I N S T I T U T E F OR D E F E N S E A NA LYS E S

Interim Report on Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture

Anil Joglekar, Project Leader Dave Baratto Devol Brett Jim Doherty Scott Feil Bob Mohan Sam Packer David Spalding

July 2003
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

IDA Paper P-3779 Log : H 03-000926

This work was conducted under contract DASW01 98 C 0067, Task BB-9-2143 for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Affairs. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency. 2003, 2004 Institute for Defense Analyses, 4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 (703) 845-2000. This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (NOV 95).

I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A NA LYS E S

IDA Paper P-3779

Interim Report on Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture

Anil Joglekar, Project Leader Dave Baratto Devol Brett Jim Doherty Scott Feil Bob Mohan Sam Packer David Spalding

PREFACE
This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) in partial fulfillment of the task National Personnel Recovery Architecture. The objective of this effort was to provide an independent study of the current capacity for recovering isolated U.S. Government personnel in overseas locations, and to propose a National Personnel Recovery Architecture that would provide coherent, integrated, interagency response capability to recover such personnel. Congress directed the study, assigning responsibility to the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. DPMO selected the Institute for Defense Analyses to conduct the study, and it was assigned to the Operational Evaluation Division. The study parameters included defining the terms of reference and focusing the scope of the study to ensure that any proposed architecture would reflect current and evolving U.S. policy, be feasible, and meet the Congressional and sponsor intent. Research included document searches, interviews, workshops, and attendance at policy and operationally-oriented conferences and meetings. The study has previously submitted IDA Document D-2775 Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Personnel Recovery A National Imperative, dated 1 October 2002. Mr. Robert R. Soule, Director of OED, chaired the IDA Technical Review Committee. Members were Mr. Phil Major, IDA Vice President; Dr. David Graham, SFRD; Dr. John Shea, SED; Dr. Gary Comfort and Dr. Rex Rivolo, OED; LCDR Mike Sheahan, JAWP; and Mr. Joe Stahl, CARD. Additionally, Mr. Rick Sayre, a former team member now serving on the Army Staff, provided a valuable review of the draft.

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INTERIM REPORT ON INTERAGENCY NATIONAL PERSONNEL RECOVERY ARCHITECTURE

Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... S-1 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... Data Collection .................................................................................................................... Direct and Guide .................................................................................................................. PR Force Planning and Preparation ..................................................................................... PR Mission Execution ......................................................................................................... Interim Report Solution Sets................................................................................................ The Road Ahead .................................................................................................................. The Briefing I. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... II. Data Collection and Consensus Building ............................................................................ III. Strategic Vision for Full Spectrum PR ................................................................................ IV. Direct and Guide .................................................................................................................. V. PR Force Planning and Preparation ..................................................................................... VI. Mission Execution ............................................................................................................... 4 30 46 66 100 142 S-1 S-2 S-2 S-3 S-5 S-6 S-7

References.................................................................................................................................. R-1 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Acronyms Glossary Data Collection, Interviews, Meetings, Conferences, Workshops and Other v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
stresses the importance of interagency operations in the Joint Vision 2020, Contingency Planning Guidance, and in the Secretary of Defense memorandum dated 17 September 2002 on top 10 legislative priorities for Fiscal Year 2004. Throughout this interim report the term interagency refers to both DoD and non-DoD agencies. With regard to personnel recovery, DoD is a key constituent of the architecture. 1. Study Objectives The study objectives are to (1) describe the national personnel architecture as it exists today (baseline), (2) develop a strategic vision for personnel recovery (PR), (3) identify shortfalls and gaps in the current NPRA, and (4) then identify alternatives to improve the national architecture to achieve the strategic vision, with emphasis on including the USG interagency. Although the task order does not task IDA to develop a plan to implement the improved national architecture, IDA will propose an approach for the development of such a plan. 2. Scope The study includes all American military personnel, government civilians, government contractors deployed overseas in an official capacity, and others designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President. Contractors have become an important element of recent operations, constituting over ten percent of S-1

A. INTRODUCTION In 2001, the House Appropriations Committee tasked the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to conduct a government-wide, interagency needs assessment in order to describe a fully integrated National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA). In April 2002, the DPMO tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to conduct a two-year study to define the interagency national personnel recovery architecture. This report provides the interim status of this task. With the increased requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, counter narcotics operations, and the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. personnel will continue to be deployed overseas in harms way. Traditionally, the U.S. government has felt a moral obligation to return military personnel home safely. With the widespread deployment of a full range of personnelgovernment civilians and contract employees, as well as military service membersthe government may find itself obligated to provide personnel recovery assistance to a much broader set of personnel when incidents occur in the future. This study recommends that the policy and planning implications of such a broadening of personnel recovery obligations be considered in advance of future incidents. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations The interagency focus for operations is not just a matter of congressional interest. The Department of Defense (DoD)

forces deployed in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This study considers, but does not focus on, coalition PR (already covered in IDA Paper P-3705, May 2002) or civil search and rescue conducted by host nations or the U.S. Coast Guard. 3. National PR Assessment Logic The term architecture means different things to different people. For the NPRA study, architecture is broad and includes military and non-military PR requirements, and interagency PR capabilities (force structure, doctrine, training, C4I, etc.). The PR architecture consists of three main components: (1) direct and guide, (2) plan and prepare PR force elements, and (3) mission execution. Using these three components of PR architecture, IDA developed a PR vision document (IDA Document D-2775, October 2002). Figure 1 shows the assessment logic. First, a baseline capability is defined for the three components. Then, the baseline capability is compared to desired end states of the PR vision, and shortfalls and gaps are identified. Further, a solution set is identified for each component. This process will have to be iterated in the future to achieve the end states. B. DATA COLLECTION Data collection efforts involved visiting various U.S. government (USG) agencies. IDA made 18 visits to non-DoD departments and agencies such as Department of State (DoS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DoJ), Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Agency for International Development, and General Services Administration. IDA also visited all four Services, four Combatant Commands, and attended many PR Response Cell (PRRC) and PR Advisory Group (PRAG) meetings and a PR conference. Data collection efforts for this phase of the study S-2

culminated with an interagency workshop at IDA on 5-6 February 2003. Besides gathering data, the visits provided several positive side benefits: (1) increasing interagency participants awareness of PR risks, (2) developing an active interagency PR network, and (3) identifying several non-DoD interagency needs, such as standard PR procedures and access to DoD training.
Planand andPrepare Prepare Plan Force Elements Force Elements
Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Recovery Forces Recovery Forces Commanders and Staff Commanders and Staff

Execute the Mission

Strategic Operational Tactical Report Locate Support Recover Return/ Repatriate

Directand andGuide Guide Direct

Doctrine Doctrine Mission Mission Requirements Requirements

I m p l e m e n t

Identify Gaps

Compare

Assess& & Assess Recommend Recommend Changes Changes

Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leader Dev. Personnel Facilities

Desired Strategic Vision End States

Figure 1. NPRA Assessment Logic

C. DIRECT AND GUIDE The term PR is much broader than Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) or the recovery of a downed pilot. Presently there is no personnel recovery doctrine and the U.S. operates largely on CSAR doctrine. However, this situation has not hampered us from conducting coalition and interagency PR

during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. 1. Baseline National Level Policy and Doctrine While the Chief of Mission (COM, almost always the U.S. Ambassador), generally has the primary responsibilities for evacuation and PR of USG personnel, the capabilities to conduct those operations lie outside the Embassy or Post. The CoM may rely on the host country for assistance, use commercial means, or ask for military assistance from the Combatant Commander. When there is no CoM, such as in Afghanistan or Iraq, the Combatant Commander assumes responsibility for all USG personnel. Presently there is no joint PR doctrine within DoD and there is no interagency PR doctrine. Joint doctrine today is contained in JP 3-50.2 for Joint Combat Search and Rescue, but not for PR. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is expecting the approval of JP 3-50, Joint Doctrine for Personnel Recovery, in April 2004. PR policy is covered by DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery. Other key documents are National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-1, Organization of the National Security System, and NSPD-12, U.S. Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad. The DoD policy documents establish two interagency groups: the PRAG and the PRRC. PRAG is an advisory group and meets semiannually, while PRRC convenes as necessary in response to PR incidents. The PRRC is charged among other things to determine the legal status of isolated personnel and provides a PR lessons learned report upon conclusion of the incident.

2. Interagency PR Definition The DoD PR definition from DoDD 2310.2 is directly applicable to interagency PR if the term personnel is taken in a broader context. Those in the DoD PR community generally interpret the definition in terms of who the individual is, his/her individual and duty status, and the environment. However, there are no accepted guidelines for limiting the scope of interagency PR efforts. In the absence of such limitations, this study will address a broad definition of interagency PR responsibilities, to include U.S. military personnel, Government civilians and contractors, without regard to the situation or environment. Hence, for this study, the DoD PR definition is not changed but the context of the definition is significantly broadened to allow the study to examine fully the policy, planning, and program implications of future interagency PR issues. 3. Shortfalls in Interagency Direct and Guide There is no national level policy or guide for interagency PR, and there is no doctrine for interagency PR. The DoD doctrine document is expected to be promulgated by April 2004. DoD Directives and Instructions establishing the PRAG and PRRC are lacking because they do not provide the necessary structure and authority to the PRAG and PRRC to improve PR capabilities. 4. Interim Direct and Guide Issue Because of the lack of national level guidance, there is no consensus on the definition and scope of interagency PR. There is a lack of PR doctrine within DoD and a lack of policy and understanding outside DoD. National level PR requirements and capabilities are not yet defined. Current PR architecture is DoDcentric and interagency capabilities are not integrated. Within

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DoD, closely related PR methods are treated as separate, and synergy among these methods is lacking. D. PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION The second key PR architecture component is planning and preparation of PR forces; for the interim, focus is on the training of isolated individuals, recovery forces, and staffs. Both rescuees (those at risk of becoming isolated personnel), and the rescuers, (the recovery forces and the commanders and staffs that will employ them) are considered elements of Personnel Recovery Forces. Personnel who are at risk of isolation can take an integral, active role in their own recovery. The DoD has developed three levels of survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) training for personnel who are at risk of isolation, capture, or exploitation. Level A is classroom training that explains the Code of Conduct. Level B is academic training and B+ has some practical field training. Level C includes level B+ plus resistance laboratory training and level C+ is a graduate level training tailored to specific missions and needs. 1. Training Requirements Combatant Commands generally decide who needs what level of training with level C requirements being generally unconstrained by training capabilities and funding. Service requirements are based on career fields that have historically faced high risks. The estimated annual wartime level C training requirements are: 4,300 for the Army, 3,430 for the Navy, 4,540 for the Air Force, and 300 for the Marines. Although non-military agencies know that they have individuals at risk, their exact requirements are not yet defined. According to the DoS F-77 report, 6,000 U.S. government S-4

personnel and their contractors are in high threat countries. It is recognized that not all 6,000 need level C training; IDA is working with the DoS Diplomatic Security to define who needs what level of training. 2. Training Capability DoD has significant SERE training capability. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) and Air Force SERE schools are at Fairchild Air Force Base in Spokane, Washington. The Air Force also has a school at the USAF Academy in Colorado Springs. The Navy has schools in Brunswick, Maine and San Diego, California, and Army schools are at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Rucker, Alabama. Some DoS personnel have gone to JPRAs PR Academy at Fairchild. The Idaho National Guard offers hostage and abduction survivor training at Couer dAlene, Idaho. There is also a Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) at Glynco, Georgia, which trains numerous interagency organizations in law enforcement, and the National Foreign Affairs training center, which trains Foreign Service Officers for overseas assignment. IDA will explore these venues for interagency training in the next phase of this study. Schools for commanders, staff, and planners are located at JPRAs campus in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and at the C2 Warrior School at Hurlburt Air Force Base in Florida. Rescue forces are trained at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada, Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Arizona, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Exercise Desert Rescue focuses on the Combat Search and Rescue mission area and is conducted annually at Fallon, Nevada. Exercises Red Flag (Nevada), Foal Eagle (Korea) and Cope Thunder (Alaska) provide limited opportunities to conduct PR force training.

3. Shortfalls in PR Force Planning and Preparation During the IDA team visits, the Air Force and Navy indicated that their level C SERE training capacity matches their present requirements. Some modernization of their capability is planned. Marines generally are not meeting their requirements because they do not have their own capability and rely on space available at the other Service schools. The Army also is not meeting its present requirements and has developed a plan to increase capacity, but the plan is not yet funded. JPRAs PR Academy has built a new facility that will increase its capacity five-fold. However, they are not presently funded for the increased instructor staff of about 50 to 80 instructors. PR training and exercises for joint rescue forces are significantly deficient. Venues for conducting full end-to-end training with survivors and PR recovery forces are lacking. NonDoD agencies are presently not participating in the limited DoD PR force and staff training. 4. PR Force Planning and Preparation Issue For both DoD and non-DoD agencies, PR planning and preparation are significantly inadequate. However, it should be noted that in recent operations such as Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, there have been frequent PR operations, in some cases involving interagency and coalition elements, and the success rate has been good. There is a lack of a common PR knowledge base in the interagency and requirements are not yet determined. Current PR capabilities are primarily in DoD, but they do not integrate non-DoD capabilities. The SERE force and staff training capabilities in DoD do not accommodate interagency requirements.

E. PR MISSION EXECUTION The third critical component of the PR architecture is to execute the PR mission to recover isolated individuals. Currently, in theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, DoD is wellorganized and equipped to conduct interagency and coalition personnel recovery operations at the JTF level, and roles and responsibilities are well-articulated. However, that may not be the case for different scenarios such as Colombia, Bosnia, or the Philippines, primarily because DoD does not have assets in place, and the State Department is responsible, in conjunction with the host nation, who might in turn request the Combatant Commands support. Thus, mission execution is dependent on the scenario, the theater, and any prior agreements that might exist. Figure 3 shows the nominal coordination that takes place in theaters where a Combatant Command alone does not have total PR responsibility. IDA is conducting a case study of the downing of a Cessna 208 in February 2003 in Southern Colombia to document the interagency coordination process involved. 1. Shortfalls in Mission Execution The interagency coordination process is not defined or understood and appears to be ad hoc. Coordination is thus time consuming and could adversely impact mission success. 2. Mission Execution Issue The roles, responsibilities and authority of USG agencies to execute the PR mission are not well defined. Command and control relationships are not defined in an interagency context and must be codified. Many non-DoD agencies have the unrealistic expectation that when they need PR help, DoD will be there to provide immediate assistance. Once again, if adequate S-5

planning and preparations are not accomplished ahead of time, the success of the mission could be in doubt.
NSC Situation Room

Executive Support Group

DCI

DoS Regional Desk CMS Host Nation U.S. Mission (Ambassador) CA/OCS PMAT

NMCC DIA JFCOM JPRA

STRATEGIC/ NATIONAL
DPMO (PRRC) USCG Command Center Host Nation

OPERATIONAL
CC/JFC

Area/ District RCC

The PRRC and PRAG should be re-engineered to give them more structure and authority for improving PR capability over time. The PRAG should be renamed as the PR Oversight Group (PROG), and empowered with commensurate authority to conduct oversight of the PR Implementation Plan. The PRRC should be comprised of a core membership that is familiar with PR policy issues, meets on a quarterly basis, makes informed decision based on information provided by Combatant Commands, CoMs, and intelligence agencies, and informs the PRAG of PR incident trends and lessons learned. 2. Interim PR Force Planning and Preparation Solution Set JPRA should integrate interagency and coalition aspects of doctrine and TTPs in the documents they are writing. The DoS should provide PR guidance in the Emergency Action Planning Handbook. The DoS also should explore PR training at the Idaho National Guard and at FLETC. The Joint Staff should develop a PR Joint Mission Essential Task List, including interagency and coalition tasks. Combatant Commands should exercise these tasks during JCS-sponsored exercises. The Services should address SERE training shortfalls at Service SERE schools and ensure adequate resources. DoD should expand PR play in existing and ongoing exercises. USG agencies should identify their PR training requirements. These requirements need to be considered in the overall USG training requirements. To improve awareness of the importance and shortfalls of PR, JPRA should develop senior-level briefings to address full spectrum PR for all interagency managers. DPMO needs to support increasing PR Academy instructor staff so that the Academy can support SERE training of all interagency groups. At present, DoD resistance training is conducted separately for three situations: POW, terrorist hostage, and peacetime S-6

SRR RCC

JSRC RCC 1. 2. Coordinate with U.S. Mission and Host Nation Execute Mission Report Locate Support Recover Return UARCC

Figure 3. Interagency Coordination of PR Mission Execution with a U.S. Mission

F. INTERIM REPORT SOLUTION SETS 1. Interim Direct and Guide Solution Set A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) or guide is needed to provide a common understanding of interagency PR policy and doctrine. The NSPD should define PR in a broad, interagency context, define the interagency coordination process for PR, delineate responsibilities, and prescribe standards for U.S. personnel assigned and deployed overseas. The NSPD should address Full Spectrum PR and promote the development of a Code of Behavior for non-military personnel in support of their resistance training.

government detainee. In the new conflict environment of the global war on terrorism, these situations might overlap significantly. DoD should transform training by providing core training that is common to all three situations, followed by specialized training for each situation, as needed, as shown in Figure 2.
Prisoner of War Terrorist Hostage

Rescue Center (JSRC) and Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center (UARCC) operations as liaisons and should loosely integrate interagency assets capable of supporting PR. G. THE ROAD AHEAD This interim report provides the sponsor the status of progress at the study mid-point. The final report will be completed in time for inclusion of the annual Personnel Recovery Conference scheduled for April 2004. Additional data collection and analysis is programmed in the meantime. While the interagency emphasis in this report has been placed on the Direct and Guide component (focusing on policy and doctrine) and the Plan and Prepare component (focusing on planning and training), subsequent efforts will devote attention to the other DOTMLPF aspects such as materiel development, technology, and leader development, as well. Data collection efforts will initially concentrate on the development of two case studies. One case study is intended to capture the condition in which a combatant commander has the dominant authority and responsibility for PR; the other case is intended to address the general condition in which an Ambassador has primary responsibility for PR. At this time Operation Iraqi Freedom and Bogot, Columbia are the likely candidate cases. Data collection has also begun on identifying materiel, software, technology, and Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations that might be applicable to PR forces. Workshops will continue to be an integral part of the study process with the intent of expanding the network of PR knowledgeable personnel throughout the interagency, while at the same time, exploring new common ground and developing consensus on issues and future initiatives.

Status Quo Three separate training curricula for three different captivity situations

Peacetime Government Detainee

Proposed A core curriculum for all captivity situations

Captive

Figure 2. SERE Training Re-Engineering

3. Interim Mission Execution Solution Set Over the years, DoD has developed recovery tools such as: Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP), Evasion Plan of Action (EPA), evasion charts (EVCs), blood-chits, and pointee-talkies. Non-DoD agencies could adopt these tools. Also, interagency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) should define the coordination process so that real-time coordination can be efficiently minimized and expedited. DoD should encourage interagency personnel to participate in the Joint Search and S-7

As indicated in the study, the absence of national level guidance and directives is a major issue that will be further explored and developed with the use of workshops. While the development of an NSPD on PR is being considered at this time, it may be that a like document or a similar instrument may prove more feasible and effective. Our objective will be to stimulate discussions, generate interest and hopefully consensus on the need for national level policy and then to initiate the process for its formulation. The directives or guidance will attempt to address identified shortfalls in the policy area that impede planning, preparation, or execution of Full Spectrum PR. The IDA study team will help facilitate workshops, as necessary and feasible, on a Code of Behavior for non-DoD Departments and Agencies. Again, the attempt here will be to first stimulate interest, then develop a consensus on the need for a Code, and finally to coordinate and support an initiative for its development. Existing organizations, such as the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC)/ Counter-terrorism Security Group, the PRAG, and the PRRC will be explored further and examined as

to their applicability to Full Spectrum PR. If appropriate, the study will provide recommendations for the modification or reengineering of authorities, relationships, or organization for improved effectiveness. A requirements definition process is being developed by DoS for the identification of high-risk personnel stationed or deployed overseas. The IDA study team will continue to work with DoS in the refinement of that process and will assist in making recommendations as to the SERE training associated with those personnel identified to be at high-risk. JPRA is in the process of staffing the development of Joint Publication 3-50 on PR. IDA will work closely with JPRA to insure they are fully informed of issues and recommendations of the NPRA study.

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IDAPaper PaperP-3779 P-3779 IDA

InterimReport Reporton onInteragency InteragencyNational National Interim PersonnelRecovery RecoveryArchitecture Architecture Personnel
June2003 2003 66June
Dr. Anil Joglekar, Project Leader Dr. Anil Joglekar, Project Leader MG(Ret.) Dave Baratto,USA Lt Gen (Ret.) Devol Brett, USAF MG(Ret.) Dave Baratto,USA Lt Gen (Ret.) Devol Brett, USAF CAPT (Ret.) Jim Doherty, USCG COL (Ret.) Scott Feil, USA CAPT (Ret.) Jim Doherty, USCG COL (Ret.) Scott Feil, USA Mr. Bob Mohan RADM (Ret.) Sam Packer, USN Mr. Bob Mohan RADM (Ret.) Sam Packer, USN Dr. David Spalding Dr. David Spalding
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OUTLINE
This outlines the annotated briefing report that describes the interim results of the NPRA study, as performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses.

Outline Outline

I.I.

ExecutiveSummary Summary Executive

Introduction Introduction

II. Data DataCollection Collectionand andConsensus ConsensusBuilding Building II. III. Strategic StrategicVision Vision III. IV. Direct Directand andGuide Guide IV. V. Plan Planand andPrepare Prepare V. VI. Mission MissionExecution Execution VI. References References Appendices Appendices Acronyms AAAcronyms Glossary BBGlossary CData DataCollection Collection C

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the study, provides the background, identifies the study objectives, and describes the methodology. It also places the concept of personnel recovery in an interagency context. context. Annex B, Glossary, provides expanded definitional

ChapterI. I.Introduction Introduction Chapter

Background Background Objectives Objectives StudyMethodology Methodology Study PRDefinition Definition PR PRin inan anInteragency InteragencyContext Context PR

BACKGROUND
A number of organizations have conducted nine studies in the past eight years (see references 1 through 9). However, none of the studies completed to date have addressed the interagency dimension of PR at the national level. The last decade of the 20th century saw a significant increase in U.S. deployments of teams and individual personnel to situations characterized by heightened risk of capture. Humanitarian assistance missions, peace support operations, counter-narcotics activities, and the Global War on Terrorism have increased exposure of personnel in many Executive Branch departments and other agencies to threats from states, failed states, transnational actors/groups, and individuals. The nature of the national security situation involves DoD both as the lead agent in combat operations and as a pro-active partner and participant with the rest of the interagency in all national security activities. Civilians and government contractors from the other Government agencies partnered with DoD now work hand-inhand with the armed forces on the front lines of these national security operations. Contractors now account for over 10 percent of operational and support personnel.1 Others, such as USAID and the DoJ, have significant numbers of personnel operating in small numbers in remote locations as a matter of course. For
1

Rep Solomon Ortiz, (D-TX), quoted in Contractors Follow Military into Harms Way Defense Week, Vol. 24, No.12. March 24, 2003. Page 8.

certain functions, the non-DoD aviation community of the USG has become larger and undertaken more risk. These civilians share similar risks as the military; they deserve the same level of assurance of rescue and recovery. While other Government agencies have had to deal with isolated and missing people, most have not documented the procedures to recover their missing or captured persons. Although a draft memorandum of agreement between DoD and the State Department does exist, it is not finalized. The current rescue and PR processes within the USG are ad hoc. Congress directed DPMO and funded this study to investigate and propose NPRA. DPMO selected IDA to conduct the study because of IDAs prior expertise in combat search and rescue. In 1994, IDA provided analytical support to the DoD Commission on Roles and Missions on the Joint Combat Search and Rescue (JCSAR) issue. From August 1994 until September 1999, IDA provided independent assessment of the JCSAR joint test chartered by the Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation (DTSE&E) in OSD. Since October 1999, IDA has been supporting DPMO on developing policy issues on PR in a coalition environment. This effort was completed and briefed at the 2002 PR Conference leveraging the prior efforts. IDA Paper P-3705, documenting the coalition-study findings, has been published and distributed.

Background Background
Therehave havebeen beennine ninemajor majorPR-related PR-relatedstudies studiesin inthe thepast past88years years There Nonehas has addressedinteragency interagencyrescue rescueas as primary focus None addressed aaprimary focus Withincreased increasedrequirements requirementsfor forhumanitarian humanitarianassistance, assistance,peace peace With support operations, counter-narcotics, and the more recent advent support operations, counter-narcotics, and the more recent advent ofthe theGlobal GlobalWar Waron on Terrorism,the theentire entireInteragency Interagency isnow now of Terrorism, is significantly more involved in conflict environments significantly more involved in conflict environments NationalSecurity Security Environmenthas haschanged, changed,blurring blurringpeacetime peacetimeand and National Environment wartime conditions wartime conditions USGcivilians civilians andcontractor contractorforce force hasgrown grown reduction reductionof ofmilitary military USG and has force size also a factor force size also a factor Many non-DoDagencies agencieslack lackestablished establishedprocedures proceduresto torecover recovertheir their Many non-DoD personnel personnel SignedMOA MOAbetween betweenDoD DoD andCIA. CIA. Some Somedraft draftMOAs MOAsexist exist Signed and between DoD, DoS and DEA between DoD, DoS and DEA Currentprocess processis is adhoc hoc Current ad Congressdirected directedand andfunded fundedthe thestudy study ofaaNational NationalPersonnel Personnel Congress of RecoveryArchitecture Architecture Recovery Sponsored by DPMO Sponsored by DPMO Conductedby by IDA Conducted IDA

INTERAGENCY FOCUS FOR THE STUDY

Although Congress tasked and provided the interagency focus, JV2020, the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), and the SecDef have all emphasized the interagency aspects of PR. While SOUTHCOMs mission analysis explores the interagency dimension within the SOUTHCOM theater, this IDA study is the first personnel recovery study to examine the mission area globally and on a national level. IDA felt this ambitious study would require 2 years to complete, and DPMO agreed.

InteragencyFocus Focusfor forthe theStudy Study Interagency

CongressionalLanguage: Language: Congressional

conduct a government wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the conduct a government wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the components of a fully integrated national personnel recovery architecture. The assessment components of a fully integrated national personnel recovery architecture. The assessment should include a consideration of service personnel, civilians and contract personnel, and should include a consideration of service personnel, civilians and contract personnel, and examine the possible consolidation of training programs. The study should recommend a examine the possible consolidation of training programs. The study should recommend a coordinated national goal for personnel recovery, roles and responsibilities of each coordinated national goal for personnel recovery, roles and responsibilities of each department, agency or officeDPMO lead. department, agency or officeDPMO lead. The joint force must be prepared to support civilian authorities in a fully integrated effort to The joint force must be prepared to support civilian authorities in a fully integrated effort to meet the needs of U.S. citizens and accomplish objectives specified by the National meet the needs of U.S. citizens and accomplish objectives specified by the National Command Authorities. Command Authorities. the CPG emphasizes importance of close interagency coordination in a number of the CPG emphasizes importance of close interagency coordination in a number of areasplan for PR operations to ensure return of designated personnel from US areasplan for PR operations to ensure return of designated personnel from US Government (USG) Government (USG) Improve Interagency Process, Focus and Integration. Improve Interagency Process, Focus and Integration.

JointVision Vision2020 2020 Joint

ContingencyPlanning PlanningGuidance Guidance(CPG) (CPG) Contingency

SecDefMemo MemoTop Top10 10priorities, priorities,17 17September September2002 2002 SecDef

STUDY OBJECTIVES
The study team established four objectives, which also serve as milestones over the course of this 2-year effort. The first objective is to define the existing national personnel recovery architecture as it exists in the interagency environment, and to benchmark it as the baseline. This is done by data collection visits made to numerous agencies as described in Chapter II. The study team defined the interagency environment as encompassing all U.S. Government departments within the Executive Branch, including the DoD as an equal member, as well as other agencies of the U.S. Government. The study teams second objective was to develop a strategic vision that defined the end states, or goals, for NPRA. The strategic vision and end states are defined in Chapter III. Once the team defined the baseline and the end state, which serve as the beginning and end of the process, the next objective is to identify the differences between the two states. Those differences can be labeled as shortfalls or gaps. The study teams fourth objective is to identify alternative courses of action to improve the NPRA. Each alternative course of action should address a shortfall or close a gap to move the architecture closer to the end state described in the strategic vision. The study team achieved some success with the first four objectives, and interim results are contained in the following chapters of this report. The study team feels that an implementation plan is required to ensure that the study recommendations are implemented. Although it is not in the current IDA task order, the study team will develop an implementation plan in the final phase of this study.

