OSPREY VANGUARDS

US 1st MARINE DIVISION

1941-45
Philip Katcher
VANGUARD SERIES
EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW
US 1st.
MARINE DIVISION
1941-45
Text by PHILIP KATCHER
Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL
OSPREY PUBLISHING LONDON
Published in 1979 by
Osprey Publishing Ltd
company of the Ccorg{' Philip Group
12 14 Long Acre, London \\'C2 E 9LP
J; Copyright 1979 Osprey Publishing Ltd
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ISBN 0 85045 3 119
Filmsct by BAS Primers Limit ed,
Over \\'allop, Hampshire
Printed in Hong Kong
Cor't'T illustration
Chappell's cover painting shows mcn of the 1St
Marine Di vision advancing through the elephant
grass of Cape Gloucester in December 1943,
supported by a cast-hull Sherman tank or the
1St Tank Battalion. It is taken from a
photograph. ilnd shows the \'cry plain appearance of
tanks of the divisional banal ion all markings,
including national stars, are omitted exccpt 1'01' smail
white vehicle numbers on the front and rear quarters
of the turret. The printed camouflage combat suit
was not much used in the 1St Division. according to
pholOgraphic evidence ; we have included it here for
imcrcst, but in fact the normal OD fatigues seem to
have been the norm at Cape Gloucester.
Before t he Battl e
On , February '94' the First Brigade of the US
Marine Corps, which had been formed to test the
latest ideas on amphibious warfare, became the
First Marine Division. Already known in the corps
as ' the raggedy-ass Marines' because of their
lough assignments, the new First Division COI1-
tinued its rugged training schedule. ' \Ye never
really came out of the boondocks (rom then on,' a
Division veteran later recalled , 'from the fall of
'940 when the brigade went to Guantaliamo
(Cuba) until after it had, as the First Division,
secured Guadalcanal. '
Spring '94' found the Division invoked in the
l\rarincs man a <lilli-aircraft cmplact l1l cllI (note range-
finde r on right .. overlooking Ihe beaches of Guadalcanal.
This. and all other photographs, COllrtCS) of uS
Corps)
largest American exercise of i ts kind, a mass
landing olfNew River, North Carolina. When the
exercise ended, most participants returned to
comfortable bases but not the First. They went
into 'tenl city' at the brand-new Camp Lejul1c,
North Carolina. There Lhey continued their
training in jungle terrain surprisingly similar to
that of the ye t-unknown island of Guadalcanal.
Pearl Harbor, 7 December '94', found the
Division with a strength of onl y 518 officers and
6,8'7 enlisted men , butthe J apanesc sneak attack
brought in a wave of volunteers.
In latc t. [arch '94' the Division received orders
3
for overseas dULY. The 7th Marines- a Marine
Corps regiments is call ed a ' Marine' - left Norfolk.
Virgini a on t a April , reaching Api a, Weslern
Samoa on 8 May. They slayed for fi ve monlhs on
defensive duty. The reSl of the Di vision weIll lO
Wel linglon, New Zealand.
The tSl Marines and supporting unils had to go
by rail to San Francisco, Californ ia, to be shipped
out, wh ile the 5th Marines and Di vision art illery
(Di van I' ) left Norfolk on t o May 1942 on the
Wakifield, an old passenger liner. ' A few of us
shared the terrible lruth that life j ackels and life
boats ex.isled for less than half our numbers,'
Divisi on Commanding General A. A. Vandegrift
wrote later. 'Fonunately enemy and weather co-
o perated La provide an uneventful if tiresome trip,
broken only on the lasll ap. Due to illlense heat we
were sailing wi lh hatches opell despite a heavy sea.
Suddenly the old girl slruck a monstrous swell that
serll LOll s of waler below deck. For a moment I
fcared pani c, but some unknown hero broke the
tension by yelling, "\rVomen and children first!" 1
In 1942 a US Marine Divi s ion included the
following basic combat units:
Thrtt inJanl1)! regiments, each of lhree
battalions, each of approx. 1,000 men
Ollt' artillery regimen/, of four battalions,
fielding
12 X I 551l1m
12 x Tosmm
36 x 751llnl guns
OneerlgilletT Tegime7l1 ofapprox. 2,500 men
01le lallk ballalioll inili all y equipped wilh
~ 3 Stuan wnks
ant US Nauy Const Difmce balla/ion
Support unitJ lOla lling some 2,600 men.
The exaCl composilion of lhe ISl Marine
Division al \arious sLages of ils service in the
Second \Vorld ''\'ar will be found lisled al lhe
end of the main narrative l(,Xl.
The Di vision's new camp was on North Island ,
some lhirty-five mil es from Wellington. Staff
officers moved into the Ho tel Cecil in downtown
Wellington. The Di vision had never been posted
so close to a cit y the size of Wellington before, and
the men took advantage of the cit y's delights and
4
the friend ly inhabitallls. One day General Van-
degrifl met ' an elderly, stern- looki ng gelllieman
wilh a clipped white moustache .' The old ma'1
wanled to know ifhe was the general commanding
the Di vision. He was, the general said. The old
ma n then said, ' \ Vell , si r, I am very g lad to mee t
you. I want you LO know, sir, tha t I have lived at
the Hotel Cecil for twent y-six yea rs.' General
Vandegrift , knowing how the residents were
evicted to make room for hi s officers, braced
himself ror a blast. 'I wanl you to know, sir,' the
old genl leman went on, 'how pl eased 1 am to move
rro m my apartment so that you and your offi cers
have a place to do your job.' Afterwards the
general wondered how many people in other
countri es would have been so pleasant about their
enforced moves.
Anoth er meeting the general had was less
pleasing. Vi ce-Admiral Ghormley, South Pacifi c
Area commander, mel General Vandegri ft on 26
June 1942 in Auckland . He told the general that
the Di vision was to ' Occupy and defcnd Tulagi
and adjacelll posilions (Guadalcanal and Florida
Isla nds and the Sama Cruz Islands) in order to
deny these areas lO the enemy and to provide
United States bases in preparation for further
offensive ac tion. ' When was this to take place, the
general asked . ' D-Day will be I August ,' replied
the admiral.
The Di vision's second echel on was not due until
II Jul y. " ot all the Di"ision's equipmem was
'combat-loaded,' so thal it could be brought ashore
hrst wilh items needed for combat. The Division
had less than a mon th to unl oad all its eq uipment
and reload il combat style. Even though the aClUal
date of' D-Day" was later pushcd back to 7 August,
it still took around-the-clock work lO unload and
reload ships. On 31 Jul y the Di vision pushed olffor
Guadalcanal with 956 officers and 18, 146 enlisled
men. It was only arter they were aboard and under
way that the men learned their destinati on, and
flllal plans were made.
'This is goi ng to be a difficull matter, ' one
li eutenant-colonel commanding lroops going in on
the first wave said at their final briefing, 'wit h rivers
to cross, lhe grass four to five feet tall, and the
drainage ditches . .. . But it can be done, and it must
be done, and we've got lO lead the way.'
Guadalcanal
The important thing about Guadalcanal was not
SO much the taking and holding of an airfield,
important though that may have been. J t was that
for the first time Americans attacked and beat
J apanese. The spell of defeats at Wake I sland and
the Philippines, Pearl H arbor and Indonesia was
broken. Guadaleanal proved that the J apanese
could be and eventuall y would be beaten.
Guadaleanal itself was an accidental battle.
Xobody would have chosen to fight there. J ack
London, who described the lush, densely jungled
island as a malaria-ridden 'place of death,' wrote,
'H I were a king the worst punishment I could
inflict on my enemies would be to banish them [0
the Solomons.' The islands were J apan's sout hern-
most outposts. Previous conquerors had been
smart enough to avoid living on Guadaleanal. By
the time of the invasion the only civi li an in-
habitants were in several Cathol ic missions , a few
coconut plantations and a Burns-Philp trading
station. The island's main population comprised
giant li zards, scorpions, crocodil es, poisonous
spiders, leeches and ferocious white ants.
These elements made up the bulk of the
. defending force thaI met the l\larines when they
lancled. [nslead of putti ng up the fierce defcnce
:\ sand-bagged 7smm pack howitzer position on the COasl or
Guadalcanal.
expected, the few J apanese in the landing areas
ned on spolting the Marines. At g.08am on 7
August, the boats carrying the 1st and 3rd
Ba ttali ons of the 5t h Marines (hereafler written as
1/5th Marines and3/ 5th Marines), bore away for
shore. Two minutes la ter the battalions hit the
beach, landing abreast with the 1/5th Marines on
the right. At Ilam the 1st Marines (reinforced)
landed behind the twO battalions and all units
began moving towards a hill described as 'the
grassy knoll ' by a Bri tish planter before the
lIl VaSIOIl.
T L was the terrain rather than the J apanese
whi ch slowed down the Marine advance.
General Vandegrift, accompani ed by a corporal
armed wit h a l2-gauge shotgun, landed shonly
after the assault troops and looked over their
advance. ' On the beach west of the main peri-
meter I found the 1St Battal ion, 5th Marines,
moving as ifil were abollt LO encounter the entire
J mperial a rmy. I gave the battalion commander
hell .. the day's objecti ve was the TenarLl
[aclllally, the IIu) river, about two miles west,
which I wanted defended by nightfall.
'At Cates' CP I learned that hi s ri ght battalion
was bogged down in an immense rain forest west of
5
the Tlu [actually, the Tenaru] river. Our inror-
mants in New Zealand had railed to report thi s
obstacle, a foeLid morass so thi ck with overgrowd1
you couldn' t sec Mt Austen or anything else rrom
its depths. In working their way through it the
troops, in poor conditi on rrom the weeks aboard
ship, seemed about done in by the heat and high
humidity. '
American planners, working with vcry o ld
maps and verbal inrormation rrom planters and
visitors, had incorrectly labell ed the Ilu River the
Tenarll and vice \ 'crsa. This not on ly confused
them then, but has confused hi slOrians ever since,
with some accountS using period designations and
others (such as thi s one! ) the correct names.
While landings on Guadaleanal itself were
unopposed save by nature, simu ltaneous landings
within the island chain were meeting with stiff
opposition.
The 1St ~ a r i n c Raider Baltalion was sent to the
island orTulagi, the capital orthe British olomon
Islands Protectorate, on th e Florida side of the
chain. The battalion, under LOugh LiClilcnanl-
Colonel Merrill E. Red Mike' Edson, landed its
18' and 'D' Companies at 8am on the western end
or the roughl y rectangular island. The spot was
chosen in the hope that it would be undefended.
Marines wade across (he l.unga river al (he stan of a dusk
patrol.
6
Such was the case, and a sig nal went alit at 8, I 5,
'Landing successrul , no opposition.' Qui ckl y U1C
2/5th 1\farines, under Li eutenant -Colonel Harold
E. Rosecrans, landed behind the Raiders and
turned north-west whi le the Ra iders headed
south-east. The north-west was quickly co\ered
without meeting any Japanese, and the 2/5th
I\l arines then returned to sllppon Edso n'g troops,
The rvfarines met their first resistance in the
small town around the Burns- Philp docks on the
nonh end orthe island. There the :YIarines halted
arter taking mocr three-quarters or the island.
a long a ridge running between a wharr on the
north and the Residency buildings towards the
sout h. The men dug themselves shallow two- and
three-man roxholes ror the ni ght.
It was the night the J apanese wcre waiting ror.
According to one or their training manuals}
' \Vcsterners being very haug ht y, effeminate and
cowardly intensely di slike figlHing in the rain or
mist or in the dark. They ca nnOl concei vC' night to
be a proper time for battle though it is excellent
for dancing. LI1 these weaknesses lie our great
opponul1lt)'.
The Raider companies werc in linc, reading
from the north, ' S' } 'D ', 'A' and C'. The
Japanese. under cover or darkness and mOrlar fire,
hit bCl\veen Companies . .\' and 'D\ clilting
through and then turnin<; on \ \ '. The company
held on, turning back four di[[erenl a u acks. One
of those who slOpped the Japanese was Pri \'ate
First Class J ohn Ahrens. Xext morning he was
found, still cl utchi ng his Browning AUlOmatic
RiOe, hi s green fatigues splashed black with his
own blood which oozed out or fivc wounds in his
chest, two rrolll bullets and three rrom bayonets. 1\
dead J apanese officer lay across his legs and a
sergeant next to him. Some lhirlccn more dead
Japanese lillered the ground in front of his
roxhole. Captain Lewis \\'. Walt, Co. 'A' com-
mander, gathered the slowly breathing Ahrens in
his anns. 'Captain.' the dying man whispcred.
'they tri ed to comc ov('r me last night, bUl l don't
think they made il.' The captain picked him up to
take him to the Residency lO die. ' They didnt.
J ohnny,' he said softl), 'they didn'l. '
The allacks had cost the J apanese dearly and
they could make only token opposition as the next
morning the 2/5th ;<- l arines pushed passed the
Raiders, taking the last parl or the island h) 3pm.
The pallern for Pacifi c hallies had he en scl.
.\nother large island in the chain was Florida,
Ilhich fell to Co. 'B', 2nd without
opposition. Tiny Gavulll, a speck some 300 yards
SEAL ARK
<!
a
?
