at least
52 Two Commentaries on the Saf!!dhinirmocana-sutra
In the Dge lugs pa school, he is classed as a Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madh-
yamika, primarily on the basis of his Differentiation of the Two Truths (satyadvaya-
vibhaliga, bden pa gnyis rnam par' byed pa), which is known in Tibet as one of
the "three [texts] illuminating Svatantrika" (rang rgyud shar gsum).6 .
Jfianagarbha, along with Candraldrti, is classed by Dbus pa blo gsal as a Sva-
tantrika-Madhyamika of a type called "Madhyamikas who practice what is re-
nowned in the world" ('jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma pa).7 In a study of the
Bio gsal grub mtha' ,
8
Mimaki provides a table for various identifications of Jfiana-
garbha's affIliation, according to which Rje btsun pa,9 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa,IO
two other authors named Jfiiinagarbha, one of whom was a teacher of Mar pa in the eleventh cen-
tury, and the other a translator whose name appears in the colophons of several works translated
into Tibetan. See also MATSUMOTO Shiro, "Jfiiingarbha's Theory of Two Truths", in Bukkyo
Gaku #5, 1978, pp. 109-137, where he discusses the three Jiiiinagarbhas. is reported in the
preface to Jfiiinagarbha's commentary on the Sarruihinirmocana-sutra in the Otani University ver-
sion of the Bstan 'gyur (sems tsam section, vol. 2 (bi), p. 8).
6See Donald Lopez, A Study of Svlitantrika (New York: Snow Lion, 1987), pp. 21 and 446-7 n.
16 and Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School, pp. 68-9, n. 223 (the other two works
are Madhyamaklila7!lklira and KamalasIla's Madhyamakliloka). It should be noted
that this tenn could also mean "the three Eastern Svatantrikas", since shar can mean both "East"
and "illuminate", "appear", "dawn". Jfiiinagarbha's treatise on the two truths is discussed by Lcang
skya ral pa'i rdo rje (Grub pa' i mtha'i mam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po' i
mdzes rgyan; Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Printing Press, 1970, p. 429.4), and he indi-
cates that Jfiiinagarbha's Svatantrika reasonings are not accepted by Prasailgikas, and so Leang
skya also does not use them in his chapter on Prasailgika. The Satyadvaya-vibhanga and its auto-
commentary (vrttl) are found in the Sde dge edition of the Tripilaka (Tohoku #3881 and #3882)
but not in the Peking edition.
7Blo gsal grub mtha', ed. and tr. MIMAKI Katsumi (Tokyo: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, 1982),
p. 27. He writes (p. 28):
Jfiiinagarbha est considere comme appartenant a 1a fois a l' ecole des' Jig rten grags sde
spyod pa'i dbu rna pa et a I'ecole des Svatantrika. On peut Ie deduire de fait que sa
Satyadvayavibhanga-klirikli est ciree pour appuyer I'opinion des Svatantrika, bien que
son nom ne soit pas cire expressement sous les Svatantrika.
8Ibid, pp. 27-8. As Tsong kha pa notes, these distinctions were not felt by Jfiiinagarbha, nor by
Bhavya, Siintaraqita, etc., who saw no difference in the view of selflessness in their own school
and that of Buddhapalita and CandrakIrti. See Lopez, A Study of SVlitantrika, p. 446 n. 16.
btsun pa chos kyi rgyal mtshan of Se ra Byes Monastery (1469-1546), in his Grub mtha'i
mam gzhag. See also Ruegg, pp. 68-9, n. 223.
IO'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (1648-1722), in his Grub mtha' chen mo.
Jfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 53
Dge 'dun rgya mtsho,l1 and Pa1}. chen Sakya mchog ldan
lz
classify him as a Sau-
trantika-Madhyamika,1' and Bu ston
l4
and Go rams paiS classify him as a Yogacara-
Madhyamika.
16
Mimaki cites several different Presentations of Tenets (grub mtha')
l1Dge 'dun rgya mtsho (1475-1542), the second Dalai Lama, in his Grub mtha' rgya mtshor 'jug
pa'i gru rdzings.
12pBJ.I chen Sakya mchog ldan, in his Dbu ma rnam par nges pa' i chos Icyi bang mdzod lung dang
rigs pa'i rgya mtsho (cited in Mimaki p. 36).
13Blo gsal'grub mtha', op. cit., p. 29. See also Lessing and Wayman's translation of Mkhas
grub's Rgyud sde spyi rnam, p. 90, where he is also identified as a Sautrantika-Svatantrika, and
Ruegg, op. cit., pp. 68-9, n. 224. On p. 39, Mililaki writes:
Jfianagarbha est consiciere normalement comme auteur des $autrantika-miidhyamika par
les auteurs dGe lugs pa, teIs que Se ra rJe btsun pa,Chos kyi rgyal mtshan et 'Jam
dbyangs biad pa. Quelques maitres anterieurs qui prennent la mfune position d'apres
Sakya mchog ldan pourraient sans doute 6tre dGe lugs pa. Par contre, des auteurs teIs
que Bu ston Rin chen grub et Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge, qui sont dans la filia-
tion des Sa skya pa, prennent Jilanagarbha pour un auteur des Yogaclira-miidyamika.
Par ailleurs dBus pa blo gsal, et probablement aussi 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzai!,
consicierent Jfianagarbha comme un auteur des 'Jig rten grags sde spyod pa'i dbu rna
'pa.
14Bu ston rin chen grub (1290-1364), in his Chos 'byung. See Eugene Obermiller's translation,
(Heidelberg, 1931) part II, p. 135.
ISGo rams pa Bsod nams seng ge (1429-1489), in his Rgyal ba thams cad Icyi thugs Icyi dgongs
pa zab mo dbu ma'i de kho na nyid spyi'i ngag gyis ston pa nges don rag gsal (cited in Mililaki
p.32).
16Blo gsal grub mtha', pp. 29 and 34. For a'discussion of the philosophical differences between
Priismigika-Madhyamikas and Sviitantrika-MAdhyamikas, see Lopez, op. cit, pp. 68-9 and 76 and
Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983), pp. 399-439. See also the
short discussion of OIle Qvamstrom, Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: The Vediintavi-
nicaya Chapter of Bhavya' s Madhyamakahrdayakiirikii (Lund: Plus mtra, 1989), pp. 96-98.
ACCOrding to the Dge lugs pa system (as outlined by Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, 1728-
1791) in his Grub pa' i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa rin po che'i phreng ba (Dharamsala: Shes rig par
khang, 1969, p. 55), a Yogaciira-Sviitantrika-Madhyamika is a MAdhyamika who does not assert
the existence of external objects but does assert the existence of self-knowers (rang rig, svasarrrved-
ana). A Sautrantika-Sviitantrika is a Madhyamika who does not assert the existence of self-know-
ers and who does assert that external objects exist by way of their own character (see Geshe
Lhundrup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism; New York: Grove
Press, 1976, pp. 122-132 and Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness, pp. 361-3). According
to these two defmitions, it is difficult to place J ilanagarbha in either classification, because in his
Satyadvaya-vibhailga he refutes an opponent who asserts the existence of self-knowers (see Tohoku
#3882.4b.2), which would mark him as a Sautrantika-Sviitantrika, but in his commentary on the
SllI!Ulhinirmocana he agrees with the statement of the siilfa that external objects do not exist This
indicates that if the same Jfianagarbha wrote both texts he did not identify exclusively with either
54 Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
of Dge lugs pa and Sa skya authors which classify Jiianagarbha, and Mimaki
concludes that Dge lugs pa authors generally classify him as a Sautrantika-
Madhyamika,11 but several Sa skya authors (e.g., Bu ston and Go rams pa) classify
him as a Y ogacara-Madhyamika,l8
According to the Tibetan doxographers, Jiianagarbha was a Madhyamika who
utilized both Madhyamaka and Yogacara sources, and so for them there is no con-
tradiction in his writing both a treatise presenting a Madhyarnaka perspective on the
two truths (The Differentiation of the Two Truths) and a commentary on the
Sa1!ldhinirmocana-sutra (which is the main scriptural source for the Yogacara
school).19 Several contemporary scholars, however, think that because there is a
philosophical incompatibility between the two schools, accepting the Y ogacara po-
sition that all phenomena are mind-only (sems tsam, citta-mlitra) or cognition-only
(rnam par rig pa tsam, vijiiapti-mlitra) would preclude his accepting the Madhya-
maka position that compounded phenomena (' dus byas, sa1!lSk.rta) do exist con-
ventionally. This discrepancy is mentioned by Ruegg in The Literature of the
Madhyamaka ~ c h o o l in India and by Eckel in liilinagarbha's Commentary on the
Distinction Between the Two Truths.20 Both indicate that they see a conflict between
the thought of the Differentiation of the Two Truths and that of the commentary on
the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra. Ruegg, for example, points out that in the Differentia-
tion of the Two Truths the author characterizes the doctrine of mind-only as a posi-
tion that is inferior to the Madhyamaka understanding of selflessness
21
(while the
commentary on the Sa1!ldhinirmocana-sutra defends the doctrine of mind-only
viewpoint It is virtually certain that he did not identify himself as a Svatantrika, but simply as a
Madhyamika, and the lines of demarkation between schools was probably much more fluid at the
time when he lived and wrote than the later Tibetan exegetes presented them.
17Blo gsal grub mtOO', p. 34.
18Blo gsal grub mtOO'. pp. 32-3.
19The Tibetan text of this work has been has been edited and translated into Japanese by
NOZAWAJosho (Daijo Bukkyo yuga-gyo no Kenkyu, Kyoto, Hozokan, 1957) on the basis of
the Peking (number 5535) and Sde dge (number 4033) texts. It is also listed in the Lhan dkar cat-
alogue (number 532 according to Lalou's numbering) and Bu ston's Chos bsgyur dkar cOOg (num-
ber 2926 in Nishioka's edition of Bu ston's text: Putun bukkyoshi, in Tokyo Daigaku Bungaku-
bu Bunka Koryu Kenkyu shisetsu Kenkyu Kiyo 4 (1980), pp. 61-92; 5 (1981), pp. 43-94; 6
(1983), pp. 47-201).
20See Ruegg, pp. 68-9 and Eckel, pp. 31-4.
21Ruegg, p. 69.
JiUinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 55
without indicating that it should be viewed as inferior to the Madhyamaka view).
Eckel speculates that the differences in philosophical outlook between the two
works could be evidence that they were written by different authors,22 but this alone
is not, in my opinion, sufficient reason by itself to reject the notion that both texts
are by the same author, since there are many cases of authors adopting different atti-
tudes and perspectives in different works.23 An equally plausible explanation is that
Jiianagarbha accepted the Mahayana idea that Buddha taught different (and often
conflicting) doctrines to different audiences according to his understanding of what
would be most beneficial to each listener, and so Ifianagarbha would feel no philo-
sophical conflict in commenting on and defending different doctrines attributed to
Buddha without rigidly adhering to just one position. This does not entail that he
was inconsistent, or even that he necessarily changed his mind; rather, as Ruegg
indicates,24 Jiianagarbha states in the Differentiation of the Two Truths that Buddha
taught different doctrines to different audiences due to his compassion and that he
taught some people about the aggregates (Phung po, skandha), constituents (khams,
dOOtu), and sense spheres (skye mched, ayatana), while he taught others that every-
thing is mind-only, and to others he taught that all phenomena lack a self.
Jiianagarbha indicates that he thinks that the doctrine of mind-only is inferior to the
Madhyamaka understanding of selflessness, but he also thinks that it is a part of a
progression of teachings given by Buddha leading up to the Madhyamaka view of
selflessness:
In accordance with [their] thought- by way of progressively teaching (1)
the aggregates, constituents, and sense spheres; (2) mind-only; (3) and the
22Eckel, pp. 5-34.
23 Although this is not the occasion to develop this idea fully, there is a basic problem in studies
by COntemporary scholars who try to decide that different texts could not have been written by the
same author on the basis of differences of thought or style. The problem with this approach is that
it tacitly assumes that every author has a uniform philosophical view and writing style throughout
his/her life, but this is patently false, as can be seen in any number of contemporary authors, who
Write from different perspectives and utilize different styles, adapting their writing to the needs of
PartiCular works. An example would be JeanPaul Sartre, who wrote in a variety of styles and
genres. Many of the works known to have been written by Sartre would have to be rejected accord-
ing to the implicit rules of the methodology of contemporary scholarship which holds that differ-
ences in thought and style necessarily indicate differences in authorship.
24R .
uegg, p. 69.
56 Two Commentaries on the Sarrulhinirmocana-sutra
selflessness of all phenomena - [Buddha] completely refuted the appre-
hension of [truly existent] things.25
This statement appears to indicate that the author of the Differentiation of the Two
Truths accepted the doctrine of mind-only as a part of a progression of teachings
given by Buddha leading up the the teaching of the selflessness of all phenomena,
and so it would not be inconsistent for the same author to write another text in
which he commented on and defended statements attributed to Buddha expounding
this position.
Both'Eckel and Ruegg also point out that there were two other Jiianagarbhas
mentioned in Tibetan literature, one of whom was a teacher of Mar pa the translator
and another who translated the Commentary on the Differentiation of the Two
Truths into Tibetan.26 In addition, SteinkellneiV states that Bu ston's mention of the
commentary on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
28
occurs in the portion of his Cata-
logue (dkar chag) that mainly lists works by Tibetans. The author listed there is re-
ferred to as "Shes rab snying po", and Steinkellner points out that this is a possible
alternative translation of Jiianagarbha (usually translated as Ye shes snying pO).29
He also mentions that none of the catalogues which mention this work list a transla-
tor, which is at least circumstantial evidence that the author might have been Ti-
betan;
In Tibetan Dge lugs pa traditions, however, it is accepted that the commentary
on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra and the Differentiation of the Two Truths were
written by the same person, the eighth century Indian master Jiianagarbha.
30
Steinkellner has provided some useful evidence which supports the thesis that the
author of the commentary on the Sarrulhinirmocana-sutra was a Tibetan rather than
an Indian, but since this evidence is circumstantial, it is not sufficient, in my opin-
25Satyadvayavibhaliga-vrtti (bden pa gnyis rnam par' byed pa'i 'grel pa), Otani University Press
Sde dge, dbu rna vol. 12, p. 13a.3-4.
26See Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, p. 69. Steinkell-
ner ("Who Is Byan chub rdzU 'phrul" (JJerliner Indologische Studien, 1989, pp. 231-3) speculates
that there may have even been two translators, one an Indian named Jiianagarbha and the other a
Tibetan named Ye shes snying po.
("Who Is Byan chub rdzu 'phrul"), pp. 231-3.
28In his ehos bsgyur dlaJr chag (number 2926 in Nishioka's numbering).
29Steinkellner ("Who Is Byan chub rru:u 'phrul"), p. 233.
30Bu ston's mention of this work in the section mainly devoted to indigenous Tibetan works
may, however, indicate that he did not think that the Indian Jiianagarbha wrote this work.
lfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 57
ion, to reject conclusively the tradition's attribution of both works to the same
person.
Furthermore, although scholars such as Eckel, Ruegg, and Mimaki have indi-
cated that they find a discrepancy between Jfiiinagarbha's Madhyamaka affiliation
and his composing a commentary on the Sartzdhinirmocana-sutra, Tibetan doxog-
raphers of the Dge lugs pa school would argue that there is no contradiction. For
instance, in his Essence of the Good Explanations (legs bshad snying po), Tsong
kha pa states that SViUantrikas (e.g., Bhavya, and KamalasIla) rely on
the Sa1!ldhinirmocana-sutra and, according to his analysis, as a Svatantrika
Jiiiinagarbha would also treat it as an authoritative scripture. According to Tsong
kha pa, the Svatantrikas, beginning with Bhavya, accept the Sa1!ldhinirmocana-
sutra as a definitive teaching, but their interpretations differ from those of the
Yogacaras:
KamalasIla's Illumination of the Middle Way (dbu rna snang ba, rnadhya-
makaloka) explains in detail that Bhavya opened this systems's path of
. commentary [in which it is held] that the meaning of the three natures de-
scribed in the Sartzdhinirmocana-sutra as interpreted by the Yogacaras is
not the meaning of the sfitra but that it has the Madhyamaka meaning.
3
!
According to Tsong kha pa's analysis of the Svatantrika system, Bhavya and his
followers rely on the Sartzdhinirmocana-sutra, but their readings differ from those
of Yoga car a thinkers. Bhavya, for example, denies that Buddha teaches that external
objects are mind-only, even though there are statements that seem to propound this
in several sfitras, e.g., the Sutra on the Ten Levels (DaSabhamika-sutra), the Des-
cent Into U:l1ikli Satra (Laitklivatara-sutra), and the Sartzdhinirmocana-sutra.
32
3!Le
gs bshad snymg po (Samath ed., p. 130.8).
32A
ccording to Jeffrey Hopkins (Meditation on Emptiness p. 361), Bhavya refuted the CittamiUra
POsition that there are no external objects. He contended that Buddha never taught this, despite the
fact that Buddha did say the words, "Everything in the three realms is mind-only." According to
Bhavya, the words do not mean what they appear to say, and he contends that if one looks at the
Context it is clear that even on the occasions where Buddha makes statements that all phenomena
are mind-only this is not what he means. This idea is discussed by Blo bzang dkon mchog in his
Word-commentary on 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Grub mtha' chen mo, p. 192.3 and by Tsong kha
pa in his Legs bshad snying po (Samath edition, p. 115.1). Meditation on Emptiness also states
Bhavya holds that all phenomena do not exist ultimately, but conventionally they do exist
1Ilherently or naturally. He is a Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, because like a Sautrantika he
58 Two Commentaries on the Sa7[ldhinirmocana-sutra
Although Tsong kha pa contends that some sections of Bhavya's works "settle
the meaning of the Sa'!ldhinirmocana-sutra", he does not cite any places where
Bhavya actually mentions the sutra by name.
33
He does indicate, however, that
Bhavya refers to doctrines presented in the sutra and refutes the.interpretations of
Yogacara authors, and Tsong kha pa seems to think that the references are clear
asserts the existence of objects that are external to perceiving consciousness. According to Tibetan
doxographers, the defintion of a Sautrantika-Svatrantika is: "a Madhyamika who does not assert
self-knowers and who asserts that external objects exist by way of their own nature" (from Practice
and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism by Sopa and Hopkins, p. 123).
33See, for instance, Legs bshad snying po pp. 109.14 (where Tsong kha pa states that Bhavya, set-
tling the thought of the Sa1JUlhinirmocana-siltra, indicates that other-dependent phenomena (gzhan
dbang, paratantra) have entityness in the sense of being established by way of their own character);
p. 113.17 (where he states that Bhavya disagrees with the Yogacaras in that he thinks that "the
meaning of the sutra is that the emptiness of an ultimately [existent] entity of form and its pro-
duction and so forth is the thoroughly established [nature]"); and p. 114.7 (where he indicates that
Bhavya disagrees with the Yogacaras' interpretation of the sutra's discussion of the idea that phe-
nomena are not produced inherently). The latter passage illustrates how Tsong kha pa indicates
that Bhavya relies on the SaT{ldhinirmocana-sutra although he does not mention the name of the
sutra:
The Yogacaras also assert that the statements in the Sa1JUlhinirmocana-sutra concerning
production by way of [the object's] own nature and inherent production from other are
of concordant meaning; and they assert that non-production of that [refers to] non-pro-
duction under [the object's] own power. Therefore, they assert that due to its non-exis-
tence it is not necessary that ultimate production not exist. [Bhavya] asserts that if
other-dependent phenomena were truly established, they would have to be established
in accordance with how they appear, due to which the statement in the [Sa1JUlhinirmo-
cana-]sutra that [other-dependent phenomena are] like magical illusions would not be
correct. Therefore, he explains that their emptiness of inherent existence is the meaning
of the SlJlfIdhinirmocana-siltra.
The passage in the SaT{ldhinirmocana-sUtra to which this passage probably refers is on D p.
9.1, Lamotte p. 38, and Stog p. 13.5.
It is noteworthy, however, that if Bhavya actually relies on the sutra he does not mention it
by name. In the flfth chapter of his Tarkajvala, for instance, he discusses Yogaciira (the chapter is
entitled "entry into ascertainment of suchness according the the Y ogaciiias", rnal 'byor spyod pa
pa'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa la 'jug pa), but never mentions the name of the sutra,
although he does mention the Dasabhumika-sutra and Dignaga's and quotes
Vasubandhu's Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhafYa. Tsong kha pa's thought that Bhavya is referring to the
Sa1JUlhinirmocana seems to be based on the fact that Bhavya utilizes and discusses terminology
that is found in the sutra (although he does not mention this as a source), and so the implication
from Tsong kha pa' s viewpoint is that the textual referent of his terminology is clear enough that
he did not need to mention the sutra by name.
Jnaoogarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 59
enough that there is no doubt that Bhavya is discussing the Sa1pdhinirmocana-
sutra. He also points to several places where other Madhyamikas, and
Kamalaslla, cite the sutra to support their philosophical positions, which backs up
his contention that the authors of the Svatantrika branch of Madhyamaka treated the
sutra as an authoritative scripture. If, as he contends, Bhavya relied on the Sa1pdhi-
nirmocaoo-sutra and and Kamalasila cited it as a scriptural source that
supported their arguments, then this is good evidence for the Dge lugs pa position
that the sutra is authoritative for this branch of Madhyamaka. Unfortunately, it still
does not settle the question of the doctrinal afflliation of Jiianagarbha, because,
according to the Dge lugs pa doxographers, as a Sautrantika-Svatantrika he would
have to assert the existence of external objects as Bhavya does, but in his com-
mentary on the sutra he indicates that he accepts the sutra's statement that all phe-
nomena are cognition-only (room par rig pa tsam, vijiiapti-mlitra).
In one of the best-known passages of the sutra, Maitreya asks, "Is that image
that is the object of activity of meditative stabilization which is a viewing con-
sciousness different from the mind or is it not different?", to which Buddha replies:
Maitreya, it is said to be not different. Why is it not different? Because that
image is simply cognition-only. Maitreya, I explain that consciousness is
distinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation is cognition-only.34
According to Schmithausen, this may be "the oldest, or at least the oldest extent,
Y ogacara text that clearly expresses universal idealism, "35 and Jiianagarbha' s com-
mentary reflects this idealism:
If you ask, 'How can objects not exist,' [Buddha replies,] 'Because
although objects do not exist, production of cognitions appears.' Although
objects in the past, in the future, and in dreams and so forth do not exist,
productions of cognitions of those appear as such [Le., as existent].36
340 p. 53.3; Stog 75.7.