10

StudyObjectives Objectives Study

Definethe thenational nationalpersonnel personnelrecovery recoveryarchitecture architecturebaseline baseline Define Developaastrategic strategicvision vision Develop Identifyshortfalls shortfallsand andgaps gaps Identify Identifyalternatives alternativesto toimprove improvethe thenational nationalarchitecture architectureto to Identify achievethe thestrategic strategicvision vision achieve

Follow-onEffort EffortDevelop Developan animplementation implementationplan planto to Follow-on improvethe theNPRA NPRA improve

11

STUDY SCOPE
The scope of the study covers two areas: who and the where of personnel recovery. With regard to who, the study focuses on recovery of Americans acting in an official capacity, such as the U.S. military, USG civilians, U.S. Government contractors, and others, as designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President. Family members of USG personnel and tourists are covered by the DoS evacuation process before the situation in a foreign country deteriorates. If the President or the Secretary of Defense so decides, these individuals are covered in specific PR cases. In any event, their safety and security continue to be the responsibility of the Chief of Mission (CoM) With regard to where, the study team chose to focus on Americans deployed overseas. The study considers, but does not address, civil SAR, which is conducted overseas by other nations in support of civilians, including American civilians, especially in a permissive environment. The study team does not address personnel recovery as an element of homeland security, which has significant interagency issues, but most of these are in the domestic area rather than overseas. Additionally, the study excludes coalition personnel recovery, since it has recently been addressed in another IDA study for DPMO (IDA Paper P-3705, Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment, May 2002).

12

Scopeof ofIsolated IsolatedPersonnel Personnel Scope

Focuson onAmericans Americansacting actingin inan an officialcapacity capacity overseasin inpotential potentialor or Focus official overseas atrisk riskfor forPR PRsituations situations at Military Military GovernmentCivilians Civilians Government GovernmentContractors Contractors Government Others(as (asdesignated designatedby by theSecretary Secretary ofDefense Defenseor orthe the President) Others the of President) Familymembers membersand andtourists touristsare areordered orderedto toleave leaveor orevacuated evacuatedby byDoS DoS Family Thisstudy study doesnot notfocus focuson: on: This does HomelandSecurity Security Homeland CivilSAR SAR Civil Coalitionpersonnel personnelrecovery recovery Coalition

13

PR ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT APPROACH

Architecture is a broad term and means different things to different people. In the NPRA context it is not a communications wiring diagram, but rather consists of defined requirements with respect to who in the interagency is at risk of capture, defined U.S. capabilities to recover U.S. personnel, and the identified shortfalls in these capabilities. All shortfalls are then addressed in their respective Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) categories. The baseline architecture consists of the baseline requirements and capabilities. Requirements consider, but are not necessarily based on the number of people at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation. The numbers can be broken down into various categories. Capabilities are based on the recovery methods, their reach, and their effectiveness in the operational environment. Capabilities are broken down into equipment, people, guidance, training, information, and technology. The study team assessed PR capabilities in relation to PR requirements to identify shortfalls and gaps. The shortfalls and gaps are broken down by DOTMLPF category. The study team recognizes that material solutions alone cannot solve all the problems unless they are coupled with necessary changes in doctrine, organization, and training.

14

PRArchitecture ArchitectureAssessment AssessmentApproach Approach PR Baseline Baseline

Identify Identify
Shortfalls/ Shortfalls/ Gaps Gaps For five PR For five PR execution execution tasks* tasks* In DOTMLPF In DOTMLPF categories categories

Identify Identify Baseline Baseline Requirements Requirements

# of people at # of people at risk by risk by Occupation Occupation Location Location Risk Risk Situations/ Situations/ Scenarios Scenarios

Examine Examine potential potential solutions & solutions & architectural architectural changes changes
Doctrine/TTP Doctrine/TTP Organization Organization Training Training Material Material Leadership Leadership Personnel Personnel Facilities Facilities

Identify Baseline Identify Baseline Capabilities Capabilities

PR Force Structure PR Force Structure Doctrine & Guidance Doctrine & Guidance Training & Exercises Training & Exercises Information, C4I Assets Information, C4I Assets Technologies Technologies

* Report, Locate/ID, Support, Recover, Repatriate * Report, Locate/ID, Support, Recover, Repatriate

15

PR ARCHITECTURE COMPONENTS
The architecture is categorized in terms of three components: (1) Direct and Guide, (2) Plan and Prepare Force Elements, and (3) Execute the Mission. DIRECT AND GUIDE The Direct and Guide component is made up of all the documents that provide direction and guidance to the PR community to provide the desired capability to meet PR requirements. Documentation includes doctrine, policy directives and instructions, regulations, procedures, reports, and memoranda of agreement and understanding. The Direct and Guide component is described in detail in Chapter IV. PLAN AND PREPARE The Plan and Prepare component is made up of all the efforts to prepare personnel, forces and assets to conduct PR missions prior to the actual execution of missions. Forces are broken down into three elements: isolated personnel, commanders and their staff, and recovery forces. Each element is prepared by organizing, training, equipping, and supporting it using the DOTMLPF construct. The Plan and Prepare component is described in detail in Chapter V. EXECUTE THE MISSION The Mission Execution component is made up of the five critical tasks of personnel recovery: report, locate, support, recover, and return. Mission Execution is described in detail in Chapter VI.

16

PRArchitecture ArchitectureComponents Components PR 1.Direct Directand andGuide Guide 1. Doctrine Doctrine Policy/Regulations Policy/Regulations Procedures/Reports Procedures/Reports Agreements/MOUs Agreements/MOUs 2.Plan Planand andPrepare Prepare 2. IsolatedPersonnel Personnel Isolated Commandersand andStaff Staff Commanders RecoveryForces Forces Recovery
Improvement/solutions implemented through DOTMLPF process Improvement/solutions implemented through DOTMLPF process

3.Execute Executethe theMission Mission 3. Report Report Locate Locate Support Support Recover Recover Return/Repatriate Return/Repatriate

17

NPRA ASSESSMENT LOGIC

This assessment begins with research and data collection to define the three components of PR architecture, printed in red across the top: Direct and Guide; Plan and Prepare Force Elements; and Execute the Mission. In order to achieve the PR transformation, one must first of all have a common understanding of the mission requirements and doctrine; then the nation must have planned and prepared PR force elements with the ability to effectively execute tomorrows mission. Materiel solutions by themselves are likely to fall short of the mark unless they are introduced with the full recognition of the interdependencies and potential synergies of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel, and facilities. The U.S. interagency needs not only clear definition of end states, but also a common understanding of the ways and means to achieve those end states. The baseline effectiveness of these three components will be compared with the desired end states to determine the gaps in DOTMLPF categories. Enhancements to DOTMLPF will be identified in Chapters IV through VI to mitigate these gaps. These enhancements will then be assessed for effectiveness. The cost-feasible DOTMLPF changes can then be implemented to improve PR capability. Since all enhancements cannot be accomplished at once, the above described process of comparing baseline with the desired end states might have to be repeated over a number of years until the baseline capabilities match the desired end states.

18

NPRAAssessment AssessmentLogic Logic NPRA

Direct and Guide Direct and Guide Direct and Guide Direct and Guide
I I m m p p l l e e m m e e n n t t
Doctrine Doctrine Doctrine Doctrine Mission Mission Mission Mission Requirements Requirements Requirements Requirements

Plan and Prepare Plan and Prepare Plan and Prepare Plan and Prepare Force Elements Force Elements Force Elements Force Elements

Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Recovery Forces Recovery Forces Recovery Forces Recovery Forces Commanders and Staff Commandersand and Staff Commanders Staff Commanders and Staff

Execute the Mission Execute the Mission

Strategic Strategic Operational Operational Tactical Tactical Report Report Locate Locate Support Support Recover Recover Return/ Return/ Repatriate Repatriate

Identify Identify Gaps Gaps

Compare Compare

Assess & Assess & Assess & Assess & Recommend Recommend Recommend Recommend Changes Changes Changes Changes

Doctrine Doctrine O rganization O rganization Training Training Materiel Materiel Leader Dev. Leader Dev. Personnel Personnel Facilities Facilities

Desired Desired Strategic Vision Strategic Vision End States End States

19

DEFINITION: PERSONNEL RECOVERY (DoDD 2310.2)

The DoD definition of PR (taken from DoDD 2310.2) is applicable for interagency PR under the condition that personnel means all U.S. military, government civilian employees, and their contractors. The definition issue in the interagency context is discussed further in Chapter IV.

20

Definition: Personnel PersonnelRecovery Recovery(DoDD (DoDD2310.2) 2310.2) Definition: PersonnelRecovery Recovery The Theaggregation aggregationof ofmilitary, military,civil, civil,and and Personnel politicalefforts effortsto torecover recovercaptured, captured,detained, detained,evading, evading,isolated isolatedor or political missingpersonnel personnelfrom fromuncertain uncertainor orhostile hostileenvironments environmentsand and missing deniedareas. areas. Personnel Personnelrecovery recoverymay mayoccur occurthrough throughmilitary military denied action,action actionby bynongovernmental nongovernmentalorganizations, organizations,other otherU.S. U.S. action, Government-approvedaction, action,and anddiplomatic diplomaticinitiatives, initiatives,or or Government-approved throughany anycombination combinationof ofthese theseoptions. options. Although Althoughpersonnel personnel through recoverymay mayoccur occurduring duringnon-combatant non-combatantevacuation evacuationoperations operations recovery (NEO),NEO NEOis isnot notaasubset subsetof ofpersonnel personnelrecovery. recovery. (NEO),
Alsoapplies appliesto toany anyindividual individualor ororganization organizationdesignated designatedby bythe theSECDEF SECDEFor orthe the Also President. President.

21

PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASKS AND MEANS DoD EXAMPLE

PR within the DoD derives from a foundation based on the recovery of downed pilots. The formal systems and physical capacities necessary to recover uniformed personnel are currently found in aviation communities. Non-aviation members of the Armed Forces receive some training in elements of PR, usually Code of Conduct and low level SERE related or derived training and familiarization. All elements of PR forces (isolated personnel, recovery forces, and commanders and staffs) must be prepared to conduct PR operations and missions before they happen. Preparation includes awareness, education, training, exercises, establishing requirements, research and development, acquiring new equipment, and test and evaluation. Once an isolation event occurs, all three PR force elements must together accomplish the five core tasks of PR: report; locate/authenticate; Support/C2; recover; and return (the task of preparing is done before an isolation incident occurs). The reporting task includes notifying the responsible commanders and staffs that an incident has occurred, and communicating the important facts about the incident. The location/authentication task is the most difficult and yet most critical task today. This task includes a continuous process of communicating the isolated persons physical whereabouts to the forces responsible for recovering that person. The process is continuous because the persons location must be known with increasing accuracy as the forces get closer to effect the recovery. It is also continuous because the isolated person is likely to be moving. The other aspect of this task is authentication: ensuring that the person claiming to be isolated is, in fact, who he/she claims to be. Successful authentication is critical to ensure that adversaries are unable to lure recovery forces into a trap. The support task includes providing for the isolated person and family members until a recovery can be effected. Support may in the form of information, morale, protection, or physical support such as food, water, clothing, and other supplies. The recover task is the actual recovery of the isolated person and return to friendly control. There are three recovery options: diplomatic, military, and civil. The diplomatic option usually involves negotiations and diplomacy with the captors. The military option is that used by the Defense Department, and typically involves the force of arms. The civil option uses assets and processes that are usually employed to rescue civilians in distress. The vast majority of governments, including foreign, state, and local agencies, can exercise the civil option. The Defense Department also has assets capable of employing civil recovery methods. The return task is the final task, and includes moving the isolated or captured person to friendly areas, repatriation, and assisting with the healing process for the individual and the family so that he/she can return to duty.

22

PERSONNELRECOVERY RECOVERY PERSONNEL Tasksand andMeans Means---DoD DoDExample Example Tasks

Tasks Tasks Means Means

PREPARE PREPARE REPORT REPORT LOCATE/ LOCATE/ AUTHENTICATE AUTHENTICATE

2 SUPPORT/C C 2 SUPPORT/

Awareness,Education, Education,SERE SERETraining, Training,Exercises Exercises Awareness, Self,Wingman, Wingman,Unit, Unit,other otherreports reports Self, PRC-90,PRC-112, PRC-112,HOOK-112, HOOK-112,CSEL, CSEL,ISOPREP ISOPREP PRC-90, JFACC,JSRC, JSRC,RCC, RCC,JFSOCC, JFSOCC,UARCC, UARCC,etc etc JFACC,

RECOVER RECOVER

Recovery Recovery Vehicle Vehicle Isolated Isolated Person Person

Airborne Mission Airborne Mission Commander Commander

Rescue Rescue CAP CAP

RETURN RETURN

Rescue Escort/ On Rescue Escort/ On Scene Cmdr Scene Cmdr

23

PERSONNEL RECOVERY TASKS AND MEANS INTERAGENCY EXAMPLE

A broader application of the same principles to the wider population of personnel at risk of capture as determined in the scope of this study will introduce many agencies and personnel to a fuller understanding of the system and its inherent tasks. Clearly, standardization in training the at-risk population, increased access to capabilities that can be brought to bear, and improved integration of leaders and staffs from a wider array of agencies are necessary.

24

PERSONNELRECOVERY RECOVERY PERSONNEL Tasksand andMeans Means Interagency InteragencyExample Example Tasks
Tasks Tasks Means Means

PREPARE PREPARE REPORT REPORT LOCATE/ LOCATE/ AUTHENTICATE AUTHENTICATE SUPPORT SUPPORT RECOVER RECOVER

Awareness,Education, Education,Training, Training,Exercises Exercises Awareness, Self,Eyewitness, Eyewitness,Overdue, Overdue,Other Other Self, Telephone,radio, radio,signal, signal,witness witness Telephone, Ambassador,Host Host Ambassador, 1 CIA, Nation,FEST FEST 1, , CIA, Nation, DoD DoD

Military Recovery Military Recovery

RETURN RETURN
1 1 Foreign Emergency Support Team

Diplomatic Diplomatic Recovery Recovery Isolated or Missing Persons Isolated or Missing Persons

Civil Civil Recovery Recovery

Foreign Emergency Support Team

25

PR OPTIONS, CATEGORIES & METHODS

As this chart shows, the U.S. Government can choose to employ any mix of Diplomatic, Military, and Civil recovery options. It is important to note that civil PR options are different than civil search and rescue (SAR). Civil SAR is civil with respect to its end result: the rescue of a civilian. A Civil PR option is civil with respect to its means: the use of civilian assets or methods to rescue a government person. Within DoD, there is very little written about diplomatic and civil recovery options. By definition, the military does not use civilian methods. Because the chart categorizes everything into clearlydelineated elements, it does not capture the synergies that can be achieved by a coordinated and synchronized effort by multiple organizations to execute multiple, simultaneous PR methods and options. The chart also does not capture the dynamic aspect of PR missions. As PR scenarios evolve, new PR options, categories, and methods become feasible, as others become impractical. By defining different options, categories, means and methods, the PR community has compartmented, fragmented, and stovepiped PR into numerous bins. Each Service or component has its own way of conducting PR operations. But if properly prepared, each Service or component can employ common methods across a variety of categories, to include joint, interagency, and multinational, to enhance the capabilities of a particular force. NGO Non-Governmental Organization PVO Private Volunteer Organization CSAR Combat Search and Rescue TRAP Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (USMC term) UAR Unconventional Assisted Recovery SAR Search and Rescue.

26

PROptions, Options,Categories, Categories,& &Methods Methods PR

Diplomatic Diplomatic
Negotiation Negotiation Armistice Armistice Treaty Treaty Unassisted Unassisted

PersonnelRecovery Recovery Personnel Military Military

Civil Civil
IntlOrganizations Organizations Intl PersonalAppeal Appeal Personal NGO/ /PVO PVO NGO

Opportune Component Component Opportune

Joint Joint

Interagency Interagency Multi-national Multi-national (Non-military) (Non-military)

Evasion Evasion

CSAR TRAP CSAR TRAP DoDPR PRMethods Methods DoD SAR(permissive) (permissive) SAR

UAR UAR

27

CURRENT INTERAGENCY PR RESPONSIBILITIES

Like the previous chart, this chart also categorizes everything into clearly-delineated situations. While illustrating the various environments and isolated personnel categories and aligning responsible agencies, it fails to illustrate the fluid and ambiguous situations that frequently confront the policy maker in the real world. The chart also points out that the lead responsibilities are still undefined and the lead agency is still undesignated.

28

CurrentInteragency InteragencyPR PRResponsibilities Responsibilities Current

US Government US Government (Lead?) (Lead?) Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Hostile Action Hostile Action (DoD) (DoD) POWs POWs Hostile Action Hostile Action (DoD) (DoD) MIAs MIAs Hostile Action Hostile Action (DoD) (DoD) Detainees Detainees Peacetime Peacetime (DoS) (DoS) Evacuation Evacuation Peacetime Peacetime (DoS) (DoS)

Currentcapability capabilityis is Current compartmentalized compartmentalized ratherthan thanintegrated integrated rather Nationalarchitecture architectureshould should National benefitfrom fromsynergy synergy between benefit between agencies agencies

Hostage Rescue Distressed Persons Missing People Mass Rescue Homeland Security Hostage Rescue Distressed Persons Missing People Mass Rescue Homeland Security Peacetime Peacetime Peacetime Operations (MROs) Anytime Peacetime Peacetime Peacetime Operations (MROs) Anytime (DoS OCONUS) Civil SAR (DoS OCONUS) Peacetime (DHS Office Lead) (DoS OCONUS) Civil SAR (DoS OCONUS) Peacetime (DHS Office Lead) (FBI CONUS) (Multiple Leads) (Multiple CONUS) (USA EA lead) ???? (FBI CONUS) (Multiple Leads) (Multiple CONUS) (USA EA lead) ????

Lead Agency Indicated Within ( ) Lead Agency Indicated Within ( )

29

CHAPTER II. DATA COLLECTION AND CONSENSUS BUILDING

This chapter discusses the data collection portion of the NPRA study. Central to this portion of the study has been an active interview program that provided several positive though unexpected side benefits. The interviews provided a wealth of information, mostly in the form of discussions that were largely unstructured. The information derived was somewhat subjective, and not conducive to objective formatting. Although IDA made an attempt to develop a standardized interview process, after numerous visits, the team concluded that the discussions needed to be free-flowing to be most useful. IDA obtained access to the DoS F-77 report that accounts for personnel within countries for whom ambassadors are responsible. Detailed numbers of personnel of various categories were provided, but the data tends to overestimate the individuals at risk and an effort is being planned to refine these numbers. However, discussions with the interagency contacts showed clearly that there were personnel doing official work in remote and potentially dangerous regions in many countries. IDA is still attempting to develop a credible estimate of the at-risk population.

30

ChapterII. II. Data DataCollection Collectionand andConsensus ConsensusBuilding Building Chapter

DataCollection Collection Data Awarenessof ofPR PR Awareness InterviewResults Results Interview Summary Summary FurtherWork Work Further

31

DATA COLLECTION
The data collection plan focused primarily on the interview program. Within the non-DoD interagency, the DoS was expected to be (and was) key to developing leads in the interagency. DoS responsibility for and experience in evacuation processes and their involvement in overseas hostage situations proved very helpful. Similarly, the DoD PR community proved to be an invaluable source of information. The extensive network of PR personnel embedded within many commands, organizations, and offices is very effective and has been helpful. In general, very good support was provided to the IDA team across the board. Several challenges are described below. Entree into the interagency (non-DoD) departments and agencies, and access to individuals to be interviewed, was sometimes at a senior level, but was more often at lower staff level (planner and Action Officer). A formal introductory request from a senior DoD official to the interagency offices selected for interview would have been useful to both advise the interagency leadership and assist in access for the study team. IDA had limited but adequate access to compartmented programs. This situation will be resolved prior to the completion of the study. The team visits to four combatant commands USJFCOM, USOCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM were useful. USPACOM and USCENTCOM have not been visited and should be. USSOUTHCOM will be revisited to conduct an interagency coordination case study for the ongoing Colombia incident related to the downing of a Cessna 208 on 13 February 2003.

32

DataCollection Collection Data

Datacollection collectionplan planwas wasdeveloped developedto toconduct conduct Data researchand andcollect collectdata data research

Interviewportion portionof ofplan planemphasized emphasizedhigh highpriority prioritywithin within Interview theinteragency interagencyon onnon-DoD non-DoDDepartments Departmentsand andAgencies, Agencies, the withappropriate appropriateemphasis emphasison onrelevant relevantDoD DoDcommands commands with andorganizations organizations and DoSwas wasanticipated anticipatedto tobe beaaprimary primarysource sourceof ofinformation information DoS andwithin withinDoD DoDthe thePR PRcommunity communitywas wasexpected expectedto tobe be and essential essential Withinentire entireinteragency, interagency,support supportfor forIDA IDAefforts effortswas wasvery very Within good good

33

AWARENESS OF PR
Due to the wide variance in familiarity with PR issues among those interviewed, significant time at the outset of each visit had to be spent not only to describe the IDA study, but also to attempt to establish a common understanding of concepts and terms. Only after that was achieved could meaningful discussions be conducted and useful information obtained. In fact, at the end of some interviews there was still a question as to whether the differences between the DoS-conducted evacuations and DoDunique Personnel Recovery were fully appreciated. Not unexpectedly it was evident that DoD personnel at the tactical and operational levels had a better grasp of PR issues than at the strategic level. A principal strength of the PR community appears to be in the operational aspects; as with other small communities, the wide separation within DoD of training, resourcing, and experimentation efforts has a significant adverse impact on PR capability.

34

Awarenessof ofPR PR Awareness

Realitiesin inDoD: DoD: Realities WithinDoD DoDPR PRcommunity, community,most mostindividuals individualscontacted contactedhad hadinin Within depthunderstanding understandingof ofPR, PR,but butpaid paidlittle littleattention attentionto toother other depth formsof ofrescue, rescue,and andalso alsohad hadlimited limitedexposure exposureto tointeragency. interagency. forms WithinDoD, DoD,training, training,resourcing resourcing(including (includingacquisition), acquisition),and and Within experimentationaspects aspectshave havelimited limitedsynergy. synergy. experimentation Realitiesin innon-DoD non-DoDAgencies Agencies Realities Withinthe thewider widernon-DoD non-DoDinteragency, interagency,most mostunderstood understood Within evacuation,some somespoke spokeNEO, NEO,and andalmost almostnone nonespoke spokePR. PR. evacuation,

35

INTERVIEW RESULTS
Significant mutual education developed within the interagency network of contacts as a result of the IDAs interview and workshop programs. Many different cultures exist within the interagency. As one example, DoD has a very formal planning process for the nearand far-term in the form of deliberate, contingency, and crisis operational planning processes, and of the programmatic, POM (Program Objective Memorandum) planning. The planning and programming horizon for the other departments and agencies is much nearer than DoDs, more in the contingency-crisis range. At DoS, any planning relevant to PR would likely be done within the Political-Military Bureau by the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (OCPP), whose scope includes plans for implementing U.S. policy in areas requiring close coordination among U.S. Government agencies. Additionally, the Diplomatic Security Bureau is responsible for Emergency Action Planning (EAP) both at DoS and at the diplomatic posts (embassies and consulates).

36

InterviewResults Results Interview

Accordingly,data datacollection collectionvisits visitsaccomplished accomplishedseveral several Accordingly, purposes purposes ::

WithinDoD DoDin ingeneral, general,increased increasedfamiliarity familiaritywith withPR. PR. Within WithinDoD DoDPR PRcommunity, community,educated educatedmany manyon on Within interagency. interagency. Withinwider widernon-DoD non-DoDinteragency, interagency,educated educatedmany manyon on Within uniquenessof ofPR PRas asdifferent differentfrom fromevacuation. evacuation. uniqueness Overall:Raised Raisedthe theconsciousness consciousnesstowards towardsnational nationalPR PR Overall: mattersof ofmany manyincluding includingsome somesenior seniorleadership leadership matters

37

INTERVIEW RESULTS (CONTD)

A number of developments throughout the data collection efforts were often very gratifying as well as useful. The network of contacts established proved very key to commencing the development of a common ground for interagency discussion and understanding. Additionally, those contacts were essential in obtaining attendance at the IDA Interagency Workshop conducted on 5-6 February 2003. The IDA team was not fully aware of the Federal Government aviation community until meeting with the General Services Administration (GSA) office responsible for developing aviation policy. The Federal aircraft fleet inventory (less DoD and the intelligence community) includes some 1,300 aircraft, many of which operate overseas, often in hazardous areas by agencies such as DEA, DoS, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and U.S. Customs bureau). Aviation personnel in those organizations are often former military and to varying degrees are familiar with the existence and capability of the DoD PR forces. The GSA coordinates a forum for discussing interagency aviation issues on a national basis; the Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy (ICAP) that meets quarterly with representatives of the 18 Department and Agency members of the ICAP. The intelligence community and DoD are not members (DoD provides an observer at the meetings). The IDA team briefed an ICAP meeting regarding the NPRA study with positive results. Regarding Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, as of January 2003, some 104 operations falling within the broader PR definition had occurred in Afghanistan, with active participation by interagency and coalition elements, both in rescue and as rescuees. Operation Iraqi Freedom was staffed by the largest JSRC in history, executing 55 missions and saving 73 personnel as of 30 April 2003. Thus, although without explicit doctrine and procedures, the PR community is contributing positively to military, civilian, and coalition personnel safety.

38

InterviewResults Results(contd) (contd) Interview

Additionally,research researchand anddata datacollection collectionresulted resulted Additionally, inseveral severalunique uniqueand andpositive positiveside sidebenefits: benefits: in
Developedan anactive activeinteragency interagencyPR PRnetwork. network. Developed Identifiedseveral severalnon-DoD non-DoDinteragency interagencyneeds needssuch suchas as Identified standardizingPR PRtechniques techniquesand andaccess accessto toDoD DoDtraining training standardizing andexperience. experience. and Informedmany manyas asto tohow howPR PRis isconducted conductedin inthe thecurrent current Informed operationalenvironment. environment. operational Identifiedan anactive activeinteragency interagencyaviation aviationpolicy policyforum. forum. Identified Researchinterviews interviewssupported supportedthe thestudy studyobjectives, objectives,and and Research indirectlyserved servedto tobenefit benefitoverall overallPR PRprocess. process. indirectly Interagencywould wouldlike liketo torely relyon onDoD DoDcapabilities capabilitiesand andis is Interagency willingin inprinciple principleto towork workto tointegrate integratenon-DoD non-DoD willing capabilitiesand anddevelop developprocedures procedureswithout withoutcreating creatingnew new capabilities organizations. organizations.

39

SUMMARY
All visits and interviews (as well as meeting and conferences attended) were documented in comprehensive trip reports provided to the sponsor and other team members.

40

Summary

Interagency visits and interviews: Details in Annex C Nineteen interviews with non-DoD Departments and Agencies including
Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, General Services Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development At DoS, five separate Bureaus

Nineteen interviews with DoD commands and organizations

Including four unified combatant commands, OSD, the Joint Staff, and Services

41

SUMMARY (CONTD)
The meetings and conferences were particularly useful as a source of information as well as providing new contacts throughout the PR community. The interagency workshop at the 2002 Annual PR Conference was held at the unclassified level, and although there was active interest in and discussion of the NPRA study, there was little opportunity for free discussion. Accordingly, the Interagency Workshop conducted at IDA was at the Secret level and the discussions were wide-ranging. This event was considered particularly useful by all attendees. The only general criticism was that no positive steps to improve the PR in the interagency were identified. That problem is now under active work by the IDA team.