,f
f
IN "'1ILES
CHANNEL
4:'
wide and 500 yards long, was a lOugh nutlO crack.
ho\\c\'Cr. l 'he Parachute Battalion landed there
rrom boats, uncler coveri ng fire [i'om destroyers, at
about noon on 7 i\uguSl. The naval nrc broke up
J apanese seaplane ramps, so several boats de-
toured to land by a nearby concrete dock. As they
hit the beaches, coveri ng fire ceased and the wcll-
dug-in J apanese opened up. The ballalion com-
mander was hit almost as soon as he landed. One
OLit or every len m('n who made it to the dock was
wounded and the whole right fl ank was pinned
clown on the narrow beach. It was not until 2pm
that a squad took th e hi ghest point on thc island,
Hill t48. Ewn so, the troops cou ld not move olf the
island to take the ncarby and equally small
Tanambogo since so many J apanese remained on
Gavulli hidden in caves and pillboxes.
\"'hil e wenl abolll the island lOssing
explosive charges inlO these ca\'es, at 6.45pm Co.
'B', 2nd tried to cross the narrow strait to
Tanambogo. Flares exposed thcm to enemy ore
when sti ll in the water, and they had to fall back.
The night brought constant attacks from in-
dividual J apanese who crawled Out of their caves
lo toss grenades into Marines' foxholes. The nex t
day Li eutenant- Colonel Robert C. Hunt's 3/0nci
successfull y landed on Tanambogo with
two tanks. The J apanese slOpped one of the tanks
by jamming a bar into its treads, and then co\'ered
it with 1\loloLOv cocktails. One 1\l arinc threw.open
the lurret hatch and jUlllped oul. Rolling 0[[ the
turret, he lanclcd in a sha ll ow hole onl y to be
rushed by J apanese. 1 nfalltrymen began picking
0[[ the J apanese aile by one, and eventuall y the
tanker got back to safet}'.
7
The three islands around Guadalcanal -
Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo- had been
garrisoned by some 1,500 J apa nese. Of these,
were captured ali ve and some seventy
were thought to have escaped LO other isla nds. The
rest were dead a grim indication of what the
Marines could expect in the future.
On Guadalcanal propel' the enemy had not yet
been seell in any la rge numbers. f1 eeing J a pa nese
abandoned, on their airfield, two generators,
machine shops, an air-compressor faClory for
torpedoes and even an icc plant, which the
Marines qui ckl y decora ted with a sign : 'Tojo l ee
Plant, Under New Management. ' By the 9t h the
airfield, named ' Henderson Fi eld ' a ller Yl ajor
LofLOn R. Henderson, a !'vl arine lI )'er killed at
Midway, was firmly held by Marines. A defensive
perimeter some 9,600 yards long was SCl up, with
the Divarty's 7smm and 10511101 howitze rs in its
centre. On 20 August two squadrons, one of
fighters and the other of dive bombers, landed at
Henderson Ficld LO make it their base.
Things were not all Lhat good, however. The US
Navy was obli ged by pl a ne losses and petrol
shortages LO withdraw lhe supponing sh ips.
Except for the twO air squadrons, the Di visio n was
on llS own.
At first, the Japanese 17th Army, under
Li eul enant-General Haruki chi :Vl ya kutake, did
not realize the potential threat of Henderson
Field. Considering the there to be simpl y
A patrol heads up the lIu. in search of two troublesome
Japanese nmm field guns.
8
Ll. -Ccn. Thomas A. Holcomb, Col. A. Edson ofLhe
Raider Bn., and 1St Division commander Alexan-
der .\ . Vandcgrin confer dUling Gen. Holcomb's inspection of
Guadalcanal.
a nui sance, they sent a force of some 6,000 men
under General Ki yotake Kawaguchi to retake the
isla nd . General Kawaguchi , who LOld a reporter
that the a ll ack would be extremely serious
business', had hi s men paid and well fed to put
them in good heart for the li ght. Then, juSt before
midni ght on 18 August the advance party of
Colonel Ki yono Ichiki a nd 9 15 men of the 28t h
In falllry Regiment landed on Guadalcanal. Leav-
ing some 125 men LO hold the beachhead, Colonel
Ichiki 's force pushed LOwa rds the dug-in Marines.
At abo ut I .Isam o n 2 J Aug ust, Coloncll chiki 's
force was facing 2/ 1St Marines dug in along the lIu
river. A green fl are was (he sig nal for a banzai
attack. A Marine guard fired a single shotLOwards
the fl a re, and then the J apanese ca me splashing
across the green scum of that stag nant creek.
Pri va te Robert Lecki e was one of the defenders:
Ivcryone was firing, every weapon was sound-
ing voice; but this was no o rchestrati o n, no
terribly beautiful symphony of death, as decadent
rearechelon observers write. Here was caco-
phony; here was dissonance; here was
here was [hat absence of rhythm, the loss of limit,
for everyone fires what, when and where he
chooses; here was booming, sounding, shri eking,
wailing, hiss ing, crashing, sha king, gibbering
noise. Here was helL'
One i\llarinc machine g unner nicknamed 'The
Indi an' was caug lll by a burst from a J apanese
machine g un and died, hi s finger pressed LO the
trigger, hi s weapon coughing out bull ets as hi s
dead body leaned inLO it. In death he fired twO
hundred morc rounds inLO the oncomll1g
Japanese.
Pri vate AI Schmidt, wounded in the leg, the rest
of hi s crew dead about him, kept loading a nd
firing his machine gun across the unmoving
Stream. Finall y one J apanese tossed a hand
grenade into hi s foxhole, the fl ying
blinding him and tearing into hi s arms a nd
shoulder. ' J can smell the rOll en buggers' , he
yelled, and kept on firing. When fell ow Marines
finall y gOtLO him, he' d been firing steadil y for over
five hours. Pri vate Schmidt was awarded the
Medal of Honor.
About 2.30am the reserve pl atoon of Co. ' G'
went into acti on. An artillery barrage was call ed
in on the persistent J a panese at a bout 3am. M3
tuan tanks from Co. 'll', I st Tank Bauali on,
fired cannister from their 37mm guns into the
J apanese infantry, then drove forward, crushing
J apanese hiding in the shrubbery. Ordered to
return, the tank commander declined with the
words, 'Leave us alone- we' re LOa busy killing
J aps!' At about 8.30am the ' lISt Marines came
up, and by then theJ a panese knew it was all over .
Pinned againstlhe sea, some 250 survi vors tri ed LO
escape along the beach at about 2pm, onl y to be
hit by waiting fi ghters from Henderson Field. The
Malines took onl y fifteen prisoners, thirteen of
whom were wounded. Virtuall y all the rest \\lere
dead. Total l\1arine losses we re thirty-four kill ed
and seventy-fi ve wounded.
' The all ac k of the l chiki de tachment', Tokyo
was informed, 'was not entirel y successfuL'
On 21 August the 2/5th II-l arines were brought
from Tul agi to form a mobil e reserve for the
Guadalcanal garri son.
The Japanese reali zed tha t their error lay in
underes timating US strength on Guadalcanal,
a nd so sent General Kawaguchi 's 35 th Brigade of
some 2,400 men to Taivu Point, whil e Colonel
Akinsoukc Oka's 1, 100 men landed at Kokum-
bona, ten mil es west of the airfi eld. The plan
call ed for ajoint allack.
Offi cers in the 35th Bri gade, white crosses
painted on their backs for quick identifi cati on, led
an allack agai nst the main position d ue south of"
the fi eld along a high point thereaft er known as
' Bl ood)' Ridge'. At about 9.30pm they ran in to
Men of the 7th !\1arincs lake a break during the advance on the
Mataniko. )JOI C detai ls of dress and equipment, and the
grenade pouch rig worn by Ihe man in lhe middlcground.
9
A heavy r 5SInln ho\\ il'lcr in position on Cu;tclaJcanal.
Co. 'C' , Raiders, driving a whole platoon
back against the Lungga. Company 'C' rell back,
joined by Co. ' B', but the rough Lerra in kept Lh e
Japanese from taking ad\ 'an tagc of their \ietory.
The neXL d ay the 2/5Lh Marines were seill to
suppon Colonel Edson's Ra iders, despite hi s
protests that Lhe R a iders a lone could hold thc
ridge. 1\ [OS t o r the 2nd Ballalion ncver gOt to Lhe
ridge, held up by roug h Lerrain and J a panese air
attac ks. New defensive lines were dug aro und the
southern slope orLhe hi gh knob in Lh e celll re orLhc
ridge.
As daylighL faded away, Lhe noise from Lhe
Japanese lines increased . A smoke pot was roll ed
int o lines with the yel l 'Gas attack' ,
probably rrom a n English-spea king Japanese.
Finall y the Japanese, screaming and firing their
weapons from their hips, came o n. 'The attack was
a lmost cOnStalll,' wrOLe 2/5th commander :--Iajor
Willi a m McKennon, ' like a rain LhaL subsides ror
a moment and then pours the harder. In mos t 0('
these assaulLs LheJ aps never reached our lines .. .
vVhen one wave was mowed down and I mean
mowed down- another rollowed it inLo deaLh.
Some or the J a p rushes carri ed Lh ern inLO our
posiLions a nd Lh ere was ugly ha nd-La -hand fi ght-
ing. But nOt one of our men, LO my knowledge, met
deaLh LhaL night by a Jap bayonet.'
The whole line slowly rell back under J apanese
pressure, re-rorming a long whaL had been the
10
battali o n reserve line, whil e I05mm howitzen
o pe ned up in su pporl. By dawn it was all over
AnotherJapancse attack 'was not entirely success
rul. '
Colonel Edson and one or his compa ny com
mandel'S were awarded :\1edals or Honor ror their
night 's work. General Kawaguchi reponed 633
men dead a nd 505 wounded. The survi,ors.
beate n and starvi ng, made lheir way to Colonel
Oka's pos ition. For the moment LhcJapanese had
bee n SLOpped.
AL this poinL General \ 'andegrift relt SLrOIlR
enough lO begin oUensi,'e opera Lions. On 23
SepLember the 1/ 7Lh t- l arines were sent LO cross
the t- fa taniko a nd scout the hill ) count ry beyond
Lhat river. Quickl y Lh ey ran illlo some J a panese,
and 2/ 5th Mari nes were sent as reinforcements. B}
the 26t h the two ballal ionss Lill had nOt crossed the
Mataniko, and the Raiders were sent up to attempt
the c rossing. IL look three separate atte mpts to
gain a fomhole! o n the western side of the river,
with the Marines taking more casualti es than in
a ny ot her pan or the campaign, but by 9 OCLOber
th ey were across and their lines had been ad
vanced three mi les.
The Japanese were still not ready to give up
Guadalcanal. Lie utenant-Ge neral iVl asao
yam a, 2nd Divi sion, told hi s men: "rhi s is the
decisive battle between Japa n and Lhe niLed
Slales, a battlc in which the ri se or fa ll o f the
J a pa nese Empire will be decided.'
On 11 OCLOber the J a pa nese reinrorced their
LroOpS with anillery, and on ' 3 OelOber they laid
do\vn a huge naval bombardment on Henderson
Fi eld . The bombardment, whi ch began at about
1.30am, included 14-inch shell s rrom the ba lll e-
ships J-/a1'lJnga and Kongo and eight- and five-
inch shell s rrom supponing vessels. The shelljng
lasLed ulllil abouL 3am, leaving hundreds or men
more ba llered a nd shocked by the pure intensit y of
it than by its actual balli st ic e lTects.
By '9 OCLOber, Lil e 2nd (Sendai ) Di vision, LWO
ballalions or Lh e 38Lh Di vision, three balleries of
heavy artillery, a battery of mount ain artillery, a
mortar battalion, three rapid-fire gun battalions
and a force of sixteen wnks were ashore, totalling
some '20,000 men. Combining these with lhe
remains of the first two forces, thcJapancsc finall y
o UlI1umbe red the Ame ri cans. The Firsl f'..1 arine
Division itself had received reinforcements in the
shape of the 164t h Infantry R egimel1l, an Army
".tional Guard outfit.
The Japanese plan this time was elaborate.
Their 4th and 124th RegimenlS, with hea\")'
artillery and tanks, were to hit positions on the
lower :\1ataniko, thcn push towards Henderson
Field. The 16th and 29th Regiments would go by
them and, following an artillery barrage, attack the
southern perimeter. The lower attack
was onc of several scheduled to hit at the same Lime.
Another would fall on the upper Mataniko, while a
third would hit Bloody Ridge. Unfortunately for
the Japanese, their heavily loaded troops fa il ed to
get into position for their assigned allacks by '0-
Day' on 22 October. Their commanders did not
know thi s, however, because of poor com-
munications.
At 6pm on 22 OCLOber, J apanese artillery
opened up on the lower Ma taniko positions held by
the 1171h l\[arines and a ballalion of the I 64th.
Following the barrage the J apanese infantry
charged, led by nine IS-LOn tanks. Marine anti -
tank fire stopped a ll but one tank, which rolled over
the American foxholes until a l\farine jammed a
hand grenade in its tracks. Wi t h that the tank
rocked back a nd forth once, and a tank destroyer
caught it in its sights. A lucky shot, wh ich must have
hit its ammunition supply, blew the tank twenty
yards back into the sea. The attack was Slopped.
After that allempt had been beaten off, General
Vandcgrift reasoned that the main attack would
fall on the upper Mataniko. The 2/ 7th l\l arines
were sent to reinforce the 3/7th Marines already
there. This left Li eutenan t-Colonel Lewis 'Chesty'
Pull er's 117th Marines as the on ly force holding
Bloody Ridge. At about 3am on 24. OCLOber the
next Japanese allack was laun hed , hitling Lh e
Il7th on the ridge. By 3.30 the 164th'S reserve
battalion was sent in as reinforcemenLS. Even
though they wellt into strange positions, under nrc
and at night, the Army troops acqui llcd themselves
well. It was the Marines who had LO take the main
weight of the defence, however. Sergeal1l John
Basilone, who ea rned the Medal of Honor that
night, said later, 'They kept coming and we kept
firing. We all thought our end had come.' The
attack was a typical banzai charge, notable for a
lack of tactical subt lety. When the rushes finally
SLOpped, at around 7am, the l\larines and soldi ers
counted 941 bodies under thei r gu ns.
