EVIDENCE CASES (OCTOBER 2013 DECEMBER 2013) OCTOBER 2013 People vs. Halil Gambao *G.R.

.172707 October 1, 2013+ Facts: Before the court for Automatic Review is the decision finding the accused-appellants guilty of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. Accused-appellants allegedly conspired and by force and intimidation, and use of high-powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully take Lucia Chan y Lee away and deprived her of her liberty to extort a ransom of P400,000 pesos. Issue: Accused-appellants argue that Chan was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight and old age. Acussed Perpenian argued the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. Ruling: Insufficiency of Evidence xxx This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chans testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accusedappellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. In People v. Taedo, this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. It can be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness Chan. The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of 14 August 1998, and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial. Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime. The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts. xxx

People vs. Jade Caycong Remonquillo

*G.R. 196051

October 2, 2013+

Facts: Accused-appellant was found guilty of two counts of statutory rape now under automatic review. Victim *AAA+ disclosed that she was raped by accused-appellant. The accused-appellant denied the allegations. The RTC found him guilty of two counts of statutory rape. The CA denied his appeal and affirmed the decision. Issue: Appellant argues against the credibility of the victim due to inconsistent facts: (1) the description of how the victim was supposedly raped; (2) the total number of instances of rape committed against her by appellant; (3) the uncertainty of whether or not the victim saw appellants penis; and (4) the doubt with respect to whether or not the victim was able to touch appellants sexual organ. Appellant also highlights the testimony of Dr. Carpio, the medico- legal officer who examined *AAA+ to the effect that *AAA+ informed him that the accused inserted his finger into her vagina as contradictory to *AAA+'s testimony. Ruling: Inconsistencies of Witness Testimony xxx Jurisprudence tells us that for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. We have also declared that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies, moreover, they do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. In the case at bar, the alleged inconsistencies in AAAs testimony do not deviate from the fact that AAA categorically identified appellant as the one who raped her on July 4, 2002 and earlier sexually assaulted her sometime in June of the year 2001. The inconsistent statements pointed out by appellant merely affect minor and tangential aspects of AAAs testimony which do not significantly alter the integrity of her narrative concerning the incidents of rape and sexual assault which are the subject matter of this case. With regard to the credibility of AAAs declarations against appellant as well as that of other prosecution witnesses, we see no cogent reason to veer away from the jurisprudential principle of affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses. xxx People vs. Jovi Pornillos Y Hallare *G.R. 201109 October 2, 2013+

Facts: Appellant was charged before the RTC of Iriga City with selling shabu in violation of Sec 5, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC found Pornillos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling .2204 grams of shabu and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.

Tha CA affirmed the decision finding the policemen's testimony worthy of belief. The police immediately marked the seized items for proper identification and had these inventoried in the presence of Pornillos, a representative of the media, and an elective official as required by Section 21. It has been held that conducting the inventory at the nearest police station constitutes compliance with the law. Issue: The wide discrepancy between the weight of the substance seized from the accused and the weight of the substance in the forensic test. Ruling: The CA is in error in holding that the chain of custody was unbroken. The PDEA report to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, booking sheet, arrest report, Certificate of Inventory and Laboratory examination request put down the seized shabu as 0.4 gram. The forensic chemist however, reported and testified the police submitted only o.2204 grams, short by 0.1796 grams from what was inventoried. In People vs. Aneslag, the accused sold 240 grams but the test showed 230 grams, short of 10 grams. The prosecution adequately explained the 4.16% loss. The loss occurred due to two samples taken during two separate tests. In this case, the loss was not that small. There was a loss of 45% of its original weight. The prosecution offered three theories: only two chemists served the entire region giving rise to possible error; the police and the crime laboratory used different weighing scales; and the failure of the laboratory to take into account the weight of the sachet container. But mere speculations cannot overcome the concrete evidence that what was seized was not what was forensically tested. This implies tampering with the prosecution evidence. The court cannot affirm the conviction based on compromised evidence. The appeal is granted, the decision of the CA is set aside and the accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime on ground of reasonable doubt. Oscar Constantino et al. vs. Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr. *G.R. 181508 October 2, 2013+

Facts: Respondents, great grandchildren of the late Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro Jr. filed a complaint against petitioners for nullification of a document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hakuman and Tax Declatations and the reinstatement of a Tax Declaration in the name of Pedro Sr. Respondents alleged petitioners asserted ownership over a land owned by Pedro Sr. to the exclusion of respondents. They allege that Tax Declarations 02010-2170-33235 in petitioner's name were unlawfully issued cancelling Pedro Sr.'s tax declaration. The new Tax declarations were allegedly due to a fabricated and fictitious document called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman where petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole heirs of Pedro Sr. Petitioners allege respondents have no cause of action considering their lawful share of the estate of Pedro Sr. have already been transferred to them by a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. The deed adjudicated to themselves a parcel of land by misrepresenting that they were also the only heirs of Pedro Sr. The RTC found both were equally at fault in pari delicto and both are denied recovery. The complaint for nullification was dismissed. On appeal, the CA found the RTC erred in finding the parties in pari delicto.

The Deed covered land belonging to Pedro Jr. and not Pedro Sr. Therefore, since it pertains to a different property, they are not in pari delicto. Issue: Correct application of the in pari delicto doctrine Ruling: The trial court erroneously applied the doctrine. However, the CA erred in upholding the contract denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman being likewise based on pari delicto. The two deeds are in reality, assignments of different portions without a lawful partition of estate. In pari delicto cannot be applied because to apply it would validate both illegal Deeds. Both are void from the beginning. Judicial Admissions Respondents claim the land subject of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver was not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. was unsupported by evidence. The CA merely relied on the typographical error in the Deed. The CA contradicted admissions made during the pre-trial conference that the land covered by Tax Declaration 9534 belonged to Pedro Sr. Such admission against respondents' interest are legally binding without need for evidence. Judicial admission of a fact are a waiver of proof Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. The Deed is void for exclusion of heirs. Both Deeds are void for exclusion of heirs. The CA decision is reversed without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Sr. People vs. Rodolfo de Jesus Y Mendoza *G.R. 190622 October 7, 2013+ Facts: The RTC of Pasig City found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and affirmed by the CA. Appellant allegedly raped *AAA+, a minor, on the fourth floor of Mega Parking Plaza. Boca, the security guard at the Mega Parking Plaza heard the cry of *AAA+ and witnessed appellant insert his penis into the vagina of *AAA+ and perform sexual movements. Boca handcuffed him and bought him to the Barangay Hall. Dr. Ortiz found shallow healed lacerations although no external signs of trauma. Dr. Ortiz opined the lacerations could have been caused by a penis and that *AAA+ may have been sexually abused. Issue: On appeal, appellant raises the sole assignment of error that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him of rape despite failure of the prosecution to prove sexual intercourse. Appellant argues that there is no evidence showing that he inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA. He claims that if he indeed raped AAA, then the latters physical examination should have shown fresh lacerations instead of old healed lacerations considering that AAA was examined immediately after the alleged incident. Ruling: Testimony xxx The RTC found the testimony of AAA to be credible. She positively identified appellant as the malefactor and never wavered in her assertion that it was appellant who raped her. This finding was affirmed by the CA. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the *CA+, are binding upon this Court. As a general rule, on the question whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial courts choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to

conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses *are+ telling the truth. There is no cogent reason for us to depart from the general rule in this case. Also, it is worth to note that the victim, AAA, was a minor. She was only 11 years old when she was raped. When placed on the witness stand to narrate her harrowing experience at the hands of the appellant, AAA was only 12 years of age. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. In addition, the foregoing testimony of AAA was corroborated by the testimony of Boca. He testified that while he was conducting his roving patrol, he heard a cry emanating from the fourth floor of the parking building. When Boca reached the fourth floor, he saw AAA seated on the lap of the appellant. Boca also testified that he saw appellant insert his penis into the vagina of AAA and perform sexual movements. xxx Medico-Legal Evidence In People vs. Amistoso this court held that the finding of healed laceratioons do not negatively affect *AAA+'s credibility nor desprove the rape. The absence of fresh lacerations does not prove appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape. Medical examination and certificate is merely corroborative and are not indispensable to a rape case. Fe Abella Y Perpetua vs. People *G.R. 198400 October 7, 2013+

Facts: Petitioner was charged with frustrated homicide hitting a Benigno Abella Perpetua on the neck with a scythe inflicting wounds which would produce homicide but did not due to causes independent of the will of the accused, that is the timely and able intervention of the medical assistance rendered to the said victim. The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide. The CA affirmed the decision ratiocinating that: ntent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim. Isssue: Petitioner avers that the courts failed to appreciate relevant facts that would justify acquittal or downgrading his conviction to less serious physical injuries. The petitioner points out that after the single hacking blow was delivered, he ran after Alejandro and Dionisio leaving the victim Benigno behind. He could have inflicted more wounds with his two scythes. Furthermore, Benigno was not attacked without opportunity to defend himself. Benigno saw petitioner approach with the weapons and approached petitioner and was allegedly accidentally injured with the latter's scythe.

