History Asia

CRIBB &
KAHIN
HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES OF ASIA, OCEANIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST, NO. 51
SECOND EDITION
Praise for the first edition:

“This weighty volume . . . will be extremely useful for anyone needing quick
information about Indonesia’s past and present.”

Historical Dictionary
—Australian Journal of International Affairs

“A sophisticated reference tool that will aid the user, of whatever background, to
find immediate information about Indonesian history.”
—The Journal of Asian Studies

of INDONESIA
Indonesia is Asia’s third largest country in both population and area, a sprawling
tropical archipelago of 180 million people, representing hundreds of ethnic
groups, with a complex, turbulent history. One of Asia’s newly industrializing countries,
it is already a major economic powerhouse. In more than 800 clear and succinct
entries, Historical Dictionary of Indonesia covers people, places, and organizations,
as well as economics, culture, and politics from Indonesia’s ancient history until the
recent past. With a comprehensive bibliography, maps, chronology, list of abbre-
viations, and appendix of election results and major office-holders, this second
edition has been thoroughly updated and expanded to include the past fifteen years.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF

INDONESIA
Robert Cribb is senior fellow at the Australian National University in Canberra. His
research interests focus on Indonesia and include political violence, national identity,
and historical geography. He is the author of several books on Indonesia.

Audrey Kahin was managing editor of Southeast Asia publications at Cornell and
coeditor and editor of the journal Indonesia from 1978 to 1995. She has also written
extensively on Indonesia and Southeast Asia and visits the region frequently.

SECOND
For orders and information please contact the publisher EDITION
SCARECROW PRESS, INC.
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4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200
ISBN-13: 978-0-8108-4935-8
ROBERT CRIBB
Lanham, Maryland 20706 ISBN-10: 0-8108-4935-6
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AUDREY KAHIN
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 HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES
OF WAR, REVOLUTION, AND CIVIL UNREST
Edited by Jon Woronoff

Asia
1. Vietnam, by William J. Duiker. 1989. Out of print. See No. 27.
2. Bangladesh, 2nd ed., by Craig Baxter and Syedur Rahman. 1996. Out
of print. See No. 48.
3. Pakistan, by Shahid Javed Burki. 1991. Out of print. See No. 33.
4. Jordan, by Peter Gubser. 1991
5. Afghanistan, by Ludwig W. Adamec. 1991. Out of print. See No. 47.
6. Laos, by Martin Stuart-Fox and Mary Kooyman. 1992. Out of print.
See No. 35.
7. Singapore, by K. Mulliner and Lian The-Mulliner. 1991
8. Israel, by Bernard Reich. 1992
9. Indonesia, by Robert Cribb. 1992. Out of print. See No. 51.
10. Hong Kong and Macau, by Elfed Vaughan Roberts, Sum Ngai Ling,
and Peter Bradshaw. 1992
11. Korea, by Andrew C. Nahm. 1993
12. Taiwan, by John F. Copper. 1993. Out of print. See No. 34.
13. Malaysia, by Amarjit Kaur. 1993. Out of print. See No. 36.
14. Saudi Arabia, by J. E. Peterson. 1993. Out of print. See No. 45.
15. Myanmar, by Jan Becka. 1995
16. Iran, by John H. Lorentz. 1995
17. Yemen, by Robert D. Burrowes. 1995
18. Thailand, by May Kyi Win and Harold Smith. 1995
19. Mongolia, by Alan J. K. Sanders. 1996. Out of print. See No. 42.
20. India, by Surjit Mansingh. 1996
21. Gulf Arab States, by Malcolm C. Peck. 1996
22. Syria, by David Commins. 1996. Out of Print. See No. 50.
23. Palestine, by Nafez Y. Nazzal and Laila A. Nazzal. 1997
24. Philippines, by Artemio R. Guillermo and May Kyi Win. 1997

Oceania
1. Australia, by James C. Docherty. 1992. Out of print. See No. 32.
2. Polynesia, by Robert D. Craig. 1993. Out of print. See No. 39.
3. Guam and Micronesia, by William Wuerch and Dirk Ballendorf.
1994
4. Papua New Guinea, by Ann Turner. 1994. Out of print. See No. 37.
5. New Zealand, by Keith Jackson and Alan McRobie. 1996
New Combined Series
25. Brunei Darussalam, by D. S. Ranjit Singh and Jatswan S. Sidhu.
1997
26. Sri Lanka, by S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe and Vidyamali Samaras-
inghe. 1998
27. Vietnam, 2nd ed., by William J. Duiker. 1998
28. People’s Republic of China: 1949–1997, by Lawrence R. Sullivan,
with the assistance of Nancy Hearst. 1998
29. Afghanistan, 2nd ed., by Ludwig W. Adamec. 1997. Out of print. See
No. 47.
30. Lebanon, by As’ad AbuKhalil. 1998
31. Azerbaijan, by Tadeusz Swietochowski and Brian C. Collins. 1999
32. Australia, 2nd ed., by James C. Docherty. 1999
33. Pakistan, 2nd ed., by Shahid Javed Burki. 1999
34. Taiwan (Republic of China), 2nd ed., by John F. Copper. 2000
35. Laos, 2nd ed., by Martin Stuart-Fox. 2001
36. Malaysia, 2nd ed., by Amarjit Kaur. 2001
37. Papua New Guinea, 2nd ed., by Ann Turner. 2001
38. Tajikistan, by Kamoludin Abdullaev and Shahram Akbarzedeh. 2002
39. Polynesia, 2nd ed., by Robert D. Craig. 2002
40. North Korea, by Ilpyong J. Kim. 2003
41. Armenia, by Rouben Paul Adalian. 2002
42. Mongolia, 2nd ed., by Alan J. K. Sanders. 2003
43. Cambodia, by Justin Corfield and Laura Summers. 2003
44. Iraq, by Edmund A. Ghareeb with the assistance of Beth Dougherty.
2004
45. Saudi Arabia, 2nd ed., by J. E. Peterson. 2003
46. Nepal, by Nanda R. Shrestha and Keshav Bhattarai. 2003
47. Afghanistan, 3rd ed., by Ludwig W. Adamec. 2003
48. Bangladesh, 3rd ed., by Craig Baxter and Syedur Rahman. 2003
49. Kyrgyzstan, by Rafis Abazov. 2004
50. Syria, 2nd ed., by David Commins. 2004
51. Indonesia, 2nd ed., by Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin. 2004
 Historical Dictionary
of Indonesia
Second Edition

Robert Cribb
Audrey Kahin

Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the

Middle East, No. 51

The Scarecrow Press, Inc.

Lanham, Maryland • Toronto • Oxford
2004
SCARECROW PRESS, INC.
Published in the United States of America
by Scarecrow Press, Inc.
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200
Lanham, Maryland 20706
www.scarecrowpress.com

PO Box 317
Oxford
OX2 9RU, UK

Copyright © 2004 by Robert Cribb and Audrey Kahin

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored

in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission
of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cribb, R. B.
Historical dictionary of Indonesia / Robert Cribb, Audrey Kahin.— 2nd ed.
p. cm. — (Historical dictionaries of Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East ; 51)
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8108-4935-6 (alk. paper)
1. Indonesia—History—Dictionaries. I. Kahin, Audrey. II. Title. III. Series.
DS633 .C75 2004
959.8'003—dc22 2003025416

∞ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of

American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
 Contents

Editor’s Foreword vii

Preface ix
Acknowledgments xi
Reader’s Note xiii
Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii
Maps xxxi
Chronology xlv
Introduction lxiii
THE DICTIONARY 1
Appendix A. Governors-General of the Netherlands Indies 463
Appendix B. Netherlands Ministers of the Colonies 467
Appendix C. Rulers of the Early States 473
Appendix D. Cabinets of the Republic of Indonesia 477
Appendix E. Republic of Indonesia Officeholders 479
Appendix F. Parliamentary Strengths and Electoral
Performance of the Parties, 1945–1999 489
Bibliography 499
About the Authors 583

v
 Editor’s Foreword

When the first edition of this volume appeared just over a decade ago, it
would have seemed almost pointless to ask in which direction Indonesia
would turn. Everything seemed perfectly clear. It had a political regime that
was, if anything, too stable and an economy that was moving smartly ahead
toward a secure status as a newly industrialized country. But now, with the
damage caused by the Asian financial crisis and the uncertainty since the
fall of Suharto, there are many questions to answer: political, economic, so-
cial, and even religious. Will democracy take hold this time, or will insta-
bility reign (unless the army intervenes again)? Will industrialization con-
tinue and supplement weaker agricultural and mining sectors, and will the
states leave more room for private enterprise? Will the many peoples, re-
gions, and classes come together or splinter further? Will Islam cohabit
comfortably with other religions, or will the appeal (or fear) of an Islamic
state be too strong? This book cannot provide the answers, but it can cer-
tainly elucidate the questions and give some idea of where Indonesia is
headed at present. So it is of much greater interest for all those concerned
about Indonesia, the Indonesians first and foremost, followed by the rest of
Southeast Asia and the broader world as well.
This second edition of the Historical Dictionary of Indonesia has been
thoroughly updated and considerably expanded, partly to round out its
overall coverage, and very much also to include information about the
many things that have occurred meanwhile. It has a double advantage in ex-
amining Indonesia as a country but also looking closely at its numerous
components, without which nothing makes sense. Thus, while the chronol-
ogy and introduction help us see the overall thrust, some of the most useful
dictionary entries deal with the specific ethnic groups, islands, and regions,
giving their history prior to the creation of the state of Indonesia and even
prior to Dutch colonization. Others present the most notable leaders of all
periods and important aspects of politics, economics, and social, cultural,

vii
viii • EDITOR’S FOREWORD

and religious life. The bibliography, which is also expanded and updated,
has the additional advantage of relating specific works to specific entries,
so readers know where to seek further information. And the list of
acronyms and abbreviations is virtually indispensable.
This book is the result of a joint effort. It is based on an excellent and
much-admired first edition by Robert Cribb, who has written widely about
Indonesian history and politics; was professor of Southeast Asian history at
the University of Queensland in St. Lucia, Australia; and is now at Aus-
tralian National University. It has been updated and expanded, while main-
taining much of the original text, by Audrey Kahin, who was managing ed-
itor of Southeast Asia Publications at Cornell University and coeditor, and
then editor, of Indonesia. She has also written extensively on Indonesia, in-
cluding several books, and is presently a freelance editor and writer.
What they both obviously share is an intense interest in the country,
where they have traveled frequently and widely, and an ability to convey
this interest to others. That may explain why this book is, among other
things, written in a style that can be easily read by students while including
a wealth of information that is not readily available elsewhere, and cer-
tainly not in such an accessible form.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor
 Preface

The Historical Dictionary of Indonesia is intended primarily as a conve-

nient reference tool for those whose studies or professional activities de-
mand ready access to reliable information on Indonesia’s history to the
present. The current edition is an updating and revision of the dictionary
prepared by Dr. Robert Cribb and published in 1992. The major changes in
the revised version are in the coverage of the last 15 years of Indonesia’s
history, which have been the most turbulent experienced since the 1960s, or
indeed perhaps since the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949. In or-
der to devote the necessary space to the events of these years, I have felt it
necessary to cut some items from the first edition of the dictionary that, al-
though interesting and useful in themselves, are not of central importance
for those seeking to understand the nature of contemporary Indonesia. The
original dictionary contained an immense amount of valuable information
on the history of Indonesia under the Netherlands East Indies Company
(VOC) and the Dutch colonial government, and although it has been nec-
essary to shorten some of these entries in order to keep the volume to a rea-
sonable length, they provide such a useful treasure of information (particu-
larly for English-speaking readers with little access to Dutch sources) that
most of them have been retained.
The emphasis in the present edition is, however, on the late Suharto pe-
riod and on the military, economic, and political forces that helped maintain
its power but ultimately led to its downfall. It also covers the transfer of
power to a new administration, the disorder and violence that has followed
this change, and the often unsuccessful efforts by reformers to push for a
new, more democratic state and society. In view of the fact that one of the
major problems facing the governments of post-Suharto Indonesia is how to
dismantle the centralized administrative structure that has characterized In-
donesia since independence without this leading to disintegration, there is

ix
x • PREFACE

also a greater focus in the dictionary on the Indonesian regions outside Java.
Although East Timor gained its independence in 1999, there are still several
extensive entries dealing with that territory and its relations with Indonesia,
for the Suharto regime’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the struggle
leading to its ultimate liberation have had a profound effect on the recent
history of the Republic of Indonesia.
 Acknowledgments

In revising and updating this Dictionary, I have been indebted especially to

Dr. Robert Cribb, who compiled the original dictionary and provided me
with many of his notes and ideas for a revised version. I am also grateful to
him for drawing the maps that appear here. Anyone wishing to follow the
text more closely through its geographic context is advised to consult his
Historical Atlas of Indonesia (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2000), which has be-
come an indispensable reference for scholars working on Indonesian history.
I am grateful to Scott McCasland-Bodenstein for his computer assis-
tance, to Margaret McCasland for helping me with the technical side of
preparing the bibliography, to Kaja McGowen who provided useful advice,
and to friends and family who have had to accept the fact that so much of
my time over the past couple of years has been occupied in bringing this
work to completion.
My thanks also go to Jon Woronoff, who has made useful suggestions
and has been patient as I missed several deadlines, and the staff at Scare-
crow Press, especially Kim Tabor and Andrew Yoder.

Audrey Kahin

xi
 Reader’s Note

Several changes have been made in the order of the components in the re-
vised Historical Dictionary of Indonesia to bring it into line with other vol-
umes in this series. The following is a brief guide to the main sections com-
prising the dictionary.
After this reader’s note, there is a list of acronyms and abbreviations.
This list is by no means exhaustive, as Indonesians seem to have an ongo-
ing inclination to update and introduce acronyms into their language at a
spectacular pace. It has also been necessary to retain many of the acronyms
that were of importance in earlier decades of Indonesia’s history but are no
longer in use. As in the first edition of the dictionary, I have followed the
rule that where the acronymic origin of a word has become obscure (e.g.,
Gestapu, Masjumi, Fretilin, Golkar, and PRRI/Permesta), the entry appears
under the acronym with a cross-reference from the full name. In the list of
acronyms, as in the dictionary as a whole, cross-references to other dic-
tionary entries are usually indicated by the use of bold type. I have at-
tempted to maintain a consistent use of terminology both in the acronym
and its translation. In using the dictionary, readers not familiar with an or-
ganization’s full title or its English meaning will find these in this list.
In the chronology that follows the maps, as in most of the rest of the dic-
tionary, the emphasis is on the more recent period rather than on the early
history of the archipelago. The same chronological divisions are used here
as in the historical section of the bibliography, so that it should be easy to
refer to the literature relating to the different periods. As is the practice
throughout the volume, bold type has been used to indicate a cross-refer-
ence to the relevant dictionary entries.
The introduction has been expanded to provide a more detailed back-
ground of Indonesia’s history, especially in the postindependence period,
and give a broader context for the entries that follow.

xiii
xiv • READER’S NOTE

As mentioned in the preface, the greatest change in the dictionary is in

its coverage of events of the past 15 years. The entries dealing with politi-
cal and economic events of the Suharto era have also been expanded, and
some of the coverage of colonial history and the Sukarno era condensed.
There is more biographical data on people who have played an important
role in these recent periods, especially in the political and economic fields.
There is probably still inadequate coverage of the arts in Indonesia, and I
hope the bibliographical entries in the section on Indonesian culture will
lead readers to explore the field more deeply for themselves.
Again, as throughout the volume, cross-references are indicated by bold
type. I have also continued Dr. Cribb’s practice of numbering the items in
the bibliography and noting the number of the relevant bibliographic item
within square brackets at the end of most of the dictionary entries. These
references are not exhaustive, but they provide an easy way for the reader
to find works on which the entry is based and suggestions for further read-
ing on the topic.
The bibliography has been expanded to include a selection of the volu-
minous literature that has appeared on Indonesia over the past 12 years, and
it has been necessary to remove some of the earlier, more ephemeral works
in order to make room for them. A more extensive introduction to the bib-
liography appears immediately preceding it.
As Dr. Cribb noted in his preface to the original dictionary, all works on
Indonesian history require an explanation for the spelling. General entries
in the dictionary use modern Indonesian spelling (ejaan yang disempu-
rakan [EYD], or perfected spelling; see INDONESIAN LANGUAGE).
Until 1973, Indonesian words followed Dutch spelling conventions, most
notable of which were the use of tj for the English sound ch, j for y, oe for
u, dj for j, and sj for sh, although in the early independence period, some of
these conventions had already changed, especially a more common use of
u instead of oe. The Indonesian spelling reform of 1973, which attempted
to harmonize usage in Malay and Indonesian, generally brought these
spellings closer to English-language usage. The major changes were for j
now to be rendered as y, tj as c, dj as j, nj as ny, and ch as kh. The greatest
confusion with these changes in spelling comes with the rendering of per-
sonal names and names of organizations. I have generally followed the con-
vention of retaining the original spelling of names of people or organiza-
tions that ceased to exist before the introduction of the spelling changes,
while in all other personal names the spelling generally used is either that
preferred by, or most commonly employed in referring to, the person. (See
also entry on NAMES.)
 READER’S NOTE • xv

Contemporary Indonesian terminology and spelling are used for place

names: thus Kalimantan and Sulawesi, not Borneo and Celebes, although
the common English spelling of Sumatra and Java is used instead of the In-
donesian Sumatera and Jawa. The recently introduced Papua has been used
for Indonesian Western New Guinea, previously known as Irian Jaya (and
before that, Irian Barat), as this is now its official name and the name most
Papuans prefer, although it is still unclear whether it will be retained in of-
ficial Indonesian usage.
 Acronyms and Abbreviations

Note: The headings under which the terms appear in the dictionary are set
in bold type.

ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed

Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
AD Angkatan Darat, Army.
AH Anno hijrae, Muslim year. See CALENDARS.
AJ Anno Javanicae, Javanese year. See CALENDARS.
ALRI Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia, Navy of the Re-
public of Indonesia.
AMS Algemene Middelbare School, General Secondary
School. See EDUCATION.
ANETA Algemene Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap, General
News and Telegraph Agency. See NEWS AGEN-
CIES.
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
APODETI Associação Populár Democrática Timorense, Timo-
rese Popular Democratic Association.
APRIS Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat, Armed
Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia. See
ARMY.
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
ASPRI Asisten Presiden Republik Indonesia, assistants to the
president of the Republic of Indonesia. See
MALARI.
AURI Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, Air Force of the
Republic of Indonesia.
BABINSA Bintara Pembina Desa, NCOs for Village Develop-
ment. See DWIFUNGSI.

xvii
xviii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BAIS Badan Intelijen Strategis, Strategic Intelligence Body.

See INTELLIGENCE.
BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, State Intelli-
gence Coordinating Agency.
BAKORSTANAS Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas
Nasional, Coordinating Body to Assist in Maintain-
ing National Security.
BAPERKI Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarga Negaraan In-
donesia, Consultative Body of Indonesian Citizenship.
BAPINDO Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, Indonesian Develop-
ment Bank.
BAPPEDA Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, Regional
Development Planning Board.
BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, Na-
tional Development Planning Board.
BB Binnenlandsch Bestuur, literally, administration of
the interior, the European bureaucracy of the
Netherlands Indies.
Berdikari Berdiri atas kaki sendiri, to stand on one’s own feet.
See ETYMOLOGY.
BFO Bijeenkomst voor Federale Overleg, Federal Consulta-
tive Meeting. See FEDERALISM.
BIA Badan Intelijen ABRI, Armed Forces Intelligence
Agency. See INTELLIGENCE.
BIMAS Bimbingan Massal, mass guidance. See GREEN REV-
OLUTION.
BKKBN Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional, Na-
tional Family Planning Coordinating Body. See
FAMILY PLANNING.
BKR Badan Keamanan Rakyat, People’s Security Organiza-
tion. See ARMY.
BKS Badan Kerja Sama, Cooperative Bodies.
BNI Bank Negara Indonesia, Indonesian National Bank.
See BANKING.
BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, State Audit Board. See
CONSTITUTIONS.
BPM Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij, Batave Petroleum
Company. See “KONINKLIJKE”; OIL.
BPS Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme, Body to Support
Sukarnoism.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xix

BPS Biro Pusat Statistik, Central Statistical Bureau; also

Badan Pusat Statistiek, Central Statistical Body. See
STATISTICS.
BPUPKI Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan
Indonesia, Investigatory Body for Preparatory
Work for Indonesian Independence.
BTC Banking and Trading Corporation. See STATE EN-
TERPRISES.
BTI Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants’ Front.
Bulog Badan Urusan Logistik Nasional, National Logisti-
cal Supply Organization.
CCP Chinese Communist Party. See CHINA, RELATIONS
WITH.
CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia.
CIDES Center for Information and Development Studies. See
IKATAN CENDEKIAWAN MUSLIM INDONESIA.
CONEFO Conference of the New Emerging Forces. See
NEKOLIM.
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Indonesian Is-
lamic Preaching Council. See ISLAM IN INDONE-
SIA.
DEKON Deklarasi Ekonomi, Economic Declaration. See
GUIDED ECONOMY.
DEPLU Departemen Luar Negeri, Department of Foreign Af-
fairs. See FOREIGN POLICY.
DGI Dewan Gereja Indonesia, Indonesian Council of
Churches. See PROTESTANTISM.
DI Darul Islam, House of Islam.
DIY Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Special Territory of Yo-
gyakarta. See YOGYAKARTA.
DKI Daerah Khusus Ibukota, Special Capital Territory. See
JAKARTA.
DPA Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, Supreme Advisory
Council.
DPN Dewan Pertahanan Negara, State Defense Council.
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative
Council.
DPR-D Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, People’s Represen-
tative Council local assemblies.
xx • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DPR-GR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, mutual

self-help.
DPR-S Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Sementara, provisional.
DRET Democratic Republic of East Timor.
Drs Doctorandus. See TITLES.
Dt Datuk. See TITLES.
DVG Dienst voor Volksgezondheid, Public Health Service.
See HEALTH.
EB Europees Bestuur, European administration. See BIN-
NENLANDSCH BESTUUR.
EC European Community.
ELS Europese Lagere School, European Lower School. See
EDUCATION.
EYD Ejaan yang disempurnakan, perfected spelling. See
INDONESIAN LANGUAGE.
FALINTIL Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor,
Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor.
See FRETILIN.
FBSI Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Fed-
eration of Labor. See LABOR UNIONS.
FDI Foreign direct investment. See INVESTMENT, FOR-
EIGN.
FDR Front Demokrasi Rakyat, People’s Democratic Front.
FRETILIN Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente,
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.
FSPSI Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, Federation
of All-Indonesia Workers’ Associations. See LA-
BOR UNIONS.
FUII Front Umat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Com-
munity Front.
G/30/S Gerakan Tiga Puluh September, 30 September Move-
ment. See GESTAPU.
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Independent Aceh Movement.
See ACEH.
GANEFO Games of the New Emerging Forces. See NEKOLIM.
GAPI Gabungan Politik Indonesia, Indonesian Political
Federation.
GBHN Garis Besar Haluan Negara, Broad Outlines of State
Policy. See MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN
RAKYAT.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xxi

GDP Gross domestic product.

GERINDO Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia, Indonesian People’s
Movement.
GERWANI Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women’s
Movement.
GESTAPU Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, September 30 Move-
ment.
GHS Geneeskundige Hogeschool, Medical School. See ED-
UCATION.
GKI Gereja Kristen Injil di Tanah Papua, Papuan Church of
the Christian Gospel. See PAPUA.
GOLKAR Golongan Karya, Functional Groups.
HAM Hak Azasi Manusia, human rights.
HANKAM Pertahanan dan Keamanan, (Department of) Defense
and Security. See ARMED FORCES.
HANSIP Pertahanan Sipil, Civil Defense. See ARMED
FORCES.
HBS Hogere Burger School, Higher Civil School. See ED-
UCATION.
HCS Hollands-Chinese School, Dutch Chinese School. See
EDUCATION.
HIR Herziene Inlands Reglement, Revised Native Regula-
tions. See LAW.
HIS Hollands-Inlandse School, Dutch Native School. See
EDUCATION.
HKTI Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, Association of
Indonesian Peasant Leagues. See LABOR UNIONS.
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Muslim Students’ As-
sociation.
HNSI Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia, All Indonesia
Fishermen’s Association. See LABOR UNIONS.
HVK Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon, high represen-
tative of the Crown. See GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Religious
Institute. See EDUCATION, ISLAMIC.
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency. See BANKING.
ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, All Indone-
sia League of Muslim Intellectuals.
IEV Indo-Europees Verbond, Indo-European Union. See
INDO-EUROPEANS.
xxii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

IGGI Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia.