35Lambert Schmithausen, "On the Problem of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in
Buddhism", in German Scholars on India (Bombay, 1976), p. 240. See also Etienne Lamotte,
Sa1!Uihinirmacana-sutra, p. 211 n. 6 and Schmithausen, "On the Vijtl.aptimiitra Passage in Sal!!-
dhininnocanasutra ViII.7", in Acta Indologica, vol. VI, 1984, pp. 433ff.
p. 322a.6.
60 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
He then goes on to refute objections to the statement that objects of observation are
cognition-only, and he states that in dreams one perceives images that one believes
to be external objects, but these are simply mental creations. He also cites the anal-
ogy of different types of beings who perceive a body of water differently because
of their respective predispositions. Animals such as fish perceive it as a habitat,
human beings perceive it as a place for getting drinking water or for bathing, hun-
gry ghosts (yi dags, preta) perceive it as being fIlled with disgusting substances
such as pus and blood, and gods see it as being of the nature of precious jewels.
The upshot of the analogy is that there is no static external object; rather, each indi-
vidual being perceives objects as a result of predispositions that exist within the
continuum of the mind.
Although the SIUra passage and Jiianagarbha's commentary clearly indicate that
the mind and its objects are non-different, Alex Wayman thinks that the sutra's
statement only applies to the context of meditation and is not a general statement that
applies to all objects.
37
He states that the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra is only describing
how objects appear to meditators during some meditative states, but he thinks that
the text does not extend this to include all phenomena. He categorizes the idea that
this statement of the doctrine of cognition-only indicates a denial of external objects
as "nonsense."38 His contentions, however, are clearly disproven by the sutra and
by Jiianagarbha's commentary.
In the first place, his implicit assumption that the perceptions of meditative
states are somehow less valid than ordinary experiences is odd considering the great
value that Buddhist thinkers place on the insights gained through meditative experi-
ence. For Buddhist meditators, the experiences of meditative states are if anything
more valid than ordinary experiences, and they commonly extend the insights of
meditation to ordinary experience.
39
Indeed, if meditative experience were only valid
37Alex Wayman, "Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians", JIABS, 2.1,1979, p. 68. See also his
review of The Yogiiciira Idealism by A.K. Chatterjee (in PEW, 15, #1,1965, pp. 65-73), in which
he attacks Chatterjee's thesis that the Y ogacaras hold a doctrine of idealism.
38Wayman, "Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians", p. 70.
39 A good description of how this attitude is expressed in the Vi1]1iatikii can be found in INAZU
Kizow's article, "The Concept of Vijilapti and Vijilana in the Text of Vasubandhu's Vi1]1iatikii-vi-
jnaptimatratii-siddhi", inIBK 15.1, pp. 474-468. See also Schmithausen, "Spiritual Practice and
Philosophical Theory in Buddhism", pp. 239-249, where he argues that the SaT{ldhinirmocana-su-
tra and other Y ogacara treatises do not justify doctrines such as cognition-only on the basis of
Jfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 61
in the meditative situation, there would be little point in engaging in meditation in
the first place, since one's experiences would only be meaningful in a limited situa-
tion that would be irrelevant to most of the experiences of oneself and others.
A more fundamental error in Wayman's position can be found by reading the
section following the sutra passage cited above, in which Buddha explicitly extends
the doctrine of cognition-only to all phenomena. Maitreya asks, "Are the forms and
so forth of sentient beings, which abide in the nature of imag,es of the mind, not dif-
ferent from the mind", to which Buddha replies,
Maitreya, they are not different. With respect to those images, because
childish beings with distorted awareness do not know cognition-only just
as it is in reality, they consider them wrongly.40
Jiianagarbha comments,
This indicates that mind appears as an object of observation which is like
an image; [and so Buddha] teaches, 'It is not different from mind.' In order
to indicate the reason, [Buddha] says, "I explain that consciousness is dis-
tinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation (dmigs pa, iiZambana)
is cognition-only." An object of observation is an appearance of mind in
the aspect of an object and, moreover, it is not different from cognition be-
cause it is observed simultaneously.41
The idea that a mind appearing in the aspect of an object and perception of that ob-
ject occur simultaneously is important to Jfianagarbha's argument. In order for there
to be a difference between mind and its objects, there must be a temporal difference
between the arising of an object and the mind's awareness of that object. Jfiana-
garbha argues that there is no such temporal difference and that mind produces
rational arguments; rather, these doctrines "resulted from a generalization of a fact obserVed in the
case of meditation-objects, i.e" in the context of spiritual practice" (p. 241),
40n p. 53.7; Stog p. 76.6. See also Schmithausen, "Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory
in Buddhism", p. 241, where he states, "already in the Sarrzdhinirmocanasutra the ust: of the tenn
[vijiiaptimatra] is not limited to objects of meditation ... the statement that mind (vijiilina) is char-
acterized by the fact that its object is nothing but cognition contains no restriction." See also
HATTORI Maasaki, "Realism and the Philosophy of Consciousness-Only", in EB, vol. XXI #1,
1988, pp. 23-26.
410tani University Press, serns tsam vol. 2, #4033 (bi), p. 321b.4.
62 Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
cognitions of objects from predispositions in the mental continuum. Because of this,
the appearance of an object and awareness of that object occur in the same moment
Similar themes reoccur throughout the commentary. On several occasions, he
clearly indicates that external objects do not exist and that our perceptions of them
are merely the result of mental predispositions. Just as in.dreams, hallucinations,
etc. we perceive non-existent external objects that are purely mental creations, so
also in waking rea1ity we assent to the apparent reality of mental images that appear
as external objects. Waking reality, of course, has a stronger hold on us than dream-
realities, but both are unreal. At no point does Jiianagarbha attempt to argue that
Buddha's intention is not really to propound the idea that external objects do not
exist. Rather, he accepts the sutra passages cited above as straightforward state-
ments that all objects of observation are cognition-only, and he argues against op-
ponents who disagree with this contention.
To return to our earlier discussion of what his commentary on the
Sa'!ldhinirmocana reveals about his doctrinal stance: the numerous statements
asserting universal idealism in the commentary reveal that in this work he under-
stands the sutra as containing an unambiguous denial of external objects. According
to the doxographers of the Dge lugs pa school, this would be inconsistent if he
were a Svatantrika-Madhyarnika, since according to the Dge lugs pas Svatantrikas
assert that external objects exist. Moreover, if we look at the Differentiation of the
Two Truths, it contains no clear statement as to whether he accepts or rejects the
existence of external objects. This leaves open a number of possibilities, including:
(1) the two works may have had different authors; (2) Jiianagarbha only discussed
the doctrine of cognition-only in his commentary on the sutra but did not mention it
in his other work; (3) Jiianagarbha adopted different perspectives in each work; (4)
the Dge lugs pa classification scheme is not pertinent to Jiianagarbha's thought
If a major difference of opinion were found between these two works, this
would be a good reason for rejecting the thesis that they were authored by the same
person, but the texts do not seem to provide enough evidence to draw a conclusion.
Moreover, Tsong kha pa's analysis indicates that Svatantrika-Madhyarnikas rely on
the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra, and so Jiianagarbha's purported Madhyamaka affilia-
tion would not-interfere with his composing a commentary on the sutra.
Thus, he could have written from a mainly Yogacara point of view in his com-
mentary on the Sa'!ldhinirmocana-sutra and from a mainly Madhyamaka point of
view in his Differentiation of the Two Truths. Whether or not he wrote both works,
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 63
it is certain that he was not concerned with presenting either the SViitantrika position
or that of any subdivision within SViitantrika, since these classifications were in-
vented in Tibet and were not recognized by Indian authors such as Jiiiinagarbha.
42
He undoubtedly only saw himself as a Miidhyamika and was probably not as con-
cerned with fme points of doctrinal affiliation as either the Tibetan doxographers or
contemporary scholars. As Donald Lopez has noted, the philosophical situation of
India during Jiianagarbha's time was fairly fluid,43 with a great deal of interaction
and debate between different philosophical schools, and most thinkers were proba-
bly conderned with presenting the most consistent and defensible position possible
,in a particular work, not with how later scholars would classify their doctrinal affil-
iation. In any case, the questions of the philosophical position of Jiianagarbha and
of the authorship of the works attributed to him are too complex to settle here and
require further study.
2. The Translation
As the title of his commentary on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra indicates, Jiiana-
garbha only comments on 'the eighth chapter, "[The Questions of] Maitreya," which
is primarily concerned with the topics of calming (zhi gnas. samatha) and insight
(lhag mthong. vipayana). Jiianagarbha's methodology involves first citing a pas-
sage and then explaining what it means. These explanations are often prefaced with
short phrases that indicate the context of the passage and provide a transition from
the explanation of one passage to the next He often identifies the purpose for Bud-
dha's speaking a particular phrase, and he also often sums up the main point of a
section with a concluding remark about the intent of the section.
Unlike Wonch'uk, he seldom mentions any other texts or authors (the only
quotations are two passages from Perfection of Wisdom Siitras),44 and his explana-
tions seem to be indications of his own .opinions. He states many qualms that could
arise from his explanations or from Buddha's words, and he answers them by
42por a discussion of these doctrinal classifications, see Olle Qvamstrom, Hindu Philosophy in
Buddhist Perspective: The Vediintaviniicaya Chapter of Bhavya' s Madhyamakahrdayakiirikii
(Lund; Plus Ultra, 1989); pp. 96-98.
43Soo Lopez, A Study of Sviitantrika, pp. 446-48 n; 16.
44These are found on pp. 320b and 334b.
64 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
showing that the teachings of the chapter present a coherent system of meditative
theory and epistemology, but he never attributes any of the questions and qualms to
any particular person or persons.
The main text used in the following translation is that publish.ed by Otani
University Press, sems tsam vol. 2, #4033 (bi), pp. 318b-345a, which comprises
fIfty-three pages and is divided into two sections. This has been compared to the
Peking translation (peking #5535, vol. 109, pp. 196.4.1-209.3.8), and every quota-
tion from the sutta has been identifIed in notes.
As with the translation of Asaitga's commentary, for every quotation from the
. sutra the page numbers in both the Sde dge and Stog Palace versions
4S
have been
given so that anyone wishing to fInd the sutra passage in my forthcoming transla-
tion and critical edition of the Tibetan texts of the sutra may do SO.46 There are many
passages in the text that are followed by particles (such as zhes, ces, etc.) which in
Tibetan are used to identify quotations but that do not refer to passages in the
SCl1!Idhinirmocana. These appear to be paraphrases of the sutra, and since they are
not actual quotanons, I have marked them with single quotations marks to distin-
guish them from citations of passages from the sutra, which are indicated with
double quotes. The page numbers in brackets refer to the page breaks inthe Otani
edition.
I have mainly tried to mirror the style and syntax of the text in the translation,
but in many places have taken some liberties in order to make the text more readable
in English. One of the great diffIculties facing a translator of a text like this is the
difference between classical Sanskrit style and the kinds of styles that are acceptable
in contemporary English. Jiianagarbha, like many classical Sanskrit stylists, uses
4SThe Sde dge edition referred to is: Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, vol. milo sde ca; Tohoku
#106; the Stog Palace edition referred to is in The Tog Palace Edition of the Tibetan Kanjw; Leh:
Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod, 1975-1978, vol. 63, pp. 1-160.
46rhe references to the Sde dge text are abbreviated as D, and the references to the Stog Palace text
are abbreviated as Stog. Anyone who compares the quotations of the sutta in JiUlnagarbha's com-
mentary and my translation will find numerous differences. This is due to the fact that the Stog
Palace edition is quite different from the translation found in the Sde dge, Peking, Snar thang,
Lhasa, and Co ne editions of the sutta. These are discussed at length in John Powers, "The Ti-
betan Translations of the Sa7{lf.lhinirmocana-sutra and Blea' 'gyw Research", forthcoming in Cen-
tral Asiatic Journal. I think that in most cases the meanings of the two translations are equivalent
Where this is not the case, I have indicated the differences between the Stog and Sde dge versions
in notes.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 65
long sentences containing a number of interconnected ideas and phrases. Many In-
dian writers considered this to be an elegant and polished style, but teachers of
modern English would generally consider many of Jtianagarbha's passages to be
run-on sentences and would never allow their students to write in this way. In addi-
tion, since there is no extant Sanskrit version of the text, a translator has to rely on
Tibetan translations, which are generally very exacting but are also difficult to read
for this very reason. The Tibetan translators generally attempted to render every
particle, case indicator, etc., and the result is often turgid reading, even by the stan-
dards of philosophical Tibetan. Add to this the differences between Tibetan and
Sanskrit grammar and style, and the problems multiply.
Even more problematic from the translator's point of view, contemporary
English and classical Sanskrit are quite different in grammar and style. Since rela-
tions between parts of a sentence are indicated by case particles in Sanskrit, the
position of words is fairly fluid in comparison to English. In addition, classical
Sanskrit styles allowed and even encouraged writers like Jiianagarbha to write in
ways that would be unacceptable in English, and even to formulate thoughts in
ways that would not occur to English writers. In addition, many of the key terms
Jiianagarbha uses and that informed his worldview and philosophy have no English
equivalents. Thus, the translator faces a difficult choice: to translate the text as lit-
erally as possible or to essentially paraphrase the text in order to make it more palat-
able to contemporary readers. I have chosen the former course, which places a
greater burden on the reader because of the difficulties in the style, but which pre-
serves more of the distinctive techniques and insights of the author. A paraphrase is
often helpful as' an interpretation of a difficult text, but it is not a translation. My
goal has been to prepare a translation, one that mirrors the original as closely as
possible given the differences between the original text and the limitations that
English grammar, vocabulary, and syntax place on the translator.
The style, vocabulary, and thought mark it as a text intended for scholar-monks
who were thoroughly versed in Buddhist philosophy, particularly philosophy of
mind and meditation theory. It also assumes a thorough knowledge of the Sa1pdhi-
nirmocana-sutra and its doctrines, and so undoubtedly would have been difficult
even for many of Jtianagarbha's Buddhist contemporaries. Given the distance be-
tween classical India and the contemporary English-speaking world, for many
readers this commentary will no doubt prove to be difficult reading, but for anyone
interested in the meditational and psychological thought of the Sarrzdhirmocana, this
66 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
is a commentary well worth close study and consideration. It discusses one of the
most important sections of a seminal Buddhist work and provides helpful keys for
interpreting many of its difficult points. It was an invaluable aid in translating the
eighth chapter and helped to clear up some problematic passages ,and guided my
translation of a number of technical terms. More importantly, it is a meticulous and
thorough commentary that provides guidlines and insights that are useful for
anyone seeking to understand the sutta's presentation of meditation theory and its
relation to the nature of mind.
Translation of Jfianagarbha's
Commentary on Just the Chapter
o/the Superior Maitreya

With respect to explaining a little the "Maitreya chapter" from the Superior Sutra
Explaining the Thought, [this is] the first part. Homage to the Superior Maitreya.
Beginning with the presentation of designations of doctrines, [the passage -] "You
should know the divisions of the path of calming (zhi gnas, samatha) and insight
(lhag mthong, vipatyana) , which are included within yoga.'>47 - indicates the path
of yoga through delineating the designations of: (1) nature; (2) cause of application;
(3) development; (4) methods of attainment; and (5) non-degeneration. With respect
to that, whatever is included within [the topic of] yoga is of the nature of the path of
calming and insight
[The phrase,] "This is yoga"48 is [spoken] thinking of the category of ethics.
You should know that the division of the path of calming and insight by way of the
nature of the categories of meditative stabilization (ting nge ' dzin, samiidhi) and
exalted wisdom (ye shes, jiilina) - which are included within the category of ethics
-is [included within] nature and so forth.49
47Th'
IS passage is not found in either D or Stog (or any other Tibetan text of the siitra that I have
consulted).
48nu
s phrase is also not found in any of the Tibetan versions of the siitta.
49
In other words, these are included within the fIrst division listed above. According to Geshe
Yeshe Thabkhe, this means that ethics is the foundation (sa gzhl) of meditative stabilizations and
exalted wisdom.
68 Two Commentaries on the Sa!pdhinirmocana-sutra
Moreover, yoga is reasonable; it is associated with the path of calming and
insight, which is included within the four analyses.
50
"Sa'!ldhinirmocana" means 'cutting the knots of the afflictive obstructions
and the obstructions to omniscience' through definitely freeing (nges par dkrol bas)
the profound thought [of Buddha]. It is a "sutra" because it is simply a complete
statement of what is deflnite ..
With respect to the Bodhisattva Maitreya's posing questions to the Bhagavan
[i.e., Buddha]: This path of calming and insight is the cause of approaching great
enlightenment, and because the Superior Maitreya is also close to great enlighten-
ment, he poses questions to the Bhagavan.
51
After having settled the nature of the path of calming and insight in this way,
[Maitreya's question -] "Bhagavan, abiding in what [and in dependence upon
what] do Bodhisattvas ... "52 - asks about the causes of practice. The causes of
practice are indicated by the abode, the basis, and the object of observation (dmigs
pa, alambana). [319a] [Buddha's response -] "Maitreya, abiding in and depend-
ing upon an unwavering resolution to expound designations of doctrines and to be-
come unsurpassably, perfectly enlightened"53 - indicates the causes of practice by
way of [the discussion of] calming and insight and indicates the conditions of prac-
tice by way of [the discussion of] conditions. Because the statement concerning
designations of doctrines is [an exposition of] the collections of doctrines that are
explained, it is the cause of abiding. Because unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment is
50Yeshe Thabkhe says this means they are purified by the four analyses; (1) analysis of nature
(coos nyid kyi rigs pa); (2) analysis offunctions (bya ba grub pa'i rigs pa); (3) analysis of depen-
dence (ltos pa'i rigs pa); and (4) analysis establishing logical proofs (' thad pa sgrub pa'i rigs pa).
51This seems to contradict the contention of Gung thang <Ikon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me (in his
Drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel rtsom 'phro legs bshad snying po'i yang snying; Samath:
Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1965, pp. 74.6-75.13) that the Bodhisattvas in this siitra (who are
all on the tenth Bodhisattva level) do not actually have these questions, but are questioning the
Buddha for the benefit of other beings for whom the questions and answers are relevant. Since all
these Bodhisattvas have attained the initiation of "great light rays", according to Gung thang, they
have nothing to learn that they do not already know, and so they ask questions for the benefit of
trainees less advanced on the path.
See also Rgyal ba dge 'dun gya mtsho's Rje btsun thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsung 'bum las
drang nges rnam 'byed kyi dka' 'grel dgongs pa'i don rab tu gsal bar byedpa'i sgron me (the copy
I have consulted is a blockprint from the library of H.H. The Dalai Lama, n.d.), p. 6a.3.
52D p. 51.1; Stog p. 72.6.
53D p. 51.2; Stog p. 72.7.
lfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 69
the realized truth body (chos kyi sku, dharma-kliya), aspiration to that is the cause
upon which one depends. This is because aspiration is the prerequisite for all of the
qualities that lead to great enlightenment.
The statement - "The Bhagavan [said,] 'The four things that are objects of
observation of calming and insight are ... "'54 - indicates the cause of practice by
way of the object of observation. With respect to [Buddha's statement,] "analytical
images (rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan, savikalpa-pratibimba);
(2) non-analytical images (rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brnyan, nirvikalpa-prati-
bimba); (3) the limits of phenomena (dngos po'i mtha', vastvanta); and (4) ac-
complishment of the purpose (dgos pa yongs su grub pa, krtyanu:j!hana)":55
"image" (gzugs brnyan, pratibimba) means
56
"similitude" (' dra ba, sadrtya).57 If
you ask, "Of what is it an image," [I reply,] "Of mind": this is because all appear-
ances are just that. With respect to the object of observation, what is present in front
of [the observer] is the analytical image. What is included among internal [objects of
observation] is the non-analytical image. "Thing" (dngos po, vastu) [refers to] the
basis-consciousness (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, lilaya-vijfilina), because in that
minds and mental factors that have bases and objects of observation abide due to
things that are causes and effects.
Because of subsuming the limits of those, that [term] "limits of phenomena"
means "transformational truth body". Also, because "accomplishment of the pur-
pose" accomplishes the aims of oneself and others, entry into [a path of]58 seeing-
that is not obstructed with respect to all objects of knowledge and is non-attached
exalted wisdom - is said to be "accomplishment of the purpose".
S4D p. 5l.3; Stog p. 73.l.
s5D p. 51.3; Stog p. 73.l.
s ~ e Tibetan word is tha tshig. Yeshe Thabkhe equates it with meaning (don).
s7Yeshe Thabkhe says that this is because the image (e.g., a Buddha's truth body) is just visual-
ized internally, through the medium of a meaning-generality (don spyi, artha-siimiinya), and one
only observes it without analyzing it in terms of its final mode of subsistence (gnas lugs).
s7he words in brackets are added in accordance with an oral explanation by Yeshe Thabkhe, who
Connects this with the three things that are abandoned by a path of seeing (mthong lam spangs
gsum): (1) the imputation of true personhood ('jig Ita kun btags); (2) adherence to ethical conduct
(tshul khrims brtul zhugs phyogs 'dzin); and (3) having afflicted doubt (the tshom nyon mongs
can).
70 Two Commentaries on theSarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
[Maitreya's question,] "with respect to those . .. "59 asks, "With respect to those
four objects of observation, which paths [are connected] with which objects of ob-
servation?" [The passage- "the Bhavagan] said: 'One is [an object of observation
of calming]: non-analytical images">60 - [indicates] that these are objects of obser-
vation of calming, since [319b] calming is internal viewing. They are included
among internal [objects of observation] because of how [the mind] engages them.
The passage - "How many are [just] objects of observation of in-
sight? .. [The Bhagavan] said, 'Only one is: analytical images"'61- [indicates that]
they are [objects of observation] of insight because one apprehends signs due to
scattering62 with respect to the object of observation.
63
The passage - "How many are [just] objects of observation of those two?;
[The Bhagavan] said: Two are; what are the two? They are: the limits of phenomena
and accomplishment of the purpose"64 [indicates that] because these two are of
the nature of abandonment and exalted wisdom, they are said to be just objects of
observation of a path that is a union of calming and insight. This is because they are
final fruits.
After having settled the nature of the path of calming and insight and the
causes of practice, in order to teach that a Bodhisattva should seek calming and how
[that Bodhisattva] should become skilled in insight, the passage- "Bhagavan, how
is it that Bodhisattvas abiding in and depending upon these four phenomena that are
objects of observation of calming and insight seek calming and become skilled in
insight?"6S - asks about the attainment of these two. Because calming is of the na-
ture of pacification of mental turmoil, Bodhisattvas should seek it. Because insight
is of the nature of differentiation of phenomena, in order to indicate that they must
be skilled in that, [Buddha] said, "Maitreya, [designations of doctrines that] I [have
stated to Bodhisattvas are] .... "66 "Designations of doctrines [that I] have stated" is
59n p. 51.3; Stog p. 73.2.
60n p. 51.4; Stog p. 73.3.