42

Summary (contd) (contd) Summary

Participatedin in15 15meetings meetingsand andconferences conferencesdevoted devotedto toPR PR Participated issues issues

Examplesincluded includedthe thePRAG PRAGand andPRRC PRRC Examples ObservedExercise ExerciseDesert DesertRescue RescueX X Observed ChairedInteragency InteragencyWorkshop Workshopduring during2002 2002PR PR Chaired conference conference

Conducteddedicated dedicatedInteragency InteragencyPR PRWorkshop Workshopat atIDA IDA Conducted

Co-chairedby byDoS DoSand andDoD DoD Co-chaired Attendance included includedeight eightinteragency interagencyDepartments Departmentsand and Attendance Agencies Agencies Workshopserved servedas asStudy StudyCouncil Counciland andvetted vettedinitial initial Workshop findingsat atstudy studymid-point mid-point findings

43

FURTHER RESEARCH
These are some specific examples of work still to be done in the second half of the NPRA study. Work on some items is already underway. A key next step is to develop an action document within the interagency to further the development of standardized PR processes and procedures, and to improve the exchange of PRrelevant information such as through training courses. Work on this item is in progress. Another key step is to obtain a credible estimate of those personnel particularly at risk of capture within the population for which U.S. Ambassadors are responsible overseas. Among other things, such an estimate would help to size the requirements for special survival training. In coordination with the IDA team, contacts at the DoS/Diplomatic Security Bureau and GSA have initiated actions to assist in this effort. The following organizations are already a part of the national architecture; they need to be considered further to determine whether they could or should play a more central or betterdefined role in the NPRA. FEST Foreign Emergency Support Team NSARC National Search and Rescue Committee PMAT Political Military Action Team JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force ICAP Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy PRTFG Personnel Recovery Technology Focus Group.

44

FurtherResearch Research Further

ContinueInterview InterviewProgram Programwith: with: Continue Departmentof ofState State(Office (Officeof ofthe theCoordinator Coordinatorfor forCounterCounter Department Terrorismand andOffice Officeof ofContingency ContingencyPlanning), Planning),Federal Federal Terrorism AviationAdministration, Administration,NASA, NASA,U.S. U.S.Marshals, Marshals,and andNational National Aviation DefenseUniversity University Defense ExploreFEST, FEST,NSARC, NSARC,PMAT, PMAT,JIACG, JIACG,JIATF, JIATF,ICAP ICAPand and Explore PRTFGroles roleswith withregard regardto toPR PRnational nationalarchitecture architecture PRTFG

45

CHAPTER III. STRATEGIC VISION FOR FULL SPECTRUM PR

To meet the goals of Joint Vision 2020, DoD and the nation need a new strategic vision for PR. One part of IDAs National PR Architecture task was to develop this Strategic Vision. Increasingly in the 21st Century, U.S. personnel, including military forces, government employees, and contractor personnel, will be placed in harms way. The U.S. will be called upon to intervene in a wide range of operations, from peace support operations through major theater war, to include transnational threats such as global terrorism and drug trafficking. Inevitably, some of the personnel involved in these operations will become isolated and placed in life threatening situations. America has a moral obligation to these people to do everything in the nations power to return them home safely. The current architecture for PR is DoD-centric and does not adequately consider the capabilities and requirements of other Government agencies and coalition partners. PR doctrine is Service-centric and combat focused. For the 21st Century, PR must be transformed into Full Spectrum PR to meet one overarching goalto return all isolated U.S. personnel home as soon as possible and to leave no one behind.

46

ChapterIII. III.Strategic StrategicVision Visionfor forFull FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PR Chapter

StrategicContext Context Strategic PRCommunity CommunityToday Today PR FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PR Full StrategicNational NationalTasks Tasks Strategic PRin in2020 2020 PR DesiredEnd EndState State Desired

47

FULL SPECTRUM PR STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The United States today faces a world in which adversaries have the ability to attack the U.S. homeland, American forces, and allies with little or no warning. These adversaries are smart, however, and rather than face our forces on open battlefields, they will seek to use any asymmetric advantage open to them. If weakness in U.S. PR capabilities is perceived by our foes as an asymmetric vulnerability, they can be expected to exploit it. U.S. PR capabilities currently date from the 20th Century. As previously indicated, these capabilities are DoD-centric and focus on combat search and rescue. They must be transformed to meet the challenges of 21st Century threats and to achieve the full spectrum of PR operations, for the full range of personnel that might become isolated. To achieve this transformation, the Interagency must first have a common understanding of the mission requirements and doctrine; then it must plan and prepare PR force elements with the ability to effectively execute tomorrows mission. We need a clear definition of end states and also a common understanding of the means to achieve them. Under JV2020, DoD PR forces will operate not only as one element of a national PR effort but also in concert with multinational forces and other Government agencies. Collaborative planning and interoperability will be the mandates that carry the day, especially in terms of communications, standard operating procedures, and shared information systems. America must transform its combat PR capability into a national, Full Spectrum PR capability that is dominant across the full spectrum of engagement, assuring full dimensional protection to all isolated personnel in any environment.

48

FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PR Strategic StrategicContext Context Full

NATIONAL GOALS NATIONAL GOALS NATIONAL GOALS
NationalStrategy Strategy National National Strategy National Strategy MilitaryStrategy Strategy Military Military Strategy Military Strategy

Interagency Interagency Interagency Interagency Coordination Coordination Coordination Coordination

Joint Vision 2020 Joint Vision 2020 Full Spectrum Dominance Full Spectrum Dominance
Dominant Maneuver Dominant Maneuver Precision Engagement Precision Engagement Focused Logistics Focused Logistics Full Dimensional Protection Full Dimensional Protection

Joint/Coalition Joint/Coalition Joint/Coalition Joint/Coalition Planning Planning Planning Planning

Strategic National Task Strategic National Task Strategic National Task Strategic National Task Support Personnel Support Personnel Personnel Support Support Personnel Recovery Recovery Recovery Recovery Worldwide Worldwide Worldwide Worldwide

Strategic Vision Strategic Vision Strategic Vision For PR For PR For PR

49

THE PR COMMUNITY TODAY

This chart illustrates the current state of the PR community, with its many elements, each effective within its defined area, but it clearly shows that overall, in fact, there is no PR Community. The constituent organizations are fragmented, and there is effectively no single advocate for PR. There are actually several voices speaking for parts of PR or for PR-related activities, each with its own purpose, and the results are mixed messages. There are a few identifiable major sub-communities, namely the OSD, Services, and the Coast Guard (formerly a part of the Department of Transportation, now in the Department of Homeland Security). These are primary stakeholders, who have major interests, equities, responsibilities, and capabilities in the various major pieces of the PR mission area. Given the need for National Architecture for PR, the rest of the Interagency group might also be considered a sub-community with its various constituencies of State Department, CIA, Customs, DEA, Justice, etc. Not shown on this chart are the Combatant Commands, each also distinct, particularly in their relationships for PR with coalition partners and host nations (see IDAs Coalition PR Report, P-3705, May 2002). There are many resources and capabilities reflected in this chart. To achieve 21st Century, Full Spectrum PR capabilities, leadership is needed to pull these pieces together. The PR Strategic Vision provides a focus for doing this.

50

ThePR PRCommunity CommunityToday Today The

NAR NAR AirForce Force Leader Leader Air Army Army Champion UAR Champion UAR Advocate Advocate CivilSAR SAR Civil MedEvac Navy MedEvac Navy NEO NEO CoastGuard Guard Coast Interagency Interagency CSAR CSAR
USMC USMC

Hostage Hostage Rescue Rescue

Fact: Several SeveralVoices Voices++Varied VariedPurposes Purposes==Mixed MixedResults Results Fact:

51

PERSONNEL RECOVERY DOD VIEW

The popular view of PR in the DoD consists of the following missions (please see Glossary at Appendix B for explanation of terms): NAR: Non-Conventional Assisted Recovery UAR: Unconventional Assisted Recovery

JCSAR: Joint Combat Search and Rescue MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation CASEVAC: Casualty Evacuation CSAR: Combat Search and Rescue.

52

PersonnelRecovery Recovery DoD DoDView View Personnel

Person nel ry ries Person nelRecove Recove ryCatego Catego ries

NAR NAR

UAR UAR JCSAR JCSAR

MEDEVAC/CASEVAC MEDEVAC/CASEVAC

CSAR CSAR
Permissive Uncertain Hostile Permissive Uncertain Hostile OperationalEnvironments Environments Operational

53

PERSONNEL RECOVERY BROADER VIEW

This chart shows the entire range of 20th Century activities that when integrated, could be considered appropriate for 21st Century PR. Certain activities, such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Hostage Rescue, are currently defined as outside the scope of PR activities because the former is formally defined within DoD as not PR, and because the latter is within the portfolio of other Federal agencies. Other activities, such as Civil SAR and Mass Rescue operations, are also currently defined as outside the scope of PR, as they generally are conducted in a permissive environment. The reality, however, is that as envisioned in JV2020, the United States now has, and will have well into the future, global interests and engagement with many regional actors. Civil SAR authorities (e.g., Coast Guard in U.S. maritime regions) will continue to be the experts in search and rescue (i.e., PR in permissive operating environments); when DoD and other personnel become isolated in permissive (yet environmentally hostile or dangerous) locations in other countries, the host countrys civil SAR authorities are responsible for PR. The IDA Coalition PR report found that relationships among civil SAR authorities could be (and frequently are) assets in developing coalition PR strategies for various theater combatant commanders, when the operational environment may not be so permissive. Similarly, capabilities employed for NEO and hostage rescue may be very similar to those used for PR. For example, training for potential isolated persons, C4ISR and training for commanders and staffs, and tactics, training, and procedures for rescue forces for PR could very well apply to these other types of operations. Thus, when one considers the full range of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, plus others designated by the President (which could include non-government organizations (NGO), allies, and coalition partners), it is clear that Full Spectrum PR should consider how to leverage all PR-related capabilities. It is also clear that all potential isolated persons should have some basic knowledge of PR operations.

54

PersonnelRecovery Recovery Broader BroaderView View Personnel

Perso nnel ery ories Perso nnelRecov Recov eryCateg Categ ories

NAR NAR

HostageRescue Rescue Hostage UAR UAR JCSAR JCSAR

MassRescue* Rescue* MEDEVAC/CASEVAC MEDEVAC/CASEVAC Mass CSAR CSAR CivilSAR* SAR* Civil Evacuation/NEO Evacuation/NEO SAR SAR Permissive Uncertain Hostile Permissive Uncertain Hostile OperationalEnvironments Environments Operational

*DoD *DoD supportson on supports not-toaanot-tointerfere interfere basis basis

55

FULL SPECTRUM PERSONNEL RECOVERY

This chart shows the PR-related activities that should be integrated within 21st Century Full Spectrum PR. This chart is identical to the previous illustrations but uses the same shading for all component missions to indicate that these are integrated rather than compartmented to achieve synergy among them. Hostage rescue is the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC). Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) executed by DoD in support of DoS ordered evacuation, is also outside the bounds of PR as currently defined. As an intermediate objective, IDA recommends that PR and hostage rescue operations be integrated and coordinated so that one operation does not begin where the other ends. With the ultimate objective of providing seamless policy, training and execution, Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery is defined as the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, recover, and return of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, or others as designated by the President, Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated or missing in all situations and all scenarios.

56

FullSpectrum SpectrumPersonnel PersonnelRecovery Recovery Full

Integratedrather ratherthan thancompartmented compartmentedCONOPS CONOPS Integrated

Person nel ry Catego ries Person nelRecove Recove ry Catego ries

NAR NAR MassRescue* Rescue* Mass

HostageRescue Rescue Hostage UAR UAR JCSAR JCSAR

CivilSAR* SAR* Civil SAR SAR

MEDEVAC/CASEVAC MEDEVAC/CASEVAC CSAR CSAR Evacuation/NEO Evacuation/NEO

*On a not-to*On a not-tointerfere basis interfere basis

Permissive Uncertain Hostile Permissive Uncertain Hostile OperationalEnvironments Environments Operational

PRdoctrine doctrineshould should seamlessly integrateall allPR PR environmentsand and PR seamlessly integrate environments scenariosacrossthe theentire entirespectrum spectrumof ofoperations. operations. scenariosacross

57

A STRATEGIC NATIONAL TASK

The strategic national task already recognizes the interagency and broader aspects of PR. This UJTL (Unified Joint Task List) task is also broad PR is for anyone, anywhere, and using all available tools and techniques. Overall, the strategic national task recognizes the need for Full Spectrum PR. What is needed is a way to help focus the national level policy, plans, and strategic direction; to develop the relationships and trust needed to support and leverage interagency coordination; to understand who might be at risk as potential isolated persons, and then train and prepare them; and to leverage the significant capabilities available in the combat, interagency, and civil SAR communities.

58

AStrategic StrategicNational NationalTask Task A

UniversalJoint JointTask TaskList, List,SN SN3.4.9, 3.4.9,Support SupportPersonnel PersonnelRecovery Recovery Universal Worldwide: Worldwide: Thistask taskincludes includesreporting, reporting,locating, locating,supporting supportingthe theperson person This andtheir theirfamily, family,recovery, recovery,and andreturn returnof ofthe theisolated isolatedperson person and totheir theirfamily familyor orduty. duty. This Thissupport supportincludes includesdeveloping developing to nationallevel levelpolicy, policy,plans, plans,and andstrategic strategicdirection directionto tomilitary military national supportmissions missionsrequiring requiringnational nationaland andinteragency interagency support coordination,such suchas asspecial specialoperations operationssupport supportto to coordination, unconventionalassisted assistedrecovery recoverymechanism mechanism(UARM) (UARM)and and unconventional otherrecovery recoverymethods. methods. ItItalso alsoincludes includessetting settingworldwide worldwide other standards for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape standards for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE)training. training. Included Includedwithin withinthis thistask taskare arecivil civilsearch search (SERE) andrescue, rescue,combat combatsearch searchand andrescue rescue(CSAR), (CSAR),and andevasion evasion and andescape. escape. and

59

DESIRED END STATES: DIRECT AND GUIDE

The desired end states are organized in three components of the personnel recovery architecture: (1) Direct and Guide, (2) Plan and Prepare Force Elements, and (3) Execute the Mission. Associated end states for each dimension are as follows: DIRECT AND GUIDE 1. Currently there is no PR doctrine per se. The existing doctrine is for the CSAR mission and needs to be broadened across the full PR spectrum. Most future U.S. military operations will be conducted in a joint and combined environment, with multiple government agencies, and with the support of coalition/allied forces. Hence, PR services must be extended to all participants, including interagency personnel, coalition personnel, and contractors, who are often key to the success of military operations. 2. There are several categories or types of PR operations, which might be conducted in a range of friendly to hostile operational environments. There are:

J/CSAR Joint/Combat Search and Rescue CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation UAR Unconventional Assisted Recovery NAR Non-conventional Assisted Recovery. The units conducting these operations are compartmented to support different missions, and many times the same resources may be used for multiple missions. PR scope should be broad and should encompass all of these missions, so that the decision maker is not confused as to how to task these missions. Hence, the PR requirements must be well articulated. Similarly, there is confusion as to who receives the PR services, i.e., whether nonDoD government personnel and allies are eligible. Any successful operation must provide the same level of services to all people placed in harms way to conduct a mission. Otherwise, there will be a lack of cohesion.

SAR Search and Rescue

60

DesiredEnd EndStates: States:Direct Directand andGuide Guide Desired

1. PR PRDoctrine Doctrine 1. ::

ThatPR PR doctrineis is well articulatedto toensure ensurethat thatthe theServices, Services,as as That doctrine well articulated force providers, are responsible for planning and budgeting for PR but force providers, are responsible for planning and budgeting for PR but theexecution executionis isconducted conductedby byaajoint jointtask taskforce force(JTF) (JTF)commander commanderor or the a unified Combatant Commander, considering interagency and a unified Combatant Commander, considering interagency and coalitionissues. issues. coalition

2. PR PRMission MissionRequirements Requirementsand andScope Scope 2. ::

Thatthe thePR PR missionrequirements requirements andscope scopeare arearticulated articulatedto to That mission and seamlessly integrateall all PR methodsand andcategories categoriesacross acrossthe theentire entire seamlessly integrate PR methods spectrum of operations. spectrum of operations.

61

DESIRED END STATES: PLAN AND PREPARE

support, recover, and return). Finally, it is desirable to establish readiness standards for all the elements of the entire DoD capability, and then, on a routine basis, to review, assess, and report the readiness of the overall PR system. 4. The current PR capability should be improved to provide PR support for two Major Theater Wars (MTW), or for the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) along with one MTW. The capability is fragmented among Services, SOF, and the National Guard. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) must provide adequate focus for the PR mission and the Services must budget for PR force modernization, readiness, and training via the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) process. Without resources, PR capability will not improve.

PLAN AND PREPARE FORCE ELEMENTS 3. The operational commanders and staff at all levels must be educated in PR doctrine, requirements, and mission execution. The commanders and staff must also be trained in strategic and operational C4ISR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities. Individuals that have potential of being isolated should receive survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. Their level of training and their equipment must be commensurate with the risks they face. Also, the PR units and forces must receive periodic training in end-to-end mission execution involving the five PR core tasks (report, locate,

62

DesiredEnd EndStates: States:Plan Planand andPrepare Prepare Desired

3. PR PRForce ForceElements Elements 3. ::

Thatthe thePR PRforce forceelements elementsconsisting consistingof ofisolated isolatedpersonnel, personnel, That commanders/staff, and recovery forces are adequately programmed, commanders/staff, and recovery forces are adequately programmed, organized,trained, trained,and andequipped. equipped. organized,

4. PR PRForce ForceElements: Elements: 4.

Thatthe thePR PRforce forceelements elementsconsisting consistingof ofisolated isolatedpersonnel, personnel, That commanders/staff,and andrecovery recoveryforces forcesare areadequately adequately resourced. commanders/staff, resourced.

63

DESIRED END STATES: MISSION EXECUTION

MISSION EXECUTION 5. The present capabilities to locate, identify, and authenticate isolated personnel are limited in effectiveness and reliability and must be improved in timeliness, accuracy, covertness, and worldwide availability. Because other government agency, contractor, and coalition personnel need PR support, this area must be reexamined to provide simpler and more reliable systems. 6. The present strategic level PR C4ISR system components must be integrated to improve the synergy among them. The operational level PR C4ISR, consisting of Joint Search and Rescue Centers (JSRCs), Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), and Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Centers (UARCCs), need to be better integrated into theater systems. 7. PR forces employ equipment that is aging and must be modernized. It would be desirable to have all Services and Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) develop common modernization systems for both conventional and nonconventional recoveries. New equipment will be effective and suitable in all environments and all scenarios.

64

DesiredEnd EndStates: States:Mission MissionExecution Execution Desired

5. Location, Location,Identification, Identification,& &Authentication AuthenticationCapabilities: Capabilities: 5.

Thatthe thelocation, location,identification, identification,and andauthentication authenticationcapabilities capabilities That for isolated personnel are operationally effective, suitable, and for isolated personnel are operationally effective, suitable, and available when/whereneeded. needed. available when/where Thatthe thePR PRC4ISR C4ISRsystems systems operateeffectively effectively alllevels levelsfrom from That operate all strategic and operational to the tactical. strategic and operational to the tactical. Thatdeployed deployedPR PRforces forceshave have effectivecapability capability toconduct conduct That effective to missionsin inany any scenarioand andenvironment. environment. missions scenario

6. PR PRC4ISR C4ISRSystems: Systems: 6.

7. Deployed DeployedPR PRForces: Forces: 7.

65

CHAPTER IV. DIRECT AND GUIDE

With data collection completed (to the extent indicated in Chapter II) and a proposed strategic vision for PR as described in Chapter III, the IDA study team could then begin to construct the beginning (referred to in this report as baseline) and end states for national PR capabilities. Concurrently, the study team is in the process of conducting a comparative analysis to identify shortfalls in the current national PR capability. As shortfalls are identified, they are synthesized into a single, comprehensive component issue with a proposed DOTMLPF solution set. This chapter reviews the analysis conducted to date for the first of the three components of PR architecture the Direct and Guide component beginning with baseline policy for the overall security and safety of USG personnel and concluding with a recommended solution set for identified shortfalls. Keep in mind that these recommendations are interim findings based on research and analysis conducted to date, at the mid-point of the study. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations.

66

ChapterIV. IV. Direct Directand andGuide Guide Chapter

Baseline Baseline Policy Policy Doctrine Doctrine Directives Directives Key KeyDefinitions Definitions Shortfallsand andDeficiencies Deficiencies Shortfalls Issue Issue SolutionSet Set Solution

67

BASELINE POLICY
The Chief of Mission (CoM) and the Combat Commander bear overall responsibility for the safety and security of USG personnel and American citizens. The CoM generally has the responsibility for evacuation of USG personnel. That does not mean that there are required capabilities on-hand to conduct the evacuation; this is particularly true in an unstable country with a small Embassy. Capabilities required for an evacuation range from use of regularly scheduled commercial air to commercial charter air to military air or naval shipping; in some scenarios, evacuation could be overland by bus, privately owned vehicle (POV), rail, or military vehicle. None of these capabilities are organic to a post (less perhaps some vehicle and very limited air assets) and would have to be arranged by direct commercial contract or by a request to the Combat Commander. The principal means to identify personnel for evacuation at Diplomatic posts is the DoS F77 Report, which lists numbers of personnel in a country in administrative categories such as those indicated under the first bullet of the slide. Recently DoS and other non-DoD agencies have begun to think more seriously about identifying those personnel potentially at risk for PR. In coordination with DoS, and GSA, and other agencies, IDA has embarked on a process to identify numbers of personnel for whom the CoM has responsibility and who fall into the at risk for PR category. In an evacuation, the CoM may also have responsibility for certain non-US personnel, such as third country aliens, based on prior agreements. Of interest, a particular concern at DoS are the TDYers, those personnel who may be official USG, or contractor, or others, who come to a country for a short period, often with inadequate prior security indoctrination and sometimes with limited contact with the Diplomatic Post, but for whom the CoM has responsibility. Evacuation scenarios might range from assisted (authorized) evacuation as a situation deteriorates, to directed (ordered) evacuation (which in latter stages may include a request for DoD support), to the rare worst case in which the mission is closed. In an evacuation scenario the CoM may authorize direct evacuation by government or commercial means. When necessary the CoM may request assistance from DoD. The policy of no double standard requires that the CoM provide equal priority for all American citizens in an evacuation by (for example) reserving the same number of seats on commercial aircraft for American citizens in the private sector as for official USG personnel. In a PR situation, the CoM may assist by employing diplomatic means, requesting host nation assistance, requesting DoD assistance, and/or employing other assets that might be available. In a hostage detention scenario, the CoM may coordinate the negotiation process, or request and authorize the use of force.

68

BaselinePolicy Policy Baseline

AllUS USpersonnel, personnel,except exceptthose thoseassigned assignedto tothe theCombatant Combatant All Commander,in inaaforeign foreigncountry countryare arethe theresponsibility responsibilityof ofthe the Commander, Chiefof ofMission Mission(CoM) (CoM)for forevacuation evacuationin inaadeteriorating deterioratingsecurity security Chief situation. Personnel Personnelinclude includethe thefollowing: following: situation. USGofficial officialpersonnel personnelincluding includingcontractors contractors USG Americancitizens citizensin inthe theprivate privatesector sector American Americancitizen citizentourists tourists American TheCoM CoMplays playsaakey keyrole rolein inthe thefollowing: following: The Evacuation Evacuation PersonnelRecovery Recovery Personnel HostageSituation Situation Hostage TheCombatant CombatantCommander Commanderis isresponsible responsiblefor forall allpersonnel personnel The assignedto tohis hiscommand command assigned

69

BASELINE DOCTRINE
Doctrine is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. The following publications pertain to PR. If there is a conflict between a joint publication and a Service publication, the joint doctrine takes precedence for joint forces. Military doctrine, which is based on time-tested principles intended to shape the employment of Armed Forces, is authoritative in nature. Joint Doctrine Documents Joint Pub 3-50.2, Doctrine for Joint CSAR Joint Pub 3-50.21, Joint TTP for CSAR Joint Pub 3-50.3, Joint Doctrine for Evasion & Recovery Multi-Service Doctrine Documents FM 90-18/FMFRP 2-70/MACP 64-3/ACCP 50-51/CI M16120.8/ USAFEP 50-51/PAC AFP 50-52, Multi-Service Procedures for CSAR (rescinded) AFM 200-3(rescinded)/FM 21-77A/NWP 43(A), Joint Worldwide E&E Manual FM 21-76-1/MCRP 3-02H/NWP 3-50.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.26, Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, & Recovery The importance of doctrine as a catalyst for the implementation and management of change cannot be overstated. Doctrine is the engine of change that drives requirements; at the same time it establishes the parameters for orderly change. Doctrine embraces everything from policy to multi-service manuals and publications, to unit tactics, techniques, and procedures (some primary examples indicated below). Unfortunately, baseline doctrine for PR is rooted in outmoded service CSAR concepts and lags seriously behind joint warfighting concepts and current successful operational missions. JPRA is working diligently to fill the void and has a draft Joint Publication 3-50 on PR out for staff coordination. Air Force Doctrine Documents Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, CSAR Army Doctrine Documents Field Manual 1-111, Aviation Brigade (Appendix D, CSAR) Army Regulation 525-90, CSAR Procedures Field Manual 3-50.2, CSAR (draft) Field Manual 3-05.231, Special Forces PR (draft) USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery Navy Doctrine Documents Naval Warfare Pub 19-2, Navy CSAR Supplement Marine Corps Doctrine Documents FMFM 5-70, MAGTF Aviation Planning (Chapter 9, TRAP).

70

BaselineDoctrine Doctrine Baseline

Thereis isno noPersonnel PersonnelRecovery Recoverydoctrine, doctrine,per perse se There Theonly onlydoctrine doctrinedocument documententitled entitledPersonnel PersonnelRecovery Recoveryis isFM FM33The 05.231,which whichis iscurrently currentlyin indraft. draft. 05.231,

FM3-05.231 3-05.231is isderivative derivativeof ofexisting existingJoint JointCSAR CSARdoctrine doctrineand andTTP TTP FM However,when whenaddressing addressingPR PRissues, issues,the theDoD DoDPR PRcommunity community However, refersto todoctrine doctrinein inthe thefollowing followingmission missionareas areas refers CSAR(predominant (predominantsource sourceof ofdoctrine) doctrine) CSAR JointCSAR CSAR Joint SERE SERE UAR UAR UniversalJoint JointTask TaskList List(UJTL) (UJTL)has hasbeen beendeveloped developedfor forPR PR Universal

ThePR PRsystem systemis isbest bestcharacterized characterizedas asthe thesum sumof ofunrelated unrelated The subsystems,command commandand andcontrol control (C2)nodes, nodes, units, elements,and and subsystems, (C2) units, elements, organizations united for the purpose of performing tasks and functions organizations united for the purpose of performing tasks and functions associatedwith withthe therecovery recoveryof ofpersonnel personnel whoare arein inharms harmsway. way.(FM (FM associated who 3-05.231, page 1-1) 3-05.231, page 1-1)

71

BASELINE POLICY AND DIRECTIVES

Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1501, Missing Personnel, establishes an office within DoD to have responsibility for matters relating to missing persons including the policy, control, and oversight of the entire process for investigation and recovery related to missing persons and for coordination with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), Article 17, concerning military personnel and civilian personnel accompanying the Armed Forces, provides that . . . each party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war with an identity card showing the owners surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The following Directives and Instructions are intended to implement current PR policy. DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery (PR), establishes definitions for PR and Non-conventional Assisted Recovery (NAR) and designates the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as the DoD executive agent for PR. DoD Instruction 2310.3, PR Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures, establishes a PRRC with the function to facilitate informed decision-making by OSD principals in an actual PR incident. DoD Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct, provides guidance to train members of the Armed Forces and directs that commanders of Combatant Commands shall designate the level of training.