IMET International Military Education and Training Pro-
gram. See UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH.
IMF International Monetary Fund.
INDRA Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency. See DEBT,
FOREIGN.
INPRES Instruksi Presiden, presidential instruction.
IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia,
League of the Supporters of Indonesian Indepen-
dence.
Ir Ingenieur. See TITLES.
ISDV Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, Indies
Social Democratic Association.
JABOTABEK Jakarta-Bogor-Tanggerang-Bekasi. See JAKARTA.
JI Jemaah Islamiah, Islamic community. See ISLAM IN
INDONESIA, ISLAMIC STATE.
KABIR Kapitalis birokrat, bureaucratic capitalist. See CLASS
ANALYSIS.
KADIN Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Chamber of Commerce
and Industry.
KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian
Students’ Action Front.
KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, National
Front of Indonesian Muslim Students.
KAPPI Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia, Indone-
sian Youth and School Students Action Front. See
KESATUAN AKSI MAHASISWA INDONESIA.
KASAD Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat, army chief of staff. See
ARMY.
KASI Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia, Indonesian Gradu-
ates’ Action Front.
KKN Kolusi, Korupsi, dan Nepotisme, corruption, collu-
sion, and nepotism.
KNI Komite Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National
Committee.
KNIL Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger, Royal
Netherlands Indies Army.
KNILM Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Luchtvaartmaatschap-
pij, Royal Netherlands Indies Air Company. See AIR
SERVICES.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xxiii

KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indone-

sian National Committee.
KNPI Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Na-
tional Youth Committee.
KODAM Komando Daerah Militer, Regional Military Com-
mand. See DEFENSE POLICY; DWIFUNGSI.
KOGA Komando Siaga, Readiness Command. See KO-
MANDO OPERASI TERTINGGI.
KOGAM Komando Ganyang Malaysia, Crush Malaysia Com-
mand. See KOMANDO OPERASI TERTINGGI.
KOKAR Korps Karyawan, Employees’ Corps. See KORPS PE-
GAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA.
KOMNAS HAM Komisi Nasional Hak Azasi Manusia. National Com-
mittee for Human Rights.
KOPASSANDHA Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, Secret Warfare Com-
mando Unit. See KOMANDO PASUKAN
KHUSUS.
KOPASSUS Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Commando
Unit.
KOPKAMTIB Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan
Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restora-
tion of Security and Order.
KORPRI Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Government
Officials Corps of the Republic of Indonesia.
KOSGORO Koperasi Serba Guna Gotong Royong, Multipurpose
Cooperative for Gotong Royong.
KOSTRAD Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army
Strategic Reserve.
KOTI Komando Operasi Tertinggi, Supreme Operational
Command.
KOTOE Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi, Supreme Oper-
ational Command for the Economy. See DWI-
FUNGSI.
KOWILHAN Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Regional Defense
Commands. See DEFENSE POLICY.
KPM Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, Royal Packet
Service Company.
KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Elections Commit-
tee. See ELECTIONS.
KRISMON Monetary crisis. See FINANCIAL CRISIS.
xxiv • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

KUHAP Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana, proce-

dural code for criminal law. See LAW.
KUHP Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, criminal code.
See LAW.
LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Legal Aid Bureau. See LE-
GAL AID SERVICES.
LEKRA Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Institute for People’s
Culture.
LEMHANNAS Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, National Defense Insti-
tute. See DEFENSE POLICY.
LIPI Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Indonesian
Academy of Sciences.
LKBN Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional, National News
Agency Institute. See ANTARA.
LKBN Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional, National Fam-
ily Planning Institute. See FAMILY PLANNING.
LKMD Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, Institute for
Village Community Resilience. See DESA.
LMD Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, Village Consultative
Council. See DESA.
LNG Liquefied natural gas. See GAS.
MAHMILLUB Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa, Extraordinary Mili-
tary Tribunal.
MALARI Malapetaka 15 Januari, Disaster of 15 January.
MANIKEBU Manifes Kebudayaan, Cultural Manifesto.
MANIPOL Manifesto Politik, Political Manifesto.
MAPHILINDO Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia.
MASJUMI Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative
Council of Indonesian Muslims.
MIAI Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia, Supreme Islamic
Council of Indonesia.
MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Council of Indonesian
Defenders of the Faith. See ISLAMIC STATE.
MONAS Monumen Nasional, National Monument. See
JAKARTA.
MPR (S) Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (Sementara),
(Provisional) People’s Deliberative Assembly.
Mr Meester in de Rechten. See TITLES.
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Is-
lamic Scholars. See ISLAM IN INDONESIA.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xxv

MULO Meer Uitgebreide Lagere Onderwijs, Broader Lower

Education. See EDUCATION.
NASAKOM Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme; nationalism, reli-
gion, communism.
NEFIS Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service. See POLI-
TIEK INLICHTINGEN DIENST.
NEFO New Emerging Forces. See NEKOLIM.
NEKOLIM Neo-Kolonialis dan Imperialis, neocolonialists and im-
perialists.
NGO Nongovernmental organization.
NHM Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij, Netherlands
Trading Company.
NIAS Nederlands-Indische Artsenschool, Netherlands Indies
Doctors’ School. See HEALTH.
NICA Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
NII Negara Islam Indonesia. See DARUL ISLAM.
NIROM Nederlandsch-Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij,
Netherlands Indies Radio Broadcasting Company.
See RADIO.
NIT Negara Indonesia Timur, State of East Indonesia.
NTB Nusatenggara Barat, Western Lesser Sundas.
NTT Nusatenggara Timur, Eastern Lesser Sundas.
NU Nahdlatul Ulama, Revival of the Religious Scholars.
OLDEFO Old Established Forces. See NEKOLIM.
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. See
OIL.
OPM Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Free Papua Movement.
OPSUS Operasi Khusus, Special Operations.
ORBA Orde Baru, New Order.
ORI Oeang (i.e., Uang) Republik Indonesia, currency of
the Indonesian Republic.
ORMAS Organisasi Massa, mass organizations.
OSVIA Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren,
Training School for Native Officials. See EDUCA-
TION.
PAI Persatuan Arab Indonesia, Indonesian Arab Union. See
ARABS.
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party.
PANGAB Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata, commander in chief of
the armed forces. See ARMED FORCES.
xxvi • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

PANGESTU Paguyuban Ngèsti Tunggal, Association for Striving

towards Harmony with God.
PARAS Partai Rakyat Sosialis, Socialist People’s Party. See
PARTAI SOSIALIS.
PARI Partai Republik Indonesia, Party of the Indonesian Re-
public. See TAN MALAKA.
PARINDRA Partai Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia Party.
PARKINDO Partai Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Party.
PARMUSI Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslims’
Party.
PARSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party.
See PARTAI SOSIALIS.
PARTINDO Partai Indonesia, Indonesia Party.
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Moon and Stars Party).
PBI Partai Buruh Indonesia, Indonesian Labor Party.
PBI Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia, Association of the In-
donesian People.
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic
Party.
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan, Indone-
sian Democratic Party of Struggle.
PDRI Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, Emer-
gency Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
PELNI Perusahaan Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian
National Shipping Company. See SHIPPING.
PEMILU Pemilihan Umum, general elections. See ELECTIONS.
PEPUSKA Pemilikan Pusat Kapal-Kapal, Central Shipowning
Authority. See SHIPPING.
PERMESTA Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal Struggle
Charter. See PRRI/PERMESTA REBELLION.
PERSIS Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union.
PERTAMINA Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Nasional, National Oil
and Gas Mining Corporation.
PERTI Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Education
Association.
PESINDO Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist
Youth.
PETA Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Homeland.
PETRUS Pembunuhan/ Penembakan Misterius, mysterious
killings/shootings.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xxvii

PI Perhimpunan Indonesia, Indonesian Association.

PID Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst, Political Intelligence
Service.
PIR Persatuan Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesian Asso-
ciation.
PK Partai Keadilan, Justice Party.
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Rise of the People
Party.
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist
Party.
PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, Family Welfare
Development. See DESA.
PKN Pakempalan Kawula Ngayogyakarta, Yogyakarta
People’s Party.
PKP Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, Justice and Unity Party.
See PARTIES, POLITICAL.
PKRI Persatuan Katolik Republik Indonesia, Catholic
Union of the Republic of Indonesia. See PARTAI
KATOLIK.
PN Perusahaan Nasional, state enterprise.
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National
Party.
PNI-Baru New PNI. See PENDIDIKAN NASIONAL IN-
DONESIA.
PP Persatuan Perjuangan, Struggle Union.
PPBI Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia, Indonesian Work-
ers’ Struggle Center. See LABOR UNIONS.
PPKI Panitya Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, Committee
for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. See
BADAN PENYELIDIK USAHA PERSIAPAN KE-
MERDEKAAN INDONESIA.
PPKI Persatuan Politik Katolik Indonesia, Indonesian
Catholic Political Union. See PARTAI KATOLIK.
PPKJ Pakempalan Politik Katolik Jawi, Political Association
of Javanese Catholics. See PARTAI KATOLIK.
PPMI Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia, Indonesian
Muslim Workers’ Brotherhood. See LABOR
UNIONS.
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Unity Develop-
ment Party.
xxviii • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

PPPKI Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan

Indonesia, Confederation of Indonesian Political
Organizations.
PRC People’s Republic of China. See CHINA, RELA-
TIONS WITH.
PRD Partai Rakyat Demokrasi, Democratic People’s
Party.
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolu-
tionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia.
See PRRI/PERMESTA REBELLION.
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party.
PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic
Association Party.
PT Perusahaan Terbatas, limited liability company.
PUSA Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, All-Aceh Ulama Asso-
ciation. See ACEH.
PUSKESMAS Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat, Center for Society’s
Health (see HEALTH).
PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, Center of the People’s Power.
PWI Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, Indonesian Reporters’
Association. See NEWSPAPERS.
R. Raden. See TITLES.
R.A. Raden Ajeng. See TITLES.
REPELITA Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Five-Year De-
velopment Plan.
RHS Rechtshogeschool, law school. See EDUCATION.
RIS Republik Indonesia Serikat, Republic of the United
States of Indonesia.
RMS Republik Maluku Selatan, Republic of the South
Moluccas.
RPKAD Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, Army
Paracommando Regiment.
RR Regeringsreglement, Government Regulating Act. See
CONSTITUTIONS.
RRI Radio Republik Indonesia, Radio of the Republic of
Indonesia. See RADIO.
RUSI Republic of the United States of Indonesia. See RE-
PUBLIK INDONESIA SERIKAT.
SARA Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan; ethnicity, religion,
race, intergroup relations.
 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • xxix

SARBUPRI Serikat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia, Union

of Plantation Workers of the Republic of Indonesia.
See SENTRAL ORGANISASI BURUH REPUB-
LIK INDONESIA.
Satgas Papua Satuan Tugas Papua, Papua Task Force. See PAPUA.
SBG Serikat Buruh Gula, Sugar Workers’ Union. See SEN-
TRAL ORGANISASI BURUH REPUBLIK IN-
DONESIA.
SBSI Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, Indonesian Pros-
perous Workers’ Union. See LABOR UNIONS.
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
SESKOAD Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Army
Staff and Command School. See ARMY.
SH Sarjana Hukum. See TITLES.
SI Sarekat Islam, Islamic Association.
SIT Surat Ijin Terbit, publication license. See CENSORSHIP.
SIUPP Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, permit to operate a
press company. See CENSORSHIP.
SMP Satgas Merah Putih, Red and White Task Force. See
PAPUA.
SOBSI Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-
Indonesia Federation of Labor Organizations.
SOKSI Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia, All-
Indonesia Federation of Employee Organizations.
SPSI Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, All Indonesia
Workers’ Union. See LABOR UNIONS.
St. Sutan. See TITLES.
STICUSA Stichting voor Culturele Samenwerking, Institute for
Cultural Cooperation. See LEMBAGA KEBU-
DAYAAN RAKYAT.
STOVIA School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen, School for
the Training of Native Physicians. See EDUCA-
TION; HEALTH.
SUPERSEMAR Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Executive Order of 11
March.
TABANAS Tabungan Pembangunan Nasional, National Develop-
ment Savings Scheme. See BANKING.
TAPOL Tahanan politik, political prisoners.
THS Technische Hogeschool, Institute of Technology. See
EDUCATION.
xxx • ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

TKR Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, People’s Security Army.

See ARMY.
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National
Army. See ARMED FORCES; ARMY.
TPN Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, National Liberation
Army. See PAPUA.
TRI Tentara Republic Indonesia, Army of the Republic of
Indonesia. See ARMY.
TRIKORA Tri Komando Rakyat, People’s Triple Command. See
PAPUA.
TRIP Tentara Republik Indonesia Pelajar, Student Army of
the Indonesian Republic.
TRITURA Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Three Demands of the People.
See KOMANDO AKSI MAHASISWA INDONE-
SIA; MALARI.
TVRI Televisi Republik Indonesia, Television of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia. See TELEVISION.
UDT União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Demo-
cratic Union.
USDEK Undang-undang ’45, 1945 Constitution; Sosialisme a
la Indonesia, Indonesian socialism; Demokrasi Ter-
pimpin, guided democracy; Ekonomi Terpimpin,
guided economy; and Kepribadian Indonesia, In-
donesian identity. See MANIFESTO POLITIK.
UUD Undang-Undang Dasar, Constitution. See CONSTI-
TUTIONS.
VFR Voorlopige Federale Regeering, Provisional Federal
Government. See SUCCESSION.
VOC Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, United East In-
dies Company. See DUTCH EAST INDIES COM-
PANY.
VSTP Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramweg Personeel, Union of
Rail and Tramway Personnel. See LABOR UNIONS.
ZOPFAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality. See ASSOCI-
ATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS.
Maps
Map 1: The Indonesian archipelago: main geographical features
Map 2: The Indonesian archipelago: traditional distribution of ethnic groups
Map 3: Java in the 16th and 17th centuries: the expansion of Mataram
Map 4: Indonesia in the 17th century: major states
Map 5: Dutch territorial expansion in Sumatra, 1817–1907
Map 6: Netherlands East Indies: administrative divisions in 1940
Map 7: Federal Indonesia, 1948–1949
Map 8: Indonesia: provinces and military regions, 1958–1959
Map 9: Indonesian provinces and their capitals, 1976–1999
Map 10: Golkar in the 1992 elections
Map 11: Indonesia: Oil and gas fields in production, 1994
Map 12: Indonesian provinces, 2003 (with new provincial capitals)
 Chronology

Early History (to c. 1400)

1.9 million years ago Hominids Pithecanthropus and Meganthropus

lived in Java (see PREHISTORY).
40,000 years ago Wajak Man (Homo sapiens) lived in Java.
15,000–8,000 years ago Sea levels rise, separating Java, Sumatra, and
Kalimantan from the Asian mainland and New Guinea from Australia.
c. 3000 B.C. Austronesian peoples begin moving into Indonesia from the
Philippines (see MIGRATIONS).
c. 1000 B.C. Kerbau introduced to Indonesia.
c. 400 A.D. Hindu kingdoms of Tarumanegara and Kutai emerge in
West Java and East Kalimantan.
c. 675 Rise of Srivijaya in Sumatra.
c. 732 Emergence of Mataram under Sanjaya.
c. 760 Construction of Sivaitic temples at Dieng.
c. 824 Construction of Borobudur begins.
c. 840 Construction of Prambanan begins.
860–c. 1000 Golden age of Srivijaya.
Before 929 Political center of Java moves to East Java.
914–1080 First known Hindu kingdom on Bali.
1006 Srivijaya attacks Java.

xlv
xlvi • CHRONOLOGY

1019–c. 1045 Airlangga rules Java.

1023–1068 Chola raids on Sumatra.
c. 1045 According to legend, Airlangga divides his kingdom into Kediri
and Janggala.
1222 Ken Angrok founds Singasari.
1292 Civil war in Singasari; Jayakatwang kills Kertanegara; Mongol in-
vasion of Java.
1293 Wijaya founds kingdom of Majapahit and rules (1293–1309) as
Kertarajasa.
c. 1297 Sultan Malek Saleh of Pasai, first known Muslim ruler in the ar-
chipelago.
c. 1330–1350 Adityavarman rules in Minangkabau.
1331–1364 Gajah Mada is prime minister of Majapahit.
1387 Founding of Banjarmasin.

Islamic States and the Expansion

of the VOC: 1400–1800

1402 Kingdom of Melaka founded.

1406, 1408, 1410, 1414, 1418 Expeditions by Zheng He (Cheng Ho) to
Southeast Asia.
c. 1478 Demak becomes first Muslim state on Java.
1511 Portuguese seize Melaka.
1522 Portuguese build fort in Ternate.
1527 Sultanate of Demak defeats Majapahit.
1552–1570 Banten rises as independent state under Sultan Hasanuddin.
1570 Revolt against the Portuguese in Ternate.
1575–1601 Senopati rules Mataram.
1596 First Dutch ships under de Houtman arrive in Banten.
 CHRONOLOGY • xlvii

1605 Dutch seize Ambon.

1607–1645 Rise of Aceh under Sultan Iskandar Muda.
1613–1645 Sultan Agung rules Mataram.
1619 Dutch establish base in Jayakarta (later Batavia).
1621 Dutch seize control of Banda islands.
1623 “Amboyna Massacre.” Mataram subjugates Gresik and Surabaya.
1629 Sultan Agung unsuccessfully attacks Batavia.
1641 Dutch capture Melaka from Portuguese.
1641–1675 Aceh ruled by Queen Taj al-Alam.
1663 Treaty of Painan establishes Dutch influence in Minangkabau.
1667 Makassar falls to Dutch and Bugis forces; Treaty of Bungaya;
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) wins control of north coast of Java.
1671–1679 Revolt of Trunojoyo on Java.
1704–1708 First Javanese War of Succession.
1719–1723 Second Javanese War of Succession.
1723 Forced delivery of coffee to Dutch by regents of Priangan begins.
1740 Revolt of the Chinese in Batavia.
1746–1755 Third Javanese War of Succession.
1755 Treaty of Giyanti.
1778 Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen
founded.
1790–1820 Gold rush in West Kalimantan (see KONGSI WARS).
1795 Batavian Republic founded; first census conducted on Java.
1799 VOC bankrupt.

Colonial Rule and the Nationalist Movement: 1800–1942

1800 1 January: VOC Charter allowed to lapse; company properties

taken over by the Dutch state.
xlviii • CHRONOLOGY

1803–1837 Paderi Wars in Central Sumatra.

1808–1811 Herman Willem Daendels governs the Dutch Indies.
1811 August–September: British conquest of Java.
1811–1816 Thomas Stamford Raffles is lieutenant-governor of Java.
1812 British seize Bangka and Belitung from Palembang.
1813 First land rent introduced; Sultanate of Banten abolished.
1815 Eruption of Tambora.
1816 Dutch restored to their Indonesian possessions.
1817 Botanical gardens at Bogor founded; revolt by Pattimura in Ambon.
1821 Cholera reaches Indonesia.
1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty; founding of Nederlandsche Handel
Maatschappij.
1825–1830 Java War.
1828 Dutch settlement at Lobo in Papua.
1830 Cultivation system introduced.
1846 Commercial coal mining begins in South Kalimantan.
1854 Revised Regeeringsreglement (Constitution) of the Netherlands
Indies promulgated.
1859–1863 War of Succession in Banjarmasin.
1863 Tobacco cultivation begins in East Sumatra.
1864 First railway established.
1870 Agrarian Law; start of Liberal Policy.
1871 Undersea telegraph cable laid between Java and Australia.
1873–1904 Aceh War.
1877 End of batig slot (budgetary surplus) transfers to Dutch treasury.
1878 Coffee plantations devastated by disease.
1880 Coolie Ordinance introduced.
 CHRONOLOGY • xlix

1883 Eruption of Krakatau.

1886 First oil discovery at Pangkalan Brandan.
1888 Anticolonial uprising in Banten.
1891 Tooth of Java Man discovered in East Java.
1894 Dutch conquest of Lombok.
1901 Start of Ethical Policy.
1902 Transmigration begins.
1905 Dutch occupy Tapanuli, North Sumatra; decentralization measure
introduced in Dutch territories.
1905–1906 Dutch conquest of Bone.
1908 Budi Utomo founded; antitax rebellion in West Sumatra; Dutch
conquer southern Bali.
1910 Outbreak of bubonic plague on Java; Sarekat Islam and Indische
Partij founded.
1912 Muhammadiyah founded.
1914 Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereniging (Indies Social Dem-
ocratic Association) founded.
1916 Volksraad installed.
1917 Rebellion in Toraja land.
1918 Influenza pandemic.
1920 Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party)
founded.
1923 Communists expelled from Sarekat Islam.
1925 November: Algemene Studieclub founded.
1926 November: Communist uprising in Banten; internment camp es-
tablished at Boven Digul. 31 December: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival
of the Religious Scholars) founded.
1927 January: Communist uprising in West Sumatra. June: Tan Malaka
establishes Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI, Indonesian Republican
l • CHRONOLOGY

Party) in Bangkok. July: Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Na-

tionalist Party) founded.
1928 October: Youth Pledge.
1929 December: Sukarno jailed.
1931 April: PNI dissolves itself; Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI,
Indonesian National Education; also called PNI-Baru, New PNI) and Par-
tai Indonesia founded.
1933 February: Mutiny on the Zeven Provinciên. Mid: Dutch impose
assembly ban (vergader verbod) on several political parties. August:
Sukarno jailed and exiled.
1934 February: Hatta, Sjahrir, and other political leaders jailed and ex-
iled.
1935 December: Partai Indonesia Raya founded.
1936 July: Sutarjo Petition.
1937 May: Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia founded. Antara news agency
founded.
1941 July: Netherlands Indies stops exports of oil, tin, and rubber to
Japan.

War and Revolution: 1942–1949

1942 27–28 February: Battle of the Java Sea. 9 March: Dutch forces
on Java capitulate to Japan at Kalijati. 27 March: Dutch forces on Suma-
tra surrender unconditionally.
1943 June: Japanese order establishment of volunteer armies (Peta on
Java, Giyu gun on Sumatra).
1944 September: Japanese Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso issues decla-
ration promising Indonesian independence.
1945 March: Japanese set up Investigatory Body for Indonesian indepen-
dence. June: Sukarno formulates Pancasila. 15 August: Japan surrenders.
17 August: Indonesia declares independence. 18 August: Constitution prom-
ulgated and Republic of Indonesia established. 29 September: First Allied
landings in Jakarta. 5 October: Formation of Indonesian army. 10 October:
 CHRONOLOGY • li

Allied troops land in Medan and Padang. 1 November: Manifesto Politik

of the Indonesian Republic issued. 10 November: Battle of Surabaya. 14 No-
vember: First parliamentary cabinet formed under Sutan Sjahrir.
1946 January: Tan Malaka establishes Persatuan Perjuangan. March:
Tan Malaka and followers arrested. April: First formal negotiations begin
between Indonesians and Dutch. 15 November: Linggajati Agreement
initialed; British forces leave Indonesia. 24 December: Negara Indonesia
Timor founded.
1947 March: Komité Nasional Indonesia endorses Linggajati agree-
ment. 21 July: First of Dutch “Police Actions” launched.
1948 17 January: Renville Agreement signed. September: Madiun re-
bellion launched and suppressed. 19 December: Second of Dutch “Police
Actions.” 22 December: Pemerintah Darurat established on Sumatra.
1949 14 April: Republican leaders and Dutch begin talks. 7 May:
Roem–van Roijen agreement reached. 6 July: Republican government re-
turns to Yogyakarta. 13 July: Emergency government returns its mandate.
7 August: Darul Islam movement declares an Islamic state. 23 August:
Round Table Conference begins in The Hague. 27 December: Transfer of
Sovereignty except for West New Guinea (Papua).

Sukarno Era: 1950–1966

1950 23 January: Attempted coup by R. P. P. Westerling in Bandung.