The OSG seeks dismissal of the petition since it calls for re-calibration of evidence, hence, outside the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, intent to kill can be inferred by the weapon used and extent of injury. Benigno could have died without medical attention. Ruling: Factual Issues The case at bar is a challenge against the findings of the court a quo that petitioner had homicidal intent and that the wounds could have caused his death without medical intervention. These questions are factual requiring a re-calibration of the contending parties' evidence. Appeals on Rule 45 are only for questions of Law and not of fact. Evidence of Intent xxx From the foregoing, this Court concludes and thus agrees with the CA that the use of a scythe against Benignos neck was determinative of the petitioners homicidal intent when the hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead. While no complications actually developed from the gaping wounds in Benignos neck and left hand, it perplexes logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a lesser degree of medical attention. This Court likewise finds wanting in merit the petitioners claim that an intent to kill is negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to him, which is a cause independent of the petitioners will. All told, this Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the RTCs conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged. People vs Marciano Cial Y Lorena *G.R. 191362 October 9, 2013+ Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the RTC of Gumaca, Quezon finding the appellant guilty of the crime of qualified rape against *AAA+ with the qualifying circumstance of *AAA+ being a minor of 13 years and appellant being the common-law husband of complainant's mother. Issue: Appellant argues that if he indeed raped AAA in the manner that she narrated, it would be improbable for AAAs maternal grandmother not to have noticed the same. Appellant also claims that it was illogical for AAAs uncle to allow AAA to return home after learning about the alleged rape incident. Appellant also insists that the examining physician was unsure as to what actually caused AAAs hymenal lacerations. Ruling: Credibility of Witnesses xxx Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses manner of testifying, her furtive glance, blush of unconscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath all of

which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. xxx Credibility of Child Witnesses xxx Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. xxx People vs. Ricardo Dearo *G.R. 190862 October 9, 2013+ Facts: This is an appeal from the CA affirming the judgment of the RTC finding appellants guilty of three counts of murder. Witnesses saw appellants carrying long firearms walking from the back of the house to the road. While none of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual shooting of the victims inside the house, all attendant circumstantial evidence are consistent with the conclusion that appellants are responsible for the shooting. The CA likewise held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt, treachery and premeditation. Issue: Whether the guilt of appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling : xxx Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, applies when no witness has seen the actual commission of the crime. It states: SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Under the rule on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances shown must be consistent with each other. They should all support the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and, at the same time, be inconsistent with the hypothesis that the accused is innocent. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. xxx The court agrees with the RTC and the CA that all circumstances proven and unconverted, combine to leave no reasonable doubt the appellants conspired to kill the victims. People vs. Florentino Galagar Jr. *G.R. 202842 October 9, 2013+ Facts: This is an appeal from the CA affirming the decision of the RTC of Gingoog finding appellant guilty of Rape. *AAA+ testified appellant used a kitchen knife to threaten her and raped her. Appellant threatened to kill her family if she would report to the authorities.

Issues: Accused questions the credibility of *AAA+ who failed to immediately inform the authorities. Appellant also argues that *AAA+ failed to present a medical report to prove the rape. Ruling: Credibility of Witnesses - xxxThe failure of AAA to report her ordeal is not unique in her case. Many victims of rape would choose to suffer in silence rather than put the life of their loved ones in danger. *I+t is well entrenched that delay in reporting rape cases does not by itself undermine the charge, where the delay is grounded in threats from the accused. Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. xxx Corroborative Evidence xxx As to the failure of AAA to present a medical certificate or report, the Court has consistently held that in proving rape the medical examination of the victim or the presentation of a medical report is not essential. The victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical examination of the victim and the corresponding medical certificate are merely corroborative pieces of evidence. xxx People vs. Garyzaldy Guzon *G.R. 199901 October 9, 2013+ Facts: Guzon was accussed of violation of Sec 6, Article II of RA 9165 for selling shabu weighing .06 grams in a buy-bust operation. Guzon was bought to San Nicolas Police Station where PO2 Tuzon prepared an inventory of the seized items. He marked the seized sachet with EAT his initials, then delivered it to the crime laboratory. PO3 Domingo, who received the sachet and Inspector Cayabyab, the Forensic Chemical Officer no longer testified in court. The Initial Lab Report and Chemistry Report in the pre-trial order state that the specimen weighing .06 grams was shabu. The RTC found the accussed guilty as charged. The CA affirmed the same rejecting appellant's chain of custody argument maintaining that the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu was preserved. Issue: Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody for the subject drug. Ruling: Section 21 of RA 9165 provides safeguards for compliance by law officers for the handling of seized substances: Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, particularly Section 21 thereof, further

provides the following guidelines in the custody and control of confiscated drugs: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Unbroken Chain of Custody An unbroken chain is not always the standart. However it becomes indispensable when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. There were several lapses in the law officers' handling of the seized item: 1. The buy-bust officers failed to mark them immediately after its confiscation from the appellant. PO2 Tuzon only marked it with his initials upon arrival in the police station. Failure to mark at the place of arrest does not in itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody but when taken with other lapses,they form part of a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards that are drawn by the law, sufficient to create reasonable doubt as to the culpability of the accused. 2. The certification does not bear the signature of the accused or his representative, a representative from the media, a representative from the DOJ, and any elected public official. 3. There was failure to adequately explain the procedural lapses hence the saving claise in Section 21 of RA 9165 fails to remedy the lapses. 4. There is a weight discrepancy of the seized items. The inventory prepared by PO3 Manuel and PO2 Tuzon weighed more or less .01 gram including plastic material. However the Chemistry Report states a bag containing .06 grams of the substance that does not include the plastic container. Hearsay The poseur-buyer of the buy-bust operation was not presented as a witness. Although PO2 Tuzon testified during the trial on the supposed sale, such information he could offer was based only on conjecture, as may be derived from the supposed actions of Guzon and the poseur-buyer, or at most, hearsay, being information that was merely relayed to him by the alleged poseur-buyer. Given the 20-meter distance, it was unlikely for PO2 Tuzon to have heard the conversations between the alleged

buyer and seller. True enough, his testimony provided that he and PO3 Manuel merely relied on an agreed signal, i.e., the poseur-buyers removal of his cap, to indicate that the sale had been consummated. Xxx In the absence of neither the poseur-buyers nor of any eyewitness testimony on the transaction, the prosecutions case fails. In People v. Tadepa, the Court explained that the failure of the prosecution to present in court the alleged poseur-buyer is fatal to its case. Said the Court in that case, the police officer, who admitted that he was seven (7) to eight (8) meters away from where the actual transaction took place, could not be deemed an eyewitness to the crime. The Court held, viz: In People v. Polizon we said We agree with the appellants contention that the non-presentation of Boy Lim, the alleged poseurbuyer, weakens the prosecutions evidence. Sgt. Pascua was not privy to the conversation between Lim and the accused. He was merely watching from a distance and he only saw the actions of the two. As pointed out by the appellant, Sgt. Pascua had no personal knowledge of the transaction that transpired between Lim and the appellant. Since appellant insisted that he was forced by Lim to buy the marijuana, it was essential that Lim should have been presented to rebut accuseds testimony. The ruling in People v. Yabut is further instructive Well established is the rule that when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. In the present case, accused-appellants version of the circumstances leading to his apprehension constitutes a total denial of the prosecutions allegations. In this regard this Court has ruled that when there is such a divergence of accounts it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellants allegation by presenting x x x the alleged poseur-buyer. This it failed to do giving rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Rule 131, Sec. 5 *e+). This failure constitutes a fatal flaw in the prosecutions evidence since the so-called (poseur-buyer) who was never presented as a witness x x x is the best witness for the prosecution, xxx The court reverses and sets aside the decision of the CA and acquits accused-appellant. Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Robert Mar Chante *G.R. 170598 October 9, 2013+ Facts: Robert Chan, also known as Robert Chan was a current account depositor for petitioner. He was issues a Do-it-all card to handle credit card and ATM transactions. A PIN, known only to Chan, was the security feature. FEBTC bought a complaint against Chan to recover P770,488.30 as unpaid balance for an amount allegedly withdrawn using the card at the ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila. The withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine at P4,000 per transaction. The transactions were processed despite a) the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch); (b) Chans account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time, as shown in the bank statement; (c) the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and (d) his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or deductions from his current