The allack on the upper Mataniko finally came
on 25 October, hitling Companies 'F', (Go and 'E\
7th The weight of these charges virwally
wiped out Co. 'F' and pushed back Co. 'E'. Linking
those two companies was a machine-gun platoon
led by Sergeant l\litchell Paige, whose fight here
earned him a Medal of Honor and a ballleficJd
commission as second li elltenant. Paige not only
did not pull back. but actually led his men forward,
cradling his .50 calibre water-cooled machine gun
in his arms a nd firing as he went. When the fight
was over some I 10 dead Japanese lay in front of his
position.
The overall .Japanese plan, cursed by over-
optimism and faulty illlelligenec, had failed.
What the J apanese couldn't do, Guadaleanal's
terrible environment could. The Dhision reponed
' ,94' malaria cases in October alone. Even those
men who were physically well enough, if a bilthin,
wcre mentally deadly wcary. They had been
pUlling up with rougher conditi ons than most
l\larines plan to endure for any length of time.
One thing which could be done for morale would
be a return LO the cOen ivc. On I November
Ceneral Vandegrift launched an attack across the
Matani ko. The 115th Marines were sta lled for a
Lime on the right, but 215th moved ahead
smanl y all the left. The reserve battalion, 315th
wenl into line with I/Sth i\.1arines on 2
Len Admiral William F. Hulr Halsey, commanding oHicer
in (he: SOtuh Pacific, with Cen. Valldegrift (centre) during an
inspeClion I,our of the CuadaJcanaJ positions. NOH: sun helmets
with USMC insignia worn by Vandegrift and his aide on lhe
righl.
II
Interesting photo of new M4 Sherman tanks making practice
landings from an LeT outside the reef of Rua Sura Island,
near Guadalcanal. The original print shows that each bears on
the hull side a triangle reversed, a cartoon elephant, and a
nickname beginning with ' Doo . .. '; 'Doodlebug' (right) and
' Dood-it' (left ) are visible, and the former also seems to have a
pin-up on a dark panel forward of the name.
November, while 2/ 5th Marines mopped up
Japanese remaining in the 1/5th Marines' zone.
Some 450 Japanese were killed, although most did
escape, while Marine losses were about forty.
Oh 4 November other troops who had arrived as
reinforcements pushed through the Division's lines
westward. However, as they were moving forward,
word reached General Vandegrift that Japanese
troops had landed at Tetere, east of American
positions. He therefore halted the advance, leaving
some troops on the new perimeter and bringing the
others back as a precaution.
Meanwhile, work on a second airfield began at
Aola on the island's eastern side. It turned out the
land there was too marshy for a strip, so the site was
abandoned and the 2nd Raider Battalion, which
landed on Guadalcanal in October, began a long,
150-mile hike back from there through Japanese
lines along the Gavaga. The march finally ended
when they reached American lines on 4 December.
They killed 488 Japanese while on the way, losing
only seventeen dead and eighteen wounded them-
selves.
In mid-November the Army's Americal Division
had landed, and the Marines had to admit that the
First Division was officially 'no longer capable of
12
offensive operations.' The Division's final action
report notes: 'The cumulative effect oflong periods
of fatigue and strain, endless labour by day and
vigilance by night were aggravated to an alarming
degree by the growing malarial rate.'
By 7 December 1942, the anniversary of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the last of the
troops who had dealt the Japanese Empire its first
stinging blow were evacuated, and General Van-
degrift turned over his command to the Americal's
c o m m a n ~ The general watched the last of the
5th Marines embark, ' . . . some so weak they could
scarcely climb the cargo nets draped over the sides
of the fat transports. Two days later I walked to our
small cemetery called Flanders Field to take my
own farewell of the almost 700 officers and men of
my command who died in this operation. I looked
in silence on the rude crosses that bespoke valiant
deeds by great men.'
The Division, by taking and holding Guadal-
canal, had caused the Japanese to lose great
numbers of men and equipment and had driven a
wedge into their Pacific perimeter. A leading
Japanese Navy planner said later, 'After Guadal-
canal I knew we could not win the war. I did not
think we would lose, but I knew we could not win.'
Cape Gloucester
The veterans of Guadalcanal landed in Australia,
where they became part of that continent's defence
forces. A Division officer watched them land. 'The
men were ragged, still dirty, thin, anaemic,
shallow, listless. Just about one out of every ten of
them fell down, tumbling limply down the steep
ladder on their backs, landing pitifully on the
dock.'
The Division was camped near Melbourne
where, with tender, loving care from both drill
sergeants and local ladies, the men slowly recovered
their physical and mental health.
In July I943 a reconditioned First Division
received their first directive for an operation
against Cape Gloucester, New Britain. The oper-
ation had the purpose of taking a Japanese airfield
there which threatened the flank of an Allied
advance towards the Philippines. By 23 October
the last of the Division's troops had left Melbourne
for Milne Bay, New Guinea, where the men
practised landing manoeuvres, using the new
LSTs, LCIs, and LCTs. *
*Landing Craft
Many different models were built during the war.
Some of the basic characteristics of major repre-
sentative types are as follows:
Type LCM Displacement 22- S2 tons Dimensions
So x 14ft Draught 3-!-/4tft Load I x 30-ton tank or 60
troops.
Type LCV IP Displacement 8- I I-!- tons Dimensions
36 x 10Ft Draught 2-!-/3-!-ft Load I x 3-ton truck or 36
troops.
Type LCI (L) Displacement 234- 384 tons Dimensions
IS8-!- x 23Ft Draught 4il6tft Load 188 troops.
Type LCT S Displacement 143- 3 I I tons Dimensions
I I7-!- x 32ift Draught 3/4tft Load 3 x so-ton or
4 x 40-tol1 or S x 30-ton tanks, or 9 x 3-ton trucks.
Type LCT7 Displacement S I 3- 900 tons dimensions
2031 x 341 ft Draught 31/7 ft Load 3 x 40-ton or
S x 30-ton tanks plus S4 troops.
Type LCT2 Displacement 106S- 2 I 60 tons Dimensions
327i x soft Draught 3/9!ftLoad 18 x 3o-tol1 tanks or
.I x LCTS or 27 x 3-ton trucks plus 8 jeeps plus 177
troops.
All had top speeds in the range 9- 14 knots.
Armament was light anti -aircraft only, the smaller
types mounting a few machine guns and the larger
types, 20mm cannon in addition.
P ACIF IC OCEAN
N
t
!>lAlE IN f>1\ LES
At 3am on Christmas morning, I 943, the Division
got under way for its second amphibious assault of
the war. At 6am on 26 December the escorting
cruisers and destroyers opened fire on the en-
trenched Japanese on Cape Gloucester. At 7-46am
men of the 317th Marines were the first to hit the
beaches, followed two minutes later by the I/7th
Marines. The 'beach' turned out to be a fringe of
greenery overhanging the ocean, with a vast swamp
just beyond.
The plan called for the 7th and I st Marines to
land and move quickly to seize the airfield, while
the 2/Ist made a diversionary landing at Tauali.
The 5th Marines were in reserve. The landing
worked perfectly; the 21 I st Marines were un-
opposed, and the other units met only light
opposition. It wasn't until they got into the swampy
jungle headed towards the airfield that they ran
into a stiff Japanese defence. With the aid of some
Sherman tanks, however, the Marines pushed the
defenders aside, and all units were in their assigned
phase lines by the end of 'D-Day'. Casualties
among the Marines were only twenty-one killed
and twenty-three wounded, with at least one of
these crippled by a falling tree instead of enemy
fire .
The weather became the big problem. It began
raining by early afternoon on 'D-Day' and con-
tinued through the night, and then for five more
days. The Division's after-action report stated:
'Water backed up in the swamps in the rear of the
shore line, making them impassible for wheeled and
Part of the second wave of Marines landing at Cape Gloucester
from their shallow-draught LCI , characteristically loaded with
spare ammunition.
tracked vehicles. The many streams which emptied
into the sea in the beachhead area became raging
torrents. Some even changed course. Troops were
soaked to the skin and their clothes never dried out
during the entire operation.'
The second day's advance was slow. The few
tanks that did manage to get up proved a decisive
factor in breaking enemy defences. One tank
platoon commander recalled turning a corner and
running into aJapanese 7smm gun position. 'I saw
oneJap walk calmly over and pull the lanyard. The
shell- it was HE- hardly scratched the tank. They
were so astonished they just stood there while we
mowed 'em down and smashed the piece.'
AJapanese company attacked the 217th Marines
at about 2.Ispm on 27 December, but was easily
driven off with the loss of 466 Japanese against a
Marine cost of twenty-five killed and seventy-five
wounded.
The Sth Marines were sent against the airfield
from the south on 29 December while the 1st
Marines moved on it from the east. Because of the
appalling jungle, the I /Sth and 2/Sth Marines were
not in position until 3pm, and the attack began
then. By 6pm the I st Marines were on the airfield;
the 2/Sth Marines reached it by 7.30pm. On the
evening of the 29th the Japanese launched a banzai
charge on a narrow front held by the 2/ ISt Marines
at Tauali. A single gunnery sergeant with a light
machine gun broke up the attack, and the Japanese
then spent the rest of the night trying to break
through the battalion's lines in small groups. All
were unsuccessful. At noon on 3 I December the
United States flag was raised over a completely
secure Cape Gloucester airfield.
Once the airfield was taken, attention was drawn
to three hills which dominate Borgen Bay: Hill IS0,
Hill 660 and Aogiri Ridge. Troops holding these
hills dominate all of western New Britain. The 7th
Marines, reinforced by the 3/Sth Marines, were
sent towards this high ground. On S January the
battalions (from left, I/7th, 2/7th, 317th and 3/5th
Marines) set out in line through the swamps
towards the hills which rose out of the green carpet.
Combat correspondent Asa Bordages, with the
3/ Sth Marines, reported how that battalion came to
a slightly wider, less green spot of swamp.
'The Marines didn't know the creek was a moat
before an enemy strong point. They couldn't see
that the heavy growth across the creek was salted
with pillboxes- machine-gun emplacements
armoured with dirt and logs, some of them dug
several stories deep, all carefully spotted so they
could sweep the slope and both banks of the stream
with interlacing fire.'
The Marines tried to get across the creek under
covering fire. Private First Class Calvin B. King's
platoon actually crossed the stream four times that
day, only to fall back each time under smashing
fire. Only on the last occasion did they actually see
a single enemy soldier. 'They were just coming at us
through the trees. We were firing,' he said later,
'but they kept coming at us. There were too many
of them to stop. We had to pull out. Machine guns
were shooting at us from everywhere. And all them
Japs coming. We' d pull back a little way and stop
and fire, and then we'd fall back a little more.' Not
one crossing was successful.
All night long the Japanese directed their dive-
bombers on to the pinned-down Marines with their
tracer fire. On the morning of 3 January the
Japanese brought mortars into use. The Marines
tried once again to cross that bloody stream, and
again they failed. Snipers cut down survivors as
they tried to get back across the stream. One party
was forced under a bank, neck-deep in water, while
one of their platoon lay across a log in plain view of
both them and the Japanese. He'd been hit at least
twenty times by machine-gun fire; he was still
alive, calling, ever weaker, 'Here I am, Wills, over
here, I'm here! ' It WQuid have been certain death
to have gone after him, and the men stayed where
they were while his blood, and the blood of others,
flowed around their faces . Later they said that it
was harder to stay there, doing nothing and
listening to him, than anything else in the cam-
paIgn.
Finally the Sherman tanks came up. The creek
banks, too steep for them to traverse, stopped them.
An unarmoured bulldozer, the driver sitting naked
to enemy fire, then appeared. Corporal John E.
Capito drove the 'cat' pushing three loads from the
bank into the stream before being shot in the face.
Staff Sergeant Keary Lane and Private First Class
Randall Johnson crawled to the machine and,
using an axe handle to work the levers, got it
working again. Then Sergeant Lane got into the
driver's seat and began smoothing out the banks
again. He, too, was soon hit, but continued working
until nightfall. By then the banks were level enough
Marines warily follow Sherman tanks which blast Japanese
bunkers out of their path on the advance from the beach to
Cape Gloucester airfield.
Marines in action at Cape Gloucester; note Thompson gun
and pouches, grenades hooked to equipment, and fixed
bayonets. In the larger photo, immediately below the second
bogi e of the Sherman, a dog can be seen ; this beast became
quite famous, as he led the advance all day, barking without
pause!
16
for three Shermans to work their way across the L
creek and destroy two enemy bunkers. By 4 0
January both 3/5th and 317th Marines were across u
' Suicide Creek.' Then the whole force halted to t
reorgamze.
Meanwhile, back at Target Hill, which had been
captured the first day, at 540am on 3 January the
Japanese launched a two-hour-Iong banzai charge
which was beaten off easily. Marine deaths were
three; Japanese losses were over 200.