April: Benteng Program launched; Andi Aziz affair; Declaration of the
Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas). 17 August:
Reestablishment of unitary state (see FEDERALISM). 26–29 September:
Indonesia joins United Nations.
1952 17 October: Army challenges Sukarno, demanding dissolution of
parliament and holding of elections.
1953 Java Bank nationalized (see BANKING). September: Aceh revolt
begins.
1955 18–24 April: Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung. 29 Sep-
tember: General elections.
1956 8 May: Indonesia unilaterally abrogates Netherlands Indonesian
Union. 4 August: Indonesia repudiates international debt to the Netherlands.
lii • CHRONOLOGY

1 December: Hatta resigns as vice president. 20 December: Banteng coun-

cil proclaimed in West Sumatra.
1957 9 April: Sukarno commissions first Business Cabinet (Kabinet
Karya). May: Dewan Nasional founded. 29 November: United Nations re-
fuses to act on the West Irian dispute. 30 November: Cikini assassination
attempt against Sukarno. 3 December: PNI and PKI unions begin seizure
of Dutch businesses in Indonesia (see NATIONALIZATION). 5 Decem-
ber: Justice Ministry orders expulsion of 46,000 Dutch citizens. 13 De-
cember: Nasution announces that army will manage seized enterprises;
Mohammad Natsir and other Masjumi leaders flee to Sumatra.
1958 15 February: Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia pro-
claimed in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. 12 March: Nasution begins military
operations against Sumatra rebels. 10 May: Government forces begin op-
erations against rebels in Sulawesi. 18 May: Government forces shoot
down American plane flying over Ambon in support of the rebels and cap-
ture its pilot.
1959 14 May: Alien Chinese banned from trading in rural areas. 5 July:
Restoration of 1945 Constitution. 17 August: Sukarno outlines the Mani-
festo Politik (see GUIDED DEMOCRACY).
1960 5 March: Sukarno dissolves parliament.
1961 First postindependence census. April–September: Surrender of
most of the PRRI/Permesta rebel leaders. 19 December: Sukarno an-
nounces military campaign against Dutch in Irian (see PAPUA).
1962 15 August: Dutch hand authority in Irian to United Nations.
1963 March: Sukarno’s Deklarasi Ekonomi (see GUIDED ECON-
OMY). 1 May: United Nations hands Irian to Indonesia. 31 July–5 Au-
gust: Sukarno attends Manila summit on Malaysia (see MAPHILINDO).
23 September: Sukarno announces plans to crush Malaysia (see CON-
FRONTATION). October: Manifes Kebudayaan.
1964 17 August: Sukarno gives his “Year of Living Dangerously” speech.
1965 2 January: Indonesia withdraws from the United Nations. 30 Sep-
tember–1 October: Gestapu coup attempt. 2 October: General Suharto
takes responsibility for restoring “security and order.” Late 1965–1966:
Mass killings of PKI members and associates. 13 December: 1,000 rupiah
(Rp) devalued to Rp 1 (see CURRENCY).
 CHRONOLOGY • liii

1966 13 February: First post-Gestapu Mahmillub trial begins. 11

March: Sukarno issues Supersemar order, transferring full executive au-
thority to Suharto. 12 March: PKI and associated organizations banned. 11
August: Relations with Malaysia normalized, end of Confrontation. Sep-
tember: Indonesia rejoins United Nations.

Suharto Era: 1967–1998

1967 12 March: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—Sementara

(MPR-S) strips Sukarno of presidency and appoints Suharto acting presi-
dent. April: Indonesia rejoins World Bank. 8 August: Formation of As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
1968 20 February: Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi, Indonesian
Muslims’ Party) founded. 27 March: MPR appoints Suharto president. 6
June: Suharto forms first Development Cabinet.
1969 1 April: Launch of first Five-Year Development Plan. 15 July–
2 August: Kabupaten councils in Papua opt for integration with Indonesia
in “Act of Free Choice.” 2 October: Attorney General Sugiharto an-
nounces plans to settle alleged communist detainees on Buru.
1971 17 March: Treaty of Friendship with Malaysia. 3 July: Second
general elections. 23 August: Indonesia and Malaysia claim territorial
rights over the Strait of Melaka.
1973 5 January: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Unity Devel-
opment Party) formed. 10 January: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI,
Indonesian Democratic Party) formed. 12 February: Indonesia signs bor-
der agreement with Papua New Guinea.
1974 15 January: Malari affair.
1975 11 March: Indonesia reaches border agreement with Philippines. 29
July: Indonesia recognizes Provisional Revolutionary Government of South
Vietnam. 26 August: Portuguese colonial government abandons East
Timor. 28 November: Fretilin declares Democratic Republic of East
Timor. 7 December: Indonesian forces invade Dili, capital of East Timor.
1976 3 March: Ibnu Sutowo, director of state oil company Pertamina,
dismissed. 22 September: Government authorities claim to have uncov-
ered coup plot by Sawito Kartowibowo.
liv • CHRONOLOGY

1977 2 May: Third general election. May: Paratroops dropped in the

central valley of Papua to crush rebellion by Organisasi Papua Merdeka
(OPM, Free Papua Movement).
1978 16 January: Bandung students issue White Book criticizing New
Order performance. 22 March: MPR reelects Suharto as president. 15 No-
vember: Rupiah devalued (see CURRENCY).
1979 July–December: Ten thousand political prisoners released.
1980 February: ABRI Masuk Desa program introduced (see DWI-
FUNGSI). 5 May: Petition of Fifty signed.
1981 28 March: Radical Muslims hijack Garuda DC-9 en route from
Palembang to Medan. 25 February: Malaysia recognizes Indonesia’s
Archipelagic Concept.
1982 4 May: Fourth general election. December: Law of the Sea Con-
vention in Jamaica effectively recognizes Indonesia’s Archipelagic Con-
cept.
1983 30 March: Rupiah devalued. April: “Mysterious killings” of crim-
inals begins (see PETRUS). October: Sudharmono and Sarwono
Kusumaatmaja take over leadership of Golkar; Golkar restructuring be-
gins.
1984 20–22 August: First national congress of Pertai Persatuan Pemban-
gunan (PPP) accepts Pancasila as its sole basic principle. 12 September:
Tanjung Priok affair (see WHITE PAPER). Early December: Muham-
madiyah adopts Pancasila as its sole basic principle. Mid-December:
Nahdlatul Ulama adopts Pancasila as its sole basic principle, but with-
draws from PPP.
1985 21 January: Bomb explosion on Borobudur. 5 July: Resumption
of direct trade with China. 18 August: H. R. Dharsono placed on trial for
subversion. August–November: 1,600 people dismissed, mainly from the
oil industry, for alleged links with the PKI. August: First of a series of ex-
ecutions of PKI members detained after the 1965 Gestapu. December
1985–August 1986: International oil price drops from US$25 to $12 per
barrel.
1986 8 January: H. R. Dharsono sentenced to 10 years of jail for sub-
version. May: Legislation passed requiring mass organizations to adopt
 CHRONOLOGY • lv

the Pancasila as their sole basic principle. 12 September: Rupiah devalued

by 31 percent. October: Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship, and Coop-
eration with Papua New Guinea. 9 October: Newspaper Sinar Harapan
banned.
1987 4 February: Plans announced to privatize some of Indonesia’s
state enterprises. 21 April: Fifth general election. 14 December: Suharto
calls for nuclear weapons free zone in Southeast Asia. 24 December: Ma-
jor reduction announced in government regulation of imports, exports, for-
eign investment, and tourism.
1988 5 January: 1988–1989 budget allocates 36 percent of prospective
foreign income to service international debt. 10 March: Suharto reelected
as president, Sudharmono elected vice president. 22 September: KOP-
KAMTIB abolished. 27 October: Deregulation of the banking sector (see
BANKING). November: Indonesia recognizes state of Palestine.
1989 6–8 February: Violent clashes in Lampung between troops and lo-
cal people. 24 February: Indonesia and China agree to restore diplomatic
relations. April: Student protests over dispossession of small farmers for
development projects. 8 June: Suharto receives United Nations Population
award for Indonesia’s family planning program. 11 December: Indonesia
signs Timor Gap agreement with Australia.
1990 17 January: 150 students demonstrate before U.S. ambassador on
a visit to East Timor. 3 February: Lampung rebels sentenced. 15 Febru-
ary: Four political prisoners, jailed since 1965, executed. February:
Netherlands refuses to sign aid agreement because of execution of the four
detainees. 16 April: Indonesian army kills five Acehnese. August: Gov-
ernment lifts ban on strikes. 8 August: Diplomatic relations officially re-
stored between China and Indonesia. 16 September: Dharsono released
from jail. October-November: Public outcry over poll in newspaper Mon-
itor that ranked Mohammad below political figures; its editor arrested. De-
cember: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) formed.
1991 1 January: Indonesia joins Human Rights Commission. 3 April:
Forum Demokrasi established under Abdurrachman Wahid, League for
Restoration of Democracy formed under Ponke Princen. 8 April: Monitor
editor sentenced to five years in jail. 4–5 July: Army kills seven suspected
rebels in Aceh. November: Massacre at Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East
Timor; Indonesian military arrest Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão.
lvi • CHRONOLOGY

1992 10 June: Sixth general election. September: Abillo Jose Osorlco

Soares becomes governor of East Timor.

1993 January–February: ABRI and PDI propose Try Sutrisno for vice
president. 27 February: Edi Sudrajat replaces Try as panglima. 17 March:
Sixth Development Cabinet announced; Benny Murdani dismissed as
minister of defense.

1994 February–March: Government publishes White Paper on events

in 1965. 10 February: Mochtar Pakpaham and other labor leaders ar-
rested. 14 April: Labor demonstrations in Medan and elsewhere. 29 April:
Government arrests more labor leaders. June: Philippines president Fidel
Ramos bans non-Filipinos from participating in Manila conference on East
Timor. 17 June: U.S. Senate passes bill banning use of U.S. equipment in
East Timor. 21 June: Government closes news magazines Tempo, Detik,
and Editor. October: Labor activist Muchtar Pakpahan on trial. 6 Octo-
ber: Foreign Minister Alatas meets with East Timorese in New York. No-
vember: APEC summit held in Jakarta. 10 November: Indonesia’s first
aircraft christened by Suharto. 14 November: UN recognizes Indonesia’s
archipelagic status.

1995 January: Army kills three East Timor civilians. May: State Ad-
ministrative Court says government acted unlawfully in closing Tempo. 19
July: Pramoedya Ananta Toer awarded Magsaysay prize. August:
Netherlands Queen Beatrice visits Indonesia. 17 August: Indonesia cele-
brates 50 years of independence.

1996 Early January: Rebels in Papua seize British, Dutch, and Indone-
sian prisoners. April: Death of Suharto’s wife (Siti Hartinah “Tien”).
April–May: Sri Bintang Pamungkas sentenced to 34 months in jail. 20
June: Megawati Sukarnoputri excluded from Partai Demokrasi Indone-
sia (PDI) party congress held in Medan, and Suryadi endorsed as party
head. 19–20 June: Over 100 injured in protest demonstrations. June: Ten
churches burned or ransacked in Surabaya. 27 July: Government support-
ers attack and occupy Megawati’s party headquarters. 30 July: Muchtar
Pakpaham detained. 7 August: Suharto accuses Partai Rakyat Demokrasi
(PRD) of being like PKI. 9 August: Megawati appears at police headquar-
ters with other PDI members. 11–12 August: Budiman Sudjatmiko ar-
rested. 13 August: Suharto accuses PRD of trying to topple the govern-
ment. 11 October: Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos Horta awarded Nobel
 CHRONOLOGY • lvii

Peace Prize. October: Several churches burned near Situbondo, East Java.
21 December: Churches ransacked in Tasikmalaya.
1997 30 January: Anti-Christian/Chinese violence in Rengadengklok.
January–March: Dayak Madurese violence in West Kalimantan leaves
hundreds dead. 29 May: In national elections, Golkar wins 74 percent of
the vote, PDI 3 percent, and PPP 23 percent. June–October: Jakarta
stock exchange falls over 30 percent. 14 August: Rupiah floated. Sep-
tember: Race riots in Sulawesi. 11 September: Parliament approves a
new labor law. September–October: Forest fires rage in Kalimantan and
Sumatra. 19 October: Suharto announces he will run again as president.
20 October: Central bank cuts interest rates. 31 October: First Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) package announced. November: Govern-
ment closes 16 banks.

1998 6 January: 1998–1999 budget announced, ignoring IMF recommen-

dations. 5–8 January: Rupiah plunges. January: IMF creates Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to reform Indonesian banking system.
15 January: Suharto accepts IMF reform package. 22 January: Rupiah
falls to record low of Rp 17,000 to US$1. February: Wiranto replaces
Feisal Tanjung as army commander. 3 March: Student protest demonstra-
tions begin in Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Padang, Ujung Pandang (Makassar),
and other cities. 6 March: IMF delays further Indonesian financing. 10
March: Parliament selects Suharto for seventh term as president, with B. J.
Habibie as vice president. 14 March: Suharto announces new cabinet,
which includes family members and cronies. 24 March: IMF and United
States delay aid to Indonesia, but United States allows emergency food and
fuel subsidies. March: Megawati questions U.S. military aid and training. 8
April: Third IMF agreement. 15 April: Student protest marches at dozens of
campuses. 1 May: Suharto says reforms must wait until 2003. 6 May: Prices
of fuel and electricity raised. 9 May: Suharto flies to Cairo for G-15 summit.
12 May: Army kills several student demonstrators at Tri Sakti University in
Jakarta. 13 May: Students buried as martyrs; riots erupt in Jakarta. 14 May:
Riots continue, particularly against Chinese businesses and Suharto cronies;
over 500 killed. 15 May: Suharto returns early from Cairo. 16 May: Faction
of Golkar removes support from Suharto. 18 May: Students drive to Parlia-
ment; Harmoko calls on Suharto to resign. 19 May: Students occupy Parlia-
ment building. 20 May: Suharto rejects calls to resign and proposes new
elections; army clamps down in Jakarta; Amien Rais calls off mass protests.
21 May: Suharto resigns in favor of Vice President Habibie.
lviii • CHRONOLOGY

Post-Suharto: 1998–Present

1998 22 May: President Habibie pledges to dedicate himself to democ-

ratization; a Development Reform Cabinet (Kabinet Reformasi Pembangu-
nan) announced.
23 May: Prabowo Subianto replaced as head of Kostrad; army removes
students from Parliament building. 25 May: Habibie promises early elec-
tions and frees political prisoners Muchtar Pakpahan and Sri Bintang Pa-
mungkas. 28 May: Government takes over Bank Central Asia. 30 May:
IMF relaxes deadlines for austerity measures. 2 July: Hundreds of Papuan
tribesmen raise “Free Papua” flag in Biak. 6 July: Indonesian marines kill
Free Papua supporters. August: Indonesia withdraws 1,000 troops from
East Timor, but other forces replace them. 4–5 August: Portugal and In-
donesia agree to discuss autonomy plan for East Timor. September: Gov-
ernment proposes electoral reforms. 6 October: Tempo relaunched. 8–10
October: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) congress held in Bali. 10–13
November: Parliament meets to establish legal framework for reform. 13
November: Student demonstrations result in at least 16 deaths. 22 No-
vember: At least 14 Christians killed by Muslims in Ketapang, Jakarta. 4
December: Habibie sacks Pertamina’s president.
1999 19 January: Street brawl in Ambon sparks religious violence lead-
ing to hundreds of deaths. 27 January: Habibie proposes independence for
East Timorese if they don’t accept autonomy. 27 February–3 March:
Government closes 38 of Indonesia’s sickest banks and nationalizes seven
others. 4 March: Government announces 48 political parties qualified to
contest elections. Mid-March: Dayak anti-Madurese violence kills 165 by
24 March. 1 April: Police made independent of armed forces; ABRI re-
named Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI). 17 April: Prointegration militias
crack down on independence supporters in East Timor. 23 April: Parlia-
ment approves law on intergovernmental fiscal relations, diverting funds to
regions. 3 May: Military in Aceh kills 45 civilians. 10 May: Golkar for-
mally nominates Habibie as its presidential candidate. May: Wiranto an-
nounces staged return to pre-1980s 17 Kodam from current 11 Kodam. 15
May: Kodam XVI Pattimura (Maluku) established. 7 June: Nationwide
elections held. 21 June: Formal announcement of election results. 23 July:
Army kills more than 50 people in Aceh. 31 July: Bank Mandiri (encom-
passing Banks Dagang Nagara, Bumi Daya, Exim, and Bapindo) opens. 8
August: Vote on independence scheduled for East Timor. 9 August: In Par-
liament, “Central Axis” group nominates Abdurrachman Wahid for presi-
 CHRONOLOGY • lix

dent. 18–20 August: Intervillage fighting begins in northern Halmahera.

30 August: East Timorese vote in UN-supervised referendum. 31 August:
Three members of UN staff killed in East Timor. 3 September: Pro-Jakarta
militias rampage in East Timor. 4 September: East Timor referendum re-
sults announced: 78.5 percent vote for independence. 5 September: At
least 100 Timorese killed around Dili. 6 September: Bishop Belo’s home
burned and 6,000 refugees taken to West Timor. 7 September: State of mil-
itary emergency imposed in East Timor. 12 September: Habibie accepts
plans for international force in East Timor. 15 September: UN authorizes
an international force to enter East Timor. 27 September: Indonesian mil-
itary formally transfers authority in East Timor to multinational force.
20–21 October: Parliament elects Wahid president. 21 October: Megawati
Sukarnoputri accepts vice presidency. 24 October: Renewed violence in
Halmahera, spreading to Ternate and Tidore. 27 October: Wahid appoints
National Unity Cabinet, including State Ministry for Regional Autonomy.
31 October: Wahid withdraws Kostrad and Kopassus troops from Aceh.
November: Thousands of Christians evacuated from Maluku to Minahasa.
2000 17–18 January: Muslims riot in Lombok. 28 January: Wahid visits
Middle East seeking economic aid. Mid-February: Wahid suspends
Wiranto as coordinating minister for security. April: Military announces trial
abolition of military presence at village level in Jakarta and Surabaya. 24
April: Wahid dismisses two other ministers. 12 May: Cease-fire agreed to
in Aceh. 16 May: Wiranto formally resigns. 28 May: Riots in Poso, Central
Sulawesi, kill at least 100. 4 June: Papuan Congress asserts rights of sover-
eignty and calls for dialogue with Jakarta. 27 June: State of civil emergency
declared in Maluku. 1 July: National police separated from TNI and placed
directly under president’s control. 20 July: Wahid defends ministers’ firings
before Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR). 9 August: Wahid agrees to
share power with Megawati. August: Government abolishes Ministry of Re-
gional Autonomy. 28 August: Parliament begins investigation of financial
scandals involving Wahid. 6 September: Indonesian militias kill three UN
aid workers in West Timor. 19 December: Wahid visits Banda Aceh. 24 De-
cember: Christmas Eve church bombings throughout Java and Sumatra.
2001 3 January: Parliament censures Wahid over Bulog and Sultan of
Brunei scandals. 5 January: Government declares it will control mining
for five years. 22 January: Wahid refuses to answer Parliament’s accusa-
tions and denies wrongdoing. 1 February: Parliament censures Wahid over
financial scandals. February-March: Student demonstrations call for
Wahid’s resignation. 28 March: Wahid rejects Parliament’s censure. 30
lx • CHRONOLOGY

April: Parliament censures Wahid a second time. 20 May: Kostrad soldiers

pledge loyalty to Constitution. 28 May: Attorney general clears Wahid of
wrongdoing. 30 May: Wahid rejects second censure; Parliament to meet to
initiate impeachment of Wahid; police reject Wahid’s firing of police chief.
1 June: Wahid reshuffles cabinet. 9 July: Wahid threatens state of emer-
gency on 20 July if charges not dropped against him. 13 July: Amien Rais
says he will call impeachment vote if Wahid declares state of emergency.
20 July: Parliament announces intention of convening session to oust
Wahid. 22 July: Two Christian churches bombed in Jakarta. 23 July: Par-
liament votes to dismiss Wahid; Megawati Sukarnoputri sworn in to replace
him as president. 24 July: Separatist leaders and human rights lawyers ar-
rested in Aceh. 26 July: Parliament elects Hamzah Haz of Partai Pemban-
gunan Persatuan (PPP) as vice president. 16 August: In her first state of the
union address, Megawati apologizes for military abuses. September: Elec-
tion held in East Timor for de facto parliament and to draft new constitu-
tion. 13 December: Supreme Court declares Tommy Suharto must serve
11 months in jail. 17 December: Suharto hospitalized.
2002 10 January: Reestablishment of separate military command for
Aceh. 22 January: Abdullah Syafei, commander of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
(GAM), killed together with six others. February: Coordinating minister
for political and social affairs given authority to resolve Aceh situation. 2
March: On Sulawesi, Moluccan Christian and Muslim leaders sign peace
accord (Malino II) formally ending hostilities on Ambon. March: Tommy
Suharto arrested. 28 April: 14 Christians killed in clashes in Maluku. 1
May: Laskar Jihad leader Ja’afer Umar Thalib arrested on charge of incit-
ing Muslims to attack Christians. 20 May: UN Secretary-General Kofi An-
nan cedes governing authority to newly independent Democratic Republic
of East Timor with Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão as president. Presi-
dent Megawati Sukarnoputri attends ceremony. 5 June: Indonesian security
agents arrest and extradite Omar Al Faruq (allegedly al Qaeda’s Southeast
Asia representative). June: Eurico Guterres and six other pro-Jakarta mili-
tia leaders charged with crimes against humanity for violence after Timor’s
1999 independence vote. 29 June: Aceh rebels kidnap nine crew members
of an ExxonMobil boat. July: President Gusmão visits Jakarta to discuss In-
donesia–Timor relations. August: U.S. State Department urges federal
court to dismiss human rights suit against ExxonMobil. 1 August: Malaysia
law calls for imprisonment and caning of illegal workers, forcing thousands
of migrants to flee back to Indonesia. 3 August: MPR votes to approve di-
rect elections for president and vice president and to abolish military seats
in parliament by 2004, defeats proposal for introduction of Islamic law
 CHRONOLOGY • lxi

(syariah). 15 August: Human rights court clears six army and police offi-
cers of crimes against humanity in East Timor. 31 August: Gunmen attack
jeep near Freeport mine in Papua, killing two Americans and an Indone-
sian. September: Akbar Tanjung, Golkar head and speaker of Parliament,
sentenced to three years in jail for misusing $4 million of government funds.
He appeals. 30 September: Army–police clash over marijuana trade near
Medan leaves eight dead and over 20 wounded. 12 October: Bomb blast
destroys nightclub in Bali, killing 202 people, about half foreign, 88 of them
Australian tourists. Mid-October: 1,000 members of Laskar Jihad return to
Java from Ambon; their leader Ja’far Umar Thalib states that they have dis-
banded. 18 October: Indonesia issues emergency decree on terrorism. Late
October: Government orders arrest of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, allegedly spiri-
tual leader of Jemaah Islamiah; despite being in hospital, he is taken into de-
tention. 5 November: Police arrest Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, who allegedly
bought and transported the bombs used in the Bali bombings. 9 December:
Indonesian government and Acehnese rebel negotiators sign a peace agree-
ment. 17 December: The World Court awards the small Celebes Sea islands
of Ligitan and Sipadan to Malaysia. December: East Timor’s parliament
ratifies a treaty with Australia on production, profit sharing, and distribution
of royalties and taxes from oil and gas reserves.
2003 January: Lt. Col. Sujarwo, former army commander in East Timor,
is convicted of failing to prevent attacks on home of Bishop Belo; Jakarta
High Court upholds jail sentence against Akbar Tanjung; government raises
prices for fuels, electricity, and communications, sparking large protest
demonstrations in many Indonesian cities; a presidential instruction (inpres)
proposes dividing Papua into three provinces; FBI links Indonesian soldiers
to the 31 August 2002 killing of two Americans near the Freeport mine in
Papua; in response to public opposition, government repeals many of the
price hikes on fuel and other items. 2 February: Police arrest terrorist sus-
pect Selamat Kastari, accused of complicity in terrorist attacks. February:
Megawati confirms that she will run for reelection in 2004. 25 February:
United Nations indicts General Wiranto and other officers for crimes against
humanity during East Timor’s independence vote in 1999. March: Indone-
sia states it will ignore the UN’s arrest warrants for Wiranto and the others
accused. 13 March: Former East Timor commander Brig. Gen. Noer Moeis
sentenced to five years in jail. 26 March: Megawati addresses meeting of
Non-Aligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur, and Indonesia formally requests
UN Security Council to convene an emergency meeting on Iraq. 31 March:
Hundreds of thousands participate in antiwar protests against U.S.-led war
in Iraq. 4 April: Government declares severe acute respiratory syndrome
lxii • CHRONOLOGY

(SARS) a national epidemic threat; three GAM fighters killed in Pidië,

Aceh; bill proposed transferring development powers from Bappenas to
Ministry of Finance; Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) attacks weapons
warehouse in Wamena Papua, killing two TNI soldiers. 14 April: Charges
of treason officially filed against Abu Bakar Baa’syir, chiefly in connection
with the Christmas Eve 2000 church bombings. 23 April: Trial of Abu
Bakar Baa’syir begins. 24 April: Peace talks between the government and
GAM break down. 27 April: Bomb explodes at Jakarta airport, injuring 11.
5 May: Nurcholish Madjid expresses his willingness to run for president
in 2004. 12 May: Amrozi bin Nurhasyim is first defendant to go on trial for
the Bali bombings. 18 May: Peace talks in Tokyo to extend the cease-fire in
Aceh between GAM and Indonesian government collapse. 19 May:
Megawati declares martial law in Aceh, and some 50,000 government sol-
diers and police launch full-scale invasion. 21 May: U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee withholds $400,000 for training military officers in the
United States until allegations of army complicity in killing of Americans in
Papua are resolved. Late May: Imam Samudra goes on trial as mastermind
of Bali bombings. 5 August: An explosion outside the Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta kills 10 people and wounds about 150. 7 August: Amrozi found
guilty in Bali bombing case and sentenced to death. 12 August: Riduan
Isamuddim (Hambali), alleged head of Jemaah Islamiyah, arrested in Thai-
land. Mid-August: Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri found guilty for crimes against
humanity in East Timor and sentenced to three years in prison. 25 August:
Province of Papua split into three with inauguration of new provinces of
Central Irian Jaya and West Irian Jaya. 2 September: Court acquits Abu
Bakar Baa’syir of terrorist charges, but sentences him to four years in jail for
sedition. 10 September: Imam Samudra sentenced to death for his role in
the Bali bombing. 18 September: Ali Imron sentenced to life imprisonment
for his role in the Bali bombings. October: Landslide disrupts production at
Freeport’s Grasberg mine in Papua. 2 October: Ali Gufron (Mukhlas) sen-
tenced to death for authorizing the Bali bombings. 9–12 October: Attacks
on Christian villages in central Sulawesi leave 13 villagers and six suspects
dead. December: Abu Bakar Baa’syir’s jail sentence reduced to three years
for immigration and forgery charges; second major landslide hits Freeport
mine in Papua. 7 December: General Elections Commission announces 24
parties eligible to contest 2004 elections. 29 December: Political parties
submit their candidate lists for elections.
2004 4 February: The Supreme Court overturns the corruption conviction
of Golkar head Akbar Tanjung.
 Introduction

A wide-flung archipelago lying between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, In-
donesia is the world’s most populous Islamic country. For over 2,000 years,
it was a crossroads on the major trading route between China and India, but
was not brought together into a single entity until the Dutch extended their
rule throughout the Netherlands East Indies in the early part of the 20th
century. Declaring its independence from the Dutch in 1945, the Republic
of Indonesia was ruled by only two regimes over the next half century—the
nonaligned parliamentary and Guided Democracy of the flamboyant
Sukarno and the Western-oriented authoritarian military rule of General
Suharto. Neither regime was able to realize the country’s potential either
economically or politically, and after Suharto’s resignation in 1998 his suc-
cessors have struggled in varying degrees to introduce a more democratic
and representative structure of government. They have been faced on the
one hand with separatist movements and widespread ethnic and religious
violence and on the other with a military eager to reassert its dominance of
the state. At the same time, there have been formidable economic chal-
lenges to be overcome in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of the
last years of the 20th century.

