Summary of Nations and Nationalism From the onset of his book, Gellner provides an abstract definition of Nationalism as primarily

a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (p. !. "e then asserts that nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which re#uires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state ... should not separate the power$holders from the rest (p. !. Gellner maintains the thesis of his book by arguing that nationalism is a powerful sentiment that holds a key component of passage from an agrarian community to an industrial society in which the latter re#uires a politically defined state that can create and enable a belonging, knowledgeable and appreciated culture. %he discourse in which this concept is conveyed has become a rich segment occupying a wide field of philosophy of history. &n chapters ', ( and ), Gellner advances his hard$core modernist interpretation of nationalism by underpinning that the only unprecedented change since the recorded history began has been the transition from agrarian to industrial society. *ccording to Gellner, this e+traordinary transition has holistically transformed society,s basic social relations to its overall political structure based on the goodness of industrialisation. -ike most modernist scholars, Gellner pays specific attention to human #uest for knowledge. and, as knowledge peaks, he believes that it will be standardi/ed as high culture and persistently becomes the most essential re#uirement of industrialism. &naccurately, however, Gellner thinks that only nation$state has the legitimate authority and the ability to indoctrinate and maintain #ualities of high culture on an uprooted agrarian labour force. &n furthering this argument, he asserts that modern industrial society is based on constant cognitive and comple+ economic progress. Gellner reasons that because of the division of labour in modern industrial society is more comple+ and constantly evolving, and re#uires open, precise, and conte+t$free communication between members of society, the high culture development re#uires a nationally homogeneous society. &n chapters 0 and 1, Gellner focuses on the importance of will and culture for the construction of a theory of nationality. &n so doing, he advances on his well$known description of fissiparous 2astern nationalism in which the 2mpire of 3egalomania,s top$down homogeni/ation incites the reaction of the e+cluded ethnic minority to protect its own will and culture. 4et, if this minority group needs to be transformed into a high culture, then it has to have a legitimate political authority. %herefore, the creation of a tiny, but glorious state of 5uritania becomes the perfect nationalist ob6ective. &n chapter 7, Gellner tackles various typologies of nationalism as his core functionalist thesis. &n it, he re6ects four of the highly contested theories of nationalism. First, in concert with 8edourie, he argues that the nationalist theory which is claimed to be a natural and self$evident and self$ generating is false (p. '9!, because it owes its plausibility and compelling nature only to a very special set of circumstances, which do indeed obtain now, but which were alien to most of humanity and history (p. '1!. :econd, this time disputes 8edourie,s theory by describing it as an artificial conse#uence of ideas which did not need ever to be formulated, and appeared by a regrettable accident which politics in industrial societies could ignore it (p. '9!, Gellner maintains that nationalism is a key component for any modern nation$state. %hird, he ridicules 3ar+ism,s ;rong *ddress %heory which claims that the awakening message <of nationalism=

was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations (p. '9!. &n this regard, Gellner argues that the theory of social conflict predicts conflict to occur where >ethnic, (cultural or other diacritical marks! are visible and accentuate the differences in educational access and power, and, above all, when they inhibit the free flow of personnel across the loose lines of social stratification (p. 91!. -ast, Gellner dismisses the ?ark Gods theoretical claim that nationalism is the re$emergence of the atavistic forces of blood or territory on the bases that these dark forces are neither nicer nor nastier than the pre$ nationalism ones (p. (@!. &n chapter A, Gellner speculates that when an industrial society is alleviated and stabili/ed, nationalism will be modified in one way or the other (pp. @A$ @9!. %hen, he goes on to assume that an increase in international freedom and the shared limitations of industrial society may reduce the sharpness of international conflicts (p. 1!. Finally, in chapter 9, Gellner refutes 8edourie,s erroneous claims that &mmanuel 8ant had ideologically played a significant role in the development of nationalism. therefore, he was the source of all evil. For that, Gellner states that 8ant is the very last person whose vision could be credited with having contributed to nationalism (p. ('!. &n fact, he defends 8ant maintaining that there is no relationship, other than a verbal one, between individual self$ determination and national self$determination, and that 8ant was a very model for that allegedly bloodless, cosmopolitan, emaciated ethic of the 2nlightenment, which romantic nationalists spurned and detested so much, and which they so 6oyously repudiated in favour of a more earthy, shamelessly specific and partial commitment to kin or territory or culture (p. ((!. Critical Review of Nations and Nationalism *s provided in the summary section of this paper, Gellner considers nationalism as a political principle which, if not violated, ultimately leads toward the creation of sovereign nation$state. %his implication that nationalism is by definition geared toward the formation of independent nation$state is also advocated by 2ric "obsbawm who writes that the nation is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation$state, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationalism e+cept insofar as both relate to it ( 99@, p. 9$ @!. ;orking with ;eber,s definition of the state, as that unit within society that retains the control of legitimate violence, Gellner asserts that a state only e+ist where there is division of labour, and the state is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also be concerned with! (p. )!. %here are several issues with Gellner,s definition of nationalism. First of all, we all know that nationalism, as a political phenomenon, has been defined many ways, including by modernists such as Gellner, 8edourie, "obsbawm, and others. 4et the most common abstract definition of nationalism holds that it is the political will of a nationBa particular group of peoples descended from common ancestors with common histories and a shared language,Bover the distinct lands in which her members belong to and reside. %his tells us that there is not a single political unit to hold a coherent and a unitary political will. Gellner knew the true meaning of the term >will,. %hat is why he devoted two chapters of his book to discuss it as mentioned earlier. ?espite of