On 6 January, in driving rain, the forward
movement was Co. 'A', 1/ 7th Marines,
quickly ran into a stiff fire fight. Another bulldozer,
whose driver seemed to have a charmed life,
levelled stream banks and several Shermans crossed
and drove out the enemy, capturing three 37mm
guns and five machine guns. At the same time the
1 17th Marines took Hill 150, finding few defenders,
and the 3/5th Marines went on to Aogiri Ridge,
running into a position of some thirty-seven
interlocking bunkers which the J apanese planned
to hold at all costs. The Marines were stopped flat.
Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis Walt, 3/5th Marines
commander, was just about everywhere at once,
urging and encouraging his men. Once he joined
the crew of a 37mm cannon, helping manhandle it
into position and watching as it fired cannister
rounds into the dense rain forest of trees, vines,
shrubbery and pillboxes. Still the Japanese posi-
tion held.
At about I.30am on I o January the Japanese, as
they were so helpfully wont to do, leapt out of.their .
well-built bunkers and, screaming, charged the
Marines with swords and bayonets. This was just
what Colonel Walt figured they might do, and his
men were ready. A sheet of fire met the Japanese,
who charged into that certain death five times. The
colonel had one anxious moment when between the
fourth and fifth charges his most important
machine gun ran out of ammunition. It was a race
between the ammunition party and the Japanese to
reach the gun first. The Marines won. With that
the back of the Aogiri defence was broken.
An attack on the I 17th Marines the same night was
easily turned back. By noon on I I January the main
Japanese supply and bivouac areas around Borgen
Bay had been captured. Aogiri Ridge was later
nicknamed 'Walt's Ridge' by the Marines.
On 12 January scouts reconnoitred the last
bastion, Hill 660, which was defended by the
Japanese 2/141st Infantry Regiment. The 2/7th
Marines then dug in on the right flank of the
Borgen Bay task force. The fatigued and bloodied
3/5th Marines were held back to rest while the
317th Marines were sent directly up Hill 660 at
6.50am on 13 January. A force made up ofa hal..
track, two light tanks, ajeep, several 37mm guns, a
bulldozer and some specialized troops were senno
support the battalion. According to the official
report: 'Preceded by a heavy artillery preparation,
the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines advanced rapidly in
column of companies to the northern slope of Hill
660 and at 0930 started up its slopes.'
It really wasn't that easy. One private in the
attack recalled: ' You could hardly walk. If you'd
try to watch where you were stepping, the vines
would cut your face. AJap sniper hit my buddy in
the hip. I waited till he fired again, found him in a
tree, and let him have it. I shot five times, and he
dangled. He was tied in the tree. A BAR man
sprayed the J ap and he came bouncing down
through the limbs of the trees.' The Marines were
stopped and, under covering artillery fire, with-
drew.
The next day troops were sent around to the
south side, where they found few enemy troops.
Even though it was late in the day they pushed on
up. A combat correspondent with them wrote,
'Our boys were tired, wet to the skin, and going on
nerve alone. Not even Colonel Buse could explain
it, but spontaneously those bedraggled and be-
devilled Marines rose and charged that vertical face
of rock and clay. They had been broken into small
units by casualties and terrain and enemy fire, but
these small units just kept going. That night we
camped on the crest of Hill 660.'
The 3rd Battalion spent the morning of 15
January mopping up the slopes. The last fighting
here broke out at about 5.3oam on 16 January,
when two Japanese companies staged a typical
banzai charge, suffering a typical defeat.
When the fighting was over around Borgen Bay,
the Division was sent some sixty miles east along the
New Britain coast. The 5th Marines led the way,
being held up for five days until 25 January by
Japanese rearguards at the Natamo River before
getting across. By 21 February the Marines had
taken Karai-ai, some thirty miles east of Borgen
Bay. By 8pm on 25 February the 5th Marines'
command post was installed at Iboki, the end of the
Division's long march.
On 5 March the 5th Marines were loaded into a
motley naval convoy which then headed towards
Talasea, a small island on the eastern side of the
Willaumex Peninsula, some fifty-seven miles from
Iboki. The only air support the Marines enjoyed
was from a Piper Cub, whose pilot dropped eight
hand grenades on beachhead positions, while
'naval' gun fire was supplied by tanks firing from
LCMs! The I st and 2nd Battalions landed success-
fully by 8.35am on 6 March, under a hail of
Japanese mortar fire; this barrage landed in the
midst of an artillery battery which was just being
unloaded, but did not stop the infantry. The two
battalions dug in just beyond the beach and
awaited the 3/5th Marines, who did not get ashore
until just before dark on 7 March. The next day the
Marines pushed on towards the main Japanese
positions on Mount Schleuchter. Under fire from
mortars, artillery and small arms, the Marines
succeeded in clearing the area by about rpm on 9
March.
With New Britain secure the Navy wanted the
Division back under its control, while the Army
wanted it to stay in New Britain. The Navy finally
won, and by 4 May the Division's last personnel
boarded a ship bound for a rest camp in Pavuvu,
the largest island of the Russells. The tired men were
in no mood for the tiny, miserable, muddy, hot,
poorly-equipped coconut-growing island; when
they arrived, Pavuvu did not even boast any lights.
Lieutenant David M. Brown wrote home that on
Pavuvu ' . . . you have nothing much to think about
except the details of daily routine. The prospect of a
bottle of beer is a matter of interest and speculation
to us here. One lad wrote in his letter of the things
he bought at a recently opened PX [post
and a comb and handkerchiefs
and shoelaces, chewing gum and a towel you could
Newly arrived 'cast hull' M4A1 Shermans move off Cape
Gloucester beach and into the jungle; December 1943.
r8
get at the meanest ten-cent store. "They an
beautiful!" he says. And they fascinatin!
and novel as Robinson Crusoe's carpenter chest.'
One good thing about the spell on Pavuvu was
that many of the veterans who had been with the
Division from the beginning were rotated home-
260 officers and 4,600 enlisted men. They were sent
off by ship, the Division's band playing as they
embarked. After a variety of popular songs, the
band started up the Marine Corps hymn, 'From the
Halls of Montezuma.' Many veterans wept.
Peleliu
Replacements, many of whom were the first draftees
in Marine Corps history, had to be trained. The
Division returned to the practice manoeuvre field.
All the signs of another campaign were in the air.
The target was the Palau Islands, some 470 miles
east of Mindanao in the Philippines: another flank
to be secured as part of General MacArthur's
overall plan for the drive back to those islands. Two
islands were the targets. Angaur would be taken by
the Army's untried 81st Division, while the First
Marine Division would take Peleliu. This ocean
speck, some six miles long and two miles wide, was
expected to fall in what divisional commander
Major-General William H. Rupertus said would
be ' ... a quickie. Rough but fast. We'll be through
in three days.'
Japanese documents captured on Saipan in-
dicated that Peleliu's garrison totalled some 10,000
men. A coral reef lay some 500 yards off the
beaches, so large landing craft could not get close
enough to shore for the men to land directly off
them. Everyone who made a combat landing on
Peleliu would have to ride in on an amphibian
Artillerymen in camouflage-printed one-piece combat fatigues
and round Marine fatigue hats fire their 7.'imm pack howitzer
atJapanese positions near Cape Gloucester airfield.
tractor, the 'Amtrac'. Since Amtracs could not be
launched as far from shore as the 18,000 yards that
ocean-going transports needed to keep them safely
out of enemy artillery range, the men would have to
disembark first from the transports into LSTs.
Then, after a short ride, they would get out of the
LSTs and into Amtracs for the final leg of the
assault. An LST could carry no more than a
company at a time, so the assault would have to be
rather piece-meal. The goal was to get 4,500
Marines on Peleliu's beach in the first nineteen
minutes of landing. It would take considerably
longer for all the 28,484 men in the reinforced First
Division to land.
Peleliu's 10, 700-man Japanese garrison came
largely from the Army's elite 14th Division, with
Imperial Navy support. The commander was
Colonel Kunio Nakagawa, an excellent tactician.
He had built a fantastic array of bunkers and
19
interconnected pillboxes, some as many as six
slOries deep, made wi ,h "eel doors and gunports
whi ch commanded the whole island. His philo-
sophy was 10 avoid the ban:cai charges which
marked the defence of so many j apanese positions,
usually disastrously. I nstead he would let ,he
Americans land and come 10 hi s positions in the
mountains. As onen happened, j apa nese engineer-
ing skill s were so much in evidence that naval
gunfire from five batt leships, eight crui sers and
twenty-one destroyers fai led to do any not iceable
damage to the fonifications.
The plan was fo r the three regiments to land in
line on the beaches next to the airfield. The 1St
Marines would head directly across the airf,e1d, the
7th Mari nes would turn south IOwards ,he waiting
J apanese, and the 5th :Vlarines would dri ve nonh
againstJ apancse dug in on a ridge line. I f,hi s pl an
were to \ .... ork the Mari nes would have to meet only
token opposition. ' If the initial momcntum of the
assault did nOt overrun the rugged ground inl and
from the beach, the landing force would have been
placed in a ve ry diffi cult situation', lhe senior
Di vision Starr officers latcr wrOlC. 'The art ill ery
would have possessed no suitable position areas
frolll which LO suppon the atl ack; lhe tanks would
have had limi ted scope for employme nt ; and
logistical suppOrt over beaches commanded a t
short range by enemy weapons would have been
extremely difficult.
'This course o('acti on with 100 per cent successful
executi on would have been excell ent ; with less than
100 per cent execulion was dangerous. Experience
indicates thal the rapid execution of thi s course of
action would have been problematical. ' (This
masterpi ece of LOrlured j argon may be translated
thus: ' If the pl an succeeds compl etely, we'll be
OK; ifit is less than 100 per cent successful, we're in
bad trouble; and frankl y, our chances are poor 10
ni I. ' )
'D-Day' was '5 September, 944. It was a dark,
grey day. 'For an hour we ploughed IOward the
beach, the sun above us coming down through the
overcasllike a si lver burning ball, wrote arli st Tom
Lea, who rnadc the landing there. ' Pclcliu was
vei led with the smoke of our shelling. New hits
against that veil made brown and grey pi ll ars like
graceful ghost -trees by Claude Lorrain .
'Suddenl y I was completely alone. Each man
20
drew intO himself when he ran down that ramp.
in lO that fl ame. Those Marines flattened in tht
sand on that beach were dark and huddl ed like wei
rats in death as I threw my body down among
them. There was a rattle and roar under my helmet
while I undid the chin strap and smelled the
flaming oil and popping ammunition from the
burning LVTs around us. Men of the first wave had
penetra ted about twemy-five ya rds inland as I
looked up the sandy slope.'
\\'i thin a hal f hour General Rupertus learned
,hat the island's capture mi ght not be quick, but i,
would certainly be rough. One observation pl ane
reponed some twenty Amlracs burning off one
beach and eighteen off another. One of the Amtracs
which was hi t was the 1st command
vehicl e. Communications were lost between Di v-
ision and regiment , making the left Rank the weak
point of the assault.
By the afternoon it was obvious that the auack
was stall ed. The divisional reserve, the 2/7th
were ordered in. vVithout enough Am-
tracs, it was a job landing .the battalion on
beaches still under fire. The sun had burned away
the overcas, and turned the island's beaches into
one huge sizzling frying pan. About 4pm, in
an,i cipation of the expected japanese counter-
attack, the men were ordered to di g in wherever
they were. Most had not gOt nearl y as far as
originall y pl anned. Inc\'itably, a counter-attack
did hit the invaders; it was described by a wounded
corporal in the 2/ l st Marines:
"At 1715 someone shouted, "Here they come!1!
\ \l e kne\v it meant the J aps and nO( the water
wagon. I pushed down deeper in my foxhole; rifle
ready, I looked ou, over 'he airfi eld. From behind a
bombed-down hangar I saw a cloud of dust with
the ugly snout of a Nippon tank at the head of it,
then came another, then anotl)er from behind a
bunker, another from here and one from there.
Sure enough they are coming. j ap tanks pouring
out of their hiding places, dodging and swirling
crazil y about. All of us open fire with machine
guns, automat ic rifl es, small arms, bazookas, or
whatever we have. The j aps don' t give up, they
keep coming and coming rast, very cl ose now.
Things happened so fa" from here on in with these
tanks that I wa nt to tell you about onl y what
happened within ten yards of me.
Above: Landing craft away- heading for the shell-torn
beaches of PeleJiu.
Below: Holding the line against coullter-attacks at Cape
Gloucester, these !\ Jarincs are armed with (top to bottom) the
MI .30 cal. carbine, the Browning MI9 17 water-cooled .30
cal . Olachincgun, and an M 1928 Thompson sub-machine gun.
21
'D-Day' aL Pc1c1iu - Marines take cover behind a DUKW on
the fire-swepl beach, while one of many 'Amtracs' losl that day
burns in the background.
'A tank rushed for the machine gun on my right ,
"Stoney" stands up in the foxhol e (he's a lad with
guts) and lets go a burst of automatic fire. The tank
was not ten foot away when it burst into flame,
leaving a lrailing fire as il Sli ll roll ed (arward. The
lower halfof a twisted and burntJap body fell nOl a
pace from mc. The Marine machine gunners
jumped to safety just in time as the tank came
crushing over their nest, smashing the weapon to
bits; still il rolled on, ran over the roxhol e or
"Chi ck" ... "Chi ck" came crawling Oll t as the
tanks moved on, with onl y singed eyebrows. The
Sham bows' tank gave a final lunge as it blew up
about ten yards behind our lines. Don ... rushed
lip LO give the tank a sq uirt with his flame-thrower,
bu t only to meet a quick death as the turret gun
spoke, catching him directl y in the chest. OneJap
raised his head above the tUITel to have a look at the
situation. He found out the situat ion all riglll, and
fell back into the lank onl y to be pushed OUl again
by other Japs insi de and to fall down alongside of
hi s machine. I n the boltom of these lanks is an
escape hatch ; oneJ ap rushing out of this hatch met
instant death. Still another J ap inside raised a
22
bloody and dirty whi te rag, and got hi s hand shot
off. Then hand grenades were LOssed inLO the tank. '
The li ght tanks were stopped bysmall arms and a
few Shermans which had survived the landing. The
attack had hit the wrong troops. Had the tanks hi t
the hard-pressed 2Jlst Marines they might have
destroyed the landing.