LAND AND PEOPLE

Lying between the Asian and Australian continents and between the Indian
and Pacific Oceans, the Indonesian archipelago straddles the Equator, be-
tween 6º08'N and 11º15'S and between 94º45'W and 141º05'E. The Repub-
lic of Indonesia shares land borders with Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, and
Australia. There are three official time zones, 7–9 hours ahead of Green-
wich mean time.

lxiii
lxiv • INTRODUCTION

The country is 2,027,087 square kilometers (sq. km) in area, plus

3,166,163 sq. km in territorial waters. It is 5,100 km long on its east-west
axis and 1,888 km broad on its north-south axis. It consists of approxi-
mately 13,669 islands the size of a tennis court or larger; the exact number
changes frequently due to siltation and volcanic eruptions. About 6,000 is-
lands are named, and about 1,000 are inhabited. Indonesian annexation of
the Portuguese overseas territory of East Timor never received full interna-
tional recognition, and East Timor gained its independence in 1999. The is-
lands are customarily grouped into four regions: the Greater Sundas (Suma-
tra, Java, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi); the Lesser Sundas or Nusatenggara
(the chain of islands running from Bali eastward to Timor); the Moluccas,
or Maluku, between Sulawesi and New Guinea (Papua); and Papua. Over
80 percent of Indonesia’s land area is accounted for by its five largest is-
lands: Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Java, and the western portion of
New Guinea, now named Papua.
The Greater Sundas Islands and part of Nusatenggara sit on the Sunda
shelf, a southeastern extension of the Asian continental plate partly covered
by shallow seas. A zone of volcanic activity along the southern rim of this
shelf has created a chain of volcanoes that forms the spine of Sumatra and
Java. Papua sits on the Sahul shelf, a geologically stable extension of the
Australian continental plate. Between these two shelves, Maluku is an area
of extreme geological instability, with volcanic mountains and deep sea
trenches. Australia is still moving north, and the mountains of Papua rise 4
to 5 cm per century. The highest is the snowcapped Puncak Jaya in Papua
at 5,030 meters.
As Indonesia lies in the tropics, temperatures are determined primarily
by the time of day and by elevation. The maximum recorded temperature
range in Jakarta is 18º to 36º C. There are permanent, but receding, snow-
fields in the Maoke mountains of Papua. Rainfall is generally heavy, with
all of Kalimantan and most of Sumatra and Java, eastern and southern Su-
lawesi, Maluku, and Papua receiving an average annual rainfall of 200 cm
or more. Timor and Sumba, which lie in Australia’s rain shadow, receive
100 to 150 cm per year. In recent times, it has been recognized that the El
Niño Southern Oscillation regularly changes rainfall patterns to produce a
pronounced dry season in much of the archipelago.
High temperatures and heavy rainfall generally work to encourage chem-
ical weathering, which impoverishes tropic soils. In much of Indonesia, es-
pecially Kalimantan, this process was sidestepped by the growth of tropi-
cal rain forest, rooted in a shallow layer of topsoil from which nutrients are
rapidly recirculated. As this rain forest layer is lost due to the extensive log-
 INTRODUCTION • lxv

ging that has taken place over the past three decades, soil degradation has
been rapid. In Java and West Sumatra, basic andesitic volcanic materials
ejected from volcanoes are responsible for the high levels of fertility in
those regions. There are approximately 829 active volcanoes in Indonesia
today.
Indonesia’s population is predominantly mixed Austronesian-Austrome-
lanesian in origin, with the Austromelanesian component becoming
stronger in the east. There has always been a basic cultural division be-
tween the coastal peoples and the upland interior groups (such as the Bataks
of Sumatra and the Dayaks of Kalimantan), who until recently depended on
shifting slash-and-burn agriculture. Over the centuries, there has been con-
siderable admixture of Chinese and Arab elements, and a large Chinese mi-
nority exists throughout the archipelago mainly in urban areas. The popu-
lation is estimated in the 2000 census at 206.3 million, of whom the
majority live on Java. Islam is the principal religion, but there are signifi-
cant Christian (Protestant and Catholic), Hindu, and Buddhist minorities.

EARLY HISTORY

Although the first human settlement in the archipelago has been dated from
1.9 million years ago, the ancestors of most modern Indonesians arrived
from the north from about 3000 B.C. Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms
emerged in many parts of the western archipelago from the fifth century
A.D. In the early centuries of the Christian era, trading ships from India be-
gan to ply the Melaka Strait, and it was perhaps two centuries later that di-
rect trade began between the western archipelago and China. Indian culture,
in particular, exerted a powerful influence on the character of the states that
developed in the archipelago. By the seventh century, there were two prin-
cipal types of political units: the maritime trading states along the coasts of
Sumatra, North Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and some of the other eastern
islands, and the rice-based inland kingdoms, particularly those in East and
Central Java.
Predominant among the maritime states was Srivijaya, a Mahayana Bud-
dhist kingdom on Sumatra’s southeast coast, which, by the late seventh cen-
tury, was a center of trade with India and for several centuries monopolized
much of China’s commerce with the Malacca Strait and the western archi-
pelago. Several rice-based Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms developed in the in-
terior of Java between the eighth and 14th centuries, including the Hindu
kingdom of Mataram, which flourished on Central Java’s Dieng Plateau in
lxvi • INTRODUCTION

the early eighth century; the mid-ninth-century Mahayana Buddhist king-

dom on the nearby Kedu Plain, which left the massive Buddhist temple of
Borobudur; and a near-contemporary Hindu kingdom that left extensive
Sivaite monuments in nearby Prambanan. When the center of power shifted
to East Java during the succeeding centuries, the kingdoms that developed
there—under Sindok (r. 929–947) and Airlangga (r. 1019–c. 1045)—united
with Bali and relied more on trade with the outside world. By the 13th cen-
tury, the kingdom of Singasari, under the Tantric Buddhist king Kertana-
gara (r. 1268–1292), was asserting its ascendancy over areas of Sumatra
formerly controlled by Srivijaya.
The Mongols under Kublai Khan attacked Java in 1292, killing Kertana-
gara, but his successor, Wijaya, expelled a subsequent Mongol invasion,
founding Majapahit, the greatest of the Javanese empires, in 1293. Ma-
japahit claimed sovereignty over much of the archipelago and parts of the
Malay Peninsula.
Before the end of the 13th century, merchants from South India and Gu-
jarat were successfully propagating Islam among some of North Sumatra’s
coastal trading states. However, until the early 15th century and the rise of
Melaka, Islam spread only gradually through the archipelago. An entrepôt
on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, Melaka came to dominate the
strait and thus the trade route between the Spice Islands of the eastern ar-
chipelago and India. By 1436 it had become the major emporium for the
trade that had grown in response to the rising European demand for spices.
At the same time, it was the major center spreading Islam to the other trad-
ing kingdoms of the archipelago. The North Javanese coastal kingdoms that
converted to Islam exerted commercial and military pressure on the Ja-
vanese kingdom of Majapahit, contributing to its virtual disappearance by
the early 16th century.

INTRUSION OF THE WEST AND THE COLONIAL STATE

From the early 16th century, the trading states of island Southeast Asia
faced growing pressure from the Portuguese, British, Spaniards, and Dutch,
all of whom were seeking to profit from the European demand for spices.
The Portuguese made a major effort to wrest the spice trade from the local
Islamic states. They conquered the Sultanate of Melaka in 1511, and from
there attempted to exclude all competitors from the trade to Europe. In re-
sponse, the local powers strove to establish alternative trading routes. The
most powerful of the competing trading states was Aceh, which by the 16th
 INTRODUCTION • lxvii

century dominated much of northern Sumatra, controlled the pepper ports

down Sumatra’s west coast, and ultimately extended its influence to some
of the sultanates on the Malay Peninsula. There were other strong Islamic
states: Makassar on Sulawesi, Banten in West Java, and the Islamic
Mataram in Central Java, which grew in importance in the second half of
the 16th century and absorbed many of Java’s maritime principalities dur-
ing the first half of the 17th century.
After the founding of the Netherlands’ United East India Company
(VOC) in 1602, the Dutch soon replaced the Portuguese as the dominant
outside power in the region. Jan Pieterszoon Coen established a base in
Sunda Kelapa on the northwest coast of Java, which he named Batavia, and
moved to isolate the archipelago’s interisland network from international
commerce. After capturing Melaka from the Portuguese in 1641, the Dutch
also attempted to impose a monopoly on the spice trade, restricting culti-
vation of cloves to Ambon and of nutmeg and mace to the Banda islands.
Over the next century, although continuing to dominate the trade of the
eastern archipelago, the Dutch shifted their attention from the Spice Islands
to Java. They introduced coffee and other export crops to the island and
worked with amenable collaborators from among the local aristocrats and
the growing numbers of Chinese they had encouraged to immigrate to Java
in extracting these export crops. In other parts of the archipelago, however,
the VOC played an exceedingly limited role. During the 18th century, as
the company attempted to expand its territorial control, the increased ad-
ministrative costs, combined with a decline in the spice trade, led it to bank-
ruptcy. Its charter was allowed to lapse in December 1799, and the Dutch
government took over its debts and assumed direct responsibility for ad-
ministration of its possessions in the East Indies.
In the Napoleonic wars, Herman Willem Daendels was sent to organ-
ize the defense of Java against the British, but was recalled in 1811 when
the Netherlands was incorporated into the French Empire. Dutch areas of
the archipelago came under a brief British interregnum (1811–1816), dur-
ing which Thomas Stamford Raffles attempted to centralize and reform
the administration of Java. Shortly after their resumption of power, the
Dutch were forced to expend massive sums in suppressing a rebellion
(1825–1850) led by the Javanese prince Diponegoro. They then annexed
extensive areas of Central Java, and in 1830 Governor-General Johannes
van den Bosch instituted the “Cultivation System” (Cultuurstelsel),
whereby peasants had to devote a percentage of their land (officially one-
fifth but usually far more) to cultivating government-designated export
crops instead of rice. Although extremely profitable for the Dutch, the
lxviii • INTRODUCTION

system was partly responsible for the widespread famine that swept parts
of Java in the 1840s and 1850s.
Concurrently, Dutch power was spreading over other parts of the archi-
pelago. Their forces intervened in West Sumatra against the reformist Mus-
lim Paderi movement, finally defeating and exiling its leader, Tuanku Imam
Bonjol, in 1837. In the 1850s they annexed Sumatra’s northeast coast prin-
cipalities and the tin-mining island of Belitung (Billiton). Finally, after 30
years of warfare, Dutch forces subdued Aceh and Bali in 1908 and 1909
and continued to bring regions of Sulawesi, Maluku, the Lesser Sundas,
and most of Kalimantan under firmer control.
A bitter campaign by Dutch liberals against the Cultivation System suc-
ceeded by the 1870s in removing some of its harsher aspects, though forced
deliveries of coffee continued until 1919. Oil, tin, and rubber, coming
mostly from the newly acquired areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan, began to
replace coffee, sugar, and tobacco as the main exports to Europe. At the be-
ginning of the 20th century, the Dutch introduced their “Ethical Policy” in
part as a response to domestic criticisms of government policies in the In-
dies, but also as a means of training a local workforce to help run the ex-
panding state bureaucracy. Infrastructure of the archipelago was expanded
through the development of railways, roads, and interisland shipping, and
more health and educational facilities were provided for the local people.
Although this change had very limited results, with only a few thousand
Indonesians receiving even a secondary-level Western education, the pol-
icy did help create two new social elements in the archipelago: a small
Western-educated intelligentsia, particularly on Java, which served the
colonial regime (mostly in clerical roles); and an even smaller group of en-
trepreneurs and smallholders on some other islands, who began to compete
with a still predominantly Chinese commercial class. In time, both ele-
ments became resentful of a colonial structure that denied them a role
commensurate with their education and abilities.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE

ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE

Local entrepreneurs formed the basis of the first major anti-Dutch nation-
alist movement, the Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union), established in 1912,
which grew out of an association of batik merchants formed in an attempt
to contain competition from Chinese entrepreneurs. By 1918 it claimed a
membership of more than 2 million, with branches throughout the Nether-
 INTRODUCTION • lxix

lands East Indies. Responding in part to the SI’s calls for self-government,
the Dutch established a Volksraad (People’s Council) at the end of World
War I, but the few indigenous members of this advisory body had little in-
fluence.
Other organizations questioning Dutch rule also developed during the
1910s, the strongest being the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV),
made up largely of intellectuals—Dutch, Eurasian, and Indonesian—who
saw socialist teachings as directly relevant to the colonial situation they
faced in the Indies. At that time it was possible to hold membership in more
than one political party, so these radicals also constituted an influential com-
ponent of the SI. In 1920 the ISDV became the Communist Association of
the Indies, which developed into the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).
Conflict grew between the communist and Islamic streams within the
Sarekat Islam, until the communists were expelled from all branches of the
party in 1923. Severely weakened by this struggle, the Sarekat Islam never
regained its coherence, size, and unity. A deep schism also developed within
the Communist Party, and an effort to mount a nationwide anticolonial rev-
olution planned for 1926 resulted in only a few scattered outbreaks, mainly
in Banten and West Sumatra. The Dutch easily suppressed these uprisings
and then took harsh steps to eradicate the influence of the communists and
other anticolonial groups from the Indies.
From then on, the anti-Dutch political movement in Indonesia was
headed by leaders who were not identified closely with either communism
or Islam. Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir emerged as the
foremost nationalist leaders. Sukarno founded the Indonesian National
Party (PNI) in 1927, an organization that demanded complete indepen-
dence from the Dutch. In October 1928, a youth congress articulated In-
donesian aspirations in the slogan “Indonesia, one people, one language,
one motherland” and adopted Indonesian as the national language.
Alarmed by the strength of Sukarno’s following, the Dutch arrested him,
together with seven other party leaders, at the end of 1929. The remaining
leader of the PNI dissolved the party and adopted more cautious policies.
Although Sukarno was released from jail in 1931, he was arrested again
two years later and sent into exile until the Japanese released him in 1942.
Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, who saw Sukarno’s 1929 arrest as
proof of their contention that mass parties under charismatic leadership
were very vulnerable to Dutch counterattack, sought instead to train a small
cadre of potential leaders in many parts of Indonesia. But this effort also
failed and both leaders were arrested in 1934, remaining in exile until the
eve of the Japanese occupation.
lxx • INTRODUCTION

After these arrests, more moderate leaders and parties emerged who were
willing to work within the parameters set by the colonial administration.
They based their party programs on cooperation with the Dutch and grad-
ual achievement of self-government but attracted only a small following.
The Netherlands government rejected even such modest proposals as the
Volksraad’s request for an Indonesian parliament and the Soetardjo petition
(mid-1936) calling for evolutionary development toward self-government.
Only in 1941 after Germany overran the Netherlands did the Dutch queen
promise some postwar devolution of political authority.
The Japanese dealt a humiliating defeat to the Dutch in early 1942, and
three and a half years of Japanese occupation dismantled the Dutch power
structure, dividing the archipelago into three separate military administra-
tions. Of these, the Japanese regime on Java was most sympathetic to the
Indonesian nationalists, allowing Sukarno, Hatta, and other prewar leaders
freedom to address large audiences in return for their help in mobilizing In-
donesian support for the Japanese war effort. Outside Java, the Japanese
military authorities were extremely repressive, permitting the nationalists
no more latitude than had the Dutch.
From September 1943, the Japanese established “volunteer” militias in
Java, Bali, Sumatra, and Kalimantan to help repel expected Allied landings.
In October 1944, in an effort to muster support against these anticipated at-
tacks, the Japanese promised independence to Indonesia and partially re-
laxed controls over the nationalist leaders’ activities on Java; but prior to
their surrender to the Allies on 15 August 1945, they paid little more than
lip service to their promise of self-government.
On 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s indepen-
dence, and the following day members of a Japanese-sponsored preparatory
committee for independence elected them president and vice president of the
new Republic of Indonesia. By late September, when British forces on be-
half of the Allied command began to land in Java and Sumatra to accept the
Japanese surrender, a functioning Republican administration already existed
in much of these two islands. When the British attempted to take over the
administration on behalf of the Dutch, they met with fierce resistance in
many parts of Java and Sumatra. But in the eastern archipelago, Australian
forces had already established themselves in New Guinea and parts of Kali-
mantan before the Japanese surrender, and they were able to restore Dutch
authority with comparative ease to most of these areas. The relative strength
of the Republic in Java and Sumatra and of the Dutch in the eastern archi-
pelago was reluctantly acknowledged by both sides. Thus, before their with-
drawal in November 1946, the British were able to persuade the Dutch as
 INTRODUCTION • lxxi

well as the Indonesians to initial the Linggajati agreement recognizing de

facto authority of the Republic in only Java and Sumatra and planning for
the establishment of a federal system for the whole of Indonesia.
The British departure precipitated a direct military and diplomatic strug-
gle between the Republic and the Dutch. From 1946, the Dutch began to set
up autonomous territories in the areas they controlled that were to form part
of a projected Federal State of Indonesia with strong ties to the Nether-
lands. The Dutch attempted to reimpose their rule over Republican-con-
trolled areas through two major military operations, euphemistically termed
“police actions,” in July 1947 and December 1948. In the second of these,
they overran the Republican capital at Yogyakarta and arrested most of the
Republic’s top leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta. But the vigor of Re-
publican guerrilla resistance and pressure from the international commu-
nity ultimately forced the Dutch toward accommodation, and after talks
culminating in the Roem–van Roijen agreement, Sukarno and Hatta were
allowed to return to Yogyakarta in July 1949. A “Round-Table conference”
was convened in The Hague the following month. Negotiations among the
Netherlands, the Dutch-sponsored states, and the Republic culminated in
the Netherlands government agreeing to transfer sovereignty over all of In-
donesia at the end of 1949, with the exception of western New Guinea
(Papua), to a federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS or
RUSI) consisting of the Republic and the Dutch-sponsored states.

THE SUKARNO ERA

The newly independent government of Indonesia, launched in January

1950, faced immense problems in its attempts to create a viable state out of
the archipelago’s disparate peoples and cultures. It inherited a country dev-
astated by nearly a decade of war, an enormous debt from the Dutch, and a
poorly educated population, with many of the small components of edu-
cated civilians discredited by their collaboration with the colonial govern-
ment. The federal state was tarnished by its identification with the Dutch
divide-and-rule policy, and by August 1950 it had been replaced by a Uni-
tary State of Indonesia, with its capital on Java and with a form of govern-
ment likely to feed outer-island fears of Javanese dominance. There was a
brief revolt in Sulawesi and Ambon against the unitary state and in favor of
a South Moluccan Republic (RMS), but the Indonesian National Army
(TNI) easily crushed the rebellion, with many of the rebel soldiers fleeing
with their families to the Netherlands.
lxxii • INTRODUCTION

Suspicions between the center of power on Java and the other islands
were exacerbated by views with regard to Islam’s role in the new state. In
1945 the formateurs of the Constitution had established the Pancasila, or
Five Principles—belief in the one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, de-
mocracy, and social justice—as the ideology on which the state would rest.
The lack of a specifically Islamic religious orientation created dissatisfac-
tion, particularly in the strongly Muslim areas of the Outer Islands and West
Java, a dissatisfaction that soon led to serious rebellions by the Darul Islam
(House of Islam) especially in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi.
There was also a severe rift between the new state’s civilian and military
sectors. Most army officers regarded themselves and their forces as the ma-
jor component in Indonesia’s achievement of independence. They viewed
with contempt the faction-torn, ineffective, and often corrupt governments
that followed each other in rapid succession during the early 1950s. The na-
tionwide elections finally held in 1955 did little to resolve the country’s
problems, for there was no clear winner. Four parties emerged with sub-
stantial support—the National Party (PNI), the modernist Islamic Masjumi,
the traditionalist Islamic NU, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
Only one of these parties, the Masjumi, had a major following outside Java.
Outer-island disillusionment with political developments was further
strengthened by the insufficient funds allocated to economic development
of regions outside Java, despite their providing most of the country’s export
earnings. Responding to this dissatisfaction, regional military commanders,
particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi, began large-scale smuggling in copra
and rubber, using the profits for themselves, their soldiers, and their re-
gions. In a series of largely bloodless coups between December 1956 and
March 1957, army-led councils seized power from the local civilian au-
thorities in several regions of Sumatra and Sulawesi. The dissidents in
Sumatra were joined in December 1957 by several top Masjumi party lead-
ers forced to flee Jakarta by increased harassment from leftist mobs in the
aftermath of an assassination attempt against Sukarno at the end of No-
vember. Emboldened by support from these civilian political leaders, the
dissident colonels in Sumatra and Sulawesi challenged the government in
Jakarta by proclaiming a competing Revolutionary Government of the Re-
public of Indonesia (PRRI) on 15 February 1958. Despite arms and covert
paramilitary assistance to the insurgents from the United States and Taiwan,
Jakarta’s army soon defeated the major rebel forces on Sumatra, though it
took longer for government troops to gain the upper hand in Sulawesi.
Guerrilla activity against the central government continued on both islands
until 1961.
 INTRODUCTION • lxxiii

At the center, Sukarno had answered the crisis of confidence in Indone-

sia’s postrevolutionary governments by calling for an overhaul of the party
system and proposing instead a system of “Guided Democracy” based on a
return to the 1945 Constitution, under which the president’s powers would
be expanded and functional representation in parliament would be added to
that of the political parties. After Guided Democracy replaced parliamen-
tary democracy in 1959, Sukarno strove to implement his concept of
Nasakom (nationalism, religion, and communism), a fusion of what he
viewed as the major streams making up Indonesia’s political culture. He
also struggled to maintain a balance between the two strongest competing
forces in the society at that time—the army and the Communist Party.
In the international arena, he was also conducting an activist foreign pol-
icy. In the late 1950s, he challenged the Dutch over their continued reten-
tion of West Irian (Papua) until under U.S. pressure an agreement was fi-
nally reached in 1962 whereby the United Nations took over administration
of the territory until May 1963, when it was handed over to Indonesia. In
return, Indonesia agreed to provide the Papuans with the opportunity before
1969 to register whether or not they wished to continue under Indonesian
rule. Sukarno led Indonesia in its policy of “confrontation” with the new
federation of Malaysia, which incorporated the north Borneo territories of
Sabah and Sarawak, bordering on Indonesian Kalimantan. Beginning in
late 1963, this confrontation involved two years of sporadic Indonesian at-
tacks, mostly into Sarawak.
Knowing of U.S. involvement in the PRRI rebellion and suspecting its
involvement in assassination attempts against him, Sukarno hardened his
anti-Western stance during the early 1960s. He criticized American actions
in Vietnam, withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations, and proposed es-
tablishment of an anti-imperialist axis stretching from Beijing to Jakarta.
In early August 1965, widespread rumors of a “Generals’ Council” plot-
ting to overthrow Sukarno intensified and were intermingled with warnings
of Sukarno’s imminent demise as he suffered the resurgence of a kidney
complaint. The period of rumor and uncertainty broke on 30 September
1965 when Lieutenant Colonel Untung of Sukarno’s palace guard led an ac-
tion in which six top generals were kidnapped and brutally murdered.
Forces under General Suharto crushed the movement within 24 hours. The
dynamics and real instigators of this so-called Gestapu (Gerakan Tiga Pu-
luh September, 30 September Movement) have remained obscure and are
the subjects of intense controversy. Whoever was responsible, it was
Suharto who, after successfully crushing the Untung forces, took control of
the army and eventually maneuvered Sukarno into surrendering effective
lxxiv • INTRODUCTION

presidential power to him on 11 March 1966. The army alleged PKI re-
sponsibility in the Gestapu, and, despite Sukarno’s efforts to prevent the
bloodshed, during 1965–1966 army units together with some Muslim or-
ganizations and others launched massacres of communists and supporters
of their mass organizations, with estimates of the dead ranging between
300,000 and 1 million. The PKI was banned on 13 March 1966, and the
army arrested hundreds of thousands of people accused of having ties to the
party.
At the end of the Sukarno era, Indonesia was left with an economy close
to collapse. Sukarno’s renunciation of Western aid had exacerbated the
country’s parlous economic situation and expanded its debt. Budget deficits
were nearly half of the country’s gross domestic product, exports had de-
clined drastically, and inflation had risen to an annual rate of almost 600
percent.