that, he chose not to include it in his definition of nationalism. &nstead, he used the term >principle, to mislead his readers as he countlessly does, particularly in his meaningless attacks on 3ar+ism and &slam. Coth terms. will and principle have different meanings and drastically diverse linguistic, philosophical, and political applications which & do not think there is a need here for details. Dolitical units, especially in the western hemisphere, are made of multiparty systems. 2ach one of these systems operate based on various political thoughts, ideas, and philosophies held by separate political entities reflecting the division of labour,s diverse needs and interests. Nationalism is one of these various political thoughts, ideas, and philosophies which some political parties are identified with to ascribe their political will and most of the time their national ambitions. %herefore, nationalism is not a political principle. 5ather, it is a political will held by a particular political entity as a mean to meet the ends demanded by one or several segments of the division of labour. :econd, for the division of labour to occur, there must be a society with diverse professions to e+ist on a defined geopolitical unit or state. :uch a society could either be homogeneous or heterogeneous. *ccordingly, a society,s political state must reflect the characteristics with which its people are identified. &n a homogeneous state, patriotism, as a sentiment, plays a crucial role in legitimi/ing the political authority of the state. %herefore, the state, through its education policies, will act on developing and maintaining patriotism to legitimi/e its e+istence on the one hand, and then evolve it into a nationalist formula as a high #uality of its society,s culture, on the other hand. 3odern states do this in order to secure a competitive edge in the non$governed international arena. Eonse#uently, they are always prone to interstate conflict. %he Fnited :tates and &srael are two e+amples of such states. &n a heterogeneous state, however, it is nationalism that overwhelms and subdues patriotism. * heterogeneous state is made of different nations with distinct societal characteristics formed on the outputs of their own division of labours. Eanada, Celgium, and :pain are perfect e+amples where their distinct nations have strong nationalist sentiments drastically different from that of the predominant political will of the >legitimate, state. &n other words, the political wills of the GuHbHcois in Eanada, the Flemish in Celgium, and the Cas#ues in :pain, to name a few, are significantly different from those of their corresponding states. %herefore, although these states rarely involve in international conflicts, they have been defied with internal disintegration attempts. %hird, the most difficulty with Gellner,s definition of nationalism which implies that stateless societies cannot e+perience nationalism (p. )! is that it runs counter to observed reality. ;ith the end of the Eold ;ar era, ethnically oriented nationalism stepped in to fill the vacuum which 3ar+ism has left behind. Eonsiderable number of nation$states either disintegrated allowing new states to emerge or decentrali/ed. %hus, approving that nationalism is a prior to state and not the other way around as Gellner erroneously assumes. Gellner e+travagantly states that nationalism is typical to modernity. Nevertheless, it has become part of a philosophy of history that differentiates three essential periods in mankind development, the pre$agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial (p. 0!. &n other words, a considerable re$work of the 3ar+ist historical materialism. Gellner maintains that each of these three periods is associated with characteristic means of production, oppression, and cognitive culture. &n the period of industrial society, nationalism is closely associated with the mode of production. &t would have made no sense in pre$agrarian societies because they were and still are too small to

have a division of labour which re#uires the establishment of a unified political state. &n the agrarian societies, the e+istence of the state was an option, because they did not need their elites to share a common culture with their peasants. Cy contrast, during the industrial age, the e+istence of the state became and still is inevitable. %herefore, nationalism arises as a fundamental aspect of the cultural cohesion in which values and norms of individualism supersede those of collectivism. Cy not providing logical grounds for the rising of nationalism, Gellner makes a critical omission. For nationalism to arise, it must go through three critical stages. collective national grievance caused by foreign oppressors, struggle for independence, and consolidation (3inogue, 917, pp. '0$'A!. %hroughout the recorded history of humans, be them in stateless or statehood societies, foreign rulers have been an affront to human dignity. &n the %igris$2uphrates valley, :umerian city$states evolved around (@@@ C.E. displaying definite signs of the division of labour. *s the :emites, probably from the *rabian Deninsula, moved upwards to invade :umerian city$states such as *kkad and Fr, endless wars broke out lasting well over a thousand years. Foreign invaders such as *le+ander the Great, 5oman, Cy/antine, and the &slamic con#uerors had all faced ardent resistance from their oppressed sub6ects. ;ith the signing of Deace of ;estphalia in 1)A, recognition for 2uropean sovereign states became the most appealing demand for the newly emerging independent states. French and German intellectuals, especially German Fniversalist philosophers like Iohn "erder and &mmanuel Fichte had made initial but considerable contributions which led to the emergence of the 2uropean nationalism ( 917, p. 7!. "owever, Gellner chose not accredit their themes because he knew that his modernist argument would entrap him further. Gellner provides a simplistic three dimensional typology of nationalisms in which he differentiatesJ . '. Dower$holders from the rest. %hose who have access to modern high culture from those who have not.