account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded. FECTC alleged a bug allowed Chan to withdraw more than his account would allow. Chan denied liability alleging he was home at the time of the withdrawal. He argued it was humanly impossible to stand long hours in front of the ATM to withdraw those funds. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of FEBTC. Regardless of lack of precedence regarding computer errors, respondent should return what is not rightfully his. The CA reversed the decision. The evidentiary dillema was that there was no direct evidence on who made the actual withdrawals. Issue: Is Chan liable for the amount? Ruling: The FEBTC argues that Chan authorized the withdrawals based on the fact that only Chan knew the correct PIN. The court disagrees with the FEBTC. Burden of Proof xxx The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The mere allegation of a fact is not evidence of it. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, which may either be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court sets the quantum of evidence for civil actions, and delineates how preponderance of evidence is determined, viz: Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. xxx FEBTC did not discharge its burden of proof. The fact that Chan's account number and ATM card were the once used is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he should be deemed to have made the withdrawals. The possibility of system bugs cannot be discounted. The court affirms the decision of the CA and directs petitioner to pay the costs of the suit.

People vs. Hadji Socor Cadidia *G.R. 191263 October 16, 2013+ Facts: Prosecution presented PNP Non-uniformed Personnel who testified that while performing her duties as airport security personnel, she frisked accused whom she noticed had unusual thick bulk near the buttocks. Witness Trayvilla and her co-worker brought accused into the comfort room and found two sachets of shabu.

The second witness, Bagsican, corroborated the testimony of Trayvilla testifying that together, they brought accused into the comfort room and obtained two sachets of shabu after noticing bulkiness in his maong pants. The RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 of Republic Act *No.+ 9165, sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay the fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). Issue: On appeal the accused raises the following issues: Accused argues the testimony of the witnesses had inconsistencies om who was the one who asked accused to empty the contents of his underwear. Furthermore the self-serving testimnies of Trayvilla and Bagsican failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The accused claims a broken chain of custody of the drugs allegedly taken from her and the ones presented in court. Accused questions the lack of physical inventory of the confiscated items at the crime scene, lack of photographs and failure to mark. Ruling: Presumption of Regularity The Court has held that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers. Chain of Custody xxx In Mallillin v. People, the requirements to establish chain of custody were laid down by this Court. First, testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence. Second, witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item. xxx The prosecution were adequately able to prove through testimony, the integrity of the seized item in every step of the process. The first link, Trayvilla and Bagsican confiscated the items and turned them over to SPO3 Appang who confirmed the transfer. The items were turned over to the RASO of the airport. Bagsican marked the sachets with her initials. The items were turned over to SPO4 Villaceran of the NAIA-DITG. SPO3 Appangas signed the confiscated items at the PDEA office located at the airport. As agreed upon by both parties in stipulation of facts, the specimen confiscated were the same as the ones from accused and tested positive for Methyl amphetamine Hydrochloride. Non-compliance with Section 21, par 1 of Article II of RA 9165 does not render void such seizure of and custody of items so long as the integrity and evidential value of the items are preserved. The successful presentation of the prosecution is sufficient to hold the accused guilty. Xxx On a final note, we held that airport frisking is an authorized form of search and seizure. As held in similar cases of People v. Johnson and People v. Canton, this Court affirmed the conviction or the accused Leila Reyes Johnson and Susan Canton for violation of drugs law when they were found to be in hiding in their body illegal drugs upon airport frisking. The Court in both cases explained the rationale for the validity of airport frisking thus: Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure or their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack or subjective expectation of privacy, which

expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage arc routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travellers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. xxx People vs. Michael Maongco Y Yumonda *G.R. 196966 October 23, 2013+ Facts: Accused-appellant was convicted of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. The police conducted an operation allowing a Carpio to talk to accused-appellant on a cellphone to arange for a sale transaction of shabu. PO2 Arugay asked accused-appellant Maongco for Carpo's order of dalawang bulto of shabu. When PO2 Arugay got hold of the sachet, he revealed he was an officer, arrested accused-appellant and informed him of his rights. Accused-appellant discolosed the other bulto of shabu was with accused-appellant Bandali in nearby Quezon Avenue. PO2 Ong approached Bandali and he voluntatily handed the other sachet. He was the narrested and informed of his rights. At the police station, the drugs from accused-appellant Maongco were marked with the initials MMY while the sachet from Bandali was marked with PBS. The shabu were turned over to PO1 Del Fierro and PO2 Sugui. The sachets were inventoried and photographed in the presence of accused-appellants and submitted for laboratory examination. It tested for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC found the accused-appellants guilty. The CA denied their appeal finding no error in jusgment. Issue: Accused-appellants raise the issue that the prosecution was unable to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu had been preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165. Accused-appellants point out that PO1 Arugay did not mention the time and place of the marking of the sachet of shabu purportedly sold to him by accusedappellant Maongco; while PO2 Ong admitted that he marked the sachet of shabu he received from accused-appellant Bandali only at the police station. Both PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong merely provided an obscure account of the marking of the sachets of shabu, falling short of the statutory requirement that the marking of the seized drugs be made immediately after seizure and confiscation. Ruling: Chain of Custody xxx The Court disagrees with accused-appellants as the police officers had substantially complied with the chain of custody rule under Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165. The Court had previously held that in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory, to photograph, and to mark the seized drugs at the place of arrest do not render said drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody of the same. The Court had further clarified, in relation to the requirement of marking the drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation, that the marking may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of the accused and that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary value. xxx

The credibility of the testimonies of the officers are best left to the lower courts. The finding of weight and credence are sustained. The decision is affirmed with modifications.

NOVEMBER 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN, accusedappellant. [G.R. No. 181473. November 11, 2013.] DEL CASTILLO, J p: Appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, 3 qualified object rape and sexual abuse committed against "AAA, his own 12-year old daughter on three separate occasions. AAA and her mother filed a complaint against the appellant who denied and put up alibis. RTC gave more weight to "AAA's" positive testimony as against appellant's bare denials since her testimony was candid, straightforward and free from material contradictions. Her testimony was complemented by the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined "AAA." In fact, "AAA" suffered intense psychological stress and depression as a result of the abuses. On the other hand, the RTC found that appellant's denials were not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. It also found unacceptable his attempt to malign the reputation of his wife and daughter in order to exculpate himself. According to the said court, this evasive attitude of appellant cannot prevail over "AAA's" testimony. On appeal, the appellate court sustained appellant's conviction. Like the RTC, it stressed that appellant's bare assertions cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. It brushed aside the inconsistencies on the part of "AAA" as pointed out by appellant and concluded, after a careful evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, that appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence this petition contending that the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes attributed to him. Appellant argues that his alibi and denial deserve greater weight in evidence than the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The appeal is unmeritorious. We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA" is worthy of credence. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. She did not waver on the material points of her testimony and maintained the same even on cross-examination. Indeed, her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict appellant for the crimes alleged in the Informations. 69 Moreover, "AAA's" testimony is corroborated by the result of her medical examination which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration in her private part. 70 This finding is consistent with her declaration that appellant inserted his penis and finger into her vagina. "Where a victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place." 71 Appellant seeks to discredit "AAA's" testimony by insisting that he could not have raped the latter in the evening of August 22, 2002 since the whole family was in their house that day. This assertion is undeserving of credence due to our constant pronouncement that a bare assertion cannot prevail over