THE SUHARTO ERA

When he assumed power, Suharto initiated basic changes in the govern-

ment’s ideological and political orientation and in its economic policies, but
he also made use of the authoritarian legislation that accompanied the in-
troduction of Guided Democracy to impose a militarily enforced “bureau-
cratic authoritarian regime” that dominated Indonesia over the next 30
years. His so-called New Order government abandoned Indonesia’s con-
frontation with Malaysia, deemphasized party politics, and laid its main
stress on economic rehabilitation. “Development” became its slogan, and
the regime opened the country to foreign investment while also pursuing a
generally pro-Western foreign policy.
Needing to legitimize its rule for both a domestic and foreign audience,
the new regime prepared for parliamentary elections but was reluctant to
hold them until it could ensure the result. To do this, it built up the already
existing General Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golkar) as an in-
strument to dominate the political process, and then moved to emasculate
the existing political parties. The eight political parties that remained after
the 1971 elections were forced to consolidate into two groupings, which
eventually became the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), incorporating the
secular and Christian parties; and the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP),
incorporating the Islamic parties. Golkar’s success in all subsequent elec-
tions was guaranteed, for not only did all government employees, including
teachers, have to vote for Golkar, but it also controlled voter registration and
 INTRODUCTION • lxxv

was the only contender allowed to organize at the village level. Through
constant manipulation, the government was able to ensure that Golkar’s
share of the vote never fell below 62 percent. By the 1987 elections when
Golkar achieved a record 73.2 percent of the vote, it seemed that Suharto
had effectively turned the political parties into nonoppositional bodies.
But although the government was successful in eliminating any challenge
in the political arena, particularly from Islamic organizations, critics of the
regime, lacking a legitimate spokesperson, had little option but to oppose the
government in less legitimate ways. Eruptions of discontent surfaced peri-
odically throughout the New Order, from the Malari of 1974 to the violent
demonstrations that eventually removed Suharto from power in 1998.
The Suharto regime also perceived maintenance of national integration as
a basic problem, and to preserve the country’s unity the government em-
ployed a policy of militarization and centralization. In 1969 Suharto reor-
ganized the armed forces into a system of regional commands in which Ja-
vanese dominated all top echelons of the army hierarchy, especially in the
regions outside Java. Through the army’s territorial structure, the regime
was able to exert political pressure at every level of society, monitoring and
largely controlling political and social developments. It expanded the con-
cept of the army’s dual function (dwifungsi), originally developed by former
army commander A. H. Nasution in the 1950s, asserting the army’s duty to
participate as a “social-political force” throughout the society. The firmness
of central military control was successful in preventing any serious chal-
lenge to Jakarta from any of the previously volatile regional commands.
At the same time, Jakarta utilized one of the major components of In-
donesia’s development policy, the transmigration program, to strengthen its
control over potentially dissident areas, transferring people from the
densely populated provinces of Central and East Java to Sumatra, Kali-
mantan, and Sulawesi as well as East Timor and Irian Jaya (Papua). But this
program also increased fears of Javanese colonization in these areas, and
the ecological damage inflicted by many of these settlements strengthened
opposition to the policy and led to international criticism. In the final years
of the Suharto regime, the policy was reduced drastically.
These measures were insufficient to prevent, and indeed may have en-
couraged, strong disaffection in three major regions: East Timor, Papua
(Irian Jaya), and Aceh. Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor at the end of 1975
was never accepted by the people of that territory and led to a long, drawn-
out, bloody, and brutal war in which perhaps a third of East Timor’s popu-
lation died. Similarly in Papua, after the Dutch finally relinquished control
via the United Nations, Jakarta had to wage a “secret war” against stubborn
lxxvi • INTRODUCTION

resistance from a number of Papuan groups, the largest being the Organiza-
tion for a Free Papua (OPM), which were increasingly supported by local
dissatisfaction at the exploitation of their region’s resources and the brutal
repression that accompanied this. In Aceh, too, local outrage at Jakarta’s ex-
ploitation of the region’s oil and gas resources and the brutal policies used
to enforce this succeeded in turning what began as a weak, locally based
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) into a potent force
enjoying considerable popular support throughout the province.
Between Suharto’s accession to power in 1966 and the early 1990s, In-
donesia experienced rapid economic development that contributed to a ris-
ing standard of living for its population. Between 1965 and 1996, its econ-
omy grew at an annual rate of about 7 percent, a growth underpinned in
large part by foreign investment. This economic growth was accompanied
by a decline in the incidence of absolute poverty and by marked improve-
ment in both education and health care. During these years there was a
striking shift from agriculture to industry, in large part based on the pro-
cessing of petroleum and natural gas. By 1993 the World Bank character-
ized Indonesia as a “high-performing Asian economy.” But its development
during these years had been built in large part on loans negotiated at the be-
ginning of the Suharto era, and by the late 1980s Indonesia had the largest
foreign debt in Southeast Asia, with the burden of servicing this debt ac-
counting for 37 percent of all government expenditures. In Suharto’s final
years, moreover, his economic achievements were undermined by the
widespread corruption that increasingly permeated all parts of his govern-
ment. Together with the economy’s growing ties to global capital markets,
this corruption rendered it vulnerable in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Thai currency and the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
This financial crisis, along with the perception that the Suharto regime
was riddled with corruption and the perception of an alternative as
Megawati Sukarnoputri emerged at the head of the revitalized PDI, all con-
tributed to a growing crisis that engulfed the regime in early 1998 and
forced Suharto’s resignation in May of that year. His unexpected and rapid
capitulation to the forces confronting him opened the way for Vice Presi-
dent B. J. Habibie’s accession to the presidency.

THE REFORMASI ERA

The relatively smooth transfer of power in May 1998 left almost all of the
New Order structure in place, impeding efforts to implement the reformasi
 INTRODUCTION • lxxvii

that had been the battle cry of the forces opposing Suharto. Although
viewed as weak and mercurial, B. J. Habibie instituted policies that had a
significant effect on Indonesia’s future course, most notably by initiating
steps that ultimately enabled East Timor to gain its independence and by in-
troducing a decentralization law dismantling the centralized structure that
had characterized the Indonesian state since independence. Habibie also
oversaw a remarkably successful and peaceful election process, the first
fair election held since 1955. Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Democratic Party of
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan, PDI-P) emerged from
the election with a plurality of the vote. Golkar and the PPP came in sec-
ond and fourth, and longtime NU head Abdurrachman Wahid’s new Rise of
the People Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB) took third place.
Wahid’s political maneuvering enabled him to succeed Habibie as presi-
dent, but through his erratic behavior and apparent inability to confront the
country’s major problems, he squandered the opportunity offered him. He
antagonized both parliament and the military and was ultimately im-
peached in July 2001, with Megawati voted in as his successor.
The government under both Wahid and Megawati continued to be
plagued by the corruption that had characterized the Suharto regime, espe-
cially in its later years. Although the implementation of the decentralization
law proceeded much more smoothly than had been anticipated, it did not
stem the ethnic and religious violence that had broken out in many parts of
the archipelago, especially Kalimantan, Maluku, and Sulawesi, in the wake
of Suharto’s resignation. In addition, the heavy-handedness of the Indone-
sian military response to the separatist movements in both Aceh and Papua
exacerbated the disaffection in those two provinces. Under Megawati, the
armed forces were given a much freer hand, particularly in Aceh, to crush
the rebels by whatever means necessary. The all-out military operation
against the rebels in Aceh further exacerbated opposition there to the cen-
tral government, as the government’s division of the province of Papua into
three smaller provinces antagonized the disaffected population there.
These problems were rendered only more intractable by the terrorist
movements that emerged in many parts of the world in the wake of the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, DC. Pressure on the
Indonesian government to take strong action against radical Islamic ele-
ments came not only from the United States but also from Indonesia’s
neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore. Finally, in response to a disastrous
bombing attack in Bali in October 2002 that killed over 200 people,
Megawati’s government cracked down on suspected members of the shad-
owy organization, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community), which
lxxviii • INTRODUCTION

Singapore and Kuala Lumpur accused of responsibility. Indonesian author-

ities arrested and tried a number of suspects in the Bali bombings and sen-
tenced three of the alleged leaders to death and several to life imprisonment.
In the closing months of 2003 preparations accelerated for nationwide
legislative and presidential elections scheduled for 2004. In December
2003, the Electoral Commission published the names of the 24 parties that
had met the criteria for contesting these elections. The first elections were
to be held on 5 April 2004 for the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat) and for regional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,
DPRD) at the provincial and district levels, as well as for the new Regional
Representative Council (DPD) set up under the constitutional changes of
2002. These elections promised to be challenging for the voters who would
be required to select both a party and individual candidates for most of the
legislative bodies.
Parties that emerged from these elections with three percent of the seats
or five percent of the votes could then nominate a candidate for the presi-
dency. The leading presidential contenders were likely to be Megawati
Sukarnoputri (nominated by the PDI-P), either Akbar Tanjung or Wiranto
(from Golkar), Abdurrachman Wahid (PKB), Hamzah Haz (PPP), Amien
Rais (PAN), and perhaps General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Partai
Demokrat, PD, or possibly PKB), Professor Yusril Mahendra (PBB), and
even Suharto’s daughter Siti Hardijanti (Tuti) Rukmana (Partai Karya Peduli
Bangsa, PKPB [Concern for the Nation Party]) should their parties gain suf-
ficient support to nominate a candidate. The presidential election was to be
held on 5 July 2004, and if no single candidate emerged with more than 50
percent of the vote, the top two vote-getters would then compete in a run-off
election to be held on 20 September. The process was scheduled to be com-
pleted before 20 October. Though in early 2004 Megawati Sukarnoputri was
still the leading presidential candidate, her popularity had drastically de-
clined over the previous two years and it was not inconceivable that one of
the other contenders would provide a strong challenge should she fail to gain
a majority in the first round.
As they approached the elections the Indonesian electorate evidenced lit-
tle of the hope and excitement that characterized the first post-Suharto elec-
tions in 1999. Disillusionment at the extent of the corruption in the Refor-
masi period and cynicism at the ineffectiveness of the new political actors
dominated the national and local scene, along with nostalgia in some quar-
ters for the security and order of the Suharto era, a sentiment on which the
Golkar party and some candidates from the New Order period hoped to
capitalize.
 INTRODUCTION • lxxix

At the same time, there was a slow but steady improvement in Indone-
sia’s economic situation, as the rupiah strengthened and inflation was
curbed. Foreign investment remained sluggish in the aftermath of the ter-
rorist attacks, but the economic outlook for 2004 was relatively good with
an anticipated growth rate of between 4 and 5 percent. In October 2003 the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) praised the government’s handling of
the economy, approving a final loan in the program set up in the late 1990s
to help Indonesia recover from the Asian financial crisis. The Indonesian
government intended to end the loan program at the end of 2003, thus free-
ing itself from IMF conditions that it felt were not in tune with Indonesia’s
social and economic needs.
 The Dictionary

–A–

ABANGAN (from Javanese abang, red). Term popularized by American

anthropologist Clifford Geertz to describe Javanese Muslims in East Java
whose religion, sometimes called kejawen (Javanism) or kebatinan, en-
compasses many non-Islamic elements, especially mysticism and respect
for local spirits. Followers of kejawen insist that their religious commit-
ment is different from, not less than, that of orthodox santri Muslims.
See also ALIRAN; ISLAM. [1239, 1351]

ABDURRACHMAN WAHID (1940–). Born in Jombang, East Java, and

grandson of the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Kyai Hasyim Asyari,
Wahid studied in Cairo and Baghdad and then taught at the Hasyim
Asyari University in Jombang. He was elected chairman of the NU in
1984 and withdrew it from formal politics when the Suharto govern-
ment decreed that all political parties and organizations had to acknowl-
edge the Pancasila as their azas tunggal (sole foundation). Under his
chairmanship, NU was the first Islamic mass organization to accept this
decree. His closeness to Suharto at this time led to a strong challenge be-
ing mounted against him at the NU’s 1989 national congress, where the
president came to his support, though this alliance between them was
short-lived.
Known by the affectionate nickname of Gus Dur, Wahid gained enor-
mous stature during the 1990s not only among his NU followers but also
throughout the society, where he played an active role despite severe phys-
ical weaknesses that left him nearly blind and despite infirmity due to dia-
betes and a series of strokes. As an early leader of the prodemocracy move-
ment, he preached tolerance of other religions and was a founding member
of the Forum Demokrasi in 1991 and an opponent of the religious intel-

1
2 • ABDURRACHMAN WAHID

lectuals’ organization Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI),

which he accused of being a tool of the Suharto administration. The pres-
ident’s supporters then led a campaign against him in the Muslim commu-
nity, and he moved closer to the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI), par-
ticularly to Megawati Sukarnoputri, with whom he formed an ad hoc
alliance in the mid-1990s. During the closing months of Suharto’s rule, he
played a controversial role, again meeting with Suharto and campaigning
with the president’s daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) in behalf of
Golkar in areas previously loyal to the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP). He played no direct part in Suharto’s ouster. During the subsequent
opening of the political process, he founded the Partai Kebangkitan
Bangsa (PKB) and became its head. Although his party only came in third
in the 1999 elections (with 12.7 percent of the vote), he was able to ma-
neuver Megawati (whose PDI-Perjuangan [PDI-P] came in first) out of
the presidency, garnering sufficient support in parliament to become In-
donesia’s president in October of that year. He arranged for Megawati to
be elected as his vice president.
Wahid’s stormy tenure lasted less than two years, and after a long
struggle to prevent his impeachment by parliament, he was replaced by
Megawati Sukarnoputri. He had proved himself to be an erratic and au-
tocratic administrator, never coming to grips with the enormous eco-
nomic and political problems his country faced. Despite the minority po-
sition of his party, he treated parliament with contempt and alienated his
longtime ally and vice president, Megawati. He did not build sufficiently
on his natural strength among the Muslim community in confronting the
secessionist threat in Aceh or easing the interreligious tensions in east-
ern Indonesia, passing over responsibility for the eastern provinces to
Megawati. Instead he spent much of his time in travel abroad, ostensibly
to raise urgently needed aid. Although not himself suspected of corrup-
tion, he tolerated corrupt practices amongst his closest associates, losing
the moral high ground he had occupied when he first assumed office.
When he realized that his power was crumbling, Wahid resorted to ar-
bitrary measures, firing his police chief and openly confronting the army,
driving it into a closer alliance with Megawati. When his impeachment
seemed imminent, he declared a state of emergency and ordered security
forces to shut down the legislature. The army refused to obey the order
and sent in reinforcements to protect parliament. The assembly voted
unanimously to remove Wahid as president, and Megawati was immedi-
ately sworn in as his replacement on 23 July 2001.
After his ouster, Wahid remained as advisory chairman of the PKB and
in 2003 dismissed two of the party’s leaders because of their support two
 ACEH • 3

years previously for his impeachment, a dismissal that was upheld by the
Jakarta High Court. [0771, 0760, 1029]

ACÇÃO NACIONAL POPULÁR (ANP, National Popular Action).

Founded by António Salazar in 1930 as the União Naçional, the ANP
was the sole legal political party in Portugal and its overseas provinces,
including East Timor. It was abolished in 1974 after the armed forces
coup in Portugal. Many of its former members in East Timor later joined
the conservative União Democrática Timorense. [0806]

ACEH. Muslim state in the northernmost part of Sumatra, founded in

the 15th century by rulers of the state of Lamuri after their expulsion
by Pedir. Sultan Ali Mughayat Syah (r. 1514–1530) was able to draw
many Muslim traders to his port of Banda Aceh (Kuta Raja) after the
fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511, transforming it into a major
emporium for trade in pepper and Indian cloth. With European
weapons purchased from the profits of this trade, he conquered much
of northern Sumatra, including Pasai and Pedir. Under Sultans Alaud-
din Riayat Syah al-Kahar (r. 1537–1571) and Iskandar Muda (r.
1607–1636), Aceh fought a protracted war with the Portuguese and
with the sultanate of Riau-Johor (see RIAU). Sultan Alauddin sought
with partial success to concentrate the pepper trade in Kuta Raja and
turned his court into a major regional center of Islamic law and learn-
ing. He was patron to the writers Hamzah Fansuri and Syamsuddin of
Pasai. Iskandar Muda used revenue from taxation and his own personal
trade to build a strong centralized state that was able to subdue the
Acehnese commercial nobility (orang kaya) as well as the feudal rulers
of the interior (uleëbalang). He pushed Acehnese rule southward along
both coasts of Sumatra as far as Padang and Nias in the west and Aru
in the east, as well as dominated Pahang, Kedah, and Perak on the
Malay Peninsula. He launched major but unsuccessful attacks on
Riau-Johor in 1613 and 1623 and on Melaka in 1614 and 1629, losing
most of his navy in the latter campaign.
After the fall of Melaka to the Dutch and the shift of trading activity to
Batavia and the Sunda Strait, Aceh was ruled by a succession of four
queens, beginning with Taj al-Alam (r. 1641–1675) in coalition with the
orang kaya, but state power declined under Dutch military pressure and
the rise of uleëbalang power based on the growing rice trade. At the same
time Islam became more and more firmly established, leading to the rise
of powerful Islamic scholars, or ulama, whose influence ended the tradi-
tion of female rule. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 guaranteed Aceh’s
4 • ACEH

independence, but in 1871 the British authorized the Dutch to invade to

avoid possible French annexation. The Dutch annexed Aceh in 1874, but
the ferocious Aceh War lasted from 1873 to 1903 and the Dutch won only
because of the advice of Snouck Hurgronje that they should support the
uleëbalang against the sultanate and because of their vigorous military ac-
tion led by Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz. According to official esti-
mates, 100,000 Acehnese and 12,000 Dutch were killed in the operations.
Guerrilla warfare, led mainly by ulama, continued until 1914, by which
time the Dutch had been able to crush the opposition and install an ad-
ministration headed by the uleëbalang.
A reformist religious revival under the ulama began in the late 1920s
and culminated in formation of the Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh
(PUSA, All-Aceh Union of Ulama) in 1939 headed by the most promi-
nent of the religious leaders, Muhammad Daud Beureu’eh from Pidië
(Pedir). Under their occupation, the Japanese used PUSA leaders for
propaganda purposes but maintained the Dutch administrative system
with the uleëbalang carrying out such tasks as collecting the rice crop
and organizing forced labor.
In 1945, after the Japanese surrender, the ulama declared for the In-
donesian Republic and launched a social revolution in which most
uleëbalang were killed or deposed. Aceh became one of the most loyal
Republican regions, being its most staunch financial supporter. Except
for the island of Pulo Weh (Sabang), the Dutch made no effort to retake
Aceh during the Revolution. After his return to Yogyakarta in July 1949,
Sukarno appointed Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as deputy prime minis-
ter, with power to decree government regulations for Sumatra, and
Sjafruddin established Aceh as a separate province. In 1950, however,
this decree was rescinded and Aceh became part of the province of North
Sumatra. When the government then tried to deprive PUSA of its control
over the civil administration, army, and economy and to erode Aceh’s ef-
fective autonomy, a revolt broke out in September 1953. This was led by
Daud Beureu’eh and was affiliated with the more general Darul Islam
uprising. The designation of Aceh as a province in 1957 and as a daerah
istimewa (special territory) with greater autonomy in religious and edu-
cational matters in 1959 largely ended the revolt.
Under the Suharto regime, many of the attributes of autonomy disap-
peared as the government canceled the region’s control over religion, ed-
ucation, and law. Hopes for maintaining any degree of autonomy disap-
peared after massive reserves of natural gas were discovered in 1971 in
Lhokseumawe in northern Aceh, and by 1977 a liquefied natural gas
 ACEH • 5

(LNG) refinery had commenced production. These discoveries did not

benefit the local people. By the end of the 1980s, the province was con-
tributing 30 percent of Indonesia’s oil and gas exports, but nearly all of
the profits and taxes were channeled directly to the central government.
Establishment of an industrial zone around Lhokseumawe displaced
much of the local population and removed their source of livelihood.
As early as 1976, anti-Jakarta feeling in the region had sparked a new
rebel movement known as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh
Movement), which called for the creation of an independent state of
“Aceh-Sumatra.” Headed by Hasan di Tiro, who had been born in Pidië
but had mostly lived abroad since the early 1950s when he served in the
Indonesian mission to the United Nations, the GAM at this time was
weak, and Indonesian government forces were able fairly easily to sup-
press it and kill or exile most of its leaders. However, its remnants con-
tinued recruitment; and when by 1989 local resentment had grown at the
central government’s exploitation of Aceh and its people, GAM
reemerged and mounted a far stronger challenge to central authority. The
Indonesian military responded brutally, deploying about 12,000 troops in
counterinsurgency operations in 1990 and killing an estimated 2,000
mostly civilian Acehnese by mid-1991 when the government appeared
again to have crushed the movement.
The rebellion resumed in late 1998 after the government had begun to
withdraw some of its forces in the wake of Suharto’s resignation. In re-
sponse, the military redeployed hundreds of troops to the area and began
another major counterinsurgency campaign. This was accompanied,
however, by the Abdurrachman Wahid government’s resumption of
negotiations with the GAM beginning in 2000. The following year (9
August 2001), Wahid’s successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, signed a
law providing again for special autonomy for the Province of Nanggroe
Aceh Darussalam. Under this law the province was granted special pow-
ers, including permission for its legal system to be based on Islamic law.
Also under the new decentralization law, Aceh could begin to receive
70 percent of the net income from the vast ExxonMobil oil and gas fields
near Lhokseumawe, though its share of proceeds from gas exploitation
was less than had been negotiated by Papua regarding its fields. Despite
these moves the level of violence continued high, with more than 1,700
people being killed in 2001 alone and widescale human rights abuses
carried out by both sides.
In January 2002 a separate military command (KODAM), the Iskan-
dar Muda command, was again established for Aceh. But on the 21st of
6 • “ACT OF FREE CHOICE”

that month, Indonesian troops killed GAM’s military commander, Ab-

dullah Syafei, who was one of two GAM leaders invited for peace talks
scheduled to be held in Geneva the following week. It seemed that the
government had chosen to emphasize a military solution when in July
2002 the military commander requested six more infantry battalions (a
total of about 4,000 soldiers) in addition to the army and police forces
of about 25,000 already in the territory.
Nevertheless, efforts continued toward a peaceful settlement and ne-
gotiations resumed in Geneva between representatives of the GAM and
central government, who signed a peace agreement on 9 December 2002.
This provided for regional autonomy, control over the province’s natural
resources, and elections for an Acehnese legislature, but it contained no
provision for disarmament or demilitarization. By the time the accord
was signed, it was estimated that 12,000 people had died in the conflict
during the previous decade. The agreement provided only a temporary
respite. On 24 April 2003 further talks between the two parties failed,
leading to a breakdown of the truce. Megawati declared martial law in
the province, and some 50,000 soldiers and police launched a major at-
tack to crush the GAM rebels. See also TJIK DI TIRO; UMAR, TEUKU.
For list of rulers of Aceh, see APPENDIX C. [0529, 0568, 0660, 0777,
0808, 0818, 0820, 0827, 0946, 1258, 1261]

“ACT OF FREE CHOICE.” See OPERASI KHUSUS; PAPUA.