(. * state in which a homogeneous culture shared by all from a state with nonhomogeneous culture (p. 9($)!. *side from proposing eight possibilities in which nationalism will be stimulated by four circumstances and thwarted by four other circumstances, the typology implies four nationalism$ engendering situations limited to nationalist conflicts within statesJ . :atisfied nationalism, characteristic of mature homogeneous industrial societies in which no internal nationalist conflicts and problems are e+pected. '. Elassical liberal nationalism, characteristic of territories in which some have power and others do not. %his difference correlates with cultural differences which historically correspond to the nineteenth$century >unification nationalisms, between &taly and Germany.

(. 2thnic nationalism, characteristic of territories in which power$holders have privileged access to the central high culture, while the powerless are sunk in low cultures. %he small intelligentsias of the powerless will lead efforts to transfer their low culture into a high culture. ). ?iaspora nationalism arises in societies in passage from high agrarian culture to high industrial culture. %hese groups are economically better e#uipped for moderni/ation but lack political and military power. "owever, because of their ethnic distinctiveness, they are likely to face genocidal assaults or mass e+pulsions due to scarce resources within a moderni/ing state (pp. 97$ @9!. &t appears that this typology is based on a theory of cultural conflict rather than of political nationalism. Eonflict is predicted to occur where >ethnic, (cultural or other diacritical marks! are visible and accentuate the differences in educational access and power, and, above all, when they inhibit the free flow of personnel across the loose lines of social stratification (p. 91!. *s provided, Gellner offers very little e+planation about nationalist oriented interstate conflicts. *lso, he does not clarify how classical liberal nationalism arises from the intrastate conflicts which occur between the educated power$holders of one high culture and the educated non$ power$holders of another high culture, while ethnic nationalism arises from a conflict between the educated power$holders of one high culture and the uneducated non$power$holders of a low culture. *dditionally, this typology neither has a persistent logic of political doctrine to shape social life, nor does it offer a politically sensitive e+planation on the possibility of reducing nationalist secessionism. %his lack of political hold is due to Gellner,s deliberate choice of ignoring the role of power$politics in e+plaining which cultures become nations. *lthough he sees the connections between nationalism and egalitarianism in modern societies as he demonstrates in his hypothetical discussion on the nature of 2astern nationalism, he did not see, however, the e#ually supporting relationships between nationalism, egalitarianism and democrati/ation. &f any, this validates his already e+posed dislike of nationalist doctrines. ;hat is important to be highlighted here is the fact that at the core of his definition of nationalism, Gellner asserts that nations ought to be ruled by co$nationals. %hough liberal nationalists insist on this to be the case, however, they reiterate that this must be done with une#uivocal consensus of the co$nationals. Gellner did not hesitate to tell his readers that nationalism is not worth e+amining because it represents a mi+ture of myths, human superstition, and false consciousness (p. '9!. %he suggestion that nationalism cannot tolerate ethnic, racial or religious differences is refuted by the e+istence of multi$ethnic, multi$racial and multi$religious nations. 4et because Gellner asserts that the essence of nationalism is to attain that close relation between state and culture, he preludes it with the charges of population e+changes or e+pulsions, more or less forcible assimilation, and sometimes li#uidation (p. @ !. Cy far, this is the most deficient sign of his understanding of the variety of political methods available to modern political systems.

Conclusion Gellner,s arguments about the discretionary attraction between modernity and nationalism are conceivable. Nations and nationalism have not been perpetual features of human history. Nations emerge and disappear based on the scale of their division of labour. Nationalism is an ideology of mobili/ation closely associated with the political will of the state$actors and the marginali/ed non$state$actors. %he criti#ues provided in this paper on Gellner,s Nations and Nationalism book are simply essential e+aminations. "is obvious functionalist argument is problematic, as is the prevalence he gives to industriali/ation in discussing the origins and development of nationalism. Gellner,s typology of nationalisms is defectively defined and has a modern political deficiency. "is reliance on reductionist interpretations of political motivation could have stemmed from his deep disenchantment with the range of established democratic institutions in the Eold ;ar era. Ktherwise, he would have not failed to treat nationalism as a political doctrine on the one hand, and, as he was a liberal social democrat, he would have seen the interdependencies between modern nationalism and the democrati/ation which endures, especially in th