61n p. 51.4; Stog p. 73.3.
61bis is translated in accordance with the Peking text (p. 197.1.6), which inserts the instrumental
particle kyis here; this is omitted in the Sde dge text.
63In other words, because one fails to foCus on the object of observation and to perceive its final
nature of emptiness, one instead becomes involved in perception of signs and characteristics.
64n p. 51.5; Stog p. 73.4.
65n p. 51.5; Stog p. 73.5.
66n p. 51.6; Stog p. 73.6.
Joonagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 71
the general instruction. Through designations of collections of names, collections of
words, and collections of letters, [Buddha provides] a general presentation of doc-
trines. [The phrase,] "sutta collections ... "67 is the specific instruction.
Question: In what way does hearing well these general and specific teachings of
sutta collections and so forth, apprehending them well, repeating them, analyzing
them them well with the mind, and realizing them well with insight facilitate (rgyur
gyur) the practice of calming? [320a]
[Response:] [Buddha] says, "Remaining alone in an isolated situation .... "68 [They
are] "alone" due to physical isolation (Ius dben pa, kaya-viveka); [they are]
"isolated" due to mental isolation (sems dben pa, citta-viveka). In order to indicate
both that the mind through which they mentally contemplate those doctrines is of
the nature of [those] doctrines and that those doctrines are also of the nature of
mind, [Buddha] says, "engaging [in this practice] in this way and abiding in that
many times ... . "(0 Physical pliancy (Ius shin tu sbyangs pa, kltya-pratrabdhi) arises
from physical isolation. Mental pliancy (sems shin tu sbyangs pa, citta-pratrabdhi)
arises from mental isolation.
Moreover, because of diminishing the afflictions that are objects of abandon-
ment of meditation by way of obtaining mental contemplation of antidotal doctrines
in accordance with how they are taught, [one attains] physical pliancy. Because of
diminishing the afflictions that are objects of abandonment by [a path ofJ70 seeing,
[one attains] mental pliancy. Because [those afflictions] do not exist in that body
and because mental turmoil does not exist [in the mind,] physical and mental pliancy
are called "calming". [The phrase,] "in this way ... "71 makes it definite that
"Bodhisattvas seek calming just through taking doctrines to mind, and not through
other [practices]".
Also, in order to indicate that Bodhisattvas are skilled in insight, [Buddha]
says, ''They [attain] physical pliancy and .... ''72 "They" refers to Bodhisattvas. Those
67
0 p. 51.6; Stog p. 73.6.
68
0 p. 52.1; Stog jJ. 74.2.
69
0 p. 52.2; Stog p. 74.3.
7 ~ e words in brackets are added on the basis of an oral explanation by Yeshe Thabkhe, who ex-
Plains that this practice refers to the preliminary training for the path of seeing.
710 p. 52.2; Stog p. 74.4.
72
0 p. 52.3; Stog p. 74.5.
72 Two Commentaries on the SarruIhinimwcana-sutra
Bodhisattvas abide in and depend upon the attainment of physical pliancy and men-
tal pliancy. [The phrase,] "In accordance with how those doctrines have been con-
sidered''73 [indicates] non-mistaken mental contemplations. "Just those"74 [refers to
the doctrines] indicated previously. "Intemally''75 [means] not externally.
Individual analysis - with respect to phenomena that are mental images
which are meditated on as images that are objects of activity of meditative stabiliza-
tions - is differentiation. Belief is ascertainment (nges par byed pa).
Question: Since, at the level of realization, aspectless phenomena function unitarily
with a mind that has aspects,76 how are individual analysis [320b] and belief
suitable?
[Response: Buddha] states, "Therefore, having abandoned the aspects of
mind .... ''77 This is because aspects of mind are mistaken appearances.
Objection: Because meditative stabilization and wisdom are
78
mental factors (sa
mang po ba)79 due to being always related with mind, if mental aspects do not exist,
in what way do these two arise in relation? Such calming is meditative stabilization,
and insight is wisdom; therefore, if those two do not exist, how are phenomena
suitable to be individually analyzed as mental images?
[Reply:] Here, according to the Proponents of Yogic Practice (mal' byor spyod
pas smras pa; yogacara-vada) - since at the level of understanding [one realizes
that] all minds, meditative stabilizations, wisdoms, and phenomena are not external
objects [and arise] from mind - mind similarly lackS inherent existenct (ngo bo
nyid med pa, nil}svabhliva). The lack of inherent existence of mind is just mind's
absence of being mind [by way of its own character]. It is also said in the Perfection
730 p. 52.3; Stog p. 74.5.
74
0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.5.
75
0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.5.
76Yeshe Thabkhe explains that this means that the mind has no actual external objects (phyi 70/
med), but it appears to have them. Thus the mind takes on the appearances of aspects of external
objects, but mind and its objects are of the same entity.
770 p. 52.3; Stog p. 74.6.
78The Sde dge text has a negative particle rna here, which the Peking text omits. Yeshe Thabkhe
thinks that the Peking reading is the correct one.
"many-grounders"; Yeshe Thabkhe glosses this as referring to mental factors (sems
byung. caitta).
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 73
afWisdom [Satra,] "That mind is non-mind; the nature of the mind is clear light."80
Therefore, [Buddha] says, "Having abandoned the aspects of mind .... "
"Images that are objects of activity of meditative stabilization"8! are [arisen]
from mind and are not external objects. "In those"82 [means] just in those. "Objects
that are known"83 are non-dual objects. "Differentiation"84 is understanding.
"Thorough differentiation"85 etc. [refer to] excellence in terminological enumera-
tion.
86
"Forbearance" is just mental freedom with respect to ascertaining phenomena
that are countless non-dual objects. In [the phrase,] "That is insight",87 "insight"
[means] that because one eliminates the phenomena that are associated with specifi-
cally and generally characterized phenomena, this view is an "insight". [The words,]
"in that way ... "88 mean that when Bodhisattvas are just like this, it is definite that
'they are skilled in insight, and otherwise they are not.'
Mter having settled the attainment of calming and insight, in order to about
the method of attaining it, [Maitreya] asks, "Bhagavan, [321a] prior to ... that
Bodhisattva ... .''89
[The passage,] " ... that is observing the mind''9O refers to "observing signs".
"Internal''9! [refers to] taking to mind what is not an external object. Prior to attain-
ing physical and mental pliancy, one is at the level of practice.
[When Maitreya] asks, "What is that mental contemplation called", [Buddha]
answers, "It is not calming.''92 It is said to be belief that is concordant with calming
and to be a similitude [of calming] because it is a means of attaining calming.
80rn other words, the term "mind" is merely a conventional designatiori, and there is no essence or
entity of mind. The designation "mind" is given to a constantly changing series of mental events,
but mind is actually empty of inherent existence, and so is said to be of the nature of clear light
8!0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.5.
82
0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.5.
83
0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.6.
840 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.6.
85
0 p. 52.4; Stog p. 74.7.
86Yeshe Thabkhe says this means that the mind becomes more skilled in understanding differenti-
ations of phenomena.
870 .
p. 52.5; Stog p. 74.7.
880 p. 52.5; Stog p. 75.1
89
0 p. 52.5; Stog p. 75.1.
90 p. 52.6; Stog p. 75.1.
.
91
0 p. 52.6; Stog p. 75.1.
92
0 p. 52.6; Stog p. 75.2.
74
Two Commentaries on the Sarrzdhinirmocana-sutra
In [the passage,] "Bhagavan, at what point do Bodhisattvas ... ",93 [Maitreya]
says, "prior to attaining physical and mental pliancy," because "body and mind have
not become serviceable".
[Maitreya] asks, "When [a Bodhisattva] is doing internal mental contempla-
tion with respect to the images that are objects of activity of meditative stabiliza-
tions, in accordance with how those phenomena are contemplated ... ''94 because this
is not the completion of preparation. When [Maitreya] asks, "What is that mental
contemplation," [Buddha] answers, "It is not insight,''9S because it is a means of at-
taining insight. You should know that prior to this there are many ways in which
one ascertains designations [of doctrines] by way of not forgetting [Buddha's in-
structions] .
Ascertainment of designations [of doctrines] due to not forgetting meditative
stabilizations that are based on non-conceptual exalted wisdom [is the focus of
Maitreya's question,] "Bhagavan, are the path of calming and the path of insight
different or not different?''96 [Buddha] answers, "Why are these two not different?
Because [insight] observes the mind that is the object of observation [of calm-
ing] .... ''97 The path of calming is not different from the path of insight, because in-
sight observes the mind that is the object of observation [of calming]. With respect
to the path of calming: since insight observes just the mind that is its object of ob-
servation, both the object of observation and the observer are just not different, be-
cause they are of the nature of mind. [The rhetorical question and answer -] "Why
are they not non-different ... ''98 - indicates that they are simply not non-different.
Therefore, [Buddha] says, "Because [insight] observes an analytical image."99
[321b]
The path of calming and the path of insight are different, because that [i.e., in-
sight] observes analytical signs and analytical images in that way.t'JO The statement
93D p. 52.6; Slog p. 75.1.
94D p. 52.7; Slog p. 75.3.
9sD p. 53.1; Stog p. 75.3.
96D p. 53.1; Stog p. 75.5.
97D p. 53.2; Slog p. 75.6.
98D p. 53.2; Stog p. 75.6.
99D p. 53.3; Stog p. 75.7.
loo.rbis passage (' di ltar de ni rnam par rto g pa dang bcas pa mtshan ma dilng bcas pa'i gzugs
brnyan la dmigs pa'i phyir ro) is translated in accordance with Yeshe Thabkhe's oral explanation,
in which he glosses dang bcas ba as meaning yod pa, 10 have.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 75
that those two are of the natllTe of mind indicates that they are just one; and because
[one is] conceptual and [the other is] non-conceptual, [Buddha] states that "they are
just different".1Ol With respect to non-conceptual exalted wisdom's not losing un-
derstanding, [Maitreya] says, "Bhagavan, is that image that is the object of activity
of meditative stabilization which is a viewing consciousness different from the mind
or not different?"102 This asks, 'Are those two - the mind that is an observer and
the observed object, the image that is the object of activity of meditative stabiliza-
tions - different or non-different,' and [Buddha] answers, "they are not
different" .103
By way of indicating the reason [that answers] the question, "why", [Buddha]
says, "Because that image is simply cognition-only."I04
This indicates that mind appears as an object of observation that is like an im-
age; [and so Buddha] teaches, 'It is not different from mind.' In order to indicate the
reason, [Buddha] says, "I explain that consciousness is distinguished by [the fact
that its] object of observation is cognition-only (rnam par rig pa tsam, vijfiapti-
mlitra)."105 An object of observation is an appearance of mind in the aspect of an
object and, moreover, it is not different from cognition because it is observed simul-
taneously.l06
100This appears to refer to 0 p. 53.2 and Stog p. 75.6.
102
0 p. 53.3; Stog p. 75.7.
103
0 p. 53.4; Stog p. 76.1.
104
0 p. 53.4; Stog p. 76.1.
105
0 p. 53.4; Stog p. 76.2.
l ~ i s statement accords with the statement in chapter five of the sutra that an eye consciousness
arises "engaged with, in one instant with, and in the same range as" a mental impression of it.
This is significant in that it indicates that there are at least two places in the text that can be read
as propounding similar statements about the relation of the mind and its objects, statements that
imply that mind and its objects are non-different. This is important because some Western schol-
ars think that the section in the eighth chapter of the SarruJhinirmocana that discusses the doctrine
of cognition-only ,is a later interpolation, but the plausible link between this section and chapter
five suggests that this doctrine is integral to the thought of at least two parts of the text, thus call-
ing into question the idea that this is a later interpolation.
In an oral commentary on this passage, Yeshe Thabkhe expressed the same idea, saying that
if the appearance of an object and its cognition by the mind are simultaneous, then mind and its
objects must be of the same entity (ngo bo gcig), since if they were different substantial entities
there would have to, be a temporal succession.
76 Two Commentaries on the Sa1[ldhinirmocana-sutra
[Objection: The passage -] "If that image which is the object of activity of medi-
tative stabilization ... "1117 - offers a basis of opportunity for dispute because, if the
signs that are realized are agents and the images that are investigated are actions,
then how could those two be suitable to be non-different, since in the world agents
and actions appear differently?
[Reply:] Because they are established as being just non-different in reality,
[Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that. ... "108 "No" indicates an agent, and
"any" indicates an action.
109
Because just one phenomenon is not also several,
[322a] if realizers, analyzers, and actions were real - since individual subtle
particles do not appear among minds and mental factors - then conventionalities
that are agents and actions would also not exist. This is so because of their being
conventionalities [that appear] among compounded phenomena,110 their having
relations, and their being powerless. Moreover, if some autonomous (rang dbang
can) things were non-existent, then due to exaggerated adherence to an agent, deeds
would just be doers, because an agent would not be suitable. Agents, actions, and
deeds would also not be suitable.
Objection: How could the mind that cognizes the aspects of apprehending subject
and apprehended object appear?
Reply: [Buddha] says, "The mind that is generated that way appears as such."1l1
This indicates that 'such cognitions - which arise from seeds of cognition that
from beginningless time are infused with the predispositions for designating appre-
hending subjects and apprehended objects - appear in the aspects of apprehending
subjects and apprehended objects.' In order to clarify the meaning, [Buddha]
teaches the example [of a mirror,] "It is like this: for example .... "112 This indicates
that 'an image in a round mirror does not arise [as a real substantial entity]. But
107D p. 53.4; Stog p. 76.2.
108D p. 53.5; Stog p. 76.3.
109D p. 53.5; Stog p. 76.3.
110
1 have translated this in accordance with the most probable meaning. The passage reads: 'dus pa
dag la yang kun rdzob yin pa'i phyir. I assume that '4us pa refers to' dus byas, compounded phe-
nomena
111D p. 53.5; Stog p. 76.4.
112D p. 53.6; Stog p. 76.4.
I
Joonagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 77
form itself produces the mistaken image. Therefore, the mind thinks, "I see an
image.'''
[Qualm:] With respect to that, there are also proponents [of truly existent external
objects] who say, ['You assert that] in dependence upon a basis - a round mirror
- and a sign - a form - an image that is just like a substantial entity arises. If all
of those bases were non-existent, then how could this example be suitable?'
[Response:] In response to them, [Buddha] says, 'Because objects that are different
from cognitions of aspects of forms and images do not exist.' If you ask, 'Hpw can
objects not exist,' [Buddha replies,] 'Because although objects do not exist, pro-
duction of cognitions appears.' Although objects in the past, in the future, and in
dreams and so forth do not exist, productions of cognitions of those appear as such
[Le., as existent].
Moreover, because one observes different cognitions through the power of
believing in concordance of objects,113 [322b] just mind defmitely appears as an im-
age. As an example: with respect to one phenomenon - a river and so forth -
animals perceive it in the form of an abode. Hungry ghosts (yi dags,preta) perceive
it in the form of pus, etc. People similarly perceive it in the form of water; and gods
similarly perceive it as a place having a nature of vai4urya.
114
[The phrase,]
"Likewise ... "llS [indicates] that, just as the two - form and an image - are not
different but appear to be different, likewise - because they appear simultaneously
with their ascertainment - one ascertains that 'the two, objects of observation and
observers, are determined to be just non-different'
In [the passage -] "Bhagavan, [are the forms and so forth] of sentient be-
ings ... "116 - [the phrase,] "forms and so forth" [refers to] substantial entities like
1l3In other words, the reason for the fact that we tend to perceive similar objects is that we expect
to do so: our minds create realities that make sense and that accord with our expectations. Just as
in dreams we create images and rules that accord with the logic of dreams, so in waking life we
create images and events that accord with the logic of waking !'reality".
114According to Chandra Das (A Tibetan-English Dictionary; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, p.
877), vailjiirya caD refer to three different types of lapis-lazuli: (1) a yellow lapis-lazuli called a
manjuri; (2) a green lapis-lazuli called a sugata; and (3) a white lapis-lazuli called a siinya.
Wonch'uk (vol. ti [118], p. 107.2), quoting Acarya Paramiirtha (Slob dpon Yang dag bden pa),
states that "vailjiirya" is a precious substance of blue color that does not disintegrate when burned.
llSD p. 53.7; Stog p. 76.5. .
116D p. 53.7; Stog p. 76.6.
78 Two Commentaries on the Saf?Ulhinirmocana-sutra
blue and so forth. "Images of the mind" are [images] appearing to the mind. "Abide
in the nature" [means that they] abide in its entity. "Moreover" [refers to] things that
are external objects. What is not different from mind [includes] 'actions and afflic-
tions' and so forth, from which consciousness [gives rise to] actions, afflictions,
and even Demons (bdud, mlJra).ll7
Because those actions
ll8
do not operate differently, one also apprehends them
as being threefold due to the differentiations of virtuous, non-virtuous, and
neutral
1l9
phenomena. With respect to that, [if one asks,] 'Are virtuous actions and
afflictions [different from mind] or [not,' Buddha's] response is, "Maitreya, they
are not different"
Qualm: Why do they appear to be different?
[Response: Buddha] says, "With respect to those images, because childish beings
with distorted awareness do not know cognition-only just as it is in reality, they
consider [them] wrongly."120 This indicates that those childish beings - not
perceiving reality just as it is, corrupted by faulty vision - 'perceive non-existent
external objects as existing in that way'.
In answer to [Maitreya's] question - "At what point do Bodhisattvas soley
cultivate insight?" - [Buddha] says, "At the time of continuous mental contempla-
tion".121 Regarding uninterrupted mind: 'interrupted' [means] obstructed, and 'not
obstructed' [means] uninterrupted. [323a] This is the meaning of 'focusing on the
object of observation' .
With respect to [the question,] "At what point [do Bodhisattvas cultivate] the
two, calming and insight?,,:l22 Insight is simply mental one-pointedness with respect
to the object of observation. Calming is simply internal mental one-pointedness.
By way of asking about the signs of mind, [Maitreya] says, "What are the
signs of mind?"123 [Buddha] answers with the statement, "Maitreya, objects ofob-
117This whole paragraph is omitted in the Peking text, p. 198.4.
1l8Text correction: Sde dge reads: lam; Peking p. 198.4 reads: las.
l1!1.iterally: non-fluctuating, mi g.yo ba.
120D p. 54.1; Stog p. 76.7.
l2lD p. 54.2; Stog p. 77.1.
122D p. 54.3; Stog p. 77.3.
123D p. 54.4; Stog p. 77.4.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 79
servation of insight .... "124 Whatever is an object of observation of insight - a men-
tal image that is a conceptual object of activity of meditative stabilizations - is a
sign of mind, because [mind] apprehends different types of signs.
In answer to the question, "What is an uninterrupted mind,"l25 [Buddha] says,
"Maitreya, it is the object of observation of calming .... " Whatever internally focuses
on an object of observation of calming that observes an image is an "uninterrupted
mind", because this includes all internal objects of observation.
In answer to the question, "What is mental one-pointedness," [Buddha] says,
"that image which is the object of activity of meditative stabilizations .... "126 This in-
dicates that whatever phenomena appear in the aspect of mental images to meditative
stabilizations are not different from mind, because their inherent existence is not
established. Therefore, in [the passage,] "this .. .is cognition-only",1Z7 [Buddha] indi-
cates that this is 'realization of the reality-limit' (yang dag pa' i mtha' , bhuta-kop).
"Realization" [refers to] individual knowledge.
In [the phrase,] "Having realized that, it is also mental contemplation in that
way",I28 "realized that" [means] that one has realized that it is just cognition-only.
After having realized that, realization of suchness is the establishment of mental
one-pointedness, because cognition-only has eliminated [false adherence to] as-
pects. This is because the suchness of mind abides in just its own sphere.
The question concerning the divisions of insight asks, ''Bhagavan, how many
kinds of insight are there?"129 In answer to the question, [Buddha] says, "There are
three kinds." [323b] With respect to the [unspoken] thought, 'What are the three,'
[Buddha] says, "(1) that arisen from signs (mtshan rna las byung ba, nimitta-mayr);
(2) that arisen from searching (yongs su tshol ba las byung ba, parye:jalJii-mayr);
and (3) that arisen from individual investigation (so sor rtog pa las byung ba,
pratyavelqa1Jli-mayr)".l3 That arisen from signs is arisen from hearing. That arisen
124
0 p. 54.4; Stog p. 77.4.
1250 p. 54.4: bar chad rna mchis pa'i sems; Stog p. 77.5: de rna thag pa'i sems.
126
0 p. 54.5; Stog" p. 77.6.
127
0 p. 54.5; Stog p. 77.6.
1280 p. 54.5; Stog p. 77.7.
1290 p. 54.6; Stog p. 77.7.
13
00 p. 54.6; Stog'g translation (p. 78.1) of h e ~ tenns is different, in that las byung ba is omit-
ted: mtshan rna can dang I kun tu tshol ba dang I so sor rtog pa' o.
80 Two Commentaries on the SwruJhinirmocana-sutra
from searching is arisen from thinking. That arisen from individual analysis is
arisen from meditation.!3!
Moreover, four purities are explained: (1) purity of object of observation; (2)
purity of actions;!32 (3) purity of non-defilement;!33 and (4) natural purity. From
among those, differentiation in accordance with purity of object of observation is
[insight] arisen from signs. Differentiation in accordance with purity of actions is
[insight] arisen from searching. Differentiation in accordance with purity of non-
defllement and differentiation in accordance with natural purity are [insight] arisen
from individual analysis.
Moreover, whatever is engaged in the four analytical procedures - (1)
analytical procedure [looking into] dependence, (2) analytical procedure [looking
into] performance of functions, (3) analytical procedure [looking into] logical
correctness, and (4) analytical procedure [looking into] the a t u r c ~ - in dependence
upon what has the signs of the analytical procedure [looking into] dependence and
the causes of the analytical procedure [looking into] performance of functions, is
[insight] arisen from signs. Whatever is engaged in searching in accordance with
the analytical procedure [looking into] logical correctness is [insight] arisen from
searching. Whatever arises from individual investigation of nature (chos nyid,
dharmata) in accordance with the analytical procedure [looking into] the nature is
[insight] arisen from individual analysis.
!3!This refers to an important idea in Buddhist meditation theory, that there are three stages in-
volved in understanding doctrinal teachings. The first, wisdom arisen from hearing (thos pa las
byung ba'i shes rab, srutamayi-prajiiii), occurs when someone hears and studies doctrines. The
second, wisdom arisen from thinking (bsams pa las byung ba'i shes rab, cintiimayi-prajiiii), occurs
when one understands those doctrines through further contemplation. The third, wisdom arisen
from meditation (bsgoms pa las byung ba'i shes rab, bhiivaniimayi-prajiiii), occurs when analytical
meditation and stabilizing meditation are in harmony, that is to say, when there is a union of
calming and insight. These are discussed at length by Wonch'uk (vol. thi [119], pp. 339-347).
