!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.

+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Rules that govern special proceedings Subject matter of special proceedings Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90) A. Jurisdiction and Venue 1. Which court has jurisdiction Mendoza vs. Hon. Angelito Teh Facts: On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate" of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction". Said complaint states, among others: "2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on December 29. 1993; "3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;" On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss invoking lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. The trial court dismissed the action. Issue: Whether in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case? Held: No. Ratio: An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-95 provides that actions involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court. Jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title to property is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction. 2. Venue in judicial settlement of estate Held: De Borja vs. Tan Yes. Facts: Ratio: On October 25, 1940, petitioner Francisco de Borja filed a petition in the lower court for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco. The will was probated on April 2, 1941, and named Francisco de Borja as executor thereof. Due to the physical inability of Francisco de Borja to fully administer the estate he being quite weak and unable to see, on August 25, 1951, on petition of Matilde de Borja, one of the heirs, the lower court appointed Crisanto de Borja, another heir, as coadministrator. Crisanto qualified as co-administrator on August 29, 1951. On April 9, 1952, the trial court according to petitioner, without petition of or notice to anyone appointed respondent Jose de Borja as coadministrator, this, after holding in abeyance consideration of Francisco de Borja's amended account dated March 25, 1952. Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto moved for reconsideration of the appointment of Jose de Borja but by order of August 14, 1952, respondent Judge indirectly denied the motion for reconsideration, and acting upon an alleged ex-parte petition of the heirs Jose, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed De Borja, revoked the appointment of Crisanto as co-administrator and directed administrator Jose de Borja to comment on the amended account filed by Francisco de Borja. On July 22, 1952, Francisco, Matilde and Crisanto filed a notice of appeal from the order appointing Jose de Borja as co-administrator and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and later they filed the corresponding record on appeal. By order of December 27, 1952, respondent Judge Tan disapproved the record on appeal and refused to give due course to the appeal on the ground that the appointment of Jose de Borja as co-administrator was interlocutory in nature and so was not appealable. Hence, this petition for mandamus, as already stated, to compel respondent Judge to approve the record on appeal and to give due course to the appeal. An order appointing a regular administrator is appealable. On the other hand, according to Rule 105, section 1 (e) an order appointing a special administrator is not appealable. Respondents contend that a coadministrator is not a regular or general administrator, and his duties and functions rather partake those of a special administrator; consequently, his appointment is not subject to appeal. We cannot share this view. The powers and functions of a special administrator are quite limited. Under Rule 81, section 1, a special administrator is appointed only when there is a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from allowance or disallowance of a will or from any other cause, and such special administrator is authorized to collect and take charge of the estate until the questions causing the delay are decided and an executor or administrator thereon appointed. Under Rule 87 section 8, a special administrator is also appointed when the regular executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents and said special administrator shall have the same power and subject to the same liability as a regular executor or administrator. In other words, a special administrator is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Naturally, because of the temporary and special character of his appointment, it was deemed by the law not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment. On the other hand, a co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. Further taking into consideration the circumstances obtaining in this case, that petitioner Francisco de Borja though originally designated administrator, is and has for several years been one only in name due to his physical and mental disability, as a result of which respondent Jose de Borja is now practically the sole administrator there is no question that for all practical and legal purposes the appointment of Issue: Whether the appointment of Jose Borja is appealable

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Jose de Borja as co-administrator is equivalent to and has the same effect as a sole regular or general administrator. Fule vs. CA Facts: On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, a petition for letters of administration. The petition stated, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, the said court granted the motion. Preciosa B. Garcia, who alleged to be the surviving spouse of the deceased, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue. In support of her claim, she offered the death certificate which provides that the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Issue: Whether the action filed in Laguna should be dismissed due to improper venue Held: Yes. It should have been filed in RTC-QC. Ratio: 1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Eusebio vs. Eusebio Facts: This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers. Issue: Whether the action filed in Rizal should be dismissed for improper venue Held: Yes. Ratio: It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained". Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appear to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2 as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent has not been offset by the evidence of record. In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that: ". . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. de Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court. In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition. 3. Extent of jurisdiction of probate court Lim vs. CA Facts: May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person? Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated 04 July 1995 2, 12 September 1995 3 and 15 September 1995 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner". Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system. On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint petition 5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion 7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. Issue: Whether the properties of the corporation as well as the corporation itself can be included in the estate of the deceased Held: No. (obviously) Heirs of Sandejas vs. Lina Ratio: Facts: Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed. On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition (Record, SP. Proc. No. R-83-15601, pp. 8-10) in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of 'the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955. On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the impugned orders. Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas. On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by movant Alex A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell absolutely several parcels of land which formed part of the estate in favor of Alex Lina. A new administrator was later appointed after the death of Eliodoro Sandejas. Alex Lina filed an omnibus motion with the probate court to approved the deed of conditional sale entered into by him and the previous administrator from which the new administrator opposed. Issue: Whether the conditional sale should be approved Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under administration. We are not persuaded. We hold that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences alleged by petitioners have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86 91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses. The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was and a definite, clear and absolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition, the conditional sale became a reciprocally demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties. That Acebedo (case cited by petitioners) also involved a conditional sale of real property proves that the existence of the suspensive condition did not remove that property from the jurisdiction of the intestate court. However, because petitioners did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares in the disputed lots, the CA correctly limited the scope of the receipt to the pro-indiviso share of Eliodoro Sr. Thus, it correctly modified the intestate court's ruling by excluding their shares from the ambit of the transaction. De Borja vs. De Borja Facts: The heirs contended that the administrator of the decedents estate erroneously accounted for the properties of the deceased. They filed several motions in court praying that the administrator clarify and account for the deficiencies in the estate. The administrator in the same special proceeding filed a counter-claim for moral damages against the heirs. Issue:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Whether the counter-claim for moral damages can be allowed in the probate court Held: No. Ratio: Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig branch) was instituted for the purpose of settling the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the case, the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related to the settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special. Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate court in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers, this should be understood to comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes. For it was even said that: "Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions limited to the control of the property upon the death of its owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral questions". It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower court dismissed the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela de Borja who allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being that the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of this kind which should properly belong to a court of general jurisdiction. From whatever angle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of the proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law, for it was held that: "The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of the creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law". Adapon vs. Maralit Facts: On December 16, 1936, Pedro Adapon presented for probate the last will and the testament of his deceased father, Rudocindo Adapon, in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The will was admitted to probate, and Pedro Adapon, having been appointed administrator by the court, filed an inventory of the properties and assets of the estate. The surviving spouse of the testator by a second marriage, Felisa Maralit, the oppositorappellee here, through counsel, presented a petition asking the court to order the administrator to pay her a monthly allowance of P50, and to include in the submitted inventory the several properties alleged to have been omitted. Issue: Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership over properties claimed by the administrator and a third person Held: No. Ratio: Under section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the probate jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons, the appointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the powers, duties, and rights of guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que trust." As may be seen, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. In the case of Bauermann vs. Casas this court, in

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
passing upon the same question now raised observed that "the mere fact that one of the parties is an executor or administrator of a certain estate does not give exclusive jurisdiction to the probate court wherein the estate is being settled, of questions arising between such the executors or administrators and third persons, as to the ownership of specific property. Paz vs. Madrigal (missing case) Bernardo vs. CA Facts: Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro. On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. One of the collateral issues raised by the parties is the validity of donation which the probate court declared as void. Now, petitioners question the jurisdiction of the probate court to rule on such collateral issue. Issue: Whether the probate court has jurisdiction to rule on such issue Held: Yes. Ratio: In a line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon; and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced. In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented, because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by respondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in motion. They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges the question against them. 4. Powers and Duties of probate court Bernardo vs. CA (supra) Vda. De Manalo vs. CA Facts: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop. On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. Petitioners opposed the petition contending that a condition precedent to the filing of the action (absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among family members) was not satisfied. Issue: Whether such condition precedent is applicable in special proceedings Held: No. Ratio: It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action 15 16 or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the 17 administration of the estate rest. The petition is SP.PROC No. 9263626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo. Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, 19 moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code. It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, 20 siting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple 21 strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate. Moreover, the condition precedent requirement is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or 23 in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court. B. Summary Settlement of Estates 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs, when allowed Guevarra v. Guevarra (Original is 34 pages long) Facts: Ernesto M. Guevarra (legitimate son) and Rosario Guevara (natural daughter) of Victorino L. Guevara (deceased) are litigating over their inheritance. Rosario instituted an action to recover from Ernesto what she claims to be her strict legitime as daughter of the deceased which is a portion of a large parcel of land in Pangasinan. Victorino executed a will, apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made several bequests and devises. He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto in order to pay all his pending debts and to degray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death. Subsequently, Victorino executed a document whereby he conveyed to Ernesto a parcel of land of which he had disposed by will in consideration of the sum of P1 (for the northern half) and the obligation of paying off the his debts (for the southern half). Victorino died. His last will and testament was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor is unclear. Ever since the death of Victorino, Ernesto appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him and to