the categorical testimony of a victim. 72 Even if corroborated by appellant's mother, the same does not deserve any weight since courts usually frown upon the corroborative testimony of an immediate member of the family of an accused and treat it with suspicion. The close filial relationship between the witness and the accused casts a thick cloud of doubt upon the former's testimony. Even assuming that appellant was not alone with "AAA" on August 22, 2002, the presence of other people is not a deterrent to the commission of rape. This observation is apparent from the rape by sexual assault committed on October 9, 2002 while the entire family was in the residence. As aptly held by the RTC and the CA, rape indeed does not respect time and place. Appellant impugns the credibility of "AAA" by emphasizing that she gave conflicting accounts on the manner she was raped. He also stresses the contradictions in the testimony of "AAA" and the other prosecution witnesses on the events that transpired after the alleged rape and regarding the disclosure by "AAA" of her ordeal. We are not persuaded. Our review of the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveals that these inconsistencies refer to inconsequential matters "that [do] not bear upon the elements of the crime of rape. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts indispensable to the guilt or innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. As the inconsistencies alleged by the appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape, they cannot be used as [grounds] for his acquittal." 73 With regard to the inconsistencies on the part of "AAA," it bears stressing that "victims do not cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually violated. Thus, an errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a witness, especially when she is recounting details from an experience as humiliating and painful as rape. Furthermore, rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation." 74 Verily, in this case, minor inconsistencies in the testimony of "AAA" are to be expected because (1) she was a minor child during her defloration; (2) she was to testify on a painful and humiliating experience; (3) she was sexually assaulted several times; and, (4) she was examined on details and events that happened almost six months before she testified. On the other hand, what appellant offered for his defense were mere denials which, as aptly observed by the RTC, are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Given the foregoing circumstances, the CA correctly affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding appellant guilty of the crimes charged. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent. [G.R. No. 188260. November 13, 2013.] BERSAMIN, J p:

This case involves a claim for refund or tax credit to cover petitioner Luzon Hydro Corporation's unutilized Input Value-Added Tax (VAT) worth P2,920,665.16 corresponding to the four quarters of taxable year 2001. Pursuant to the Power Purchase Agreement entered into with the National Power Corporation (NPC), the electricity produced by the petitioner from its operation of the Bakun Hydroelectric Power Plant was to be sold exclusively to NPC. 3 Relative to its sale to NPC, the petitioner was granted by the BIR a certificate for Zero Rate for VAT purposes in the periods from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000; February 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000 (Certificate No. Z-162-2000); and from January 2, 2001 to December 31, 2001 (Certificate No. 2001-269). petitioner filed a written claim for refund or tax credit relative to its unutilized input VAT for the period from October 1999 to October 2001 aggregating P14,557,004.38. The BIR, through Revenue Examiner Felicidad Mangabat of Revenue District Office No. 2 in Vigan City, concluded an investigation, and made a recommendation in its report however, despite the recommendation, the CIR Commissioner did not ultimately act thus, on April 14, 2003, the petitioner filed its petition for review in the CTA, praying for the refund or tax credit certificate (TCC) corresponding to the unutilized input VAT paid for the four quarters of 2001 totalling P9,795,427.88. Answering on May 29, 2003, 11 the Commissioner denied the claim. Petitioner filed against the BIR who later on granted partial grants on the petitioners claims thus the latter filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Petition for Review in consideration of the partial grant of the claim. The commissioner did not file an answer while the petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to support its claim. The CTA in Division promulgated its decision in favor of the respondent denying the petition for review. In petitioner's VAT returns for the four quarters of 2001, no amount of zero-rated sales was declared. Likewise, petitioner did not submit any VAT official receipt of payments for services rendered to NPC. The only proof submitted by petitioner is a letter from Regional Director Rene Q. Aguas, Revenue Region No. 1, stating that the financial statements and annual income tax return constitute sufficient secondary proof of effectively zero-rated and that based on their examination and evaluation of the financial statements and annual income tax return of petitioner for taxable year 2000. This Court cannot give credence to the said letter as it refers to taxable year 2000, while the instant case refers to taxable year 2001. It is clear under Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997 that the refund/tax credit of unutilized input VAT is premised on the existence of zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales. The petitioner filed a petition for review in the CTA En Banc who affirmed the CTA in denying its claim for refund or tax credit on the basis that it had not established its having effectively zerorated sales for the four quarters of 2001. Hence this petition praying for the reversal of the decision of the CTA En Banc, and for the remand of the case to the CTA for the reception of its VAT official receipts as newly discovered evidence, representing that the VAT official receipts misplaced by Edwin Tapay, its former Finance and Accounting Manager, but had been found only after the CTA En Banc has already affirmed the decision of the CTA in Division. In the alternative, it has asked that the Commissioner allow the claim for refund or tax credit of P2,920,665.16.

The supreme court denied the petition. Although the petitioner has correctly contended here that the sale of electricity by a power generation company like it should be subject to zero-rated VAT under Republic Act No. 9136, 31 its assertion that it need not prove its having actually made zero-rated sales of electricity by presenting the VAT official receipts and VAT returns cannot be upheld. It ought to be reminded that it could not be permitted to substitute such vital and material documents with secondary evidence like financial statements. TADCSE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES, INC., petitioner, vs. ALABANG MEDICAL CENTER, respondent. [G.R. No. 181983. November 13, 2013.] REYES, J p: CIGI, as contractor and AMC, as owner, entered into a contract 4 whereby the former bound itself to provide labor and materials for the installation of a medical gas pipeline system for the first, second and third floors (Phase 1 installation project) of the hospital for the contract price . When the sales invoice was left unheeded, CIGI sent a demand letter to AMC on January 7, 1998. AMC, however, still failed to pay thus prompting CIGI to file a collection suit. CIGI claimed that AMC's obligation to pay the outstanding balance of the contract price for thePhase 2 installation project is already due and demandable pursuant to Article II, page 4 of the contract stating that the project shall be paid through progress billing within fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of original invoice. During trial, CIGI presented the testimonies of its officers, James Rodriguez Gillego (Gillego), Credit Manager and Marcelino Tolentino (Tolentino), Installation Manager. Gillego confirmed the unpaid balance of AMC as well as its additional liabilities for interest and penalty charges at 17% per annum and 2% per month, respectively. CIGI submitted in evidence photographs of allegedly defective and incomplete parts of the installed medical oxygen and vacuum pipeline system. RTC adjudged AMC to have breached the contract for failure to perform its obligation of paying the remaining balance of the contract price relying on Tolentino's testimony that they were unable to test run the installed system. CA reversed the decision. Hence this appeal. The main core if this resolution is whether or not CIGI's demand for payment upon AMC is proper. CIGI failed to prove by substantial evidence that it requested AMC for electrical facilities as such, its failure to conduct a test run and orientation/seminar is unjustified. CIGI failed to amply support its allegation that it requested for electrical facilities from AMC. Tolentino, CIGI's installation manager, testified that on August 23, 1999 they requested in writing for the electrical facilities but no evidence of such document was submitted. It is but a self-serving allegation, which by law is not equivalent to proof. In addition, Pineda, the one who actually sent the request was not presented as witness thereby making Tolentino's statement mere hearsay evidence bearing no probative value. ASTIED

Settled is the rule that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. While Tolentino's testimony may be considered as independently relevant statement and may be admitted as to the fact that Pineda made utterances to him about the request for electricity, it is still inadequate to support the claim that AMC reneged on its obligation to provide electrical facilities. Admissibility of testimony should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Here, the Court finds no reason to doubt and overturn the CA's evaluation of Tolentino's testimony. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL ALCOBER, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 192941. November 13, 2013.] LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals convicting accused-appellant Alcober with deliberate intent and with lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation then armed with a long bolo (sundang), taking advantage of the minority of the victim and their relationship, the accused being [the] common-law spouse of the victim's mother, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had (sic) carnal knowledge with AAA. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the CA except the latters findings that the records are bereft of independent evidence to prove that AAA is a minor. In People v. Pruna, 33 the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1.The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party. 2.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3.If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a.If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;