See also: Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom, 1983) pp. 92-94; Louis
de la Vallee Poussin, tr., L'Abhidharmalcosa de Vasubandhu (paris, 1924), ch. 6, pp. 143 and
159; and Walpola Rahula, tr., La Compendium de la Super-Doctrine d' Asmiga by Walpola Rahula
(paris, 1971), p. 134. Etienne Lamotte provides a bibliography of these terms in La Somme du
Grand Vihicule d' Asa/iga (Louvain, 1973) notes p. 7*.
!32>yext correction: the Sde dge text (p. 323b.2) reads: 10m mam par dag pa; emended to los rnom
par dag pa in accordance with the Peking text (p. 199.2.2). '
!3J.yext correction: the Sde dge text reads: dr; mam par dag pa; emended to to dr; ma med pa
mam par dag pa on the basis' of its occurrence in the next sentence as dri ma med pa.
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 81
In response to the question, "What is [insight] arisen from signs", [Buddha]
says, "It is that insight which takes to mind just an analytical image that is the object
of activity of a meditative stabilization. "
134
1bis indicates that - with respect to phe-
nomena such as heard objects of meditative stabilizations that are conceptual and
analytical and so forth - any insight that takes to mind any image having the signs
of a pure object of observation is "arisen from signs".
In response to the question, "What is [insight] arisen from searching,"
[Buddha] says, "With respect to this and that. ... "135 [The phrase,] "with respect to
this and that" [refers] to the entities of mental images.
In [the passage,] " ... understood well through wisdom Oust those phenomena
that] were not well understood":136 [324a] Wisdom [means] a pure path. It
[operates] with respect to non-observational phenomena. "That" is said to [refer to]
"phenomena". "Just those" [means] 'just mental images.' Any insight of
Bodhisattvas which mentally contemplates [its object] through understanding it well
is [insight] arisen from searching.
In answer to the question, "What is [insight] arisen from individual investiga-
tion," [Buddha] says, "With respect to this and that.. .. "137 "With respect to this and
that" [means] 'with respect to differentiation by way of cognition-only.' "Through
wisdom" [means] 'through supramundane wisdom.' Because - with respect to
meditational phenomena that are realized well as they are ascertained - liberative
objects of knowledge - purity of non-affliction and natural purity - abandon the
afflictive obstructions, the mind is liberated. Thus, due to the purity of non-affliction
and abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience, wisdom is liberated. Thus,
that natural purity connects one with complete, perfect happiness. Thus, [Buddha]
says, "That insight which takes to mind [its object] is [insight] arisen from individ-
ual investigation."
[in response] to the question, "With respect to calming, how many kinds are
there," [Buddha] says, "through engagement with that uninterrupted mind .... "138
134
0 p. 54.6; Stog p. 78.1.
13S0 p. 54.7; Stog p. 78.2.
136
0 p. 54.7; Stog p. 78.2.
1370 p. 54.7; Stog p. 78.2.
1380 p. 55.2; Stog p. 78.3.
82 Two Commentaries on the SG1'Jldhinirmoeana-sutra
The arising of uninterrupted insight from a mind of meditative equipoise is an
"uninterrupted mind".
[The statement -] "Moreover, it is said to be of three kinds"139 - [refers to
insight] arisen from signs, [insight] arisen from searching, and [insight] arisen from
individual investigation, because these are the three kinds of insight. You should
know that calming is also of three kinds. Because they are internal operations and
because they are subtle factors, [Buddha] does not describe their characteristics.
[The passage,] "Alternatively, there are eight kinds of calming ... "140 indicates
a division. Because there is an eightfold division that subsumes the divisions of the
[four] concentrations and the [four] formless absorptions, calming is also explained
as being of eight types. [Buddha says,] "Alternatively, there are four kinds [of
calming]"141 because immeasurable love, [immeasurable] compassion, [immeasur-
able] joy, [324b] and immeasurable equanimity are internal mental operations.
Because they are entities that pacify agitated minds - such as harmful intent and so
forth - they are explained as being calming.
Also - by way of asking about the division of the two, calming and insight
that dwell on doctrines and that do not dwell on doctrines - [Maitreya] says,
"Bhagavan, when you say, 'calming and insight that dwell on doctrines .... "'142 In
[Buddha's answer -] "due to engagement with the signs of doctrines as sutra col-
lections etc.
143
are apprehended and contemplated" - "signs of doctrines" (ehos kyi
mtshan ma, dharma-nimitta) [refers to] words, letters, and so forth. "Meanings"
are reasons (rgyu mtshan, hetu) that are meanings. This indicates that calming and
insight - [focusing] on meanings after having focused on the signs of doctrines of
sutra collections etc. that are apprehended and contemplated - abide in doctrines.
Thus, [Buddha] teaches that 'they are interested in doctrines due to focusing on
meanings'. "Without relying on doctrines that are apprehended and contemplat-
ed ... "I44 [means] 'not apprehending doctrines such as sutra collections and so
139D p. 55.2; Stog p. 78.3.
140D p. 55.2; Stog p. 78.4.
141D p. 55.3; Stog p. 78.6.
142D p. 55.4; Stog p. 78.7.
143The Sde dge text reads: mdo'i sde la sogs pa. This is not found in D, Stog, or any other
Tibetan text of the sutra.
144D p. 55.5; Stog p. 79.1.
ffilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 83
forth.' "From others"145 [means] from other causes, not by the power of one's own
causes. In [the phrase,] "instructions and teachings": speech that is understood is
instruction.
Objection: Hearing [doctrines] from others is also just [calming and insight] that
abide in doctrines, because of being engagement with doctrines propounded by
others.
[Response:] This is not engagement through the power of apprehending doctrines
such as siitta collections etc., but it is engagement due to the cause of faith in others,
because doctrines are not ascertained. Therefore, it is not [calming and insight] that
dwell on doctrines.
[The words -] "It is like this: [calming and insight fOCusing on] discolored
corpses or ... "146 - [indicate that] they do not receive instructions from others due
to faith, because calming and insight that meditate on ugliness and so forth focus on
them through exertion. Therefore, this is not [calming and insight] that dwell on
doctrines.
. [The passage -] "Maitreya, with respect to that ... "147 - indicates that
Bodhisattvas of sharp faculties, who relate to doctrines in accordance with how they
have heard and apprehended them, [325a] cultivate the arising of calming and in-
sight that dwell on doctrines through the power of their own minds. Therefore,
[Buddha] teaches that they are 'non-reversible'.l4
8
[The phrase,] "In dependence upon [calming and insight] that do not dwell on
doctrines ... "149 indicates that Bodhisattvas who initially are not able to hear and ap-
prehend doctrines - such as siitta collections etc. - and who relate to [doctrines]
through faith because of others [teaching them] are of dull factulties. Therefore, be-
cause they are suitable to be motivated by others, [Buddha] teaches, 'I do not desig-
nate [these Bodhisattvas as being of sharp faculties],.
By way of asking about the division of [calming and insight] which observe
doctrines that are unmixed and which observe doctrines that are mixed, [Maitreya]
1450 .
p. 55.5; Stog p. 79.2.
146
0 p. 55.5; Stog p. 79.2.
147
0 p. 55.7; Stog p. 79.4.
148This tenn (phyir mi Idog pa, avaivartika) may also mean that they are ''not in conflict with" or
"not turned away from" a correct understanding of doctrine.
149
0 p. 55.7; Stog p. 79.5.
84 Two Commentaries on the SaTJUihinirmocana-siUra
says, "Bhagavan, [ what are] calming and insight that observe doctrines that are
unmixed ... "ISO [The phrase -] "doctrines in accordance with how they have appre-
hended and considered them"151 - indicates that cultivation - of calming and in-
sight with respect to those doctrines of slitra collections etc. that are apprehended
and considered in terms of the aspects of emptiness and so forth - are "calming
and insight which observe doctrines that are unmixed"
[The phrase, "calming and insight] that observe each of the individual doc-
trines of sutTa collections etc."152 refers to [calming and insight] that observe [their
objects] within dwelling on different doctrines of sutTa collections etc. In [the
phrase,] "If ... doctrines of sutra collections etc.", "all of these doctrines" [refers to]
those sutTa collections etc. that were indicated previously.
[The phrase,] "flow into suchness"153 [means that] they are inclined toward
suchness. [The phrase,] "descend into suchness"154 [means that] they are mainly
concerned with suchness. [The phrase,] "have descended into suchness"155 means
that they 'have gone into suchness'. This indicates that all of those phenomena [Le.,
enlightenment, nirviII).a, and transformation of the basis] 'are of one taste with such-
ness'. "Suchness" refers to the naturally pure realm of truth.
In [the passage,] "flow into enlightenment ... ",156 'enlightenment' [refers to]
supramundane conceptual exalted wisdom. In [the phrase,] "flow into transforma-
tion of the basis" (gnas gyur, asraya-parlivrtti),157 basis [refers to] the qualities of a
Buddha; [transformation occurs] through the power of the [ten] levels (sa,
and the [ten] perfections (poo rol tu phyin pa, pliramitli). [325b] "Transformation
of the [refers to] the truth body.
In [the phrase] - "All these doctrines of sutra collections etc ... virtuous doc-
trines ... "158 - "virtuous doctrines" [means that] they are ultimately virtuous, be-
cause the point at which one understands that their nature is of the nature ofnirviII).a,
150D p. 56.1; Stog p. 79.6.
l5lD p. 56.2; Stog p. 80.I.
152D p. 56.2; Stog p. 80.I.
153D p. 56.3; Stog p. 80.3.
154D p. 56.3; Stog p. 80.3.
155D p. 56.3; Stog p. 80.3.
156D p. 56.4; Stog p. 80.3.
157D p. 56.4; Stog p. 80.4.
!S8D p. 56.5; Stog p. 80.5.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 85
and that their nature is virtuous because they are of the nature of the path is the point
at which one [understands] scripture. "Innumerable" [means] measureless.
The uncontaminated realm of truth [is such] because of being unrestricted.
[The virtuous doctrines] are "measureless" because of their innumerability. This is
because they completely transcend enumeration. "Expressed through the manifest
expression" [means that] such uncontaminated doctrines are expressed through
manifest expression.
[The phrase,] "that .. .is calming and insight which observe doctrines that are
mixed"159 [refers to] calming and insight that observe collected doctrines.
By way of asking about the divisions of [calming and insight] which observe
doctrines that are a little mixed, very mixed, and immeasurably mixed, [Maitreya]
says, "Bhagavan, [when you designate] calming and insight which observe doc-
trines that are a little mixed. ... "160
[Buddha's response,] "Maitreya, beginning with sutra collections ... "161 an-
swers this [question]. After one has lumped together into one the beginning, mid-
dle, and end of what one has apprehended of any doctrines of sutra collections etc.,
calming and insight that mentally contemplate [those doctrines] are to be known as
being "[calming and insight] which observe doctrines that are a little mixed".
[Buddha] states this 'because they do not observe all doctrines'.
[The phrase -] "as many sutra collections etc. as one has apprehended"I62-
indicates that after one has lumped into one each and every [doctrine] of h o s ~ sutta
collections etc., that mental contemplation is to be known as being calming and in-
sight observing doctrines that are very mixed, 'because they observe all the doc-
trines of sutta collections etc. ' .
[B uddha' s] teaching - "the teachings of doctrines of the Tathagatas are num-
berless ... "163 - indicates that, because the teachings of the Tathagatas refer to all
objects of observation, [326a] they completely gladden the thoughts of all beings
Who are trainees everywhere and at all times; thus, they are "measureless in their in-
IS9n p. 56.5; SlOg p. 80.6.
160n p. 56.5; SlOg p. 80.6.
161n p 56.7; SlOg p. 81.1.
162n p. 57.1; Stog p. 81.3.
163n p. 57.2; Stog p. 81.4.
86 Two Commentaries on the Sa"ulhinirmocana-sutra
crease". The measureless words and letters of doctrines and the measureless
progress of wisdom and inspiration are like this.
[The phrase,] "lumped into one"l64 means that - due to the non-observabiIity
of the reality of doctrines -'- calming and insight that treat them as. being of one taste
are known to be "[calming and insight] which observe doctrines that are immeasur-
ably mixed"
[Maitreya's question] - "Bhagavan, at what point do Bodhisattvas [attain
calming and insight which observe doctrines that are mixed]"16S - is a question
about the cause of attainment of that. [Buddha's answer-] "Maitreya, you should
know that they attain them through five causes ... " - indicates the cause of
attainment
In [the passage] - "When mentally contemplating, they destroy all of the
bases of the assumptions of bad states (gnas ngan. len gyi 'ching ba, d a ~ ! u l y a
bandhana) in each moment" - assumptions of bad states are of two kinds: (1) as-
sumptions of bad states that are afflictions such as desire and so forth; and (2) as-
sumptions of bad states that are afflictions such as [wrong] views and so forth. The
basis of those is the basis-consciousness. Because calming and insight which ob-
serve doctrines that are mixed are antidotes to these two assumptions of bad states,
they serve to destroy the bases of these. They get rid of various conceptions.
With respect to [the phrase,] "attain joy in the joyousness of doctrine":I66 Be-
cause one is separated from the defilements of assumptions of bad states, due to
physical and mental pliancy one attains joy in the joyousness of doctrines that are
. separated from various [wrong] discriminations. "They understand well that the ap-
pearances of doctrines are measureless in the ten directions and that their aspects are
not limited ... " because they ascertain measureless doctrines well.
With respect to [the passage,] "The non-imaginary signs that are partially con-
cordant with purification - these being endowed with accomplishment of the pur-
pose - arise in them":I67 this is because they purify the view [that mistakenly sees]
the aspects of [a self of] persons and of phenomena. Because an exalted knowledge
of all aspects is a cause of accomplishing the aims of oneself and others, it is an
164
0 p. 57.2; Stag p. 81.3.
165
0 p. 57.3; Stag p. 81.5.
166
0 p. 57.4; Stag p. 81.7.
167
0 p. 57.5; Stag p. 82.1.
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 87
'accomplishment of the purpose'. [326b] When one understands a portion of that,
the non-imaginary aspects of signs that are concordant with that arise due to one's
faith.
In [the passage,] "For the sake of attaining, perfecting, and completing the
truth body, they grasp the causes of increasing goodness, the greatest auspicious-
ness":l68 on the first level, one realizes the truth body. On the third level one attains
it. On the tenth level one completes it. On the Tathagata level, one perfects it be-
cause one brings it to completion. With respect to [the term] "cause": Through culti-
vating the [ten] levels and the [ten] perfections one defmitely emerges [from cyclic
existence].
[The phrase,] "increasing goodness, the greatest auspiciousness"169 [means
that] through realizing [the truth body] one attains it; through attaining it one com-
pletes it; through completing it one increasingly perfects it; through greater auspi-
ciousness one becomes very auspicious.
Also, by way of asking about the divisions of these two, [Maitreya] says,
"Bhagavan, on what level.. .. "170 In [Maitreya's next question, the phrase,]
"meditative stabilizations that are conceptual and [merely] analytical"171 [means] that
just coarse mind is conceptual. Just the fourth is analytical.
In [the passage -] "In accordance with how they are apprehended and ... "172
- [the phrase,] "the signs of those" indicates that 'calming and insight - which
observe the signs of doctrines of sutra collections etc. in accordance with how they
are apprehended, investigated, and analyzed, which are analytical in the sense of ex-
periencing clear and coarse [signs,] - are meditative stabilizations that are concep-
tual and analytical. '
In [the phrase,] "signs of those",173 "those" [refers to] the signs of doctrines of
sutra collections etc. that are apprehended in accordance with how [Bodhisattvas]
have aprehended, investigated, and analyzed them. With respect to that, because this
[apprehension] is non-conceptual, it is a signless [apprehension] that is clear and
168n p. 57.5; Stog p. 82.2 reads: "For the sake of completing and accomplishing the truth body,
they grasp the causes of increasing goodness, the greatest auspiciousness."
169n p. 57.5; Stog p. 82.2.
l70n p. 57.7; Stag p. 82.5.
l71n p. 58.1; Stog p. 82.5.
172n p. 58.1; Stog p. 82.6.
173n p. 58.2; Stog p. 83.1.
88 Two Commentaries on the Sf!Ulhinimwcana-sutra
coarse. This indicates that 'analytical calming and insight - which experience the
subtle in the sense of merely following that which appears - are non-conceptual
and merely analytical meditative stabilizations.'174
In [the passage,] " ... in all respects with regard to the signs of those .. .",17S
"they experience doctrines spontaneously in all respects with regard to the signs of
those" [327 a] because they unify the continuum of the mind, because conceptuality
and analysis are pacified, and because they have mental engagement that experi-
ences doctrines spontaneously without apprehending the signs of doctrines of sutra
collections etc. Thus, [Buddha] teaches that 'such calming and insight are non-con-
ceptual and non-analytical meditative stabilizations.'
[The phrase,] "Moreover, [calming and insight] arisen from searching .. ."176
indicates that 'on the level of conceptuality and analysis, calming and insight-
arisen from searching with respect to doctrines that are conventional and ultimate
truths - are conceptual and analytical meditative stabilizations.' "[Calming and in-
sight] arisen from individual analysis are non-conceptual and merely analytical
meditative stabilizations"177 because of analyzing individually and in detail the doc-
trines of sutra collections etc. "Calming and insight which observe doctrines that are
mixed are non-conceptual, non-analytical meditative stabilizations"178 because all
doctrines are of one taste in terms of their suchness. Thus [calming and insight] en-
gage them spontaneously.
[Maitreya's question -] "Bhagavan, what is the cause of calming?"179-
asks about the cause of apprehending calming and insight and about the cause of
equanimity. In [Buddha's answer -] "Maitreya, when the mind is excited or ... "180
- "excited" [means] not pacified. [The phrase,] "qualms that it will be excited"
[refers to] scattered thoughts. [The phrase,] "phenomena that are concordant with
174The translation of this phrase follows the Peking text, p. 201.1.1: de soong ba' 0 la spyir dren
pa tsam phra mo myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa' i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gang yin pa de ni rtog
pa med cing dpyod pa tsam gyi ting nge 'dzin yin 00 zhes ston to; Sde dge reads: de soong ba' 0
la phyir dran pa tsam phra mo myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa' i zhi goos dang lhag mthong gang yin
pa de ni rtogs pa med cing dpyod pa tsam gyi ling nge 'dzin yin no zhes ston to.
17SD p. 58.3; Stog p. 83.2.
176D p. 58.4; Stog p. 83.3.
177D p. 58.4; Stog p. 83.4.
I78D p. 58.5; Stog p. 83.4.
179D p. 58.5; Stog p. 83.5.
180D p. 58.6; Stog p. 83.5.
Jfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 89
sobering phenomena" [refers to] the aspects of [true] sufferings and [true] sources.
[The term] "uninterrupted mind"181 [means] that the mind does not observe mental
objects.
In [the passage] - "Maitreya, [when] the mind becomes lax or ... "!82-
"mental laxity" [means that the mind] degenerates due to lethargy and sleep. [The
phrase,] "suspects that it will become lax" indicates what is concordant with laxity.
"Pleasing phenomena" are the aspects of [true] cessations and [true] paths. [The
phrase,] "signs of the mind" refers to 'the signs of a mind that observes pleasing
phenomena'. [327b]
After having explained the causes of calming and the causes of apprehending
[it,] by way of [the passage -] "Maitreya, when a path that is singly dedicated to
insight, or is singly dedicated to insight, or even one that is a union of those
two ... "183 - [Buddha] indicates the cause of equanimity. [The phrase,] "not
afflicted by the secondary afflictions that are those two" indicates the differences
between those three kinds of paths. When the mind spontaneously engages in a path
that is not defiled by excitement, contrition, lethargy, or sleep, that spontaneous
mental contemplation is said to be "the cause of equanimity".
[Maitreya's] question - "Bhagavan, when Bodhisattvas cultivating calming
and insight know doctrine and know the meaning, in what way do they know doc-
trine? In what way do they know the meaning?"I84 - asks about the division of the
natures of doctrines and meanings. Doctrine is the basis, and meaning is [not]l8s the
basis. Therefore, [Buddha's answer] - "Maitreya" they know doctrine by way of
five aspects ... "186 - initially indicates the division of transformational doctrines.
I8!Sde dge and Lamotte's citation of this passage read: bar chad rned pa'i sems. Stog, however,
reads: "immediately preceding mind" sems kyi de rna thag pa. The explanation in the commentary
indicates that Jiiiinagarbha would favor Sde dge and Lamotte's reading of "uninterrupted mind".
The probable Sanskrit equivalents of bar chad med pa and de rna thag pa are close (anantara and
anantarya), and so Stog's reading may have been a mistake on the part of its translators, or per-
haps they saw the two terms as being equivalent.
182D p. 58.7; Stog p. 83.6.
I83Dp. 58.7; Stog p. 84.1.
184D p. 59.1; Stog p. 84.2.
185The negative particle rna is not found in the Sde dge text, p. 327b.4, but is found in the Peking
text, p. 201.3 .. 3. Yeshe Thabkhe indicates that the Peking reading is the more probable one.
186D p. 59.2; Stog p. 84.3.
90 Two Commentaries on the Sfl1!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
Alternatively, with respect to the nature of doctrine, there are two kinds: (1)
doctrines that are explained and (2) doctrines that are realized. Because doctrines
that are explained are the foundation of doctrines that are realized, and because doc-
trines that are explained also are of the nature of names, words, specifics, and col-
lections, [Buddha] teaches, "words and ... "I87
In [the passage -] "What are names? They are what are designated to af-
flicted and purified phenomena as actual and specific names"188 - 'afflicted phe-
nomena' are desire and so forth. Purified phenomena are faith and so forth. With
respect to those, 'desire' and 'faith' are actual nominal designations. [The expres-
sions -] 'Desire also should be known', or '[Desire] should be abandoned' - are
specific nominal designations. [328a] Similarly, [the expressions -] 'Faith should
be cultivated', or ['Faith should be cultivated] many times' - are specific nominal
designations. That is [the aspect of] names.
With respect to [the passage,] "What are words? They are bases and supports
that reside in and depend upon collections of just these names for the sake of imput-
ing conventions with regard to objects that are afflicted and purified":189 [the state-
ment -] 'Attachment to the Desire [Realm,] the Form [Realm,] and the Formless
[Realm] are to be abandoned' - is a collection of names. Collections of names of
purified phenomena are similarly indicated [The statement,] 'Faith in the connection
between the actions and results of non-sentient beings is virtuous' is like this.
[The passage] - "What are letters? They are the letters that are the bases of
these two"190 - means that particles that are letters are the bases of names and
words.
[The passage -] "What is individual knowledge? It is individual knowledge
due to mental contemplation that observes unmixed [doctrines]"191 - indicates that
1870 p. 59.3; Stog p. 84.4.