72

Baseline Policy Policyand andDirectives Directives Baseline

Title10, 10,U.S. U.S.Code, Code,Section Section1501, 1501,Missing MissingPersonnel Personnel Title GenevaConvention ConventionRelative Relativeto tothe theTreatment Treatmentof ofPrisoners Prisonersof of Geneva Warof ofAugust August12, 12,1949 1949(GPW) (GPW) War DoDDirective Directive2310.2, 2310.2,Personnel PersonnelRecovery Recovery(PR), (PR),June June30, 30, DoD 1997 1997 DoDInstruction Instruction2310.3, 2310.3,Personnel PersonnelRecovery RecoveryResponse ResponseCell Cell DoD (PRRC)Procedures, Procedures,June June6, 6,1997 1997 (PRRC) DoDDirective Directive1300.7, 1300.7,Training Trainingand andEducation EducationMeasures Measures DoD Necessaryto toSupport Supportthe theCode Codeof ofConduct, Conduct,December December8, 8, Necessary 2000 2000

73

RELATED DIRECTIVES AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1 revises requirements for the form, issuance, and use of identity cards required by the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, for the Protection of War Victims. Executive Order 12656 paragraph 13 (F) assigns the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services, with lead responsibilities for the protection or evacuation of United States citizens and nationals abroad and safeguarding their property abroad. PDD 29 was an effort to codify operating principles and processes for the interagency environment. It was superseded by the adoption of NSPD-1 (see below), which shifted responsibilities for executing PDD 56 and 29 functions to regional and functional Principals and Deputies Committees (PCCs). PDD/NSC 56 defines complex contingency operations. National Security Presidential Directive 1 was the first in a series of National Security Presidential Directives issued under President George W. Bush. Under this directive, National Security Presidential Directives shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives and Presidential Review Directives as an instrument for communicating presidential decisions about the national security policies of the United States. It establishes that management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day forums for interagency coordination of national security policy. Six NSC/PCCs were established for the following regions: Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa. Eleven NSC/PCCs also established for specific functional areas. The previous system of Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) was abolished. NSPD 12 is one of the first in the current generation of NSPDs since NSPD 1, under President George W. Bush. As such, it not only serves as a precedent, but it addresses a related mission area of PR, namely Hostage Recovery. The directive announces the taking of hostages anywhere overseas is a violation of Federal Law and establishes policy for their safe return. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provide the most relevant and current guidance to military departments and defense agency planning in support of the National Security Strategy.

74

RelatedDirectives Directivesand andGuidance GuidanceDocuments Documents Related

DODI1000.1 1000.1Identity Identity CardsRequired Requiredby bythe theGeneva GenevaConventions, Conventions,30 30January January DODI Cards 1974; Incorporating Change 2, 5 June 1991 1974; Incorporating Change 2, 5 June 1991 ExecutiveOrder Order12656 12656Assignment Assignmentof ofEmergency Emergency PreparednessResponsibilities, Responsibilities, Executive Preparedness November 18, 1988 November 18, 1988 PDD-29Security Security PolicyCoordination, Coordination,27 27Sep Sep 1994 PDD-29 Policy 1994 PDD/NSC56 56Managing ManagingComplex Complex ContingencyOperations, Operations, May May 1997 PDD/NSC Contingency 1997 NSPD11Organization Organization ofthe theNational NationalSecurity SecurityCouncil Council System,13 13Feb Feb2001 2001 NSPD of System, NSPD12 12United UnitedStates StatesCitizens Citizens TakenHostage HostageAbroad, Abroad, 18Feb Feb2002 2002 NSPD Taken 18 DefensePlanning PlanningGuidance Guidance(DPG) (DPG) Defense Contingency PlanningGuidance Guidance(CPG) (CPG) Contingency Planning MOAConcerning ConcerningDoD-CIA DoD-CIAMutual Mutual Supportin inPolicy, Policy,Research Researchand andDevelopment, Development, MOA Support Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery, 17 July 1998 Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery, 17 July 1998

75

PR ADVISORY GROUP BASELINE DIRECTIVE

DoDD 2310.2, establishes the purpose, composition and tasks for the PRAG. In accordance with the Missing Persons Act (MPA), DPMO is responsible for coordination for the Department of Defense with other departments and agencies of the United States on all matters concerning missing persons and within DoD among the military departments, the Joint Staff, and the commanders of the combatant commands. The PRAG provides a forum for DPMO to exercise this aspect of its responsibilities under the MPA at a senior level. The PRAGs primary focus is on long-term, enduring issues central to PR planning. However, the PRAG might also be convened at the request of the DASD (POW/Missing Personnel Affairs) or any of the PRAGs principal members to address problems of a more immediate nature or provide crisis support to the Secretary of Defense. Membership on the PRAG consists of the following principals:

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts Director, Overseas Citizens Bureau, Department of State Director, Policy Support, DIA Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Chief, Military and Special Projects Division, CIA Service and SOCOM Representatives Dep. Dir. for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C3ISR) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command Control, Communications, and Intelligence Dir. of Operations and Policy, USCG DASD for Policy Support, ASD(SO/LIC) Deputy Director for Operations, The Joint Staff HQ, AF/DXOO Director of Defense Policy, National Security Council.

DASD(POW/Missing Personnel Affairs)

76

PRAdvisory AdvisoryGroup GroupBaseline BaselineDirective Directive PR

DODD2310.2, 2310.2, establishesthe thepurpose, purpose,tasks, tasks,and andcomposition compositionof of DODD establishes thePersonnel PersonnelRecovery RecoveryAdvisory AdvisoryGroup Group(PRAG). (PRAG). the Purpose Purpose Thepurpose purposeof ofthe thePRAG PRAGis isto toreview reviewDoD DoDprogress progresstoward toward The developing a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures itsability ability to developing a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures its to recoverisolated isolatedpersonnel. personnel. recover Specified Tasks Specified Tasks Workcollaboratively collaboratively todevelop, develop,review, review,and andrecommend recommendpolicy-level policy-level Work to actions or initiatives to support achieving the DoD goal of havingaa actions or initiatives to support achieving the DoD goal of having fully integrated PR architecture that ensures the recovery ofisolated isolated fully integrated PR architecture that ensures the recovery of U.S. personnel worldwide. U.S. personnel worldwide. Providepre-crisis pre-crisisadvice adviceto toDoD DoD andother otherU.S. U.S.Government Government Provide and principals on personnel recovery policies. principals on personnel recovery policies. Membership Membership Principalsfrom fromwithin withinServices, Services,OSD, OSD,and andthe theJoint Joint Staff Principals Staff Limited representation from NSC and Non-DoD agencies Limited representation from NSC and Non-DoD agencies

77

PR RESPONSE CELL BASELINE INSTRUCTION

Department of Defense Instruction 2310.3, directs that upon notification that the USD(P) had decided to activate a PRRC, the DASD(POW/MPA) shall convene a PRRC for the purpose of facilitating informed decision-making by OSD principals. It further directs that the PRRC will accomplish this by addressing issues that have impact on the PR incident, and by expeditiously developing coordinated policy options for the Secretary of Defense and/or the President. The PRRC serves as the Department of Defense point of contact for PR interagency coordination. The PRRC deactivates after recovery has been accomplished, or recovery had been determined to be impossible. In the event the USD(P) decides a PRRC is inappropriate, DPMO shall function as an operational coordination center in support of the OSD for evolving PR policy issues until the incident is resolved. The incident report will be provided to the SECDEF through the USD(P). This initial report shall provide, as time permits, a status report on the situation, legal status of those involved, public affairs guidance, and summary of the interagencys response to the incident, and shall recommend policy options for managing the incident. The PRRC shall provide update and spot reports covering significant developments throughout the duration of the incident. The specified tasks listed on the slide are explicitly stated in the DoDI; the implied tasks are not stated, but derived as necessary tasks in order to accomplish the directed, specified tasks.

78

PRResponse ResponseCell CellBaseline BaselineInstruction Instruction PR

DoDI2310.3 2310.3Personnel PersonnelRecovery RecoveryResponse ResponseCell Cell(PRRC), (PRRC),66June June DoDI 1997,establishes establishesauthorities authoritiesand and responsibilities. 1997, responsibilities. Specified Tasks Specified Tasks Facilitate the development ofcoordinated coordinatedpolicy policyoptions optionsfor forthe the Facilitate the development of SECDEF and the NCA. SECDEF and the NCA. ProvideaaPR PRincident incidentreport reportwithin within33hours hoursof ofthe thecell cellconvening. convening. Provide Provideupdate updateand andspot spotreports reportsthroughout throughoutthe theduration durationof ofthe the Provide incident incident Write PRlessons-learned lessons-learnedreport reportfor forOSD OSDdistribution, distribution,and andaa PR Write aaPR PR after-action report for DoD historical files. after-action report for DoD historical files. ImpliedTasks Tasks Implied Maintainnear nearreal-time real-timeintelligence intelligenceand andSituational Situational Awarenessof ofPR PR Maintain Awareness incidents. incidents. Maintainaamembership membershipthat thatis isfamiliar familiarwith withPR PRissues, issues,capabilities, capabilities, Maintain and limitations. and limitations. Conductcentralized centralizedoversight oversight ofthe theincident, incident,while whilepermitting permitting Conduct of decentralized execution. decentralized execution.

79

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PR DEFINITION

This slide and the analysis below illustrate the problem inherent in the current definition of PR. As discussed and developed in Chapter III, the IDA NPRA study proposes a much broader and more inclusive definition of PR termed Full Spectrum PR. Full Spectrum PR is broader in the sense that it serves as the umbrella term for related rescue and recovery missions (such as SAR, MEDEVAC/CASEVAC, Evacuation/NEO, CSAR/JCSAR, NAR/UAR, Mass Rescue, and Hostage Rescue). Full Spectrum PR is also more inclusive in terms of both personnel (referring to DoD, USG interagency employees, government contractors, other American citizens, multinational, and coalition partners) and operational environments (referring to benign, uncertain, hostile, and denied). A Full Spectrum PR capability recognizes the unique aspects of each mission are and the consequences of a more inclusive definition while capitalizing on the synergy of common requirements, like assets, and similar architecture. An analysis of the definition of PR, as currently defined in DoDD 2310.2, shows that a scenario or incident must successfully pass four tests to be considered a PR incident.

The first test is for the target set, or individual who is the subject of the incident. The individual must be a member of the U.S. military, a DoD civilian, a DoD contractor, or must be designated by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

The second test is for the status of the individual. The individual must be captured, detained, beleaguered, evading, isolated, or missing. Each of these statuses is defined in DoD guidance. Hostages, evacuees, and persons who are besieged do not pass the test for PR. The third test is for the environment. The individual must be in an uncertain or hostile environment, or in a denied area. Each of these environments is defined in DoD guidance. Individuals in permissive environments do not pass the test for PR. There is, however, a discrepancy between the environment test and the individual status test. An individual can qualify as an isolated person in any environment, according to the definition. Therefore, it is possible for an individual to be an isolated person, yet still not be the subject of a PR incident. The final test is for the duty status of the individual. The individual must be engaged in an official U.S.-sponsored activity or mission. While the aforementioned tests may well be necessary to determine the legal status of an individual being rescued or recovered, the technically restrictive definition also constrains proactive, cooperative, integrated efforts that could lead to successful PR operations.

80

Analysisof ofCurrent CurrentPR PRDefinition Definition Analysis

Target Set Target Set Existing Existing DoDD DoDD 2310.2 2310.2 Guidance Guidance Individual Status Individual Status
Captured Captured Detained Detained Beleaguered Beleaguered Evading Evading Isolated Isolated* Isolated* Isolated Missing Missing

Environment Environment Uncertain Uncertain Hostile Hostile Denied Denied Yes /No Yes /No

Duty Status Duty Status

U.S. Military U.S. Military DoD Civilian DoD Civilian DoD Contractor DoD Contractor (or as directed by (or as directed by SecDef or President) SecDef or President)

Official U.S. Official U.S. Sponsored Sponsored Activity/Mission Activity/Mission

Yes /No Yes /No

Yes /No Yes /No

Yes /No Yes /No Note 1: Existing DoDD 2310.2 required all four criteria be met and answered Yes. Note 1: Existing DoDD 2310.2 required all four criteria be met and answered Yes. * JP 1-02 definition of isolated personnel makes Environment irrelevant. * JP 1-02 definition of isolated personnel makes Environment irrelevant.

CurrentCriteria Criteriaare arerestrictive; restrictive; Current Impededachievement achievementof ofFull FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PR Impeded

81

INTERIM INTERAGENCY DEFINITION

While the criteria associated with determination of an isolated person's status are restrictive and preclude comprehensive, integrated solutions to PR, there is much that is relevant and effective in the definition of Personnel Recovery that is currently in use. Much of the unnecessary compartmentalization with which organizations approach the issue has to do with the categorization of personnel status, rather than anything inherently wrong with defining the issue. Therefore, in the interim, a way to achieve a more comprehensive and integrated approach to PR may be to discard the legalistic and discrete tests outlined on the previous page and interpret the word "personnel" to encompass all those who may be at high risk of capture. By broadening this interpretation, the interagency still receives the guidance necessary to develop and sustain capabilities, while personnel involved in day to day personnel recovery operations and crisis management are given the flexibility to exercise good judgment in making decisions about when and how to execute PR operations.

82

InterimInteragency InteragencyDefinition Definition Interim

PersonnelRecovery Recovery The Theaggregation aggregationof ofmilitary, military,civil, civil, Personnel andpolitical politicalefforts effortsto torecover recovercaptured, captured,detained, detained,evading, evading, and isolatedor ormissing missingpersonnel personnelfrom fromuncertain uncertainor orhostile hostile isolated environmentsand anddenied deniedareas. areas. Personnel Personnelrecovery recoverymay may environments occurthrough throughmilitary militaryaction, action,action actionby bynongovernmental nongovernmental occur organizations,other otherU.S. U.S.Government-approved Government-approvedaction, action, organizations, anddiplomatic diplomaticinitiatives, initiatives,or orthrough throughany anycombination combinationof of and theseoptions. options. Although Althoughpersonnel personnelrecovery recoverymay mayoccur occur these duringnon-combatant non-combatantevacuation evacuationoperations operations(NEO), (NEO),NEO NEO during isnot notaasubset subsetof ofpersonnel personnelrecovery. recovery. is DoDDirective Directive2310.2 2310.2 DoD
Theterm termpersonnel personnelmeans meansall allU.S. U.S.military, military,government governmentcivilians, civilians, The andgovernment governmentcontractors contractorsin inall allsituations situationsand andall allscenarios scenarios and

83

DIRECT AND GUIDE SHORTFALLS AND DEFICIENCIES

To date, the data collection effort revealed that there is virtually no guidance at the interagency level concerning PR. NSPD 1 establishes that NSPDs shall replace both Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) and Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) as an instrument of communicating presidential decisions about national security policy; it also establishes Policy Coordination Committees with specific regional or functional national policy responsibilities. PR is not specifically addressed in either NSPDs and it has never been addressed specifically in a PCC or Sub-PCC. DoS intuitively associates PR under the general rubric of evacuation as a part of Emergency Action Planning; however, while evacuation is addressed in some detail in the Emergency Planning Handbook, PR is not addressed. As indicated earlier, currently there is no PR doctrine, per se. Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for PR have been developed for the Strategic National, Strategic Theater, Operational, and Tactical Levels; however they do not seem to be well understood or applied. The PR related METs in existing Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) vary widely among the combatant commands. With exception of the DoDD 2310.2 and DoDI 2310.3, other Directives and Instructions are generally adequate in implementing existing PR policy recognizing that PR policy in itself is lacking. However, the DoDD concerning the purpose of the PRAG is too vague and promotes a passive management style without establishing requisite authorities for planning and providing oversight. Likewise the DoDI regarding the PRRC lacks sufficient structure to enable it to perform implied task and thus make it a viable organizational entity within the architecture. While DoD has a codified Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, promulgated in Joint Publication 1-02, DoS has no common lexicon except as defined in national level directives. While one might argue that the lack of precise and common definitions usually do not present major obstacles in the execution of a mission when human lives hang in the balance, they could create considerable angst or disappointment, and have serious implications in determining legal status and attendant responsibilities, pay, and medical benefits. Finally, PR guidance is lacking in both DPG and CPG, although DPMO is trying to provide emphasis on PR in DPG.

84

Directand andGuide: Guide:Shortfalls Shortfallsand andDeficiencies Deficiencies Direct

Policy Policy

There is no national level policy or guidance on PR There is no national level policy or guidance on PR NSPD 1 establishes NSC PCCs, and a Sub-PCC for Defense POW/Missing Personnel matters NSPD 1 establishes NSC2002. PCCs, and a Sub-PCC for Defense POW/Missing Personnel matters was formed on 18 June was formed on 18 June 2002. There is no joint Doctrine for PR. There is no joint Doctrine for PR. PR related Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) are applied inconsistently among combatant PR related Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs) are applied inconsistently among combatant commands commands Existing Service doctrine is outdated and CSAR-focused. Existing Service doctrine is outdated and CSAR-focused. DoDD 2310.2 in regard to the PRAG purpose statement is too vague. DoDD 2310.2 in regard to the PRAG purpose statement is too vague. DoDI 2310.3 lacks sufficient structure to make PRRC an effective organizational body. DoDI 2310.3 lacks sufficient structure to make PRRC an effective organizational body. There is no interagency definition for PR, and the current definition of PR, and related terms There is no interagency definition for PR, and theagencies. current definition of PR, and related terms vary widely among Services, departments, and vary widely among Services, departments, and agencies. Specific PR guidance is lacking in both DPG and CPG. Specific PR guidance is lacking in both DPG and CPG.

Doctrine Doctrine

Directives Directives

Instructions Instructions Definitions Definitions Guidance Guidance

85

ISSUE
Aggregating the shortfalls and deficiencies stated on previous slides led the IDA study team to the conclusion that the central issue is that, as a result of lack of national guidance, there is little or no consensus on the definition and scope of USG PR. While the DoD PR definition from DoDD 2310.2 is directly applicable to interagency PR if the term personnel is taken in a broader context, those in the DoD PR community generally interpret the definition in terms of who the individual is, his/her individual and duty status, and the environment. However, there are no accepted guidelines for limiting the scope of interagency PR efforts. In the absence of such limitations, this study will address a broad definition of interagency PR responsibilities, to include U.S. military personnel, Government civilians and contractors, without regard to the situation or environment. Hence, for this study, the DoD PR definition is not changed but the context of the definition is significantly broadened to allow the study to examine fully the policy, planning, and program implications of future interagency PR issues. Until there is interagency policy that defines full spectrum PR in terms of vision, scope, and goals, deliberate planning and preparation will be, at best, ad hoc and inefficient. NSPD 1 establishes that the management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall usually be accomplished by the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. Additionally, the directive states the except for those established by statute, other existing NSC interagency groups, ad hoc bodies, and executive committees are also abolished as of March 1, 2001, unless they are specifically reestablished as subordinate working groups within the new NSC system as of that date. If Full Spectrum PR is to be a national priority consisting of a credible capability with a coherent architecture and a coordinated interagency effort, policy formulation should be an essential and fundamental requirement. Without national level policy and clear supporting doctrine, PR will continue to default to DoD capabilities on an ad hoc basis without the benefit of supporting capabilities and efforts from other agencies.

86

Issue Issue

ISSUE:As Asaaresult resultof ofthe thelack lackof ofnational nationallevel levelguidance, guidance, ISSUE: thereis isno noconsensus consensuson onthe thedefinition definitionand andscope scopeof ofUSG USG there PR. PR. Thereare arelack lackof ofPR PRdoctrine doctrinewithin withinDoD DoDand andlack lackof ofPR PR There policyand andunderstanding understandingoutside outsideDoD. DoD. policy NationalPR PRcapabilities capabilitiesand andrequirements requirementsare arenot notyet yet National defined. defined. Thecurrent currentarchitecture architecturefor forPR PRis isDoD-centric DoD-centricand anddoes does The notadequately adequatelyconsider considerthe thecapabilities capabilitiesand and not requirementsof ofother otherUSG USGagencies agenciesand andcoalition coalition requirements partners. partners. Closelyrelated relatedmissions missions(e.g., (e.g.,CSAR, CSAR,SAR, SAR,evacuation, evacuation, Closely hostage rescue) are treated as separate entities. hostage rescue) are treated as separate entities.

87

DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET: POLICY/DOCTRINE

A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), or similar document is needed to ensure a common understanding of PR policy and to establish a national policy with defined interagency roles and responsibilities. The essential ingredients of the NSPD are elaborated in the next chart. Ultimately, the NSPD should stimulate the development of a coherent and cohesive policy/doctrinal infrastructure in the form of supporting directives, instructions, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures. With the increased requirements for humanitarian assistance, peace support operations, counter narcotics operations, and the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. personnel will continue to be deployed overseas in harms way. Traditionally, the U.S. government has felt a moral obligation to return military personnel home safely. With the widespread deployment of a full range of personnelgovernment civilians and contract employees, as well as military service membersthe government may find itself obligated to provide personnel recovery assistance to a much broader set of personnel when incidents occur in the future. This study recommends that the policy and planning implications of such a broadening of personnel recovery obligations be considered in advance of future incidents. The second phase of the study will explore the program and resource implications of these policy considerations. Better use could be made of DPG concerning PR by providing firm guidance in the form of goals, priorities, and objectives, including fiscal constraints, for the development of the Program Objective Memorandums for PR by the Military Departments and Defense agencies. Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) also provides an opportunity to clarify and emphasize the importance of PR in interagency and multinational planning.

88

DOTMLPFSolution SolutionSet: Set:Policy/Doctrine Policy/Doctrine DOTMLPF

Policy/Doctrine Policy/Doctrine Developan anNSPD NSPDto toidentify identifyresponsibilities responsibilitiesfor forconducting conducting Develop fullspectrum spectrumPR PRfor forUSG USGpersonnel personnelof ofall alldepartments departmentsand and full agencies. agencies. Developdoctrine doctrineto toaddress addressfull fullspectrum spectrumPR. PR. Develop Considerdevelopment developmentof ofcode codeof ofbehavior behaviorto tosupport support Consider resistance training for non-military personnel resistance training for non-military personnel EnsureJMETLs JMETLsinclude includefull fullspectrum spectrumPR PRand andinteragency interagencyand and Ensure coalitionrequirements requirements coalition Addressfull fullspectrum spectrumPR PRin inDPG DPGand andCPG CPG Address

89

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DOCUMENT

As mentioned, a new directive or guide is needed for interagency PR. Such guidance is needed at the national level to make interagency PR the responsibility of the National Security Council as NSPD-12 does for hostage recovery. The guidance needs to define PR in an interagency context and identify who is responsible for PR under various circumstances. The guidance should also describe interagency PR roles and responsibilities, as well as an interagency coordination process tailored for PR. The guidance should define the requirements for U.S. personnel who are on official duty overseas in high-risk areas. These requirements should be in terms of training, equipment, and procedures. The guidance should also identify the code of behavior that serves as the foundation for PR. The specific code would be described by another policy document. IDA intends to organize an interagency workshop to develop such a National Directive or multi-agency MOA.

90

NationalSecurity SecurityPolicy PolicyDocument Document National

ADirective Directiveor orGuide Guideis isneeded neededto toestablish establishinteragency interagencyPR PR A policythat thatwould: would: policy DefinePR PRand andassociated associatedterms terms in ininteragency interagencycontext context Define Ensureaacomprehensive comprehensivescope scopethat thataddresses addresses government government Ensure employees, civilians, and contractors in all environments employees, civilians, and contractors in all environments Identifyinteragency interagencyroles rolesand andresponsibilities responsibilitieswith withregard regardto to Identify PRpolicy, policy,planning, planning,training, training,and andexecution execution PR Describethe theinteragency interagencycoordination coordinationprocess processfor forPR PR Describe incidents incidents Prescribeminimum minimumstandards standardsfor forU.S. U.S.personnel personnelto toenter enter Prescribe high-risk countries (e.g., level of training, awareness, high-risk countries (e.g., level of training, awareness, equipment) equipment) Describefundamental fundamentalprinciples principlesof ofaacivilian civiliancode codeof ofconduct conduct Describe or behavior or behavior Promoteappropriate appropriatecoordination coordinationmechanisms mechanismsfor for Promote interagency,coalition, coalition,and andinternational internationalorganizations. organizations. interagency,

91

CIVILIAN CODE OF BEHAVIOR

The Code of Conduct (CoC) guides the actions of every member of the Armed Forces during peacetime or wartime. The CoC not only establishes standards of conduct, but also provides the basis of training and instruction as to the proper procedures to be employed when isolated, evading, or captured. SERE training for the Armed Forces is conducted on three levels according to the following categories of personnel: Level A Minimum level of understanding for all members of the Armed Forces, imparted during entrylevel training. Level B Includes members of ground combat forces, security forces for high threat targets, and those close to the forward line of troops. Level C Minimum level of understanding for Military Service members whose military jobs, specialties, or assignments entail high risk of capture and exploitation. This training includes combat aircrews, special operations forces, military attachs, and the like. While the CoC is founded on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which allows the military to take punitive action when the situation warrants, instruction on the CoC (1300.7) is primarily motivational. Past experience of captured Americans

reveals that honorable survival in captivity requires a high degree of dedication and motivation and a strong belief in the following: Love of and faith in the United States and a conviction that the U.S. cause is just. The values of American democratic concepts and institutions. Faith and loyalty to fellow captives. Maintaining the highest standards of integrity. The IDA study team has determined that a corollary Code of Behavior may be needed for the non-uniformed interagency, which includes government civilians and contractors. Code of behavior is valuable when military and non-military personnel are isolated together. The policy should be motivational, rather than punitive, but should be underpinned by the oath of office employees take upon assuming their official duties, and legislation concerning unauthorized release of classified material. A strong belief in the above principles enables POWs or detainees to survive long and stressful periods of captivity, and return to their country and families honorably and with selfesteem intact. Code of behavior will form the basis for civilian survival training.

92

CivilianCode Codeof ofBehavior Behavior Civilian

Codeof ofConduct Conductis isapplicable applicableto to situationsinvolving involvingSurvival, Survival,Evasion, Evasion, Code situations Resistance, andEscape Escape Resistance, and Guidancewould wouldbe bebeneficial beneficialfor for thenon-military non-military(government (governmentcivilians civiliansand and Guidance the contractors) to survive with honor if they are at risk of capture. This contractors) to survive with honor if they are at risk of capture. This guidancewould wouldbe bemotivational motivationalrather ratherthan thandisciplinary disciplinary distinctly reduced guidance distinctly reduced function from military Code of Conduct. function from military Code of Conduct. ProposedCivilian CivilianCode Codeof ofBehavior; Behavior;Corollary Corollary tothe theCoC: CoC: Proposed to aman anAmerican. American.I Iserve serveto toprotect protect theAmerican Americanway way oflife. life. I Iam the of I will do all I can to avoid being captured or detained. I will do all I can to avoid being captured or detained. amcaptured capturedor ordetained, detained,I Iwill willresist resistto tothe theutmost utmostof ofmy myability. ability. IfIfI Iam amcaptured capturedor ordetained, detained,I Iwill will keepfaith faithwith withand andtrust trustin inmy my fellow IfIf I Iam keep fellow detainees. I will give no information that might be harmful to my comrades. detainees. I will give no information that might be harmful to my comrades. will makeno nooral oralor or writtenstatements statementsdisloyal disloyalor orharmful harmfulto tomy my country. I Iwill make written country. willnever neverforget forgetthat thatI Iam aman anAmerican, American,responsible responsiblefor for my actions and I I will my actions and dedicated to the principles that made America free. dedicated to the principles that made America free. CivilianCode Codeof ofBehavior Behaviordocument documentwill willbe bedeveloped developedby by coordinationand and Civilian coordination workshops workshops

93

DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET: ORGANIZATION

The fragmented organizational responsibilities for PR contribute to the lack of interagency focus, oversight, cooperation, and capabilities. Definition and exercise of organizational authority and responsibility is essential for improvement. Dedicated responsibilities of DoS and DoD and the PRAG and the PRRC need to champion oversight and advocacy of full spectrum PR for USG Centralization of responsibility for oversight of PRrelated policy, issues, programs, and activities Provision for greatly increased Congressional, interagency, and international coordination. Revisions of the PRAGand the PRRC will be addressed next.

94

DOTMLPFSolution SolutionSet: Set:Organization Organization DOTMLPF

Organization Organization Resourcedesignated designatedlead leadagency agencyto toprovide provideoversight oversightand and Resource advocacyfor forFull FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PRfor forUSG USG advocacy Refinethe therole, role,tasks, tasks,and andfunctions functionsof ofPRAG PRAGand andPRRC. PRRC. Refine Establishan anInteragency InteragencyPR PRCommittee Committee Establish

95

PR ADVISORY GROUP RE-ENGINEERING

Communication within the PR community is a major challenge. Although, many agencies from throughout the Government, especially within DoD, are undertaking significant initiatives to improve USG PR capabilities, not everyone is aware of the various projects underway. The PRAG normally meets biannually, but it can be convened at any time at the call of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy (DASD-P) to address issues or provide crisis support to the SECDEF. Periodic meetings are normally held on a semiannual basis; however, agenda compression usually results in information briefings on initiatives rather than decision briefings on policy or programmatic issues that will guide progress toward developing a fully integrated PR architecture that ensures the USGs ability to recover isolated personnel in the sense of full spectrum PR (as defined earlier in this study; including related missions, interagency, and coalition requirements). In order to accomplish those additional tasks, the scope and membership of the PRAG need to be expanded. In order to facilitate decision-making at the senior level, more process structure must be applied to ensure a better, more focused, and more efficient output. Oversight of major issues concerning PR experimentation, acquisition, training, and exercises is the most important function the PRAG could and should perform. Accordingly, this proposed oversight charter should be emphasized by redesignating the PRAG to be the PR Oversight Group (PROG). The PROG should exercise its oversight responsibilities by monitoring milestone objectives contained in the Strategic Implementation Plan.