All ni ght lhe J apanese kept lip their fire, yelling
through megaphones, 'Amclicans, Amelicans, pigs,
dogs, Amelican pigs and dogs, you die, you die, you
die!'
'Come on in and see what we did to your tanks!'
a Marine yell ed back. ' We' re using them to pack
fish in .'
Al ni ght the 1st Marines totalled up their
casualties and round some five hundred men had
been hit , abou t a sixth or the whole regiment.
Reinforcemellls were pull ed in from beach and
service parucs.
The next morning the attack gOt under way
again. The 7th Marines were to take the high
ground , whi le the 5th crossed the airfield and the
1st took the ground already nicknamed 'Bloody
Nose Ridge'. The 7th Marines had the toughest
fi ght ahead of them, but by the end of the day they
had pushed the J apanese back enough to all ow
artillelY to land and join the fIght. The 1st Marines
also faced tough resistance. The left Aank was
pinned, but the ri ght continued LO move rorward
despite heavy losses. Over the two days the 1st
Marines lost 33 pCI' cent of their men. The 5th
Marines had things a bit easier crossing the ai rfi eld.
Thal ni ght found the J apanese agai n bothering
the dug-in Marines. Captain George Hun t's
Company ' K' was one of those hit:
'The battlc broke with a tremendous, angry roar
as though a fi endish blast had shattered the doors of
hell and exposed to human ears the horribl e
turmoil which bawled and wrilhed within. At the
one hoarse cry, HThere they arc! They're comi n' in
on us!" lhe entire line opened lip simultaneollsly,
bursting in to an uncontroll ed din that stirred the
most furious, savage instincts of a man. I found
myselr bell owing unti l I thought my lungs would
crack- "Give 'em hell ! Kill everyone of the
bastards !"
The J aps were answeri ng wi lh grenades and
mOrlars and riRes. Again 1 heard the \.vhirring or
shrapnel and the whine of bullets, many or which
were smacking inLO the rocks, ri cocheting and
burning crazy trails in the air. The Ja ps were
assaulting us Wilh slampcding rury, wave arlcr
wave, charging blindl y into our lines and the hail of
bull ets and shrapnel which we poured into thelll .
Above the uproar I heard their devilish screams,
'Ban<.ai, banzai !" ,
Simi lar attacks on othcr sectors were beaten off,
whil e some of the Marine positi ons were subj ected
to mortar and sniper fire only.
On the 17th the 7th Marines moved ahead
stead il y. That morning the 1St Marines, their
ballered battalions lined up from west to east in the
sequence 3rd, 1St and 2nd, pushed forward against
' Bl oody Nose Ridge'. The 2nd was stopped on Hill
200 but, supported by artillery, pressed on regard-
less of great losses. The 1St moved ahead amazingly
easil y ror an hour until it ran into a concrele
blockhouse the size of a small block of Aats. Some
twelve pil lboxes supported the position. Fire from
the 14-inch guns of the USS Mississippi was call ed
down, but lhe sturdy building still stood. Under
cover or the naval fire, however, the Marines by-
passed the positi on.
_ - __ -"'lIIIIIII_ ...
. --,"

The shallow lagoon enclosed by the reef 500 yards out frOin
Pcleliu beach was a handicap; here, Marines manhandle
drums of fuel and water across lhe lagoon, while landing ships
stand in outside the reef.
Concentrated J apanese nre forced both the 1St
and 2nd Batlalions to keep up the impetus of their
allack raLher Lhan SLOp and reorganize. Using
Sherman tanks, bazookas and Rame-throwers, the
1St Battalion pressed on, ending up on the forward
slopes of lhe first line of hills by evening. The 3rd
Ballali on, meeting less resistance than the other
two, had advanced nearl y 700 ya rds by ni ghtfall.
Losses were shocking. Pri vate Russell Davis, with
the 1St Marines, recalled rcaching the cliff:
' We had los t heavil y, ever since the beach, but I
had not reali zed ho\"., bad the losses were until our
compani es moved Out on the c1.iff. Clawing and
crawling up the c1if went platoons that were no
more than squads, and compani es that were no
Illore than large platoons. I counted one platoon. It
mustered eigh teen men on that push. But they went
up. '
Tha t ni ght the Japanese allacked again, hitling
the line between the 1St and 2nd Battalions. There
simpl y weren't enough men to stop Lh em. Qui ckl y,
Di vision sent the 2/ 7t h Marines' Co. 'F' to plug the
gap, foll owed the next morning by that battalion's
Co. ' E. The line held, but just barely.
On the fourth day, 18 September, some I ' 5
pi oneers, the last of the reserve, were senl to lhe
batlcred 1St Marines . Survi\'ors of the I / I Sl
were pulled out of line. The regiment 's
line was now made up of the 31 1St, 2/7th and 21 1St
Marines. The line moved on, onl y to meet the
heaviest artill ery and mon ar concentration of the
emire campaign. At abou t noon, the 2/7th Marines
r.nall y had to pull back out of range. Company ' B',
rj l st was rushed LO reinforce the hard-hit
21 1St ]\i[arines. Very li ttl e ground had been gained,
b Ul 1St i\1arines' losses tOtall ed 1,500 f"ll cn .
The 5th Marines were selll to occupy nearby
islands, whil e the bu lk of the 7t h continued to mop
up J apanese dug in to the south .
On the 19th, Colonel Puller's 1St Marines again
rose from their foxholes and half-stumbl ed. half-
staggered towards the waitingJ apanese. On the left
the 3/ 1St Marines adva nced almost four hundred
ya rds before coming under fire. I n the centre, the
2/7th Marines slowl y worked their way along to
contact the 31 1St The ri ght side of , Bl oody
lose Ri dge' was hit by the 2/ 1St Marines, who
gained some fi ve hundred ya rds. Company ' A' ,
' 11St a total of fi fty -six men left out of an
authori zed establishmelll of 235, passed through
the 2/7Lh Marines against tough opposit ion. When
Co. "A' returned only sjx men were on their feel.
Company 'C', ' I ,st Marines, was scm to j oin the
2/ , st Marines and fought to the top of Hill 100.
There they found themsel ves cut 00' and sur-
rounded. The company's handful of men then
fought oIr constant J apanese attacks. With their
ammunition just about gone, they kill ed J apanese
with rocks, ammuniti on boxes and bare fi sts. They
even tossed some 00' the hill 's steep sides. The
company commander, Captru n Everett P. Pope,
received the Medal of Honor for the stand .
The sixth day, 20 September, dawned. The ' I , st
and 2/ 1S t Marines and the Di vision Recon-
naissance Company were merged on the right,
rein forced by some dozen machine guns manned
by clerks, cooks and mechani cs. \ Vi th the dawn
came the expected J apanese art ill ery fire whi ch
stopped the 1St IVl arines' advance. In the late
afternoon the ' / 7th and 3/7th Marines replaced the
few survivors still standing from the ' I ' st and 2 / 1 st
-Marines.
The 3/ 1 st Marines advanced a shan di stance on
2 I September, whil e (he o[her units were stili
stall ed on the hill s. Casualti es fo r the 1St IVlarine!
totall ed 1,749 men by ni ghtfall on that day. On thl
22nd, the I/ l st Nl arines survivors wcre sent to the
3/ Ist but, even so, the 1St 1Vi arines virtuall y ceased
to exist as a usefu l organi zat ion.
By the end of a week it was obvious that the
Pel eliu campaign was going to need reassessment:
The 8 Tst Infantry Di vision from nearby Anguar
was brought in as reinforcements. On 23 Septem
bel' , a t about 2pm, the 8lSt's 32 1St Infantry
Regiment reli eved the 3/ 1St Marines. The Marines
weregjven a three day 'rest' on Lh e beach, and then
those who were not badl y "vounded were sent up LO
other units as repl acements- not a popul ar move,
but losses everywhere were heavy and replacements
nil.
The 7th i',,1 arines were ordered to take the 1St
Marines' old objective. They began to look for an
easier way into the Japanese posiLi on than the onc
Colonel Pull er had tri ed. The 217th Marines went
along the east coast, whil e the ' 17th I'vIarines went
along the west coast road. The ' / 71.h and 3/7th
Nl adncs then attacked frolll the nort h whil e the
2/7th Marines came in from the wes t.
On 4 October the 3/7th Marines weill a f,er a
prominent hill , ' Baldy Ridge', taking three small er
hill s fi rst. From one of those hi ll s, Co. 'L' was sent to
take a fo urth hill ri ght under the ridge. They scaled
the almost venical sides, reaching the tOp without
seri ous loss. Once there they found a cave which
they sprayed with small arms fire. This noise
attracted J apanese noti ce, and they opened fire on
the Americans. The platoon leader di ed, wrote a
combat correspondent with the men, when 'bull ets
tore him from hi s grip on the cl iffside where he ,,,ras
trying LO withdraw hi s men to safer positi ons, and
he fel l to hi s death on the ravine 0001' many feet
below.' The men still on the hill were trapped.
Under smoke grenade cover they tri ed to escape,
many more dying in the process . Out of the forty-
eight men who had cl imbed the hill , eleven
survived.
On 6 October the 7th Marines were withdrawn.
Their casualti es were now of the same order as
those suIrered by the 1St I\ll arines. It was the LUi'll of
the 5th ;\1arines to be thrown against those terribl e
ridges.
The regiment, under Colonel Harold D. Harri s,
A Guadalcanal, 1942
B Peleliu, 15 SepteInber 1944
C Okinawa, April 1945
......
c -<- - .....
D Okinawa, May 1945
1
2 3 4
11 12
was placed in a surprISIng position. The colonel
chose li nes somewhat back from the origi nal ones,
with his fl anks resti ng on the beach. It looked to the
J apanese like the stan or a retreat, and that night
they began a seri es or small attacks with arti ll ery
fire. The 5th held. On 25 September, eleven days
arter landing, the regiment attacked the hill
commanding the northern part of Pclcliu. The
Japanese held firm so the regiment swi rl ed around
them like a stream around rocks.
As they bypassed the J apanese, still pushing
north, the 5th came under fu"c from positions on Lhe
island of'Ngesebus, only a rew hundred yards away
rrom Peleliu. TheJapanese had turned a phosphate
ractory there into a blockhouse. Colonel Harris
call ed in naval and artillery fire and sent a
battali on to take that island and Kongauru and
Murphy Islands, whi ch it achi eved by 28 Septem-
ber. SomcJapancsc remained on the nonh-weslcrn
tip of Ngcscbus, but their threat was minimal, and
the 321St In rantry Regiment secured and gar-
risoned the island.
With the islels captured, the 5t h Marines
returned to what the Di vision's final report' call ed
' ... a slow, slugging, yard -by-yard struggle to blast
the enemy rrom his last remaining stronghold in the
high ground .' They cominued to dig ou t the
Japanese, using combinat ions of tanks and in-
fantry, flame-throwers and machine gunners, and
hand grenades and submachine guns. On 12'
October the 'assault phase' orthe Peleliu campaign
was declared Q\er. At3pm on 13 October, the 32 1 st
1nran lIY Regiment was ordered to replace the
Division's remaining regiment, the 5th Marines, in
the line. The 81st Inran lIY Di vision fought on. It
was not until 25 November that Tokyo received
word from Pelcliu, 'All is over on Pelcliu. '
The last Japanese to give up there were a group
or twenty-six soldiers and sai lors, led by a lieu-
tenant , who did nOt surrender until 21 April 1947.
The garrison had rought magnificently. It took
some 1,589 rounds or ammunition of all SOrts to kill
each derender.
For the taking or Peleliu the First Marine
Division was awarded the Presidential Uni t
Citation.
Okinawa
After Pclcliu, the i v i s i o n ~ s survivors returned to
Pavuvu, happy for once to see the place. Major-
General Pedro Augusto del Vall e, the previous
'Di varty' commander, was named to command the
Di vision. After resting, training new recruiLS and
generall y binding its wounds, the Division headed
olf on 15 March 1945 ror its last landing.
The target was Okinawa Shima, the largest or
the Ryukyulslands, onl y 325 miles south orJ apan.
The island had long been held by the J apanese.
The garri son, commanded by Lieutenant-General
Mitsuri Ushijima, included the 62nd Di vision
deployed south and east or Okinawa's capital,
Naha. To the north was the 24th Di vision. Between
the divisions were scattered the 1st and 2'3rd
Medium Artillery Regiments, the 7th Heavy
Artillery Regiment and the I loth Heavy Artillery
Batlaiioll , as well as three machine-gun companies,
four anti-aircraft battalions and various monar,
rocket and anti-tank troops. Nort h or the 24th
Di vision was the Bimbo Tai (, Have Nothing'), an
organization or the 44th Independent Mixed
Brigade.