ADAT. Arabic term literally meaning “custom,” as distinct from law laid
down in the Qur’an and other texts. Adat has come to denote all indige-
nous customary law in Indonesia, as opposed to the codified civil and
criminal law of the colonial and Republican governments, as well as,
more narrowly, the body of customary law as recorded in the late 19th
and early 20th century by Dutch scholars, notably Cornelis van Vol-
lenhoven, Snouck Hurgronje, and G. A. Wilken and given the name
adatrecht (“adat law”). The compilers identified 19 adatrechtskringen
or adat law zones of similar legal tradition. This codification was un-
dertaken to allow the partial application of “traditional” law to the in-
digenous peoples of the regions as part of a more general policy of
indirect rule. Adat law, as codified, has tended to emphasize the collec-
tivist aspects of traditional practice, in which crimes committed by an
individual against another are seen as committed by and against the
whole community. See also ISLAM; LAW; ZELFBESTUREN. [0479,
1075, 1082, 1083, 1084]
 AGRARIAN LAW OF 1870 • 7

ADONARA. See SOLOR ARCHIPELAGO.

AFFANDI (1910–1990). Painter with a vigorous style described as im-

pressionist and reminiscent of van Gogh. He was a founder of Pelukis
Rakyat (People’s Painters) and a member of Lembaga Kebudayaan
Rakyat (Lekra), but later in life became less sympathetic to the notion
that art should have a social purpose. In 1955 he was elected to the Con-
stituent Assembly under Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) sponsorship
but sat in the assembly’s sessions as a nonparty member. See also CUL-
TURE, DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF. [0159, 0202]

AFRICA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Although Austronesians probably

touched the east coast of Africa en route to Madagascar (see MIGRA-
TIONS) and although that coast was raided by Southeast Asian pirates, per-
haps Indonesian, in the 10th century, Indonesia has had little influence on
the African continent, except perhaps in the field of music. A. M. Jones has
argued that several features of African traditional music have an Indonesian
origin. The principal trade route that took Indonesian cinnamon, cloves,
and other spices to the Mediterranean in classical times probably ran via
East Africa, and Africa was also the source of an important number of cul-
tivated plants used in the archipelago, especially kapok and oil palm.
The Dutch settlements in South Africa were formally under the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC), though independent of Batavia for most
practical purposes, and an important “Malay” community exists in South
Africa, the descendants of slaves and political exiles from the VOC’s
East Indies possessions. The first of these arrived in 1667, and there was
a substantial import of slaves from 1715 to 1767, when the trade was
banned by the Raad van Indië. Troops were recruited in Dutch settle-
ments on the coast of Guinea in west Africa for service in the colonial
army (Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger, KNIL) until the loss
of those colonies in 1872.
From December 1962 to April 1963 an Indonesian unit, the Pasukan
Garuda, served in the Congo as part of the United Nations (UN) forces
there. Some intellectual links existed between the liberation movements
in Portugal’s African colonies and Fretilin in East Timor (see also EX-
ILE), and those former colonies, along with Portugal, led international
resistance to Indonesia’s annexation of the colony in 1976. [0165, 0527]

AGRARIAN LAW OF 1870. More correctly the Agrarian article of the

Regeeringsreglement or Constitution, this marked a major change in
8 • AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION

colonial agrarian policy. Under the Cultivation System, villages had

been the owners of land but acquired with ownership the obligation to
provide land and labor for government purposes, while Europeans were
largely prohibited from acquiring land. Under the 1870 law, Western
companies were at last allowed long-term leases over land, though the
ban on freehold sale of land to non-Indonesians was strengthened. The
law provided that leases should be for no longer than 75 years on “un-
used” land and 21 years on village land, and that leases could not in-
fringe traditional rights of indigenes. It also declared all “unclaimed”
land to be government property, though it recognized indigenous
usufruct rights on such lands. The law removed the right of nonresident
noncitizens to lease land. Except for the provision on unclaimed land, it
applied only to Java and Madura. See also BESCHIKKINGSRECHT;
INDO-EUROPEANS; LIBERAL POLICY; RACE. [0484, 0638]

AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION. Term coined by American anthropol-

ogist Clifford Geertz for the process, beginning under the Cultivation
System, by which land tenure arrangements on Java allegedly became
steadily more complex and intertwined with systems of credit, lease, and
usufruct as population grew. It was allegedly able to emerge because the
cultivation of rice permitted steadily greater labor inputs with only
slightly diminished productivity per capita. A consequence of agricul-
tural involution, in Geertz’s view, was the absence of a clearly defined
landlord class and a set of social obligations on both rich and poor, which
hindered capital formation. This hampered the development of a vibrant
entrepreneurial economy such as that of Japan. Presented originally as
a hypothesis rather than as a fully elaborated theory, the idea of agricul-
tural involution generated abundant research, much of which tended to
disprove its conclusions. In particular, research has shown enormous re-
gional variation and numerous examples of capital and class formation
in rural Java. See also BESCHIKKINGSRECHT; CLASS ANALYSIS;
DESA; SHARED POVERTY. [0328, 0349]

AGRICULTURE. Wet-rice cultivation (sawah) based on an intricate irri-

gation system has characterized the agricultural techniques of Indone-
sia’s most populous areas, notably on Java and Bali. A dry agricultural
method based on shifting cultivation (ladang) has been more prevalent
in the upland regions of the Outer Islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan,
and Sulawesi and is still common, especially in parts of Kalimantan. Un-
der the Dutch in the late 18th and early 19th century, the colonial gov-
 AGRICULTURE • 9

ernment sponsored a major expansion of wet-rice agriculture, expanding

irrigation, clearing land, and beginning a program to breed improved va-
rieties. At the same time, plantation agriculture came to the fore as the
Dutch invested their capital in such crops as sugar, tobacco, coffee, tea,
and later rubber, leading to the development of a dual economy (see
DUALISM), wherein the plantations produced crops for export and in-
digenous farmers supported themselves with subsistence crops. At the
same time Indonesian smallholders competed with the plantations, espe-
cially with such items as coffee that could be easily developed as a cash
crop. Smallholder production in such areas as south Sumatra and Su-
lawesi competed with estate exports, both under the Dutch and in subse-
quent periods, especially at times when international prices were high. In
the mid-1800s the expansion of the cultivation system, under which vil-
lagers had to devote one fifth of their land to crops for the government,
brought huge profits to the Dutch, with the production and export of
valuable tropical crops financing the administration of the colony and
contributing to the Dutch coffers.
After independence, efforts to redistribute land under the 1960 Basic
Law on Agriculture (Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria)—passed at the urg-
ing of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and applying mainly to
Java—aimed to assist smallholders who had lost or were in danger of los-
ing their land because of indebtedness. (See LAND REFORM.) Although
the law was never rescinded, there were few efforts to implement it.
From the mid-1960s the green revolution brought a rapid increase in
agricultural production, particularly of rice, with sawah output rising by
more than 250 percent between 1966 and 1991. In 1985 Indonesia be-
came for a while self-sufficient in rice, before drawbacks in the system
reversed some of these advances and the droughts of 1991 and 1997
forced the government again to begin importing rice. Under the Suharto
regime, cash crop production did not increase at a similar rate. One no-
table exception was oil palm, and plantations cultivating this crop began
to replace the forests in many parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan as In-
donesia aimed to become the world’s largest palm oil producer. For other
cash crops, output growth has been slow and erratic, in large part depen-
dent on the rise and fall of international prices for these products. During
the closing decades of the 20th century, Indonesia’s economy was trans-
formed from one based mainly on agriculture to one based mainly on in-
dustry, with agricultural output shrinking from 56 to 17 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) between 1965 and 1995, while industrial output
rose from 13 to 42 percent. [0318, 0319, 0330, 0340, 0348, 0730, 0761]
10 • AGUNG, SULTAN

AGUNG, SULTAN (r. 1613–1646). Ruler of Mataram, Agung came to

the throne amid a sustained campaign by his father Seda ing Krapyak to
defeat the port cities of Java’s north coast, especially Surabaya and
Tuban. Agung conquered Sukadana in Kalimantan in 1622 and
Madura in 1624, and he finally starved Surabaya into submission in
1625. His campaigns devastated much of the countryside, causing severe
food shortages and badly damaging Java’s overseas trade. However,
they established, for the first time since Majapahit, a single city (around
Agung’s court at Karta, near modern Yogyakarta) as the center of Ja-
vanese culture. In 1629 he attempted unsuccessfully to capture the Dutch
fortress of Batavia, but was able to conquer most of East Java in a se-
ries of campaigns from 1635 to 1640, in honor of which he took the Is-
lamic title sultan in 1641. [0560]

AIDS. Since the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was first identified
in Indonesia in 1985, AIDS has spread rapidly in Indonesian society. By
2001 an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 Indonesians were living with HIV,
and according to the Indonesian government cumulative HIV/AIDS
cases jumped 60 percent from 2000 to 2001, with 635 AIDS cases and
1,678 HIV infections reported from January to September 2001. An esti-
mated 3,856 AIDS deaths had occurred through 2000, and a further 274
AIDS deaths were reported between January and September 2001. The
first infections were probably brought by Western tourists to Bali, but at
least since the early 1990s the main conduits of infection have been
sailors and fishermen from Thailand and India, and long-distance truck
and bus drivers in Indonesia itself. Ignorance of the cause of infection,
religious objection to the use of condoms, widespread extramarital sex
by men, and routine reuse of needles in medical procedures have all con-
tributed to the spread of the disease. In 1987 the government launched a
National AIDS Control Commission (NACC) and in 1994 created a min-
isterial AIDS Prevention and Control Commission. The campaign to
limit the spread of AIDS has concentrated on the “family values” of fi-
delity and chastity rather than on “safe sex.” See also HEALTH; PROS-
TITUTION; SEX. [1205, 1206]

AIR FORCE (Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, AURI). Founded in

1945 with a few former Japanese trainer aircraft, the air force contributed
to the revolution mainly by using its planes to import war materials. Its
operations were plagued by crashes, in one of which its first commander,
Halim Perdanakusuma, was killed. Air Commodore Suryadi Suryadarma
 AIRLANGGA • 11

(1912–1975) became chief of staff in 1946. Especially dependent on

modern technology, the air force received extensive supplies from the
Soviet Union in the 1960s and was the most left wing of the armed
forces, especially from January 1962 under Air Vice-Marshal Omar
Dhani (b. 1924). Some of the events of the Gestapu coup took place at
Halim Air Force Base; Dhani was jailed, and the force itself was heavily
purged. Under the New Order, the separate identity of the air force was
gradually submerged in that of the Armed Forces. [0714, 0727]

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. Although the Netherlands airline KLM was es-

tablished in 1919 partly to provide air links with the Indies, regular ser-
vices did not begin until the founding of the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-
Indische Luchtvaartmaatschappij (KNILM) in 1927, with a subsidy from
the colonial government. Since 1950, international air services have been
provided by Garuda. In 1976 B. J. Habibie, with Suharto’s backing,
established an indigenous aircraft industry, the Industri Pesawat Terbang
Nurtanio (IPTN, Nurtanio [later Nusantara] Aircraft Industry) in Ban-
dung, which by the early 1980s was assembling helicopters and other
light aircraft under license from Western corporations. IPTN reached a
contract with Boeing Corporation in 1982, under which it became a qual-
ified supplier of aircraft components for Boeing and General Dynamics.
The first Indonesian air show was held in 1986, and until 1988 Nusan-
tara enjoyed a monopoly of light aircraft sales to Indonesia’s 55 domes-
tic airlines. In the mid-1980s IPTN entered into a joint venture with
Spain’s Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (CASA) to manufacture a twin-
turboprop commuter transport plane, the CN-235, several of which were
sold to overseas airlines. In 1989 it began a project to develop a domes-
tically produced commuter aircraft, the 64–68-seat N250, which was un-
veiled at the end of 1994. In early 1998 during the financial crisis, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) barred future subsidies for aircraft
manufacturing at a time when the N250 still lacked certification. There-
after the debt-ridden IPTN concentrated on marketing its turboprop CN-
235 and acting as a subcontractor for aircraft parts, engineering designs,
and computer technology. [0414]

AIRLANGGA (Erlangga; 991–1046). Of Javanese and Balinese royal de-

scent, Airlangga was at the court of the king of Java in 1006 to be mar-
ried to the king’s daughter, Dharmawangsa, when the court was abruptly
attacked by forces from Srivijaya. Alone of the royal family, Airlangga
escaped and established his rule over an attenuated kingdom in East Java
12 • AKSI SEPIHAK

and Bali. After the fall of Srivijaya in 1024–1025, he expanded his power
on Java, creating a network of alliances and vassalages centered on the
Brantas river valley. Although regional chiefs (bupati) remained power-
ful, Airlangga’s kingdom was more centralized than any before that time.
He built irrigation works in the Brantas delta, which controlled flooding
and enabled a major expansion in the cultivation of rice, which was ex-
ported through the new deepened harbor of Surabaya to other parts of
the archipelago. He is also credited with increasing the Javanese content
of court culture and with diminishing its Indian elements. In about 1045,
according to legend, Airlangga abdicated to become an ascetic after hav-
ing divided his kingdom between his two sons to form the kingdoms of
Kediri and Janggala. [0509, 0512, 0516, 0520]

AKSI SEPIHAK (direct action). See LAND REFORM.

ALANG-ALANG (Imperata cylindrica Poaceae). A hardy grass that is an

early colonizer in cleared rainforest areas, its matted root system makes it
difficult to eradicate. Its spread is traditionally one of the factors prompt-
ing shifting cultivators to move. It is intolerant of shade, and so gradually
gives way to tree species, but where repeated fires hamper the growth of
broad-leafed plants, it may form extensive fields resistant to forest suc-
cession, leading to the so-called Green Desert, something of a misnomer,
since many communities do return alang-alang fields to cultivation.
Shifting cultivators are commonly blamed for the spread of the grass, but
it seems that some of the largest areas of infestation were caused by ex-
tensive cultivation of pepper and gambier in the 19th century. [1148]

ALGEMENE RECHERCHE. See POLITIEK INLICHTINGEN DIENST.

ALGEMENE STUDIECLUB (General Study Club). The club was

founded in November 1925 on the model of study clubs organized by Dr.
Sutomo to bring together young Indonesian intellectuals to discuss pol-
itics and philosophy. The Algemene Studieclub in Bandung included
Sukarno and was openly political. After the banning of the Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI) in 1927, the club became the core around which
the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) was formed. See also NATION-
ALISM. [0888]

ALI-BABA FIRMS. They had their roots in the cooperation between Chi-
nese smugglers and Indonesian officials during the Japanese occupa-
 ALIRAN • 13

tion and particularly during the revolutionary war, when the Republic
sanctioned the trading of local products in exchange for hard cash or mil-
itary supplies, using Chinese businessmen. In the 1950s establishment of
such firms was an effort to circumvent legislation encouraging pribumi
business at the expense of the Chinese. In practice firms were still run by
a Chinese (“Baba”), with an Indonesian (“Ali”) as nominal head, some-
times providing political protection. See also CUKONG; INDONE-
SIANIZATION. [1045, 1068]

ALI SASTROAMIJOYO (1903–1975). Nationalist politician, prominent

in the Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland, and after independence
leader of the left wing of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). As
prime minister from July 1953 to July 1955, he sponsored the Asia-
Africa Conference and abrogated the Netherlands Indonesian Union.
His cabinet fell after the army refused to accept his nominee for chief of
staff. Ali formed a second cabinet in March 1956, which was also dogged
by scandals and regional rebellions. Its resignation on 14 March 1957
marked the end of parliamentary democracy. He remained party leader
during Guided Democracy, but was purged in 1966. [0695, 0706, 0841]

ALIRAN (lit., “stream” or “current”). In Indonesian usage this term is ap-

plied to any group characterized by adherence to similar ideas or ideals,
for example, aliran sosialis. In Western social science, following the
work of American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, it denotes the two ma-
jor cultural-religious traditions in Muslim Javanese society: the syn-
cretist abangan and the orthodox santri. A third aliran identified by
Geertz, the priyayi, is now commonly regarded as a class category, re-
ferring to the aristocratic aspect of the abangan aliran (and sometimes
extended to part of the santri elite). Aliran structure has been said to re-
semble the verzuiling (“pillarization”) of Dutch society, with most peo-
ple belonging in the 1950s and 1960s to aliran-specific (rather than na-
tional, regional, or class-based) political, social, and other organizations.
Organizational life in Java, however, has always been far more frag-
mented than this would imply. The 1955 election results, for instance,
suggested the existence of at least four aliran at that time. In many re-
gions the classification is subethnic, santri coming from the pasisir and
abangan from the interior of Java. The classification is made more prob-
lematic by the fact that some santri Muslims, especially of the Nahd-
latul Ulama, draw a good deal of their thought from non-Islamic Ja-
vanese traditions. See ISLAM; KEBATINAN. [0700, 0703, 1239, 1343]
14 • ALISYAHBANA, SUTAN TAKDIR

ALISYAHBANA, SUTAN TAKDIR (1908–1994). Novelist and philoso-

pher, born in North Sumatra. He studied law in Batavia and worked as
editor for the Balai Pustaka before founding the journal Poedjangga
Baru with Armijn Pané and Amir Hamzah. He played a major role in de-
veloping the Indonesian language as a tool for sophisticated intellectual
and technical usage, especially through his editing of the journal Pem-
bina Bahasa Indonesia. [0636, 0890]

ALOR. Island and archipelago in Nusatenggara. The mainly animist pop-

ulation still produces cast bronze drums whose cultural origin is uncer-
tain. See also GAMELAN. [1219]

AMANGKURAT I (r. 1646–1677). Son and successor to Sultan Agung,

he sought to consolidate his father’s empire by gathering all authority in
the land to himself, but in doing so he alienated both court officials and
regional lords. In 1647 he lost control of the Balambangan region; most
of Mataram’s former vassals in Sumatra and Kalimantan also fell
away. He forbade his subjects from leaving Java and in 1652 banned the
export of rice and timber, though his aim seems to have been to gain con-
trol of the trade, especially with the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC), for himself. His authoritarian rule precipitated the revolt of the
Madurese prince Trunojoyo in 1671, in the course of which Amangku-
rat was driven from his capital in 1677 to die in exile. [0484, 0560]

AMBON (Amboina). Island and city in Maluku (formerly the Moluccas),

originally a part of the sparsely populated hinterland of Ternate and
Tidore. The Portuguese established a fort in 1574, but in 1605 the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) seized the island, made it the center of
their operations in the east of the archipelago under Cornelis de Hout-
man, and planted extensive clove orchards. For most of the 17th century,
the Dutch struggled to exclude other foreigners (see “AMBOYNA
MASSACRE”; ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY) and to estab-
lish a monopoly on the spice trade (see HONGI RAIDS). British forces
seized the island during the Napoleonic Wars (1796–1802, 1810–1817),
and the restoration of Dutch rule was followed by a revolt on the nearby
island of Saparua in 1817, led by Thomas Matulesia (1783–1817), also
known as Pattimura.
In the latter part of the colonial period, the Ambonese gained a repu-
tation for strong loyalty to Dutch rule. This was partly because service in
the colonial army or Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL)
 AMBON • 15

was one of the few employment opportunities available to Ambonese,

and they were posted widely through the archipelago (though the mili-
tary category “Ambonezen” also included many from the Minahasa and
Timor). Christian Ambonese had European legal status (see LAW;
RACE), though seldom enjoyed practical legal equality. In 1930, Protes-
tant Christians formed around 67 percent of the Ambon population, with
the balance Muslims.
Ambon was the scene of heavy fighting between Japanese and Aus-
tralian troops in 1942, and it was bombed by the Allies in 1945. It be-
came part of the Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT) in 1946, and after the
transfer of sovereignty in 1949 became a base of the separatist Repub-
lik Maluku Selatan (RMS).
In the years after independence, there was an influx of Muslim mi-
grants, mostly from Sulawesi. The Buginese in particular came to dom-
inate Ambon’s commercial life, eroding the power of the Christians. An
Ambonese Muslim became governor of the island in the early 1990s, and
Christian resentment of Muslims increased with the downturn in the
economy and the collapse of clove prices. In October 1998, there was a
rumor that the governor intended to replace all top civil servants with
Muslims. Interreligious violence broke out early the following year and
continued through 1999, with Jakarta apparently powerless to end it. It
was exacerbated by an influx of Muslim volunteers from Java, particu-
larly members of the Pemuda Pancasila and Laskar Jihad. By the end
of the year, Muslims controlled approximately 40 percent of Ambon city
and Protestants 60 percent, and the economy was in ruins.
In early 2000 the violence spread to the islands of Banda, Buru, Ter-
nate, and Halmahera. By June more than 2,500 people had been killed in
Ambon, and tens of thousands of Bugis and other Sulawesi migrants had
fled. Altogether, between January 1999 and mid-2001 more than 6,000
people died in the Moluccan Islands before the violence petered out.
In March 2002 the government flew Christian and Muslim represen-
tatatives to Sulawesi to sign the Malino II Agreement, which brought a
formal end to hostilities on Ambon and called for the disarming of mili-
tia groups and an investigation into the origins of the violence. Some of
the 150,000 refugees began to return, but there was a further outbreak of
violence on 28 April when masked gunmen slaughtered 14 Christian vil-
lagers. About 400 Laskar Jihad members remained on Ambon until Oc-
tober, when they returned to Java after the Bali bombing and announced
that their organization had been disbanded. [0025, 0491, 0559, 0781,
0784, 0967]
16 • “AMBOYNA MASSACRE”

“AMBOYNA MASSACRE.” In 1623 Dutch authorities on Ambon exe-

cuted 10 English merchants and 10 Javanese alleged accomplices on
charges of conspiring to seize the local Dutch fort. Dutch writers have
cited the affair as an example of English perfidy, with British writers
complaining in turn that the governor of Ambon had reneged on his
promise to protect the merchants. The massacres hastened the with-
drawal of British interests from the archipelago to India. See also EN-
GLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY. [0491]

AMERICAS, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH THE. Tropical America

was a major source of plants cultivated in the Indonesian archipelago
from the 17th century. These included chili, cinchona, pepper, rubber,
sisal, soursop, vanilla, pawpaw, and pineapple. The disease syphilis
probably also derives from the Americas.

AMIEN RAIS. See RAIS, AMIEN.

AMIR SJARIFUDDIN (1907–1948). Nationalist politician. Born in

Medan, he graduated from the faculty of law in Batavia in 1933. He was
deeply involved in the nationalist movement and helped to establish the
Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo) in 1937, arguing strongly that
Japanese fascism was an even greater danger to Indonesia than Dutch
colonialism. When Japan attacked, he accepted ƒ25,000 from the Dutch
to set up an underground resistance against the Japanese. As a result of
his underground activities, he was arrested by the Japanese in January
1943 and condemned to death, but his life was spared through the inter-
cession of Sukarno. After independence, he cofounded the Partai
Sosialis (PS) with Sutan Sjahrir, becoming deputy prime minister and
defense minister in the Sjahrir cabinets. He cooperated closely with
A. H. Nasution and with the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo) and
was one of the architects of the Indonesian conventional army.
Amir became prime minister on 3 July 1947 and headed the Indonesian
delegation in negotiations leading to the controversial Renville Agree-
ments of January 1948. Discredited by his role in these agreements, he
was forced to resign and joined the radical opposition to the Sukarno/
Mohammad Hatta government, forming a Front Demokrasi Rakyat
(FDR) in February of that year. When Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
leader Musso returned from Moscow in August 1948, Amir allied his
FDR with the Communist Party, announcing that he had been a commu-
nist since before the war (a claim then widely doubted). In September he
joined the unsuccessful Madiun uprising against the Sukarno/Hatta gov-
 ANTARA • 17

ernment and was captured in late October. He was summarily shot by

government troops at the start of the second Dutch “Police Action” on
19/20 December 1948. [0478, 0674, 0858, 0865, 1117]

AMUK. A temporary derangement that leads an individual (normally male)

to wild and directionless violence, usually against other people. It is not
clear whether amuk has any strictly clinical causes; most observers at-
tribute it to a reaction against the extreme suppression of personal feel-
ings allegedly demanded in many Indonesian societies, but it may have
developed, like the Viking berserk, as a technique for inspiring terror in
enemies during battle and could apparently be encouraged by the use of
cannabis or opium. See also LATAH; WARFARE.

ANAK BUAH. Literally, “fruit child.” Protégé, client. See BAPAK.

ANGKATAN BERSENJATA REPUBLIK INDONESIA (ABRI). See

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA.

ANGKATAN ’45; ANGKATAN ’66. See GENERATIONS.

ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY. Signed on 17 March 1824, it revised British

and Dutch colonial holdings in western Indonesia. The British, ceding
Bengkulu to the Dutch and receiving Melaka in exchange, confined
themselves to and were given exclusive rights on the Malay Peninsula,
where they immediately established the port of Singapore. The Dutch
were given a free hand on Sumatra but agreed to guarantee the inde-
pendence of Aceh. The treaty permanently split the territories of the sul-
tanate of Riau-Johor. It explicitly permitted the British to retain their in-
terests in northern Borneo and to trade in areas not annexed by the
Dutch. See also BELITUNG; NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION
OF; RAFFLES, THOMAS STAMFORD. [0583]

ANSOR (from Arabic al-ansar, followers of the Prophet). Youth organiza-

tion founded in 1934 and affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),
known for its participation in massacres of communists, especially in
East Java, in 1965–1966. See also MASSACRES OF 1965–1966.

ANTARA (“between”). Founded on 17 December 1937 by R. M. Sumanang

and A. M. Sipatuhar, it was developed by Adam Malik and others as a pri-
vate, nationalist news agency. During the Japanese occupation, it was
merged with the Japanese agency Domei but became Indonesia’s official
18 • ANTASARI

news agency in 1945. Several agencies were merged with Antara in 1963
to form the Lembaga Kantor Berita Nasional (LKBN, National News
Agency Institute), but the name Antara is retained for daily use. [1304]

ANTASARI. See BANJARMASIN.

ARAB WORLD, RELATIONS WITH. Trade in spices linked Indonesia

and the Arab world even before the emergence of Islam, but it is the haj,
or pilgrimage to Mecca, and the study of Islam in general that have taken
the largest number of Indonesians to the Middle East. Arabs have al-
ways been prominent in the archipelago as traders and mercenaries.
Some 10,000 Indonesians (so-called mukim) lived semipermanently in
Arabia in the late 19th century. From the early 20th century, many In-
donesians studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.
In November 1946 the Arab League recommended recognition of the
Indonesian Republic, and Egypt and Syria in June 1947 were the first
states to officially recognize it. In the 1950s, Indonesia joined Arab and
other states in Asia and Africa to form the Non-Aligned Movement (see
ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE). Muslim organizations, especially
the modernist Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian
Islamic Preaching Council) founded in 1967 by former Masjumi lead-
ers, received donations from such countries as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Egypt for social and educational programs. During the 1970s and 1980s
they established hundreds of schools and mosques, and increased their
contacts with the Arab world, sending hundreds of students to centers of
learning in the Middle East. Also, since 1987 the number of Indonesians
working in the Middle East has increased substantially. Indonesia has no
diplomatic relations with Israel but recognized the state of Palestine only
in November 1988. Jemaah Islamiyah, the group accused of complicity
in terrorist activities, including the Bali bombing, reportedly receives fi-
nancial support and military training from Al Qaeda forces in the Middle
East and has sent volunteers to train with them in Afghanistan. See also
TURKEY, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. [0084, 0543, 0774, 1031,
1039, 1363]

ARABS. Coming especially from Hadramawt, Arabs settled in Indonesia

in small impermanent trading communities from perhaps the fifth cen-
tury, and Arab adventurers founded the kingdom of Pontianak; other dy-
nasties had Arab ancestry. As with the Chinese, Arab communities ab-
sorbed much local culture, some disappearing altogether and others
 ARCHEOLOGY • 19

forming distinctive peranakan communities. The greatest immigration

took place in the second half of the 19th century, when large communi-
ties settled especially on the north coast of Java. Sharing Islam with
most Indonesians, the Arabs were often better able than the Chinese to
be accepted as part of the nationalist movement. In 1934 A. R. A.
Baswedan founded the Persatuan Arab Indonesia (PAI, Indonesian Arab
Association) in Semarang to encourage the allegiance of peranakan
Arabs to Indonesia. The PAI joined the Gabungan Politik Indonesia
(GAPI) in 1939–1940. An Indo-Arabische Beweging (Indo-Arab Move-
ment) founded in 1939, on the other hand, argued for continued separate
status. After independence Arabs were generally accepted as Indone-
sians, and in the 1990s several Indonesians of Hadrami descent were
cabinet ministers, notably long-serving foreign minister Ali Alatas.
The modernist Al Irsyad organization, established in 1913 by Arab In-
donesians, is among the most active proponents of the introduction of Is-
lamic law and establishment of an Islamic state. It runs a network of
schools and colleges, including a school in Solo founded and headed by
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as well as about 140 missions and several hospitals.
Its chief, Faisal Buasir, is also a prominent leader in the Partai Persat-
uan Pembangunan (PPP). After the unification of Yemen in 1990,
growing numbers of Indonesian young people traveled there each year to
study at religious schools. The Arab community came under suspicion in
the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York (2001) and Bali (2002) as
several of the prominent Islamic militants in Indonesia (including Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir and Laskar Jihad head Ja’afar Umar Thalib) are of Arab
descent. [0480, 1041, 1057, 1069]

ARCHEOLOGY. The earliest serious archeological work in the archipel-

ago was conducted by the Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en
Wetenschappen, while in the early 19th century T. S. Raffles did some
work on the antiquities of Java, such as the excavation and partial recon-
struction of Borobudur. Extensive archeological work, however, did not
begin until the foundation of the Commissie in Nederlandsch-Indië voor
Oudheidkundig Onderzoek op Java en Madoera (Netherlands Indies Com-
mission for Investigation of Antiquities on Java and Madura) in 1901 un-
der J. L. A. Brandes. Headed successively by N. J. Krom (1910–1916),
F. D. K. Bosch (1916–1936), and W. F. Stutterheim (1936–1942), and be-
coming the Oudheidkundige Dienst (Archeological Service) in 1913, it
was active in investigating and protecting the archipelago’s antiquities,
though it paid greatest attention to the Hindu-Buddhist relics of Java. The
20 • ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT

postindependence Dinas Purbakala dan Peninggalan Nasional (National

Archeological and Remains Service, now Pusat Penelitian Arkeologi Na-
sional, National Center for Archeological Research) under H. R. van
Heekeren (to 1956) and then Sukmono continued this work while giving
greater attention to the archeology and prehistory of the other islands.
[0112–0124, 0507]

ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT (Wawasan Nusantara). On independence,

Indonesia inherited a three-mile territorial waters limit around each of its
(then) 13,677 islands. Largely for security reasons, this was expanded by
a declaration of 13 December 1957 and an Act of 18 February 1960 to
12 miles, measured from a straight baseline drawn from the outermost
points of each island, thus covering the entire archipelago. The 1973 Act
on Indonesia’s Continental Shelf claimed seabed resources but required
the reaching of seabed agreements with Malaysia (1969, 1971, 1981),
Thailand (1971, 1975, 1977), Australia (then including Papua New
Guinea) (1971, 1972, 1973), India (1974, 1977), Singapore (1973,
1978), and Papua New Guinea (1980). A further treaty was signed with
Australia in 1988, establishing a marine border in the so-called Timor
Gap, covering the territorial waters of former Portuguese Timor. Over-
lapping claims with Vietnam and China in the South China Sea remain
unresolved, the most troubling for Indonesia being Beijing’s unilaterally
declared boundary that in 1995 included Indonesia’s rich Natuna Island
gas field. The principle, argued by Indonesia since the 1958 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, that an archipelagic nation is entitled to claim all
waters between its islands as internal waters was upheld by the United
Nations International Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, though
the Sunda and Lombok straits are recognized as international water-
ways. On 21 March 1980 Indonesia claimed a 200-kilometer Exclusive
Economic Zone around its outer perimeter, and this was formalized by
law in 1983. In 1994 Indonesia’s claim to archipelagic status was recog-
nized under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, giving In-
donesia an additional 3 million square km of territorial waters and juris-
diction over another 3 million square km Economic Exclusion Zone. See
also CONTINENTAL DRIFT; PIRACY. [1108]

ARCHITECTURE. Austronesian migrants to Indonesia in circa 3000

B.C. apparently brought with them techniques for building thatched
communal dwellings (see MIGRATIONS) of a kind still seen among
the Dayaks. In later times, however, smaller dwellings for individual
 ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA • 21

(extended) families became more common, and the typical house

throughout much of the archipelago was a light, impermanent structure
built of palm and bamboo materials, with a steep roof against tropical
rains and constructed on poles as a protection against flooding. Royal
palaces adopted the same style on a grander scale. In Java, the charac-
teristic structure of royal palaces is the pendopo, consisting of a steep
roof with decorated ceiling supported on pillars over a raised floor, with
no walls.
Foreign influences may have registered first in religious architecture:
Hindu and Buddhist temples were often of stone and brick, and many
examples still survive especially on Java (see ARCHEOLOGY;
BOROBUDUR; KRATON). The style of mosque most common in In-
donesia, especially Java, is also distinctive, being square, with four sup-
porting pillars and a veranda (serambi) facing east. European trading
companies used brick and stone extensively for their trading posts, partly
for defensive reasons, and their early dwelling houses were closely mod-
eled on European styles. A distinctive Dutch colonial architecture
emerged in the early 19th century, with high ceilings, marble or tiled
floors, deep verandas, neoclassical pillars, living areas opening directly
onto the garden, and separate pavilions for cooking, bathing, and the like.
This style declined in the 20th century with a return to European urban
models. Since independence, many Indonesian architects have endeav-
ored to incorporate traditional forms and motifs in their work. While the
Suharto government was often suspicious of manifestations of regional
ethnic identity in matters such as language, it expressly encouraged the
preservation of the strikingly different characteristic architectural styles
of Indonesia’s many ethnic groups; this official sanctioning is seen per-
haps most clearly in Jakarta’s Taman Mini Indonesia Indah (Beautiful In-
donesia in Miniature theme park). [0125–0131, 0536]

ARISAN. A rotating credit association, typically of 10–20 persons, com-

mon on Java. Members meet regularly to pay fixed contributions, the en-
tire kitty at each meeting being taken by one member, chosen by lot or
prior agreement. The arisan ends when all members have drawn from it.
See also PAWNSHOPS.

ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. Until 1999

(when its name was changed and the police separated from it), the armed
forces was named Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) and
encompassed the army (Angkatan Darat), navy (Angkatan Laut), air
22 • ARMY

force (Angkatan Udara), and police (Polisi Negara or Angkatan Ke-

polisian). In 1962 Sukarno created ABRI as a central body over the pre-
viously separate individual forces, mainly as a device to remove General
A. H. Nasution from command posts. Until the advent of the New Or-
der, therefore, the central armed forces command had little power over
the separate services. After the abolition of separate service ministries in
1967, however, the armed forces, except the police, were gradually inte-
grated within a single command structure under the Ministry of Defense
and Security (Hankam, Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan). From
1967 to 1983, the posts of defense minister and ABRI commander were
always held by the same man. In 1988 the armed forces consisted offi-
cially of 284,000 personnel, with a further 800,000 in “reserves,” which
included the village guards (Hansip, Pertahanan Sipil).
In April 1999 the armed forces were renamed Tentara Nasional In-
donesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army), the name they had held dur-
ing most of the Revolution and the 1950s. On that same date the police
were formally separated from the armed forces, although this order was
not implemented until the following year. In 2000 the armed forces com-
prised 300,000 men in the army, air force, and navy. Armed Forces Day
is celebrated on 5 October.
For a list of armed forces commanders, see APPENDIX E. See also
DEFENSE POLICY; DWIFUNGSI; “FIFTH FORCE.” [0037, 0714,
0930, 0968, 0972, 0974, 0975]

ARMY (Angkatan Darat, AD). The Indonesian army dates its founding to
5 October 1945, when the new national government announced the cre-
ation of a Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People’s Security Army) and
gave a mandate for the actual formation of an army to Urip Sumoharjo,
a retired major from the Dutch colonial army (Koninklijk Nederland-
sch Indisch Leger [KNIL]). The government had previously (on 22 Au-
gust) created a quasi-military Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People’s
Security Organization), responsibility for which was largely devolved to
regional national committees (Komité Nasional Indonesia, KNI); BKR
units in general formed the basis of the TKR.
The new army drew its officer corps principally from former soldiers
and officers of the KNIL and the Japanese-sponsored Pembela Tanah
Air (Peta) on Java and Giyugun on Sumatra. For about 40 years, the
army remained under the domination of the so-called Generation of ’45
(see GENERATIONS) who first made their mark and obtained com-
mand posts during the national Revolution. The ranks of this generation
 ARMY • 23

were thinned in later years by the exclusion and self-exclusion of many

fundamentalist Muslims and leftists so that the social base of the officer
corps could increasingly be described as conservative, abangan, and
from the small town elites of Java.
After 1945 a gradual centralization of military authority took place.
Initially most army units depended financially and logistically on local
civilian governments, and regional commanders enjoyed extensive au-
tonomy from the center. Senior officers met in Yogyakarta on 12 No-
vember 1945 and elected Sudirman as army commander, relegating the
government’s choice, Urip, to the post of chief of staff. The navy and air
force were separate organizations under the Ministry of Defense. Hier-
archy was further weakened by the existence of numerous armed organ-
izations outside the army (see BADAN PERJUANGAN; HIZBUL-
LAH; LASYKAR). Gradually, however, military authority was
concentrated in the general staff, dominated by former KNIL officers.
With the help of the Ministry of Defense under Amir Sjarifuddin, ir-
regular armed units were disbanded or incorporated, Sudirman’s author-
ity was gradually diminished, and “reliable” officers were gradually
placed in key positions. In this process the TKR changed its name to Ten-
tara Keselamatan Rakyat (TKR, 1 January 1946), Tentara Republik In-
donesia (TRI, 24 January 1946), and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI,
June 1947). In 1949 the Republic’s armed forces were merged with the
KNIL to form the APRIS (Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat,
Armed Forces of the RIS), becoming APRI in August 1950.
The postrevolutionary army was overlarge (perhaps 500,000 in late
1949) and deeply segmented. Divisional commanders, especially of the
Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions in West, Central, and
East Java respectively, enjoyed great autonomy, while the regional com-
manders in East Sumatra and Minahasa maintained major smuggling
operations. The high command was unable to meet army financial needs
and the following decades saw a gradual movement toward reduction of
size and centralization of authority, promoted particularly by A. H. Na-
sution as minister of defense. This process included the creation of elite
commando-style units (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan
Darat [Kostrad], Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat [RP-
KAD], and Banteng Raiders) directly under central command and an ex-
pansion of formal military training both at the Army Staff and Command
School (Seskoad, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat) in Ban-
dung and at Fort Leavenworth in Texas. In 1952, Nasution began a pro-
gram of transferring regional commanders away from their power bases.
24 • ARMY

When the officers mobilized parliamentary support against the transfers

and demobilizations, Nasution and others organized demonstrations in
Jakarta on 17 October, calling for the dissolution of parliament.
Sukarno refused and Nasution was suspended from duty for three years,
leaving the high command much weakened.
With his reinstallation as chief of staff in November 1955, Nasution
resumed his transfer program, which sparked the regional military
coups preceding the regional rebellions. Martial law was instituted
throughout the country. Dismissals after the PRRI/Permesta rebellion
and an expansion of the army to 330,000 for the West Irian (Papua)
campaign increased the power of the high command, headed from 1962
by Ahmad Yani. During Guided Democracy, President Sukarno, sus-
picious of army power, promoted the distinctive identities of the navy,
air force, and police, but in 1967–1970, after General Suharto became
president, the four separate ministries were reabsorbed into the Defense
Ministry.
Under President Suharto, the role of the army expanded into all levels
of the administration when dwifungsi, the official doctrine authorizing
the armed forces’ extensive participation in politics and government in-
troduced in 1960, was expanded and implemented. During the early
years of the New Order, the top positions within the army were still
dominated by the 1945 generation of officers, but by the early 1980s
these officers were gradually retiring from active service to be replaced
by a new “professional” generation graduated from the Military Acad-
emy, established in Magelang in 1957. With this development there was
a decline in the importance of affiliation with the historic territorial divi-
sions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and so on) of the Revolution, and greater
emphasis was placed on technical service specializations (infantry, ar-
tillery, engineers, and the like). Javanese dominance of the officer corps
continued, however, into the early 1990s, with between 60 and 70 per-
cent of senior officers of Javanese origin, a proportion that lessened to
approximately 55 percent by the end of the New Order. By 1988, all
members of the ’45 generation had retired.
During the 1980s, under Benny Murdani (who held the post of com-
mander in chief of the armed forces from 1983 to 1988), the army’s in-
fluence expanded throughout all sectors of the state and society. In
1985–1986 there was a major reorganization of the armed forces,
whereby the 16 regional commands instituted in the late 1950s were re-
duced to 10 (see map 8). Power within the army was further centralized
within the hands of Commander in Chief Murdani, and roles previously
 ARMY • 25

held by the navy and air force were taken over by the army. The aims of
the reorganization were primarily to emphasize the importance of inter-
nal security vis-à-vis that of external threat. In 1988 army personnel of-
ficially numbered 215,000. Murdani’s strengthening grip on the military,
however, drew the suspicion of the president, leading to his abrupt re-
moval from his position as commander in chief in February 1988 (though
he was appointed minister of defense and held onto his post as Kop-
kamtib commander) and replacement by army chief of staff and former
Suharto aide, Try Sutrisno.
From that point on, particularly after Murdani’s later dismissal from
his post as minister of defense in 1993, it became clear that Suharto was
attempting to strengthen his personal control over the army, a situation
reflected in the rapid personnel changes in the top army leadership
throughout the mid-1990s. The growing strength of Suharto’s connection
to Muslim organizations and the resultant increase in the influence of
Muslim officers, together with a shift in the army’s relations with
Golkar and the increasing influence of Suharto family members, such as
the president’s son-in-law Prabowo Subianto in the army and his
daughter Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) in Golkar, led to increasing
schisms within the officer corps and a resultant weakening of its power.
As dissension grew with the financial crisis and collapse of the rupiah
in late 1997 and early 1998, Suharto made efforts to protect himself by
placing officers of undisputed loyalty in key positions around the na-
tion’s capital, but the army became incapable of decisive action. This
was clear in May 1998 when Suharto called on the military to defend him
and, instead, Armed Forces Commander in Chief Wiranto was one of
those who advised the president to abdicate in favor of his vice president
B. J. Habibie.
Immediately after Suharto’s resignation Prabowo, as Kostrad com-
mander, made an effort to replace Wiranto but was instead himself dis-
missed. Subsequently Wiranto moved to remove or transfer officers
closely allied with Prabowo from influential positions and subsequently
announced a program of military reforms reducing the army’s political
role in Indonesian society. On Armed Forces Day (5 October) 1998, he
announced the separation of the national police from the armed forces
and the reversion of the armed forces’ name to Tentara Nasional Indone-
sia (TNI), publicly cutting the army’s ties to Golkar and declaring its
neutrality in the forthcoming electoral campaign. He also agreed to the
TNI’s representation in parliament being reduced from 75 to 38 seats,
and he drastically reduced the numbers of army personnel seconded to
26 • ARMY

nonmilitary governmental positions. It was subsequently announced that

the army’s territorial structure would revert to the pre-1984 system of 17
rather than 10 Kodam (four each in Sumatra, Java, and Kalimantan,
two in Sulawesi, and one each in Nusatenggara, Maluku, and Irian
[Papua]).
But the army was discredited by its reactions to the unrest in Aceh and
its role in sponsoring militias involved in the 2001 massacre in East
Timor. Wiranto had been replaced as armed forces commander in chief
by his deputy Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto (1944–) in November 1999,
being appointed instead to the position of coordinating minister for po-
litical and security affairs, and then forced to resign from that position in
May 2000. The new president Abdurrachman Wahid overrode many of
Wiranto’s policies, particularly in Aceh, and publicly disagreed with his
plans for reorganizing the military’s territorial structure. Subsequent
fierce infighting among the officer corps was exacerbated by investiga-
tions into human rights abuses by military elements in East Timor and
other restless areas. President Wahid’s interference in military affairs
alienated much of the officer corps, who established close ties with his
vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Army Chief of Staff Endri-
artono Sutarto (1947–) refused to back President Wahid when he tried to
proclaim a state of emergency and dissolve parliament in early 2001; in-
stead, the army supported moves in parliament to impeach the president.
When Megawati replaced Wahid as president, she seemed intent on ap-
pointing Army Chief of Staff Sutarto as armed forces commander in place
of Admiral Widodo, though he was not due for retirement until 2004.
Lieutenant-General Ryamizard Ryacudu (1950–), head of the Army
Strategic Reserve, replaced Sutarto as army chief of staff. Both Sutarto
and Ryamizard have close links not only to Megawati but also to her hus-
band Taufik Kiemas and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan
(PDIP), and Ryamizard is also the son-in-law of Try Sutrisno. Despite its
close alliance with the president, however, the military seemed unlikely
to resume a major parliamentary role—with its current representation of
38 appointees scheduled to end in 2004. Former defense minister Juwono
Sudarsono criticized its forces for acting as mercenaries in their general
policy of collecting protection money from large and small businesses—
a practice that had been common since the late 1970s when the state cut
the army budget, but one that gained publicity with the killings of Amer-
icans near the Freeport mine in August 2002. The army began making at-
tempts in early 2003 to supersede civilian control in the event of a na-
tional emergency, introducing a provision to a TNI bill before parliament
 ARTS, ARTISTS • 27

authorizing the armed forces chief to deploy troops when he determines

the well being of the state is at risk, needing only to inform the president
24 hours after so doing. Such a provision would directly contravene the
Indonesian Constitution as well as the 2002 Defense Act, which stipu-
lates that the sole authority to declare a national emergency rests with the
president.
Despite calls by reformers wishing to dismantle the territorial system,
the current army leadership is apparently trying to expand the number of
territorial units. They see such an expansion as strengthening their polit-
ical power at both the national and local level while helping ease their fi-
nancial difficulties. For a list of army commanders, see APPENDIX E.
See also DEFENSE POLICY; MILITARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS;
WARFARE. [0668, 0669, 0709, 0714, 0727, 0731, 0733, 0877, 0968,
0972, 0973, 0981, 1005]

ARTS, ARTISTS. Indonesia’s prehistory yielded works of durable materi-

als like stone, metal, and sometimes clay, which are still preserved today.
Other art forms are still perpetuated, although often in a new medium.
These include dance, the wayang (shadow play), and the classical dance
drama of Java and Bali. Parallel to traditional art forms are contempo-
rary painting and sculpture. Portuguese sources indicate that there were
experts in painting at the court of Majapahit in the early 16th century,
and Western influences on indigenous art may have begun with pictures
brought by agents of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as gifts to
local rulers in the 17th century.
Modern Indonesian painting has its roots in the 19th century when a
number of Dutch and other European artists lived in the Indies. The first
Western-trained Indonesian painter of significance was Raden Saleh
(1816–1880). Following him, the “Beautiful Indies” school of painting,
with its emphasis on naturalistic landscapes and portraits, was prevalent
in the early decades of the 20th century. The modern Indonesian art that
emerged in the late 1930s was characterized by its growing emphasis on
the individual and its increasing experimentation with new approaches to
painting. After independence in 1945, two fine arts departments were es-
tablished in Indonesia modeled on Dutch academies—the Faculty of Fine
Art and Design in Bandung “espousing aesthetic formalism” and the In-
donesian Academy of Fine Art (ASRI) in Yogyakarta, practicing “an art
rooted in social realities.” Both schools played important roles in the de-
velopment of modern Indonesian art. In Bali the tradition of painting and
sculpture provided the foundation for modern artists (for example, Agus
28 • ARU

Djaja [Djajasuminta]), while in Java the artists drew largely on Western

influences (for example, Affandi, Basoeki Abdullah, Hendra Gunawan,
and Anton H. Sudjojono).
In 1965 the overthrow of the Sukarno regime and the resulting mas-
sacres silenced many of the socially engaged artists, especially those
who had been affiliated with the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat
(Lekra). It was not until the mid-1970s that a group of young artists,
calling themselves the New Art Movement, challenged the more estab-
lished artists in the academies and tried to bring their art closer to In-
donesian life. In the closing decades of the 20th century, according to As-
tri Wright, “Official Indonesian definitions of modern art to a large
degree cluster around the old Javanese philosophical values halus and
kasar,” with halus referring to the “‘universalist’ aesthetic adhered to by
many senior artists” and kasar represented by younger artists seeking to
view society “from an ant’s perspective” and focusing on the less refined
and more disturbing aspects of modern Indonesian society. See also
CULTURE, MUSIC. [0150, 0159, 0172, 0201, 0202]

ARU. Malay-Batak kingdom on the east coast of Sumatra, near modern

Deli. Seldom fully independent, it was occupied by Javanese forces from
Majapahit in 1350, became briefly independent around 1460, and was
later contested by the Muslim rulers of Aceh and Riau. It fell to Aceh in
about 1600 but during the 17th century reemerged as the independent
sultanate of Deli. [0818]

ARU ISLANDS. Archipelago in southeastern Indonesia with a largely

Melanesian population. The islands were formally annexed by the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) in 1623 as a source of pearls and birds
of paradise, but there was little active Dutch presence and they were ef-
fectively under Bugis and Makassarese domination until Dutch adminis-
tration was established in 1882. Commercial pearl fishing expanded in
the early 20th century. [0032]

ARUNG PALAKKA (1634–1696). Prince of the Bugis state of Soppeng

in southern Sulawesi. After rebelling against Sultan Hasanuddin of
Makassar in 1660, he took refuge with his followers on Buton before
they served as mercenaries for the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
in Batavia in 1663. He joined the VOC attack on Makassar in 1666–1667
and as a reward was made commander in chief and later (1672)
Arumpone, or king, of Bone. He assisted the VOC against Trunojoyo on
 ASLI • 29

Java in 1678. His autocratic rule in South Sulawesi prompted an exodus

of Bugis to other parts of the archipelago. [0549]

ASAHAN. Malay-Batak and Acehnese sultanate on the east coast of

Sumatra, founded 1695 and formerly subordinate to Siak. It was an-
nexed by the Dutch in 1865 and the sultan exiled to Riau, but in 1885
he was returned with reduced powers to provided a legal and political
basis for the expansion of European tobacco cultivation, later replaced
by rubber. In 1932 Dutch firms involved in the mining of bauxite on
Bintan made plans for an alumina plant powered by hydroelectricity
from the Asahan River, which flows out of Lake Toba. War and other
concerns delayed plans and not until July 1979 did work begin on the
so-called Asahan project, a joint venture with Japanese investors that
opened in February 1982 and involved the construction of a hydro-
electric dam on the Asahan River to supply power for an aluminum
smelter at Kuala Tanjung. Since that time, however, the water level in
Lake Toba has dropped two meters as a result of declining rainfall in
the catchment area, and the factory has at times had to cease produc-
tion. [0818]

ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE (Bandung Conference). Held in April

1955 on the initiative of the Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet and attended by
the leaders of 29 Asian and African states, including Zhou Enlai of
China, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cam-
bodia, and Gamal Nasser of Egypt. The conference endorsed Indonesia’s
claim to West Irian (see PAPUA) and helped to establish Sukarno’s cre-
dentials as a major Non-Aligned Bloc leader. See also FOREIGN POL-
ICY. [0695, 1102, 1122]

ASLI (“original”). Term widely used to describe cultural elements and tradi-
tions believed to predate Muslim, Christian, and often Hindu-Buddhist in-
fluence. Several small tribal groups—the Badui (West Java), Tenggerese
(East Java), Bali Aga (Bali), Buda (Lombok), and Donggo (Sumbawa)—
are believed to preserve the traditional culture of their respective regions.
(See also SAMIN MOVEMENT. [0487])
Asli is also an ambiguous term for indigenous people, often used in the
context of some form of discrimination against foreigners. Asli may
mean “born in Indonesia”—the 1945 Constitution prescribes that the
president shall be asli and seems to be based on the article of the U.S.
constitution, which requires the president to be native-born—or it may
30 • ASMAT

refer more narrowly to ethnicity, thus excluding descendants of Chinese,

Arabs, and Europeans. See also PRIBUMI.