96

PRAdvisory AdvisoryGroup GroupRe-Engineering Re-Engineering PR

Purpose Purpose Changeto todecision-making decision-makingfunction functionfrom frominformation informationsharing sharingfunction function Change Maintainoversight oversighton onmajor majorissues issuesconcerning concerningPR PRexperimentation, experimentation, Maintain acquisition, training, and exercises acquisition, training, and exercises Changetitle titleto toPR PROversight OversightGroup Group(PROG) (PROG) Change ImpliedTasks Tasks Implied Approve(published (publishedunder underthe theDASD) DASD)aaFull FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PRObjectives Objectives Approve or Vision statement or Vision statement Identify PROGdecision decisionpoints points andissues issues Identify PROG and Publish a list of key exercises, programs, andmilestones milestonesfor forPROG PROG Publish a list of key exercises, programs, and oversight oversight Solicitissues issuesfrom fromPR-related PR-relatedforums forumsthat thatrequire requiresenior seniorlevel level Solicit decisions decisions Overseethe thePR PRimplementation implementationplan plan Oversee Membership Membership Expandedinteragency interagency andcoalition coalitionrepresentation representation Expanded and Definevoting votingmembership membership Define

97

PR RESPONSE CELL RE-ENGINEERING

One of the major problems with the PR Response Cell is that it is convened only when a PR incident takes place; therefore, members are on call, as necessary. The reality of the matter is that there might be long periods of time, because of an absence of PR incidents, that the PR Response Cell does not meet. During such periods, it has been determined that the essential knowledge of PR requirements, processes, and issues perishes over time because of personnel turnover or operational tempo. In order for the PR Response Cell to be an effective body in the execution of its crisis mission, it needs to be fully informed and up to speed on PR policy and procedures. As such, membership ought to consist of a standing, permanent body of core members with representatives not only from OSD and DoD components, but also from DoS. Quarterly meetings should focus on a review of PR policy and procedures combined with scenario-based training in the form of table-top exercises or seminars that review likely to occur PR incidents. The PR Response Cell should maintain a standing status to review and document PR issues, trends, and lessons learned and brief them semiannually to the PR Advisory Group. The implied tasks listed in the baseline DoDI should be specified to clarify any ambiguity as to the intent, purpose, and functions of the PRRC.

98

PRResponse ResponseCell CellRe-Engineering Re-Engineering PR

Membership Membership Nucleuscomprising comprisingstanding standingcore coremembers. members. Nucleus Membership to meet on a routine, periodic basis,in inaddition additionto tocrisis crisis Membership to meet on a routine, periodic basis, response. response. Membersgraduates graduates ofPR PR 101. Members of 101. Permanentcore coremembership membershipthat thatincludes includesDoS DoSrepresentation. representation. Permanent Supporting members tasked as appropriate. Supporting members tasked as appropriate. Responsiblecombatant combatantcommanders commandersand andIntel Intelagencies. agencies. Responsible Specified Tasks Specified Tasks Reviewapplication applicationof ofcurrent currentpolicies policiesand anddirectives directivesbased basedon oncurrent current Review and anticipated full spectrum PR incidents. and anticipated full spectrum PR incidents. Determinelegal legalstatus statusof ofconcerned concernedpersonnel personnel within72 72hours hoursof of Determine within notification of incident. notification of incident. Determineand and establish reportingchain chain andassociated associated Determine establish aareporting and responsibilities for incident management and updates. responsibilities for incident management and updates. Maintainoversight oversightfor forthe theduration durationof ofthe theincident. incident. Maintain Provide periodic reports on policy issues, trends,and andlessons lessonslearned learned Provide periodic reports on policy issues, trends, tothe thePRAG. PRAG. to

99

CHAPTER V. PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION

This chapter addresses PR force planning and preparation. Planning and preparation are described in terms of baseline requirements and capabilities, shortfalls, and issues. The baseline consists primarily of DoD requirements and capabilities, as those are defined. Preliminary non-DoD requirements and capabilities are addressed. This chapter, which focuses on training in the context of the DOTMLPF construct, examines training for command and control, planning staffs, forces, personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation, exercises, and infrastructure. The IDA study team will fully address material and facility solutions to planning and preparation shortfalls in the second phase of the study. Information in this chapter is based on findings of recent studies as well as visits to Service and Joint SERE Schools and interviews of PR training experts. Recent Studies include the following (see references):

JPRA SERE and Code of Conduct Training Assessment (2000-2001) JPRA Joint CSAR Mission Area Analysis (2000-2001) DPMO Coalition PR Study (1999-2002) DPMO PR Mission Area Analysis (1999-2001) JCRA CSAR Requirements Study (1997-1999) OSD Joint CSAR Joint Test and Evaluation (1994-1999).

100

ChapterV. V. PR PRForce ForcePlanning Planningand andPreparation Preparation Chapter

Baseline Baseline DoDSERE SERETraining TrainingRequirements Requirements DoD Non-DoDSERE SERETraining TrainingRequirements Requirements Non-DoD DoDTraining TrainingCapability Capability DoD
PR Training Centers PR Training Centers Exercises Exercises SERE Schools SERE Schools Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel

Shortfalls Shortfalls Trainingand andExercises Exercises Training

PR Forces PR Forces PR Staffs PR Staffs Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel Isolated Personnel

TrainingCapacity Capacity (Personneland andFacilities) Facilities) Training (Personnel Issue Issue SolutionSet Set Solution

101

BASELINE SERE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

DoD has defined three major levels of SERE training: Level A Academics on the Code of Conduct (unclassified) Level B Academics on Survival, Evasion, and Resistance (confidential). Minimal academics on escape and recovery. Level B+ Level B training augmented with practical field exercises. Level C Level B academics, plus thorough practical field exercises, plus experiential training in a resistance training laboratory (secret). No practical escape or recovery exercises. Level C+ Graduate level resistance academics and practical exercises, tailored to specific missions and needs (secret+). Limited to resistance training only. Current policy requires that the Combatant Commands determine the level of SERE training required for personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters. The process for determining these requirements is ongoing, but it is likely that SERE training throughput requirements will increase significantly. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has identified its current level C SERE training requirements for wartime and peacetime training. Other Combatant Commands are in the process of identifying their SERE training requirements. According to the JPRA, there is currently no uniform requirements process that reviews, defines, and validates requirements throughout the SERE training community. Because the combatant commands have not exercised their authority to define their level C training requirements, the Services have identified specific career fields that have been historically categorized as high risk, and have, in most cases, programmed for their SERE schools to train those career fields. Service guidance currently requires Level C combat training for personnel in 54 identified occupational fields or assignments, and the major portion of Level C training is provided to aviation, special operations, and special mission personnel. There are no established criteria or direction for determining who requires specialized or advanced training. Attendance at these courses, while open and offered to a variety of military and other USG agency users, is largely determined by user perception of need and the availability of user resources. While this arrangement satisfies the need for narrow and well-defined audiences, it might not fully recognize the peacetime risk level inherent in military operations other than war for a potentially large number of military personnel. The changing battlefield environment, including asymmetry, non-state actors, transnational threats, terrorists, and narco-trafficking, further complicates the training requirements determination effort.

102

BaselineSERE SERETraining TrainingRequirements RequirementsProcess Process Baseline

DoDhas hasthree threelevels levelsof ofSERE SEREtraining training DoD LevelA Afor foreveryone everyonein inthe themilitary military Level LevelB Bfor formoderate-risk moderate-riskpersonnel personnel Level LevelC Cfor forhigh-risk high-riskpersonnel personnel Level CombatantCommands Commandsare areresponsible responsiblefor fordetermining determiningthe the Combatant levelof ofrisk riskof ofpersonnel personnelassigned assignedor ordeploying deployingto totheir their level theaters theaters Asaaconsequence, consequence,Combatant CombatantCommanders Commandersshould should As determine how many people get what level of training determine how many people get what level of training OnlySpecial SpecialOperations OperationsCommand Commandhas hasdone donethis this Only OtherCombatant CombatantCommands Commandsare arestill stillworking workingthis thisissue issue Other Inabsence absenceof ofrequirements requirementsfrom fromthe theCombatant CombatantCommands, Commands, In theServices Servicesprovide providelevel levelC CSERE SEREtraining trainingto tocareer careerfields fields the that have historically been high risk that have historically been high risk

103

BASELINE SERE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoDs wartime level C SERE training at about 12,600 students per year. Based on a new understanding of the modern battlefield, SOCOM and the Army have determined that the requirements for wartime and peace-time governmental detention/hostage detention (PGD/HD) resistance training are roughly the same. If all Services apply the same standard, then the total requirement for DoDs peacetime level C PGD/HD resistance training is also about 12,300 students per year.

104

Baseline SERE SERETraining TrainingRequirements Requirements Baseline

WartimeLevel LevelC CSERE SERETraining Training Wartime Service/Component Service/Component
Army Army Navy Navy Air Force Air Force Marine Corps Marine Corps

AnnualRequirement Requirement Annual

4,300 4,300 3,430 3,430 4,540 4,540 300 300

PeacetimeDetention/Hostage Detention/HostageLevel LevelC CResistance ResistanceTraining Training Peacetime Service/Component Service/Component

Army Army Navy Navy Air Force Air Force Marine Corps Marine Corps

AnnualRequirement Requirement Annual

4,100 4,100 3,460 3,460 4,420 4,420 300 300

105

BASELINE USG ESTIMATES OF PERSONNEL AT RISK

The DoS F77 Report of Potential Evacuees Abroad contains a wealth of information as to numbers of personnel in countries worldwide to assist the DoS in calculating the number of people (largely American citizens) potentially requiring assisted or directed evacuation if the local situation requires such a drawdown. The personnel are listed by several categories including USG officials and estimates of tourists, among many others. IDA did an assessment based on DoS travel and other Warning Advisories to develop an arbitrary list of high-, medium-, and low-threat countries. Then the number of personnel including primarily USG employees, USG contractors, and USG TDYers was determined from the F77 Report. It was anticipated many of these people will be in the embassy and other secure locations; however, many will also be out in the field doing tasks in the national interest. Of interest, serious concern was expressed during several interviews for those in the TDY group, since these often arrive in country with little specific country indoctrination and often find their tasks take them a distance away from the Post compound. The F77 Report does not contain an assessment of relative risk to personnel (e.g., those who primarily work in the embassy as compared with those out in the field. In some situations, one might argue those in the embassy might be at higher risk for such things as terrorist attack than those in more distant locations).

106

Baseline USG USGEstimates Estimatesof ofPersonnel Personnelat atRisk Risk Baseline

Departmentsof ofState, State,Treasury, Treasury,and andJustice, Justice,and andCIA CIAhave have Departments identifiedlimited limitedcareer careerfields fieldsthat thatdesire desireSERE SEREtraining training identified Requirementsare arenot notformalized formalized Requirements Thereis isan anidentified identifiedneed needto todetermine determinenumbers numbersof ofall allUSG USG There personnelworldwide worldwideat atrisk risk personnel Criticalelement elementof ofthe thePR PRresource resourcetriad triadalong alongwith withrecovery recovery Critical forceand andcommand commandand andcontrol controlelements elements force Numbersneeded neededto toidentify identifySERE SEREtraining trainingrequirements requirements Numbers DoShas hasidentified identifiednumbers numbersfor forevacuation evacuationrequirements requirementsin inF77 F77 DoS Report Report Basedon onF-77 F-77data, data,IDA IDAcomputed computedaarough roughestimate estimateof of Based personnelat atrisk riskin inselected selectedhigh highthreat threatcountries: countries: personnel USGemployees employees(e.g., (e.g.,DoS, DoS,DoJ, DoJ,AID, AID,DoD DoD[less [lessthose those USG assignedto toRegional RegionalCombatant CombatantCommands]) Commands]) assigned USGcontractors contractors USG USGTDYers TDYers USG

107

BASELINE USG ESTIMATES OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

IDA has drafted a proposed cable for DoS to send out to selected high-threat countries in an attempt to narrow the actual number of personnel for whom the ambassador is responsible. That cable, however, has not yet been sent because of the press of other business at DoS. Additionally, GSA has asked the members of the Interagency Committee for Aviation Policy (ICAP) to provide estimates of personnel who are at risk overseas from their department or agency, and to provide estimates of capabilities to assist in a PR operation as necessary. Responses are coming into GSA, and that information will be incorporated in the IDA report. It is not expected that there will be a high number of personnel requiring Level C SERE training, but it is anticipated that information useful in sizing the level B and C training requirements will become available.

108

Baseline USG USGEstimates Estimatesof ofTraining TrainingRequirements Requirements Baseline

IDAsinitial initialestimate estimatein inselected selectedF77 F77categories categories(all (all IDAs locationsin inselected selectedhigh-threat high-threatcountries countriesworldwide) worldwide) locations wasapproximately approximately6,000 6,000 was isrecognized recognizedthat thatnot notall all6,000 6,000require requirethe thehighest highest ItItis levelof oftraining training level IDAis isworking workingwith withDoS DoS(Diplomatic (DiplomaticSecurity) Security)to to IDA providenumbers numbersof ofpersonnel personnelat atrisk risk provide IDAwill willcontinue continueto torefine refinetraining trainingrequirement requirement IDA estimatesand andlevel levelof ofSERE SEREtraining trainingrequired requiredfor forthose those estimates atrisk risk at

109

BASELINE TRAINING CAPABILITY

The DoD has a training capability for all three components of the PR force structure. The Army offers its Level C course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a satellite level B+ course at the Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Navy conducts its Level C course at North Island Naval Air Station, California and Brunswick Naval Air Station, Maine; and the Air Force provides Level C training at Fairchild AFB, Washington. The Air Force also runs a separate Level B+ course at the Air Force Academy, which is completed at Level C by attendance at the resistance training laboratory portion of the Fairchild course. The Joint PR Agency offers advanced resistance training at the PR Academy, Fairchild AFB. Training is tailored for peacetime government detention and hostage detention. The SERE schools at the Air Force Academy and Fort Rucker are considered Level B+ schools because they do not conduct the resistance training laboratory, although the Academy has the facility. The Marine Corps is discussing the possibility of providing SERE training at its mountain warfare training center in Bridgeport, California. The Marine Corps already teaches two environmental survival courses there (mountain and winter). The Air Force Academy Course MT-220 program completes the Survival, Evasion, and Recovery requirements of the Basic Combat Survival Training course taught at Fairchild AFB, Course SV-80-A. In November 1997, the Air Force Academy and Air Education and Training Command established a Memorandum of Understanding to conduct the resistance laboratory portion at Fairchild. This top-off program requires that all Air Force Academy graduates going to career fields that demand Level-C training receive their resistance training at the Air Force Survival School. JPRA and the Air Force provide all of the available PR training for commanders, controllers, and planners. JPRAs courses are taught at Fredericksburg, Virginia, or by mobile training teams. The Air Force teaches a Joint CSAR Controller Course at the C2 Warrior School, Hurlburt AFB, Florida. The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army Special Operations Command all conduct advanced training for rescue forces. The Air Force conducts CSAR training at the USAF Weapons School and at Red Flag, at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The Navy conducts CSAR training at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, at NAS Fallon, Nevada. The Marine Corps conducts Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) training at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Sqdn-1, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona. Army Special Forces conduct unconventional assisted recovery training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. The Army has no doctrinal foundation for conventional PR training, such as SAR, CSAR, or TRAP.

110

Baseline Training TrainingCapability Capability Baseline

SEREtraining training(Level (LevelC C andLevel LevelB+ B+ SERE and )) JPRAand andAF AFSERE SERESchools, Schools,Fairchild FairchildAFB, AFB, WA JPRA WA AFSERE SERESchool, School,USAF USAFAcademy, Academy,CO CO AF Navy SERE Schools, Brunswick, ME andSan SanDiego, Diego,CA CA Navy SERE Schools, Brunswick, ME and Army SERESchool, School,Fort FortBragg, Bragg,NC NC Army SERE ArmySERE SERESchool, School,Fort FortRucker, Rucker,AL AL Army Schoolsfor forCommanders, Commanders,Controllers, Controllers,and and Planners Schools Planners JPRA, Fredericksburg, VA JPRA, Fredericksburg, VA PR 101 Introduction to PR C2 WarriorSchool, School,Hurlburt HurlburtAFB, AFB,FL FL C2 Warrior Joint CSAR Controller Course
Joint CSAR Controller Course PR 101 Introduction to PR PR 301, 302 PR Planning, UAR Planning PR 301, 302 PR Planning, UAR Planning PR 501 Capstone PR 501 Capstone

Trainingfor forRescue RescueForces Forces Training USAF Weapons School andRed RedFlag, Flag,Nellis Nellis AFB,NV NV USAF Weapons School and AFB, NavalStrike Strike&&Air Air WarfareCenter, Center, NASFallon, Fallon,NV NV Naval Warfare NAS MarineAviation Aviation Weapons Tactics Sqdn-1,MCAS MCASYuma, Yuma,AZ AZ Marine Weapons && Tactics Sqdn-1, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg TheInteragency Interagency doesnot nothave haveaaPR PRtraining trainingcapability capability The does

111

BASELINE PR TRAINING EXERCISES

The IDA study team found that the current situation for PR training exercises has not changed much from that reported in recent studies. The studies reported a number of serious findings: Rescue forces, rescue staffs, and High-Risk-of-Capture (HRC) personnel do not exercise together (Ref. 1, DPMO, Ref. 8). Theaters identified training as inadequate, and cited the need for more frequent exercises. Deficient joint training causes interoperability problems (Ref. 1, Ref. 2, DPMO, Ref. 8). Joint CSAR training is deficient, causing interoperability problems for joint CSAR task forces. There is a lack of interoperability between Services' training. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) are not used to develop training requirements (Ref. 2, Ref. 5, Ref. 8). Service training is not linked to the UJTL, and the Combatant Commanders do not have a Joint Mission Essential Task (JMET) for Ref. 1, even though JMETL development procedures are in place. The PR community does not train its people to use the Joint Strategic Planning System. There is a lack of training for personnel assigned at all levels on the joint, theater, and Service staffs. There is a lack of validated or prioritized training requirements for PR. Joint CSAR events are not included in the training plans. Assessment of training and exercise adequacy is ineffective (Ref. 5). Unit preparedness and training deficiencies are not fixed because they are not entered into the DoD readiness reporting system. There is a lack of formal assessment and feedback of exercises. Combined training is inadequate (DPMO). Training systems are inadequate (Ref. 1, Ref. 8). There is insufficient force structure and personnel to support joint training. There is no opportunity for planners to establish training relationships between CSAR-capable forces. Exercise Desert Rescue is the only venue for examining interoperability for Joint CSAR. Units fund their own attendance at this Navy exercise. This exercise is limited in that it focuses only on the planning and execution of Joint CSAR from the unit level. There is no exercise of command and control functions. Services and components reduce emphasis on planning, training, and resourcing for CSAR and Joint CSAR in favor of their primary missions. Services CSAR forces are not prepared to the standards of Doctrine for Joint CSAR. Compliance with joint standards varies. The current policy and guidance are not reflected in action. Thus, the potential for successful Joint CSAR missions is reduced. A Joint CSAR force generally will operate together for the first time when there is an isolated person in a hostile or denied area. Special Operations Command components do not routinely train to recover other components isolated personnel, even though they have been repeatedly tasked for high-risk Joint CSAR missions without preparing with the supporting forces.

112

Baseline PR PRTraining TrainingExercises Exercises Baseline

Thereare areno nofunded, funded,PR-focused PR-focusedtraining trainingexercises exercises There Inthe thepast, past,there therewere wereUAR/SERE UAR/SEREtraining trainingexercises exercises In RidgeRunner Runner(JSSA) (JSSA) Ridge FleetDeer Deer Fleet FoalEagle Eagle(Korea) (Korea) Foal NSAWChosts hostsDesert DesertRescue, Rescue,aaCSAR-focused CSAR-focusedtraining trainingexercise exercise NSAWC Unit-funded Unit-funded Hostedon onan anas-capable as-capablebasis basis Hosted Limitedin inresources, resources,capacity, capacity,& &concept concept Limited
Notsuited suitedfor forend-to-end end-to-endPR PRexercises exercises Not

CopeThunder Thunderdemonstrated demonstratedaaCSAR-focused CSAR-focusedconcept conceptin in1999 1999 Cope RedFlag Flaghas hasCSAR CSARexercise exercisecapability, capability,but butnot notfocus focus Red Theinteragency interagencydoes doesnot notparticipate participatein inPR PRexercises exercises The

113

BASELINE SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

Training documentation varies greatly in format and detail from Service to Service; however, training content and objectives are consistent across the spectrum and are driven by compliance to the JPRA Executive Agent Instruction (EAI). Level C course content was assessed based on the 1996 EAI and found to be in compliance for all Service schools. All Services appropriately view SERE training as an integral part of inherent PR responsibilities. Other than the Air Force, Service representatives share responsibilities for PR matters other than SERE training. This assignment of responsibilities relies heavily on the schools to represent their Services in identifying, advocating, and resolving training issues. In the Army and Navy programs, lacking a career specialty or formal assignment policies that promote the accrual of multiple-tour experience in SERE CoC training, staff qualifications cannot require extensive mandatory prior experience. For three of the Services, SERE is normally a one-tour assignment, with second assignments to SERE training positions a relatively rare occurrence. As the exception, the Air Force has a long-established career field for enlisted personnel and has a new Combat Rescue career field for officers, which will encompass SERE training. The Air Force Survival School has several new facilities recently constructed, soon to be constructed, or planned. A Phase II Academic Facility (70-seat planetarium and environmental training room), with a computer based training (CBT) laboratory, video teleconference center with unclassified uplink, and administrative offices, was recently completed. Another building under design is a consolidated water training facility to allow all water survival training to be done at one location. This new water training facility will accommodate the trainer for underwater egress training, all of the water survival non-parachuting training devices, and parachute descent trainers, parachute water drags, and helicopter water recovery training devices. The new state-of-the-art Phase II academic training building deserves special mention. The new planetarium and wraparound viewing screens present environmental training through multiimagery and stereo-sound presentation. Each of the student desks has a computer station to facilitate CBT. The 336 TRSS Training Technology Flight is responsible for creating, developing, and programming new training modules. A second feature of this training facility is a distance learning unclassified uplink that provides a new capability for the survival school to export training programs and courseware to DoD or other agencies. However, manning for distant learning studio presentations and additional personnel for computerized modular development are still needed.

114

Baseline SERE SERETraining TrainingCapability Capability Baseline

LevelC Ccourse courselength: length:12-19 12-19days days Level Courselength, length,curriculum, curriculum,and andinstruction instructiontechniques techniquesare aretailored tailoredto to Course Service requirements and culture Service requirements and culture
Navy 12Days Days Navy 12 Air Force 17Days Days Air Force 17 Army 19 Days Army 19 Days

TheAir AirForce Forcetreats treatsSERE SEREinstruction instructionas asaacareer careerfield field The AllowsSERE SEREinstructors instructorsto tobuild builddepth depthand andbreadth breadthof ofexperience experience Allows Providesqualified qualifiedpeople peoplefor forstaff stafffunctions functions Provides
Includingexchange exchangetours toursto toArmy, Army,Navy, Navy,and andForeign ForeignSERE SEREschools schools Including

TheUSAF USAFSERE SERESchool School(Fairchild (FairchildAFB) AFB)has hasaastate-of-the-art state-of-the-arttraining training The facility facility Facilityis isbrand brandnew, new,but butmaturing maturingrapidly rapidly Facility AdvancedDistributed DistributedLearning Learning(ADL) (ADL)capability capability Advanced Computer-BasedTraining Training(CBT) (CBT)capability capability Computer-Based Multi-MediaTheater Theater Multi-Media

115

BASELINE SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

The USAJFKSWCS at Fort Bragg, North Carolina has developed an ambitious plan to expand its SERE training facility. The plan includes an expanded support base, additional survival training areas, evasion lanes, advanced resistance laboratories, and three new resistance training facilities. This will effectively quadruple the schools throughput from its current level of 960 students per year, to meet its requirement to train 4,300 students per year for the aviation and SOF branches. The plan will also address the requirement for PGD/HD training for 4,100 students per year. The Army has not funded the plan yet. Also, Army Special Operations Command has developed an exportable Level B SERE Program of Instruction (POI) that can be taught in 3 to 5 days. The POI includes academics and practical field exercises. The Navy SERE school at NAS North Island, California has developed a PGD/HD resistance course with the assistance of JPRA. The Navys course evolved from the Advanced Terrorism Abduction and Hostage Survival (ATAHS) course that was developed at the specific request of NAVSPECWARCOM. This 5-day course provides instruction in antiterrorism, knowledge of terrorist actions, threats, global hot spots, and concepts to make an individual a hardened target against act of terrorism. A decision was made to amend the course to comply with the EAI (July 99) for Level C peacetime training, and to provide training for detention by hostile governments during peacetime operations other than war or captivity by a terrorist group. A pilot course of the new curriculum has been developed, and the Navy is prepared to offer it at both Navy schools. Quota procurement for this course is by message or letter to the Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific (FASOTRAGRUPAC) or Commanding Officer Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Atlantic Fleet (FASOTRAGRULANT). The course serves as a model for similar peacetime training courses at other Service schools.

116

Baseline SERE SERETraining TrainingCapability Capability Baseline

TheArmy Armyhas hasestablished establishedaaPR PRCenter Centerof ofProponency Proponencyat atFort Fort The Bragg Bragg Codeof ofConduct, Conduct,SERE, SERE,UAR, UAR,and andRCC RCC Code TheUSA USASERE SERESchool School(Fort (FortBragg) Bragg)has hasan anunfunded unfundedplan planto to The quadruplein insize sizeto tosupport supportArmy Armyaviation aviationand andspecial specialforces forces quadruple SEREtraining trainingrequirements requirements SERE Moremanpower, manpower,facilities, facilities,training trainingranges ranges More TheNavy NavySERE SERESchool Schoolat atNorth NorthIsland Islandhas hasaaPGD/HD PGD/HD The resistancecourse course resistance Serviceequivalent equivalentof ofJPRA JPRAadvanced advancedresistance resistancecourse course Service

117

BASELINE JOINT SERE TRAINING CAPABILITY

JPRA/J7 has significant responsibilities beyond conducting specialized resistance training programs. Oversight and standardization functions for the SERE training community, in addition to normal training program coordination duties, place the Director in a position of both conducting and overseeing training programs. Specialized training conducted by JPRA provides advanced and tailored joint peacetime resistance instruction to selected personnel of all Services as well as U.S. Government agencies outside of DoD. Attendance at these JPRA-provided courses, while open and offered to a variety of military and other government agency users, is largely determined by user perception of need and the availability of user resources. While this arrangement satisfies the need for narrow and well-defined audiences, it may not fully recognize the peacetime risk level inherent in military operations other than war for a potentially large number of military personnel. Approximately 1,000 personnel received specialized training last year, including two classes specifically for students from the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Mobile Security Deployments.