The derence plan called ror al lowing the Ameri-
cans to land, and then holding them north ofNaha
and the ancient capital orShuri Castle. The terrain
there was characterized by heavily wooded hills,
deep ravines and many caves . The plan was
designed to neu trali ze American firepower, es-
pecially that or tanks. General Ushijima told his
officers that 'The enemy's power lies in his tanks. It
has become obvious that our general battle against
the American forces is a battle against their r-.,r-I
[sic 1 and :v!-4 tan ks.' The only Japanese armour on
Okinawa was the under-strength 24th Tank
Regiment , with (ou rt een medium and thineen
light tanks.
The Americans planned to bring some 180,000
troops to the island ; rour divisions would land
abreast. The First 'N[arine Division was to land in
the very centre between the ai rfi elds at Yontan and
Kadena. They expected heavy losses. There was a
sea wall behind the beach which the men would
have to climb, and a slope slowly rose up behind
that - perrect conditions ror derenee.
' D-Day', call ed ' L' or 'Love' Day in thi s
" en
I
~ ~
a
.... ..... -'
-6-
,...;-
.-
The 1St i\.larincs move oH'Peleliu beach- the firing Line isjust beyond the smoke rising in Lhc centre
background. Olhers dig in on the crowded strip of crushed coral at the edge orthe waler. In the
original print Oflhis remarkable battle photo, more than seventy Mannes can be counted.
~
,.'
operati on, was I April ' 945. A seven-day-I ong
preliminary bombardment dropped 27,226 rounds
or naval gunfire on J apanese positions. At 4.06am
on I April , the signal ' Land the landing rorce' weill
out, and at 7am troops, covered by ten battleships,
nine cruisers
l
twenty-three destroyers and 177
gunboa ts, di sembarked into their barges. They
headed the 4,000 yards to the beach. A board the
ships, olhers waited tensely.
'\Vhat's happening in there son?', asked a
doctor, of the o nl y wounded man to arrive at hi s
floating hospital a coupl e or hours arter the landing
began.
'Don't ask me, Doc,' said the Nlarine, who had
lost a finger-lip in an accidenl. 'All I know is
everybody's going in standing up.'
There was no Japanese opposition.
By 9.45 the 7th Marines were through the vi ll age
or obe, their first priority objective, and the 5th
Marines were 1110re than a thousand yards inland.
Two ballali ons or the I st Marines and the 4/' Ilh
~ a r i n e Artillery, lhe Division's reserve, were
ordered in, and the divisional command post was
set up at So be a t 4.30 that arternoon. The amazed
Marines were ordered to dig in ror the ni ght. It
truly had been a ' love day'.
The next morning the Di vision moved out at
7. l sam, in cool weather and over bea utiful
count ryside. Again they met no J apanese oppo-
sition. A puzzled General del Vall e tOld reponers,
' I don' t know where the Japs are, and I can' t olfer
you any good reason why they let us come ashore so
easil y. We' re pushing across the island as rast as we
can move the men and eq uipmenl.' On the third
ciay,jusl before nOOl1 , the Di vision Reconnai ssance
Company, riding jeeps, reached Okinawa's far
shore. They were then ordered to scout the Ka tchin
Peni nsu la, which they did, whil e the whole
Di vision reached the island's rurther side by that
evening. By 4 April the whole area assigned ror the
Di vision to capture, an area whi ch it had been
thought would take firt een days to secure, was in
American hands.
The Division scltJ ed intO a rou tine of patrols
while the Anny's 7th, 96th and 27 th Inrantry
Divi sions were pushing sou th agai nst the real
Japanese line or derence. The Army's dri ve was
slow, too slow, and casualti es were heavy. On 24
April the Di vision was oidered to get ready to join
them, and on 27th April it was sent to reli eve the
27th In rantry Di vision.
On go April the Di vision, whi ch had moved
through the 27th Di vision's positi ons the day
berore, went into the attack. The 3/ 1st Mari nes,
attempting to take Mi yagusuku, were hit by
concentrated small arms, monar and artillery fire,
and rell back to their start positions. A J apanese
attack hit Co. ' K' , 1St IV[arines. Mud had put all
but two riAes in the company out of action, but the
Marines beat ul eJapanese back with bayonets and
clubbed riAes.
The nex t day the 1St Tank Ballalion sent three
gun and rour fl ame tanks to support the 3/ 1st
M.arines in the second allempt on Mi yagusuku.
Some 300 gallons or napalm were laid on the
village, and Co. ' L' then passed through it easi ly,
roll owed by the rest or the baltalion in earl y
afternoon.
At 2am on 4 May, the II Ist Marines (along with
some armoured Amtracs from the 3rd Armored
Amphibian Tractor Battalion) were in position
along the beach south or Machinalo airfi eld when
they saw, in the dim moonli ght, approaching
barges. Fl ares were fired: it was a Japanese landing
party. The Marines opened up with everything
they had and the 217 ul Marines were alerted as a
possibl e reserve in case or a breakthrough. By 4am
the bu lk or the J apanese 26th Shipping Engineers
were dead or wounded. Among their bodies one
Marine round a carri er pigeon in its cage. The bird
was released with a note attached to its leg: 'We arc
reLUrning your pigeon. Sorry ,\le cannot reLUrn
your demoli tion engineers.' The few survivors were
routed out by a war dog platoon.
The Di vision raced the mainJ apanese line held by
the 62nd Di vision ; thi s ran along low coral ridges
with Ji chaku on the ri ght, Hill Nan and Hill 60 in
the centre, and Wilson's Ridge and Awacha Pocket
on the lert. Behind that lay another ridge and the
town or Dakeshi. Further on there was a draw in
rront or Shuri , behind whi ch were another town
and ridge, both named Wana.
On 5 May the 1/5th Marines, supported by
firteen gun and two fl ame tanks, started working its
way slowly through this maze or ridges and
pillboxes. The typical firefi ght range was so short
that grenades were the main weapons used. The
J apanese 23rd Independent In rantry and 14th
27
Independent Machine Gun Batt ali on held their
positions on the Awacha Pocket, whil e heavy rains
on 7 May slowed Ameri can tanks to a craw!'
Meanwhile the 1st !'vl arines faced equall y slow,
bloody fi ghting for Hills Nan and 60. On 9 May the
2/ 1st Marines, supported by name-throwing tanks,
worked their way up those hill s whil e the Il l st
Marines pressed eastward .
AJ apanese 47mm anti -lank gun on Awacha was
finall y sil enced on 10 Mayas the 2/5u1 Marines
went up the north slopes of Wil son's Ridge and the
1/5th Marines up the wes t side. On II May
Wilson's Ridge and Awacha were in Ameri can
hands. Some twel ve gun and three fl ame tanks
j oined in thi s final push, supporting the 1/5th
Marines.
The baltered 5th Nfarincs were then all owed a
short rest and were replaced in the line by the 7th
Marines, JUSt in time for the 3/ 7th to turn back,
with support from four (Di van y' battali ons, a
J apanese att ack. As the J apanese fell back, l /7th
Marines passed through the 3rd Battalion' s lines on
their own attack. They were stopped almost
immedi atel y, and the call went out for tanks to
come up. These tanks were nOt onl y used for
offensive operati ons, but also as ambul ances. A
tank would drive astride a wounded man and pull
A l\'l arinc squad in combat on 'Suicide Ridge'; in the cClllrc,
one throws a ''' Ioloto\' cocktail' which he has just IiI rrom the
burning brand held by the man behind him. The i\ lari nc on
the right has lhe dischargt r for the 1\ 19:\ I grenade fitted (0 his
Garand. and a .45 cal. pistol hoist('l'cci at his hip.
hilll up to safety through the bell y escape hatch.
\ Vounded Ill en were also carri ed on tank backs, the
turrets serving as shields frol11 enemy fire.
The a ttack went on. The 2/ 7th was at tll e foot of
Dakeshi ridge by II May . The next Illorning the
town of Dakeshi was a ttacked by 1/ 7th Marines. A
pl aLOon leader, riding on a fl ame-thrower tank, led
the way, followed by another name-thrower tank
a nd a gun tank. Reaching a positi on overl ooking
J apanese emplacements, they halted and worked
over the ground with 75mlll guns, .30 calibre
machine guns and fl ame-throwers. Then tll e tanks
fell back and infantry came up to take the ground.
By the ni ght of 12 May tll e 7th Marines had secured
Dakeshi 's crest.
The next ridge linc was Wana, held by the
J a panese 62nd Di vision's 64th Brigade al ong with
surviyors of the 15th , 23rd and 273rd Independent
Infantry Battali ons, 14th Independent Machine
Gun Battalion and 81 st Fi eld Anti-Aircraft Bat-
tali on. Company ' E', 7th :VIarines, first sent a
platoon towards \Nana Draw, where they were
pinned down. At aboul 6pm, under smoke cover,
the platoon pull ed out , whil e the whole battalion
pulled back to Dakeshi that ni ght.
The 1/ 1 st Marines reli eved the tired 2/7th
Ma rines during the ni ght of 14- 15 May. Once in
positi on, they turned bac k three separate auacks,
aided by naval gunfire, artill ery and air suppOrt.
The fI ghting had so weakened the regiment that the
' ! ISt was formed into 3 single company ,\,hi ch was
reli eved by ul e 3/ 1S( l\'Iarines on 17 May. This
bauali on aU3cked constantl y for the nex l three
days, but could onl y gain a Sill all foothold on Wana
Ridge.
The ridge's weak point appeared to be on its
ri ght , and ul e only way to break through would be
by combined in fantry-armour tacti cs; but heavy
rains had mired down the armour, and lhe bani e
became a stalemate.
On 16 Maya force of twelve M-4Shcrman tanks
and four M- 7 Pri est tank destroyers joined the 5th
Marines in attacking Hill 55, whi ch guarded ule
way in to Wana Draw. Colonel A. J. J eb' Stuart,
who cOl11manded the 1st Tank BaLlali ol1 , later
described the grinding, non-Slap advance:
'Tanks and fl ame tanks ranged ou t to positi ons
up to eight hundred yards beyond our front lines
systemati call y des troyed positi ons on forward and
reverse slopes within that distance by point-blank
7smm gunfire into cave interiors, and by Aame
allack. In additi on, tanks destroyed in a simil ar
fashion enemy direct fire positions on fonvard
slopes for an additional 1,500 yards to the front
beyond the farthest point of tank advance.
' In order to give the enemy no opportunity to
reorganize and reinforce, two rclays of tanks were
necessary 1O permit reamling while maintaining a
cominuous attack. This "processing" then per-
mined the infantry to advance lines some five
hundred yards wilh relatively light losses, using the
neutrali zati on support of preceding tanks and
artill ery. Especially important was the fact that the
ground so gained by "processing" was tenable, and
held. The procedure was then repeated in a zone
extended farther to the fron t.'
During the fierce figilling on Pclcliu a wounded Marine,
already labt lled rOl-thc medics, is given a drink by a rully laden
buddy.
By 20 May, Hill 55 had fallen. The I st Marines
conLinucd their push on Walla, but the terrain and
the mud prevented the repetition of tank-infantry
' processing'. Finally, on 23 May, the 1St Pioneer
Battalion wenl fOr\\'ard LO fire raw napalm over the
creSlLO burn the J apanese oul. Even then, enemy
mortar and arti ll ery fire fell among the I st Mari nes.
Still, vital positions were falling to the Americans.
A J apanese stalT offi cer later said that lhey reali zed
that their forces would be cut 01T and destroyed
where they were unless they fell back to another
derensive linc. 'ConsequenLi y,' he said, 'il was
decided to retreat in accord with the Army policy of
protracting the struggle as long as possible.'
On 26 May, J apanese troops were spotted
retreating by alen air patrols, and two days later a
pat rol of the 1/5th Marines discovered Shuri had
onl y a few defenders left. Quickly Lhe whole
ballalion pushed forward, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Ri chard P. Ross Jm, 3/ lst Marines, raised an
American Aag over Shuri Castl e on 31 May.
The Di vision received a Presidential Unit
Citation for Lhe 'bi tter siege' ofShuri . The First had
paid for the citation in blood. Some 180 officers and
4,065 enli sted Mari nes from replacement bat-
tal ions had to be sent into its ranks by the end of
May.
The Di vision pushed on in June over rutted,
muddy roads after the retreating J apanese. Some
road surfaces were nothjng more Lhan 'mud soup',
three feet deep. Vehicl es were abandoned. lI en a t
the front found it difficult to get enough to eat, since
suppli es could not be brought up. Some suppli es
were dropped by air. Major-General]. L. Bradley,
commanding the Army's 96th I nfaIllry Division,
gave the Marines rations frolll Army supplies. The
general noticed that the Marines ' . . . were not
equipped or organi zed for a protracted campaign. I
was glad to assist in suppl y, air drops, and care of
their wounded. They were fine comrades and co-
operated to the fullest extent. '
One private of the 3/ I st Marines said of IfJ une, a
day he spent in miserabl e, driving rain, deep in
mud and under enemy fire, 'This day was probably
the most miserable speIll on Okinawa by men of
this battalion.'
The 1St l\1arines, on the Di vision's left, ran into
J apanese on Yuza Hill on 10 June. Charging
through sloppy ri ce paddies, then across a stream
and a railroad track, Co. C' lost 75 of its 175 men in
this action alone-but by noon they were on Yuza.
On I I June Lhe 1St Marines took Hill 69. The
Japanese counter-attacked, using novel tacti cs. A
large band of Okinawans tried to enter Maline
lines. II turned out that every fifth 'civilian' was a
J apanese soldi er. Suddenly they broke away from
the real civilians and charged Lhe Marines. Despite
the confusion, the Marines killed everyone of the
Japanese.