1880 p. 59.3; Stog p. 84.4 reads: "What are names? They are what are designated as actual names
to afflicted and purified phenomena."
1890 p. 59.3; Stog p. 84.5 reads: "What are words? They are what reside in and depend upon col-
lections of just these names for the sake of imputing conventions with regard to affliction and
purification."
190D p. 59.4; Stog p. 84.6.
1910 p. 59.4; Stog p. 84.6 reads: "What is knowledge in the aspect of individuality? It is knowl-
edge due to mental contemplation that observes unmixed [doctrines]."
Jnanagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 91
words of doctrines of excellent stltra collections etc., which are arrangements of
names, words, and letters, are apprehended individually.
[The passage -] "What is individual knowledge by way of collections? It is
individual knowledge due to mental contemplation that observes mixed [doc-
trines]"192 - indicates that after one has unified those collections of doctrines of
si.itra collections etc., they are apprehended.
After having explained how Bodhisattvas who cultivate calming and insight
individually know doctrines, in order to indicate the aspects through which they in-
dividually know meanings, [Buddha] states in detail, "Bodhisattvas individually
know objects by way of ten aspects, by: (1) their varieties .... "193
With respect to [the passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that, these which are
the fmal divisions, in all respects, of afflicted and purified phenomena, are the va-
rieties":I94 Among the afflicted are desire and so forth. [328b] Among the purified
are faith and so forth. The enumerated aspects of those afflicted and purified phe-
nomena are their varieties; the final divisions of their aspects are their modes.
In [the passage,] " ... these are ... "195 [the varieties of] the aggregates include all
the aggregates of afflicted and purified phenomena, which [are included] within the
five aggregates.
With respect to [the passage,] "The six internal sense spheres indicate the pro-
found; the six external sense spheres indicate enjoyments ... ":196 You should under-
stand that the sense faculties (dbang po, indriya) and so forth are subsumed by the
five-fold enumeration.
With respect to "the varieties": The existence of afflicted and purified phe-
nomena - [differentiated] in accordance with the varieties of phenomena - is [the
category of] "the varieties".
192D p. 59.5; Stog p. 84.7 reads: ''What is knowledge in the aspect of collection? It is knowledge
due to mental contemplation that observes mixed [doctrines]."
193D p. 59.6; Stog p. 85.2.
194D p. 59.7; Stog p. 85.3.
195D p. 60.1; Stog p. 85.4.
1 9 ~ i s passage is not found in D, SlOg, or Lamotte. The passage to which this probably refers is
found in D p. 60.1, SlOg p. 85.5: "Moreover, these are: 'the fivefold enumeration of the aggre-
gates, the sixfold enumeration of the internal sense spheres, and also the sixfold enumeration of
the external sense spheres', and so forth."
92 Two Commentaries on the SaTJIdhinirmocana-sutra
[The passage -] "Maitreya, with respect to that, the suchness of just those
afflicted and purified phenomena is the way that they really exist"197 - indicates
that at the point where one analyzes afflicted and purified phenomena, their
unmistaken [mode of] existence, just as it is, is "the way they really exist".
[The phrase,] "Moreover, it has seven aspects"198 indicates another division.
In [the phrase,] "the suchness of arising", continuous engagement in afflictions, ac-
tions, and births is 'arising'. "Suchness" is not different from that aspect. This indi-
cates non-mistaken nature.
[The phrase,] "the beginninglessness and endlessness of compounded phe-
nomena"199 indicates the absence of a former and later limit. With respect to [the
passage -] "The suchness of character is the selflessness of persons and the
selflessness of phenomena in all phenomena":2oo "all phenomena" are the
compounded and the uncompounded. With respect to that, among individual
compounded phenomena, a person does not exist within each subtle atom or among
all minds and mental factors. [329a] Also, among whatever is uncompounded-
space, analytical cessations, and non-analytical cessations - a person does not
exist. Therefore, the character of phenomena is the non-existence of a self of
persons.
"The suchness of cognition is [the fact that] compounded phenomena are
cognition-only"ZOI because internal and external things are distinguished by being
cognition-only.
In [the passage] - "The suchness of abiding is explained by me as true suf-
ferings"Z02 - "abiding" [means that] selfless phenomena
zo3
abide in time and so
forth. This is because all of those are not concordant with true sufferings with re-
spect to Superiors.
197D p. 60.2; Stag p. 85.5.
198D p. 60.2; Stag p. 85.6.
199D p. 60.2; Stag p. 85.7.
200D p. 60.3; Stag p. 85.7.
zolD p. 60.3; Stag p. 85.7.
zo2D p. 60.3; Stag p. 86.1.
Z03The Tibetan reads: bdag po med pa'; chos; Yeshe Thabkhe equates this with bdag med pa';
coos.
Jiiltnagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 93
In [the passage -] "The suchness of distorted establishment is explained by
me as true sources''204 - distorted establishment is of the nature of delusion and so
forth [which misconceive] the selfless as [having] a self; therefore, it is the cause of
the sufferings of manifestation and birth.
With respect to [the passage,] "The suchness of purification is explained by
me as true cessations";20S Because it eliminates adventitious imputations that are im-
pure phenomena, it is [called] purification.
With respect to [the passage,] "The suchness of correct establishment is ex-
plained by me
206
as true paths";207 Because correct establishment is the antidote to
distorted establishment, it is a pure path that pacifies the delusion of a self and so
forth.
[The passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that ... ''208 indicates how these such-
nesses are differentiated. [The passage,] " ... the suchness of arising ... " explains
this in detail. Because all sentient beings increase
209
the predispositions for the view
of personal existence, [Buddha] teaches, 'Due to the suchness of arising and so
forth, [all sentient beings] are similar and equal.'
With respect to [the passage,] "Due to the suchness of character and the such-
ness of cognition, all phenomena are similar and equal"; This is because all phe-
nomena have a character that is an absence of a self of persons [329b] and because
they are distinguished as being cognition-only.
[The passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that .. .''210 [refers to] the three en-
lightenments [of Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Mahayanists]. The suchness of
purification indicates that they are similar and equal, because they are similar in
terms of the natures of their cessations.
Objection; Why should they be similar, since - although a liberated Buddha
works for the benefit of sentient beings by way of the characteristics of the truth
body -liberated Hearers and Solitary Realizers do not.
2040 p. 60.4; Stog p. 86.1.
205
0 p. 60.4; Stog p. 86.2.
206Text correction: the Sde dge text reads las; emended to ngas.
207
0 p. 60.4; Stog p. 86.2.
208
0 p. 60.5; Stog p. 86.3.
209The Tibetan term is brtas pa. According to Yeshe Thabkhe, this equals rgyas pa in this passage.
210
0 p. 60.5; Stog p. 86.5.
94 Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ul.hinirmocana-sutra
[Response:] Liberated Buddhas are differentiated by the force of former vows, but
liberated Hearers and so forth are not For example: although knotted cloth and un-
knotted cloth are similarly placed together in a dyeing vessel, by the power of this,
bright color appears in the knotted [cloth,] but not in the unknotted [cloth].
Similarly, even though they are similarly placed in the dyeing vessel of
due to the power of this, the of Buddhas are differentiated, but the
of Hearers and so forth are not. Therefore, in the similarity of their purifi-
cations they are liberated, but in terms of the truth bcxly - which is just an uncom-
mon sovereignty - they are not
[The phrase] - "Maitreya, with respect to that, due to the suchness of correct
establishment ... "211 - indicates that wisdoms that are included within
212
calming
and insight which observe doctrines that are mixed are similar and equal, because
wisdom is the antidote to all obscurations. This indicates that, due to the suchness
of correct establishment, the way that things really exist is "similar and equal" [in all
things].
In the context of [discussing] objects that are apprehenders, [Buddha] says,
"Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are apprehenders are the following phe-
nomena: (1) the five physical sense spheres .... "213 [Buddha says that] because the
five physical [sense spheres] are the five: eyes and so forth. These are included
within the aggregate of form.
Phenomena that are: mind, sentience, consciousness, and mental factors
[330a] are also just [discussed] in the context of objects that are apprehenders. This
is because mind [refers to] the basis-consciousness. Sentience (yid, manas) [refers
to] afflicted [sentience] (nyon mongs pa can [gyi yid], Conscious-
ness [refers to] the six operating consciousnesses. Mental factors are feeling and so
forth [Le., the fifty-one mental factors].214 These are apprehenders because they are
of a type that has objects of observation.
Mter having explained objects that are apprehenders, in the context of
[discussing] objects that are apprehended, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect
21lD P 60.7; Slog p. 86.6.
21ZSee p. 329a.3.
2l3D p. 61.1; Stog p. 86.7.
214Por a list of the fifty-one mental factors, see: Elizabeth Napper and Lati Rinbochay, Mind in
Tibetan Buddhism (Valois, New York: Snow Lion, 1980), pp. 35-39.
JnanagarbJul's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 95
to that, objects that are apprehended are ... .''2IS The 'six external sense spheres'-
fonns, sounds, scents, tastes, tangible objects, and phenomena - are apprehended.
In order to indicate that all phenomena are apprehended objects of mental con-
sciousnesses, [Buddha] says, "Moreover, Maitreya, objects that are apprehenders
are also objects that are apprehended.''216
Mter having discussed objects that are apprehended, in order to explain ob-
jects that are abodes, [Buddha] extensively teaches, "Maitreya, with respect to that,
objects that are abodes are ... ."217 [The passage,] "one village, or 100 villages .. ."
refers to immeasurable worldly reahns.
Mter having discussed objects that are abodes, in order to explain objects that
are resources, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are re-
sources .... "218 [The phrase,] " ... due to being an object of enjoyment. .. " [means]
due to being an [object of] enjoyment - such as an object of veneration etc. - of
men and women. "Property" [refers to] clothing etc., because Bodhisattvas must
differentiate everything through correct reasonings.
After the explanation of objects that are enjoyments, in order to explain mis-
taken objects, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, mistaken objects
are .... "219 [The phrase,] "with respect to just these objects that are apprehending
subjects and so forth" [refers to] those indicated previously. "Mistaken" [refers to]
incorrectly viewing the [four] truths. [330b] Superimposing pennanence etc. on the
entities of impennanent phenomena - dependent-arisings that are apprehended
objects, apprehending subjects, and so forth - is a mistaken discrimination. Be-
cause the two, mistaken discrimination and mistaken mind, awaken mistaken views,
they are abandoned by correct views.
Mter having explained the meaning of "mistaken objects", in order to explain
non-mistaken objects, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, non-mistaken
objects are .... ''220 [The passage -] "You should know that [non-mistaken objects]
are the opposite of those [Le., mistaken objects] and they are antidotes [to them"-
refers to:] (1) viewing impennanent objects - such as apprehending subjects and
21S0 p. 61.1; Stog p: 87.1.
216
0 p. 61.1; Stog p. 87.2.
217
0 p. 61.2; Stog p. 87.2.
2180 p. 61.6; Slog p. 88.1.
219
0 p. 61.6; Stog p. 88.2.
220 p. 62.1; Stog p. 88.4.
96 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-satra
so forth - as impennanent; (2) viewing the nature of suffering - which is discor-
dant with [the state of] a Superior - as suffering; (3) viewing the nature of unclean
things as unclean; and (4) viewing selfless things that depend upon conditions as
selfless. When one is separated from mistaken views through obtaining [their] anti-
dotes, one also becomes free from mistaken discriminations and mistaken minds.
Mter [discussing] non-mistaken objects, in order to indicate afflicted objects,
[Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, afflicted objects are of three
kinds .... "221 If you ask, 'What are they', [Buddha] says: " ... of the three realms .... "
If you ask, 'What are the three', [Buddha] says, "(1) afflictive afflictions [of the
three realms]; (2) afflictions that are actions; and (3) afflictions that are lifetimes".
From among the limbs of cyclic existence: ignorance, craving, and appropria-
tion are the afflictive afflictions. Activities and existence are the afflictions that are
actions. Consciousness, name, fonn, the six sense spheres, contact, feeling, birth,
aging and death are the afflictions of lifetimes.
After having explained afflicted objects in that way, in order to explain pure
objects, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, pure objects are the phe-
nomena that are hannonies with enlightenment through serving. to separate one from
those three types of afflictions.''222 [331 a] You should know that these are the mind-
ful establishments (dran pa nye bar gzhag pa, smrtyupasthana) etc.
[The passage -] "Maitreya, you should know that these ten aspects include
all objects"223 - indicates that Bodhisattvas correctly understand objects through
these ten [categories:] their varieties and so forth. Therefore, [Buddha] teaches that
'they correctly understand objects'.
Second and Final Part
Also, by way of indicating a five-fold division, [Buddha] says, "Alternatively,
Maitreya, Bodhisattvas know objects by way of five aspects .... ''224 In answer to the
question, "What are the five," [Buddha] says, "things that are objects of knowledge;
objects that are objects of knowledge; knowledges; obtaining the fruits of knowl-
22ID p. 62.1; SlOg p. 88.5.
222D p. 62.2; Stog p. 88.6.
223D p. 62.2; Stog p. 88.7.
224D p. 62.3; SlOg p. 89.1.
Jiiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 97
edge; knowing those". [He says this] because everything is included within these
five aspects. In [the passage -] "Maitreya, with respect to that ... things that are
objects of knowledge ... are to be viewed as being all objects of knowledge; they are
as follows: the aggregates ... " - the [five] aggregates and so forth include all things
that are objects of knowledge.
With respect to [the passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are
objects of knowledge should be known as the actual mode of those objects of
knowledge that are [known through] various aspects ... ":225 These are objects that
are objects of knowledge that 'should be known in accordance with what is known
by one aspect, the varieties, and should be known in accordance with how [they are
known]'. In the extensive statement - "these are such things as conventionalities
and ... " - "conventionalities and ultimate truths" are what Buddhas teach in depen-
dence upon the two truths.
''Faults'' are so called because they function as afflictive faults. "Qualities" are
so called because they function as purifying qualities. With respect to "conditions":
Those afflictions and purifications only arise from their own causes, and not from
God (dbang phyug, isvara) etc. With respect to "time": This [331b] [refers to] the
times of arising in the past, future, and present.
With respect to "the characteristics of production, abiding, and disintegration":
Objects that are objects of knowledge and so forth are differentiated in terms of
conditions that are characteristics of compounded phenomena. "Sickness and so
forth" [refers] to suffering. "[True] sufferings and [true] sourpes and so forth"
[refers] to the Hearer Vehicle. "Suchness and so forth" [refers] to the Great Vehi-
cle. With respect to "condensed [discourses] and differentiations":226 these instruct
by way of the two, summarizing and elaborating.
Also, when there are answers in [Buddha's teachings,] certain prophecies are
[for example,] when someone asks, 'Will all sentient beings die,' and [Buddha]
defmitely responds, 'They will die. '
Differentiation and scriptural questions are [for example,] when someone
asks, 'Will all dead [beings] be reborn,' and [Buddha] differentiatingly answers,
225D p. 62.4; Stog p. 89.2.
226D p. 62.6 reads: bsdu ba dang f dbye ba; Stog p. 89.6 reads: "condensed [discourses] and exten-
sive [discourses]" (bsdus pa dang f rgyas pa).
98 Two Commentaries on the Saqu1hinirmocana-satra
'Those sentient beings who have afflictions will be reborn, but those without afflic-
tions will not be reborn. '
Answering after having asked a question is [for example,] when someone
asks, 'Are humans superior, or are they inferior,' and [Buddha] answers after hav-
ing asked a question: 'The answer depends upon who they are.' If the question
refers to those in the bad migrations [i.e., hell beings, hungry ghosts, and animals,]
then the answer must be, '[Humans] are superior [to them]'. But conversely (' on
te), if the question refers to gods, then the answer must be, 'They are inferior'.
Thus, [Buddha] answers after having asked a question.
"Discarding''227 is [for example,] when someone asks, 'Are the aggregates and
the self one or different,' and [Buddha] discards that [question,] because the self
does not exist
"Secrets" [are so named] because for sentient beings who have not ripened
[their wisdom] doctrines are hidden secrets. "Proclamations''22B [are so named] be-
cause they are the opposite of those. With respect to [the phrase,] "partially concor-
dant with such": You should know that other things, such as imputed persons and
so forth, are objects thatare objects of knowledge.
"By way of the varieties"229 [means] by way of the aspects of conven-
tionalities [332a] and so forth. You should know that "the way that they really
exist"230 [refers] to the [four] truths - suffering and so forth - for those of the
Hearer Vehicle, and to suchness and so forth for Mabayanists.
With respect to [the passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that, knowledges are
[the harmonies with enlightenment] that apprehend both of those":231 Qualities -
such as the [four] mindful establishments etc., that are concordant with the limbs of
enlightenment, which are apprehended through just observating [the following]: (1)
things, the aggregates etc., that are objects of knowledge; (2) how the varieties of
objects that are objects of knowledge exist; and (3) their mode of existence - are
knowledges, because they are of the nature of knowledge.
227Tbe Sde dge text (p. 331b.6), D p. 62.7, and Stog p. 89.7 all read: gzhag, which normally
means "to establish" or "to posit", but Yeshe Tbabkhe says that in this passage it means "to dis-
card", not "to establish", which makes more sense given JiUinagarbha's explanation.
228D p. 62.7: bsgrags pa; SlOg p. 89.7: "teachings" (rab tu bstan pa).
229TIUs is not found in either D or Stog.
230'Jbis is also not found in either D or Stog.
231D p. 62.7; Stog p. 90.1.
JfIlJnagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 99
Mter having explained knowledges, in order to teach about attainment of the
fruit of knowledge, [Buddha] says, "Maitreya, with respect to that, obtaining the
fruit of knowledge is .... ''23Z [The passage -] "disciplining desire, anger, and bewil-
derment ... " - [refers to] disciplining desire through mindful establishments etc.
with respect to the self, twofold body, feelings, mind, and phenomena.
[The words,] "completely abandoning''233 [indicate that] after one has thor-
oughly subdued them, they are abandoned. [The words,] "the fruits of asceticism"
[refer to] the four, Stream Enterers and so forth [Le., Once Returners, Non-Return-
ers, and Arhats]. [The phrase,] " ... mundane qualities of Hearers and Tathagatas ... "
[refers to] the [four] concentrations, the [four] immeasurables and so forth.
"Supramundane" [refers to] knowing that [the afflictions] are exhausted and will
not arise [again] and so forth. "Common" [refers to] non-afflicted consciousness,
aspirational consciousness, and so forth. Any actualizations of those are attainments .
of fruits of knowledge.
After having taught about attaining the fruits of knowledge, in order to indi-
cate how that obtainment of the fruits of knowledge is to be known, [Buddha] says,
"Maitreya, knowledge of that.. .. "Z34 [The phrase,] " ... just those phenomena that are
actualized ... " [refers] to those things that were just taught. "Liberating knowledge"
[332b] is self-knowledge.
[The phrase,] "extensively explaining and teaching these to others''235 means
that one causes realization - in others' continuums - of the qualities of Tathagatas
and Hearers that one has actualized oneself.
After having taught, "Maitreya, you should know that all objects are also in-
cluded by way of these five aspects of objects",Z36 [the passage] - "Moreover,
Maitreya, Bodhisattvas ... " - indicates that 'just as [Bodhisattvas] know all objects
by way of five aspects, so they also know objects by way of four aspects.'
In answer to [the question,] "What are the four aspects of objects,"Z37
[Buddha] says, "(1) appropriated objects of mind; (2) objects of experience; (3)
objects of cognition; and (4) objects of affliction and objects of purification .... "
Z3ZD p. 63.1; Stog p. 90.2.
Z33D p. 63.2; Stog p. 90.3.
Z34D p. 63.3; Stog p. 90.4.
Z35D p. 63.3; Stog p. 90.5.
Z36D p. 63.4; Stog p. 90.5.
Z37D p. 63.4; Stog p. 90.5.
100 Two Commentaries on the Saqulhinirmocana-satra
This indicates that just as [Bc:idhisattvasl know all objects by way of five aspects, so
they also know objects by way of four aspects.
In answer to [the question,] "What are the four," [Buddha] says, "by way of:
(1) appropriated objects of mind; (2) objects of experience; (3) objects of cognition;
and (4) objects of affliction and purification".238 Appropriated objects of mind are
predispositions of the basis-consciousness, because they are causal. Objects of ex-
perience are: (1) a mind's bewilderment concerning a self; (2) viewing a self; (3)
pride in the self; (4) desire for the self; and so they are experienced objects. Objects
of cognition are said t9 be different things that are aspects of abodes, abiders, and
objects of observation that are simply cognition-only in the sense that operating
consciousnesses view them as external. Objects of affliction and objects of purifi-
cation are the aspects of abodes, abiders, andobjects of observation of those minds
and mental factors that are either not realized or realized by just those minds.
Mter [Buddha] has indicated that all objects are also included by way of these
four aspects of objects by stating, "Maitreya, you should know that all objects are
included [by these four aspects]", [333a] [the statement,] "Moreover,
Maitreya ... ''239 indicates that 'Bodhisattvas know objects by way of three aspects'.
In [the passage,] "objects that are letters, objects that are meanings, and ob-
jects that are realms",240 objects that are letters are supports. Objects that are mean-
ings are what is supported. Objects%at are realms are objects that are both.
Regarding [the passage,] "Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are
meanings should be known in terms of ten aspects":241 "The character of suchness"
[refers to] just apprehended objects. "The signs of knowledge" [refers to] just ap-
prehending subjects. ''The character of abandonment" [refers to] just separation.
"The character of actualization" [refers to] just attaiIiment "The character of medita-
tion" [refers to] how these are not wasted. "the character of differentiation of those
characters of suchness and so forth" [refers to] the differentiation of 'the suchness
of mirrors and the suchness of appearances and so forth'.
231There appears to be no reason for the repetition of this quotation. The wording is slightly differ-
ent from the previous citation, but nothing new is added.
239
0 p. 63.5; Stog p. 90.7.
240 p. 63.6; Stog p. 91.1.
241
0 P 63.6; Stog p. 91.2.
JfIlinagarbha's Corrunentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 101
In [the phrase,] "the character of basis and what depends upon a basis",242
"Basis" [refers to] phenomena such as suchness and so forth. [Things that depend
upon] a basis are objects. "The character that interrupts knowledge and so forth"
[refers to] obstructions and so forth.243
"The character of concordant phenomena" [refers to] good attainment and so
forth. "Faults of non-knowledge and so forth" [refers to] corrupting the aims of
oneself and others. "Benefits of knowledge and so forth" [refers to] fulfilling the
aims of oneself and others.
In [the passage -] "Maitreya, with respect to that, objects that are realms are
the five realms ... ''244 - worldly realms include worlds that are environments: these
are objects to be purified by Bodhisattvas. Realms of sentient beings are objects of
maturation. The realm of truth is an object to be realized. The realms of discipline24
s
are suitable to be objects of maturation. The realm of methods of discipline [333b]
[includes] things that are well-taught.