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father. In the meantime, Rosario, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. However, 4 years after Victorinos death, she sued Ernesto for the purpose of recovering her strict legitime; and it was only during the trial of the case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Rosario was arguing that she is entitled to her claim on the assumption that Victorino died intestate, because the will had not been probated. Issue: Whether the procedure adopted by Rosario is legal Held: No. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Although not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77) The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will. The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it authorized the procedure adopted by Rosario for the following reasons: The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion, which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things, although both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others. In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate. Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition. Section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not authorize the procedure adopted by Rosario. Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law. The parties are ordered to present the document to the proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino, the heirs and legatees named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator. 2. Two-year prescriptive period PEZA vs. FERNANDEZ and the Heirs of Deceased Sps. Juan Cuizon and Florentina Rapaya FACTS: The subject of this controversy was Lot No. 4673 in Lapu Lapu City which had an area of about 11,345sqm and registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon, Isidro Cuizon, Ursula Cuizon, Benito Lozano, Isabel Lozano, Pelagia Lozano, Augusto Lozano, Valeriano Ybaez, Jesus Ybaez, Numeriano Ybaez, Martino Ybaez, Eutiquio Patalinghug, Celedonio Patalinghug, Santiago Patalinghug and Silvino Patalinghug in OCT No. 2537. In May 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroo, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon (not named above) executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of the registered owners of the aforesaid lot. Consequently, they were issued TCT in July 1982. Meanwhile, said Lot No. 4673 was subject of an expropriation proceeding pending before the RTC of Lapu Lapu City. The court rendered a partial decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into between Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and the new registered owners of Lot No. 4673; namely, Igot-Soroo, Booc and Cuizon. Under the Compromise Agreement, EPZA would pay P68,070 as just compensation for the expropriation of Lot No. 4673, which was to be used for an export

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
processing zone to be established in Lapu-Lapu City. PEZA then acquired title over Lot No. 4673 by virtue of the Compromise Agreement and a TCT 12788 was issued in PEZAs name. In July 1996, private respondents, Heirs of Deceased Sps. Juan Cuizon and Florentina Rapaya, filed a complaint for Nullity of Documents, Redemption and Damages against petitioner PEZA and Igot-Soroo, Booc and Cuizon, alleging that the private respondents had been excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the nullification of several documents, including TCT No. 12788 issued in the name of PEZA. PEZA filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription. Such motion was denied, as well as the subsequent MR. PEZA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which the latter dismissed. The CA, in effect, held that Booc, Igot-Soronio and Cuizon committed a breach of trust which enabled them to execute a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition[,] Special Power of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of EPZA to the prejudice of the plaintiffs as their co-heirs And if the action involve(s) the declaration of the nullity or inexistence of a void or inexistent contract which became the basis for the fraudulent registration of the subject property, then the action is imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the claim of the Heirs against the subject property had already prescribed. RULING: YES, the action had prescribed. Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides: "Section 4. Liability of distributees and estate. - If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation Based on the foregoing, persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may assert their claim only within the two-year period after the settlement and distribution of the estate. This prescription period does not apply, however, to those who had no part in or had no notice of the settlement. Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, is not meant to be a statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third persons who had no knowledge thereof. However, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be known actually or constructively. In the present case, private respondents are deemed to have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate. On the matter of constructive notice vis--vis prescription of an action to contest an extrajudicial partition, an authority in land registration said that while it may be true that an extrajudicial partition is an ex parte proceeding, yet after its registration under the Torrens system and the annotation on the new certificate of title of the contingent liability of the estate for a period of two years as prescribed in Rule 74, Section 4, of the Rules of Court, by operation of law a constructive notice is deemed made to all the world, so that upon the expiration of said period all third persons should be barred [from going] after the particular property, except where title thereto still remains in the names of the alleged heirs who executed the partition tainted with fraud, or their transferees who may not qualify as innocent purchasers for value The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject property or in those of their transferees who cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. However, title to the property in the present case was no longer in the name of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of an innocent purchaser for value the government. Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that title thereto was obtained through a Compromise Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation proceedings. Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part of the other heirs, private respondents may proceed only against the defrauding heirs, not

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
against PEZA which had no participation in or knowledge of the alleged fraud. The remedy of an owner alleged to have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of property that was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value is an action for damages against the person or persons who perpetrated the fraud. 3. Affidavit of self-adjudication by sole heir ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent. Facts: Jose Q. Portugal had 2 wives: (1)On 1942, Paz Lazo, the mother of respondent, Leonila (born April 11, 1950); and (2) On 1948, Isabel, petitioner, mother of Douglas, other petitioner (born September 13, 1949). This is a case centering over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan. The land originally belonged to Mariano, father of Jose. On May 16, 1968, Jose and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition and waived their rights in favor of Jose. The TCT stated: 'Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo. On February 18, 1984, Paz died, while April 21, 1985, Jose died intestate. On February 15, 1988, Leonila executed an 'Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Jose adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. As a result, the TCT was cancelled and was issued on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, 'Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr. Therefore, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name. In their complaint, (1) petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, a. not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and b. that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication. (2) Petitioners accordingly prayed a. that respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and b. that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent's name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners') name, and c. that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them. After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners' status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario: However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is 'to establish', while in the latter, it is 'to enforce', a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The court, not being a probate (sic) court , is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra). (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied). The Court of Appeals (2002) likewise affirmed the trial courts ruling and stating that the ruling of Cario is inapplicable to the case, even if promulgated in 2001, while the of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay case in 1999. The reason because the the main issue in the Cario case was the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
validity of the two marriages, and not annulment of title to propert y, which is the main issue in this case. Thus, the institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. Issue: Whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name. Held: Yes. GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the records be REMANDED to the trial court. Ruling: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case ' subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DELGADO FACTS The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute. The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate. ISSUE Whether the self-adjudication executed was valid HELD No RATIO To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed. Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado). All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate: SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x ( Cua vs. Vargas Facts: A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas heirs. Florentino, Andres,

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks. On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein. According to respondent Gloria Vargas, she was unaware of the two extra judicial settlement that took place. She filed the complaint against Cua to exercise her right of redemption. Issue: Whether the extra-judicial settlement was binding on respondent Held: No. Ratio: The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedents estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. 4. Summary settlement of estates of small value, when allowed 5. Remedies of aggrieved parties after extra-judicial settlement of estate PEREIRA V. CA Facts:Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent. On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to 1 the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased. On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss 2 the petition of private respondent alleging that there exists no estate of

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. Issue: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? Held: The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the 6 rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted 7 by the parties. Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to

name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established in 9 Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to 10 do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration 11 proceeding without good and compelling reasons. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .

C. Production and Probate of Will 1. Nature of probate proceeding 2. Who may petition for probate; persons entitled to notice Alaban v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 156021 Facts: Respondent Francisco Provido filed for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado. The RTC

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
allowed probate of the will and eventually directed issuance of letters testamentary to respondent. Four months later herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction ove the petition due to nonpayment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. The RTC held that there was sufficient publicatioin in the probate proceedings first filed to notify the petitionersoppositors. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal. Issue: Whether petitioners have or have not become parties to the probate proceedings filed by respondent. Ruling: Unde the RoC, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jursidiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for 3 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate. As parties to the probate proceedings (through the valid publication notice), petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition fo relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision (in the probate proceeding instituted by respondent) became final and executory. Petitioners action to annul the final judgment based on extrinsic fraud must also fail. Petitioners claim they were ommited from respondents petition for probate of the decedents will. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that the respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and neices of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under he Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court. D. Allowance or Disallowance of Will 1. Contents of petition for allowance of will 2. Grounds for disallowing a will 3. Reprobate; Requisites before will proved outside allowed in the Philippines; effects of probate In Re: In the matter of petition to approve the will of Ruperta Palaganas Facts: Ruperta, a Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother Sergio as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US. Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta filed with the RTC a petition for probate of her will and for his appointment as special administrator. Petitioners, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that the will should be probated in the States where it was executed. The RTC allowed the probate of the will and designated Ernesto as special administrator to administer the decedents properties in the Philippines. Issue: Whether a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it had been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed Held: The TCs decision is affirmed. Ratio:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Our rules merely require that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: a) the jurisdictional facts; b) the names, ages and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator or decedent; c)the probative value and character of the property of the estate; d) the name of the persons for whom letters are prayed and; e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. Reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established. The assailed RTC decision is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will. Fluemer v. Hix Facts: Hix, special administrator of the estate, appeals from a decision denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Hix is not authorized to carry on this appeal. However, Fluemer, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will. It is the theory of Fluemer that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, by the testator who had his residence in that same place. Thus, Fluemer argues that the laws of West Virginia should apply. Issue: Whether the probate of the will should proceed. Held: No. No evidence was introduced to show that the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed. In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the Fluemer. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. It was also necessary for Fluemer to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this fact based on the recitals in another will and the testimony of Fluemer. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the Fluemer violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands. While the appeal was pending submission, Fluemer presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper purporting to be the will was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, in West Virginia. It was shown by another document that Claude W. Maxwell was appointed as administrator of the estate. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia. E. Letters Testamentary and of Administration 1. When and to whom letters of administration granted 2. Order of preference BELEN ANGELES VS. CORAZON MAGLAYA FACTS: The dispute started when Corazon Maglaya filed before the RTC in Caloocan City a petition for letters of administration or appointment as administratrix of the estate of Francisco Angeles. In the said special proceedings, Maglaya alleged the ff: ! That deceased Francisco died intestate and left 4 parcels of land and a building ! That there is a need to appoint an administrator of the estate ! That Maglaya (sole legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado) and Belen Angeles (second wife) were the surviving heirs ! That Maglaya had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an admin. Petitioner Angeles opposed and prayed instead that she be made the adminstratrix of Franciscos estate. Petitioner averred that Francisco was single at the time of their marriage and Maglaya could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Petitioner further alleged that Maglaya, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, had not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Respondent Maglaya countered that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. During the trial, Maglaya testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. She also also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records. Petitioner Belen Angeles filed a Motion to Dismiss. Trial court found that Maglaya failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco and dismissed the petition. On appeal before the CA, the latter reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the trial court to appoint Corazon Angeles (Corazon Maglaya became her married name) as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, because Corazon Angeles was able to sufficiently establish her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco. Petitioner Belen Angeles filed this petition before the SC. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that Corazon was a legitimate daughter of Francisco and in decreeing Corazons appointment as administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate. RULING: YES, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision on both issues. The SC was unable to lend concurrence to CAs conclusion on the legitimate status of Corazon, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondents supposed legitimacy arose. Save for Corazons gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnized was offered in evidence. Testimonies of the witnesses that Corazon presented, at best, proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter. Clearly, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there was really nothing for petitioner to rebut. On the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedents property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 (Petition for Letters of Administration and Appointment as Administratrix) REINSTATED. SAN LUIS v. SAN LUIS 2 cases: (same respondent in both cases) 1. EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS. 2. RODOLFO SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS Facts: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who died on 1992 and was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. (1) Virginia Sulit on 1942 out of which were born six children. On 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. (2) On 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on 1973 Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody was granted to Merry Lee in Hawaii. (3) On 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, in California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. (1) Respondent alleged: a. that she is the widow of Felicisimo; b. that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at Metro Manila; c. that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; d. that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; e. that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. (2) Respondent prayed: a. that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and b. that letters of administration be issued to her.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
On February 1994, petitioners Rodolfo and Linda San Luis, children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, separately filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: (1) improper venue: - not sirs issue, which I will not discuss anymore (Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death.) (2) failure to state a cause of action this is the issue He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. The Trial court dismissed the motion. Felicidad being unaware filed her opposition by submitting documentary evidence (on the issue only): the decree of absolute divorce to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code. The trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent. (Note: there were 2 separate judges who ruled on this in the Trial court) Later, upon being re-raffled to Branch 134: the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. (on the issue only) (1) Felicidad was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. (2) It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. (3) It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, relying on the doctrines of both Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. Issue: Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration. ***Whether venue was properly laid. (side issue: just in case sir asks) SC: Yes Held: Yes. The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. Ruling: Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. (Note: I included the Family Code just in case Sir asks substantive law part) FAMILY CODE aspect of the case:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. (citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, Quita v. Court of Appeals, Republic v. Orbecido III giving a historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code) (NOTE: Please read the full case for history of Art.26 if need to rehash memory of Persons) EVIDENCE aspect of the case: (in case sir asks why need to remand case) The records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. (citing Garcia v. Recio for requirements for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments) Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. SPEC PRO ISSUE NEEDED: Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x. An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. Further: If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. Further more: If respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. The regime of limited co-ownership Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from: (1) her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or (2) as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or (3) as his co-owner under Article 148 of the Family Code. 3. Appointment of co-administrator