The 7th Marines, on the right, passed through
the villages ofDakiton, Hanj a, and Zawa, reaching
the coastal city ofItoman on 7 June, an advance of
10,000 yards in a week. With 11Oman's caplLire, the
Di vision had a pan, which solved its suppl y
problems. Then the 7th Marines ran into J apanese
dug in on the ridge line JUSt beyond !toman, call ed
Kunishi.
The attack on Kunishi was unusual in thal il was
one of the very few ni glll allacks the Americans
ever made during the Paci fi c War. At 3.30am on 12
June the I /7th and 2/7th Marines attacked a totall y
surpri sed J apanese garrison, and quickly took
possession of the crest. IThe silualion,' General del
Vall e said later, 'was one ofLhose tacti cal oddities of
this peculiar warfare. We were Oil Lhe ridge. The
J apanese were ill it, both on Lhe forward and reverse
slopes.'
Reinforcemeills could not get across the open
canefield to aid the troops on the ridgehead, who
were counler-attacked in the morning. A pI a LOon
was senl in on tanks, six men LO a lank; the tanks
later brought back the wounded. Other tanks
brought up ammunition, waler and plasma to Lhe
defenders. These tanks saw lilli e actual fighting
themselves. By I 3J une the Marines were in comrol
of the lidge, although some J apanese were still
clinging to caves on both sides and would have to be
rooled out. h was a cavC-LO-cave fighl, with tanks
bringing oUlthe wounded. Some twenty-one tanks
were destroyed or damaged in the fight around
Kuni shi. Artill ery was also of great use in the fights,
breaking up counter-attacks before Lhey began.
One battali on commander later said, ' Irthe tank-
infanlry team was the offensi ve weapon, our
arti ll ery was ou r best defence. Not since Guadal-
canal had the average infantryman realized how
important il was to him.'
The 2/Sth Marines were sent in to ta ke [he
eastern pan of Kunishi. On Lhe night of 7- 8 June
the 7th Marines on Kunishi were relieved by the
8th Marines, who had been a tLached to the
Divi sion . Taking the ridge had cost I, I 50 casual-
ties, but the back of organized J apanese resistance
\Vas broken.
Opposi te : PeJeJiu, October 19+4 another example of the
extraordinary work of US combat photographers. With the
smoke of combat risi ng in the teft background, inl'w lry and
Shermans of the 18l Division move into 'The Horseshoe'. The
small pond barel y vis ible on the vall ey floor beyond the large
si nkhole in the foreground was the only source of water for
ncarby Japanese dug into the hillsides; many were killed as
they tried to creep down to fill their canteens aftcr dark.
Okinawa, late r.., llarch [945 make ,111 aSlolllshingiy
cas)' landing 011 the Jap-hcld island. Note lhat some wear
ratigue caps beneat h thei r helmets.
On 21 June General shij ima and hi s chi ef of
slaO' eommilled seJlpuku. The Okinawa campai gn,
whi ch cosl lhe Di vision 1,1 15 kill ed, 6,745 wound-
ed and 4 ' mi ssing, was over.
On 27 May 1945, Lil e Di vision began buildi ng ils
camp on u1e MOLObu Peninsul a, Okinawa. On 6
Augusllhe Uniled Slales dropped an atomi c bomb
on Hiroshima. On 8 August the Soviel Uni on
declared war on J apan. On 9 Augusl the second
aLOmi e bomb was dropped on Nagasaki . On 10
Augusl the J apanese olTered LO surrender. On 14
Augusl u1e J apanese accepled the Allies' lerms of
surrender.
' A 10l of us gOl drunk,' recall ed one Di vision
member of the day J apan surrendered, 'and ran
around like chi ckens wilh our heads cul off; bUl I
fel l, and I lhink olhers fcl l, il was like doing what
we were expected lO do. Besides, it wasn't a very
good place to celebrate. [t scemed irreverenl. It was
onl y days before that your buddies had been dying.
There were slill 10ls of wounded men around in
hospi tals.'
= ritual suicide, usually blll inaccurately tt'mu .. "<i horo kiri in
the West.
On 26 September the Di vision embarked, nOl for
home, but for ano ther overseas tour. On 30
September the lroops landed in Tanku, China, and
the next day were in Ti entsin, where a parade of
honour was heJd fonhem. Elemenls or the Di vision
were sent on LO Peiping, while olhers stayed in
T ientsin . The Di vision's j ob was to 'carry out the
provisions of the surrender and to mairnain law and
order in the T ienlsin, Tangshan and Chinwanglao
area.' This lour, whi ch brought them in lO almost
consi..ant brushes and 'i ncidcrHs' with guerrill as)
bandi ts and members of the Chi nese Commun isl
Army, lasted umil they fi nall y returned lO lhe
United Stales in October 1946. It had been a long
war for the IVI arincs'.
The Division
Organization
Guadalcallal:
1St Marines, 5l h Marines, 7t h Marines, 2nd
r-ifarines (lhree battalions each), I I th Marines
(Any. ) (four battalions), 1St Tank Bn., ISl Service
Bn., 1St Special Weapons Bn., 1St Pioneer Bn., 1St
Engineer Bn., 1St Parachute Bn., 1St Amph. Trac.
Bn., 1St Medical Bn., 1St Raider Bn., 3rd Defense
Bn., Div. HQ Bn. Attached subsequently: I64th
Inf. Rgt., US Army.
Cape GLoucester:
1St Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three
battalions each), Div. HQ Bn., 1St Tank Bn., 1St
Service Bn., 1St Motor Transport Bn., 1St Special
Weapons Bn. , 1St Amph. Trac. Bn., 1St Medical
Bn., 17th Marines (Eng. ) made up of the I'St Bn.
(Eng.), 2nd Bn. (Pion.) and 19th Naval Cons. Bn.,
12th Defense Bn., and 11th Marines (Arty.) (four
battalions) .
Peleliu:
1St Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three
battalions each), Div. HQBn. , 1St Tank Bn., 1St
Service Bn., 1St Motor Transport Bn., 1St Pioneer
Bn., 1St Engineer Bn., 1St Medical Bn., 11th
Marines (Arty. ) with four battalions, 3rd Amph.
Trac. (A) Bn. (Prov. ), 1St Amph. Trac. Bn., 6th
Amph. Trac. Bn. (Prov.), 8th Amph. Trac. Bn.,
3rd Bn. III Phibcorps Arty. (155mm), 8th Bn. III
Phibcorps Arty. ( I 55mm), 12th Anti-aircraft Bn.,
33rd Naval Cons. Bn., 73rd Naval Cons. Bn., and
16th Field Depot.
Okinawa:
1st Marines, 5th Marines, 7th Marines (three
battalions each), Div. HQBn., 1st Tank Bn., 1st
Service Bn., 1st Motor Transport Bn., 1st Pioneer
Bn., 1st Engineer Bn., 1st Medical Bn., lIth
Marines (Arty.) (four battalions), 3rd Amph. Trac.
(A) Bn., 1st Amph. Trac. Bn., 8th Amph. Trac.
Bn., and 145th Naval Cons. Bn.
The Plates
A Guadalcanal, 1942
A patrol crosses the Ilu River; and one of its
members settles down to the familiar chore of
hunting leeches out of his pants and boots with a
cigarette end. The Marines wear the two-piece
fatigue suit of herringbone twill- the pattern
accentuated in the foreground figure-in the shade
known, like so many others, as Olive Drab. It
appears from colour photographs to have been of
every shade from dark green to pale grey-green,
depending on age, wear and tear, etc. The only
insignia is the black stencil Corps badge silhouette
and 'USMC' on the pocket. Some NCOs painted
chevrons on their sleeves, but for the most part
combat fatigues were bare of rank markings. The
usual long web gaiters were often abandoned, as
they retained water inside the trouser-legs and
boots after the frequent wading of streams and
swamps. The fatigues were hot, and not as
convenient for tropical combat as those issued by
the Japanese. I t was not for several years that orders
were issued allowing divisional personnel to chop
the trousers off above the knee.
The basic weapon on Guadalcanal was the bolt-
action M I 903 Springfield 30/06 illustrated here; its
stopping power was superior to that of Japanese
Arisakas, but it was not until the arrival of Army
units with the MI Garand that the superiority
became very marked. The usual basic webbing
equipment is worn here, the rifle belt supplemented
by cotton and tape bandoliers. Often two water-
bottles and two first-aid pouches were worn. The
man on the left, taken from a photograph, appears
to have a jury-rigged set of grenade pouches slung
on his chest, apparently improvised from BAR
magazine pouches. The combat-weary appearance
o
--
1</I'1!1U- WAN
TSUGEN-JIM!I

}
..J
10
I
33
A 'composite hull ' late-model M4 Sherman converted as a
'flame tank' lays a blazing carpet over Japanese-held ruins on
the advance to Naha, capital of Okinawa, during May 1945.
The practised collaboration of gun tanks, flame tanks and
infantry was the key to the American advance.
of these soldiers is considerably played down from
the reality shown by the eye-witness drawings of
such artists as Donald L. Dickson.
B Peleliu, 15 SepteInber 1944
Peleliu was defended with vigour on 'D-Day'; here,
under the cover of rocketing Corsairs, men of the
Division prepare to fight their way off the beach
and into the jungle. An 'Amtrac', its sinister
nickname taken from a photograph of this action-
'The Bloody Trail'-provides cover and supporting
fire at the top of the beach; it is an LVT(A) I, with
the turret of an M3 Stuart tank. Behind it a red
fluorescent cloth panel identifies friend from foe to
34
the fighter-bombers. In the distance an L VCP
lands men of the second wave. The Marines are
dressed in the same twill fatigues as on Guadal-
canal; they now have camouflage-printed helmet
covers, and camouflage ponchos rolled on their
packs. George McMillan recalled how, on Peleliu,
'to protect themselves against sunstroke, the men
pulled out the cloth camouflage covers on their
helmets and let it hang over the backs of their necks,
so that they looked like Arabs.' Later, because of
the heat, men discarded the helmets altogether,
even in combat, and wore the 'old, soft, floppy
fatigue caps of the Army', recalls Pvt. Russell
Davis.
The man in the left foreground wears the waist
belt of BAR pouches, and carries that weapon. The
'butcher' knife is typical. He wears his trousers loose
over his gaiters. On the right are men armed with
the -45 pistol, and the Thompson sub-machine gun
of the same calibre: note the webbing magazine
pouches for the latter. This heavy, slow, short-
range man-stopper, a far better weapon than the
unsatisfactory Reising sub-machine gun initially
issued to the Marines, tended to draw 'friendly' fire
in night fighting due to the similarity of its report to
that of some Japanese weapons. All these assault
troops still wear their knapsacks with entrenching
shovels and ponchos.
C Okinawa, April 1945
Behind the front lines, a jeep carrying Japanese
prisoners passes the emplacement of one of the I I th
Marine Artillery's I 55mm guns. It was on Okin-
awa that prisoners in significant numbers began to
be taken for the first time- they were still enough of
a novelty to attract the attention of the artillery
sergeant in our scene. The correspondent Ernie
Pyle was with the Division when two Japanese
privates were discovered lying under some bushes,
their hands over their ears, pretending to be asleep.
Instead of fighting, the Japanese were '... so
terrified that the marines had to go into the bushes,
lift them by the shoulders, and throw them out into
the open.' The Japanese uniforms show signs of
considerable wear and tear by this stage. In
practice, prisoners were often stripped to their loin-
clothes by their captors, to be certain they had no
concealed weapons or grenades. Parts of Japanese
uniforms tended to end up adorning Marines. Pyle
noticed how 1st Division men ' . .. wore Japanese
Identifiable by its markings as tank 5 of Co. ' B', 713th Tank
Bn., attached to the 7th Infantry Division of US loth Army,
this 'flame tank' - again, a 'composite hull' M4-supports
Marine infantry on Okinawa. This is logical , since the 7th
landed immediately south of the 1st Marine Division and
advanced across the island on the Marines' right flank .
35
insignia or pieces of uniform. Later an order came
out that any Marine caught wearing Jap clothing
would be put on burial detail. '
The gun crew, taken from several photographs,
wear a motley collection of clothing including the
T -shirt in a strong green shade, camouflage-
printed trousers, 'khaki' shirts- which colour
photos show to have been a light yellowish shade-
and OD clothing of all shades. The NCO wears the
Marines' forest-green overseas cap. Pvt. Russell
Davis recalls that ' ... the round hat was a favourite
in the First Division. It could be bent into any
shape, and serve against the rain or the sun.' The
guard in the jeep carries the M I .30 cal. carbine,
popular and handy in tropical fighting, but lacking
stopping-power. In the background are tents
assembled from camouflaged shelter-quarters.
Men of Co. 'N, 2/5th Marines in action on a ridge two miles
north of Naha, which held up the advance for fort y-eight
hours.
3
6
Note the yellow shade used for stencilling Marine
serials on the sides of the jeep.
D Okinawa, May 1945
Marine infantry advance III the Naha sector,
supported by a flame-tank of the Army's 7 13th
Tank Battalion, attached to the 7th Infantry
Division. This is a late-model 'composite hull' M4
Sherman; note the markings on the rear hull -
'IOA- 713TK' and 'BS', and the painted-out star;
the track extensions or 'duckbills'; and the ap-
plique side armour. Mixed units of gun and flame-
tanks, working in close co-operation with the
infantry, were the key to success on Okinawa.