With respect to [the passage,] "Maitreya, you should know that all objects are
also included by way of these three aspects of objects":2Mi You should perceive that
all interpretable meanings and defmitive meanings are included. [The passage-]
"Bhagavan, [what are the differences between] knowledge of objects by wisdom
arisen from hearing ... ''247 - is a question [that asks,] 'What are the differences be-
tween [knowledge of objects by wisdoms] arisen from hearing, thinking, and
meditating?'
In [the passage -] "Maitreya, through wisdom arisen from hearing Bodhisat-
tvas ... "248 - wisdom arisen from hearing is based on words; the meanings which
arise [from that] are not. This is because apprehenders of only what is literal and
what lacks [Buddha's] thought are thoughts that do not ascertain profound doc-
trines. This is because what is not direct perception does not perceive directly.
242D p. 63.7; Stog p. 91.4: "the character of basis and dependent arising" (gnas dang rten cing
'brei ba' i mlshan nyid).
243 According to Yeshe Thabkhe, this includes the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to
omniscience.
244D p. 64.1; Stog p: 91.5.
24SThe siitra indicates that "realms of discipline" are sentient beings, because each sentient being is
a potential trainee, i.e., someone who can be disciplined by Buddhist doctrine and practice.
246D p. 64.2; Stog p. 91.6.
247D p. 64.2; Stog p. 91.7.
248D p. 64.4; Stog p. 92.2.
102 Two Commentaries on the Sf11!Ulhininnocana-sutra
"Concordant with liberation" [refers tei] what serves as a cause of liberation, be-
cause one indirectly correctly realizes individual meanings. These are not liberators.
In [the passage,] "Maitreya, through knowledge arisen from thinking .. ,''249
"arisen from thinking" [means that] it arises from thinking by means of reasoning.
This is because those who only abide in the letters, who are not literal, and who ap-
prehend the thought [behind the teachings] are acquainted with what they hear. This
is because they do not [understand] through direct perception, are very concordant
with liberation, and have the conditions for liberation. This is because those who
have not correctly understood non-liberative meanings have not directly perceived
liberative [meanings].
In [the passage,] "Maitreya, through knowledge arisen from meditation
Bodhisattvas ... "250 knowledge arisen from meditation arises from ascertaining doc-
trine. 11lis is because those who apprehend [doctrine while] abiding in the words
and those not abiding in the words are well acquainted [with doctrine]. This is be-
cause those who are literal and apprehend [Buddha's] thought ripen the predisposi-
tions of what they have heard. [334a]
[The phrase,] "partially concordant with these things to be known''251 [means
that they are] partially concordant with those things that are things to be known as
they are by way of various aspects. If you ask, 'What sorts of things [are indi-
cated,]' [Buddha] says, "images that are objects of activity of meditative stabiliza-
tions". [Bodhisattvas] do not understand by way of objects of activity that are ex-
pressions of what they have heard and considered. This is because [only] direct
perception is individual knowledge.
[These Bodhisattvas are] "very concordant with liberation''2S2 because they are
very close to it. This is because those' who also know liberative meanings realize
them directly. [The phrase,] "These are the differentiations of those" [refers to the
differentiations] of wisdoms arisen from hearing, thinking, and meditating.
In the extensive passage, "Bhagavan ... Bodhisattvas who cultivate calming
and insight .. ,''253 [Buddha] says, 'Whatever is a wisdom regarding calming and in-
249D p. 64.5; Slog p. 92.3.
250D p. 64.6; Slog p. 92.5.
251D p. 64.7; Slog p. 92.6.
252D p. 64.7; Slog p. 92.6.
253D p. 65.1; Slog p. 92.7.
Jfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 103
sight observing doctrines that are mixed is knowledge', because their aspects are
not various. 'Whatever is a wisdom regarding calming and insight which observe
doctrines that are unmixed is discernment', because their aspects are various.
With respect to [the passage,] "Bhagavan ... Bodhisattvas cultivating calming
and insight ... ":254 Due to [being asked] - " ... how and through what mental con-
templation do [Bodhisattvas] remove what signs?" - [Buddha] teaches three things
with respect to the question [in paraphrase,] 'Due to knowing doctrines and mean-
ings, through what mental contemplations do Bodhisattvas remove what signs?'
"Through mental contemplation of suchness" refers to 'mental contemplation of
non-duality'. [The phrase,] " ... remove the signs of doctrines and the signs of
meanings" [refers to] two types of signs. They remove signs of doctrines and signs
of meanings. "Signs" means 'objects of observation'.
With respect to [the question,] "how do ... [Bodhisattvas] remove ... ":255
[Buddha] says, [334b] "not observing the nature of names with respect to
names .... " This is because signs of doctrines are of the nature of names, words, and
letters. One also does not observe doctrines in terms of their bases.256 Just as it is
with respect to the names that are bases of doctrines, so when words and letters that
are the signs of doctrines are removed, they are not observed.
[The passage -] "Just as it is ... so all ... meanings should be known"257 -
[means that] the ten kinds, five kinds, four kinds, and three kinds taught [earlier] are
not observed.
With respect to [the passage,] "up through realms, not observing an inherent
nature of realms ... ":258 When the inherent natures of those five realms indicated
[previously] are eliminated, they are not observed. "Signs abiding in them" are
signs that are the bases of meanings. Since bases of meanings are doctrines, when
those signs are also eliminated, they are eliminated by way of non-observation. Be-
cause mental contemplation of suchness is just non-dual- since in meditation on
the suchness of those objects: signs of doctrines that are names, words, letters, ap-
254D p. 65.3; Stog p. 93.3.
25sD p. 65.3; Stog p. 93.3.
256This refers to words and letters. which are the bases of meanings.
257D p. 65.4; Stog p. 93.5.
258D P 65.5; Stog p. 93.5.
104 Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
prehenders, and so forth, their aspects are [perceived as] non-dual- this is the
meaning of "non-observation of those signs".
In [the question -] "Bhagavan, are ... ''259 - [the phrase,] "the signs of cogni-
tion of the meaning of suchriess" [indicates that] cognition of suchness is simply an
exalted knower of all aspects. Its objects of observation are non-things. Also, the
Perfection of Wisdom says, "SubhUti, the objects of observation of an exalted
knower of all aspects are non-things. Aspects are pacified. The controller is mind-
fulness. Characteristics do not exist"
[The passage -] "Maitreya, cognition of the meaning of suchness overcomes
all phenomena and signs of phenomena''260 - [indicates that] all the signs of doc-
trines and meanings are not completely realized, [335a] but their antidote is knowl-
edge of the meaning of suchness. Therefore, they are exceeded by them.
With respect to [the passage,] "[I] do not explain that in that anything is ex-
ceeded by anything":261 Because [cognition of suchness] is an antidote to all signs
that are viewed with respect to that and because objects of observation and aspects
are not eliminated, [that] is not exceeded by anything.
With respect to the extensive statement, "Bhagavan ... a dirty pot, for exam-
ple ... ":262 [Maitreya's question -] "Thinking of what mental analysis and what
suchness did you say that ... " - is asked because there are three kinds of mental
analysis263 and seven kinds of suchness.
[Buddha's answer -] "Maitreya, it was due to three kinds of mental analy-
sis ... "264 - indicates that mental analysis arisen from heanng, from thinking, and
from meditating and the suchness of cognition are non-dual. Thus; this means that
'thinking of them, I [Buddha] taught those.' [This explains] the verses of the
Maitreya Chapter.26S
259D p. 65.5; Stog p. 93.6.
26Ol) p. 65.6; Stog p. 93.7 reads: "Maitreya, when one does not observe as signless the cognition
of the meaning of suchness, with respect to that, what could be eliminated?"
261D p. 65.7; Stog p. 94.1.
262D p. 65.7; Stog p. 94.1.
2 6 ~ e x t correction: the Sde dge text (p. 335a.3) only mentions anaIysis (so sor brtags pa). This is
emended on the basis of the Peking text (p. 204.5.1), which reads: sems la so sor brtag pa.
264D p. 66.2; Stog p. 94.4.
26SThe translation of this passage is speculative. The Tibetan reads: byams pa'j le'u'j k'a ri ka If,
which makes no sense in this part of the text, since the klirikiis of chapter eight occur several pages
later than the section presently under discussion. It may indicate that the present section is rele-
Jnanagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 105
[Maitreya] asks, "Bhagavlill, how many signs - which Bodhisattvas who cognize
doctrines and meanings in that way are engaged in removing - do you describe; by
what are they eliminated";266 and [Buddha] answers, "There are ten .... "
With respect to [the passage,] "The various signs of words and letters - ac-
cording to which one knows doctrines and meanings - are eliminated by the
emptiness of all phenomena?':267 This is because the phenomena which are the
'various signs of words and letters that are not included within the emptiness of all
phenomena' are not different.
In [the passage -] "The signs of continual operation of production, cessation,
abiding, and transformation, which are known in terms of the meaning of the such-
ness of abiding, [335b] are eliminated by the emptiness of character and the empti-
ness of what is beginningless and endless''26R - "abiding" [refers to] the character-
istics of production, abiding, aging, and impermanence that are included among
compounded phenomena of the three times.
Moreover, because illustrations (mtshan gzhi, do not exist, they are
empty of characteristics; and because illustrations do not exist, they are also empty
of the characteristics of illustrations, since illustrations and characteristics are free
from being one or different. As it is said, "You have correctly said, 'If characteris-
tics were other than illustrations, then illustrations would be signless. If they were
one, then there would be nothing that is both. '" "Beginningless and endless"
[means that] there is no former or later limit. This is because there is no former and
later limit and a real basis does not exist. '
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of the view of true personhood and
the signs of thinking 'I' - which one knows with respect to objects that are appre-
vant to the thought of the verses, which are primarily instructions concerning how the teachings
on yoga ot this chapter should be put into practice. Since this is the most probable explanation of
the cryptic statement in JiUinagarbha's text, I have translated it in accordance with this hypothesis.
266D p. 66.3; Stog p. 94.6.
267D p. 66.4; Stog p. 94.7 reads: "when one thoroughly knows the meanings of doctrines, then
the various signs of verbal expressions are eliminated by the emptiness of all phenomena." Note
that Stog treats the compound translated as "verbal expressions" ("words and letters" in D) as a
karmadhiiraya, whereas D treats it as a dvcuru1va.
26RD p. 66.4; Stog p. 95.2 reads: "when one knows the meaning of the suchness of abiding, then
the signs that are a continuation of production, cessation, abiding, and transformation are elimi-
nated by the emptiness of character and the emptiness of what is beginningless and endless."
106 Two Commentaries on the SaJ?Ulhininnocana-sutra
henders - are eliminated by the emptiness of the internal and the emptiness of the
unapprehendable":269 Apprehenders are the eye and so forth and minds and mental
factors. With respect to those, whatever signs are apprehended as I and mine, which
appear to be a person, are empty by way of the emptiness of the internal and are
empty by way of the emptiness of the unapprehendable, because their nature is not
observed.
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of viewing enjoyments - which
one knows with respect to objects that are apprehended - are eliminated by the
emptiness of the external":Z70 Apprehended objects are external appearances such as
form and so forth. They are empty in terms of each subtle particle and in terms of
collections [of these]. This is because a functioning self-entity which is of the nature
of the objective appearances of shapes and colors is not suitable.
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of internal happiness and the signs
of external sufferings which one knows - that are objects of enjoyment possessing
the services of men and women - are eliminated by the emptiness of the external
and internal and [336a] by the emptiness of nature":Z71 "The signs of internal enjoy-
ments" [refers to] interest in
272
mistaken feelings. "Signs of external sufferings"
[refers to] mistaken interest in the bodies of men and women. They are empty, just
like mistaken [feelings] in dreams and so forth. The nature of that interest in internal
and external [enjoyments] is [also] empty, as it did not arise previously [and so it
does not naturally produce desire, but only does so due to our afflictions].Z7
3
2690 p. 66.5; Stog p. 95.2 reads: "when one knows objects that are apprehenders, then the signs of
the view of true personhood and the signs of the 'I' are eliminated by the emptiness of the internal
and the emptiness of the unapprehendable."
Z7CJn p. 66.6; Stog p. 95.4 reads: "when one knows objects that are apprehended, then the signs of
viewing enjoyment are eliminated by the emptiness of the external."
Z71D p. 66.7; Stog p. 95.4 reads: "when one knows objects that are resources - possessing the
services of women and men and of posessions as objects of enjoyment - then the signs of inter-
nal happiness and the signs of external apprehended objects are eliminated by the emptiness of the
external and internal and by the emptiness of nature."
2'72nie Tibetan term is mos pa, which Yeshe Thabkhe equates with "delight" or "happiness" (dga'
00).
Z73The words in brackets summarize an oral explanation by Yeshe Thabkhe, who indicates that the
upshot of this passage is that the things in which we find pleasure are not naturally enjoyable. If
they were, they would naturally produce pleasure, but in fact they tend to lead to suffering and
unhappiness because of the negative thoughts we produce with regard to them. Also, they only
seem pleasurable due to conditioning and previously generated predispositions.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 107
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of the immeasurable - which one
knows with respect to objects that are abodes - are eliminated by the emptiness of
the great":274 Manifest establishments of immeasurable worldly realms are empty by
way of the emptiness of the great, which is like space [in that it pervades every-
where].
With respect to [the passage,] "In dependence upon [knowing] formlessness
in that way, the internal signs of blissful liberation are eliminated by the emptiness
of compounded phenomena":275 All compounded phenomena without exception are
just empty, because they [are produced] from coarse causes and conditions.
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of the selflessness of persons, the
signs of the selflessness of phenomena, the signs of cognition-only,276 and the signs
of the ultimate - through which one knows objects in terms of the suchness of
character are eliminated by the emptiness of what has passed beyond the ex-
tremes, by the emptiness of non-things, by the emptiness of inherent existence of
non-things, and by the emptiness of the ultimate": The signs of the selflessness of
persons are empty by way of the emptiness of what has passed beyond the ex-
tremes. If a person did exist, then negation of the person would also be suitable.
The signs of the selflessness of phenomena are empty by way of the empti-
ness of non-things. If phenomena did exist, then negation of phenomena would also
exist.
The signs of cognition-only are empty by way of the emptiness of the inherent
existence of non-things. Mistaken cognition of inherent nature is only of the nature
of non-things, because duality is not established.
The signs of the ultimate are empty by way of the emptiness of the ultimate ..
[336b] Because the two, objects of negation and negators, are not ultimate, because
objects of negation do not exist, and because neither negators nor eliminators exist,
thus, apart from realization of emptiness, an ultimate does not exist.
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of the uncompounded and the signs
of the indestructible - which one knows with respect to objects of pure suchness
274D p. 67.1; Stog ~ 95.6 reads: "when one knows the objects that are abodes, then the signs of
the immeasurable are eliminated by the emptiness of the great."
275D p. 67.1; Stog p. 95.6.
276Text correction: the Sde dge text (p. 336a.5) reads: mam par rig pa. The Peking text (p.
205.2.4), D p. 67 p. 2, and Stag p. 96.1 all read: mam par rig pa tsam. Also, when Jfianagarbha
uses this term later on in this section (p. 336a. 7), it reads mom par rig pa tsam.
108 Two Commentaries on the SOJ?Ulhinirmocana-satra
- are eliminated by the emptiness of uncompounded phenomena and the emptiness
of the indestructible":277 "Pure suchness" [refers to] true cessations. They are un-
compounded and immutable, but apprehended objects that are the signs of those
two - uncompounded phenomena and the immutable - are eliminated by the
emptiness of uncompounded phenomena and the emptiness of the indestructible.
With respect to [the passage,] "The signs of emptiness that one takes to mind
in terms of the emptiness that is an antidote to those signs are eliminated by the
emptiness of emptiness":278 Any cognition of emptiness that eliminates all these
signs is also empty.
In the extensive statement - "Bhagavan, when one eliminates ten types of
signs ... ''279 - the elimination of signs of the image, the object of activity of medita-
tive stabilizations, is an antidote, and the signs of afflicted phenomena are its dis-
cordant class.
In [the passage-] "Maitreya ... these emptinesses .. .''280- [the phrase,] "each
of these objects is not a non-antidote to all these signs" means that' all of those are
also objects of observation for purification. '
[The passage -] "Bhagavan ... in the Great Vehicle ... ''28i [discusses] non-de-
generation. Thus, [Buddha] offers the following designation: Because emptiness is
the antidote to the boastful pride that is the cause of degeneration of Bodhisattvas,
when Bodhisattvas know the character of that they become non-degenerated with
respect to the Great Vehicle. [337 a]
In [the passage,] " ... good, good",282 "degenerated from emptiness''2S3 refers to
'not understanding the character of emptiness'. One "becomes degenerated from all
of the Great Vehicle" due to fear of emptiness.
277D p. 67.3; Stog p. 96.3.
278D p. 67.4; Stog p. 96.4 reads: "when one takes to mind the suchness that is an antidote to .
these signs. then the signs of emptiness are eliminated by the emptiness of emptiness."
279D p. 67.5; Stog p. 96.5.
2800 p. 67.6; Stog p. 96:7.
2
81
D .p. 67.7; Stog p. 97.2 does not mention the Great Vehicle. but the rest of the quote is the
same.
282D p. 68.2;.Stog p. 97.4.
283The Sde dge text and D read: stong pa nyid las rab III nyams pa; Stog reads: "corrUpted
with respect to emptiness" stong pa nyid larab III rung ba.
Jfiiinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 109
In [the passage,] "Maitreya, because of this .. .1isten'',284 "other-dependent
characters" are [produced] from coarse causes and conditions. "The thoroughly
established character" is a non-dual character.
In [the passage,] "separated from imputational characters, such as afflicted
and purified phenomena in all aspects and ... ",28s phenomena that are [produced]
from coarse causes and conditions are other-dependent characters. They have a na-
ture of emptiness because of being non-entitynesses in terms of production (skye ba
ngo bo nyid med pa nyid, utpada-nilJsvabhliva). Purification of those is the thor-
oughly established nature. This is empty in the sense of being an ultimate
emptiness.
Conceptions thinking, 'In other-dependent characters there is affliction,' and
'In the thoroughly established nature there is purification' are imputational charac-
ters that are empty due to being emptinesses in terms of character.
[The phrase,] "non-observation with respect to that''286 [indicates that] the enti-
tyness of imputations is not observed in the entityness of other-dependent charac-
ters. This is because they are not established as being of the entityness of affliction
and purification. Because it is established as being emptiness, [the thoroughly
established character] is a thoroughly established entity. Because they are are neither
one nor different by way of their own nature, illustrations and characteristics are
similar.
[The passage,] " ... that is 'the full character of emptiness in the Great Vehi-
c1e"'287 [indicates that] because the three natures that are subsumed by the two truths
-- the conventional and the ultimate - are empty, this includes the character of
emptiness.
[The passage,] "Bhagavan, how many kinds of meditative stabilization of [the
two,] calming and insight, are inc1uded"288 asks, 'Bhagavan, [337b] from what
causes of calming and insight do they arise'. [Buddha's] answer, "They arise from
the cause of pure ethics." [refers to] meditative equipoise when ethics is purified.
284D p. 68.3; Stog p. 97.5.
28SD p. 68.3; Stog p. 97.6.
286D p. 68.4; Stog p. 97.7.
287D p. 68.4; Stog p. 97.7.
288D p. 68.4; Stog p. 98.1.
110 Two Commentaries on the Saf!Ulhinirmocana-sutra
[The sentence,] "They arise from the cause that is a pure view arisen from
hearing and thinldng''289 [indicates that] the view arisen from meditative equipoise of
hearing and thinking becomes purified.
In order to ask about the results of having realized VIe causes of calming and
insight, [Maitreya] asks, "Bhagavan, what are the results of those?''290
[Buddha's reply -] "Pure mind is the result; pure wisdom is the result"291_
indicates that 'the result is a liberated mind and liberated wisdom.'
After [Buddha] has settled the results of calming and insight by way of the
extensive statement, "Moreover, Maitreya ... ''292 [Maitreya] asks, "[Bhagavan,] what
are the functions of [calming and insight]" in order to ask about their functions.
With respect to [Buddha's] answer, "Maitreya, they are liberation from the
two bonds ... ":293 The functions of these two types of bonds are similar, and
[Buddha] says, "[They are liberation] from the [two bonds,] the bonds of signs and
the bonds of assumptions of bad states." The afflictions of desire and so forth -
which [arise] from grasping signs of objects such as desirable things and so forth
- are bonds of arising signs. Manifest conceptions of things that are '1' and 'mine'
with respect to the aggregates are bonds of assumptions of bad states. Liberation
from these two kinds of bonds is the function of calming and insight.
In [the passage,] "Bhagavan, from among those five kinds of obstacles spo-
ken of by the Bhagavan ... "294 - "the views [that overvalue] bodies and resources"
are desire for the [six] internal sense spheres and the [six] external object spheres.
"The discourse of Superiors" [refers to] discourses on the harmony of the supreme
doctrine. "Abiding in commotion" [338a] [refers to a condition that] is not physical
isolation. "Being satisfied with inferior [attainments" refers to] mere mundane con-
centrations.
[11le phrase -] "because of the fITst one does not exert oneself'295 - [means
that] due to not having physical isolation, one does not exert oneself with respect to
calming and insight. [The phrase] - "because of the second one does not bring the
289
0 p. 68.6; Stog p. 98.4.
290 p. 68.6; Stog p. 98.4.
2910 p. 68.7; Stog p. 98.4.
2,920 p. 68.7; Stog p. 98.5.
293
0 p. 69.2; Stog p. 98.7.
294
0 p. 69.2; Stog p. 98.7.
295
0 p. 69.3; Stog p. 99.4.
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 111
training to completion" - [means that] because of being satisfied by mere inferior
[attainments] one does not bring one's training to completion.
With respect to [the passage] - "Bhagavan, from among the five obstruc-
tions, which ... ":296 regarding "excitement and contrition", excitement is non-pacifi-
cation of the sense-faculties. Contrition [refers to] things that are done wrongly.
When one does not perform virtuous actions and performs actions that are non-vir-
tuous, one becomes mentally attached [to these actions].
"Lethargy" [refers to] an unsuitability in terms of actions of body and d .
!'Sleep" [refers to] going to sleep. "Doubt" [refers to] error concerning the [three]
jewels, the [four] truths, and [teachings concerning] actions and results [of actions].
"Aspiration to the attributes of the Desire Realm" [refers to] desire for the five
qualities of the Desire Realm.
297
''Harmful intent" [refers to] hatred toward sentient
beings.
With respect to [the passage,] "Bhagavan, at what point is a path of calming
purified ... ":298 lethargy and sleep are internal discouragements. Excitement and con-
. trition are distractions to external objects.