b.If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c.If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5.It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6.The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (Emphases supplied, citation omitted.) In the case at bar, no birth or baptismal certificate or school record showing the date of birth of AAA was presented. Pursuant to number 4 of the guidelines, however, in the absence of the foregoing documents (certificate of live birth or authentic document), the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. In the case at bar, AAA testified that she was 13 years old on July 20, 1999 and that her birthday was in February. Accused-appellant, who insists that the incident occurred on October 20, 1999, expressly and clearly admitted that AAA was still 13 years old on that date, which was three months later. Several more questions were propounded to accused-appellant to ascertain that he was aware of AAA's minority at the time of the sexual intercourse, and accused-appellant's answers plainly showed that he was fully cognizant of this fact. Furthermore, BBB categorically testified that AAA was 13 years old at the time material to this case. To be sure, there is no disparity between the evidence for the prosecution and the defense on the point that the accused had carnal knowledge of AAA when she was only 13 years old. WHEREFORE, the accused appellant is found GUILTYof the crime of rape qualified by minority and relationship. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. KENNETH MONCEDA y SY alias "WILLIAM SY" and YU YUK LAI alias "SZE YUK LAI," appellants. [G.R. No. 176269. November 13, 2013.] BRION, J p: The accused appellants were charged and convicted of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 in both RTC and CA. Lai faults the lower courts for disregarding the defense's evidence which pointed out the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The supreme court disagree with the accused appellants. We are not persuaded that this inconsistency is sufficient to taint the prosecution's case to the point that it should fail. The rule is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor inconsistencies even enhance their veracity as the variances erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. 31 Besides, P/Inspector Arsenal was on a separate vehicle, at a some distance from the actual buy-bust transaction. It is possible that he might have been mixed up and confused on who was carrying the box containing shabu. But this uncertainty is a minor matter in the context of what had been sufficiently proven as a whole. What is material to consider is that the transacting parties were there, together with the red box that contained the shabu; the order by which the box was handled is not all that important and material given that it passed from the appellants and ultimately to PO3 Pastrana. In other words, the illegal transaction had indeed taken place. Significantly, PO3 Pastrana, the poseur-buyer and the one who directly received the drugs, was unwavering in his testimony that it was Lai who was carrying the box. In People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 33 we held that like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts of government officials. HSIADc Lai, unfortunately for her, failed to corroborate her statements regarding the alleged arrest which occurred at Diamond Hotel. Her presented witnesses all testified on the events before or after her arrest. Lai's lone testimony regarding the circumstances of arrest at Diamond Hotel, on the other hand, failed to overcome the positive and credible testimony showing the existence of the buy-bust operation at Sofitel Hotel. Worse, the two persons, her son and her driver, who accompanied her during the alleged arrest at Diamond Hotel, and who could have possibly shed light to her version of the events both refused to testify. We find this development perplexing and is a matter which greatly weakened Lai's frame-up allegations. HEIRS OF THE LATE FELIX M. BUCTON, namely: NICANORA G. BUCTON, ERLINDA BUCTON-EBLAMO, AGNES BUCTON-LUGOD, WILMA BUCTON-YRAY and DON G. BUCTON, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GONZALO and TRINIDAD GO, respondents. [G.R. No. 188395. November 20, 2013.] PEREZ, J p: After the pre-trial conference was terminated without the parties having reached at an amicable settlement, the RTC went on to receive testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties in support of their respective positions. The case is hereby dismissed as it is hereby dismissed on grounds that plaintiffs were barred by laches and prescription. The CA affirmed the RTC finding that the evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix failed to preponderantly establish that the questioned SPA was a forgery. 15 The appellate court further declared that the Spouses Go were innocent purchasers for value who acquired the property without any knowledge that the right of Belisario as attorney-in-fact was merely simulated. Hence this petition. The Supreme Court find the petitione impressed with merit.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. To prove forgery, the Heirs of Felix offered the testimony of an expert witness, Eliodoro Constantino (Constantino) of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified that significant differences existed between the signatures of Felix on the standard documents from the one found in the SPA of Belisario. His testimony, however, was disregarded both by the RTC and the Court of Appeals which upheld the validity of the SPA on the ground that it enjoys the presumption of regularity of a public document. While it is true that a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity, this presumption, however, is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The testimony of Constantino and Nicanora, had it been properly appreciated, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to public documents and to meet the stringent requirements to prove forgery. Evidently, the foregoing testimonial evidence adduced by the Heirs of Felix are proof opposite to that which is required to show the genuineness of a handwriting as set forth by the Rules of Court: Rule 132. Sec. 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, or has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Indubitably, the foregoing testimonial and circumstantial evidence cast doubt on the integrity, genuineness, and veracity on the questioned SPA and impels this Court to tilt the scale in favor of the Heirs of Felix. Although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence indubitably favors the Heirs of Felix. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

People of the Philippines Vs. Welmo Linsie y Benevidez [G.R. No. 199494. November 27, 2013] Facts: Appellant Welmo Linsie y Benevidez was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of simple rape by the trial court, and later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Upon appeal before the Supreme Court, appellant alleges that the court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant. Issue: Whether or not the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant and plagued with inconsistencies and variations constitute proof sufficient for a conviction. Ruling: The credibility of the rape victims testimony is a recurring crucial factor in the resolution of a case of rape. In fact, we have held that, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. We have repeatedly held that what is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the rape by the accused against the complainant has been sufficiently proven; and that inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. Furthermore, we have recently reiterated that rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party. We have previously stated that a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape.

People of the Philippines Vs. Faisal Loks y Pelonyo [G.R. No. 203433. November 27, 2013]

Facts: Accused appellant Faisal Loks was convicted by the trial court of violating R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. It was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Appellant was apprehended in a buy bust operation conducted by SPO1 Jerry Velasco, SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos, PO2 Nicdao and PO2 Manlapaz. SPO1 Velasco (poseur-buyer) and SPO1 Ramos (prepared marked money) testified for the prosecution.

For his defense, appellant denies having sold any illegal drug to SPO1 Velasco. Apellant also brings up the buy-bust teams failure to make an inventory and to take photographs of the subject drug, and that it adversely affected the prosecutions case. Issues 1) Whether or not failure to make inventory of subject drug adversely affects prosecutions case 2) Whether or not testimonies of prosecution witnesses are to be given greater weight Ruling 1) No. Time and time again, the Court has recognized that non-compliance with Section 21of R.A. No. 9165 which identifies the said requirements does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible. What is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused are preserved. 2) Yes. It is equally settled that in cases involving violations of [R.A. No.9165], credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, the RTC gave greater weight to the testimonies of the police officers who testified against Loks, a ruling which even the CA affirmed on appeal. Upon review, the Court has determined that the testimony of SPO1 Velasco, who was the poseur-buyer in the sale and thus armed with sufficient personal knowledge on the transaction, indeed established Loks sale of the illegal drug and the validity of his arresT.

People of the Philippines Vs. Hermenigildo Maglente y Medina [G.R. No. 201445. November 27, 2013] Facts: Accused appellant Maglente seeks a review from his conviction of murder and frustrated murder. As witness for prosecution, Crisanta De Leon testified that she saw a kinky haired man (later identified in court as Maglente) standing in the corner of Jesus and Lakandula Streets holding a revolver and waiting for someone. Later, she saw the same man simultaneously riddle a van with bullets, resulting to the death of passenger Chua and injuries of driver Mendoza.

During trial on the merits, Maglente was positively identified by De Leon as the one who held the revolver while waiting along Jesus and Lakandula Streets, and also as one of the armed men who fired at the van and the victims. Initially, however, De Leon identified Magsipoc as the one holding the revolver. On cross-examination, she rectified her previous statement and identified Maglente as the gunman who fired at the van. De Leon also identified Maglente among the pictures presented by SPO3 Danilo DG Cruz (SPO3 Cruz) during his follow-up investigation of the case. Issue Whether or not appellant can be convicted notwithstanding the alleged uncertainty over his identification by De Leon as one of the assailants Ruling: Yes. It was the finding of the RTC that at first, De Leon, indeed pointed to Magsipoc as the one who stood at the corner of Jesus and Lakandula streets, and one of those who fired at the van. Nevertheless, the RTC further found that De Leon was able to positively identify Maglente during cross-examination and during the investigation conducted by SPO3 Cruz one week after the incident. The CA also made a similar finding. The well-settled rule is that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit, which the Court finds application in this particular case.

Maynilad Water Supervisors Association, represented by Roberta Estino Vs. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. [G.R. No. 198935. November 27, 2013]

Facts: Petitioner Maynilad Water Supervisors Association (MWSA) is an association composed of former supervisory employees of Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). These employees claim that during their employment with MWSS, they were receiving a monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) equivalent to 40% of their basic pay. Later, MWSS was privatized and part of it, MWSS West was acquired by Maynilad Water Services, Inc (Maynilad). Some of the employees of MWSS were absorbed by Maynilad subject to terms and conditions of a concession agreement, which contained a provision on Non-Diminution of Benefits from

those previously granted to MWSS employees. However, the payment of COLA was not among those listed as benefits. Issue Whether or not the retained MWSA employees are entitled to COLA from the year 1997, the time its members were absorbed by Maynilad, up to the present. Ruling No. In Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation, this Court ruled that [t]he agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement between the parties and their successors in interest. In the instant case, the only commitment of Maynilad under the Concession Agreement it entered with MWSS was to provide the absorbed employees with a compensation package no less favorable than those granted to [them] by the MWSS at the time of their separation from MWSS, particularly those set forth in Exhibit F x x x. It is undisputed that Maynilad complied with such commitment. It cannot, however, be compelled to assume the payment of an allowance which was not agreed upon. Such would not only be unreasonable but also unfair for Maynilad. MWSS and Maynilad could not have presumed that the COLA was part of the agreement when it was no longer being received by the employees at the time of the execution of the contract, which is the reckoning point of their new employment.