118

Baseline Joint JointSERE SERETraining TrainingCapability Capability Baseline

JPRA/J7exercises exercisesoversight oversightof ofService ServiceSERE SEREtraining trainingprograms programs JPRA/J7 Effortto toimprove improvestandardization standardization&&interoperability interoperability Effort JPRAsPR PRAcademy Academy providesmission-tailored mission-tailoredspecialized/advanced specialized/advanced JPRAs provides resistance training resistance training PeacetimeGovernmental GovernmentalDetention Detention(PGD) (PGD)course course Peacetime HostageDetention Detention(HD) (HD)course course Hostage JointResistance ResistanceTraining TrainingInstructor Instructor Course(JRTIC) (JRTIC) Joint Course PRAcademy Academy coursesbuild build onfoundation foundationof of basiclevel levelC C SERE PR courses on basic SERE courses taught by the Services courses taught by the Services PRAcademy Academy providesdirect directsupport supportto tothe theCombatant CombatantCommands Commands PR provides Theater-specificIsolated IsolatedPersonnel Personnel Guidance(IPG) (IPG) Theater-specific Guidance MobileTraining TrainingTeams Teams(MTTs) (MTTs)provide providejust-in-time just-in-timetraining trainingto toforces forces Mobile in theater in theater PRAcademy Academy hasdemonstrated demonstrated aninteragency interagency resistancetraining training PR has an resistance capability capability Twoclasses classesof ofstudents studentsfrom fromState StateDept. Dept. Two

119

BASELINE SERE TRAINING CAPACITY

The table on the opposite page shows the current throughput capacities of DoDs SERE schools. A significant disparity exists between the Air Force and other Services in the areas of personnel and infrastructure devoted to level C SERE training and training management. The JPRA and Army SERE schools both have plans for significant expansion in capacity. JPRAs new resistance training facility will have an un-constrained throughput capacity of 7,488 students per year. The Armys planned facility will have a throughput of approximately 4,000 students per year. However, neither plan is currently funded. The Air Force Academys SERE facility has the capacity to conduct level C SERE training for 1,200 students every 90 days. The Academys requirement to train cadets can be completed in one 90-day cycle in the summer, leaving capacity for up to 3,600 more students (depending on weather and land use permits) to address other DoD or U.S. Government requirements. The Academy is not currently manned or funded to run its facility at this throughput level.

120

Baseline SERE SERETraining TrainingCapacity Capacity Baseline

SERE School SERE School USAF,Fairchild FairchildAFB AFB USAF, USAFAcademy Academy USAF USN,San SanDiego Diego USN, USN,New NewBrunswick Brunswick USN, USA,Ft. Ft.Bragg Bragg USA, JPRA,Fairchild FairchildAFB AFB JPRA, TOTAL TOTAL

Wartime Wartime SERE SERE 3,500 3,500 700 700 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 960 960

PGD/HD PGD/HD Resistance Resistance

168 168

924 924 8,520 8,520 1,092 1,092

121

SHORTFALLS PR FORCE TRAINING

Prior studies and tests found that training and exercises for joint rescue forces are inadequate (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 5, DPMO, Ref 8). Joint CSAR training is deficient, causing interoperability problems for joint CSAR task forces. Deficiencies show that rescue forces and SOF need more training with live isolated personnel (simulated). As an example, rescue forces do not properly authenticate survivors. Rescue forces do not employ Joint TTP or OPSEC procedures. For example, joint forces do not exercise using secure and anti-jam communications. Also, communication skills are poor, resulting in excessive communication. Night CSAR Task Force capability is not sufficiently exercised. Army SOF aviation units are not organized, trained, or equipped to conduct CSAR, as CSAR training would degrade their readiness for primary missions. Joint rescue forces do not train the way they fight. Instead, they take an ad hoc approach to planning, exercising, and mission execution. The training needed to accomplish Joint CSAR missions is more complex than component CSAR training, yet there are few Combatant Commands with specific requirements for Joint CSAR training or exercises. The Joint Training Plans do not include CSAR. This results in Joint CSAR training that is infrequent, incomplete, and inconsistent.

122

Shortfalls PR PRForce ForceTraining Training(U) (U) Shortfalls

Training& &exercises exercisesfor forjoint jointrescue rescueforces forcesare are Training inadequate inadequate

JointCSAR CSARtraining trainingis isdeficient, deficient,causing causinginteroperability interoperability Joint problemsfor forjoint jointCSAR CSARtask taskforces forces problems Rescueforces forcesand andSOF SOFneed needmore moretraining trainingwith withlive livesurvivors survivors Rescue Rescueforces forcesdo donot notemploy employJoint JointTTP TTPor orOPSEC OPSEC Rescue procedures procedures NightCSARTF CSARTFcapability capabilityis isnot notsufficiently sufficientlyexercised exercised Night ArmySOF SOFaviation aviationare arenot notorganized, organized,trained, trained,or orequipped equippedto to Army conductCSAR CSAR conduct Jointrescue rescueforces forcesdo donot nottrain trainthe theway waythey theyfight fight Joint
CSARtraining trainingwould woulddegrade degradetheir their readinessfor forprimary primary CSAR readiness missions missions

Interagencydoes doesnot nottrain trainor orexercise exerciserescue rescueforces forcesas as Interagency doneby byDoD DoD done

123

SHORTFALLS PR STAFF TRAINING

Prior studies and tests found that training & exercises for rescue staffs are inadequate (Ref 1, Ref 2, Ref 4, Ref 5, DPMO, Ref 8). Training for Theater PR planners is insufficient, in tasks such as the SAR A/B frequency selection process. There is no tailored training available for Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) Directors. JSRCs do not exercise with rescue forces or live isolated personnel (simulated). Training for Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) and JSRC staffs is insufficient. As examples, JSRC staffs lack experience working with SOF, and Airborne Mission Commanders (AMCs) lack training. Incomplete JSRC training results in a PR process that is too slow. These delays are introduced by the lack of training. Examples include JSRC Staffs that are not sufficiently trained to support isolated personnel with Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs), and threat assessments that are inaccurate. JSRC staffs are ineffectively trained in duties during mission execution, which result in JSRCs that are not responsive to dynamic situations. Rescue command and control training throughput is insufficient to sustain Theater JSRCs. There is a shortage of trained intelligence personnel who support PR. There is a lack of education regarding classified information and releasability. The lack of training makes it difficult to identify continuing interoperability problems. PR education programs are insufficient to educate combatant commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PR doctrine and joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). Multimedia training materials are not available to support PR training and curriculum development. Joint CSAR resources, planning and training need standardization throughout the components and Services. Combatant Command J-staff have insufficient CSAR expertise to advise leadership on Joint CSAR. JSRCs have a responsibility to plan for Joint CSAR but most dont because they are left out of the commands planning process. Some JSRC personnel have learned from experience how to get involved in PR planning but these skills perish with personnel turnover. Deliberate planning for CSAR and Joint CSAR reflects standardized, templated responsibilities and lacks tasks that apply directly to the intended command.

124

Shortfalls PR PRStaff StaffTraining Training Shortfalls

Training& &exercises exercisesfor forrescue rescuestaffs staffsare areinadequate inadequate Training

Trainingfor forTheater TheaterPR PRplanners, planners,JSRC/RCC JSRC/RCCstaffs staffsand anddirectors directors Training is insufficient is insufficient JSRCsdo donot notexercise exercisewith withrescue rescueforces forcesor orlive liveisolated isolated JSRCs personnel personnel RescueC2 C2training trainingis isinsufficient insufficientto tosustain sustainTheater TheaterJSRCs JSRCs Rescue PReducation educationprograms programsare areinsufficient insufficientto toeducate educatecombatant combatant PR commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PRdoctrine doctrine commanders, their staffs, and DoD components on PR andJoint JointTTP TTP and

CombatantCommand CommandJ-staff J-staffhave haveinsufficient insufficientCSAR CSARexpertise expertiseto to Combatant advise leadership on Joint CSAR advise leadership on Joint CSAR

Multimediatraining trainingmaterials materialsare arenot notavailable availableto tosupport supportPR PRtraining training Multimedia and curriculum development and curriculum development JointCSAR CSARresources, resources,planning planningand andtraining trainingneed needstandardization standardization Joint throughout the components and Services throughout the components and Services

125

SHORTFALLS ISOLATED PERSONNEL TRAINING

While Level A training on the Code of Conduct is provided at a number of locations to everyone entering the military, it is strictly academic, and has limited practical application, since the training is not procedural in nature. It serves more as an educational foundation. Level B training throughput requirements remain largely undefined. The recent development and distribution of video presentations for minimum Level B training provide an interim basis for program development and implementation; however, a process for fully identifying the types and numbers of personnel requiring Level B training is lacking. According to JPRA and the SERE school staffs, the multimedia training materials currently available are not sufficient to support SERE training. Together, the Services and JPRA provide an excellent set of training courses on survival, evasion, and resistance for a good variety of environments and situations. The Services and JPRA acknowledge that practical training and exercises on escape techniques and procedures are lacking, and practical exercises on recovery procedures for both conventional and unconventional recovery methods are inadequate. Conventional recovery training is limited by the high cost and limited availability of recovery forces. Students at the SERE schools do not get an opportunity to train with actual PR forces or command and control elements, which has an impact on interoperability during actual PR operations. There are a number of significant challenges to synchronizing training for all three PR force elements. The most rigorous level of training, C, is also the most resource intensive. It builds on the lower levels of training with field scenarios that stress the potential isolated person and subject him/her to conditions replicating those found in actual PR situations. Several aspects combine to lower its priority in resourcing. It is focused on sub-communities within the services. Requirements are hard to quantify, as the training is an insurance policy that many ought to have, but few will have to use. When faced with must-have or good to have decisions, the farther removed from those specific sub-communities, the lower on the priority list the training.

126

Shortfalls Isolated IsolatedPersonnel PersonnelTraining Training Shortfalls

LevelA ACode Codeof ofConduct ConductTraining Training Level Marginalvalue valueadded added Marginal LevelB BTraining Training Level Requirementsfor fortraining trainingare areill-defined ill-defined Requirements 13-hourvideo videoset setis isan aninterim interimsolution solutionwith withlimited limited 13-hour educationalutility utility educational Permanentsolution solutionis isundefined undefinedand andunfunded unfunded Permanent LevelC CTraining Training Level TheServices Servicesand andJPRA JPRAhave havelimited limitedcapacity capacity The Escapeand andRecovery Recoverytraining trainingis islacking lacking Escape Isolatedpersonnel personneldo donot nottrain trainwith withPR PRforces forcesor orstaffs staffs Isolated Interagencydoes doesnot nothave haveisolated isolatedpersonnel personneltraining training Interagency capability capability Dependenton onDoD DoD Dependent
Limitedby by manpowerand andfunding funding Limited manpower

127

SHORTFALLS SERE TRAINING CAPACITY

The total throughput of the DoD Level C SERE schools is about 8,500 students per year. Current capacity satisfies about 67 percent of the total DoD requirement, leaving a shortfall of roughly 4,100 training slots annually. This shortfall does not address the significant backlog of untrained SOF and aviation personnel that already exists in the Services, and which grows daily. As previously indicated on page 104, the IDA study team estimates the total requirement for DoDs wartime Level C SERE training at about 12,600 students per year. SOCOM and the Army have determined that the requirements for wartime and PGD/HD resistance training are roughly the same. If all Services apply the same standard, then the total requirement for DoDs peacetime Level C PGD/HD resistance training is also about 12,300 students per year. The total throughput of the JPRA and Navy Level C PGD/HD resistance schools is about 1,100 students per year. Current capacity satisfies only 9 percent of the estimated DoD requirement, leaving a shortfall of roughly 11,200 training slots annually. It is important to note that these shortfalls are for uniformed military personnel in the aviation and special operations career fields. Any requirements for other military career fields determined to be high risk, as well as similar DoD civilian, DoD contractor, and USG occupations (such as aviation) must be considered as added shortfalls over and above those listed on the chart.

128

Shortfalls SERE SERETraining TrainingCapacity Capacity Shortfalls

WartimeLevel LevelC CSERE SERETraining Training Wartime

Service/Component Service/Component
Army Army Navy Navy Air Force Air Force Marine Corps Marine Corps

Backlog Backlog
10,500 10,500 240 240 18 18 1,200 1,200

AnnualShortfall Shortfall Annual

3,340 3,340 70 70 340 340 300 300

PeacetimeDetention/Hostage Detention/HostageLevel LevelC CResistance ResistanceTraining Training Peacetime

Service/Component Service/Component
Army Army Navy Navy Air Force Air Force Marine Corps Marine Corps

Backlog Backlog
14,000 14,000 15,520 15,520 16,000 16,000 1,200 1,200

AnnualShortfall Shortfall Annual

4,100 4,100 2,800 2,800 4,000 4,000 300 300

129

SHORTFALLS CAPACITY
Each of the SERE schools occupies permanent facilities that are adequate for current throughput. Under the current scheme of class scheduling, none of the schools has facility capacity (e.g., classroom, resistance training (RT) facilities) to accommodate a significant increase in throughput. Any such increase in the near term must be met by increased use of overlapping class schedules or other workarounds. Training areas are also adequate for current throughput, although constraints on their use (i.e., lease and land use agreements) place limitations on both instructional modes (e.g., limitation on pyrotechnic devices) and class sizes. Throughput at the Army SERE school is constrained to current levels by the limitations of manning, facilities, training area development, and resistance training spaces. Although, temporary surge requirements can be accommodated through scheduling adjustments, major increases in throughput demands would require equivalent investments in staffing, the available facilities, and renegotiation or extension of training area agreements. The Navy SERE school staff believe the schools maximum student load per class of 60 represents the current maximum student production level. This limitation is based on the number of interrogation huts (six at Brunswick), isolation cells (72 at Warner Springs and 62 at Brunswick), assigned manpower capabilities, equipment quantities, and classroom seating capacity (60 at North Island). Student production beyond 3,360 for both Navy SERE Schools combined would require increases in facilities, manpower, and funding. Student production beyond 4,000 for both schools would require extension of training area agreements and additional land leases. Although the Air Force SERE school is currently operating with a small manpower shortfall, the school is sustaining its throughput with increased student-to-instructor ratios. There are no constraints in meeting the currently programmed throughput because of facility limitations at the Air Force Survival School. Any increase in student production beyond 3,500 would require manning increases, and proportionate investment in base and school infrastructure, such as billeting, transportation, and training equipment. The seven training areas can handle significant increases in student throughput. JPRAs PR Academy current instructor cadre can sustain its current throughput, but cannot increase its capacity without added manpower funding. In the summer of 2003, the PR Academy will occupy its new resistance training facility, which will support significant increases in throughput. Proportionate manning is not funded.

130

Shortfalls Capacity Capacity Shortfalls

TrainingThroughput Throughput Training Facilities,ranges, ranges,and andpersonnel personnelare aresufficient sufficientfor forcurrent current Facilities, throughput throughput SEREschools schoolscan cansurge surgetemporarily, temporarily,but butcannot cannotsustain sustain SERE increases increases AllSERE SEREschools schoolshave haverecent recentor orprogrammed programmedfacility facility All improvements improvements ThroughputLimiting LimitingFactors: Factors: Throughput ARMY NAVY NAVY ARMY InstructorStaff Staff RED RED RED Instructor RED TrainingFacilities Facilities RED RED RED RED Training TrainingRanges Ranges GREEN GREENYELLOW YELLOW Training
Red: significant limitation Red: significant limitation Yellow: moderate limitation Yellow: moderate limitation Green: no limitation Green: no limitation

AIRFORCE FORCE AIR RED RED YELLOW YELLOW GREEN GREEN

JPRA JPRA RED RED GREEN GREEN N/A N/A

131

PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION ISSUE/SOLUTION

The IDA study team found that the central issue was that, within the USG interagency, planning and preparation for full spectrum PR are inadequate. There is a lack of a common PR knowledge base that includes such basic topics as definitions and terms of reference. Interagency requirements for personnel are not yet formally defined. Most USG agencies have not defined levels of risk for their people, nor identified areas of higher risk. Current PR capabilities reside primarily in DOD and do not leverage interagency capabilities. While the DoD is aware of the notion of PR by civil means, the concept is not defined or articulated beyond that notion. The military is generally unaware of what other USG agencies are operating overseas and what their capabilities are. Other government agencies do not have a clear understanding of the PR capabilities and limitations of military assets. Interagency training and equipment requirements are not defined. Because there is a significant shortfall of training capacity for DoD requirements, there is insufficient training capacity within DOD to support interagency requirements, should they ever be identified. Current equipment is inadequate. DoD has identified known equipment shortfalls, and other USG agencies are all more poorly equipped than military forces for PR. Previous PR studies support the study teams findings: 1) Training for HRC personnel is inadequate (Ref. 1, Ref. 2, Ref. 5, DPMO). HRC personnel training on EPA development is inadequate. Communications training for isolated personnel is deficient. Authentication training for isolated personnel is deficient. Survivors are too reliant on GPS. Survivors are not sufficiently trained to survive and evade. Signaling and recovery training for isolated personnel is deficient. The result of these training deficiencies is that most potential downed aircrews are not prepared. 2) Training capacity for HRC personnel is insufficient (Ref. 5, Ref. 8). There is a lack of SERE training for many DoD career fields. There is insufficient SERE training capacity. DoD civilians and contractors are not being trained. 3) Training for HRC personnel is not standardized across Services (Ref. 2, Ref. 5, and Ref. 8). SERE training is not standardized. Requirements for SERE training are inconsistently applied across the Services and Commands. The IDA study teams proposed solution is to develop a cooperative interagency environment that will promote education, awareness, and training to facilitate collaborative planning and readiness. For this interim report, the IDA study team has focused on the doctrine and training solution elements, with preliminary solutions for organizational, material, personnel, and facilities. The study team will address the DOTMLPF solution set in a comprehensive manner during the second phase of this study.

132

PRForce ForcePlanning Planningand andPreparation Preparation PR Issue/Solution Issue/Solution

Issue: Within Withinthe theUSG, USG,planning planningand andpreparation preparationfor forFull Full Issue: SpectrumPR PRare areinadequate inadequate Spectrum Thelack lackof ofaacommon commonPR PRknowledge knowledgebase base The Interagencyrequirements requirementsfor forPR PRare arenot notyet yetdefined defined Interagency CurrentPR PRcapabilities capabilitiesreside resideprimarily primarilyin inDOD DODand anddo donot not Current leverageinteragency interagencycapabilities capabilities leverage Thereis isinsufficient insufficienttraining trainingcapacity capacitywithin withinDOD DOD There Currentequipment equipmentis isinadequate inadequate Current Solution: Develop Developan aninteragency interagencyenvironment environmentto topromote promote Solution: education,awareness, awareness,and andtraining trainingto tofacilitate facilitatecollaborative collaborative education, planningand andreadiness readiness planning

133

PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION SOLUTION SET

At the Interagency PR workshop in February 2003, the interagency representatives made it clear that the interagency would rather use DoD PR guidance than reinvent the wheel. Based on that premise, the IDA study team recommends that DoD, led by JPRA, should provide the doctrinal foundation for an interagency PR capability. The IDA study team recognizes that PR tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) must become Joint before TTPs becomes Interagency and Coalition in nature, which has not happened yet. However, IDA recommends that JPRA continue to move doctrine and TTP along the Joint, Interagency, and Coalition vectors simultaneously. The study team also recognizes that doctrine and TTP are living products, and that current TTP does partially address the interagency void. Therefore, DoD should promulgate current Joint PR TTP to those USG agencies who have expressed a desire for guidance. Those agencies should incorporate PR TTP into their own procedural guidance. As an example, DoS should incorporate PR TTP into its EAP handbook and training courses at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). If the USG is to leverage any PR capability that resides in the Interagency, that capability must first be exercised. The IDA study team has not found any exercise venue outside DoD where Interagency assets could conduct PR training. The IDA study team has determined that unfortunately, the exercise infrastructure for PR training within DoD falls well short of its own needs, let alone interagency or coalition needs. The study team recommends that the Joint Staff begin the development of a DoD PR exercise infrastructure by establishing a set of joint mission essential tasks for PR. This Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) should reflect the requirement to operate in interagency and coalition environments. The Joint Staff should co-opt the Combatant Commands and Joint Forces Command into an effort to integrate a PR JMETL into every combatant command JMETL, integrate PR events into Master Scenario Events Lists (MSELs) for JCS-sponsored exercises, and provide resources for Joint PR exercise events. The IDA study team has determined that DoD needs to make organizational changes in order to increase its Level C SERE training capacity significantly. Since a significant increase is needed to address DoD requirements, DoD should take this opportunity to address interagency requirements as well under future re-organization efforts. U.S. Joint Forces Command should take the lead in developing a standard formal requirements definition process that accommodates all theater SERE training requirements (Levels A, B, and C) for assigned or deploying Joint forces of all Services. The Services should develop a common requirements review process that identifies and validates requirements for both combat and peacetime SERE training. Each Service should develop, validate, and implement an approved, Level C PGD/HD resistance training course (in conjunction with existing Level C combat SERE courses) to accommodate Service requirements.

134

PRForce ForcePlanning Planningand andPreparation Preparation Solution SolutionSet Set PR

Doctrine Doctrine JPRAintegrate integrateinteragency interagencyand andcoalition coalitionaspects aspectsin inthe the JPRA development of Joint PR Tactics, Techniques, and development of Joint PR Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(TTP) (TTP) Procedures DoDpromulgate promulgateJoint JointPR PRTTP TTPthroughout throughoutthe theinteragency interagency DoD JointStaff Staffensure ensureJMETLs JMETLsinclude includePR PR Joint
IncludePR PRguidance guidancein inthe theDoS DoS EmergencyAction ActionPlanning Planning Include Emergency (EAP) Handbook and training courses (EAP) Handbook and training courses PRtasks tasksshould shouldreflect reflectinteragency interagency andcoalition coalition PR and requirements requirements

Organization Organization DoDaddress addressSERE SEREtraining trainingorganizational organizationalshortfalls shortfalls DoD

Ensureadequate adequatecapacity capacityto tosupport supportinteragency interagency Ensure requirements requirements

135

PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION SOLUTION SET

The IDA study team knows that this study alone cannot chart the course for the future of PR for the Interagency community. It is essential that the leadership of the interagency understand PR, be involved in identifying the issues, and be willing to address them. In order to foster leader development and involvement, JPRA should develop a version of its PR-501 course that is tailored for the interagency and its broad scope of PR. The National Defense University (NDU) and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) should incorporate JPRAs PR-501 course into their curricula. USG agencies who have people at risk or who have PR-capable assets should participate in a regular series of Interagency PR workshops that address major areas of concern and topical issues. These interagency workshops serve as means of sharing lessons learned and best practices among interested agencies. It is clear to the IDA study team that there is a significant shortfall between requirements for, and capability to provide, PGD/HD resistance training, just within DoD. No further study is necessary to show that JPRA should resource the PR Academy to match its new facility with appropriate instructor staff in order to optimize its student throughput. Even that will be only a partial fix to the overall DoD shortfall. All of the Service SERE schools should be resourced for the manpower needed to optimize their capacity for wartime and peacetime SERE training, and JPRA and the Services should make a concerted effort to get PGD/HD resistance courses up and running at every SERE school. Once JPRA and the Services have addressed immediate critical shortfalls in PGD/HD resistance training, they should methodically expand DoDs SERE training infrastructure to address such issues as combined wartime/peacetime basic SERE training; new military Level C training requirements (e.g., USMC, NAVSPECWAR, Army aviation, Army and Navy cadets); Level C training requirements for DoD civilians and contractors; and Level C training requirements for other U.S. Government agencies

136

PRForce ForcePlanning Planningand andPreparation Preparation Solution SolutionSet Set PR

LeaderDevelopment Development Leader JPRAdevelop developan anexportable exportableSenior SeniorLeader/Manager Leader/Manager JPRA orientationpackage packagethat thataddresses addressesFull FullSpectrum SpectrumPR PR orientation NDU,FSI FSIinclude includePR PRin incurricula curricula NDU, USGagencies agenciesconduct conductinteragency-focused interagency-focusedPR PR USG Workshops (Code of Behavior, SERE, Intelligence, Workshops (Code of Behavior, SERE, Intelligence, equipment) equipment) Personnel Personnel JPRAincrease increasePR PRAcademy Academyinstructor instructorstaff staffto tomatch match JPRA facilitythroughput throughput facility Facilities Facilities DoDexpand expandSERE SEREschool schoolcapacity capacityfor forDoD DoDand andnon-DOD non-DOD DoD requirements, including DoD backlog requirements, including DoD backlog

137

PR FORCE PLANNING AND PREPARATION SOLUTION SET

Capacity shortfalls not withstanding, it is the IDA study teams assessment that SERE training for personnel at risk is the forte of DoDs PR community, and is the best PR program that DoD has to offer the Interagency. To exploit the value of the available training, it is incumbent upon the interagency community to identify those USG personnel at risk, determine the level of risk they face and the appropriate training for that risk, and provide resources to pay for their fair share of the training under the Economies Act. In addition to training for personnel at risk of isolation, capture, and exploitation, the other training components need to be addressed: training for PR forces, training for PR staffs, and training exercises. DoD needs to develop a robust training infrastructure to serve as a foundation upon which the Interagency can build a PR training program. Once this is done, then DoD should expand its joint training to include the interagency dimension, and the Interagency should participate in PR training courses and exercises. As mentioned earlier, the current DoD program of PR exercises could not be termed robust. As an interim solution, USG agencies with the resources to do so could participate in Joint Exercise Desert Rescue, an annual unitfunded exercise hosted by the Navy and devoted to PR. To complement the training of the interagency, JPRA should lead the effort to improve the PR community training within DoD on the interagency dimension of PR. JPRA should include expanded blocks of instruction on diplomatic and civil PR options in its PR-101 and PR-301 courses. As an example, JPRA should include instruction on the State Departments Emergency Action Planning (EAP) process in its PR-301 course. After USG agencies have assessed the numbers of people at risk, and the levels of that risk, then those agencies should define their PR equipment requirements to complement their training requirements. JPRA should continue to develop a Joint PR Modernization Plan. This plan will identify what DoD PR equipment is programmed for replacement, and when. As DoD replaces legacy equipment, it can be transferred to the Interagency based on identified requirements.

138

PRForce ForcePlanning Planningand andPreparation Preparation Solution SolutionSet Set PR

Training Training DoDexpand expandPR PRplay playin inexisting existingexercises, exercises,wargames, wargames,and and DoD seminarsto toinclude includeincreased increasedemphasis emphasison onIA IA seminars JPRAinclude includeDoS DoSEmergency EmergencyAction ActionPlanning Planningin inadvanced advanced JPRA PR courses PR courses USGagencies agenciesdefine defineinteragency interagencyrequirements requirementsfor forSERE SEREand and USG recoverytraining training recovery USGagencies agenciesparticipate participatein inPR PRcourses coursesand andexercises exercises USG Materiel Materiel JPRAdevelop developaaJoint JointPR PRModernization ModernizationPlan Plan JPRA USGagencies agenciesdefine defineinteragency interagencyequipment equipmentrequirements requirements USG
DoDtransfer transferlegacy legacy equipmentto toother otheragencies agencies DoD equipment

139

SERE TRAINING FACILITIES SOLUTION SET

The benefits of consolidating Level C SERE training in a Joint training establishment include consistency of instruction, potential economies of scale, a train as you fight Joint environment, and captivity/resistance training. The drawbacks include the loss of opportunity to efficiently incorporate Serviceunique training, limitations on currently available training areas, and potential loss of flexibility for a single Service to accommodate variances in instructor and student throughput requirements, and the costs associated with consolidation. The option of developing a Joint curriculum offers the same types of benefits and drawbacks (except costs) that would accompany consolidation. It is the IDA study teams assessment that the Services are migrating toward a Joint SERE course curriculum in an evolutionary fashion. The option of additional or larger Service schools might well be a fact-of-life future requirement that would likely be driven by the involvement of the Combatant Commands in determining training requirements for personnel assigned or deploying to their theaters. Any major increase in training demands would strain current throughput capacities (primarily facilities and instructor staffs) beyond the capability of the schools. The IDA study teams assessment is that lessons learned from real-world events will drive increased requirements from the Combatant Commands and the Services. The option of establishment of a Joint Training Laboratory involves the transformation of current JPRA training capabilities from a user-based focus to a trainer-based focus. Several recent initiatives by both the Services and JPRA suggest this transformation as a means of most effectively and efficiently improving the overall posture of the SERE training community. The IDA study team has seen that this is already occurring at an accelerated rate. Examples are the Navys and Armys initiatives to develop government detention/hostage detention (peacetime) resistance training programs and the new Joint Resistance Training Instructor Course. Each of these initiatives reflects a productive application of JPRAs expertise and effort toward providing support and services to the Service schools an appropriate role for the Joint agency. Similar opportunities exist in the shift of responsibility for in-depth peacetime resistance training (except narrowly focused, low-density/high-sensitivity courses that must be centrally controlled) from JPRA to the Service schools; in the development of common core training materials, such as the core captivity curriculum illustrated on the opposite page; in the development of new SERE training concepts and techniques; in a role as subject matter expert for Service self-evaluations of training; and in providing the SERE training community ready access to current and background information sources. The IDA study team agrees that JPRA must shift its user-based training capabilities to the Services in order to address the identified shortfalls and backlogs in peacetime resistance training.