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
UY v. CA FACTS Jose K.C. Uy (Deceased) died intestate on August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia , Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner). The letters of administration were granted to petitioner. Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be included in the estate. The trial court appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate. ISSUE Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing private respondent as co-administrator to the estate of the deceased HELD Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as follows: SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. In the instant case, the order of preference was not disregarded by the trial court. Instead of removing petitioner, it appointed private respondent, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone However, considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of this Court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedents Estate pending before this Court. A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is . not alone in the administration The practice of appointing coadministrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. Gabriel vs. CA Facts: On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private respondent filed with the RTC, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent. On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
opposition having been filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners. The probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners. Petition for certiorari was filed and denied by the CA. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion when the probate court did not follow the order of preference in appointing an administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 Held: No. Ratio: (normally I dont copy paste the entire ratio, and in fact, this is the first time I did this because the ratio is just so good and enlightening you just have to read it. But if you insist just read the one paragraph in bold ) Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.) Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules. It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors." On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of coadministrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court. WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila. Vda Dela Rosa vs Vda de Damian Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de facto adopted child (ampunampunan) of the decedents. The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. Antecedent facts On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" 25 with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana 26 Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado. In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted. On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife. On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence. On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987. On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates. Issue: Should Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia be appointed administratrix? Held: Entitlement To Letters Of Administration An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the 71 interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be 72 represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively. Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, GR No. 183053 Facts: Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay died and was survived by her husband Federico Suntay. Their only son Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel CojuangcoSuntay. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock: Emilio II and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a baby, 9 months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita, likewise an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I, also grew up in the stead of Federico and Cristina. After Cristinas death, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. Respondent then filed a petition for the issuance of letters administration in her favor. Federico opposed said petition. After failure to reach an amicable settlement, Federico nominated his adopted son Emilio III as administrator of decedents estate on his (Federicos) behalf. During the course of the proceedings, Federico died. The trial court then ruled in favor of Emilio III and letters of administration were directed to be issued. The CA reversed and appointed respondent Cristina administratrix. [Parenthetically, one of the CAs grounds for reversal was jurisprudence on Art. 992, NCC which bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent.] Issue: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate. Ruling: The CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as apparent as respondents interest therein. Sec. 6, Rule 78 [please see the provision] lists the order of preference in the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Case law has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother Cristinas estate. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. Considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate. 4. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary; simultaneous filing of petition for administration 5. Powers and duties of Executors and Administrators; restriction on the powers Ancheta vs Guersay-Dalaygon Facts: Spouses Audrey and Richard were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle. Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) as ancillary administrator. In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin. On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate the CFI. As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of her properties. Subsequently, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha as ancillary administrator. Richards will was then submitted for probate before the RTC wherein Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator. Petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. Petitioner also filed a project of partition of Audreys estate which was granted by the RTC. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Richards estate also 2 filed a project of partition wherein /5of Richards ! undivided interest in 3 the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while /5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ! undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent. The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. Petitioner reiterates that the order of the court can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed. Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. Issue: Whether the order of the court may be set aside due to the administrators failure to apply the national law of the decedent in adjudicating his property to the heirs Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court. Ratio: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC orders. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill. It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondents discovery thereof. There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code. While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a large library." He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties. Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property. In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law. In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter. This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioners abject

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights. 6. Appointment of Special Administrator 7. Grounds for removal of administrator F. Claims against the Estate Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation Facts: Republic-Asahi entered into a contract with Santos, the proprietor of JDS, for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in RepublicAsahis compound in Pasig City, where Republic-Asahi was to pay JDS 5.3M, which was supposed to be completed within a period of 240 days. In order to guarantee performance, JDS shall post a performance bond of 795,000. JDS executed, jointly and severally with Stronghold the performance bond. Republic-Asahi paid JDS 795,000 as downpayment. Several times, Republic-Asahis engineers called the attention of JDS to the alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated 240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS. On November 24, 1989, dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS, Republic-Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract. Republic-Asahi alleged that, as a result of JDSs failure to comply with the provisions of the contract, which resulted in the said contracts rescission, it had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expense of more than 3M. Republic-Asahi then filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold. It sought from JDS payment of the 3M, and from JDS and Stronghold, jointly and severally, payment of the performance bond. Sheriff reported that the summons was served on Stronghold. However, Santos already died and the whereabouts of JDS are unknown. Stronghold argues that Republic-Asahis money claims against Stronghold and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Santos. Even if this were not the case, Stronghold had been released from its liability under the performance bond because there was no liquidation, with the active participation and/or involvement, pursuant to procedural due process, of herein surety and contractor Santos, hence, there was no ascertainment of the corresponding liabilities of Santos and Stronghold under the performance bond. At this point in time, said liquidation was impossible because of the death of Santos, who as such can no longer participate in any liquidation. The unilateral liquidation on the part of Republic-Asahi of the work accomplishments did not bind Stronghold for being violative of procedural due process. The lower court issued an order dismissing the complaint of RepublicAsahi against JDS and Stronghold, on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Santos. The CA ruled that Strongholds obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death of Santos. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after Stronghold for the bond. Issue: Whether Strongholds liability under the performance bond automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal. Held: was

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
No. Stronghold contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under the surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death. Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligees action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court. Whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with Republic-Asahi were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law. Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, Stronghold as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond. As a surety, Stronghold is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code. Furthermore the suretys obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. Republic-Asahi may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and Stronghold in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, Republic-Asahi may still sue Stronghold alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latters liability under the performance bond. MELENCIO GABRIEL VS. NELSON BILON, BRAZIL, and PAGAYGAY FACTS: Melencio Gabriel was the owner-operator of a public transport business, "Gabriel Jeepney," with a fleet of 54 jeepneys plying the BaclaranDivisoria-Tondo route. Petitioner had a pool of drivers, which included respondents, operating under a "boundary system" of P400 per day. According to respondents, aside from the P400 boundary, they were forced to pay a) P20.00 police protection, b) P20.00 washing, c) P10.00 deposit, and [d)] P5.00 garage fees (total of P55 per day); that no law providing the operator to require the drivers to pay police protection, deposit, washing, and garage fees. One day, petitioner just told them not to drive anymore and boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys being considered regular employees of the jeepney operators, they were allegedly illegally dismissed by Gabriel. On the other hand, petitioner contended that he did not remember if the respondents were ever under his employ and that he never dismissed any driver who worked for him. He made sure that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even for a day so he could collect his earnings; hence, it had been his practice to establish a pool of drivers. Also, there were times when deductions were made from the days earnings of some drivers, but such were installment payments for the amount previously advanced to them. The respondents filed their separate complaints before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions and separation pay against Gabriel. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay, illegal. Meanwhile, Melencio Gabriel passed away. The spouse of Melencio Gabriel appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC First Division. NLRC First Division reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship. The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, contending that the lack of employer-employee relationship mentioned by the NLRC First Division in the dispositive portion was not raised before the labor arbiter