Spouses Teodoro and Rosario Saraza, et al. Vs. William Francisco [G.R. No. 198718. November 27, 2013]

Facts: Respondent William Francisco alleged in his complaint that he and Fernando executed an Agreement that provided for the latters sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City for a total consideration of P3,200,000.00. The amount of P1,200,000.00 was paid upon the

Agreements execution, while the balance was to be paid on installments to PNB, to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernandos parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan. When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached P226,582.13, the respondent asked for the petitioners issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the request. Petitioners claim that the amount of P1,200,000.00 which was supposed to be paid by the respondent upon the Agreements execution remained unpaid, thus their refusal was valid. Issue Whether or not there was payment of P1.2 million upon execution of the Agreement Ruling Yes. We consider the fact that both the RTC and the CA have determined that there has been a full payment by the respondent of his P3,200,000.00 obligation under the Agreement. Upon review, the Court finds no reason to deviate from this finding of the courts, especially as it is supported by substantial evidence. As both the RTC and CA correctly held, such Agreement sufficiently proves the fact of the respondents payment to the petitioners of the agreed initial payment of P1,200,000.00, as it states: That, for and in consideration of the agreed purchase price ofTHREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS([P]3,200,000.00), Philippine currency, of which the sum of ONEMILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]1,200,000.00), has been paid by the buyer upon execution of this instrument Given this categorical statement, the petitioners denial that they have received the amount necessitated concrete and substantial proof. A perusal of the case records shows that the petitioners failed in this regard. The CA also correctly held that the parol evidence rule applies to

this case. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tend to vary the terms of the written agreement, is inadmissible under the rule.

People of the Philippines Vs. Marissa Castillo y Alignay [G.R. No. 190180. November 27, 2013]

Facts: Accused appellant Marissa Alignay was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs) by the lower court and affirmed by the trial court. Her apprehension was brought about by a buy-bust operation. Upon appeal, appellant argues that the police officers who apprehended her failed to strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation. Failing in such regard, appellant insists that the prosecutions case should necessarily fall and she be acquitted of all charges against her as the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was not properly established. Issue: Whether or not the alleged non-compliance with the aforementioned procedural rule is fatal to the prosecutions case Ruling No. Non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Moreover, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, a perusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non-prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses, to wit:

Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

People of the Philippines Vs. PO2 Asir Gani y Alih, et al.[G.R. No. 198318. November 27, 2013]

Facts: Accussed appellants PO2 Asir Gani and Normina Gani were adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs) by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. During the trial, prosecution presented documentary evidence and testimonies to establish the sequence of events which led to appellants arrests in a buy-bust operation led by S1 Saul. After apprehension, the buy- bust team and accused-appellants then proceeded to the FTI Barangay Hall where an inventory was conducted in the presence of two barangay officials and the accused themselves. The evidence for the defense consisted of accused-appellants testimonies. Both denied the crime charged against them and claimed that they were the victims of extortion. Issue Whether or not the appellants guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt Ruling Yes. The prosecution witnesses gave a clear and candid narration of the buy-bust operation against accused-appellants; while accused-appellants denial and alibi fail in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of ill motive or bad faith on the part of the buy-bust team. Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Oft-repeated is the rule that in cases involving violations of Republic Act No.9165, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers (or in this case, NBI

agents) for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Absent any indication that the NBI agents herein were ill motivated in testifying against accused-appellants, their testimonies deserve full credence. In contrast, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of Republic Act No.9165. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. Accused-appellants presented no such evidence in this case.

People of the Philippines Vs. Roberto Garcia y Padiernos [G.R. No. 206095. November 25, 2013]

Facts: Accused appellant Garcia was convicted of simple rape by the trial court and later modified by the Court of Appeals, appreciating the qualifying circumstance of minority and thereby convicting Garcia of qualified rape. It was of the view of the CA that since the minority of the victim (3 years old) was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, through her testimony and Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04, the imposition of the death penalty was warranted. Issue: Whether or not sufficient evidence was shown to prove victims minority Ruling No. Well-settled is the rule that qualifying circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven with equal certainty as the crime itself. The victims minority must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the crime itself. In People v. Arpon, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows: 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rule on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and whatis sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and whatis sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; c.If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases supplied.)

In this case, there is nothing on record to prove the qualifying circumstance that the victim is a child below 7 years old. The testimony of the victim anent her age and the absence of denial on the part of Garcia are not sufficient evidence of her age. On the other hand, the information regarding the age of the victim as indicated in Medico Legal Report No. M-4356-04 is not reliable because there was no showing who supplied the same. Lamentably, her age was not one of the subjects of stipulation during the pre-trial conference.

People of the Philippines Vs. Natalio Hilarion y Laliag [G.R. No. 201105. November 25, 2013]

Facts: Accused appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape, on account of victims minority (aged 6 years old) by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court. The Information stated the minority and age of the victim. During trial, prosecution presented written and oral testimonies of the victims mother to prove the victims age. Issue: Whether or not the victims minority was sufficiently proven Ruling No. In the present case, the records are completely devoid of evidence that the certificates recognized by law have been lost or destroyed or were otherwise unavailable. The mother simply testified without prior proof of the unavailability of the recognized primary evidence (original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth). Thus, proof of the victims age cannot be recognized, following the rule that all doubts should be interpreted in favor of the accused. To reiterate, while the victims mother testified that her daughter was six (6) years old at the time of the rape, it had not been previously established that the certificate of live birth or other similar authentic document such as the baptismal certificate or school records have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable. Even the victims own testimony on cross examination that she was six (6) years old at the time of the incident would not suffice to prove her minority since her age was not expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. We stress that age is an essential element of statutory rape; hence the victim's age must be proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself.

Primo C. Miro, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Vs. Marilyn Mendoza Vda. De Erederos, et al. [G.R. Nos. 172532 & 172544-45. November 20, 2013]

Facts: The Deputy Ombudsman found respondents guilty of the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct for alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of confirmation certificates, an indispensible requirement in the processing of documents for the registration of motor vehicle with the LTO. Private complainants accuse Alingasa of selling a pad of confirmation certificate for P2,500.00 and then remit collections to Erederos and in turn remit them to Mendoza, Regional Director of LTO Cebu. The Deputy Ombudsman based his findings on the affidavits submitted by the complainants and the NBI/Progress report. Issue: Whether or not the affidavits and NBI/Progress reports constitute substantial evidence Ruling No. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos in the allegedly anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that the complainants have commonly noticed and witnessed the anomalous sale transaction concerning the confirmation certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege that to secure the confirmation certificates, an amount of P2,500.00 would be paid to Alingasa, an LTO personnel, who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza vda. Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional Director, Porferio Mendoza. While the payment to Alingasa might be considered based on personal knowledge, the alleged remittance to Erederos and Mendoza - on its face is hearsay. It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e. those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such as affidavits. With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the complainants as corroborating evidence, the same should not be given any weight, since it was based on complainants affidavits. It constitutes

double hearsay because the material facts recited were not within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. As held in Africa, et al V Caltex (Phil.) Inc., et al., reports of investigations made by law enforcement officers or other public officials are hearsay unless they fall within the scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule jus tmentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