140

SERETraining TrainingFacilities Facilities--Solution SolutionSet Set SERE

Prisoner Prisoner ofWar War of Terrorist Terrorist Hostage Hostage

StatusQuo Quo Status Threeseparate separatetraining training Three curriculafor forthree three curricula differentcaptivity captivity situations different situations

Peacetime Peacetime Government Government Detainee Detainee

Proposed Proposed corecurriculum curriculum AAcore forall allcaptivity captivity situations for situations

Captive Captive

141

CHAPTER VI. MISSION EXECUTION

This chapter addresses PR mission execution. This chapter focuses on roles and responsibilities within the interagency during the execution of PR missions. The chapter examines the architecture in the context of the five critical PR tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and return. The chapter discusses the baseline, the shortfalls, an interim issue, and an interim solution set. Significantly more research is needed for this area, which will be accomplished during the second-year effort.

142

ChapterVI. VI. Mission MissionExecution Execution Chapter

Baseline Baseline Rolesand andResponsibilities Responsibilities Roles MissionExecution Execution Mission Shortfalls Shortfalls InterimIssue Issue Interim InterimSolution SolutionSet Set Interim

143

BASELINE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Every USG agency bears a responsibility for recovering its own personnel. Within the DoD, this delineation includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines; each is responsible for its own, but not the others they work with. While this is appropriate in principal, in practice it leads to inefficiencies and because of a lack of sufficient resources, eventually to gaps in capability. PR dependencies are as varied as the agencies within the USG. They vary across the spectrum from fully external dependencies to fully internal dependencies. Examples of points on the spectrum of power bases include the following: External The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) largely depends on Host Nation support for PR; Internal International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (DoS/INL) depends on its own organic assets (helicopters) for PR support during counter-narcotics and law enforcement operations. The DoD has thoroughly delineated PR methods for itself, as described Chapter I. DoD doctrine discusses PR options outside the DoD only in concept. DoD doctrine does not address diplomatic and civil methods. This lack of information denies DoD needed visibility into the interagency PR process. PR is not institutionalized as a process in other USG agencies. Many agencies take a crisis action or task force approach to resolving incidents that involve isolated, lost, or captive personnel. Under this approach, PR methods tend to be personality-driven by members of the task force. As such, some of these methods are derivative of DoD methods, since task force members with prior military experience tend to draw upon those experiences.

144

Baseline Roles Rolesand andResponsibilities Responsibilities Baseline

Everyagency agencybears bearsaaresponsibility responsibilityfor forrecovering recoveringits itsown own Every personnel personnel IncludingArmy, Army,Navy, Navy,Air AirForce, Force,and andMarines Marines Including PRdependencies dependenciesare areas asvaried variedas asthe theagencies agencies PR Acrossthe thespectrum spectrumfrom fromfully fullyexternal externalto tofully fullyinternal internal Across DoDhas hasthoroughly thoroughlydelineated delineatedPR PRmethods methodsfor foritself itself DoD DoDdoctrine doctrinediscusses discussesPR PRmethods methodsoutside outsideDoD DoDonly onlyin in DoD concept concept

DoDdoctrine doctrinedoes does notaddress addressdiplomatic diplomatic andcivil civil methods DoD not and methods

PRnot notinstitutionalized institutionalizedas asaaprocess processin inother otherUSG USGagencies agencies PR Manyagencies agenciestake takeaacrisis crisisaction actionor ortask taskforce forceapproach approach Many
Somemethods methods arederivative derivativeof ofDoD DoDmethods methods Some are

145

BASELINE MISSION EXECUTION RESPONSIBILITIES

The IDA study team has identified two extreme scenarios where the outcomes have proven to be significantly different in recent cases. In the first scenario, the authority to execute PR missions in support of U.S. citizens is fragmented between the host nation and the State Department, and U.S. PR forces are not immediately available to execute PR missions. PR results have been unsuccessful in recent cases of this scenario in Colombia and the Philippines. In the second scenario, The Combatant Commander has clear authority to execute PR missions in support of USG personnel, and U.S. PR forces are available to execute PR missions immediately. PR results have been very good in recent cases of this scenario in Afghanistan and Iraq.

146

Baseline Mission MissionExecution ExecutionResponsibilities Responsibilities Baseline

Responsibilitiesfor forthe theexecution executionof ofPR PRmissions missionsdepend dependon onthe the Responsibilities scenario scenario Scenario11 Countriessuch such asColombia Colombiaand and Bosnia, wherethere thereis is Scenario Countries as Bosnia, where a U.S. mission, but there are no U.S. PR forces, and PR aresponsibilities U.S. mission, but there are no U.S. PR forces, and PRare ofthe the host nation and the U.S.mission mission responsibilities of host nation and the U.S. are fragmented fragmented Coordination process is not understood
Coordination process is not understood DoS has some responsibility, but no capability, DoD might execute the DoS has some responsibility, but no capability, DoD might execute the mission after request is coordinated and PR forces are deployed mission after request is coordinated and PR forces are deployed When a PR incident occurs, coordination must be done in real-time, and When PR incident occurs, coordination must be done in real-time, and coulda be ad hoc, causing an excessive delay could be ad hoc, causing an excessive delay

Scenario22 Combattheaters theaterssuch suchas asAfghanistan Afghanistanand andIraq, Iraq,when when Scenario Combat there is no U.S. Mission, there are U.S. PR forces, and PR is a there is no U.S. Mission, there are U.S. PR forces, and PR is a militaryresponsibility responsibility military

Isolated personnel are likely to be captured or killed by the time coordination is Isolated done personnel are likely to be captured or killed by the time coordination is done

The PR Commander and staff (e.g., JSRC, RCC) have the authority and The PR Commander (e.g.,without JSRC, real-time RCC) have the authority and the capability to executeand PR staff missions coordination above capability to execute PR missions without real-time coordination above the Joint Task Force level Joint Task Force level

147

ILLUSTRATIVE BASELINE COORDINATION OF PR MISSION EXECUTION

This is an organization chart showing illustrative coordination relationships that could coordinate for rescue in a region where there is a U.S. Mission, but with is no dedicated PR capability in place. Real-world examples include Columbia, The Philippines, Indonesia, and Bosnia. The chart shows representative channels for coordination for diplomatic, military, and civil PR options. The chart also shows the organizations, as well as the illustrative coordination relationships between those organizations, with regard to PR. The chart is banded into three levels: strategic/national; operational; and tactical. Organizations operating on the strategic/national level typically plan for months to years; operational level organizations plan for the mid-term weeks to months; and tactical level organizations typically plan for the short term minutes to hours. During an isolated personnel incident, State Department headquarters support for a diplomatic recovery effort would center on the regional desk for the region. The regional desk officer would be supported by the Crisis Management Support (CMS) center and the Pol-Mil Action Team (PMAT). The Political-Military Bureau (POL-MIL) within the State Department is the primary coordination channel through which the DoS and DoD communicate. Within the State Departments headquarters, there is a PolMil Action Team (PMAT) center that is manned around-theclock to provide diplomatic and political support for ongoing military operations. The PMAT Mission is to coordinate diplomatic support around-the-clock for world-wide U.S. deployments. Every overseas U.S. embassy and consulate has a Consular Affairs Overseas Citizens Services (CA/OCS) office. This office becomes the focal point for diplomatic expertise during an isolated personnel situation in the respective region. For matters of national security, the national architecture is headed by the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is supported by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), DoD, and others. The U.S. Coast Guard monitors and coordinates worldwide operations from a command center within its headquarters. Dayto-day responsibility for these Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs) is tasked to the Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs) and fourteen District Commands. These commands coordinate with the RCCs of other nations responsible for adjoining SRRs.

148

IllustrativeBaseline BaselineCoordination Coordinationof ofPR PRMission MissionExecution Execution Illustrative

Executive Executive Support Group Support Group NSC NSC Situation Room Situation Room DCI DCI

DoS DoS Regional Desk Regional Desk CMS PMAT CMS PMAT Host Host Nation Nation

DIA DIA

NMCC NMCC JFCOM JFCOM JPRA JPRA

STRATEGIC/ STRATEGIC/ NATIONAL NATIONAL

DPMO DPMO (PRRC) (PRRC) USCG USCG Command Command Center Center Host Host Nation Nation

U.S. U.S. Mission Mission (Ambassador) (Ambassador) CA/OCS CA/OCS

OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL
CC/JFC CC/JFC

Area/ Area/ District District RCC RCC

SRR SRR RCC RCC

JSRC JSRC RCC RCC 1. 1. 2. 2. Coordinate with U.S. Coordinate with U.S. Mission and Host Nation Mission and Host Nation Execute Mission Execute Mission Report Report Locate Locate Support Support Recover Recover Return Return UARCC UARCC

TACTICAL TACTICAL

149

ILLUSTRATIVE BASELINE COORDINATION OF PR MISSION EXECUTION (WITHOUT A U.S. MISSION)

This is an organization chart coordination relationships that would be rescue in a region when there is no U.S. DoD PR capability in place. Real-world showing illustrative used to coordinate for Mission, but there is a examples include Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. The functions and relationships of the organizations shown are similar to those shown on the previous slide.

150

IllustrativeBaseline BaselineCoordination Coordinationof ofPR PRMission MissionExecution Execution Illustrative (without a U.S. Mission)
(without a U.S. Mission)
DCI DCI Executive Executive Support Group Support Group NSC NSC Situation Room Situation Room

DoS DoS Regional Desk Regional Desk CMS PMAT CMS PMAT

DIA DIA

NMCC NMCC JFCOM JFCOM JPRA JPRA

STRATEGIC/ STRATEGIC/ NATIONAL NATIONAL

DPMO DPMO (PRRC) (PRRC)

OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL
CC/JFC CC/JFC

JSRC JSRC RCC RCC 1. 1. Execute Mission Execute Mission Report Report Locate Locate Support Support Recover Recover Return Return (No real-time interagency (No real-time interagency coordination required) coordination required) UARCC UARCC

TACTICAL TACTICAL

151

MISSION EXECUTION - SHORTFALLS

In many countries around the world, DoD does not have PR forces in place, and DoD PR commanders and staffs do not have authority to unilaterally execute PR missions. In these countries, execution of PR missions to recover USG personnel is not precoordinated. Thus, coordination for PR must be accomplished in real-time once an incident occurs. This coordination is done ad hoc. Other government agencies face the same technical and resource challenges as the DoD. Detection, identification, location, authentication, and communication with isolated personnel in remote areas and non-permissive environments is technically difficult and expensive. The speed and range limitations of recovery assets affect response time and coverage for PR incidents. USG agency recovery assets lack the ability to operate in any environment at any time.

152

MissionExecution Execution--Shortfalls Shortfalls Mission

Inthe theabsence absenceof ofDoD DoDPR PRcapability, capability,PR PRis isnot notprepre In coordinated,and andthe thecoordination coordinationprocess processis isnot notunderstood understood coordinated, Real-timecoordination coordinationis isad adhoc hocand andtime-consuming time-consuming Real-time Isolatedpersonnel personnelmay maybe becaptured capturedor orkilled killedwhile whilemission missionis is Isolated being coordinated or PR forces are being deployed being coordinated or PR forces are being deployed Othergovernment governmentagencies agenciesface facethe thesame sametechnical technical Other challengesas asDoD DoD challenges Reporting,identifying, identifying,locating, locating,& &authenticating authenticatingisolated isolated Reporting, personnelin inremote remotelocations locationsand andnon-permissive non-permissive personnel environmentsis isdifficult difficult environments Speed& &range rangeof ofrecovery recoveryassets assetsis islimited limited Speed Limitedrecovery recoverycapability capabilityin inextreme extremeenvironments environments Limited

153

MISSION EXECUTION INTERIM ISSUE

The key issue regarding the execution of PR missions is a lack of defined roles, responsibilities, and authority for USG organizations that have the potential for involvement. While there are many cells throughout the USG that can contribute to PR, their PR roles and responsibilities are ad hoc, and their relationships are informal. Many relationships are personalitybased, but such relationships break down when people rotate out of assignments or duties. Most cells (including formal PR organizations, such as Joint Search and Rescue Centers) are not effectively organized or networked for coordination and collaboration in joint, inter-agency, and coalition operations and environments. Coordination among USG agencies is not institutionalized, formalized, codified, or published. There are few representatives to liaison between agencies. There is a lack of understanding of other government agencies missions, cultures, and PR needs. Points-of-entry into other government agencies and suitable PR assets of other agencies are not well understood or widely known. Many USG agencies outside the Defense Department have a false perception that the Defense Department is always there to fall back on as the PR cavalry. The Defense Department, however, does not deliberately plan to provide PR support to the entire USG. DoD has created a more complex organization and command and control (C2) structure than other USG agencies. This is understandable, given the size of the DoD relative to other agencies. Other agencies tend to have a more vertical and more straightforward organizational structure. There is almost no command and control relationships between USG agencies. Most of the lateral relationships are coordination channels, even within the DoD. This condition results in a command and control structure that is very vertical in nature; relationships are stovepipes rather than networks.

154

MissionExecution Execution Interim InterimIssue Issue Mission

Issue: The Theroles, roles,responsibilities, responsibilities,and andauthority authorityin inUSG USG Issue: agenciesto toexecute executePR PRare arenot notwell welldefined definedor orunderstood understood agencies Interagency/civilcommand commandand andcontrol controlappears appearsto tobe be Interagency/civil informal,ad adhoc, hoc,and andrelationship-based relationship-based informal, ThePR PRcoordination coordinationprocess processamong amongUSG USGagencies agenciesis isnot not The codifiedor orpublished published codified Someagencies agencieshave haveunrealistic unrealisticexpectations expectationsof ofDoD DoDto to Some conductPR PRfor fortheir theirpersonnel personnelwhen whenneeded needed conduct DoDPR PRC2 C2is iscomplex complex DoD

155

INTERIM DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET

The DoD PR community has developed a number of low-cost tools for PR that require a modicum of training and financial investment for personnel at risk to be able to employ properly to improve their chances of being recovered from an isolation event. These tools include Isolated Personnel Reports (ISOPREPs), Evasion Plans of Action (EPAs), Evasion Charts (EVCs), blood chits, and pointee-talkees. ISOPREPs allow PR forces to authenticate isolated personnel. EPAs advise PR staffs and forces on the intentions of isolated personnel. Personnel at risk carry EVCs, blood chits, and pointee-talkees with them for use in case they are isolated. Interagency personnel at risk would provide their ISOPREPs and EPAs to their respective PR liaison officers to establish the linkage to the DoD PR architecture. The DoD could leverage the inherent PR capability of interagency assets through interagency liaison officers, serving as the coordination link to other USG agencies that have PR-capable assets within an area of interest. To mitigate risk, DoD should develop joint doctrine on the appropriate use of interagency assets in various operational environments.

156

InterimDOTMLPF DOTMLPFSolution SolutionSet Set Interim

Doctrine Doctrine DoDshould shouldmake makeavailable availableto toUSG USGagencies agenciesstandard standardtools tools DoD suchas: as:ISOPREPs, ISOPREPs,EPAs, EPAs,EVCs, EVCs, blood bloodchits, chits,and andpointeepointeesuch talkees, etc. talkees, etc. DoDshould shoulddevelop developjoint jointdoctrine doctrinefor forintegration integrationof of DoD interagencyPR PRcapability capabilityto toreduce reducethe thenear-real-time near-real-time interagency coordination coordination Organization Organization DoDshould shouldintegrate integrateinteragency interagencyliaison liaisonofficers officersinto intoDoD DoDPR PR DoD commandand andcontrol controlarchitecture architecture command

157

INTERIM DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET

The most critical tasks for recovery forces are locating and communicating with isolated personnel. Communications usable in remote areas, such as satellite phones, and navigation tools, such as GPS receivers, can greatly improve an isolated persons chances of recovery. Interagency personnel at risk should have these tools, and be trained to use them. To be effective, USG agencies would also have to train their personnel at risk to properly use ISOPREPs, EPAs, EVCs, blood chits, and pointeetalkees to enhance their ability to survive, evade, and be recovered. In order to make interagency liaison officers effective coordinators for PR, JPRA should train them in accordance with joint doctrine to act as effective links between interagency isolated personnel, interagency recovery assets, and DoD PR command and control architecture.

158

InterimDOTMLPF DOTMLPFSolution SolutionSet Set Interim

Training Training USGagencies agenciesshould shouldtrain trainpersonnel personnelat atrisk riskto touse use USG ISOPREPs,EPAs, EPAs,EVCs, EVCs,blood bloodchits, chits,pointee-talkees, pointee-talkees,and and ISOPREPs, location, identification, authentication, and communication location, identification, authentication, and communication means means JPRAshould shouldtrain traininteragency interagencyliaison liaisonofficers officersto tointegrate integrateinto into JPRA DoDPR PRcommand commandand andcontrol controlstructure structure DoD Material Material USGagencies agenciesshould shouldprovide providepersonnel personnelat atrisk riskwith withEVCs, EVCs, USG bloodchits, chits,pointee-talkees, pointee-talkees,satellite satellitephones, phones,and andGPS GPS blood receivers receivers

159

INTERIM DOTMLPF SOLUTION SET

USG agencies will not be able to commit limited resources to the manpower, material, and training needed to improve their PR capability if their leadership does not understand the issues, and the need to address them. JPRA should educate the leadership within the USG and enhance their awareness through exportable courses, such as PR-101 and PR-501. USG agencies should identify qualified personnel who could serve as interagency liaison officers to DoD. Liaison officers would enhance interagency coordination of PR, leverage the use of PR-capable interagency assets, and facilitate the recovery of interagency isolated personnel.

160

InterimDOTMLPF DOTMLPFSolution SolutionSet Set Interim

LeaderDevelopment Development Leader JPRAshould shouldeducate educateUSG USGagency agencyleadership leadershipon onPR PR JPRA shortfalls,issues, issues,and andsolutions solutions shortfalls, Personnel Personnel USGagencies agenciesshould shouldprovide provideliaison liaisonofficers officersto toDoD DoDPR PR USG Commandersand andstaff staff Commanders FacilitiesNo Nochanges changesrecommended recommended Facilities

161

MISSION EXECUTION INTERIM SOLUTION SET

The IDA study team is planning to conduct case studies of recent interagency PR incidents in Colombia and Afghanistan to identify positive and negative factors that influence the execution of missions to recover interagency personnel.

162

MissionExecution Execution Interim InterimSolution SolutionSet Set Mission

IDAwill willconduct conductcase casestudies studiesof ofrecent recentinteragency interagency IDA personnelrecovery recoveryincidents incidentsto toidentify identifypositive positiveand and personnel negativefactors factorsthat thatinfluence influencethe theexecution executionof ofmissions missionsto to negative recoverinteragency interagencypersonnel personnel recover Colombia Colombia Afghanistanand andIraq Iraq Afghanistan

163

REFERENCES

STUDIES Joint Combat Search & Rescue Joint Test Evaluation, sponsored by OUSD (AT&L) DTSE&E/T&E, 1994-1999. Combat Search & Rescue Requirements Study, sponsored by Joint Combat Rescue Agency, Veda Corporation, 1999. US Central Command Personnel Recovery C3I Architecture, sponsored by ASD (C3I), TRW, Incorporated, 1998. Combat Search & Rescue Analysis of Alternatives, sponsored by HQ Air Combat Command/DR, Pioneer Technologies Corporation, 2001. 5. Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Defense POW/Missing Persons Office, 1999-2001. 6. Mission Area Analysis (MAA) and Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for Personnel Accounting and Recovery, ANSER, October 2000. 7. Joint Combat Search & Rescue Mission Area Analysis, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Tate, Incorporated, June 2001. 8. Survival, Evasion, Resistance & Escape and Code of Conduct Training Assessment, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, 2000-2001. 9. Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Manpower Study, sponsored by Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Tate, Incorporated, March 2002. 10. Improving Personnel Recovery in a Coalition Environment, Dr. Mike Burlein, Project Leader, Lt Gen Devol Brett, USAF (Ret.), Mr. Robert B. Mohan, Institute for Defense Analyses. IDA Paper P-3705 Log: H 02-000207, May 2002. 11. Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Personnel Recovery A National Imperative, Dr. Anil Joglekar, Project Leader, MG (Ret) Dave Baratto, Mr. Robert Mohan, RADM (Ret) Sam Packer, Lt Gen (Ret) Devol Brett, Dr. Dave Spalding, CAPT (Ret) Jim Doherty, Mr. Ken Pribyla, Mr. John Sandoz. Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA Document D-2775 Log: H02-001902/1, October 2002. 1. 2. 3. 4.

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STATUTORY AND POLICY DOCUMENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Title 10, U.S. Code, Subtitle A General Military Law, Chapter II Personnel, Part 76 Missing Persons. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) 12 August 1949. House Appropriations Committee Report, 107th Congress, Second Session, 2002 Defense Appropriations Bill. National Security Presidential Directive 1, Organization of the National Security Council System. February 13 2001. National Security Presidential Directive 12, United States Citizens Taken Hostage Abroad. 18 February 2002. Presidential Decision Directive 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations. May 1997. Presidential Decision Directive 29, Security Policy Coordination. 27 September 1994. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. 18 November 1988. Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum of Agreement Concerning DoD-CIA Mutual Support in Policy, Research and Development, Training, Planning, and Operations for Personnel Recovery. (U) 17 July 1998.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOCUMENTS 1. Department of Defense Instruction 1000.1, Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions. with changes (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 June, 1991). 2. DoD Directive 1300.7, Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 8 December 2000). 3. Department of Defense Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000). 4. DoD Instruction 2310.3, Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Procedures. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 June 1997). 5. DoD Directive 5110.10, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO). (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 16 July 1993. 6. Contingency Planning Guidance 7. Defense Planning Guidance 8. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense, Top Ten Priorities, 17 September 2002.

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JOINT DOCUMENTS AND DOCTRINE 1. 2. 3. 4. CJCSI 2410.01B - Guidance for the Exercise of Right-Of-Assistance Entry, 1 May 2001. CJCSI 3010.02A Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, 15 April 2001. CJCSI 3100.01A - Joint Strategic Planning System, 1 September 1999. CJCSI 3121.02 - Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States, 31 May 2000. 5. CJCSI 3137.01B - The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process, 15 April 2002. 6. CJCSI 3170.01B - Requirements Generation System, 15 April 2001. 7. CJCSI 3180.01 - Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processes for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, 31 October 2002. 8. CJCSI 5123.01A - Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 08 March 2001 9. CJCSM 3500.04B, Universal Joint Task List, Version 4.0, October 1999. 10. Joint Vision 2020, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC: US GPO, June 2000. 11. JP 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 9 January 2003 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001) 12. JP 3-50.2 Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) -- 26-Jan-96 13. JP 3-50.21 JTTP for Combat Search and Rescue -- 23-Mar-98 14. JP 3-50.3 Joint Doctrine for Evasion and Recovery -- 6-Sep-96 15. JS Guide 5260 - Service Member's Personal Protection Guide: A Self-Help Handbook to Combat Terrorism While Overseas, 01 April 2000 MULTI-SERVICE DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS 1. FM 90-18/FMFRP 2-70/MACP 64-3/ACCP 50-51/CI M16120.8/ USAFEP 50-51/PAC AFP 50-52, Multi-Service Procedures for CSAR (rescinded) 2. AFM 200-3/FM 21-77A/NWP 43(A), Joint Worldwide E&E Manual (rescinded, superceded by 3-50.3) 3. FM 21-76-1/MCRP 3-02H/NWP 3-50.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.26, Multi-Service Procedures for Survival, Evasion, & Recovery

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ARMY DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Field Manual 1-111, Aviation Brigade (Appendix D, CSAR) Army Regulation 525-90, CSAR Procedures Field Manual 3-50.2, CSAR (draft) Field Manual 3-05.231, Special Forces Personnel Recovery (draft) USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery

NAVY DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS 1. Naval Warfare Pub 19-2, Navy CSAR Supplement MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS 1. FMFM 5-70, MAGTF Aviation Planning (Chapter 9, TRAP) AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENTS 1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, CSAR EXERCISE AND TEST REPORTS 1. JCSAR WOODLAND COUGAR 97, End-to-End Test Report, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, August 1998. 2. JCSAR CURRENT CAPABILITY, SURFACE-BASED C4I, TEST REPORT, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, August 1998. 3. JCSAR ENHANCED CAPABILITY, TEST REPORT, Prepared By: JCSAR Joint Test Force, Assisted By: SENTEL Corporation, Joint Combat Search and Rescue, Joint Test and Evaluation, March 1999.

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APPENDIXA A APPENDIX ACRONYMS ACRONYMS

APPENDIX A ACRONYMS
ABCCC AC2ISRC ACC ACT ACTD AEF AEW AFB AFRES AFSOC AFSOF AIRNORTH AIRSOUTH AMC ANG ANGB AOA AOB AOC AOG AOR AOS ARCT ARL ARSOC ASD Airborne Command, Control, and Communications Aerospace Command & Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance Center Air Combat Command Aircrew Coordination Training Advanced Concept & Technology Demonstration Air Expeditionary Force Airborne Early Warning Air Force Base Air Force Reserves Air Force Special Operations Command Air Force Special Operations Forces Air Forces, Northern Region Air Forces, Southern Region Airborne Mission Commander Air National Guard Air National Guard Base Analysis of Alternatives Air Order of Battle Air Operations Center Air Operations Group Area of Responsibility Air Operations Squadron Air Refueling Control Time Army Reconnaissance-Low Army Special Operations Command Assistant Secretary of Defense

A-1

ATAF ATO ATO/ITO ATP AWACS AWFC BCAOC C2 C2ISR C2TIG C2WS C3I C4I C4ISR CAF CAOC CA/OCS CAP CARD CAS CASEVAC CAX CBT CC/JCF CENTAF CENTCOM CFACC CFC CG00

Allied Tactical Air Force Air Tasking Order Air Tasking Order/Integrated Tasking Order Allied Tactical Publication Airborne Warning and Control System Air Warfare Center Balkans Combined Air Operations Center Command and Control Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Command and Control Training and Innovation Group Command and Control Warrior School Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Combat Air Forces Combined Air Operations Center Consular Affairs/Oversea Citizens Services (DoS) Combat Air Patrol Cost Analysis and Research Division (IDA) Close Air Support Casualty Evacuation Computer-Aided Exercise Computer Based Training Component Commander/Joint Force Commander Central Command Air Forces Central Command Combined Force Air Component Commander Combined Force Commander Cobra Gold 2000

A-2

CIA CINC CINCPAC CJCS CJCSI CJCSM CJTF CMS CNO COBRA CoC CoM COMACC COMCENTAF COMPACAF COMSEC COMSOUTHAF COMUSAFE CONOPS CONPLAN CONUS COS CPA CPG CPX CRCC CRD CSAF CSAR CSAREX CSARTF

Central Intelligence Agency Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual Combined Joint Task Force Crisis Management Support (DoS) Chief of Naval Operations Collection of Broadcasts from Remote Assets Code of Conduct Chief of Mission Commander, Air Combat Command Commander, Central Command Air Forces Commander, Pacific Air Forces Communications Security Commander, Southern Command Air Forces Commander, United States Air Forces Europe Concepts of Operations Concept Plan Continental United States Chief of Staff Chairmans Program Assessment Contingency Planning Guidance Command Post Exercise Combined Rescue Coordination Center Capstone Requirements Document Chief of Staff Air Force Combat Search and Rescue Combat Search and Rescue Exercise Combat Search and Rescue Task Force

A-3

CSEL CSRC CTAPS CTF DA DAR DART DASD(POW/MPA) DIA DCI DEA DoDD DO DOC DoD DoDI DoHS DoJ DoS DoT DOTr DOTMLPF DPG DPMO DSN DTSE&E DUSD DUSD(AS&C) E&E

Combat Survivor Evader Locator Combined Search and Rescue Center Contingency Theater Automated Planning System Combined Task Force Department of the Army Designated Area for Recovery Downed Aircraft Recovery Team (DoD) and Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Prisoners of War/Missing Personnel Affairs) Defense Intelligence Agency Director of Central Intelligence Drug Enforcement Administration Department of Defense Directive Director of Operations Desired Operational Capabilities Department of Defense Department of Defense Instruction Department of Homeland Security Department of Justice Department of State Department of Transportation Department of the Treasury Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, Facilities Defense Planning Guidance Defense POW and Missing Personnel Affairs Office Defense Switched Network Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems & Concepts Escape and Evasion

A-4

E&R EA EAF EAI EAP ESC EFX ELT EPA EPIRB EUCOM EVC FAC FAO FASOTRAGRULANT FASOTRAGRUPAC FBI FEST FID FLETC FLIR FS FSI FTX FY GOB GSA GWOT GWP

Evasion and Recovery Executive Agent Expeditionary Air Forces Executive Agent Instruction Emergency Action Plan (DoS) Electronic Systems Command Expeditionary Force Experiment Emergency Location Transmitter Evasion Plan of Action Emergency Position Indication Radio Beacon European Command Evasion Chart Forward Air Control Forward Air Operations Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group, Atlantic Fleet Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Pacific Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Emergency Support Team Foreign Internal Defense Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Forward Looking Infrared Fighter Squadron Foreign Service Institute, renamed National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) Field Training Exercise Fiscal Year Ground Order of Battle General Services Administration Global War on Terrorism Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War

A-5

HD HHR HHQ HLD HLS HN HQ HRC IAMSAR IAW ICAP ICAO ICSAR ID IDA IDCAOC I-FOR IGO IMO IO IO/IW IP ISA ISOPREP ISR ITO IW JAC2C

High Demand Hand Held Radio Higher Headquarters Homeland Defense Homeland Security Host Nation Headquarters High Risk of Capture International Aviation and Maritime Search and Rescue In Accordance With Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy (GSA) International Civil Aviation Organization International Civil Search and Rescue Identification Institute for Defense Analyses Interim Deployable Combined Air Operations Center Implementation Forces Inter-Governmental Organization International Maritime Organization Information Operations Information Operations/Information Warfare Isolated Personnel International Security Affairs Isolated Personnel Report Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integrated Tasking Order Information Warfare Joint Air Command & Control Course

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JAWP JCET JCRA JCS JCSAR JEFX JFC JFACC JFC JFCOM JFSOCC JIACG JIATF JIC JIMP JMETL JP JPRA JPO JRCC JROC JS JSOTF JSRC JSTARS JT&E JTF JTIMS JV2020 JWCA JWE

Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (IDA) Joint-Combined Exchange Training Joint Combat Rescue Agency Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Combat Search and Rescue Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment Joint Force Commander Joint Force Air Component Commander Joint Force Commander Joint Forces Command Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander Joint Interagency Coordination Group Joint Inter-Agency Task Force Joint Intelligence Center Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan Joint Mission Essential Task List Joint Publication Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Joint Program Office Joint Rescue Coordination Center Joint Requirements Oversight Council Joint Staff Joint Special Operations Task Force Joint Search and Rescue Center Joint Surveillance, Tracking, and Reconnaissance System Joint Test and Evaluation Joint Task Force Joint Training Information Management System Joint Vision 2020 Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Joint Warfighting Experiment

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KCRCC K-FOR KTO LD LD/HD LNO LOC LOC/ID LOS LPD LPE LPI MAGTF MAJCOM MARLO MAS MC MCAS MCM MDS MEDEVAC METL MEU MEU(SOC) MIJI MOA MOOTW MOU

Korean Combined Rescue Coordination Center Kosovo Forces Korean Theater of Operations Low Density Low Density/High Demand Liaison Officer Location Location and Identification Line-Of-Sight Low Probability of Detection Low Probability of Exploitation Low Probability of Interception Marine Air Ground Task Force Major Command Marine Liaison Officer Military Agency for Standardization Mission Commander Marine Corps Air Station Multi-Command Manual Mission Designator Series Medical Evacuation Mission Essential Task List Marine Expeditionary Unit Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference Memorandum of Agreement Military Operations Other Than War Memorandum of Understanding

A-8

MPA MRC MRO MSEL MTT MTW NAR NAS NASA NATO NAVSPECWAR NCA NCO NCOIC NDU NEO NFATC NGO NIC NMCC NOB NPRA NRAS NSA NSARC NSC NSPD OAD OAF

Missing Persons Act Major Regional Contingency (preceded Major Theater War) Mass Rescue Operations Master Scenario Events List Mobile Training Team Major Theater War Non-conventional Assisted Recovery Naval Air Station National Aeronautics and Space Administration North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Special Warfare National Command Authority Non-Commissioned Officer Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge National Defense University Noncombatant Evacuation Operation National Foreign Affairs Training Center, formerly Foreign Service Institute (FSI) Non-Governmental Organization National Intelligence Center National Military Command Center Naval Order of Battle National Personnel Recovery Architecture Naval Reserve Air Station National Security Agency National Search and Rescue Committee National Security Council National Security Presidential Directive Operational Aviation Detachment Operation Allied Force

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OB OCONUS OCPP ODS OED OIC OJCS ONW OOTW OPCON OPLAN OPR OPSEC OPSTEMPO OSC OSD OSW OTH PA PACAF PACOM PCC PCS PDD PERSTEMPO PGD/HD PJ PKO PLB PLS

Order of Battle Outside Continental United States Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping (DoS) Operation Desert Storm Operational Evaluation Division (IDA) Officer-In-Charge Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Operation Northern Watch Operations Other Than War Operational Control Operation Plan Office of Primary Responsibility Operational Security Operations Tempo On-Scene Commander Office of the Secretary of Defense Operation Southern Watch Over The Horizon Public Affairs Pacific Air Forces Pacific Command Principals Coordinating Committee (NSC) Permanent Change of Station Presidential Decision Directive Personnel Tempo Peace-Time Governmental Detention/Hostage Detention Pararescue Jumper Peace Keeping Operation Personnel Locator Beacon Personnel Location System

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PMAT POC POM POW PPBS PR PRAG PRCC PRMAA PRMS PRRC PRTFG PRTWG PVO RAAF RAF RCC RECCE RESCAP RESCORT RJ RMC ROE ROK RQG RQS RSAF RT RTIC

Political Military Action Team Point of Contact Program Objective Memorandum Prisoner of War Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Personnel Recovery Personnel Recovery Advisory Group Personnel Recovery Coordination Center Personnel Recovery Mission Area Analysis Personnel Recovery Mission Software Personnel Recovery Response Cell Personnel Recovery Technology Focus Group Personnel Recovery Technology Working Group Private Volunteer Organization Royal Australian Air Force Royal Air Force Rescue Coordination Center Reconnaissance Rescue Combat Air Patrol Rescue Escort Rivet Joint Rescue Mission Commander Rules of Engagement Republic of Korea Rescue Group Rescue Squadron Royal Singapore Air Force Resistance Training Real-Time Information in the Cockpit

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SAASM SAFE SAID SAR SAR SARDO SARDOT SARIR SARLO SARNEG SARPO SARREQ SARSAT SARSIT SATCOM SCANIC SCI SCIF SCSR SE SEAD SECDEF SED SER SERE SF SFG S-FOR SFRD SHAPE

Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module Selected Area For Evasion SAFE Area Intelligence Description Search and Rescue Synthetic Aperture Radar Search and Rescue Duty Officer Search and Rescue Dot Search and Rescue Incident Report Search and Rescue Liaison Officer Search and Rescue Numeric Encryption Grid Search and Rescue Planning Officer Search and Rescue Request Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking Search and Rescue Situation Report Satellite Communications Scandinavia & Iceland Sensitive Compartmented Information Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility School for Combat Survival & Recovery Survivor-Evader Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Secretary of Defense System Evaluation Division (IDA) Survival, Evasion, and Recovery Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Special Forces Special Forces Group Stabilization Forces Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division (IDA) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

A-12

SIPRNET SIREN SMC SME SOAR SOCCENT SOCEUR SOCKOR SOCOM SOCPAC SOCSOUTH SOF SOG SOLE SO/LIC SOP SOR SOS SOUTHAF SOUTHCOM SPECAT SPINS SPO SRR SSN ST SWA TAC-EVAL TACON TBMCS

Secure Internet Protocol Router Network Secure Information Releasability Environment Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator Subject Matter Expert Special Operations Aviation Regiment Special Operations Command, Central Command Special Operations Command, Europe Special Operations Command, Korea Special Operations Command Special Operations Command, Pacific Special Operations Command, Southern Command Special Operations Forces Special Operations Group Special Operations Liaison Element Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (DoD) Standing Operating Procedure Statement of Requirements Special Operations Squadron Southern Command Air Forces Southern Command Special Category Special Instructions System Program Office Search and Rescue Region Social Security Number Special Tactics Southwest Asia Tactical Evaluation Tactical Control Theater Battle Management-Core Systems

A-13

TDY TEP TES TOA TOT TRAP TS TS/SCI TTP

Temporary Duty Theater Engagement Plan Test and Evaluation Squadron Transfer of Authority Time on Target Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel Top Secret Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

U.S. United States UAR Unconventional Assisted Recovery UARCC Unconventional Assisted Recovery Coordination Center UARM Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanism UART Unconventional Assisted Recovery Team UBS UHF Base Station UFL Ulchi Focus Lens UJTL Universal Joint Task List UK United Kingdom UNC United Nations Command USA United States of America; also United States Army USAJFKSWCS United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command USAF United States Air Force USAFE United States Air Forces Europe USCENTCOM/CENTCOM. United States Central Command USCG United States Coast Guard USD Under Secretary of Defense USD(A&T) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology USD(ISA) Under Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

A-14

USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness USEUCOM/EUCOM. United States European Command USG United States Government USFK United States Forces Korea USJFCOM/JFCOM. United States Joint Forces Command USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy USNORTHCOM/NORTHCOM United States Northern Command USNR United States Navy Reserves USPACOM United States Pacific Command USPACOM/PACOM. United States Pacific Command USOUTHCOM/SOUTHCOM United States Southern Command USSOCOM/SOCOM. United States Special Operations Command UW Unconventional Warfare WESTPAC WG WS Western Pacific Wing Weapons School

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APPENDIXB B APPENDIX GLOSSARY GLOSSARY

APPENDIX B GLOSSARY
airborne mission commander The commander serves as an airborne extension of the executing components rescue coordination center (RCC) and coordinates the combat search and rescue (CSAR) effort between the combat search and rescue task force (CSARTF) and the RCC (or joint search and rescue center) by monitoring the status of all CSARTF elements, requesting additional assets when needed, and ensuring the recovery and supporting forces arrive at their designated areas to accomplish the CSAR mission. The airborne mission commander (AMC) may be designated by the component RCC or higher authority. The AMC appoints, as necessary, an on-scene commander. Also called AMC. alliance (DoD) An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, longterm objectives that further the common interests of the members. See also coalition; multination. assistance mechanism (DoD) Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by appropriate US or multinational agencies, to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. See also evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery operations. assisted recovery (DoD) The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. See also evader. Blood chit A small piece of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. See also evasion aid. JP 1-02. Chief of Mission The senior diplomatic representative of the United States assigned by the President and residing in a country/location. Usually refers to the Ambassador, but can be lower ranking DoS official (charg d affairs, consular officer, etc.) based on locale and current policy.

B-1

coalition (DoD) An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance; multination. coalition action (DoD) Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations. coalition force (DoD) A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. combat search and rescue (DoD) A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. combat search and rescue mission coordinator (DoD) The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific combat search and rescue mission. Also called CSAR mission coordinator. See also combat search and rescue; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator. combat search and rescue task force All forces committed to a specific combat search and rescue operation to search for, locate, identify, and recover isolated personnel during wartime or contingency operations. This includes those elements assigned to provide command and control and protect the rescue vehicle from enemy air or ground attack. Also called CSARTF. combat survival (DoD, NATO) Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture. combined operation An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. component search and rescue controller (DoD) The designated search and rescue representative of a component commander of a joint force who is responsible for coordinating and controlling that components search and rescue forces. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; search and rescue; search and rescue mission coordinator.

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conventional recovery operation Evader recovery operations conducted by conventional forces. DoD civilian work force United States citizens or foreign nationals employed by the Department of Defense and paid from appropriated or non-appropriated funds under permanent or temporary arrangement. This includes employees filling full-time, parttime, intermittent, or on-call positions. Specifically excluded are Government contractors in accordance with DoD Instruction 1400.2 (refernce (d)). DoD Instruction 3020.37 (reference (e)) covers contingency and emergency planning for contractor employees. DoD Contractor Any individual, firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal non-Federal entity that enters into a contract directly with the Department of Defense to furnish services, supplies, or both, including construction. The term DoD Contractor may include U.S. nationals, local citizens, or third-country nationals, but shall not include foreign governments or representatives of foreign governments that sell to the Department of Defense, a DoD Component, or foreign corporations owned wholly by foreign governments. Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office Established by Congress in Title 10, US Code, this office is responsible for policy development and coordination with respect to prisoners of war and missing Department of Defense personnel. The office also has statutory lead authority for coordination of DoD positions within the interagency process. Doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine, joint doctrine, and multi-service doctrine. JP 1-02. Emergency Essential Civilians A civilian position located overseas or that would be transferred overseas during a crisis situation, or which requires the incumbent to perform temporary duty assignments overseas during a crisis in support of military operations. The position ensures success of combat operations or supports essential combat systems after mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. evader Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture.

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evasion (DoD) The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. See also evasion and recovery. evasion aid (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. See also; evasion; evasion and recovery; evasion chart; recovery; recovery operations. evasion and escape (DoD, NATO) The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. evasion and escape intelligence (DoD) Processed information prepared to assist personnel to escape if captured by the enemy or to evade capture if lost in enemy-dominated territory. evasion and escape net (DoD) The organization within enemy-held or hostile areas that operates to receive, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also unconventional warfare. evasion and escape route (DoD) A course of travel, preplanned or not, that an escapee or evader uses in an attempt to depart enemy territory in order to return to friendly lines. evasion and recovery (DoD) The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. See also evader; evasion; hostile; recovery force. evasion chart (DoD) Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. See also evasion; evasion aid. evasion plan of action (DoD) A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which is intended to improve a potential evaders chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of

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information that can increase the predictability of the evaders actions and movement. Also called EPA. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery force. Full Spectrum Personnel Recovery The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for, recover, and return of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, or others as designated by the President, Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Defense, who are isolated or missing in all situations and all scenarios. high-risk-of-capture personnel U.S. personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments. Hook-112 Officially the PRC 112B, which has all the characteristics of the PRC-112, but with added commercial Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver that provides the user with location and navigation capability and also has one-way, line of sight, commercially encrypted databurst communications capability with properly equipped aircraft. Databursts provide radio identification, GPS position, and text messages. inland search and rescue region (DoD) The inland areas of continental United States, except waters under the jurisdiction of the United States. See also search and rescue region. isolated personnel (DoD) Military or civilian personnel that have become separated from their unit or organization in an environment requiring them to survive, evade, or escape while awaiting rescue or recovery. See also combat search and rescue; search and rescue and personnel. isolated personnel report (DoD) A DoD Form (DD 1833) that contains information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. See also evader; recovery force. Isolated Personnel Training, Level A Initial entry training. DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must demonstrate knowledge of survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. They must demonstrate a knowledge of the captivity environments: combat, peacetime and hostage/detention. Level A isolated personnel

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training requirements may be accomplished by completing anti-terrorism and force protection training prior to entry into the theater. Augmentations by JPRA to the pre-deployment preparations briefing may be required. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training. Isolated Personnel Training, Level B Unit level Training survival and resistance; minus hands-on/practical exercises. DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must comprehend survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must comprehend principles and concepts relation to surviving all captivity environments. Training may be accomplished through computer-based training. Isolated Personnel Training, Level C Institutional training survival, escape, resistance, and evasion; hands-on/practical exercises. The DoD civilian work force members and DoD contractor employees must apply survival, evasion, and recovery techniques, tactics, and procedures. Level C training will be a hands-on derivative of the current prisoner of war camp training captivity environment conducted by the DoD. All phases of captivity environments plus basic survival skills will be trained. Level C cannot be conducted solely by computer-based training. joint combat search and rescue operation (DoD) A combat search and rescue operation in support of a components military operations that has exceeded the combat search and rescue capabilities of that component and requires the efforts of two or more components of the joint force. Normally, the operation is conducted by the joint force commander or a component commander that has been designated by joint force commander tasking. See also combat search and rescue; search and rescue. joint search and rescue center (DoD) A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force

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component, including U.S. Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called JSRC. See also combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue. joint search and rescue center director (DoD) The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. See also combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue. life support equipment (DoD) Equipment designed to sustain aircrew members and passengers throughout the flight environment, optimizing their mission effectiveness and affording a means of safe and reliable escape, descent, survival, and recovery in emergency situations. maritime search and rescue region (DoD) The waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; the territories and possessions of the United States (except Canal Zone and the inland area of Alaska) and designated areas of the high seas. See also search and rescue region. multination (DoD) Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also alliance; coalition. multinational operations (DoD) A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition; coalition action. non-conventional assisted recovery term for methods used by US Government Agencies to set up, maintain, and operate what used to be called Escape & Evasion networks. Also called NAR. on-scene commander The person designated to coordinate rescue efforts at the rescue site. overseas search and rescue region (DoD) Overseas unified command areas (or portions thereof not included within the inland region or the maritime region). See also search and rescue region. Pararescue team Specially trained personnel qualified to penetrate to the site of an incident by land or parachute, render medical aid, accomplish survival methods, and rescue survivors. B-7

PRC-90 Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Vietnam-era system providing two-way, line-of-sight, nonsecure voice communications on two fixed frequencies. Also has a distress beacon. PRC-112 Survival radio carried by military aircrew members. Provides two-way line-of-sight, non-secure voice communications on two programmable frequencies. Equipped with a distress beacon. A coded transponder can be interrogated by properly equipped aircraft, providing the range and heading to the survival radio. personal locator beacon (DoD, NATO) An emergency radio locator beacon with a two-way speech facility carried by crewmembers, either on their person or in their survival equipment, and capable of providing homing signals to assist search and rescue operations. personnel Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned mission. personnel recovery The aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to obtain the release or recovery of personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas whether they are captured, missing, or isolated. That includes US, allied, coalition, friendly military, or paramilitary, and others as designated by the National Command Authorities. Personnel recovery (PR) is the umbrella term for operations that are focused on the task of recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from harms way. PR includes but is not limited to theater search and rescue; combat search and rescue; search and rescue; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape; evasion and escape; and the coordination of negotiated as well as forcible recovery options. PR can occur through military action, action by nongovernmental organizations, other US Government-approved action, and/or diplomatic initiatives, or through any of these. Also called PR. See also combat search and rescue; evasion; evasion and escape; personnel; recovery; search and rescue. DoD Directive 2310.2, Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 22 Dec 2000), p.3. Pointee-talkee A language translation aid containing selected phrases in English opposite same statements in local language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, programmable digital devices with sound recognition and speaker capability were also used.

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precautionary search and rescue/combat search and rescue (DoD) The planning and prepositioning of aircraft, ships, or ground forces and facilities before an operation to provide search and rescue or combat search and rescue assistance if needed. The planning of precautionary search and rescue or combat search and rescue is usually done by plans personnel with search and rescue or combat search and rescue expertise and background on a J-3 (operations) staff, a joint search and rescue center, or a rescue coordination center. Also called precautionary SAR/CSAR. See also combat search and rescue; joint combat search and rescue operation; search and rescue. recovery (DoD, NATO) In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery; recovery force. recovery activation signal (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, a pre-coordinated signal from an evader that indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates "I am here, start the recovery planning." See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations. recovery force (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. See also evader; evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations.

recovery operations Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 3-07) JP 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 9 January 2003 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 Apr 2001), p. 444.

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rescue combat air patrol (DoD) An aircraft patrol provided over a combat search and rescue objective area for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft. Its primary mission is to protect the search and rescue task forces during recovery operations. Also called RESCAP. rescue coordination center (DoD) A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also called RCC (or RCT for Navy component). See also combat search and rescue; joint search and rescue center; search and rescue. rescue ship (DoD, NATO) In shipping control, a ship of a convoy stationed at the rear of a convoy column to rescue survivors. safe area (DoD) A designated area in hostile territory that offers the evader or escapee a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until he can be evacuated. Also called selected area for evasion. SAFE area intelligence description (DoD) In evasion and recovery operations, an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called SAID. See also evasion; evasion and recovery; recovery operations; Safe Area. SANDY Callsign for a US Air Force pilot specially trained in search procedures, aircrew survival and authentication techniques, and helicopter support tactics. search and rescue (DoD, NATO) The use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (DoD) Also called SAR. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescue mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; isolated personnel; joint combat search and rescue operation; joint search and rescue center; joint search and rescue center director; rescue coordination center; search and rescue mission coordinator. B-10

search and rescue alert notice (DoD) An alerting message used for United States domestic flights. It corresponds to the declaration of the alert phase. Also called ALNOT. See also search and rescue incident classification, subpart b. search and rescue incident classification (DoD) Three emergency phases into which an incident may be classified or progress, according to the seriousness of the incident and its requirement for rescue service: a. Uncertainty phase Doubt exists as to the safety of a craft or person because of knowledge of possible difficulties or because of lack of information concerning progress or position; b. Alert phase Apprehension exists for the safety of a craft or person because of definite information that serious difficulties exist that do not amount to a distress or because of a continued lack of information concerning progress or position; c. Distress phase Immediate assistance is required by a craft or person because of being threatened by grave or imminent danger or because of continued lack of information concerning progress or position after procedures for the alert phase have been executed. search and rescue mission coordinator (DoD) The designated person or organization selected to direct and coordinate support for a specific search and rescue mission. Also called SAR mission coordinator. See also combat search and rescue; combat search and rescuer mission coordinator; component search and rescue controller; search and rescue. search and rescue region See inland search and rescue region; maritime search and rescue region; overseas search and rescue region. tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel A U.S. Marine Corps term describing a mission performed by an assigned and briefed aircrew for the specific purpose of the recovery of personnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when the tactical situation precludes search and rescue (SAR) assets from responding and when survivors and their location have been confirmed. Also called TRAP. types/conditions of recovery - Unassisted the evader simply walks out on his own, unassistedmilitary personnel train for it, it works, but it doesnt do much to bolster morale. - Opportune a matter of being in the right place at the right timea guy bails out and lands in front of a HUMMMV that gets him back to US control.

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- Component in accordance with current joint doctrine, each service component is responsible for the recovery of its own forces within its capability. - Joint components are also required to contribute PR capability to the joint effort when needed. - Multinational US capability to recover an isolated person of a coalition partner, coalition partners capability to recover US isolated personnel, and the capabilities of a multinational force to recover any coalition isolated personnel. - Interagency a new category to capture some old and some emerging relationships with other government agencies with respect to PR. unconventional assisted recovery (DoD) Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; evader; recovery. unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (DoD) That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas, which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. See also assisted recovery; recovery; unconventional assisted recovery. unconventional recovery operation (DoD) Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. See also evader; recovery operations. unconventional warfare (DoD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. unconventional warfare forces (DoD) United States forces having an existing unconventional warfare capability consisting of Army Special Forces and such Navy, Air Force, and Marine units as are assigned for these operations.

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APPENDIXC C APPENDIX DATACOLLECTION COLLECTIONINTERVIEWS, INTERVIEWS,MEETINGS, MEETINGS, DATA CONFERENCES,WORKSHOPS, WORKSHOPS,AND ANDOTHER OTHER CONFERENCES,

(Note: Dates of Interviews include initial meetings and key re-visits)

Interviews 17 April 2002 26 April 2002 2 May 2002 29 May 2002 31 May 2002 5 June 2002 7 June 2002 1 July 2002 3 July 2002 9-11 July 2002 12 July 2002 15 July 2002 Location Defense Prisoner of War, Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) Defense Intelligence Agency (PR Cell) US Joint Forces Command (Director of Operations/J3) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict/SOLIC) Department of State (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, International Security Operations) Joint Staff (J-3, Special Operations Division) Federal Bureau of Investigation (Office of International Operations) Department of Justice (Criminal Division, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) US Special Operations Command Department of State (7 offices) and US Agency for International Development HQ Marine Corps (Aviation Programs and Policy)

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22 July 2002 23 July 2002 25 July 2002 30 July 2002 1 August 2002 27 August 2002 11 September 2002 26 September 2002 8 October 2002 11 October 2002 3 October 2002 25 October 2002 12 November 2002 4 December 2002 10 December 2002 17 December 2002

Department of State (Operations Center, Crisis Management Support) Central Intelligence Agency (Special Activities Division) Army Staff (Special Operations Division), US Southern Command (Joint Interagency Task Force East) US Coast Guard Headquarters (Office of Search and Rescue) Department of State (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Security Overseas Seminar)) Department of Treasury (Customs Service) Department of State (National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Crisis Management Training Team) National Security Agency (Special Support Activity) US European Command Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement) US General Services Administration (Aircraft Management Division) US Agency for International Development (Asia and Near East Bureau) Department of State (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and Crisis Management) Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration)

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20 December 2002 10 February 2003 19 February 2003 18 March 2003 19 March 2003 31 March 2 April 2003 1-2 April 2003 28 May 2003

Office of the CNO (Plans, Policy, and Operations, and Resources, Requirements, and Assessments) Patrick AFB FL (301st Rescue Squadron, DoS-INL, Manned Space Flight Office, and AirScan Inc.) US Navy Fleet Aviation Specialized Training Group (SERE School Section) JPRA SERE School, Fairchild AB WA USAF SERE School Fairchild AB WA USA SERE School Fort Bragg NC USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg NC National Security Council Staff

Conferences/Meetings/Workshops 9-11 July 2002 23-26 July 2002 6-8 August 2002 4 September 2002 15 November 2002 21 January 2003 Special Operations Command, Personnel Recovery Working Group USSOUTHCOM, Soto Cano AB, HO (JTF BRAVO and Central American Search and Rescue Workshop) 2002 DoD Personnel Recovery Conference DPMO (In progress NPRA study review) Pre-PRAG Meeting DoD Personnel Accounting Conference

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28 January 2003 5-6 February 2003 13 February 2003 21 February 2003 25 February 2003 4 March 2003 14 March 2003 27 March 2003 14-16 May 2003 2-5 June 2003

Personnel Recovery Technology and Interoperability Forum (PRTIF) Interagency Workshop at IDA General Services Administration (Interagency Committee on Aviation Policy) Personnel Recovery Response Cell (PRRC) Personnel Recovery Advisory Group (PRAG) PRRC NSA (CSEL Review) OSD C3I (CSEL Program Review) NATO CSAR Conference, Naples, Italy Colombia: US Mission, MILGroup, etc.

Other (training, exercises, etc.) 9-11 April 2002 23-28 June 2002 PR-101, Ft. Belvoir Joint Exercise Desert Rescue X, NAS Fallon NV

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 222024302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

01 07 2003
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Final DASW01-98-C-0067
5b. GRANT NUMBER

April 2002-May 2003

Interim Report on Interagency National Personnel Recovery Architecture

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5e. TASK NUMBER

Anil Joglekar, Lt Gen Devol Brett USAF (Ret.), Robert B. Mohan, Dave Baratto, Jim Doherty, Scott Feil, Sam Packer, David Spalding
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

BB-9-2143
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

Institute for Defense Analyses 4850 Mark Center Drive Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

IDA Paper P-3779

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSOR/MONITORS ACRONYM(S)

DPMO
11. SPONSOR/MONITORS REPORT NUMBER(S)

Col John M. Hobble, USAF Director, Personnel Recovery Policy Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/MIA (DPMO) Suite 800, Crystal Square 4 1745 Jeff Davis Highway Arlington, Virginia 22202
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, 19 December 2003.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

The National Personnel Recovery Architecture (NPRA) is a congressionally directed and funded study to define the current baseline personnel recovery (PR) architecture, shortfalls/gaps in the architecture, and then identify alternatives to improve the national architecture. The architecture is divided into three main PR components: direct and guide, plan and prepare, and mission execution. For each component of the architecture, the baseline, shortfalls, issue, and the interim solution set are defined. The interim report is based on the first years effort. The final report will be published around May 2004. Some of the preliminary findings are that the scope of PR should be expanded to full spectrum PR, which broadens who is covered by PR and also integrates PR methods rather than treat them as different. Also, a national level guidance is required in order to improve integration of interagency PR operations. Many other specific enhancements are suggested in the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader-development, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) categories.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Combat Search and Rescue; Personnel Recovery; Code of Conduct; Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape; Search and Rescue; Joint Search and Rescue Center; Unconventional Assisted Recovery; Interagency; DPMO; JPRA; CSEL
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

Unclassified
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE

17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

18. NUMBER OF PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Col John M. Hobble, USAF

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unclassified

Unlimited

220

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area

code)

703-602-2202
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18