The very motley appearance of the infantry in
this mopping-up operation is taken from photos
taken on the spot. The mixture of khaki and OD
clothing of all shades; the hacked -short shirtsleeves,
and green T-shirts; the use of the characteristic
Marine fatigue cap underneath, or instead of the
steel helmet ; the stencilled name on the shirt
back; the mixture of gaiters, and double-buckle
combat boots- all are typical of the period.
Weapons include (left) the M1 Garand fitted with
the discharger for the M9A1 grenade, and (right)
the Mz carbine, with its long banana magazine,
which first began to appear in September 1944.
E Insignia
I, 2,3 & 4 are the collar insignia of, respectively,
officers of the Paymaster's Dept., the Adjutant &
Inspector's Dept., and the Quartermaster's Dept.;
and the Warrant Officer rank of Chief Marine
Gunner. This latter wore a gold bar broken by a
light blue stripe across the middle on each shoulder.
Line officers wore the gold globe-and-anchor
insignia on the collars of their dress uniforms.
(Approx. half-size. ) 5 is the globe-and -anchor Corps
badge, here in the form worn on the blue dress cap
of enlisted men. (Approx. full size. ) 6 is the sleeve
ranking of a Sergeant-Major, as worn on dress
blues. 7 is the sleeve ranking of a Platoon Sergeant,
as worn on forest-green service dress. 8 is the sleeve
ranking of a Staff Sergeant, as worn on summer
khakis. 9 is the sleeve ranking of a Master Technical
Sergeant, as worn on dress blues. (All approx. half-
size.) 10 is the I st Division's shoulder patch,
approximately full size. It was designed by the
Division Operations Officer, Colonel Twining, on
the plane bringing the Division's staff back from
Guadalcanal; the stars represent the Southern
Marines flush Okinawan civilians and Japanese troops out of
cover in June 1945. Okinawa was the first battle in which any
numbers of prisoners allowed themselves to be taken alive-
though many still took the quick way out of what they saw as
intolerable disgrace.
Cross. The Colonel recalled:
'I bought a box of water colours, and turned in
with malaria. I made six sketches, each with a
different colour scheme. In a couple of days I went
back to the General [Vandegrift] with my finished
drawings. He studied them only a minute or so and
then approved the one that is now the Division
patch.'
The original patches were made by an Aus-
tralian subsidiary of an American woven-name
maker, and were first made available to the
Division in February 1943, three weeks after the
design was approved. Patches were worn on
walking-out dress and overcoats. II is a half-size
representation of the black Marine Corps pocket
37
Left: A Tommy-gunner of the 1St Division aims his piece
during a 'firefight' on Wana Ridge, near Shuri, in this classic
photo of the Pacific War. Note the .45 pistol in a shoulder rig,
for emergencies. Above: Flushing pockets of Japanese out of
stencil worn on OD combat fatigues . 12 is a half-
size representation, taken from an actual example,
of the printed camouflage pattern of the her-
ringbone twill camouflaged combat fatigues used
by some personnel of the Division. The same
pattern was used for helmet covers and ponchos.
Finally, it should be noted that USMC officers'
shoulder ranking was as follows: 2nd Lt., one gold
bar; ISt Lt.) one silver bar; Capt.) two silver bars;
Maj., gold oak-leaf; silver oak-leaf; Col.,
silver eagle; Brig.-Gen.) Maj.-Gen.) and Lt.-Gen.) one,
two and three silver stars.
the coral caves. The top Marine has just thrown a smoke
grenade over the rock, and it explodes in a shower of sparks as
his buddies cover him with a rifle and a BAR. The man on the
right has his name stencilled on his shirt back- ' V.]. Murphy'.
Select Bibliography
George McMillan, The Old Breed, Washington, DC,
1949
Major Charles S. Nichols Jnr, USMC, and Henry I.
Shaw Jnr, Okinawa, Victory in the Pacific, Rutland,
Vermont, 1956
S. E. Smith, The United States Marine Corps in World War
II, New York, 1969
John Toland, The Rising Sun, New York, 1970
A. A. Vandegrift, Once a Marine, New York, 1964
39
L
Notes sur les planches en couleur
L'illustration sur la couverture montre des soldats appartenant it l'infanterie
de la lere Division et un char M4AI Sherman du 1st USMC Tank Battalion
s'avanc;ant vers Ie Cap Gloucester en decembre 1943.
A GuadalcanaI, 1942 Une patrouille de 'cous de cuir' traverse la riviere Ilu; un
d'entre cux se repose et cherche les sangsues qui se soot faufilees dans son
pan talon et ses chaussures, les tuant a I'aide d'un bout de cigarette. Les soldats
portent un treillis deux pieces en 'Olive cGuleur variait selon l'age et
I' usage entre un vert fonci:, un marron jaunatre et un vert gris pale. L'anne
typique a cette epoq ue etai tie fusil a verrou M 1903 Springfield 30106. Le soldat a
J'arriere-plan a fac;onne des poches porte-grenades a partir d' une cartouchiere
com,ue pour Ie Browning Automatic Rifle.
B Peleliu, Ie 15 septelllbre 1944 Les hommes de la Division portent
maintenant par dessus leur casque une housse en toile de camoufl age; un certain
nombre de soldats la glissent en arriere pour qu'elle serve de couvre-nuque. Les
annes sont Ie BAR a gauche et Ie T hompson a droite. Un ' Amtrac' vehicule
de debarq uement amphibie L VT(A) I, ayant la tourelle d' un char M5 ouvre un
tir de barrage en haut de la plage; son surnom est ' Ia trainee de sang'. Des
chasseurs-bombardiers Corsair decrivent des cercles au-dessus de la tete des
troupes qui indiquent leur position aux avions a I'aide de panneaux de tissu
rouge.
C Okinawa, avril 1945 Unejeep transponanl deux prisonniersjaponais attire
I'attention d'un sergent du 11th Marine Artillery Regiment dont Ie canon
tS5mm soutient l'avance de la Division; les prisonni ersjaponais etaient encore
rares a cette epoque. Les canonniers portent un mel ange banole de vctements en
IOlive Drab') et ' kaki ', des vetements de camouflage, des chapeaux de COIVee et
de soleil ; Ie sous-officier porte Ie calot vert fonce appartenant a la tenue de
campagne de I' USMC.
D Okinawa, lllai 1943 Des soldats de I'infanterie de la Division, portant des
elements d' uniforme tres varies, s'avancent vcrs Naha, sou tenus par un char
lance-flammes du 713th Tank Battalion de I'armee, qui etait detache a la 7th
Infantry Division; notez les marques ' loA-713TK' et 'B5'. Quelques-uns
des soldats portent la casquette de cOIvee de I'USMC sous, ou au lieu de, leur
casque; certains portent un ' T-shirt' vert au lieu d' une veste; d'autres portent des
guetres en wile a sangles et d'autres encore portent Ia chaussure de combat a deux
boucles. Entre autres armes, ils avaient la grenade MgAI qui ctait lancee a l'aide
d'un dispositif lance-grenades fixe sur Ie fusil semi-automatique Garand (it
gauche) et la carabine M2 a cartouchiere en forme de banane qui a fa it son
a pparition en septembre Ig44.
E Insignes Les vestes bleues du grand uniforme porte par les officiers de
l'infanterie de marine portaient sur Ie coll ' insigne representant un globe et une
ancre, exception faite des officiers du Paymaster's Department ( I), de I' Adjutant
& Inspector's Department (2) et du Quartermaster's Department (3). Le sous-
officier appele Chief Marine Gunner portait I' 'obus' (4). L'insigne de I' USMC
(5) etait porte sur la casquette du grand uniforme bleu. Cet exemplaire est Ie type
porte par les soldars engages. (6) et (9) sont les chevrons de rang du Sergeant-
Major et du Master Technical Sergeant et sonr du type porte sur Ie grand
uniforme. (7) est l'insigne de rang du Platoon Sergeant porte sur la tenue de
campagne vert fonce et (8) est celui du Staff Sergeant porte sur I'uniforme ' kaki '
d'ete. ( 10) est I' insigne d'epaule de la lere Division porte sur la tenuede vil le vert
fond: et Ie manteau ; cet insigne avait etc par Ie Colonel Twining apres la
campagne de Guadalcanal. ( II ) est I' insigne stenci l'; de I' USMC porte sur la
poche des vCtements de combat et (12) est Ie dessin de camouflage imprime sur
quelques vetements de combat et sur la housse du casque.
Farbtafeln
Auf der Titelseite abgebilder ist Infanteri e der Ersten Division und der M4AI
Sherman Panzer des Ersten USMC Tank Battalion beim Vormarsch auf Kap I
Gloucester, Dezember 1943
A Guadalcanal, 1942 Eine Spiihtruppe von 'Seesoldaten' uberqueren den Fluss
1Iu ; ciner ruhe sich aus, und verscheucht mit einer Zigaret tenkippe Blutegel aus
seincn Hosen und Stiefeln. Die Soldaten tragen zwei tcilige Arbcitsa nzuge aus
' Olive Drab' Korperstoff- die Farbe variicrt je nach Alter und Abnutzung
zwischen dunkelgrun, gelblichbrauh und fadem grau-grun. Di e ubli chc 'Vaffcn
zu eliesem Zeitpunkt war das M 1903 Springfield 30106 Gewehr miL Ri egelfeder.
Der Soldat im Hintergrund hat aus Mehrladetaschen fur das Browning
Automatic Rifle, cine Garnitur Patronentaschen fUr Handgrana tcn impro-
visiert.
B Peleliu, 15 September 1944 Die Mannder der Division tragen nun Helme
mit schutzgeHirbten Bedeckungen-einige sind drubergezogen, so dass sic wie
ein Sonnenschutz lose uber dem Halsrucken hangen. Die Waffen sind das BAR
(links) und das Thompson (rechts). Ein 'Amtrac'-ein LVT(A) I amphibischcs
Landungsfahrze ug, mit dem Panzcrturm eines M5 Panzers gibt Dcc-
kungsbeschuss am oberstcn Ende des Strandes; sein Spitzname ist 'Die blutige
Fahrte' . Corsair Jagdbomber kreisen droben, und die Truppen signal isiercn miL
roten Stofftafeln ihre Position zu den Flugzeugen.
C Okinawa, April 1943 Ein Jeep miL zwei japanischen Gefangencn zieht die
Aufmerksamkeit eines Feldwebels, der I Ith Marine Artillery Regiment, an,
dessen 155mr!l Geschutz den Vormarsch der Division unterstutzt ; japanische
Gefangene waren noch etwas Neues. Die Besatzung des Geschiitzes trug
Bekleidung mit einer scheckigen Zusammenstellung von ' Olive Drab' und
' Khaki ', gerarnte Kleidung, Arbeits-und Sonnenhutc; der NCO tragt elie
dunkelgriine Seitenmutze des Dienstanzugs der USMC.
D Okinawa, Mai 1945 Infanterie der Division, in zwanglosem Gemisch von
Uniformen, rucken aufNaha vor, mit der Unterstutzung eines Flammenwerfer-
Panzers vom 713th Tank Battalion der Armee, welches der 7th Infantry Division
angeh6rte; zu beach ten waren die Markierungen 'IoA-713TK' und ' BS'. Einige
der Infanterie tragen USMC AIbeitsmutzen unter ihren Helmen oder an ihrer
Stelle; einige tragen grune 'T-shirts' anstattJacken; einige, Gurtbandgamas-
chen, und andere den doppeit-geschnaUten Kampfstiefel. Zu den Waffen
gehoren die M9AI Granate, die durch eine Entladungsvorrichtung im Garand
Gewehr (links) abgefeuert wurde, und der M2 Karabiner mit seinem ' Bananen'
Mehrlader, den es ab September 1944 gab.
E Abzeichen Die blauen Paradeanzuge der Marineoffiziere trugen das USMC
Erdkugel-und-Anker Abzeichen am Kragen; ausser den Offizieren des
Paymaster's Department ( I ), des Adjutant & Inspector's Department (2), und
des Quartermaster's Department (3) . Der Stabsfeldwebelrang des Chief Marine
Gunner trug die ' Muschel ' (4). Das USMC Abzeichen (5) trug man auf der
Mutze der Paradeanzuge-hier, wie es von Unteroffizieren und Mannschaft
getragen wurde. (6) und (9) sind die Dienstgrad abzeichen des Sergeant-Major
und Master Technical Sergeant, wie man es aufder Paradeuniforrn trug. (7) ist
das Rangabzeichen des Platoon Sergeant, wie es auf der dunkelgrunen
Dienstuniform getragen wurde; und (8) ist das des Staff Sergeant, wie es auf der
Sommer ' khaki ' Uniform getragen wurde. ( 10) ist der Schultertuchstreifen der
Ersten Division, wie man es auf clef dunkelgrunen Ausgehunifonn und auf
Manteln trug, nach dem Entwurf von Colonel Twining nach dem Guadalcanal
Feldzug. ( I I) ist das schablonierte USMC Abzeichen wie man es auf der
Kampfanzugstaschc trug, und ( J 2) ist das Tarnungsmuster, wie es auf eini gen
Kampfanzugen und Helmbedeckungen gedruckt ist.
OSPREY VANGUARD
A selies of books describing the key units and weapons systems
of the Second World War, prepared by leading military experts
for the enthusiast and mod eller, and illustrating authentlc details
of uniforms, insignia, armour and supporting vehicles, camouflage,
markings and weapons.
Avec annotations en frans sur les planches en couleur Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch tiber die F",rht"fphI
ISBN 0 85045 311