Calming and insight include all meditative stabilizations, and you should
know that phenomena which serve to interrupt those meditative stabilizations [do
so] because they are mental scatterings. Because they must be abandoned,
[Maitreya] asks, "Bhagavan, how many types of mental distractions do [Bodhisat-
tvas] abiding in calming and insight find?''299
[The phrase -] "distraction of taking something to mind and mental distrac-
tion externally" - indicates that the distractions and so forth of HInayana mental
contemplations for Bodhisattvas who abide in the Great Vehicle [338b] serve as
interruptors of the meditative stabilizations that are the bases of supramundane, non-
conceptual exalted wisdoms, and so they should be abandoned.
[The phrase -] "experiencing the taste of meditative absorptions"300-
[means that] experiencing the taste of the [four] concentrations, the [four] formless
296D p. 69.4; Stog p. 99.4.
297For a discussion of these, see Leah Zahler, Meditative States in Tibetan Buddhism (London:
Wisdom, 1983), pp. 93-96
298D p. 69.5; Stog p. 99.6.
299D p. 69.6; Stog p. 100.1.
300D p. 70.3; Stog p. 100.6.
112 Two Commentaries on the Sa!!Uihinimwcana-sutra
[absorptions,] and meditative absorptions produces the lifetimes of long-lived gods.
Due to this, one forsakes working for the welfare of sentient beings.
[The passage -] "If [Bodhisattvas,] abiding in external signs ... "301 - indi-
cates that at the causal level, one abides in dwellings in dependence upon apprehen-
sion of pleasant and unpleasant signs. Mental contemplation of signs internally be-
longs to the class that is discordant with signless meditative stabilizations. There-
fore, it should be known; if should be abandoned.
[The passage -] "If [Bodhisattvas] ... in dependence upon internal mental
contemplation ... ''302 - indicates that, because bodies that have assumptions of bad
states are abodes of all afflictions, one is distracted.
With respect to [the passage,] " ... feelings that arise in dependence upon inter-
nal mental contemplation ... ":303 In dependence upon mental contemplation that is
based on the view of true personhood, one has contaminated feelings with respect
to birth. Because this is concordant with cyclic existence and because it is discor-
dant with all the paths of Superiors, this is "distraction of assumptions of bad
states".
Because calming and insight are of the nature of meditative stabilizations and
wisdom, they are said to be present on all the [Bodhisattva] levels. Therefore,
[Maitreya] asks, "Bhagavan, having apprehended calming and insight from the first
Bodhisattva level up to the Tathagata level, of what are [calming and insight] anti-
dotesT'304
With respect to [the passage,] "Maitreya, on the first level calming and insight
are antidotes to the afflictions of bad migrations, to the afflictions that are actions,
and to the afflictions that are births":305 This is because one attains the exalted wis-
dom which is an antidote to the view of [a self of] persons and of phenomena.
On the second [level] they are antidotes to the arising of subtle errors that are
infractions. [339a] This is because ethics is purified.
On the third [level] they are antidotes to desires of the Desire Realm, because
one attains unconupted concentrations and meditative absorptions.
301D p. 70.3; Stog p. 100.7.
302D p. 70.4; Stog p. 101.1.
303D p. 70.4; Stog p. 101.1.
304D p. 70.4; Stog p. 101.2.
30sD p. 70.5; Stog p. 101.3 reads: "afflictions that are lifetimes" (Ishe'i kun nas nyon mongs pa).
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 113
On the fourth [level] they are antidotes to attachmentto meditative absorption
and attachment to doctrines, because one abides many times :in things that are con-
cordant with enlightenment and because they destroy the pride of [knowing] vari-
ous doctrines of sutra collections and so forth.
On the fifth [level] they are antidotes to completely turning away from cyclic
existence or directing oneself toward nirvliI).a, because when one meditates on the
four truths of Superiors a basis of affliction and purification is not observed.
On the sixth [level] they are antidotes to the arising of many signs because -
through just abiding many times in the suchness of dependent arising by way of the
yoga of calming and insight - the suchness that is differentiated according to signs
of affliction and purification, the impure and the pure, is not observed.
On the seventh [level] they are antidotes to the arising of subtle signs, because
they [Le. Bodhisattvas] attain a signless state due to connection with the one vehicle.
On the eighth [level] they are antidotes to not having dominion with respect to
signlessness etc. or signs, because one abides in non-activity and signlessness and
because of cultivating a Buddha land.
On the ninth [level] they are antidotes to not having dominion with respect to
teaching doctrine in all aspects, because one establishes individual knowledge and
the maturation of sentient beings; thus one has power over all aspects of maturation.
On the tenth [level] they are antidotes to not attaining complete individual
knowledge of the truth body, because one purifies the doors of meditative stabiliza-
tions@d the doors of apprehension.
On the Tathagata level they are "antidotes to afflictive obstructions and ob-
structions to omniscience that are more subtle than the very subtle";306 [339b] this is
because the doors of meditative stabilizations and of apprehension are immeasur-
ably pervasive, and so on the Buddha level all Buddhas abandon all predispositions
for the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, which are more
subtle than the supremely subtle; this is a Bodhisattva's initiation into Buddhahood
With respect to [the passage,] "Because they are conquered well, one obtains
. unattached and unobstructed knowledge and vision with respect to everything ... ":307
Because one does not turn away from all objects of knowledge, one is unattached,
and because one is unobstructed in terms of knowledges with respect to which
306D p. 71.1; Stog p. 102.1.
307D p. 71.2; Stog p. 102.1.
114 Two Commentaries on the StJ1!ldhinirmocana-sutra
Hearers and so forth are obstructed, one obtains unobstructed knowledge and
vision.
"The object of observation that is an accomplishment of thepurpose''308 [is so
named] because [through this] one attains final fulfIlment of one's own and others'
purposes. "A very pure truth body" [is pure] because one completely abandons the
afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience. One "abides in the pure
truth body" due to transforming all bases.
In order to ask about the methods of attainment [of this, Maitreya] says,
"Bhagavan, how does a Bodhisattva who establishes calming and insight. ... ''309 Be-
cause calming and insight are concordant operative causes of the enlightenments of
Hearers and so forth, [Maitreya] asks, 'How does one become completely buddhi-
fied with respect to unsurpassed, complete, perfect enlightenment?' .
In [the passage -] "The Bhagavan said ... "31o - [the phrase,] "beginning
with the seven types of suchness" [refers to] the seven types of suchness,
respectively: (1) the suchness of arising; (2) the suchness of character; (3) the
suchness of cognition; (4) the suchness of abodes; (5) the suchness of mistaken
establishment; (6) the suchness of purification; and (7) the suchness of correct
establishment.
[The phrase -] "How ... on doctrines in accordance with how they have been
heard and considered ... "311 - [means] 'in accordance with doctrines that are
objects of observation such as calming and insight and the seven kinds of suchness.
[340a]
If you ask, 'From among those doctrines, how does the mind consider them,'
[Buddha] says, "With a mind that is set in meditative equipoise."312 This is because
when one engages in observation - with a mind that is set in Pleditative equipoise
on those doctrines - one is dealing with mental images. Therefore, they are con-
trary to the suchness of mind.
308D p. 71.2; Stog p. 102.2.
309D p. 71.2; Stog p. 102.2 reads: "Bhagavan, how does a Bodhisattva who is earnestly making
effort at calming and insight ... "
310D p. 713; Stog p. 102.3.
311D p. 71.4; Stog p. 102.4.
312D p. 71.4; Stog p. 102.4.
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 115
That they "apprehend them well, consider them well, and establish them
well"313 indicates a compatibility between that suchness and internal mental contem-
plation. "Just that" [refers to] suchness. In [the phrase -] "They take suchness to
mind in that way" - "they" [refers to] Bodhisattvas.
With respect to [the passage,] "IT the mind becomes very withdrawn from
even all arisings of very subtle signs":3i4 This is because mental contemplation of
suchness is the antidote to all signs. IT for Bodhisattvas who take that [i.e., such-
ness] to mind there is no arising of even subtle signs, then, [Buddha] teaches,
"What need is there to consider the arising of coarse signs?" Subtle signs are those
ranging from "signs of mental appropriation" to "signs of the selflessness of phe-
nomena".31S
"Entering into such and ... "316 [means that] through examining all signs one
enters into suchness. "Abiding in that often" [means] abiding many times in medi-
tation that takes suchness to mind. "Occasional" [means that one thing] is an object
of calming but not of insight. [One time] is a time of insight but is not a time of
calming. [Another time] is 'a time of a path that is a union [of those two]' .
IT you ask, 'At that time, with respect to that mental purification from obsta-
cles, obscurations, and distractions - of Bodhisattvas who abide in just that way
- what occurs,' [Buddha] answers, "one realizes that the seven aspects of such-
ness are to be known by oneself individually and internally."317 This is because all
phenomena are subsumed by the seven aspects of suchness. [340b] Because the
seven aspects that are individually realized are [realized] by a Bodhisattva's path of
seeing, [Buddha] says, "That is the path of seeing of that [Bodhisattva]."318
In [the passage -] "By attaining thiS ... "319 - [the term,] "faultless reality"
[means that] they perceive the foremost suchness. [The phrase -] "They also ex-
perience the advantages of that level" - means that 'on the frrst [level,] Bodhi-
3l3D p. 71.4; Stog p.102.5 reads: "they realize them well, think about them well, and arrange
them well."
314D p. 71.4; Stog p. 102.5.
31SThis refers to a list of twenty-one types of subtle signs that appears on D pp. 71.5-72.2 (Stog
pp. 102.6-103.5).
316D p. 72.2; Stog p. 103.5.
3i7D p. 72.2; Stog p. 103.6.
3i8D p. 72.3; Stog p. 103.7.
319D p. 72.3; Stog p. 103.7.
116 Two Commentaries on the SaJ?Ulhinirmocana-sutra
sattvas experience those things that are taught as being advantageous'. "Previously"
[refers to] Bodhisattvas who have previously attained the level of the path of seeing
on the level of engagement through belief. Attaining the objects of observation that
are analytical images and non-analytical images is "attaining the two ilSpects."
With respect to [the passage,] "In that case, by attaining the path of seeing
they attain [the stage of] observing the limits of phenomena":32o Because one
realizes the realm of truth by way of omnipresent objects; and because one does not
observe phenomena that are bases of affliction and purification; and because this is
a final object of realization, the limit of phenomena is the truth body that is realized.
Bodhisattvas abiding in the path of seeing attain that object of observation that is a
limit of phenomena, the nature of the truth body which is the object of observation
of a path that is a union [of calming and insight].
[The phrase,] "through entering into the path of meditation, [proceeding]
higher and higher ... "321 [refers to] the second level and so forth. [The passage-':']
"mentally contemplating just those three aspects of objects of observation" -
[refers to] analytical images, non-analytical images, and the limits of phenomena.
They internally mentally contemplate those three subtle signs, and [so Buddha
says,] "It is like this: for example, just as a person can remove
322
a very large nail
with a small nail, so also, in the same way that a [small] nail expels a [large] nail,
eliminating the signs of the internal, one gradually eliminates all of the signs that are
partially condordant with affliction. When one eliminates the signs, one also elimi-
nates the assumptions of bad states."323 [341a] With respect to [that statement,] the
faults of desire and so forth are the signs. The views are assumptions of bad states.
320D p. 72.4; Stog p. 104.2.
321D p. 72.5; Stog p. 104.2.
~ 2 2 D p. 72.5 and the Sde dge text, p. 340b.6, read: sbom po 'byin; Stog p. 104.3 reads: sbom po.
323Lamolte's translation of the MahiiyanasaT{lgraha (La Somme du Grand vehicule d' Asmiga; Lou-
vain, 1973, pp. 219-220) contains the same analogy. Vasubandhu's commentary on this passage
states:
The synthetic knowledge of an object (sa7flSmadharmiilambana jnana) serves as the an-
tidote to all obstacles (sarvavaraT)lJ-pratipa/qa). It is like a small nail (su/qmaT)/) ex-
pelling a large nail (sthuM,)/). In effect, the infused seeds (vasanablja) of afflicted
dharmas (sa7!1kldilca-dharma), which reside in the root consciousness (mula-vijnana),
are coarse (sthiUa), and the antidotal path (pratipalqa-miiTga) that can expel them is sub-
tle (suJqma) [my translation].
JiilJnagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 117
With respect to [the passage,] "By overcoming well all signs and assumptions
of bad states, gradually proceeding higher and higher [on the levels,] one purifies
the mind like gold ... ":324 For example, when gold is purified by the work of a gold-
smith who purifies it more and more, just as it becomes very bright and one is not
captivated by grains of gold that are different from those, in the same way, on a path
that cultivates the levels higher and higher, because the mind becomes serviceable
due to separation from all adventitious defiltments, it becomes very clear.
In [the passage -] "In this way, until one becomes unsurpassably, com-
pletely enlightened, one becomes perfected and attains the object of observation that
is an accomplishment of the purpose"325 - accomplishment of the purpose
326
[refers to] attaining unattached and unobstructed knowledge and vision due to
pursuing the aims of oneself and others.
In answer to [Maitreya's] question, "When Bodhisattvas practice ... ",327
[Buddha] says, "Maitreya, Bodhisattvas who are skillful with respect to six topics
manifestly establish the great powers of Bodhisattvas .... " Bodhisattvas - who are
skilled with respect to: (1) the arising of mind, (2) the abiding [of mind], (3) the
emergence [of mind], (4) the increasing [of mind], (5) the diminishment [of mind],
and (5) skill in method [with respect to. mind] - manifestly establish the great
powers of Bodhisattvas. [Buddha] indicates that 'manifest establishment of the
great powers of Bodhisattvas depends on [skill with respect to] the arising of mind
and so forth. '
[Buddha] says, "At what point [do Bodhisattvas become] wise with respect to
the arising of mind? When they know the arising of mind in terms of sixteen
aspects, then they are wise with respect to the arising of mind as it really is. ''328 With
respect to "cognition that is stable and is a vessel": "cognition that is stable" [refers
The same idea is found in Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo (Chengdu, n.d., pp. 264 and
267) and Dag yid tOOn mi'i dgongs rgyan by Tshe brtan shabs drung (New Delhi: Gondals Press,
1969), p. 38. Both of these texts indicate that the analogy refers to the way that a small wooden
peg can be used to expel a larger peg in a piece of furniture. Wonch'uk (vol. thi [119], pp. 452.3)
also discusses various ways of applying this metaphor.
324n p. 72.6; Stogp. 104.5.
325n p. 72.7; Stog p. 104.6.
3 2 ~ e x t correction: the Sde dge text (p. 341a.3) reads: dgongs pa yongs su grub pa; emended to
dgos pa yongs su grub pa.
327D p. 73.1; Stog p. 104.7.
328n p. 73.3; Stog p. 105.3.
118 Two Commentaries on the ScuruJ.hinirmocana-sutra
to] the basis-consciousness [that contains] all seeds. It is stable due to being infused
by the predispositions of phenomena that are afflicted and purified. [341 b]
Because engaging knowers fluctuate, they are not infused with predisposi-
tions, but the predispositions are just what operate as infusers, because they are of
the nature of virtue and so forth. A cognition that is a vessel is a basis. The two,
stable cognition and cognition that is a vessel, are ignorant, because in them aspects
and objects of observation are not annihilated.
Whatever is an arising of that mind is an arising of an ignorant mind that is a
cognition which is stable and a vessel. Because Bodhisattvas who are wise with re-
spect to that eliminate all the obstructions and assumptions of bad states of the ba-
sis-consciousness - which observes all phenomena as mixed - they manifestly
establish the great powers of Bodhisattvas. With respect to [the phrase,] "A cogni-
tion of various types of objects of observation ... ":329 Because they simultaneously
apprehend objects such as form and so forth, this is a cognition of various aspects
of objects of observation. Because they are able to realize defmitely and to remem-
ber subsequently, this is conceptual. Because engaging consciousnesses are of the
nature of wisdoms, they are mental consciousnesses. [The phrase,] "Bodhisattvas
are wise with respect to that" [means that] you should know that this also applies to
everything.
In [the phrase,] "simultaneously apprehends external and internalobjects",330
"external objects" are form and so forth. "Internal objects" are objects of observa-
tion and so forth. Any of those which are apprehended at one time are conceptual
consciousnesses. Skill with respect to their arising is also like the former [skill].
With respect to the extensive statement, "in a moment, in an instant, in a short
time ... ":331 Bodhisattvas - who [cultivate] meditative absorptions with respect to
many simultaneous meditative stabilizations in an instant by way of mental con-
sciousnesses that cultivate calming and insight - are suitable immediately after this
[to enter into meditative stabilizations,] because meditative stabilizations are internal
engagements.
329D p. 73.4; Stog p. 105.4.
330D p. 73.4; Slog p. 105.5.
331D p. 73.4; Slog p. 105.6.
Jiilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 119
Question: If they [engage in] different factors in one instant, [342a] how can this
very mental consciousness justifiably [be said to] perceive many Buddha lands that
are abodes, and how can it justifiably [be said to] perceive many Tathiigatas, since
appearances of external forms are objects of eye consciousnesses?332
[Response:] This is justifiable, because all engaging consciousnesses are ebjects of
mental consciousness; therefore,various aspects of mental consciousness are con-
ceptual. When that [engaging consciousness] engages and focuses on that basis,
one obtains the names of this and that.
For example, with respect to intention, actions of body and mind are similar.
Also, with respect to intention, the characteristics of compounded phenomena that
are meritorious, non-meritorious, and fluctuating should be known in terms of ac-
tions of body and mind. In the same way, you should know that because of just
that mental consciousness which purifies calming and insight Bodhisattvas who
perceive many Buddha lands and who perceive many Buddha Bhagavans with an
apprehending eye consciousness in one moment are wise with respect to various
aspects of the arising of mind.
[The arising] of cognition with respect to small signs that are objects of ob-
servation is also just treated in accordance with arising of mind. [The a s s a g e ~ ]
"It is like this .. .involved with the Desire Realm ... "333 ~ [indicates that] the arising
of a mind that is involved with the Desire Realm is a level of non-meditative
equipoise. Therefore, it has small signs as its object of observation.
[The passage -] "cognitions having great signs as their objects of observa-
tion are involved with the Form Realm"334 [indicates that] the arising of a mind
that is involved with the Form Realm is a level of meditative equipoise. Therefore, it
has great signs as objects of observation.
[The passage -] "cognitions having limitless signs as their objects of obser-
vation are involved with the sphere of limitless space or the sphere of limitless con-
sciousness"335 - [indicates that] a mind which arises from absorptions and births
and which thinks, 'limitless space', 'limitless consciousness' - is involved with
332In other words, if everything that one perceives is a creation of mental consciousness, on what
basis can one assign a privileged truth status to perceptions of Buddha-lands and Tathagatas? Why
should these be any more real than any other perceptions?
:i33D p. 73.5; Stog p. 105.7.
334D p. 73.5; Stog p. 105.7.
33SD p. 73.6; Stog p. 106.1.
120 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
limitless space and limitless consciousness. Therefore, it [342b] is a [cognition
having] limitless signs as its objects of observation.
[The passage -] "cognitions having subtle signs as their objects of observa-
tion are involved with the sphere of nothingness''336 - [indicates that] a mind which
arises from observing subtle signs and which thinks, 'nothingness' because it is a
mind that is involved with the view of true personhood is a cognition having subtle
signs as its objects of observation.
[The passage -] "cognitions having final signs as their objects of observation
are involved with the sphere of neither discrimination nor non-discrimination"337 -
[refers to] the arising of a mind which is a cognition of firial signs that are objects of
observation from final absorptions that are realms, abodes, and worlds.
[The passage -] "cognitions of signlessness that observe the supramundane
and cessation"33! - [indicates that] the arising of a supramundane mind is an anti-
dote to all signs. Therefore, it is a signless cognition. The arising of a mind observ-
ing cessations is like that. .
[The passage -] "involved with suffering: it is [involved with] ... sentient
beings who are hell beings"339 - [indicates that] the arising of a mind which
[observes] sentient beings who are hell beings is involved with suffering, because it
is not mixed with happiness.
[The passage -] "involved with feelings that are mixed: It has involvement in
the Desire [Realm as its object of observation],'340 - refers to 'the arising of a mind
that is intermingled with feelings of happiness, suffering, and equanimity. This is
because the Desire Realm encompasses various fruitions of actions.
[The passage -] "involved with joy: the first concentration and the second
concentration''341 - [refers to] the arising of a mind that is involved with joy that
arises from isolation in the two, the first and second concentrations.
[The passage -] "involved with bliss: the third concentration''342 - [refers
to] the arising of mental factors from internal purity in the third concentration.
336
0 p. 73.6; Stog p. 106.2.
3370 p. 73.7; Stog p. 106.2.
338
0 p. 73.7; Stog p. 106.3.
339
0 p. 74.1; Stog p. 106.4.
340 p. 74.1; Stog p. 106.4.
341
0 p. 74.1; Stog p. 106.4.
342D p. 74.1; Stog p. 106.4.
......
Jfilinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 121
[The passage -] "involved with neither suffering, non-suffering, happiness,
nor non-happiness: [it ranges from] the fourth concentration up to the sphere of
neither discrimination nor non-discrimination''343 [343a] - [indicates that] beyond
the fourth concentration one is separated from eight kinds of faults. Therefore, a
mind that is involved with equanimity arises. The eight kinds of faults are: (1) con-
ceptuality; (2) analysis; (3) inhalation; (4) exhalation; (5) happiness; (6) suffering;
(7) mental happiness; and (8) mental unhappiness.
[The passage -] "involved with affliction: it is involved with the afflictions
and the secondary afflictions''344 - [refers to] the afflictions of desire and so forth.
The secondary afflictions are belligerence and so forth.
[The passage -] "involved with virtue: it is involved with faith and so
forth''34S - refers to 'the arising of a mind that is involved with the [three] jewels,
the [four] truths, and conviction with respect to actions and their fruits and so
forth'.
[The passage -] "involved with the neutral: it is not involved with either of
these two"346 - refers to 'the arising of a mind that is born from fruition [of ac-
tions,] is arisen from activity, is arisen from labor, and that makes emanations' .
Mter having explained in what way [Bodhisattvas] become skilled with re-
spect to the arising of mind, because [Maitreya asks,] "At what point [do
Bodhisattvas become skilled with respect to abiding [of mind,''347 Buddha] teaches
that entrance into skill with respect to abiding of mind [occurs] "when they know
the suchness of cognition just as it is".
With respect to this [statement]: Bodhisattvas who know compounded phe-
nomena as cognition-only are wise with respect to abiding of mind. [Buddha] indi-
cates that when they are wise with respect to abiding of mind, 'they manifestly
establish the great powers of Bodhisattvas. '
Question: Why [are phenomena] like the suchness of cognition-only?