DECEMBER 2013 LAURA E. PARAGUYA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO and EMETERIO CRUCILLO, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF SORSOGON, respondents. [G.R. No. 200265. December 2, 2013.] Facts: Paraguya filed before the RTC a Complaint against Sps. Crucillo and the RD for the annulment of OCT No. P-17729 and other related deeds, alleging that Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. She claimed that she is the lawful heir to the subject properties. Meanwhile, RD filed its answer and denied any involvement in the aforesaid fraud, maintaining that its issuance of OCT No. P-17729 was his ministerial duty. During trial, Paraguya testified and presented a document entitled Recognition of Ownership and Possession executed by her siblings, as well as a titulo posesorio. Sps. Crucillo on their part presented several witnesses who testified that Escurel had been in possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1957. The RTC granted Paraguya's complaint which was, however, reversed by CA. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Paraguya's complaint for annulment of title. Ruling: Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system - Paraguya's complaint for annulment of title should be dismissed altogether since she merely relied on the titulo posesorio issued in favor of Estabillo sometime in 1893 or 1895. Based on Section 1 of PD 892, entitled "Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings," Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of ownership after six (6) months from the effectivity of the law, or starting August 16, 1976, viz.: Section 1.The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands. All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. Hence, since Paraguya only presented the titulo posesorio during the pendency of the instant case, or during the 1990's onwards, the CA was correct in not giving any credence to it at all. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROGELIO MANICAT y DE GUZMAN, appellant. [G.R. No. 205413. December 2, 2013.] Facts: On January 14, 2009, RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of AAA, the 13-year old victim, that while she was on her way to buy coffee and sugar, the appellant pulled her inside his house, undressed her, and then forced her to lie down on her back. The appellant afterwards inserted his penis inside her vagina. According to the RTC, the fact that AAA is afflicted with mild mental retardation with a mental age of 7-8 years old does not make her an incompetent witness, as she testified in a clear and straightforward manner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment and further held that AAA testified in a "straightforward, candid and convincing manner." Her testimony was corroborated by Medico Legal Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001 stating that the victim is in a non-virgin physical state. Appellant denied and raised plea of alibi. Issue: Whether or not appellants denial can overturn his conviction in light of AAA's positive testimony. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive of the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

JAIME C. REGIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO, respondents G.R. No. 204828. December 3, 2013 Facts: Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (Regio) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (Co), among other candidates, ran in the October 25, 2010 barangay elections in Barangay 296, Zone 28, District III of the City of Manila for the position of punong barangay. Immediately following the counting and canvassing of the votes from seven clustered precincts in the adverted barangay, Regio, who garnered four hundred seventy-eight (478) votes, as against the three hundred thirtysix (336) votes obtained by Co, was proclaimed winner for the contested post of punong barangay. On November 4, 2010, Co filed an election protest before the MeTC. During the preliminary conference, the trial court allowed the revision of ballots. The revision of ballots occurred on January 13-14, 2011. Per the report of the revision committee, Co won the election. During his turn to present evidence, Co limited his offer to the revision committee report, showing that he garnered the highest number of votes. Regio, on the other hand, denied that the elections were tainted with irregularities. He claimed that the results of the revision are products of postelections operations, as the ballots were tampered with, switched, and altered drastically to change the results of the elections. He presented as witnesses to support his claim. On December 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc reconsidered the August 23, 2011 Resolution of the First Division, and accordingly declared Co as the duly elected punong barangay. Issue: Whether or not reliance on the revision committee report by Co would suffice to overturn the election of Regio.

Ruling: Judicial Notice - The court takes judicial notice of the holding of barangay elections last October 28, 2013 since the protest case dismissible for being moot and academic. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. In fine, with the election of a new punong barangay during the October 28, 2013 elections, the issue of who the rightful winner of the 2010 barangay elections has already been rendered moot and academic. Private respondent Co has not proved thatthe integrity of the ballots has been preserved - It is well to note that the respondent Co did not present any testimonial evidence to prove that the election paraphernalia inside the protested ballot boxes had been preserved. The guiding standards in Rosal Doctrine posits that the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the protestant. However in the instant case Co merely relied on the report of the revision committee. There was no independent, direct or indirect, evidence to prove the preservation of the ballots and other election paraphernalia. With no independent evidence to speak of, respondent Co cannot simply rely on the report of the revision committee, and from there

conclude that the report itself is proof of the preservation of the ballots. What he needs to provide is evidence independent of the revision proceedings. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., ESTANISLAO SANTIAGO, and/or HAPAG-LLOYD AKTIENGESELL SCHAFT, petitioners, vs. ELENO A. BABOL, respondent G.R. No. 204076. December 4, 2013 Facts: On September 21, 2006, respondent was rehired by Hapag Lloyd Aktiengesell Schaft (Hapag Lloyd) through its local manning agent, Jebsens Maritime, Incorporated (Jebsens) as a reefer fitter for a term of six months. Before joining his vessel of assignment, respondent was subjected to the rigid mandatory Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was cleared as fit for sea duty. Sometime in February 2007, respondent noticed the swelling of his neck while on board. He was then repatriated and brought to Hospital for treatment and management under the care of Dr. Robert D. Lim, the company-designated physician. There, a biopsy of two soft tissue fragments taken from his swelling neck indicated Metastatic Undifferentiated Carcinoma. On April 11, 2007, respondent was diagnosed with Nasopharyngeal Carcinoma (NPC). The doctors then recommended that respondent undergo six (6) cycles of chemotherapy and thirty nine (39) sessions of radiotherapy for palliative management with a total cost of P828,500.00. This recommendation was acted upon by the petitioners who, in good faith, shouldered all the expenses. Despite having received an expensive company-sponsored treatment, respondent still demanded the payment of disability benefits from the petitioners. His demands being unheeded filed a case before the labor arbiter, where he was awarded the sum of US$60,000.00 as total disability benefits arising from work-related illness. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that respondent's condition, Nasopharyngeal Cancer, is work-related. RULING: Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states in express terms that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established only if supp1ied by substantive evidence. Here, the petitioners question the conlusion that the disease subject of this petition is a work-related illness or at least aggravated by the working conditions onboard the vessel. They argue that respondent failed to present substantial evidence in support of his claims for compensability. The Principle of Work-relation - In this case, it is undisputed that NPC afflicted respondent while on board the petitioners' vessel. As a non-occupational disease, it has the disputable presumption of being work-related. This presumption obviously works in the seafarer's favor. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the employers, the work-relatedness of the disease must be sustained. They primarily

relied on the medical report issued by Dr. Co Pefia. The report, however, failed to make a categorical statement confirming the total absence of work relation. The Principle of Work-aggravation - Respondent is of the theory that such high risk dietary factor persisted on board the vessel, thus, increasing the probability that the disease was aggravated by his working conditions: On the food he took while on board, Complainant is exposed to the risk of contracting his illness. The above assertions of respondent do not constitute as substantial evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between his illness and the working conditions on board the petitioners' vessel. The Court refuses to take judicial notice of said assertions on the basis of an allegation of mere common knowledge. This is in light of the changing global landscape affecting international maritime labor practices. The Court notes the acceptance, albeit steadily, of the minimum standards governing food and catering on board ocean-going vessels as provided in the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention of which the Philippines and MY Glasgow's flag country Germany have signed The State of Permanent Total Disability - the Court held that disability should be understood not more on its medical significance, but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In this case, records reveal that the medical report issued by the company-designated oncologist was bereft of any certification that respondent remained fit to work as a seafarer despite his cancer. Thus we rule in favor of respondent.

MARIO REYES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF PABLO FLORO, respondents. [G.R. No. 200713. December 11, 2013.] Facts: On 3 May 2004, petitioner Mario Reyes (Reyes) filed, a Complaint for Pre-Emption and Redemption, Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Occupation and Cultivation with prayer for the issuance of Restraining Order/Injunction against respondents. Reyes alleged that the land was formerly owned by Carmen T. Bautista and allegedly sold the land to Zenaida as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity. Before Bautista sold the land, Reyes was allegedly one of her tenant-lessees. On 19 December 1983, Zenaida executed an Agricultural Leasehold Contract with Reyes, her brother.