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
nor discussed in the body of the questioned decision. The NLRC First Division, in setting aside its decision, said that: In the case at bar, [petitioner] Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997 without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same. His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and is just not available to receive the decision. The preceding considered, the decision of the labor arbiter has not become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to [petitioner] . The NLRC First division also dismissed the case and complainants (respondents) were directed to pursue their claim against the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Melencio Gabriel. Respondents appealed NLRCs decision before the CA. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter subject to modifications that Gabriel was ordered to immediately reinstate Nelson Bilon, Angel Brazil and Ernesto Pagaygay to their former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges, with full backwages from the date of their dismissal until their actual reinstatement. ISSUE: Whether the claim of private respondents in this case survived. RULING: YES, the money claims of respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner Melencio Gabriel.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/feb2007/gr_146989_2007.h tml - fnt25 The relationship between jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee because in the lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercises supervision and control over the latter. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the socalled "boundary" [that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee. Thus, private respondents were employees because they had been engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The Court agreed with the labor arbiter and the CA that respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner. Respondents were not accorded due process. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that the cause for termination falls under any of the grounds enumerated in Article 282 (then Article 283) of the Labor Code. Consequently, respondents are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to their full backwages computed from the date of dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code. With the death of petitioner Melencio Gabriel, respondents monetary claim, shall be governed by Section 20 (then Section 21), Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides: SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims. When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. In relation to this, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred ; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
the same be due, not due, or contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. 1. Time within which claims shall be filed; exceptions The power of the court to extend the time for certain purposes is defined in article 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure The court does not find in said motion any allegation which it can call a just cause. The only allegation in relation to the matter is that he has not had opportunity to present his claim against the estate within the six months fixed by the court, without stating any details or facts relative to such failure of opportunity. The applicant is a merchant of much experience, a resident of the municipality of Cebu, where he has lived and where the deceased, Telesforo de Dios, died, who was also a person well-known in Cebu. It is impossible that Tomas Osmea was not informed and did not know the death of said Telesforo de Dios, and Mr. Osmea is a person who has many suits in this court, both special proceedings and civil actions. A motion was later made for a rehearing, but denied. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in refusing to extend the period for the presentation of claims against the estate of Telesforo de Dios upon the facts presented by the appellant. Held: No. Under these circumstances the court committed no error in refusing to extend the time within which the claim could be presented. Ruling: The court below correctly said that there must be cause shown before it would be authorized to extend the time within which claims may be presented against the estate. The object of the law in fixing a definite period within which claims must be presented is to insure the speedy settling of the affairs of a deceased person and the early delivery of the property of the estate into the hands of the persons entitled to receive it. (citing Jose McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng.)

In the matter of the estate of TELESFORO DE DIOS. TOMAS OSMEA, appellant. Facts: The story revolves on Tomas Osmea, a merchant and resident of Cebu, alleging and trying to claim on the estate of Telesforo de Dios, deceased and well-known in Cebu. However, he did not present his claim within the six moths specified by the court for the presentation of claims to the commissioners. Therefore, as recourse the claimant made a motion to the court asking for an extension of the time stating: "had not had an opportunity to formulate his claim during the period of six months fixed by the court." Though, later the statement was amended: "that during said time one of the heirs of said estate was making propositions to said Tomas Osmea to pay on his own account the debt which he had against the property of said estate; that said Tomas Osmea, under the belief that the said heir would pay the said debt, and in the hope that the proposed settlement would terminate satisfactorily, could not duly formulate his claim before the commission during said period of six months; that said heir did not pay the debt or any part thereof to said Tomas Osmea as he had at first offered to do." The Court of First Instance of Cebu, Honorable Adolph Wislizenus, denied the motion to extend the time, saying:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
In the first place, the appellant has not shown that he has a meritorious claim against the estate. Instead: There is simply a naked allegation that appellant has a claim. In the second place, the appellant, admitting full knowledge of the time within which he should have presented his claim and the date on which the time for presentation expired, presents no sufficient explanation for failure to present the claim within that period. Instead: His only excuse is that during the running of the period he was maintaining negotiations with one of the heirs for the payment of the claim. 2. Statute of non-claims 3. Claim of executor or administrator against the estate 4. Payment of debts MONTINOLA v. VILLANUEVA FACTS In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuel Seijo, the herein plaintiff Gregorio Montinola presented a claim which said estate owed him. The claim was approved by said committee. While said claim was pending payment, cadastral proceedings Nos. 6 and 9, which included lots Nos. 3792, 4499 and 3302, and lots 207, 210, 277, 306 and 1040, were being held in the same court. In the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Manuel Seijo, the court authorized the administrator to sell the nine lots above-mentioned for the purpose of paying the expenses of the administration and the claim of Gregorio Montinola. However, the administrator could not make the sale for the reason that the lots appeared to be the individual property of the heirs of Manuel Seijo in said cadastral proceedings, for which reason the administrator applied for the cancellation of said titles and the issuance of new ones in his names, which application was denied by the lower court, its judgment having later been affirmed by this court. ISSUE Heirs are not required to respond with their own property for the debts of their deceased ancestors. But even after the partition of an estate, heirs and distributees are liable individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims against the estate in proportion to the amount or value of the property they have respectively received from the estate. The hereditary property consist only of the part which remains after the settlement of which the entire estate is first liable. The heirs cannot, by any fact of their own or by agreement among themselves, reduce the creditors' security for the payment of their claims. Guevara vs. Del Rosario Facts: Petitioners Fernando Guevarra and Marcos Guevarra pray for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent court to conduct a preliminary investigation upon a complaint filed by them judicial officers, with the crime of falsification of public documents, defined and punished under article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The Director of Prisons reported that the petitioners died in Bilibid Prisons. Emilio Guevarra and Ciriaco Whether the properties adjudicated to the defendants can be sold in order to apply the proceeds to the payment of the alleged indebtedness. HELD Yes RATIO Under the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, the heir is not as such personally responsible for the debts and obligations of the deceased, in the whole or in part; and, on the other hand, the property of the deceased comes to him charged with the debts of the deceased, so that he cannot alienate or charge it free of such debts, until and unless they are extinguished either by payment, prescription, in satisfaction of one or the other of the modes recognized by law.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Guevarra, son and brother of the petitioners, pray to be allowed to substitute the petitioners in this case. Issue: Whether they may be allowed to substitute petitioners Held: No. Ratio: The action survived if the cause of action survived. The cause of action, upon which this proceeding in mandamus is predicated, arose from the failure of the respondent court to conduct a preliminary investigation upon a complaint filed by the petitioners charging certain officers with the crime of falsification of public documents. The right of the petitioners to file a complaint charging the commission of a crime is personal. It is so, because as required in by the rules, a complaint charging a person with an offense must be subscribed by the offended party. The right being personal, the complaint filed by the petitioners with the respondent court abated upon their death. Likewise, the cause of action, upon which this proceeding in mandamus is based, is personal. G. Actions by and against executors and administrators 1. Actions that may be brought against executors and administrators Phil Trust Co v. Luzon Surety Facts: On February 14, 1946, the Court of First Instance of Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr. as Administrator the Intestate Estate of the deceased James R. Burt (Civil Case No. 71872) upon a bond of P1,000.00. Thereafter he submitted and the Court approved his bond in the required amount, with appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. as his surety. In compliance with the above order, Picard, submitted an itemized statement of disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing that as of February 6, 1947 the estate funds amounted to P7,986.53; that on June 8, 1948 he reported to the Court additional expenses incurred amounting to P865.20, thus leaving a balance of P7,121.33; that thereafter he disbursed the sum of P250.00 to defray the burial expenses of the deceased, thus leaving a balance of P6,871.33; that on several occasions during the period from February 22, 1946 to May 14, 1947, he had delivered to Feliciano Burt adoptive son of the deceased James R. Burt different sums of money totalling P5,825.00, thus leaving a balance of P972.33. After considering this statement, the Court, on September 18, 1948, issued an order finding Picard, guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8,000.00, without For reasons that do not fully appear of record, on May 1, 1948 the Court dismissed Picard, as administrator and appointed the Philippine Trust Co. in his place. After qualifying for the position, the latter, on July 19, 1948, submitted an inventory-report showing that the only asset of the Intestate Estate of Burt that had come into its possession was the sum of P57.75 representing the balance of the checking account of said deceased with the Philippine National Bank. In view thereof, on July 26, 1948 the Court issued an order the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: A review, however, of the record of the case reveals that former Administrator Francis Picard, filed on February 6, 1941, an inventory of the estate of the deceased, from which it appears that the sole property he found was the amount of P8,873.73 in current account with the Philippine National Bank. This amount was reduced to P7,986.53 after deducting therefrom his expenses in the amount of P887.22; and as reported by him in his petition filed on June 8, 1948, the further expenses in the amount of P865.20 were deducted, thereby leaving the balance of P7,121.33 as of May 27, 1948. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders said Francis Picard, to deliver within forty-eight hours (48) from the receipt of a copy of the order the difference of P7,063.58 to the present Administrator, Philippine Trust Company; otherwise he will be ordered committed to prison for contempt until he shall have complied with this order.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
authority. For this reason, the Court referred the matter to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation. Result of this was the prosecution of Picard, for estafa. Having pleaded guilty to the charge, judgment of conviction was accordingly rendered, and he was, besides, held civilly liable in the sum of P8,000.00. On July 8, 1957 the Court issued an order requiring appellant Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard would not be confiscated. Appellant filed a motion to set aside said order upon the following grounds: firstly, that the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury to creditors, legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown, and secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu, prosecute the probate bond." On August 3, 1957 the Court denied appellant's motion and ordered the confiscation of its bond. After the denial of appellant's lotion for reconsideration, it took the present appeal. Issue: w/n lower court can order the confiscation of a bond Held: Appellant's contention that the probate court, ex proprio motu, cannot order the confiscation or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is clearly without merit. Whatever may be the rule prevailing in other jurisdictions, in ours probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an administrator's bond. The execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed be a necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much as its filing and the fixing of its amount. The rule, therefore, is that the probate court may have said bond executed in the same probate proceeding. Moreover, the condition of the administrator's bond in question is that Francis L. Picard shall faithfully execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect. In having been established that Picard disbursed funds of the estate without authority, the conclusion follows that he had and his surety became bound upon the terms of their bond. Appellant also contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or other interested person has been proved. This is also without merits. According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose Teruel for the sum of P200.00 and P3,205.00, respectively, were approved by the probate court but the same have remained unpaid because of lack of funds. Finally, appellant claims that it had been released from liability as surety because it received no notice of the proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the administrator. This contention we also find to be untenable. From the nature of the obligation entered into by the surety on an administrator's bond which makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal he is bound and concluded, in the absence of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though said surety was not a party to the proceeding. In the case of the De Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 135, the sureties on the administrator's bond were held liable thereon altho they were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator, nor were they notified in connection therewith prior to the issuance of the court order for the confiscation of the bond. Lastly, according to Section 11, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties "may upon application, be admitted as a party to such accounting." The import of this provision is that the sureties are not entitled to notice but may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator if they ask for leave to do so in due time. Romualdez v. Tiglao, GR No. L-51151 Facts: On March 15, 1960, Paz Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The CFI of Rizal directed the Tiglaos to pay plaintiffs claim. The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. On May 18, 1970, Paz Romualdez, et al., filed with the CFI of Rizal a civil case against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment from the case begun in 1960. By that time Felisa Tiglao was

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
already dead. Accordingly, the one made defendant was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat. Said special administratrix, in her motion to dismiss invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87: No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; Thus, the Estate of Felisa Tiglao filed the instant appeal. Issue: Whether the action to revive the earlier judgment is one barred by Sec. 1, Rule 87. No. Rulings: The original judgment which was rendered on May 31, 1960, has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of 5 years. (Sec 6, Rule 39, RoC). Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate. The general rule is that creditor must file the proper claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the deceased debtors estate wihtin the period fixed in the Statute of Nonclaims. But the instant case is an exception due to the singular circumstances recounted above. Facts: The Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of downpayment stipulating that they received from respondent the sum of P50, 000 for their inherited house and lot. Thereafter, the Coronels sold the property to petitioners for a higher price. Thus, they rescinded their contract with respondent by depositing her downpayment in a bank. A complaint for specific performance was filed which was granted by the trial court. This decision became final and executor y for failure of the parties appeal decision of the CA affirming the order of the trial court. Issue: Whether the decision of the trial court awarding the property to respondent may be overturned due to the fact that she is not a Filipino citizen Held: Petition for review is denied. Ratio: Respondent categorically averred that she was a Filipino citizen. The petitioner did not disprove or deny the averment of her citizenship during the trial and on appeal. Yet now where the final decision of the RTC is being implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in the RD of Quezon City on the ground that respondent was disqualified from owning land in the Philippines. Petitioner was not the proper party to challenge respondent Ramonas qualifications to acquire land. Under Sec. 7 of BP 129, the Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically state that only the government may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is

2. Requisites before creditor may bring an action for recovery of property fraudulently conveyed by the deceased H. Distribution and Partition 1. Liquidation 2. Project Partition 3. Remedy of an heir entitled to residue but not given his share Escheat (Rule 91) Mabanag vs Register of Deeds

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
nonetheless correct to hold that only the government has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any individual and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual. Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State. 1. When to file 2. Requisites for filing of petition 3. Remedy of respondent against petition; period for filing a claim Held: Department of Social Welfare vs. Judge Belen Facts: The spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own. The decision was based primarily on "findings and recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said DSWD findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment, are contained in the "Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through respondent Elma P. Vedaa. Yes. The respondent was censured for violating the procedures of Art. 33 of P.D. 603 Ratio: Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that: "No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be denied." Whether the petition for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the natural parents and the adoptive parents However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a "Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for said minor's adoption. As such, the administrative was filed against the respondent. Issue:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases: "(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed; (2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . . xxxxxxxxx The Staff Assistant V (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. . . ." The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No. 12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law. By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaa, arrogated unto herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by herself the facts on which the court was to act. In re adoption of Lim Facts: The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The childrenwere named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnestygiven under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent Petitioners husband

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Issue: Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

Held:

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children

The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rightsof a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitledsuch as supportand successional rights. Anonymous v. Emma Curamen, AM No. P-08-2549 Facts: This is an administrative case against Emma BaldonadoCuramen, Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document. On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint charging respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. The complaint alleged that respondent registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae BaldonadoCuramen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the childs purported birth certificate to show respondent misrepresented that she was the childs biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father. Complainant claimed respondent was, in fact, the childs maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted the childs original birth certificate to show that the childs real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her parents were spouses Olga Mae BaldonadoCuramen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant, respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration. In his Report, Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae BaldonadoCuramenwere the same child. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child was, in fact, respondents granddaughter. The childs real mother, Olga, was one of respondents children. On 27 November 2005, Olga gave birth to a child named Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino. The fact of birth was registered in the Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2005-15495. The birth certificate indicated that the childs parents were Olga Mae BaldonadoCuramen and Jun Aquino. Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an affidavit for delayed registration of the alleged birth of her child. Respondent claimed that her supposed child, Rica Mae BaldonadoCuramen, was born on 30 November 2005. Respondents application was given due course and the supposed birth of Rica Mae In her Comment, respondent admitted that the real parents of the child were spouses Olga Mae BaldonadoCuramen and Jun Aquino. Respondent claimed that the childs parents, being unemployed, were unable to support themselves let alone their child. She asserted that the childs parents actually depended on her and her husband for support. According to respondent, it was the childs parents themselves who proposed to register the birth of the child anew. Respondent insisted she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child. Respondent justified her act as an example of a common practice among Filipinos to extend help to family members. As to the alleged falsification of her income tax return, respondent denied listing the child as additional dependent. Issue: Whether the lack of intention to conceal a persons identity is a valid defense for falsification of a public document. Held:Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the childs true filiation to the childs prejudice. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaims. Respondents justification for her act that the true parents of the child are unable to support the child as they are fully dependent on respondent for their own support is an affront to common sense. It taxes ones imagination how concealment of the childs true parents, through falsification of the childs birth certificate, will make it easier for respondent to support the child. Respondent can very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the practice in Filipino families, without having to tamper with the childs birth certificate. Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing ones examination, appointment, or registration. Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a persons character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and BaldonadoCuramen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the childs parents were respondent and her husband.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary. No doubt, court officials occupy an exalted position in society. They enjoy authoritative influence, which leaves the innocent public unlikely to raise any objection. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why they have more opportunities to commit dishonest acts. But dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the Court will not hesitate to remove from among its ranks those found to be dishonest. Under Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are considered grave offenses punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of official duties. If a government officer is dishonest, even if the conduct is not connected with the official function, it affects the discipline and morale of the service. The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest employee, even if official duties are performed well. Respondent cannot separate her private life as a registrant of the childs false birth certificate from her public life as a court official. She is subject to discipline the moment she commits a dishonest act, whether in her private life or in her public life. However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where mitigating circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this is respondents first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. The law requires that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party. But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by respondent. We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is suspension for six months and one day without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. VI. Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rule 102) 1. Contents of the petition 2. Contents of the return 3. Distinguish preemptory writ from preliminary citation 4. When not proper/applicable 5. When writ disallowed/discharged 6. Distinguish from Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data 7. Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (AM No. 03-04-04-SC) 8. Writ of Amparo (AM No. 07-9-12-SC) 9. Writ of Habeas Data (AM No. 08-1-16-SC) Go v. Dimagiba Facts: Dimagiba issued to Go 13 checks which were dishonored for the reason account closed. Dimagiba was subsequently convicted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22. He was sentenced by the MTCC to a fine amounting to over P1 million and 3 months imprisonment. Dimagibas appeal to the RTC was denied. He did not pursue anymore an appeal to the CA. Thus, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. Dimagiba filed an MR on the Order arguing that he should be penalized for the fine only, instead of imprisonment. He reiterated this in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. MTCC denied the Motions and directed that a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba. He was eventually arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. Dimagiba filed with the RTC a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. Go filed an MR of the RTC Order. However, such motion was denied.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Issue: Whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted. Held: NO. The petition for habeas corpus was not validly granted. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on rulings that prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Dimagiba sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. However, it appears that Dimagiba has previously sought the modification of his sentence in an MR of the MTCCs Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC. In his Petition for habeas corpus, Dimagiba raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. His resort to the writ of habeas corpus was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action amounted to forum shopping. Dimagiba should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum. Vicente v. Majaducon FACTS: Vicente charged Judge Majaducon of the RTC of Gen. Santos City, Branch 23 with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality. The administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain Evelyn Te of General Santos City. In 1995, RTC of GenSan City, Br. 23, found a certain Evelyn Te guilty on four counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22 and sentenced her to two (2) months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory. In March 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. The trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences successively, but 'for humanitarian reason and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, it held that 'instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six months. In June 2000, Te filed an MR, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, (1998), in which the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. Petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was denied on the ground that Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment. Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court's order, alleging that the finality of the joint decision against her did not bar her application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending determination as to

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, '14. The trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus. Subsequently, the court approved Te's bail bonds in the reduced amount of P500,000.00 and ordered her release. The trial court also directed its clerk of court to certify the proceedings to the Court. In the present case, complainant, who claimed to be the station manager of Radyo Bombo, General Santos City, alleged that while Te was in prison, respondent judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleged that respondent judge approved Te's application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed. As a result of respondent judge's order allowing the provisional liberty of Te, the local media in General Santos City made an uproar and criticized respondent judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation, respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published a critical article against him. Judge Majaducons contentions: Evelyn Te's counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases. The judge also said, in such a dilemma, whether or not to release her on bail, it was a better judgment to release her from bail on a writ of habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her contention that she is considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. If we denied her petition for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the Supreme Court, surely, she could return and charge us with a graver offense of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. To obviate such a possible move on Te's part, we opted to allow her release on bail through the writ of habeas corpus proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the judge had discretion to allow Te to be released on bail notwithstanding that she was already serving sentence. RULING/RATIO: Judge Majaducon was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. Rule 102, '14 provides: When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement. The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. Indeed, Rule 102, '4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is 'suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. Moreover, Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides: Sec 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. ' An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has become final, unless he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
member of the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on four counts and imposing upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two months on each count has already become final and executory. She did not apply for probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was already serving her sentence. The Court reiterated its pronouncement that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. In the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial courts, The Court was not impressed with the explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent judge contended that he was caught in a dilemma whether or not to grant bail in favor of Te. However, he thought that it would be better for him to release Te on bail rather than deny her application; for if such denial is later found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous, Te could charge him with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an unjust order or for damages. Hence, to obviate such possible move on Te's part, he simply allowed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought about by the case of Te by certifying the same to this Court contending that, '[a]nyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on (the) matter. The Court finds respondent's reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that the Court have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. In the Matter of the Petition for Habes Corpus of Alejano v. Cabuay Doctrine: In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus. However, a mere allegation of a violation of ones constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. Facts: (short facts) This petition for review seeks to nullify the Decision of the CA. The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto Rafael Pulido (petitioners) on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) (detainees), who are the 10 officers of the Oakwood Mutiny. (detailed facts) The case stems from the Oakwood Mutiny. In this case, Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay (Gen. Cabuay), Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines), Sec. Angelo Reyes (Secretary of National Defense) and Roilo Golez (National Security Adviser), and, because they have command responsibility over Gen. Cabuay. Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers involvement in the Oakwood incident. On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup detat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. Thus, on 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP. On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings. On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup detat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question. The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpusproceedings. The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. Issue: Whether the CA eared in reversing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court or not. Ruling: (affirm CA) Petitioners claim that the Courts 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Courts Order had already foreclosed any question on the propriety and merits of their petition. Petitioners claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into the cause of the junior officers detention. Had the Court ruled for the detainees release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitioners cause. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal. Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a persons constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. 7438). Petitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission. SC: Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard. The regulations governing a detainees confinement must be reasonable measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape. Thus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governments objective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants the detention officer the authority to undertake such reasonable measures or regulations. Petitioners contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detainees indictment for criminal and military offenses to warrant the detainees release from detention. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to counsel. The purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible. While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the detainees, a

(NOTE: This portion is for your own understanding, the above ruling is sufficient for spec pro class, however for your further knowledge the following details are provided:) Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail are: First, the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees right to counsel and violates Republic Act No. 7438 (RA

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
fact that petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel. Second, Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the detainees right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (Maestrecampo). SC: Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes. Even in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of civil deaths. Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications between the inmate and his lawyer. Eventually, the inmates outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. The confidential [45] correspondences could not be censored. The infringement of such privileged communication was held to be a violation of the inmates First Amendment rights. A prisoner has a right to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the institution. Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots that threaten prison security. American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all. American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security. Hence, when a detainee places his letter in an envelope for nonprivileged mail, the detainee knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials. A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail. However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents without violating the inmates right to correspond with his lawyer. The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband. Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detainees letters in the present case violated the detainees right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. Third, Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP officials violated the detainees right against cruel and unusual punishment when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with their visitors. SC: In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, U.S. courts balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the legitimate concerns of prison administrators. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup detat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness. The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. Fourth, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detainees cells. SC: Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a detainees desire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment. It is when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive security measure. They must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves. An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or disability, and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement. Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal security. This case reaffirmed the hands-off doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative expertise. In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees. In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Kunting

Facts

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. The Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order. The RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation. PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG. The RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged. The RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court. Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNPIG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty. Issue The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper. Held No Ratio Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has 7 been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof. Issue: Whether the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent is proper Held: Yes. Ratio: As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court's full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent's cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the child's welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for

Salientes v. Abanilla Facts: Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son. Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court granted the petition. Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be
7

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
private respondent's petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age. Moncupa v. Enrile Facts:Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33. Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition. The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases. Issue:Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release. Held:It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are: 1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila. 2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. 3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security." 4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives. The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom. The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents." We agree with the petitioner. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment." In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting. In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ. The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted. Go Sr. v. Ramos Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit9 for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,10 averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Trial court ruled against jimmy. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 411 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 62512 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections.13 He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.14 With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino.15 As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.16 In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmys father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well. On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. Issue: GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO. Held: Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59 In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case. There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him.60 However, this Court, following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board61 wherein we stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.62 Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.63 While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.64 After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings.66 The decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.671avvphi1 After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time. We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts.68 None of the exceptions69 in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached. In re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo de Villa Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa seeks a twofold relief: First, that respondent Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner; and second, that petitioner be granted a new 1 trial. These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing DNA testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape. In People vs De Villa, petitioner was convicted of the rape of his niece by affinity. He was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to provide support for the child of the victim. During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped her.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner. Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a 5 baby girl whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza. In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to 7 support the child, Leahlyn Mendoza. On automatic review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting petitioner of the crime charged. Petitioners son alleged that at the time the case was appealed to the supreme court, he had no knowledge of DNA testing. Thus, petitioner's brief sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied. Petitioners son was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, he asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to him, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container A." Petitioners son then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice. He requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory. After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyn's. Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus. Issue: Whether the DNA tests may be admitted in evidence to prove that petitioner did not rape the victim Whether the writ of habeas corpus may be granted to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence in prison Held: Petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto". Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings. Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a postconviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him. In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early 27 case of Abriol v. Homeres, for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. The reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals: a habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings. Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court's appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the 32 function of said writ. A survey of our decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final judgment. Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the 35 function of habeas corpus. Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau 36 of Prisons, this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to 37 assail the legality of the detention. Although in Feria v. Court of 38 Appeals this Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new
34

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the 39 apparent effect of such process. The writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of imprisonment or 41 detention. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, the Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner was unduly deprived. Other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of counsel. In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different

with competent counsel. The purpose of the right to effective assistance 44 of counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor." In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court" received by this Court on September 14, 1999. Petitioner alleged that his counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity." While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect. In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail. Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child. Pregnancy is not an

43

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt. however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic review. The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis. In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape. The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence". although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newlydiscovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for 54 negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. A client is bound by 55 the acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence. It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure. Veluz v. Villanueva FACTS: Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian. In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from petitioner Veluzs house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January 13, 2005. Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears or is illegally being detained is of legal age and is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty. In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemias half-sister while respondent Teresita was Eufemias niece and petitioners sister. Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo. In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their mothers deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The latter willingly went with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents action. ISSUE Whether the writ of habeas corpus should issue. HELD NO. The Court rules for the respondents. RATIO The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemias personal freedom. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.[16] Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not: There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. AMPATUAN v. MACARAIG FACTS Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). Husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37. Thereafter, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Thus, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody ISSUE Whether the Court gravely abused its discretion when it shirked from its judicial duty to order the release of PO1 Ampatuan from the custody of respondents Mamang Pulis. HELD NO. The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. RATIO Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides: SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. The Solicitor General is correct. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads: Sec. 52 x x x. xxxx 4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. To date, the administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. SO v. TACLA, JR. FACTS A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente) of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense. Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that she was not ready for discharge, as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan. Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMHs determination that she was ready for trial. Eventually, claiming life-threatening circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of counsel, accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the writs of habeas corpus and amparo. ISSUE

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Whether the writs of habeas corpus and amparo should be issued. HELD NO. T he Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being moot and academic. RATIO The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful. Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides: Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. While the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states: Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Cesar Gonzales and Julius Mesa v. Gen Efren Abu Facts: 321 junior officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood Premiere Luxury Apartments in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate surroundings. The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of President Arroyo. They declared their withdrawal of support from the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP President Arroyo and demanded her resignation and that of the members of her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the PNP. President Arroyo declared the country to be under a state of rebellion. After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the former agreed to return to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood. Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were GONZALES and MESA, both enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy. Their Service Commander took them into custody. They were eventually discharged from military service. GONZALES and MESA were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. However, they were among the soldiers charged before the RTC, with the crime of Coup Detat. A Commitment Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of GONZALES and MESA to the Commanding Officer of Fort San Felipe Naval Base in Cavite. Subsequently, RTC ordered the transfer of GONZALES and MESA from the Naval Base Cavite to the Marine Headquarters in Taguig. RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It admitted GONZALES and MESA, and 25 other co-accused to bail amounting at P100,000.00 each. Both GONZALES and MESA posted bail. RTC issued orders directing the Commanding Officer to release them from his custody. Despite said orders and their service to the marines, the two were not released. The PEOPLE moved for partial reconsideration of the order granting bail. The RTC denied the motion for partial reconsideration. With the denial of th the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the PEOPLE filed with the CA (7 div.) certiorari (Rule 65) with prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and setting aside of the orders of Judge Oscar

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
B. Pimentel. The CA (7 injunction.
th

div.) did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary

order be issued ordering ABU and DE LEON to immediately release GONZALES and MESA. Before ABU and DE LEON could comment on the petition, the Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of GONZALES and mesa. Thus, the two are now enjoying temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders issued by the RTC. PULIDO asks that the prayer for the immediate release of GONZALES and MESA be dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted. SOLGEN stressed that the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot and academic by reason of the release of MESA and GONZALES from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or controversy, it is impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their detention, including the alleged refusal of the CA to resolve said issues. PULIDO, to support his contention that there was no forum shopping, asserts that the issues in the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of ABU and DE LEONs filing of the MR and the Petition for Certiorari, PULIDO claims that the same has no legal relevance to the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued that would affect the efficacy or validity of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of MESA and GONZALES. Issue 1: Whether the issue regarding the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is already moot and academic. Held 1: YES. When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. With the release of

Since GONZALES and MESA continued to be in detention, a Petition for rd Habeas Corpus was filed by PULIDO on their behalf with the CA (3 div.). In support thereof, it was argued that since GONZALES and MESA are no longer subject to Military Law as they had been discharged from the service, and since they are not charged before a court martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal ground to detain them further because a court order for their release had already been issued. CA (3 div.) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing ABU, Chief of Staff of the AFP, and DE LEON, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, to produce the bodies of GONZALES and MESA before the Court and to appear and show the cause and validity of their detention. A return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made. ABU and DE LEON prayed that the Petition for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of GONZALES and MESA is justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the th order of the RTC granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the CA (7 div.); and (2) PULIDO is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order granting bail has been elevated and th pending before the CA (7 div.). CA (7 div.) dismissed the petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of bail to GONZALES, MESA, and 25 of their co-accused. CA (3 div.) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court (forum shopping for failure to state in the petition that a case has been elevated and pending before another court). PULIDO filed an MR, which the CA (3 div.) denied. PULIDO filed a petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC assailing the validity of the dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. rd PULIDO prays that the CA (3 div.) be reversed and set aside, and an
rd rd th rd

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value. This Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for. Issue 2: Whether Pulido is liable for forum shopping. Held 2: YES. For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned the validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus, petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The ultimate relief sought by PULIDO in both the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of GONZALES AND MESA. PULIDO should not have filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus because the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether the two should be released on bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case PULIDO is thus guilty of forum shopping. Cases on Writ of AMparo and Writ of Habeas Data Tapuz v. Del Rosario This was a petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. FACTS: Private respondents, Spouses Sanson, filed a complaint with the Fifth MCTC in Aklan for forcible entry and damages against petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They claimed that: (1) they were the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents were the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property was spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor. On appeal before the RTC, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition. The RTC judge issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land. The petitioners thereafter filed with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition. The petition contained and prayed for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. ISSUE: Whether the petitions filed and prayed for by the petitioners were sufficient in form and in substance and content. RULING: NO. The SC dismissed the petitions outright for deficiencies in form and substance The Writ of Amparo The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that the Court shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs. The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents: "(a) Joint Affidavit dated supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and their security guards; (b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz; (c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit; (d) Certification issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land; (e) Certification issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards; (f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire." On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental." As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner. The Court preliminarily examined these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot. Under these legal and factual situations, the Court was far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo. Separately from these considerations, the Court cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. The Court discerned this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case. The Court noted too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action, These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, the Court saw no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. The Court saw no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case. The Writ of Habeas Data Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data: "(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable." Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that: "1. [ ... ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same; 66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP." These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, the Court saw no concrete allegations of unjustified or Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. The Secretary of Natl Defense v. Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo Doctrine: In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls. Short digest (from Digest Territory) FACTS:

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA. HELD: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008) Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search warrant. SUGGESTED ANSWER: (long digest) Facts: On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay. Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers de la Cruz, Mendoza all members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men. The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. Another man was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond, whom he later recognized as his brother Reynaldo. Both of them were beaten up. When they arrived at a house, they were also beaten up, e.g. with butts of the CAFGUs guns, and interrogated as to whether they belonged to the New Peoples Army or not. Later, officers with different uniforms came. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction. While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food. For the next months to August of 2007, they were repeatedly transferred from one camp to another. Raymond even writes in his affidavit his encounter with Gen. Palparan and how he threatened him to tell his family

The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened to the production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
not to participate in any rally promised by the Human rights groups. Raymond and Reynaldo were detained alongside Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in th the 24 Infantry Battalion. All the 3 were later on killed. He also recounts having seen many bodies being killed and burned during his captivity. How they escaped was later on when he was when they were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain. At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein. Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. According to the investigation of the Secretary of Justice: Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
are active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned. Thus the recommendation to drop the case. Ruling: (CA affirmed) The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning. The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis. On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial [75] proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rej"n, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847.

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents). Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents: Issue: Whether the CA erred in granting the writ of amparo or not.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs [83] of each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of [84] human dignity, her own painful history conceived." What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the [85] agrarian reform process. In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of [86] constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees [87] or fundamental rights. In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes,amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of [88] the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case [89] of Marbury v. Madison. While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the [90] Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring [91] substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, [92] Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order" to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to [93] liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion. (please read the case for your further guidance on the substantive aspect) With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz: The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz: Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied) Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied) Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony. We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners. That even if the brothers are now free, they filed this case because they are still living in constant fear of their lives. (please see full case for further discussion on constitutional law aspects of the case) In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo in favor of Melissa C. Roxas v. GMA Facts: Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States 5 of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member. During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN6 Tarlac in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future 7 medical mission.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard 8 disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and 9 medicines. After doing survey work, petitioner and her companions, decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. Fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces. Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed 14 men ganged up on her and tied her hands. At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner 15 started to shout her name. Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and 16 knees. Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner 17 was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. The van then sped away. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped. Petitioner, 19 Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight. After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a 20 jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some 21 construction bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp 22 of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
18

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled 23 with torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to 24 abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and 25 suffocating the petitioner. Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to 26 suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became 27 acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her. There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at 28 her surroundings. Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced 29 themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of 30 Battle." On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to 31 her uncles house in Quezon City. Before being released, however, the 32 abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of 33 paper containing an e-mail address with password, a plastic bag 34 containing biscuits and books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and 35 a pair of shoes. Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her 36 and her family. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo 38 and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner 39 likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family;

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
(2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, 40 medicines and her P15,000.00 cash. In a Resolution, the Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and 41 appropriate action. The Resolution also directed the respondents to file 42 their verified written return. The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and 44 torture as "stage managed." In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in 45 the Special Report of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the 46 house. From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were 47 at the time they were supposedly abducted. This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the 48 petitioner and her companions themselves. Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of 52 her immunity from suit, and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of 53 such atrocities. Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the 54 petitioner. In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner: On the part of the police, Task Group CAROJAN was made to investigate on the alleged kidnapping of the petitioner. However, it was unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts. For the military, an investigation was conducted by the Office of the Provost Marshall to investigate if any military personnel were involved. Ultimately, the office concluded that none was involved. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that 80 the latter was telling the truth. The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who 84 are still at large. Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the 85 abduction. The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected
79

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
member of the CPP-NPA. The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further 87 strain on her already volatile security. To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or 88 pertinently related to her abduction and torture. The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and 89 torture of the petitioner. The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was 90 behind her abduction. Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of 91 petitioner. The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity 92 from suit. Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal 93 belongings were denied. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and 94 production order also met the same fate. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. Issue: Whether the writ of amparo should be granted in order to hold the public respondents liable to petitioner Whether the prayer of the petitioner to inspect the fort should be granted
86

Held: Petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded 98 as respondents in her amparo petition. Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her 99 abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings. The use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a 100 party-respondent in an amparo petition. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in 103 international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command 104 responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the 105 perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, 107 civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ is that it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require 109 full and exhaustive proceedings. (Emphasis supplied) It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are 112 being practiced by the military or other state forces. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to
106

prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time 116 required to reach it is in itself doubtful. With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. On account of the insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture. The prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary 118 amparo proceeding. But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights. Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief 122 123 of inspection order. Contrary to the explicit position espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid 124 the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. The Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational 126 privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to 127 privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPPNPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal 128 measures for the protection of human rights," must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any 129 amparo case. Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the 130 performance of duty." Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors. Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in 131 their investigative efforts. While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant 132 leads. Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask. The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation 133 on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date. Further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice. To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the 134 CHR. We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the 135 commission. Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR. Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows 1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture. 2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws. 3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision. 4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision. ARMI and MINOR filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial court only after a year from publication when San Beda College, where her son was enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by ROSENDO with a copy of a court order directing the change of MINORs surname from Herrera to Alba. CA dismissed the petition. Issue 1: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the case. Held 1: YES. Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child depends on the nature of ROSENDOs action, that is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, as in the instant case, are actions in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial

VII. Change of Name Alba v. CA Facts: Rosendo C. Herrera (ROSENDO) filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to ROSENDO as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. (MINOR); and (3) the marriage of ROSENDO to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba (ARMI) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate. The trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on January 24 and directed the publication and service of said order to ARMI at her address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the SOLGEN. Before the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued an Amended Order with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing was rescheduled to February 26. This was published in "Today", a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its January 20, 27, and February 3 issues. Copies were also sent to ARMI at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, on January 17, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the SOLGEN. At the scheduled hearing, the SOLGEN appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. ARMI was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the notation that she was no longer residing in such address. The court rendered a decision deleting the surname Herrera from the birth certificate of MINOR and the supposedly date and place of marriage. Upon motion of ROSENDO, his name was deleted as the father of MINOR and the latter be renamed to Rosendo Alba only.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108, with the proper RTC. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of ARMI is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. The publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including ARMI and MINOR, which bind the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. The absence of personal service of the order to ARMI was cured by publication. A petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Issue 2: Whether the MINOR must change his surname to her mothers. Held 2: YES. Under Article 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA No. 9255, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname. An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his mothers surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his fathers surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child. In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of ARMI that MINOR is an illegitimate child because she was never married to ROSENDO. Considering ROSENDO strongly asserts that he is not the father of MINOR, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother. Ceruila v. Delantar FACTS: In 1996, Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn) filed a complaint against her father, Simplicio Delantar, for child abuse. Simplicios incarceration at the Pasay City Jail starting 1996 prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the DSWD, as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada (now Librada Ceruila), was unknown. Petition was granted by RTC of Pasay City. In February 1997, Spouses Ceruila filed an action with the RTC of Manila (special proceedings) for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn, praying that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be cancelled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein, as follows: a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin; b. The signature of informant referring to Librada T. Delantar being a forgery; c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown; d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate were (sic) actually full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually not legitimate; f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely made it appear that she was born at the time the informations for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic) proper recording; g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious Dr. Santos. RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. RTC granted the Ceruilas petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997, declaring the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab initio and ordered the City Civil Register of Manila to expunge from their respective marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto. RTC based its decision on the following, as shown by the evidence on record: On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar. In the said birth certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada A. Telin while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar. The birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on February 14, 1977 in Manila. Likewise, in the same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old when the child was born and that she was attended in her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos. The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City. This is the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners. In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar and Librada Delantar to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen. The Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is entered therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu. Such being the case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II. And going for the jugular, so to speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate purporting to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner (sic) are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the writing style. Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate; and that

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy. Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the birth. CA rendered a decision declaring that the judgment of the RTC was null and void. CA reasoned that petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent in the petition filed (special proceedings), contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and cancelled. Petitioners however contended that the petition they filed was an ordinary civil action for annulment of falsified document and not a special proceeding. They further contended that they only used Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth certificate in this case. ISSUE: Whether the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn is an ordinary civil action or a special proceeding. RULING: Petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However, the petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 108. Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that: SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. In this case, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake. In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules. Also, petitioners contention that lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation was incorrect. Serving summons is proper to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses. In this case, Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General. It did not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos. 13287576[42] considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyns age at the time of the commission of the crime. 1. Difference under Rule 103, RA 9048 and Rule 108 Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a. Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante Doctrine: It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Government. The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents the public. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available. What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. Facts: (short facts) In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decisionof the CA affirming that of the RTC of Abra in Special Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. (detailed facts) In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following: 1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra; That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records; and 4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

Thus, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001. At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts." On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial courts express March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus submitted and marked in evidence were the following: Exh. A - The Petition Exh. B The Notice of Initial Hearing Exh. C The Certificate of Posting Exh. D The Appearance of the Solicitor General Exh. E The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor Exh. F The Affidavit of Publication Exh. F-I -The Newspaper Clippings Exh. G - The Norluzonian Courier Exh. H - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier

2.

3.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name. On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition. In time, the Republic, through the OSG appealed to the CA. Yet, the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court. Issue: 1. Whether or not respondents substantial compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 103 of the Rules is sufficient to vest the Trial court with Jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition. 2. Whether or not respondents bare testimony, unsupported by any other evidence, is sufficient to prove that the change of name is not resorted for illegal purposes. Ruling: (affirmed CA) Rule 103: SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) The name asked for. province, . The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. (Underscoring added.) It is the Republics posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state and correctly so that the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover. The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing. It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government. The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents the public. In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly,

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo. Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefore rests on the sound discretion of the court. With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. Re: Financial Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC Branch 67, Paniqui Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-07-414 RTC Facts This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February 2006. The Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated 11 July 20051[2] that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to explain the following within ten (10) days from notice: (a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the required hearing and publication, in gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules on Civil Procedure;

xxx Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation dated 1 August 2005,2[5] giving the following reasons for their actions: (a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publication Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of these petitions may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 90483[6] which authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without hearing and publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the trial court considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk of Court still held ex parte hearings to receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment

(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((( ( ( (

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and grants such relief as may be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said petitions to afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of criminal and civil cases that required more attention. Issue Whether trial courts still have jurisdiction over petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name and nickname in the civil registry. Assuming that the trial courts retain such authority, the corollary question is whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 should be adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 be followed. Held Yes. The procedure in the Rules of Court should still be followed. Ratio Articles 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering the alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are public documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts contained thereinwhich is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or corrections thereof could be made only upon judicial authorization. Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the procedure for such alterations in the civil registry. The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as such strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction. The reason for this is that a change of name is a matter of public interest. Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed by Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are followed. R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or municipal registrar or consul general, without need of any judicial order. The obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors in entries and the administrative change of first name or nickname in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil registrar should follow. Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts.The promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed and verified by the person desiring a change of name, and set forth compliance with the residency requirement, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the new name asked for. The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, shall issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition and fixing the date and place for the hearing of the petition, and direct the publication of the order before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition, with the Solicitor General or city fiscal appearing on behalf of the Government. The court shall grant the petition only when satisfactory proof has been presented in open court that the order had been published as directed, the allegations in the petition are true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for changing the name of the petitioner. Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation or correction of entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim any interest and who would be affected by the petition be made parties to the proceeding and be allowed to file their opposition to the said cancellation or correction within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition or from the last date of publication.Whether the proceeding under this rule is summary or adversarial, depending on the type of errors to be corrected, the procedural requirements under this rule still need to be complied with, the nature of the proceeding becoming adversarial only when any opposition to the petition is filed and actively prosecuted. Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Republic of the Philippines v. Merlyn Mercadera Facts: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn. On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera. Her elementary, high school and college diploma as well as her GSIS certificate uniformly shows Merlyn. When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn. Initially she attempted to sought the correction directly through the Registrar pursuant to R.A. 9048. Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied" and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048." Hence, Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108. Issue: Under what rule should the petition fall (Rule 103 or Rule 108) Held: The petitioner was correct in filing the petition pursuant to RA 9048 but because it was denied the proper recourse was properly filed under Rule 108 Ratio: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community.In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known."When granted, a person's identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him." Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind." Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x." Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a person's registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one's name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG's assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercadera's petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. 2. Grounds for change of name VIII. Absentees (Rule 107) 1. Purpose of the Rule 2. Who may file; when to file IX. Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry (Rule 108) Republic of the Philippines v. Julian Edward Emerson CosetengMagpayo Facts Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent's certificate of live birth[1] shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG." In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon rd City's 3 District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."[5] The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. Issue: . . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME...INVOLVES THECHANGE OF [RESPONDENT'S] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS... Held: Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[17] Respondent's reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one's civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected - that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. Republic v. Belmonte,[21] lluminates, however: The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and inRule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied) A reading of the related provisions ( Section 4 and 5 of Rule 108) readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). What is clear then is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication. IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. RTC rulling nullified. Gerbert Corpuz v. Daisylyn Sto. Tomas Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." Issue: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. Held: The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name. xxxx Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons: (1) Birth and death register; (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages. (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1 Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. 1. Entries subject to cancellation or correction under Rule 108, in relation to RA 9048 X. Appeals in Special Proceeding (Rule 109) Nancy Zayco and Remo Hinlo v, Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo Jr. Facts: After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate in the RTC. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special administratrix of Enrique's estate. On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as special administratrix. On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of [4] Enrique's estate. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion. The RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as coadministrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the issuance of letters

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(

!"#$%&'(")*$##+%,-!(.+( /0+-#($&'+*,&( (
of administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000 bond. Respondent posted the required bond, took his oath as administrator and was issued letters of administration. Petitioners challenged the RTC order in the CA by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact filed beyond the prescribed period. Issue: Whether the notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact filed beyond the prescriptive period Held: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's [10] [11] estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable. In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within [12] 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant [13] to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30 days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time. 1. Judgments and orders for which appeal may be taken 2. When to appeal 3. Modes of Appeal 4. Rule on Advance Distribution

$123(14(567()789:;(%<=5959;7(!1>1>953(