[Response:] Because each and every cognition is separated from objects.
343D p. 74.2; Stog p. 106.5.
344D p. 74.2; Stog p. 106.6.
345D p. 74.3; Stog p. 106.7.
346D p. 74.3; Stog p. 106.7.
347D p. 74.3; Stog p. 107.1.
122
Two Commentaries on the Sa1!lflhinirmocana-sutra
Question: If mental states of dreams etc. are suitable to be just cognition-only, then
how are cognitions that are eye consciousnesses etc. and eye cognitions etc. -
which have fonns [as their objects of observation] - suitable to be cognition-only?
[343b]
[Response:] All viewing cognitions having signs appear dualistically even though
there are no objects. This is because eye cognitions etc. [operate] by way of signs of
forms etc., viewing consciousnesses that are conscious of those, and the viewing
consciousnesses up to body consciousness. Mental cognitions are those
[cognitions] that have signs of all cognitions of final phenomena - eye and so
forth - and are those [cognitions] that have viewing consciousnesses due to being
cognitions of mental consciousnesses. Signs and viewing consciousnesses are
abodes that are bases of afflictions such as mistaken [view] and so forth. If those
are not viewed, the mistaken [view] of non-objects as objects will not occur. If that
does not exist, then the afflictions that are the afflictive obstructions and the ob-
structions to omniscience also will not occur. If they do not exist, purification also
will be the non-existence of faults. You should know the suchness of cognition by
way of just these reasonings and by way of scripture.
Mter having explained abiding of mind, due to being asked, "at what point
[do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to emergence [ofmind",348 Buddha]
discusses the emergence of mind. Bodhisattvas who are skilled with respect to ex-
trication of mind are those who understand, just as it is, that a mind - which
[emerges] from the bonds of signs of afflictions such as desire etc. and the bonds of
assumptions of bad states that are afflictions such as [the view of] true personhood
etc. - 'emerges from those'. Thus, they manifestly establish the great powers of
Bodhisattvas.
Mter having explained emergence of mind, due to being asked, "at what point
[do Bodhisattvas become] skilled with respect to increasing [of mind",349 Buddha]
discusses the increasing of mind. [The passage -] "When a mind that is an antidote
to signs and assumptions of bad states is produced and increases, they know, 'It is
produced; it increases' ''350 - [indicates that] because they [have attained] a union of
348D p. 74.4; Stog p. 107.1.
349D p. 74.5; Stog p. 107.3.
350]) p. 74.5; Stog p. 107.3.
Joonagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 123
calming and insight that is an antidote to assumptions of bad states, when the signs
of engagement [in these assumptions of bad states] increase, [they know that,] 'they
increase': they are wise with respect to increasing [of mind]. [344a]
Mter having explained increasing of mind, [Buddha] discusses diminishment
of mind by way of [the passage,] "at what point [do Bodhisattvas become] wise
with respect to diminishment [of mind] .... "351 In [the passage -] "When a mind
which is afflicted by signs and assumptions of bad states that are discordant with
those [Le., calming and insight] diminishes and decreases, [they know that,] 'it di-
minishes; it decreases': they are wise with respect to diminishment [of mind]"-
[the phrase,] "that are discordant" refers to 'minds that are involved with hin-
drances, obstructions, and distractions'.
Mter having explained diminishment of mind, [Buddha] discusses skill [in
method with respect to mindp52 by way of [the passage,] "at what point [do Bodhi-
sattvas become] skilled with respect to method .... ''353 [The passage -] "When they
meditate on the [eight] spheres of liberation, the [eight] spheres of surpassing, and
the [six] spheres of totality .. .''354 - [indicates that] Bodhisattvas who meditate on
the spheres of liberation, the spheres of surpassing, and the spheres of totality are
[skilled] with respect to methods of purifying the mind
[The passage -] "Maitreya, in that way ... ''355 - [indicates that] Bodhisattvas
who are skilled with respect to these six topics
356
in that way have manifestly estab-
lished, will manifestly establish, and are manifestly establishing the great powers of
Bodhisattvas; this includes what went before.
351D p. 74.5; Stog p. 107.4.
352As Yeshe Thabkhe. indicates in an oral explanation of this passage, Ji'ianagarbha is not talking
about the doctrine of "skill in means" (thabs la mkhas pa, upliya-kauJalya), but rather a specific
type of knowledge, "skill in method with respect to mind". Skill in means refers to a Bodhi-
sattva's ability to skillfully adapt approaches and doctrines to the specific capacities, interests, etc.
of particular groups and individuals. Ji'ianagarbha indicates that the skill which is being discussed
in the sutra is developed as a result of purifying the mind through attaining advanced meditative
states.
353D p. 74.6; Stog p, 107.5.
354D p. 74.6; Stog p. 107.6.
355D p. 74.7; Stog p. 107.6.
3 5 ~ e s e are the six topics under discussion: (1) skill with respect to the arising of mind; (2) skill
with respect to abiding of mind; (3) skill with respect to emergence of mind; (4) skill with respect
to increasing of mind; (5) skill with respect to diminishment of mind; and (6) skill in method
with respect to mind.
124 Two Commentaries on the Sarrulhinirmocana-sutra
In the extensive statement: "With respect to the statement by the Bhagavan, 'In
the element of a without a remainder of aggregates all feelings completely
cease ... "'357 [Buddha states,] "Maitreya, in brief there are two kinds of feelings: (1)
cognitions of assumptions of bad states that are states; and (2) cognitions of objects
that are the fruits of those. With respect to that, cognitions of assumptions of bad
states that are states should be known as being of four kinds: (1) [assumptions of
bad states] that are cognitions of form states .... " [This passage indicates that] due to
transforming the form aggregate, one cognizes [Buddha] lands, the bodies [of a
Buddha,] the [major] marks [of a Buddha,] the minor marks [of a Buddha,] the
limitless eloquence [of a Buddha,] and the unperceivable topknot [at the crown of a
Buddha's head].358
[The passage, "assumptions of bad states] that are cognitions of formless
states" [344b] [refers to] the characteristics of the four kinds of non-form aggre-
gates when they have been transformed. With respect to those, due to transforming
the aggregate of feeling [one attains] a cognition that is a basis of extensive, fault-
less happiness. When the aggregate of discrimination is transformed, [one attains] a
cognition that has overlordship with respect to teaching by means of all collections
of names, collections of words, and collections of letters. Due to transforming the
357D p. 74.7; Stog p. 107.7.
358A Buddha land is the world or world-system in which a particular Buddha works and lives.
See: Teresina Powell, "The Background and Early Use of the Concept", The Eastern
Buddhist 6.199-430 and 7.131-176.
The major and minor marks of Buddhas are signs that distinguish them. See: Mahavyut-
patti XVII; Wonch'uk (vol. di [120], p. 291.5); Byang chub rdzu 'phru1 vol. jo (206), p. 315.7;
and Lamotte, La Somme du Grand vehicule d'Asanga, notes pp. 54*-5*. The eighty-two minor
marks are also listed there. See also: La Somme du Grand vehicule d'Asanga, pp. 286, 295, and
302; and Mahiiyiina-siltriilO1J1kiira XXI.57.
According to Yeshe Thabkhe, the limitless eloquence of the Buddha refers to the four ways
by which Buddhas get sentient beings to listen to their teachings, called the "means of gathering"
(bsdu ba'i dngos po, sa1!lgraha-vastu): (1) giving (sbyin pa, dana), which involves giving away
teachings of doctrine and material goods; (2) speaking pleasantly (snyan par smra ba, priya-
viidita), which involves interesting them in one's teachings of doctrine through pleasant words; (3)
beneficial activities (don spyod pa, artha-carya), which are activities that accord with what trainees
want; and (4) concordant actions (don mthun pa, samaTl{lrthata), which involves making one's ac-
tions accord with one's words. These are described in Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, p. 1487.
See also pa/i Text Society Dictionary (London, 1972), p. 666 and Mahiivyutpatti XXXV, 1-4.
The topknot on the crown of a Buddha's head (spyi gtsug pa, is a topknot of hair
or a growth of the skull of indetenninate size that makes it appear that the head has a turban on it.
JfUinagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapter 125
aggregate of compositional factors, [one attains] a cognition that brings forth ema-
nations,359 transformations, gatherings of attendants, and pure qualities. Due to
transforming the aggregate of consciousness, [one attains] cognitions that are: (1)
the mirror-like exalted wisdom (me long Ita bu'i ye shes, lidarsa-jfilina), (2) [the
exalted wisdom of] equality (mnyam pa nyid [kyi ye shes], samatli[-jfilina]), (3)
[the exalted wisdom of] individual investigation (so sor rto g par' i ye shes], pratya-
and (4) the exalted wisdom that accomplishes activities (bya ba
sgrub pa' i ye shes, kriYli-siddhi-jfilina).
[The passage -] "With respect to that, established results are whatever [have
their results] now .. .''360 - [means that] just those cognitions of form states and
formless states arise in that moment. [The passage -] "non-established results are
whatever serve as causes in the future" - [refers to] future results of just those.
Also, you should know that cognitions of objects are of four kinds.
361
What
are the four? (1) Cognitions of bases are uncommon establishments of the colors,
expanses, measurements, and so forth of inestimable mansions of Tathagatas. (2)
Cognition of property [refers to] appearances of various measureless ldndsofprop-
erty completely transcending those of gods and humans. (3) Cognition of resources
[refers to] one's own and others' experiencing of the resources of Mahayana quali-
ties by way of the two, enjoyment bodies and emanation bodies. (4) Cognition of
reliances [refers to] mastery of those causes and conditions that are cognitions of
objects.
In [the passage] - "Moreover, in the element of nirvliI).a that has a remainder
of aggregates ... ''362 - "moreover" [refers to] cognitions of bases and cognitions of
objects that are their results. They exist in the element of a Tathagata' s nirvliI).a that
has a remainder of aggregates. "Non-established results" are what serve as future
causes.
With respect to [the passage,] "experience feelings which arise from contact
that is included among cognitions":363 [345a] This is because one has not abandoned
35!7ext correcti0il: the Sde dge text (p. 344b.2) reads: sgrul pa; the Peking text (p. 209.2.2) reads:
sprul pa, and Yeshe Thabkhe indicates that this is the correct reading.
360D p. 75.3; Stog p. 108.3.
361This refers to D p. 75.3 and Stog p. 108.4.
362D p. 75.4; Stog p. 108.5.
363D p. 75.5; Stog p. 108.5 reads: "one experiences only a feeling that arises from cognitive con-
tact".
126 Two Commentaries on the Sa1!Uihinirmocana-satra
cognitions that are afflicted and that are unafflicted. "Its discordant class has not
ceased in all ways" because one obtains cognitions of bases which arise from con-
tact that is included among cognitions. Due to one's own conceptuality regarding
feelings which arise from contact that is subsumed by ignorance - afflicted [feel-
ings] that are a class that is discordant with that [i.e., a nirviU).a without a remainder
of aggregates] and non-afru.cted [feelings] - one eliminates the seeds of the arising
of uncommon feelings that are apprehenders. Because one obtains cognition of
objects which are pleasing results that arise from contact that is included among
cognitions, due to the conceptuality of others one also eliminates obstructions with
respect to all objects of observation that are seeds of the arising of uncommon
feelings that are apprehenders.
With respect to [the passage,] "When one thoroughly passes beyond sorrow
in the element of a nirval).a without a remainder of aggregates, even that
ceases ... ":364 This is because when states arise from contact that is included within
cognitions of Tathagatas and when cognitions of objects arise in that way, one
eliminates even those attainments. The seeds of the arising of feelings and non-
feelings are simply the body of the basis-consciousness. [The discussion] is
wrapped Up365 by [the passage,] "Therefore .... ''366
Question: If Tathagatas attain nirviU).a in the element of a nirviU).a without a remain-
der of aggregates, how do they accomplish the aims of others within cyclic
existence?
[Response:] Due to the power of former aspirations, even though Tathagatas attain
nirviU).a they still accomplish the aims of others, because the sport of Tathagatas is
manifold.
[This concludes] the explanation of "The Chapter of the Superior Maitreya" from
the Superior Sutra Explaining the Thought composed by the master Jiianagarbha.
364D p. 75.5; Stog p. 108.7.
36SThe Tibetan word is mjug sdud (Skt. nigamyatl). According to the Bod sktul tshig mdzod chen
mo, vol. I, p. 882, this term is used in two ways: (1) the method of wrapping up at the end of a
work (las mjug sgril thabs byed pa); and (2) condensing the essenC() at the end of an extensive ex-
planation (rgyas bshad kyi mthar snying po bsdu ba).
366D p. 75.6; Stog p. 109.1.
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A khu blo gros rgya mtsho, 14, 16
Abhidharma-samuccaya, 13
accomplishment of the purpose, 69, 70, 87, 114, 118
afflictive obstructions, 68, 101, 114, 123
analytical image, 69,70,75,81,116,117
Arya-gambhZra-sarrulhinirmocana-sutra-!fkli, 1, 24
2, 7,8-22,27-50
Arya-sa1!ldhinirmocana-sutrasya-vylikhylina, 2, 15, 16
2, 63-126
Asailga, vii, 2, 3,4,5,6,7,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19,21,22-27,34,50,59,
64,80,116,124
assumptions of bad states, 46,86,111,112,117,119,123,124,125
Asvabhava, 16
atman, 10, 39
A valokitavrata, 51
Avalokitesvara, 24, 45,46,47,48,51
basis-consciousness, 10, 13, 38, 39, 69, 86, 95, 100, 118, 119, 127
Bhavya, 51,52,53,57,58,59,63
Bka' yang dag pa' i tshad rna las mdo btus pa, 2
boastful pride, 10
Bodhisattva, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17,24,25,29,30,31,32,36,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,
47,48,49,68,70,71,72,73,74,78,79,81,83,84,86, 88, 89,91,95,97,
100, 101,102, 103, 105, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
122, 123, 124
Bodhisattva levels, 12, 24, 68
Bodhisattvabhami, 13
Bstan 'gyur, 14, 15, 16,52
Bu ston rin chen grub, 3, 5, 6, 15, 16,24,25,27,53,54,56
Buddha, 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 18,23,25,30,31,32,33,35,36,37,39,40,41,42,
44,45,49,55,56,57,59,61,62,63,64,68,69,70,71,72,73, 74, 75, 76, 77,
78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,88,89,90,91,93,94,95, 96, 97, 98, 99,
140 Two Commentaries on the Sa'!ldhinirmocana-satra
100,102,103,105, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123,
124, 125
Buddha land, 114, 119,120, 124, 125
Buddhajiianapada, 51
Buddhism, vii, 1, 53, 59, 60, 61
Byang chub rdzu 'phrul, 2, 3, 5,15,16,56, 124
cruming, 6,20,34,42,43, 44,45,63, 67, 68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75 ,79,82,83,
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89,91,94, 103, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119,
120, 123, 124
CandrakIrti,52
Catalogue of Dharma Translations, 15
Chieh shen mi ching chu, 3
Chos bsgyur dkar chag, 5, 6,15,27,54,56
Cittamatra (see ruso mind-only), 57
Cog ro klu'i rgyru mtshan, 5, 6, 16
cognition-only, 11, 13,54,59,60,61,62,75,78,79,81,92,93,100,108,122
Compendium of Ascertainments (see ruso Viniscaya-sa'!lgraha1}l), 13, 14, 27
Compendium of the Great Vehicle (see ruso Mah!iyana-sa'!lgraha), 27
compounded, 8,9,37,44,54, 76,92,98,106,107,120,122
cyclic existence, 32
Dafabhamika-satra, 57
Dbus pa blo gsru, 52, 53
Demieville, Paul, 1
dependent arising, 101, 113
Dge lugs pa, 3, 23, 52, 53, 54,56, 57,59, 62
DharmakIrti, 15
Dharmodgata, 9
Dpru 'byor lhun grub, 14
Eckel, Mrucolrn, 51, 54, 55, 56,57
emptiness, 32, 39,40,44, 45, 58, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110
Essence of the Good Explanations (see ruso Legs bshad snying po), 13, 57
ethics, 42, 67, 110, 113
exruted knower of rul aspects, 11, 40, 104
exruted knowledge of all aspects, 87
Fa-cheng, 2
Go rams pa Bsod nams seng ge, 53, 54
Index
God, 44, 97
Great Vehicle, 44, 45, 48, 98, 109, 110, 112
GUl).akara, 10,40
Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pa'i sgron me, 23, 68
Hearer, 31, 32, 37,41,94,99,100,114,115
Hearer Vehicle, 44, 48,98,99
hermeneutics, 3, 11
Ffinayana,8,23,25,46,112
FIopkins,JeffIey,vili,3, 7,23,26,53,57,58,80
FIsiian-tsang, 16,22
idealism, 11,59,60,62
Iida, Shotaro, 1
impermanence, 44, 106
imputation of what is not real, 12, 49
imputational character, 10, 48, 109, 110
. imputational nature, 33
Inaba, Shoju, 2
141
insight,6,20,42,43,44,45, 63, 67,68,69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79,80,81,82,
83,84,85,86,87,88,89,91,94,103,110,111,112, 113,114, 115,116,119,
120, 123, 124
'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, 52, 57
Jinamitra, 13, 50
Jfianagarbha,vli,2,4, 5, 6,25, 51-63, 64, 65, 89,98, 105, 107, 123, 127
Kamalasila, 52, 57, 59 '
Khri srong Ide brtsan, 3, 27
Kiikai,3
Lamotte, Etienne, 2, 3,4,7, 15,27,34,58,59,80,89, 116, 124
Lankltvatara-siltra, 23, 57
Leang skya rol pa'i rdo rje, 52
Legs bshad snying po (see also Essence of the Good Explanations), 3, 5, 7, 14, 15,
23,57,58
level, 12,45,,46,85,87,113,114,116,117,118
level of engagement through belief, 9,36,49, 116
Levels of Yogic Practice (see also Yogacara-bhilmi), 27
limits of phenomena, 69,70,116,117
142 Two Commentaries on the Saf!ldhinirmocana-sutra
Lopez, Donald, 52, 53, 63
MacDonald, Ariane, 3
Madhyamaka, 5,7, 23, 51,54, 55,56,57,59,62
Madhyarrrika, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63
Mahayana,vll, 1,5,7,8,12,23,25,26,27,46,55,94,99,126,
Mahltyana-saf!lgraha (see also Compendium o/the Great Vehicle), 13,27
Maitreya,2, 11,24,25,26,27,42,43,44,59,61,63,67,68,70,73,74,75,76,
78, 79,82,83,84,85,86,87,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,99, 100, 101,
102,104,105,109,110,111,112,113,115,118,122,124, 125, 127
Mafijusn, 29
Mafijrdrz-mula-tantra, 23
Marpa,56
meditation, 43, 45, 60, 61, 65, 71, 80, 101, 104, 116
meditative absorption, 112, 113, 119
meditative equipoise, 39, 82, 110, 115, 120
meditative stabilization, 42, 43, 45, 59, 67, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 81, 87, 88, 103,
109,110,112,113,114,119
Mimaki, Katsumi, 52, 53, 54, 57
mind-only (see also cittamatra), 3, 23, ~ , 55,56, 57
mindful establishments, 45
Nagao, Gadjin, 2
Nagruauna,7,23,51
Nakamura, Hajime, 1,22
nrrvaga,32, 84, 85,94,113,124,126,127
Nishioka, Soshu, 15, 27,54,56
non-analytical image, 69,70,116,117
Nozawa, Joshu, 2, 4, 54
observing the limits of phenomena, 116
obstructions to omniscience, 31, 68, 82, 101, 114, 123
openers of the chariot ways, 7, 24
other-dependent nature, 33
other-dependent character, 10, 11, 109, 110
other-dependent phenomena, 58
pararnartha,9,25
Paramarthasamudgata, 11, 17,41,42
path of meditation, 36, 117
"1
Index
path of seeing, 36, 69, 71,116,117
pe.rrection,
Perfection of Wisdom Chapter, 33
Perfection of Wisdom [Satra], 7, 25,63,73,104
Pramaf}Q-viniscaya,15
realm of truth, 31, 32,84,85,116
Rje btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, 52
Ruegg, David S., 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57
Sa skya, 53, 54
Sakyamuni, 23
143
r
SOJ?1dhinirmocana-satra (see also Satra Explaining the Thought), vii, 1-6,7,8,9,
12,13,14,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,27,28,39,40,44,52,53,54,56,57,
58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,75
saIp.slqta, 8
51, 52, 57, 59
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 55
Sarvastivada, 25
Satyadvaya-vibhanga (see also Differentiation of the Two Truths), 52

schematic outlines, 49
Schmithausen,lJunbert, 3, 21, 22, 59, 60, 61
selflessness, 30, 52,54, 55, 56, 92, 108, 116
sems tsam (see also mind-only), 3, 52
sense sphere, 30,91,111
Ser shul dge bshes blo bzang phun 5, 15
Shingon,3
Silendrabodhi, 13, 50
51
Stein, R.A., 3
Steinkellner, Ernst, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 56
Sthiramati, 16
Subhfiti,37,104
suchness, 31,44,45,49,79, 84, 89, 92,93,94, 98,99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106,
108, 113, 115, 116, 122, 123
suffering, 44, 98, 121, 122
Sum pa mkhan po, 51
Superior, 33,93,96, 111, 113
Satra Explaining the Thought (see also SarruihininizOcanacsatra), 29, 30, 127
144 Two Commentaries on the SarruJhinirmocana-sutra
Svatanttika,52, 53, 54,57, 59,62, 63
Svatanttika-Madhyamika, 51, 53
Taranatha, 22, 24,25,26,51
Tathagata, 21, 31, 32, 41, 48, 49,86,87,99,100,113,114,119,126,127
thoroughly established character, 10, 109, 110
thoroughly established p.ature, 33, 58, 109, 110
three natures, 14,33,39,57,110
Tripiraka, 12
truth body, 31, 48, 69, 85, 87,94, 114, 116, 117
Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 3, 5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,21,23,52,57,
58,59,62
Tucci, Giuseppe, 3
two truths, 14,44,52,54,97,110
ultinaate,9, 10, 11,19,20,29,33,34,35,36,37,38, 108
uncompounded,8,9,92,108
23
Vasubandhu, 5, 22, 24, 25, 27, 58; 60,80, 116
VidhivatparipfCchaka, 29
ViniJcaya-sa1flgrahaT}f, 3,14,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,27
Visruarnati,38
VVayrnan,AJex,14,22,25,53,60,61
VVonch'uk, 1,2,6, 16,24,25,63,77,80, 117,124
Ye shes sde, 13,50
yoga, 105, 113
Yogacara,vii,2,5,7, 10, 13,23,27,39,53,54,57,58,59,60,62,72
Yogliclira-bhilmi (see also Levels oJYogic Practice), 3,21,27