Sometime in January 2004, three unknown persons representing as brokers claimed that the heirs of Floro and Sun Industrial were selling the land, which had already been transferred to their names, and demanded that Reyes vacate the premises or else they would be forced to evict him. Reyes opposed claiming that he was the agricultural lessee of Zenaida based on a Certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO).Reyes wanted to acquire the land according to the approved Barangay Committee on Land Production (BCLP) in the locality.Zenaida filed her Answer with Counterclaim. She alleged that since 1983 Reyes was the actual occupant, cultivator and agricultural tenant-lessee over the subject land. Sun Industrial raised the defense that it was an innocent assignee and purchaser for value in good faith. Issue: Whether or not Reyes is a de jure tenant or lessee who is entitled to redemption, pre-emption, peaceful possession, occupation and cultivation of the subject land. Ruling: This Court takes judicial notice of two cases: (1) Zenaida Reyes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184728; and (2) Sun Industrial Corporation v. Victoria Floro-Basilio, G.R. No. 169674. The first case convicted Zenaida of falsification of public documents as defined and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the second case, the court upheld the title of Pablo Floro and declared the titles of Zenaida and Sun Industrial as void. It stated that since the title of Zenaida was fraudulently acquired on the basis of a forged deed of sale, her title is null and void and the subsequent registration of the property in the name of Sun Industrial, as mortgage creditor of Zenaida, is also void. The MARO certification is merely preliminary and does not bind the courts as conclusive evidence that Reyes is a lessee. The certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value, without any corroborative evidence. The genuineness of the agricultural leasehold contract that Zenaida entered into with Reyes is also doubtful. The records show that respondent heirs submitted two documentary evidence with the PARAD which the provincial adjudicator disregarded: (1) a MARO Certification dated 9 May 2005 manifesting that there is no copy on file, with the Municipal Land Reform Office of Malolos, Bulacan, of the supposed leasehold contract; and (2) a Pagpapatunay dated 8 June 2004 from the Punong Barangay of Malolos, Bulacan attesting that since the year 1995 until the date of the affidavit, the subject land was not being used for farming, cultivation or any agricultural purpose. This evidence can only mean that the leasehold contract was falsified. Furthermore, the Deed of Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenant[s] Conformity executed by and between her (Zenaida Reyes) as Vendee, and Carmen T. Bautista as Vendor, as not presented as evidence in Court. Copies were never presented in this Court or in the RTC, Branch 12 nor explained as why they were not presented. This is therefore clearly suppression of evidence which would therefore be adverse if produced.

Thus, from the findings of the lower court that Zenaida failed to submit concrete and reliable evidence to lend credence to her claim of ownership of the subject land, it has been clearly established that Zenaida is not the true and lawful owner and only concocted a story unworthy of belief. As a consequence, the agricultural leasehold contract which Reyes entered into with Zenaida is void. The certifications from Bautista and the MARO declaring Reyes to be a tenant are not enough evidence to prove that there is a tenancy relationship. One claiming to be a de jure tenant has the burden to show, by substantial evidence, that all the essential elements of a tenancy relationship are present WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA, accusedappellant. [G.R. No. 189840. December 11, 2013.] Facts: The prosecution testified, that on July 18, 2005, the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant. The buy-bust team then proceeded to the subject area but could not locate appellant. The next day, the buy-bust team returned and found appellant. The confidential informant introduced PO3 Ruiz to appellant and told him that PO3 Ruiz wanted to buy shabu. Appellant pulled out from his pocket three plastic sachets and told P03 Ruiz to choose one. The other buy-bust team members then rushed to the scene to assist PO3 Ruiz in apprehending appellant. Appellant was taken to the police headquarters. The items seized from him were turned over to the duty investigator who prepared a request for laboratory examination and then sent to the crime laboratory. The results revealed that the contents of the plastic sachets are positive forshabu. However, Appellant testified that on July 19, 2005, at around 2 p.m., he was in his house with his wife and child when he was roused from sleep by a man armed with a gun. He was told that a buy-bust operation was being conducted. He was made to board a vehicle where he was showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance that he believed to be shabu. He struggled to free himself and denied ownership thereof but his actions were futile. He was taken to Barangay Olympia, Makati City, where he was detained for 30 minutes, then brought to the crime laboratory for drug testing. Fancy Dela Cruz corroborated the testimony of appellant. Appellant also contends that the police officers failed to observe the proper procedure in the custody and control of the seized drug by not marking the confiscated specimens in the manner mandated by law. Issue: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. N0.9165.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE NOTWIT[H]STANDING THE FAILURE OF THE A[P]PREHENDING TEAM TO PROVE [THE] INTEGRITY OF THE SEIZED DRUGS. Ruling: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence. All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs were also established. First, the two plastic sachets containing shabu subject of the case for the illegal possession of drugs were found in appellant's pocket after a search on his person was made following his arrest in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu. It must be remembered that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant Second, appellant did not adduce evidence showing his legal authority to possess the shabu. Third, appellant's act of allowing the poseur-buyer to choose one from among the three sachets and putting back into his pocket the two sachets of shabu not chosen clearly shows that he freely and consciously possessed the illegal drugs. Hence, appellant was correctly charged and convicted for illegal possession of shabu. Appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. There is also no imputation by appellant of any evil motives on the part of the buy-bust team to falsely testify against him. Their testimonies and actuations therefore enjoy the presumption of regularity.

Failure to Physically Inventory and Photograph the Shabu After Seizure and Confiscation is Not Fatal. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The absence of evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal since the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FERDINAND BAUTISTA y SINAON, appellant. [G.R. No. 198113. December 11, 2013.] Facts: On September 15, 2003 the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan filed separate charges of selling and possessing dangerous drugs against the accused appellant Ferdinand Bautista y Sinaon (Bautista).

The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 31, 2003 the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Meycauayan, Bulacan, received a phone-in information that accused Bautista had been selling illegal drugs.At about 11:40 p.m. on September 3, 2003, after confirming through surveillance that Bautista had indeed been peddling illegal drugs, they conducted a buy-bust operation against the accused. On reaching the place, the officer told Bautista that he was interested in buying P300.00 worth of shabu. Bautista agreed and handed over a plastic sachet believed to contain shabu to his supposed buyer who in turn gave him three marked P100.00 bills. At a signal, the police back-up team rushed in and arrested. At the police station, PO1 Tadeo marked the shabu subject of the buy-bust with the initials "BBWCT." He marked the second plastic sachet seized from Bautista as "WCT" on one side and the letter "P" on the other side. After marking the seized items, the police submitted them for forensic examination which proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. However, Bautista claimed as follows: On 3 September 2003 while accused Rocel was washing clothes and accused [Bautista] was sleeping inside their house, a male person arrived and inquired from Rocel as to the whereabouts of a certain Jerry. When she replied that she does not know of a person by that name and that her only companion was her husband, several armed men went inside their house and demanded for her husband. As she was about to call [Bautista,] however, they went to him, asked him whether he was Jerry and immediately handcuffed him. Both accused were invited to the police precinct after that, and were falsely charged of the instant case. The reason behind the false accusation was that Bautista was accused of stealing the coins from the videokarera owned by PO1 Tadeo. Issue: Whether or not the arresting officers preserved the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items despite their failure to observe the mandatory procedural requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR. Ruling: When prosecuting the sale or possession of dangerous drugs like shabu, the State must prove not only the elements of each of the offenses. It must prove as well the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will be unable to discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. To prove the corpus delicti, the prosecution must show that the dangerous drugs seized from the accused and subsequently examined in the laboratory are the same dangerous drugs presented in court as evidence to prove his guilt.To ensure that this is done right and that the integrity of the evidence of the dangerous drugs is safeguarded, Congress outlined in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 the mandatory procedure that law enforcers must observe. It is only by such strict compliance that the grave mischiefs of planting evidence or substituting it may be eradicated. Such strict compliance is also consistent with the doctrine that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. The failure to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does not of itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. Marking upon "immediate" confiscation can reasonably cover marking done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, especially when the place of seizure is volatile and could draw unpredictable

reactions from its surroundings.However, PO1 Viesca marked the sachets of suspected substance seized from Ma. Rocel right where he arrested her. This shows that such marking was feasible. In contrast, PO1 Tadeo marked the substance he seized from Bautista after the police returned to their station. This unexplained digression from what ought to have been done creates a doubt regarding the integrity of the evidence against Bautista. The law requires the apprehending officer or team to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and take photograph of the same in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given copies of the same. - PO1 Tadeo categorically admitted that no elected official was present when the police made the arrest and when they conducted their investigation. PO1 Viesca admitted that no representative from the media or the DOJ were present during the inventory of the seized items. Both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain regarding whether they photographed the seized items. In fact, they failed to produce any such photograph. The Court has of course held that non-compliance with the procedural safeguards provided in Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Here, however, the buy-bust team did not bother to show that they "intended to comply with the procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable reason or consideration." Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, this Court stresses that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Due to the gross disregard of the buy-bust team of the procedural safeguards mandated by Sec. 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR and its failure to give justifiable reasons for it, this Court is led to conclude that the integrity and identity of thecorpus delicti have been compromised. IcEACH WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals.