JURISDICTION: Retroactive Effect ARUEGO vs.

CA, 1996 FACTS: On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed before the Regional Trial Court by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children". After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian; and that Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian, inter alia. Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by E.O. No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993. Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove their filiation. Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any

exception, otherwise the action will be barred prescription. ISSUE:

by

WHETHER OR NOT the provisions of the FAMILY CODE should be given retroactive effect in the case at bar. HELD: NO. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines. RATIO: The ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.

JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS INC., vs. REGISTRY OF DEEDS, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. Subsequently, it amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. The Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City. The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition. In the attached Amended Petition, petitioner impleaded instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City. In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the trial court may motu propio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue. HELD: NO, it may not. Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions relating to

venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant and not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction, touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case. Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case. Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioners motion for leave to amend its petition. RATIO: Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law. It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.

JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER LARESMA vs. ABELLANA, 2004 FACTS: Respondent Antonio P. Abellana filed a Complaint with the RTC of Toledo, Cebu, against petitioner Justino Laresma, a farmer, for recovery of possession of Lot 4-E, a parcel of agricultural land. He alleged, inter alia, that since 1985, the petitioner had been a lessee of a certain Socorro Chiong, whose agricultural land adjoined his own; and that sometime in 1985, the petitioner, by means of threat, strategy, and stealth, took possession of his property and deprived him of its possession. The respondent prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, ordering the petitioner to vacate the property and pay him actual damages, attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation. Appended to the complaint was a contract of lease executed by the petitioners wife, Praxedes Seguisabal Laresma, over a parcel of land owned by Socorro Chiong (Lot 4-C). Petitioner averred that the dispute between him and the respondent was agrarian in nature, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, involving as it did his right of possession covered by Certificate of Land Transfer issued to his wife Praxedes. The petitioner points out that the property subject of the complaint is covered by a CLT issued by the DAR in the name of his wife. The petitioner avers that although the complaint of the respondent appeared to be one for the recovery of possession of the said property (accion publiciana), by claiming that the petitioner was the tenant of Socorro Chiong, the respondent indirectly attacked the said CLT. Hence, the action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) under Republic Act No. 6657. ISSUE: WON the DARAB have jurisdiction over the action against petitioner. HELD: NO, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over his action against the petitioner. Based on the material allegations of the respondents complaint and even on the admission of the petitioner, the latter had never been an agricultural tenant of the

respondent. In fact, the respondent claimed that based on the CLT issued to his wife, they became the owner of the property covered therein. As such, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the said action. The dispute between the respondent, as plaintiff, and the petitioner, as defendant, in the RTC involving the de jure possession of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171 is not an agrarian dispute. Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property. The action of the respondent against the petitioner is not an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation. The regular court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. But it is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the allegations of tenancy. If, after hearing, tenancy had, in fact, been shown to be the real issue, the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. In this case, the respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner on May 24, 1994. Hence, the jurisdiction of the regular court over the nature of this action is governed by Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994. Section 3 thereof amended Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions are accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria. To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. In this case, the complaint of the respondent against the petitioner for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana).

The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed value of Lot 4-E. There is, thus, no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00. Patently then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondent. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision, are null and void.

RATIO: The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. A decision of the court without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it could never logically become final and executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.

JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER CUDIAMAT vs. BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-owners of parcel of land (the property) in Balayan, Batangas. Restituto, who resided in Ozamiz City with his wife, entrusted the custody of the title to who was residing in Balayan. Later, Perfecto, without the knowledge and consent of Restituto, obtained a loan from respondent Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the bank). To secure the payment of the loan, Perfecto mortgaged the property for the purpose of which he presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by Restituto, with the marital consent of his wife-herein co-petitioner Erlinda Cudiamat. Subsequently, Restituto was informed, via letter from the bank, that the property was foreclosed. He thus, by letter informed the bank that he had no participation in the execution of the mortgage and that he never authorized Perfecto for the purpose. In the meantime, Perfecto died his widow petitioner Corazon was being evicted from the property. She and her copetitioner-spouses Restituto and Erlinda filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balayan a complaint "for quieting of title with damages" against the bank and the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, assailing the mortgage as being null and void as they did not authorize the encumbrance of the property. In its Answer to the complaint, the bank, maintaining the validity of the mortgage, alleged that it had in fact secured a title in its name, after Perfecto failed to redeem the mortgage; that the Balayan RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had been placed under receivership and under liquidation by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC); that PDIC filed before the RTC of Nasugbu a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the bank; and that jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed claims against it is lodged with the liquidation court-RTC Nasugbu. ISSUE: WON estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC.

HELD: YES. In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting of title filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May 25, 2000, when PDICs petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course. While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. As a general rule, if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. However, the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved party to re-file or relitigate its case before the litigation court would be "an exercise in futility." RATIO: The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel." However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.

JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF PARTIES ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the RTC Makati, against the respondent Rodolfo Ancheta for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her 8 children. The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property. In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the RTC Cavite, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite , he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. On June 21, 1995, the Sheriff submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995. The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default and issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. Petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the CA under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite. She alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition that

she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the RTC had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. HELD: NO. The CA failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, it was ruled however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches

RATIO: Jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he is validly served with summons. Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that 30 such effort failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.

JURISDICTION OF SC, CA, RTC, MTC BARANGAY SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner filed before the MTC of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court." The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000. ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below P20,000.00? HELD: RTC. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, the SC has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second

class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction. In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. RATIO: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.

JURISDICTION OF SC, CA, RTC, MTC INIEGO vs. PURGANAN, 2006 FACTS: Private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasidelict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondents jitney(?) *sic (jeepney)+ which private respondent was driving at the time of the accident. Petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the case. Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasidelict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts (the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts In Cities, And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial Courts, depending on the value of the damages claimed. ISSUE: WON actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation and as such, they fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC or the municipal courts. HELD: YES. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendants alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action. Whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. RATIO: B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the action. A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff." On the other hand, the "subject matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong committed by the defendant." In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation the Supreme Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts].

JURISDICTION OF SC, CA, RTC, MTC ATWEL vs. CONCEPCION, 2008 FACTS: Then Assemblyman Emiliano Melgazo founded and organized Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) in Hilongos, Leyte. The organization aimed to provide livelihood to and generate income for his supporters. After his election as CPA president, Emiliano Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association. The property was later on converted into a wet market where agricultural, livestock and other farm products were sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms of amusement. The income generated from the property, mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPA. When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel Melgazo, succeeded him as CPA president and administrator of the property. On the other hand, petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPA vice-president and treasurer, respectively. While CPA was in the process of registering as a stock corporation, its other elected officers and members formed their own group and registered themselves in SEC as officers and members of respondent Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc. (CPAI). Petitioners were not listed either as officers or members of CPAI. Later, CPAI objected to petitioners' collection of rentals from the wet market vendors. CPAI filed a case in the SEC for mandatory injunction. With the passage of RA 8799, the case was transferred to Branch 24 of the Southern Leyte RTC and subsequently, to Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC. Both were special commercial courts. In the complaint, CPAI alleged that it was the owner of the property and petitioners, without authority, were collecting rentals from the wet market vendors. The special commercial court ruled that the deed of sale covering the property was in the name of CPA, not Emiliano Melgazo. Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA and contested the jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the case. According to them, they were not CPAI members, hence the case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute "between and among members" so as to warrant the special commercial court's jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other hand, argued

that petitioners were already in estoppel as they had participated actively in the court proceedings. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the special commercial court has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: NO. Upon the enactment of RA 8799 in 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. Under this authority, Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC, acting as a special commercial court, deemed the mandatory injunction case filed by CPAI an intra-corporate dispute falling under subparagraph (2) of the aforecited provision as it involved the officers and members thereof. To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two elements must concur: 1. 2. the status or relationship of the parties and the nature of the question that is subject of their controversy.

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations: (a) between any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates; (b) between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates and (c) between such corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. On the other hand, the second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy. In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor members of CPAI. Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the regulation of CPAI (or even CPA). The determination as to who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and should be threshed out in a regular court. Cases of this nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129. Therefore, the conflict among the parties here was outside the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.

RULE 1, Sec. 5: COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS; DOCKET FEES MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CA, 1987 FACTS: Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the original complaint. In the present case, at issue is the basis of the assessment of the docket fee. Based from the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, the case at bar is both an action for damages and specific performance. Although the amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint, it is spelled out in the body of the compliant. It is argued that this should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint for the inclusion of a coplaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After the Court issued an order for the re- assessment of the docket fee, the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted. ISSUE: Whether or not docket fee should be assessed based on the amount of damages sought in the original complaint. HELD: YES. The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. In the present case, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint. The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of

filing in court. Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only the docket fee for specific performance (without mention of damages soughtwhich is also a basis for assessment of the docket fee). Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void. RATIO: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

RULE 1, Sec. 5: Commencement of Actions; Docket Fees PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION, AUTOMOTIVE PHILIPPINES, ASEA ONE CORPORATION and AUTOCORP, vs. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Proton availed of the credit facilities of herein respondent, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP). To guarantee the payment of its obligation, its co-petitioners Automotive, Asea and Autocorp executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of US$2,000,000.00. BNP and Proton subsequently entered into three trust receipt agreements. Under the terms of the trust receipt agreements, Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold them in trust for BNP. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, together with all the accompanying documents of title. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the unsold motor vehicles. Pursuant to the corporate guarantee, BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the payment of the amount representing Proton's total outstanding obligations. These guarantors refused to pay, however. Hence, BNP filed on before the Makati RTC a complaint against petitioners praying that they be ordered to pay (1) US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid and (2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from petitioners as attorney's fees. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at P352,116.30. To the complaint, the defendants-herein petitioners filed on a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees to thus prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. As additional ground, petitioners raised prematurity of the complaint, BNP not having priorly sent any demand letter. Citing Administrative Circular No. 11-94, petitioners argue that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees as the said circular provides that in the assessment thereof, interest claimed should be included. There being an underpayment of the docket fees, petitioners conclude, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the clerk of court was correct in its assessment of the docket fees. HELD: NO. The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration "the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation. Respecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he applied the exchange rate of US $1 = P43.00 "[i]n the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively correct," the same does not lie. The presumption of regularity of the clerk of court's application of the exchange rate is not conclusive. It is disputable. As such, the presumption may be overturned by the requisite rebutting evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners have adequately proven with documentary evidence that the exchange rate when the complaint was filed on September 7, 1998 was US $1 = P43.21. In fine, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient. With respect to petitioner's argument that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case in light of the insufficient docket fees, the same does not lie. In the case at bar, respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal. RATIO: Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.

RULE 1, Sec. 6: CONSTRUCTION REP. of the PHILIPPINES vs. CA, 2003 FACTS: In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, the government embarked on several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT) projects. One of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros Convention Center and the founding site of the Philippine Army on the property of respondent Fe Manuel. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical landmark. To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the National Centennial Commission (NCC), filed a complaint for expropriation against respondents Fe Manuel and Metrobank. The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by the latter. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection to the expropriation as long as just compensation was paid. The trial court ruled that plaintiff had no cause of action to file the expropriation case and dismissed the case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Judge for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition in its resolution for having been filed out of time based on . It also deni ed petitioners motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the CA should not have applied to its case the amendment made to Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Bar Matter No. 803 (thus, based on this new rule, the petition for certiorari was filed 14 days late). Procedural rules, petitioner argued, should not be given retroactive effect where their application would result in injustice. Petitioner invoked Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that liberality should be observed in construing the Rules of Court in order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not liberal construction should be applied in the case at bar so as to show that the petition was not filed out of time.

HELD: YES. The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure. Nevertheless, by virtue of this retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC, it was held that the instant petition for certiorari was filed on time. In fact, there is no dispute that the petition was filed by petitioner on the 60th day from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner received the denial on October 12, 1998 and it filed the petition for certiorari on December 11, 1998. Clearly therefore the petition was filed on time.

RULE 1, Sec. 6: CONSTRUCTION MARICALUM MINING CORP., vs. NLRC, SIPALAY MINE FREE LABOR UNION and CECILIO T. SALUDAR, 1998 FACTS: A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter which ordered the reinstatement of illegally dismissed equipment operator Cecilio Saludar. The decision was not executed as all the assets of Marinduque had been foreclosed by the PNB and the DBP. These assets were subsequently acquired by petitioner Maricalum while Marinduque had ceased its operations. 8 years later, Saludar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Maricalum. The Executive Labor Arbiter granted the motion. Maricalum appealed to the NLRC contending that it is a different entity from Marinduque which was the only party to the original action. The NLRC held that since more than 5 years have elapsed the judgment could be enforced against Maricalum, not by mere motion but by an action for revival of judgment. Saludar filed an Action for Revival of Judgment before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (Bacolod City). Maricalum again moved to dismiss alleging that: (1) the complaint was not accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping; (2) that the action was cognizable only by regular courts; and (3) that it was not a party to the original case. Saludar filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, attaching therewith an Affidavit of Compliance with Supreme Court Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping. The Labor Arbiter denied Maricalum's Motion to Dismiss and directed the parties to submit their position papers. Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Saludar. He held that the certification of non-forum shopping does not apply to cases falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and labor arbiters because the NLRC is not a court but an agency performing quasi-judicial functions. He also sustained the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over action to revive judgment involving illegal dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping is mandatory and should apply to NLRC.

HELD: YES. The certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Court Circular 04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. The NLRC is a quasi-judicial agency, hence, initiatory pleadings filed before it should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum-shopping. Nevertheless, substantial compliance with the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient. The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent Saludar filed an affidavit of compliance with SC Circular 04-94 on nonforum shopping albeit a little delayed. This little delay should not defeat the action for revival of judgment which undeniably was filed within the ten (10) year prescriptive period. Also, the circumstance that respondent had painstakingly tried to enforce the favorable judgment he obtained against petitioner for almost ten (10) years but to no avail, should deter us from strictly construing the provisions of the Circular. A liberal interpretation of the Circular would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to "secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."

RULE 1, Sec. 6: CONSTRUCTION COMPOSITE ENTERPRISES, INC., vs. EMILIO M. CAPAROSO and JOEVE QUINDIPAN, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the distribution and/or supply of confectioneries to various retail establishments within the Philippines. Emilio Caparoso and Joeve P. Quindipan (respondents) were employed as its deliverymen until they were terminated on October 8, 1999. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with the NLRC. Petitioner denied that respondents were illegally dismissed, alleging that they were employed on a month-to-month basis and that they were terminated as a result of the expiration of their contracts of employment. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed with the NLRC a Motion to Resolve its motion to be allowed to pay separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Meanwhile, in the NLRC set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, holding that there was no illegal dismissal since respondents' contracts of employment were for a fixed period. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Order holding that the reversal on appeal of the Labor Arbiter's Decision did not affect respondents' entitlement to accrued salaries pending appeal, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code; that only respondent's entitlement to backwages was forfeited; and that there was no merit to petitioner's insistence on paying separation pay to respondents, since that there was no strong basis for petitioner's contention that reinstatement was physically impossible due to petitioner's implementation of a retrenchment program. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution. Within the 60-day reglementary period from date of receipt of the NLRC Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, petitioner, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA's Special Sixteenth Division, filed a second Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching the affidavit of service which was omitted in the petition.

The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, holding that resort to the second petition for certiorari was no longer available due to res judicata, since the dismissal order in the first petition for certiorari had already become final and executory; that minute resolutions of the court denying due course to petitions, or dismissing cases summarily for failure to comply with the formal or substantial requirements laid down therefor by law, were actually dispositions on the merits constituting res judicata. Petitioner contends that the dismissal of the first petition was not a judgment on the merits as to constitute res judicata; and that the dismissal of the first petition was not a dismissal with prejudice as provided by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner's procedural lapses in filing the first and second special civil actions for certiorari are irreversible and there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner at least attempted or subsequently made a substantial compliance with the formal or substantial requirements laid down by law; and that petitioner's gross and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. ISSUE: Whether or not liberal construction should be applied in favor of petitioner. HELD: YES. Contrary to the CA's ruling, failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with prejudice. The Rule clearly states that the dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise stated by the court; and the dismissal may be deemed with prejudice only upon proper motion and hearing. Since the dismissal was without prejudice, it did not bar petitioner from refiling the petition for so long as it was made within the 60-day reglementary period for filing the petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, ultimately, the SC held that the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order affirming the Order of the Labor Arbiter.

RULE 2, Sec. 1: ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION, BASIS OF. HEIRS OF SUSANA DE GUZMAN TUAZON, vs. CA and and Ma. Luisa VICTORIO, Aberto GUANIO, Jaime VICTORIO, Ines MOLINA, Erlinda GREGORIO, Visitacion GERVACIO, and Froilan GERVACIO, 2004 FACTS: Branch 71 of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, issued an Order in a LRC Case granting the heirs of Susana de Guzman Tuazons (Heirs of Tuazon) prayer for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) from the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, in lieu of the lost copy. The private respondents (Victorio et. al.,) filed with Branch 74 of the same court an action for Quieting of Title and Nullification and Cancellation of Title, which was docketed as a Civil Case, praying in the main that an order be issued directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the owners duplicate copy of the OCT it has issued pursuant to the order of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in the LRC Case. In their Answer, the Heirs of Tuazon averred inter alia that the Victorio et. al., had no cause of action against them; that Branch 74 had no jurisdiction to annul and/or reverse an order of a co-equal court; and that the OCT, on file with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal, is subsisting, otherwise, Branch 71 would not have ordered the issuance of a new duplicate OCT in lieu of that which was irretrievably lost. ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of action of Victorio et. al., petition has been properly alleged. HELD: YES. The averments of Victorio et. al., petition readily shows that indeed, as captioned, it is one for quieting of title and nullification and cancellation of title. Thus, they assert therein that the issuance to the Heirs of Tuazon of a new owners duplicate copy of the OCT, which was procured by fraudulent representation, casts a cloud on the titles of the private respondents and, therefore, should be ordered cancelled. The Heirs of Tuazon, asseverate that their petition in LRC Case involved the issuance, in lieu of the lost one, of the owners copy of OCT which is governed by Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise, known as the Property Registration Decree. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the LRC Case was a petition for reconstitution which can be validly made only in case it is the

original copy of the certificate of title with the Register of Deeds which is lost or destroyed, and the cause of action of which is based on Republic Act No. 26. The argument, however, is non sequitur. Regardless of whether petitioners cause of action in LRC Case is based on Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 or under Rep. Act No. 26, the same has no bearing on the petitioners cause in this case. Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed the Civil Case before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. Branch 74, therefore, committed no reversible error when it denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the private respondents petition in the Civil Case. RATIO: It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action and specify the relief sought.

RULE 2, Sec. 1 Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, vs. Spouses HELEN BOYON and ROMEO BOYON, 2003 FACTS: Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the RTC of Muntinlupa. The judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the Spouses Boyon. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the Spouses Boyon failed. The Spouses Jose filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. This was granted, and subsequently, the Spouses Boyon was declared in default. The Spouses Boyon then questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court (that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them). It is the contention of the spouses Jose that although the case filed before the trial court was denominated as an action for specific performance, it was actually an action quasi in rem, because it involved a piece of real property located in the Philippines. They further argue that in actions quasi in rem involving ownership of a parcel of land, it is sufficient that the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the res. Thus, the summons by publication, which they effected subsequent to the substituted service of summons, was allegedly sufficient. On the other hand, the spouses Boyon maintain that the proceedings in the trial court were null and void because of the invalid and defective service of summons. According to them, the Return of Summons issued by the process server of the RTC failed to state that he had exerted earnest efforts to effect the service of summons. As to the summons by publication subsequently effected by the Spouses Jose, the spouses Boyon argue that the case filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance and, therefore, an action in personam. As such, the summons by publication was insufficient to enable the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for specific performance is an action in personam and not an action quasi-in rem. HELD: YES. An action for specific performance is an action in personam. In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against the spouses Boyon. While the suit incidentally involved a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did not assert any interest or right over it. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds. Having failed to serve the summons on the spouses Boyon properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Consequently, due process demands that all the proceedings conducted subsequent thereto should be deemed null and void. RATIO: In general, substituted service can be availed of only after a clear showing that personal service of summons was not legally possible. Also, service by publication is applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not in personal suits such as the present one which is for specific performance. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. ACTION IN REM It is an action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person. ACTION QUASI-IN REM An individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.

RULE 2, Sec. 1: ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS, BASIS OF. MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, 2007 FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank evidenced promissory notes. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land described in an OCT. The real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. When Ernesto failed to settle the loans on its due date, PCRB sent him a written demand which however, proved futile. PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank) located at Cagayan de Oro City. The RTC rendered judgment ordering the spouses Biaco to pay PCRB and in case of non-payment within the period, the Sheriff of is ordered to sell at public auction the mortgaged Lot. The sheriff personally served the judgment to Ernesto Biaco at his office at Export and Industry Bank. The spouses Biaco did not appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court. Subsequently, Ma. Theresa Biaco sought the annulment of the RTC decision contending that extrinsic fraud prevented her from participating in the judicial foreclosure proceedings. Inter alia, she asserted that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. Further, she contended that even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by the sheriff at her husbands office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts failed. Finally, she argues that the deficiency judgment is a personal judgment which should be deemed void for lack of jurisdiction over her person.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction based on the nature of the action (whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem). HELD: YES. In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Nevertheless, the trial court went beyond its jurisdiction over the res and rendered a personal judgment against the spouses Biaco which cannot be countenanced. In this case, while the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and issue a judgment enforcing Ma. Theresa Biacos personal liabilit y. In doing so without first having acquired jurisdiction over the person of Ma. Theresa Biaco, as it did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process, warranting the annulment of the judgment rendered in the case. RATIO: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem , jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only relief that may be granted by the court against a defendant over whose person it has not acquired jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is limited to the res.

RULE 2, Sec. 2: CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED Spouses JIMENEZ vs. Juan Jose JORDANA, 2004 FACTS: In the present case, the cause of action of Jordana against the spouses Jimenez was premised on the material averments in the Complaint as follows: 1. Jordana offered to buy, and Bunye (the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Ayala Alabang) agreed to sell to him, the property for P12,300,000. 2. As agreed, Jordana tendered to her the sum of P500,000, but she refused to accept it. 3. Bunye informed him by letter, that she could no longer accept the offer of P12,300,000, but that she was willing to sell it for P16,000,000; thus, she was declining to receive the P500,000 earnest money he had sent. 4. There was a perfected contract of sale, which Bunye breached by her unreasonable refusal to complete the sale. 5. She unreasonably refused to heed his demand for compliance with the contract, which she "should be compelled to specifically perform." 6. Bunye sold the same property to the spouses Jimenez, pursuant to which TCT No. 171333 was cancelled and TCT No. 200308 issued to the latter. 7. Bunye and the Jimenezes should be compelled to execute a contract or deed of sale over the subject property in Jordanas favor x x x which complies with the requirements of Article 1358 of the Civil Code" that a contract involving real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document. 8. As a result of Bunye's and the spouses' "unreasonable breach and circumvention of the contract," Jordana suffered actual damages. 9. Having acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner," Bunye and the spouses Jimenez should be ordered to pay exemplary damages. 10. Their acts or omissions have compelled Jordana to litigate, for which they must be ordered to reimburse attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jordana has alleged a sufficient cause of action for the recovery of property against the Spouses Jimenez. HELD: YES. There are at least three reasons for this conclusion. First, it is readily apparent that Jordana has stated a demandable right over the subject property. Second, Jordana has the right to compel petitioners to respect, not violate, his rights as a prior buyer. Third, despite the discrepancies and the linguistic lapses in the material averments of the Supplement, the acts and/or the omissions that violated Jordanas rights are fairly discernible from the records and the pleadings of the Spouses Jimenez. They more than compensate for such shortcomings. Taken together, the allegations in the Complaint, the pleadings of the Spouses Jimenez and the record of the case sufficiently support a cause of action for recovery of property against them. It is generally accepted that when property belonging to a person is unlawfully or fraudulently taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property. RATIO: Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another." It has the following elements: 1) The legal right of the plaintiff; 2) The correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and 3) An act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Thus, the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. This hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint.

Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer? To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the plaintiff's claim for relief does not exist at all. On the contrary, the complaint is sufficient "if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in which event, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars." Generally, the court takes into account only the material allegations of the complaint, without considering extraneous facts and circumstances. In some cases, however, the court may also consider -- in addition to the complaint -- annexes or documents appended to it, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the record. It must then bear in mind that the facts proving the existence of a cause of action do not have to be established or alleged by the complaint and/or the other pleadings at the outset but, under exceptional circumstances, even during the trial on the merits of the case.

RULE 2, Sec. 2: CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED HEIRS OF JOSE G. SANTIAGO, vs. Aurea SANTIAGO, Vicente ONG, Mark Vincent ONG, and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, 2009 FACTS: This is an action for annulment of titles, injunction, damages and restraining order. The heirs of Jose G. Santiago, allege in their Complaint that their father and his brother Juan G. Santiago, both deceased, were registered co-owners of a parcel of land. Juan Santiago, while confined at the Chinese General Hospital, Intensive Care Unit, allegedly sold a portion of the lot, to a two (2) year old child Mark Vincent Ong with the participation of defendant Aurea Santiago as evidenced by a Deed of Sale over a Portion of Land. And in support of the foregoing sale, an alleged affidavit of [non-]tenancy was executed by Juan G. Santiago. Both signatures of the latter in the said two (2) documents, according to heirs of Jose G. Santiago, were spurious, forged and falsified by Aurea Santiago et. al., who stood to benefit from it. Vicente Ong and Mark Vincent Ong, father and son respectively, were able to secure a title over the disputed lot by virtue of the falsified deed of sale and a supposed Partition Agreement executed by Jose Santiago and Juan Santiago who were long deceased before said date. Later on, Aurea Santiago allegedly managed to obtain a title covering the remaining portion of the lot, in the names of both Jose and Juan Santiago diminishing thereby the share of herein plaintiffs in the property. ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Santiago are the real party in interest and therefore have a cause of action to bring the present case. HELD: NO. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In the present case, there is no dispute that Juan Santiago owned half of the subject lot while the other half belonged to his brother Jose. Juan Santiago merely exercised his right when he sold a portion of his undivided half to Mark Vincent L. Ong. Petitioners question Juans transaction even though petitioners are neither parties to the contract nor heirs or assigns of Juan Santiago. Juan Santiago left a probated will leaving all his properties to his wife Aurea, to the exclusion of

the Heirs of Jose Santiago. As heirs of Jose Santiago, co-owner of the subject property, they may only question the sale if their right of pre-emption under the Civil Code of the Philippines was disregarded, and they wish to exercise such right. However, they do not seek to exercise the right of preemption. Thus, they are not real parties in interest in the present case.

RULE 2, Sec.5: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION SPOUSES DANILO and CRISTINA DECENA, vs. SPOUSES PEDRO and VALERIA PIQUERO, 2005 FACTS: The Spouses Decena were the owners of a parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, covered by a TCT. The Spouses Decena and the Spouses Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in which the former sold the property to the latter payable in 6 installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took possession of the property. It appears in the MOA that the Spouses Decena obliged themselves to transfer the property to the Spouses Piquero upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. The Spouses Decena, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint against the Spouses Piquero with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages. They alleged therein that, they did not transfer the property to and in the names of the Spouses Piquero as vendees because the first two checks drawn and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite demands therefor. The Spouses Piquero filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action. The Spouses Piquero averred that the principal action of the Spouses Decena was for the rescission of the MOA, and that the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been brought in the RTC of Paraaque City, where the property subject matter of the action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the petitioners resided. The Spouses Decena on the other hand insisted that their action for damages and attorneys fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside. They averred that while their second cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action, the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the Spouses Decena is applicable in this case. HELD: NO. Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is so because the Spouses Decena, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one cause of action against the respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latters refusal to pay the first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over to them the possession of the real property, as well as the house constructed thereon occupied by the Spouses Piquero. The claim for damages for reasonable compensation for the Spouses Piqueros use and occupation of the property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by the Spouses Decena on account of the breach of contract of the Spouses Piquero are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not independent or separate causes of action. RATIO: Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action: xxx (c): Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the other falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action should be filed in the Regional Trial Court. If the causes of action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the courts of proper venue. Hence, a real action and a personal action may be joined either in the Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located or where the parties reside. A cause of action is to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer for relief. It is the substance and not the form that is controlling. A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of action in a complaint. The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action are alleged. In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is present . Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief; or whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged for enforcement or adjudication.

RULE 2, Sec. 5: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION ARTEMIO INIEGO, vs. The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN and FOKKER C. SANTOS, 2006 FACTS: Fokker Santos filed a complaint (with the RTC of Manila) for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private Santos jitney which he was driving at the time of the accident. According to Iniego, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the Santos in the case at bar are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent act. He points out that the complaint itself stated that such moral and exemplary damages arose from the alleged refusal of defendants to honor the demand for damages, and therefore there is no reasonable cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the claim for moral and exemplary damages. If the claims for moral and exemplary damages are not included in the computation for purposes of determining jurisdiction, only the claim for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 will be considered, and the MeTC will have jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the defendant) should be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. HELD: NO. The SC did not give credence to petitioners arguments. The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All

claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00. RATIO: The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action. In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.

RULE 3, Sec. 2: PARTIES IN INTEREST PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD., vs. DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION, 2007 FACTS: PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Singapore. It is not considered as a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Dakila Trading Corporation (DTC) is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, and engaged in the business of selling and leasing out laboratory instrumentation and process control instrumentation, and trading of laboratory chemicals and supplies. DTC entered into a Distribution Agreement with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA). By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA appointed the DTC as the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines. DTC was likewise granted the right to purchase and sell the products of PEIA subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Distribution Agreement. PEIA, on the other hand, shall give respondent a commission for the sale of its products in the Philippines. Under the same Distribution Agreement, DTC shall order the products of PEIA, which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin-Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP), an affiliate of PEIA. PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP. However, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement, prompting DTC to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP. The RTC issued an Order denying respondents prayer for the issuance of a writ of attachment. However, subsequently, it granted in its Order, an Alias Summons, issued by the RTC to PEIA. But the said Alias Summons was served and received by Perkinelmer Asia, a Singaporean based sole proprietorship, owned by the petitioner and, allegedly, a separate and distinct entity from PEIA. Accordingly, DTC filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, together with the Amended Complaint claiming that PEIA had become a sole proprietorship owned by the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD, and subsequently changed its name to Perkinelmer Asia. Being a sole proprietorship of the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD, the change in PEIAs name and juridical status did not detract from the fact that all its due and outstanding obligations to

third parties were assumed by the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. To this, PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD subsequently filed with the RTC a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss DTCs Amended Complaint based among other things, that DTC failed to state a cause of action against the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD because it is not the real party-in-interest. ISSUE: Whether or not PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD is a realparty in interest. HELD: NO. With regard to the defense of PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD that it is not the real party-in-interest, it is evidentiary in nature which must be proven in trial. The appellate court, then, cannot be faulted for not granting petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. In the case at bar, the SC sustained the contention of the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD that there can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because the case before the court a quo involving collection of a sum of money and damages is, indeed, an action in personam, as it deals with the personal liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the alleged unilateral termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement. The action instituted by DTC affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

The extraterritorial service of summons was not validly effected by the RTC against PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD, and the RTC thus failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the same. The RTC is therefore bereft of any authority to act upon the Complaint filed before it by DTC insofar as PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD is concerned. If there was no valid summons served upon petitioner, could RTC have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by the latters voluntary appearance? As a rule, even if the service of summons upon the defendant or respondent in a civil case is defective, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over his person when he voluntary appears in court or submits himself to its authority.

Nonetheless, voluntary appearance, as a mode of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is likewise inapplicable in this case. It is settled that a party who makes a special appearance in court for the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of said court, based on the invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be considered to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. In sum, the SC finds that the PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD did not submit itself voluntarily to the authority of the court a quo; and in the absence of valid service of summons, the RTC utterly failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

RULE 3, Sec. 7: COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES PNB, vs. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR AND DEOGRACIAS MILITAR, 2006 FACTS: Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, all surnamed Militar, were heirs of Estanislao Militar and the registered coowners of 2 lots covered by an OCT. Deogracias sold his undivided share in both lots. Notwithstanding the sale, Deogracias continued to occupy a portion of the lot sold until his death. Subsequently, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad died. Glicerio and Caridad died without issue. Deogracias was survived by Teodorico and Remedios, while Tomas was survived by Wenceslao and Ladislao. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad purportedly sold the lots to the spouses Rodolfo and Nilda Jalbuna. Consequently, titles to the Lots were cancelled and new titles, were issued to spouses Jalbuna. The Spouses Jalbuna mortgaged one of the Lots to Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for a loan. When they defaulted, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it at public auction, with PNB as the highest bidder. Title thereto was consolidated in the name of PNB and was issued TCT. Thereafter, PNB sold the lot to spouses Johnny and Nona Lucero, who were issued new TCTs. As the new owners of they filed an ejectment case against Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo, all surnamed Militar, the actual occupants therein. The actual occupants, as surviving heirs of Teodorico and Deogracias Militar, filed a complaint against spouses Jalbuna, PNB, and spouses Lucero for Reconveyance of Title, Annulment of Sale, Cancellation of Titles and Damages. Other heirs of Deogracias on the side of Remedios filed a complaint-in-intervention to join the plaintiffs. Spouses Lucero alleged that the complaint was commenced without the real party in interest; that the cause of action has prescribed; and that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value. ISSUE: Whether or not the case was brought by all indispensable parties.

HELD: YES. The SC was not persuaded by PNBs claim that the case was not brought by all indispensable parties as other heirs of Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad have not been named as parties therein. In the case at bar, the ultimate relief sought by the action is the reconveyance of titles to their rightful owners. The records reveal that prior to the forgery, the disputed properties were registered in the names of the co-owners, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, whose interests remained undivided. Thus, if reconveyance of the titles is granted, the titles will revert back to the estates of the deceased coowners and not to their individual heirs, whose interests are divisible and may properly be ventilated in another proceeding. Therefore, a co-heir may bring such action without necessarily joining all the other co-heirs as coplaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. The instant case may proceed without the other heirs, if there are any, because they are mere necessary parties. Moreover, in a co-ownership, the act of one benefits all the co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. RATIO: An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation. There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party?; and, (2) can the case be decided on the merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation.

RULE 3, Sec. 7: COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES SINCERE Z. VILLANUEVA, vs. MARLYN P. NITE, 2006 FACTS: Marlyn Nite allegedly took out a loan from Sincere Villanueva. To secure the loan, Marlyn Nite issued Sincere Villanueva an Asian Bank Corporation (ABC) check. The date was later changed with the consent and concurrence of petitioner. The check was, however, dishonored due to a material alteration when petitioner deposited the check on due date. Marlyn Nite, through her representative Emily P. Abojada, remitted petitioner partial payment for the loan. The balance was due on or before December 8, 1994. However Sincere Villanueva, barely 6 days after receipt of the partial payment, filed an action for a sum of money and damages against ABC for the full amount of the dishonored check without impleading Marlyn Nite. The apparent haste by which Sincere filed his complaint and his failure to implead Marlyn clearly shows his intent to prevent Marlyn from opposing his action. The RTC of Quezon City, ruled in his favor. When Marlyn Nite went to ABC Salcedo Village Branch to withdraw money from her account, she was unable to do so because the trial court had ordered ABC to pay Sincere the value of Marlyns ABC check. ABC remitted to the sheriff a managers check drawn on Marlyns account. The check was duly received by Sincere on the same date. Marlyn then filed a petition in the CA seeking to annul and set aside the trial courts decision ordering ABC to pay Sincere the value of the ABC check. ISSUE: Whether or not Marlyn is an indispensable party in the case at bar. HELD: YES. The contract of loan was between Sincere and Marlyn. No collection suit could prosper without Marlyn who was an indispensable party. Sincere should not have sued ABC. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by

provision of law. None of the foregoing exceptions to the relativity of contracts applies in this case. RATIO: An indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree will necessarily affect his rights. The court cannot proceed without his presence. If an indispensable party is not impleaded, any judgment is ineffective. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

RULE 3, Sec. 7: COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES ELY QUILATAN & ROSVIDA QUILATAN-ELIAS, vs. HEIRS OF LORENZO QUILATAN, and the MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA (now TAGUIG CITY), 2009 FACTS: Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias filed a Civil Case for nullification of Tax Declaration and for Partition of the Estate of the late Pedro Quilatan with damages against the heirs of Lorenzo Quilatan. They claim that during his lifetime, Pedro Quilatan owned two parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations; they discovered that said tax declarations were cancelled without their knowledge and new ones were issued under the names of Spouses Lorenzo Quilatan and Anita Lizertiquez as owners thereof. The trial court rendered its decision declaring as void the cancellation of Tax Declaration. At the same time, it ordered the partition of the subject properties into three equal shares among the heirs of Francisco, Ciriaco and Lorenzo, all surnamed Quilatan. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed without prejudice the decision of the trial court on the ground that Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias failed to implead other co-heirs who are indispensable parties to the case. (They did not implead their other co-heirs, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the case). Thus, the judgment of the trial court was null and void for want of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable parties to an action for partition. HELD: YES. The complaint filed by Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias before the trial court failed to implead their two siblings, Solita and Rolando, and all the heirs of Ciriaco, as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. It is clear that the central thrust of the complaint filed in the Civil Case was to revert the subject properties back to the estate of Pedro Quilatan, thereby making all his heirs pro indiviso co-owners thereof, and to partition them equally among themselves; and that all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable parties to an action for partition, which will not lie without the joinder of said parties.

In an action for partition of real estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff. RATIO: An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. The evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.

RULE 3, Sec. 16: DEATH OF PARTY; DUTY OF COUNSEL Atty. CELSO D. LAVIA, et.al., vs. CA and Josefina GABRIEL, 1989 FACTS: Maria Carmen Gabriel executed a donation mortis causa in favor of her widowed sister-in-law, Josefina C. Gabriel, over a parcel of land with improvements in Sampaloc, Manila, covered by a TCT in Carmen's name. The donation was thumbmarked by Carmen before a Notary Public. It was accepted by the donee in the same instrument. 4 months later, Carmen executed a Last Will And Testament in which she bequeathed the same Sampaloc property to her cousin and companion, Remedios C. Muyot, and willed a small lot in Antipolo, Rizal to Josefina. She named a friend, Concepcion M. De Garcia, as executrix of her will. Remedios Muyot, as Carmen's attorney- in-fact, hired Atty. Celso D. Lavia, as Carmen's counsel, on a 30% contingent fee basis. Carmen thumbmarked an "AFFIDAVIT OF DENIAL" repudiating the donation of the Sampaloc property to Josefina because it was allegedly procured through fraud and trickery. On the same occasion, she thumbmarked a "REVOCATION OF DONATION" before a Notary Public. Two days later, Remedios Muyot, as Carmen's attorney-in-fact, sold the Sampaloc property to Virgilio D. Cebrero. Carmen passed away and the "REVOCATION OF DONATION" was registered on the back of Carmen's TCT. Josefina filed a complaint in the RTC Manila against Carmen's estate and the Register of Deeds of Manila to annul the Deed of Revocation of Donation. She asked the court to appoint an administrator ad litem for the estate of Carmen P. Gabriel. Upon filing the complaint, she caused to be recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on the title of the property. Without appointing a special administrator for Carmen's estate, the court caused summons to be served on the estate. The summons was received by Remedios Muyot. Subsequently, Josefina filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Lavia on the ground that his authority as counsel for Carmen was extinguished upon her death. She also assailed the service of summons to the decedent's Estate through Muyot and reiterated her motion for the appointment of a special administrator for the Estate. Atty. Lavia opposed the motions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lavia may still appear as counsel for the estate of Carmen Gabriel even after the latters death. HELD: NO. The estate of a dead person may only be summoned through the executor or administrator of his estate for it is the executor or administrator who may sue or be sued (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court) and who may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court). The general power of attorney appointing Remedios as Carmen's agent or attorney-in- fact was extinguished upon Carmen's demise (Art. 1919[3], Civil Code). Thereafter, Remedios was bereft of authority to represent Carmen. Atty. Lavias contention that the agency was "constituted in the common interest of the principal and the agent" and that hence it was not extinguished by the death of the principal (Art. 1930, Civil Code) is refuted by the instrument itself which explicitly provided that the powers conferred on the agent were to be exercised for the "sole benefit" of the principal, Carmen P. Gabriel. Carmen's death likewise divested Attorney Lavia of authority to represent her as counsel. A dead client has no personality and cannot be represented by an attorney.

RULE 3, Sec. 16: DEATH OF PARTY; DUTY OF COUNSEL ANG KEK CHEN, vs. JUDGE AMALIA R. ANDRADE, 1999 FACTS: This is an administrative case filed by Ang Kek Chen against Judge Amalia R. Andrade of the RTC, Branch 5, Manila, for serious misconduct, gross inefficiency, and extreme bias and partiality. The complaints, four (4) in all, have been filed against respondent judge in connection with her handling of a Civil Case of which complainant Ang Kek Chen is one of the defendants. In one of the verified complaint, Ang Kek Chen claimed that during one of the hearings of the case, Ang Kek Chens counsel manifested before the Court that the other defendant, Mr. Tui Hok, died. Despite admission of plaintiff's counsel of the fact of death of Mr. Tui Hok, respondent court kept on sending orders and notices to the deceased at an address, which, according to Ang Kek Chen, is in violation of the Rule that no court can acquire jurisdiction over a dead person. Ang Kek Chen likewise alleges that he filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the substitution of the deceased defendant Tui Hok by his heirs and for summons to be served on the latter. Despite repeated follow-ups, manifestations and motions, Judge Andrade refused to act on said Omnibus Motion and instead issued an Order setting the case for trial for the last time with or without the presence of defendants' counsel. Judge Andrade in her answer averred that notices and orders continued to be sent to defendant Tui Hok, because no proof had been submitted to her court to prove the reported death of defendant Tui Hok. In sum, Judge Andrade was charged with serious inefficiency based on her alleged failure to take judicial notice of the death of defendant Tui Hok despite manifestations of plaintiff's counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Andrade was inefficient in her duty for failing to take judicial notice of the death of one of the defendants in the civil case. HELD: NO. Clearly, the duty of informing the court of the death of a party is on the counsel of the deceased. Under the rules, it is the duty of the attorney for the deceased defendant to inform the court of his client's death and to furnish the court with the names and residences of the executor, administrator, or legal representative of the deceased. xxx The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of the names and addresses of his legal representative or representatives. Judge Andrade cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders and notices to defendant Tui Hok in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect from his counsel. Nor can she be faulted for not resolving the Motion for Substitution filed by complainant as co-defendant in the civil case, and opting instead to reset the case for trial.

RULE 3, Sec. 16: DEATH OF PARTY; DUTY OF COUNSEL Maria Mercedes NERY, et.al., vs. Gabriel LEYSON, et.al., and the ESTATES OF DECEASED Spouses JOSE LEYSON and LOURDES VELEZ,2000 FACTS: Maria Mercedes et al., claim that they are the children of Mercedes del Rio, who died during World War II. They are also heirs of their maternal grandmother Agatona del Corro. When Mercedes del Rio died, she left a share in the parcel of land in Lapu-Lapu City covered by an O.C.T. in the name of Agatona del Corro, et al. The land is being managed by Maria Mercedess uncle Eduardo del Rio and Lourdes del Rio Espiritu. After the death of Mercedes del Rio, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Partition and Declaration of Heirs covering the share of Mercedes del Rio in the land in question. The death of Mercedes del Rio was duly annotated in the O.C.T. However, a Notice of Lis Pendens was executed and annotated on the title by Atty. Regino Hermosisima representing Lourdes Leyson, et al. It appears that the Leysons had filed a case for annulment and cancellation of the O.C.T. Maria Mercedes et al., claim that they were not made parties to said case and that although their mother Mercedes del Rio was impleaded as defendant, she was already dead when the Civil Case No. was filed. They maintain that the decision in the Civil Case does not bind them for they [were] not parties thereto, hence, the same [was] null and void. They therefore filed this case seeking the declaration of nullity of the T.C.T in the name of the Leysons and of the judicial proceedings in the other Civil Case. Leyson, et al. evidence, on the other hand, show that the land in dispute, is titled in their names under a T.C.T. which was derived from the O.C.T. Appearing in the said title is the name of their father Jose S. Leyson who acquired the land through purchase from Rosario Miranda. They were in possession of the property until 1963 when Agatona del Corro and her children took over the possession of the same. ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 3, Sec. 16 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD: NO. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only in a pending case is the counsel of a party required to inform the court in case the client dies or becomes incapacitated or incompetent. A pending case necessarily implies that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the party who died or became incapacitated or incompetent. Prior to this development, the trial court cannot impose such requirement on the counsel for the defendants; Section 16 of Rule 3 thus finds no application to this case. On the other hand, it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action. The OCT reveals that Mercedes del Rio was a registered coowner of the disputed lot, but she was not placed under the jurisdiction of the trial court in the Civil Case. Neither were her heirs. RATIO: Extra: The Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of trial court decisions. Hence, a regional trial court has no authority to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.

RULE 4, Sec. 1-3 SALUDO, JR., vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, 2006 FACTS: Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers, Vice-President and Country Manager, and the Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from AMEX unilateral act of suspending Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were cancelled by AMEX. Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. In their answer, AMEX specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue . On the latter, AMEX averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of nonforum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

ISSUE: WON the venue was improperly laid in the lower court because not one of the parties, including Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint as averred by AMEX. HELD: NO. Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads: SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court . The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and even handed determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. Following this rule, Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule. RATIO: In Koh v. Court of Appeals, the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. "It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them

of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons. The law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.

RULE 5SUMMARY RULE, Sec. 3,5,6 BAYVIEW HOTEL, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CLUB FILIPINO, INC. DE CEBU, 1997 FACTS:

ISSUE: WON Bayviews answer which embodied affirmative defenses is tantamount to a motion to dismiss and therefore prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure. HELD:

The case at bar involves a land lease. Bayview Hotel, Inc. entered into a contract of lease over a parcel of land located in Cebu City with its registered owner, Club Filipino, Inc. De Cebu. The lease agreement gave Bayview the right to construct and operate a hotel complex known as the Magellan International Hotel for a period of 30 years. It also stipulated that ownership of the building and other permanent improvements on the land built by petitioner will transfer to Club Filipino upon the expiration of the lease. Under the agreement, Bayview was given the option to renew the lease for 10 more years. Before the expiration of the lease contract on Bayview notified private Club Filipino of its intention to extend the lease contract for a longer period and at a rate of rent different from the terms as originally agreed upon. There was no meeting of the minds between the parties as Club Filipinos Board of Directors insisted on adhering to the provisions of the original lease contract. Club Filipino then sent to Bayview a notice to vacate the premises and to pay accrued rentals. Club Filipino claimed ownership of the building and the improvements pursuant to the provisions of the original contract. When Bayview failed to vacate the premises, Club Filipino filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Cebu a complaint for ejectment and recovery of accrued rentals. However, before Bayview could be served with a copy of the complaint and summons, the building was destroyed by a fire of undetermined origin. Bayview filed its answer to the complaint for ejectment interposing inter alia, the following affirmative defense: (e) Since the defendant has been effectively ejected from the premises by the fire, defendant cannot be said to have deprived plaintiff of its possession of the same, therefore, the complaint for ejectment should be dismissed and the case be considered as an ordinary claim for a sum of money. Bayview then moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which was denied by the trial judge on the ground that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the motion. NO. Under the law, parties are not prohibited from filing an answer with affirmative defenses in cases falling under summary procedure. However, the trial courts are enjoined from conducting a preliminary hearing on such affirmative defenses to prevent unnecessary delay in disposing the case on its merits. Thus, time and again, we have ruled that under summary procedure ". . . adjudication of cases can be done on the basis of affidavits or other evidence. The proceeding must be as summary as possible in order not to defeat the need to dispose ejectment cases in as fast a time as possible. The reason is because cases involving possession of properties usually pose a threat to the peace of society."

RULE 5, Sec. 3, 5, 6 SPS. JALIQUE, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ROGELIO JALIQUE, JR., vs. SPS. DANDAN, et.al., 2003 FACTS: The spouses Jalique, represented by their attorney-in-fact Rogelio S. Jalique, Jr., filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Dandan et.al., before the MeTC of Pasig City. The Jaliques alleged that they are the registered owners of a lot and its improvements situated at Palatiw, Pasig City and covered by a TCT. No. Sps. Dandan et.al., are the tenants or lessees of a portion of said property, having been in possession of the same for quite some time, pursuant to month-to-month verbal agreements. Sps. Jalique averred that the Sps. Dandan et.al., had arrogantly refused their offer to formalize their lease agreement. The Sps. Jalique had sought the intercession of the Lupong Tagapa-mayapa, but to no avail, thus giving them no choice but to terminate the lease agreement with Sps. Dandan et.al.,. The latter, however, remained in possession and refused to vacate despite demands made by Sps. Jalique. Sps. Dandan et.al., did not file an Answer to the complaint, but filed a Joint Counter Affidavit stating that: (a) Sps. Jalique were not the owners of the disputed property; (b) some of them were not residing or occupying any portion of said land; (c) Sps. Jalique should pay some of them for the improvements made on the realty in question; and (d) Sps. Jalique had no right to oust Sps. Dandan et.al., as they had been paying the rentals, albeit without the corresponding receipts from the Sps. Jalique. The Sps. Jalique filed a Motion for Judgment on the Complaint. The MeTC found that the respondents herein had failed to file their Answer and rendered judgment on the Complaint, pursuant to Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. In other words, the petitioners had preponderantly established their cause of action, while the respondents, given their failure to file an Answer, had failed to present any evidence to the contrary. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MeTC. The appellate court held that both the MeTC and the RTC erred in ignoring respondents Joint Counter Affidavit filed within the 10-day reglementary period to file an Answer under Section 5 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The appellate court pointed out that while the Joint Counter Affidavit was poorly crafted, nevertheless, it

should have been considered as petitioners Answer as it sets forth petitioners defenses and raises issues and counterclaims, which should be considered if justice is to be served. Otherwise put, both the MeTC and RTC erred in giving premium to matters of form. ISSUE: WON the Sps. Dandan et.als., Joint Counter Affidavit should be considered as the Answer contemplated under Sec. 5 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that the situation obtaining in this case calls for a liberal, not a technical and rigid, interpretation of the rules on Summary Procedure in the light of the presence rather than a total absence of a responsive pleading. Upon perusal of the respondents Joint Counter Affidavit shows that it disputed the material allegations of the Complaint and presented valid issues for the lower courts resolution, such as the ownership of the subject lot, the period of lease, right of reimbursement for improvements and the right to eject respondents. A perusal of the Joint Counter Affidavit will reveal that although the same is unsatisfactorily crafted, it sets forth the petitioners defenses. It also raises issues and counterclaims which require proper consideration if justice is to be served, i.e., petitioners claim on the improvements made upon the thing leased; if the requisites of Article 1678 of the New Civil Code are complied with, the lessees (herein petitioners) will have the right to reimbursement or if payment is refused by the lessor, the right of removal. Thus, the requirements of the Rules that the Answer shall set forth the defenses and the objections of the defendants including the compulsory counterclaim or cross-claim (Section 4, Rule 6; Sections 1 and 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) specifically denying the material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit (Section 10, Rule 8, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) were substantially complied with by the counter affidavit filed by the petitioners on time. This counter affidavit should have been considered as petitioners Answer without giving premium on matters of form thereby serving the interest of substantial justice. Thus, while a pleading may be deficient in craftsmanship and can be criticized with respect to incidental particulars, it must be deemed sufficient if it fairly apprises the adverse party of the claims or contentions therein stated and does not mislead him to his surprise or injury or when from the allegations therein, taken together, the matters required to be averred may be gathered.

RULE 5, Sec. 7-10 TUGOT vs. Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES, 2004 FACTS: This administrative case finds its roots in Rodrigo Q. Tugots Letter-Complaint charging Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City with gross ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, infidelity in the custody of public records/documents, and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in a Civil Case which was dismissed by Judge Coliflores. The plaintiffs appealed but the notice of appeal was not attached to the records of the case transmitted to the appellate court. They were informed that the notice of appeal together with the other documents were lost so they were advised to file another notice of appeal and to pay another filing fee. Plaintiffs filed a motion to transmit the entire records of the case to the Regional Trial Court but the same was not acted upon because the records were not complete. Thereafter, they received a request from the respondent Clerk of Court for a copy of the notice of appeal since the courts copy was misplaced. Complainant added that the respondent judge waited for about 900 days for the defendants to submit their pre[-]trial brief, and the preliminary conference was conducted in violation of the requirements of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Complainant contended that one of the defendants did not file an answer while the other answers were unsworn to and unverified and therefore should have been considered as mere scraps of paper. The position papers of the defendants were submitted beyond the period provided for by the rules but the respondent judge accepted the same. ISSUE: WON Judge Coliflores is guilty of negligence and ignorance of the law for conducting the preliminary conference in the Civil Case beyond the period mandated by the Rules of Court. HELD: YES. It said that such rules are elementary matters with which all dispensers of justice should be conversant. Judicial competence demands that judges should be proficient in both procedural and substantive aspects of the law.

In the present case, respondent judge failed to demonstrate the required competence in administering an ejectment case. It must be noted that unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases are covered by summary procedure because they involve the disturbance of the social order which must be restored as promptly as possible. Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. Judge Coliflores caused undue delay in dispensing the Civil CaseHe failed to observe the period within which to conduct the preliminary conference which, according to Section 8 of Rule 70, shall be held *n+ot later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. In the present case, the preliminary conference was conducted more than two years after the filing of the last answer. It is evident that respondent judge did not observe the period within which to conduct the preliminary conference. RATIO: The adoption of the Rule on Summary Procedure is part of the commitment of the judiciary to enforce the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases. It was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.] Any member of the judiciary who causes the delay sought to be prevented by the Rule is sanctionable. The present respondent has failed to abide by the provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure. He has thereby undermined the wisdom behind it and diminished respect for the rule of law.