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Us VS Guinto

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US VS GUINTO (February 26, 1990) These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine

of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges. MAIN ISSUE: Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar? 1. US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607) Facts: The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding. Held: The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial . Thus, the petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing of the case.

2. US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470) Facts: Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a complaint for damages against the club manager who was also an officer of USAF. Held: The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove. The petitioner acted quite properly in terminating the private respondents employment for his unbelievably nauseating act of polluting the soup stock with urine.

3. US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018) Facts: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial ensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because of the latters acts, he was removed from his job.

Held: It was clear that the individually named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express waiver cannot be made by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a dulyenacted statute. Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the civil case filed in the lower court dismissed. 4. US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258) Facts: Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter. The individual petitioners, US military officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just exercising their official functions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. Held: The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record were too meager to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. MAIN DOCTRINE: A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. The USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity.

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