ASMAT. Ethnic group inhabiting the swampy lowlands of southeastern

Papua. Their skilled woodcarving attracted much attention from collec-
tors and ethnographers, but since the 1970s Asmat society has been seri-
ously disrupted by labor recruitment for the timber industry and by the
relocation of communities for this purpose. [0803, 1230]

ASSOCIAÇÃO POPULAR DEMOCRÁTICA TIMORESE (APODETI,

Timorese Popular Democratic Association). Formed in Portuguese Timor
in 1974 by Arnoldo dos Reis Araujo to press for the colony’s integration
into Indonesia as an autonomous province, APODETI drew its rather
meager support from the small Muslim community and from people in
border areas. It received substantial financial aid from Badan Koordinasi
Intelijen Negara (Bakin) and the Indonesian consulate in Dili. It allied
with the União Democrática Timorese (UDT) in July 1975, just before
the UDT coup, and many of its leaders were jailed by Fretilin in the sub-
sequent civil war. It disappeared as a party after the Indonesian invasion
of December 1975, but many of its followers were appointed to posts in
the new provincial government after 1976. [0806]

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN).

ASEAN was founded on 8 August 1967 and comprised at that time In-
donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The
ASEAN secretariat is in Jakarta, and H. R. Dharsono was the first sec-
retary-general. Its members saw their principal security threats as inter-
nal and aimed to avert these by promoting economic development
through regional cooperation. Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984, soon af-
ter achieving independence from Britain; Vietnam became the seventh
member in 1995; Laos and Burma (Myanmar) were admitted to full
membership in 1997; and Cambodia became its 10th member in 1999.
ASEAN formally aimed to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neu-
trality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia, but its members commonly dis-
agreed on the extent to which great powers should be a part of this goal.
Little economic integration has been achieved, as became evident dur-
ing the 1997–1998 financial crisis, but on occasions ASEAN success-
fully operated as a unit in international affairs, especially in the achieve-
ment of a Cambodia settlement. See also FOREIGN POLICY. [0001,
1101, 1103]
 AUSTRALIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH • 31

ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLE. Doctrine, linked with the Ethical Policy

and especially Snouck Hurgronje, which argued that colonial rule
should aim to assimilate the Indonesian elite to modern Western secular
culture by means of education and the opening of government positions
to qualified Indonesians. It was opposed both by conservatives who saw
in it an end to colonial rule and by the proponents of adat, who believed
it would rob Indonesians of their own culture. See also DJAJADIN-
INGRAT, ACHMAD; MUIS, ABDUL.

ASTRA. Founded in 1957 by William Soeryadjaya (Tjia Kian Liong), As-

tra became Indonesia’s largest automobile producer. Unlike other man-
ufacturers, it retained considerable autonomy from the Suharto family
and was the main partner of Toyota in the car-manufacturing subsidiary,
Toyota Astra Motor. As the most visible symbol of Japanese influence
in Indonesia, its showroom was burned down by demonstrators in the
Malari riots (1974). Astra International was also active in banking, in-
surance, mining, food crops, and plywood manufacturing. In 1992 the
company collapsed because of mismanagement at Bank Summa and was
taken over by a group of ethnic Chinese businessmen, led by Prajogo
Pangestu and Liem Sioe Liong. Astra borrowed extensively in the mid-
1990s, and after defaulting on its debt it signed a debt restructuring plan
in 1999, which involved selling assets to help the company pay off its
losses. It was forced to ask for debt relief again in 2002 as, with little
faith in Indonesia’s economic recovery, few foreign investors were will-
ing to buy Indonesian assets. In December 2002, Astra’s major creditors
agreed to a new restructuring, forgiving part of its debt and stretching out
the repayment schedule to 2009. Toyota in a joint venture with Astra an-
nounced in March 2003 that it planned to make an investment of $180
million in expanding the production of utility vehicles, an investment
that would give it a 95-percent stake in the joint venture. [0313, 0402,
0745, 0748]

AUSTRALIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Up to about 3000 B.C.,

much of Australia and the Indonesian archipelago seem to have formed
a single cultural region inhabited by Austro-Melanesian (Australoid)
people who reached the area 50,000–100,000 years ago, perhaps earlier.
This continuity was broken by the arrival of Austronesians in the archi-
pelago (see MIGRATIONS); although the Austronesians certainly
reached the Australian coast from time to time, there is no trace of per-
manent settlement.
32 • AUSTRALIA, RELATIONS WITH

In the 17th century, Dutch authorities in Batavia sent expeditions to

the south to look for trading opportunities, but these explorers reported
nothing of commercial advantage there. The Dutch technique of sailing
to Indonesia by heading directly east from the Cape of Good Hope led a
number of vessels to sight and run against the western Australian coast.
In the 18th century the exhaustion of trepang (beche de mer) fields in the
archipelago brought Indonesian fishing fleets of up to 2,000 vessels,
mainly from Makassar, to the northern coast of Australia, where some
cultural influences on Aborigines are still visible.
During the first years of British settlement in eastern Australia in the
late 18th century, the Dutch settlements in Indonesia were the nearest
point of European civilization; and during the 19th century, Australian
produce found something of a market there. There were also important
scientific connections between the two colonies in the field of tropical
agriculture. A telegraph link between Banyuwangi on Java and Darwin,
Australia, was laid in 1871. Australian tourism to Indonesia began in the
early 20th century, and Australian commercial interests became involved
in eastern Indonesia, especially in the pearl industry of the Aru Islands.
During the 19th century, the Dutch colonial authorities became in-
creasingly worried by the possibility of Australian imperialist expansion
in the eastern archipelago, and well-founded Dutch suspicion of Aus-
tralia’s intentions hampered cooperation in the defense of the Indies
against Japan, although the two countries were joined with Britain and
America in the so-called ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian)
command. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia, the colonial
rulers formed a government-in-exile in Australia and attempted to stave
off Australian ambitions to establish some form of hegemony in Papua
(Irian) and Timor. [1116]

AUSTRALIA, RELATIONS WITH. At the close of World War II, Aus-

tralian forces accepted the Japanese surrender and restored Dutch rule
in eastern Indonesia, despite Australian ambitions in the region. The In-
donesian struggle, however, quickly attracted the sympathy of the Left
in Australia, where dockworkers organized strikes against Dutch ship-
ping, the first tangible sign of international support for the Republic.
Australian policy makers, historically unsympathetic to the Dutch and
keen to cultivate good relations with prospective neighbors, increas-
ingly sided with Indonesia in international forums, and Australia was
Indonesia’s nominee on the United Nations Good Offices Committee in
1947–1948.
 AUSTRALIA, RELATIONS WITH • 33

Relations with Indonesia deteriorated in the late 1950s over Indone-

sia’s continued claim to West Irian (Papua), which was seen in Australia
as expansionist, and in the early 1960s Australian troops fought Indone-
sians in northern Borneo during Confrontation. Relations were good
during the first decade of the New Order as Australia increasingly
sought friends in Asia while Indonesia looked for Western aid, but the In-
donesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, including the killing of five
journalists from Australia and later including what Indonesia has seen as
persistently hostile press reporting soured relations, which reached a
nadir in 1986 after a report in the Sydney Morning Herald (10 April) on
the Suharto family’s wealth.
From then on, Indonesia’s policy in East Timor was a continuing thorn
in its relationship with Australia, reaching a climax in 1999. In April of
that year, Australia pressed for introduction of an international peace-
keeping force to oversee the planned plebiscite on independence, it
opened a consulate in Dili on 8 June, and it strongly protested Indonesian
support of prointegration militias in their continuing violent campaigns.
Australia was the first country to pledge troops toward an international
peacekeeping force when widespread violence followed the 31 August
vote, and it headed the force that was dispatched to East Timor from Dar-
win on 20 September. Australian leaders condemned the Indonesian mili-
tias for their continuing violence against the Timorese, with some Aus-
tralians boycotting Indonesian goods and services, while Indonesians
responded with anti-Australian demonstrations. Relations remained cool,
and in December 2000 Indonesia protested Australia’s role in the seces-
sion of East Timor while Australia was concerned about the potential
refugee problem. In 2001 the Indonesian foreign minister visited Aus-
tralia, and the two countries agreed on joint measures to combat terrorism
and on introducing measures on a regional basis to reduce illegal migra-
tion to Australia from Afghanistan and south Asia, via Indonesia.
In the aftermath of the Bali bombings of October 2002 in which 89
Australian tourists lost their lives, relations between the two countries
underwent a further change when they signed an agreement allowing the
Australian Federal Police (AFP) to participate in the investigation. But
fears were raised in Indonesia when Australian Prime Minister John
Howard declared in December that his government was willing to launch
preemptive attacks on terrorists in neighboring countries. In 2002 total
trade between Australia and Indonesia reached a record high of A$7.4
billion, with Indonesia’s exports to Australia at A$4.3 billion. [0479,
1107, 1112, 1114, 1116, 1133]
34 • AUSTRONESIANS

AUSTRONESIANS. See LANGUAGE; MIGRATION; RICE; TARO.

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. The domestic automobile industry grew up

in the 1970s. The two major car manufacturers were Astra, which took
up more than half the market, and the Salim Group. In 1996 Suharto
announced that a company, PT Timor Putra Nasional, owned by his son,
Hutomo (Tommy) Mandala Putra, would be allowed to develop a “na-
tional car,” to be named the Timor, in conjunction with Kia Motors of
South Korea. In fact, the company imported duty-free Timors made
wholly in South Korea, an arrangement denounced both by Indonesian
competitors and the World Bank. In July 1997, the Suharto government
pressured Indonesia’s biggest state and private banks to finance a Timor
factory east of Jakarta, but in January of the following year, an agreement
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led Suharto to end
tax breaks for the national car. See also INDUSTRIALIZATION;
SUHARTO FAMILY. [0313, 0402]

AZAS TUNGGAL (“sole principle”). See PANCASILA.

AZIZ, ANDI ABDUL. Captain in the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch

Leger (KNIL) who seized control of Makassar in a limited coup on 5
April 1950, partly to prevent the landing of Republican troops who, he
feared, might begin to dismantle the Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT),
partly out of frustration at the slow progress made in integrating former
KNIL troops into the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS) armed forces.
The Aziz affair ended when the NIT government failed to back him, and
he was arrested in Jakarta on 18 April. The resemblance of the affair to
the abortive coup by R. P. P. Westerling in Bandung was an important
element in discrediting the NIT. [0699, 0784]

–B–

BABAD. Javanese verse chronicles commonly written to describe and glo-

rify the rise or rule of a particular king, though some deal exclusively
with mythical tales. The term babad also means “to clear forest,” sug-
gesting that these chronicles were associated with the founding of king-
doms; they appear to be an indigenous development, though all known
babad were written after the conversion of Java to Islam. [0497, 0502,
0505]
 BADAN KOORDINASI BANTUAN PEMANTAPAN STABILITAS NASIONAL • 35

BABAD TANAH JAWI. Babad celebrating the power of 17th-century

Mataram, probably composed in the court of Sultan Agung, though all
known manuscripts date from the 18th and 19th centuries.

BACAN. Island in northern Maluku. Its people probably came originally

from Halmahera but now include a sizeable Christian community of
part-Portuguese descent. The Portuguese founded a fort there in 1558,
which fell in 1609 to the Dutch, who placed Bacan under the sovereignty
of Ternate. [0026, 0032]

BADAN INTELIJEN NEGARA (BIN). See BADAN KOORDINASI IN-

TELIJEN NEGARA (BAKIN).

BADAN INTELIJEN STRATEGIS (Bais, Strategic Intelligence Body).

See INTELLIGENCE.

BADAN KEAMANAN RAKYAT. See ARMY.

BADAN KERJA SAMA (BKS, Cooperative Bodies). Formed in

1957–1958 to allow coordination between the army and party mass or-
ganizations (organisasi massa) under the general idea, strongest in the
army, that the military should play a guiding role in directing national
energies. The largest of these bodies, the BKS Bumil (Buruh-Militer,
Labor-Military) and the BKS Tamil (Tani-Militer, Peasant-Military),
were formed in October 1957 and September 1958 respectively. Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) mass organizations that were initially in-
volved soon withdrew, and the BKS became clearly anticommunist co-
ordinating bodies. In December 1962, they were dissolved into the Sen-
tral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI). See also
DWIFUNGSI. [0714]

BADAN KOORDINASI BANTUAN PEMANTAPAN STABILITAS

NASIONAL (Bakorstanas, National Stabilization and Coordination
Body). A security organization formed on 5 September 1988 to replace
Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kop-
kamtib). Its responsibilities were vague but included monitoring secu-
rity matters and giving advice to the government. President Suharto
was formal head of the organization (unlike Kopkamtib, which was in a
technical sense independent of the presidency), and General Try
Sutrisno was the effective commander, but Bakorstanas boards at each
36 • BADAN KOORDINASI INTELIJEN NEGARA

level included civilian as well as military officials. Under President Ab-

durrachman Wahid, Bakorstanas was abolished in March 2000.

BADAN KOORDINASI INTELIJEN NEGARA (Bakin, State Intelli-

gence Coordinating Body). A nominally civilian intelligence organization,
separate from military intelligence structures and reporting directly to the
president. It was established in 1967, and its functions overlapped sub-
stantially with those of Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan
Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) and included surveillance of civilian dissent.
Bakin was headed from January 1974 to late 1989 by Lieutenant-General
Yoga Sugama (1925–2003). Under Abdurrachman Wahid’s presi-
dencey, Bakin was reorganized in January 2001 and renamed Badan In-
telijen Negara (BIN, State Intelligence Agency), with police intelligence
as its operational arm. When Megawati Sukarnoputri became president,
BIN’s influence expanded and its head, Hendro Priyono, was appointed to
the cabinet. After the Bali bombins BIN was appointed sole coordinator
for all intelligence activities in Indonesia, and local branches were estab-
lished throughout the archipelago. See also INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.

BADAN PENDUKUNG SUKARNOISME (BPS, Body to Support

Sukarnoism). Founded in September 1964 by a group of journalists, in-
cluding Adam Malik, opposed to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
in an attempt to distinguish publicly between Sukarnoism and commu-
nism and to separate Sukarno from the PKI. It was banned by Sukarno
as an alleged CIA plot on 17 December 1964. [0727]

BADAN PENYELIDIK USAHA PERSIAPAN KEMERDEKAAN IN-

DONESIA (BPUPKI, Investigatory Body for Preparatory Work for In-
donesian Independence). In March 1945, the Japanese occupation au-
thorities on Java set up the BPUPKI following Prime Minister Kuniaki
Koiso’s promise of eventual independence for the region. Membership in-
cluded most of the better-known prewar nationalists and represented most
streams of thought. The body met in Jakarta from 28 May 1945 and was
the forum to which Sukarno presented his speech outlining the Pancasila
on 1 June. It also drafted a Constitution for independent Indonesia (10–17
July) and decided that Indonesia should include the Malay Peninsula,
northern Borneo, and East Timor, though this was later rejected by the
Japanese. On 7 August, the BKUPKI was replaced by a 21-member Pani-
tia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI). See also ISLAMIC
STATE, DEMANDS FOR AN; SUCCESSION. [0644, 0647, 0663]
 BADAN PERMUSYAWARATAN KEWARGA-NEGARAAN INDONESIA • 37

BADAN PERENCANAAN PEMBANGUNAN NASIONAL (Bappenas,

National Development Planning Board). Indonesia’s principal economic
planning body, founded in 1963 by Sukarno but later the stronghold of
the group of New Order economic policy makers known as the “tech-
nocrats” or “Berkeley Mafia” (many of them having studied at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley). The group included Widjojo Nitisastro,
Ali Wardhana, Emil Salim, Mohamad Sadli, and Barli Halim; it had the
patronage of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and was initially strongly in-
fluenced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) view that the eco-
nomic difficulties faced by the country under Sukarno’s Guided Econ-
omy could be remedied by sober financial policies, looser economic
controls, and an opening of the country to foreign investment. It lost
much of its influence in the late 1980s and 1990s with the rise of B. J.
Habibie and the expanding role the Suharto family and cronies played
in the Indonesian economy.
In 2003 an effort was made to further erode the role of Bappenas in
shaping Indonesia’s development policies. A bill was proposed transfer-
ring the drawing up of short- and medium-term economic development
programs from Bappenas to the Ministry of Finance, which would no
longer have to coordinate with Bappenas over the country’s fiscal poli-
cies. Until then, Bappenas participated actively in drawing up macro-
economic targets, yearly state budget figures, and the five-year national
development program (now called Propenas) (see RENCANA PEM-
BANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN). Under the proposal, Propenas would be
replaced by the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which
would provide guidance for three, rather than five, years. See also CEN-
TRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; DEVEL-
OPMENT IDEOLOGY. [0295, 0353]

BADAN PERJUANGAN (struggle organizations). These sprang up

widely in 1945 as an expression of popular will to defend the Indonesian
Republic against the returning Dutch. Often untrained and armed only
with bamboo spears, they were outside the control of the regular army,
and in early 1946 the government moved to consolidate them into better-
organized lasykar, incorporate them within the army, or disband them.
See also SURABAYA. [0643, 0674, 0681]

BADAN PERMUSYAWARATAN KEWARGA-NEGARAAN IN-

DONESIA (Baperki, Consultative Body on Indonesian Citizenship). A
political organization of Indonesian Chinese, founded by Siauw Giok
38 • BADAN URUSAN LOGISTIK NASIONAL

Tjhan (1914–1980) on 13 March 1954 to succeed the Partai Demokrat

Tionghoa (Party of Democratic Chinese). It encouraged Chinese to ac-
cept Indonesian citizenship but defended the right of Chinese to retain
their culture as citizens. This attitude was opposed by the proassimilation
Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Institute for Developing Na-
tional Unity). Baperki was banned in 1966. [1045, 1063]

BADAN URUSAN LOGISTIK NASIONAL (Bulog, National Logistic

Supply Organization). Established in 1967 as a government purchase
agency, Bulog expanded its role in the 1970s to supervise and stabilize
the distribution and price of basic commodities such as rice, sugar, and
flour, partly as an aid to political stability. It was sharply criticized for
corruption in the allocation of distributorships by the Commission of
Four.
Despite deregulatory packages instituted by the Suharto government
in 1995 and 1996, Bulog retained its monopolies, including the exclusive
right to import wheat and sugar. It attempted to stabilize rice prices in
1996. In 1997 it came under attack from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which tied further financial assistance to a substantial deregula-
tion of the domestic food market; as a result, Bulog’s monopoly of the
importation of all commodities with the exception of rice was ended. Un-
der the presidency of Abdurrachman Wahid, its deputy chairman was
jailed for providing the president and his associates with considerable
funds they had requested without issuing a decree. [0761, 0763]

BADUI. Tribe of southern Banten, widely believed to be descendants of

pre-Muslim Sundanese who refused to convert to Islam, but probably of
much greater antiquity. They worship lelembut, ancestral spirits who
dwell near the source of the rivers Ciujung and Cisemet. Only 40 Badui
families, the “Inner Badui,” are permitted by custom to inhabit this sa-
cred area, and these are forbidden all contact with the outside world. The
remainder, the Outer Badui, are permitted some contact but are forbid-
den to make use of introduced technology such as horses, writing, vehi-
cles, and beds. See also ASLI.

BAHASA INDONESIA. See INDONESIAN LANGUAGE.

BAJAU. Also known as Sea People (orang laut) or Sea Gypsies, the Bajau
are a seafaring Malay people of eastern Indonesia and the southern Philip-
pines, typically living aboard boats or in small settlements of temporary
 BALI • 39

houses on stilts over the sea. Their dispersal from a presumed home in
southern Sulawesi may date from the fall of Makassar to Dutch and
Bugis forces in 1667 or to the commercial opportunities offered by
trepang collection. During the 18th–19th centuries, Bajau fleets ranged as
far as Australia in search of trepang for the China trade. [0549]

BALAI PUSTAKA. The government commission for literacy and popular

publication, founded in 1917 as the Comite (later Kantoor) voor de Volks-
lectuur (Committee, Office for Popular Literature). It published cheap
reading material in Malay, Sundanese, and Javanese (both original works
and translations from Dutch, including the letters of Raden Ajeng Kar-
tini in 1921); maintained libraries; and provided court interpreters. [0219,
0231, 0234]

BLAMBANGAN. The last Hindu kingdom on Java, controlling the east-

ern end of the island (Besuki and Probolinggo) after the fall of Ma-
japahit. It was fought over by Mataram and the Balinese state of Gel-
gel in the early 17th century, but flourished as an independent kingdom
from 1670 to 1690. In 1697 it was attacked once more by Mataram and
the Balinese rulers of Buleleng. Mataram transferred its claim over the
region to the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in 1734, and the com-
pany subdued it in a major campaign in 1771–1772. Constant warfare
and the piratical raids of Madurese severely depopulated the region, and
further destruction was caused by an eruption of Mt. Ijen in 1817. In the
19th century, the area was extensively settled by Madurese. The name
now refers to the forested peninsula on Java’s southeast corner rather
than to the former territory of the kingdom. [0502, 0577]

BALI. Although the culture and society of Bali have been studied exten-
sively, until recently relatively little was written on the island’s history.
Probably Hindu from the eighth or ninth century (the first Hindu inscrip-
tions record a king Warmadewa in the ninth century), Bali was ruled at
least in part by the Javanese king Airlangga in the early 11th century and
was conquered by Majapahit in 1334. A period of intensive Javanization
followed, and contemporary Balinese sometimes refer to themselves as
wong Majapahit (people of Majapahit). There is said, too, to have been
considerable migration of Javanese Hindus to Bali following the fall of
Majapahit to the pasisir states in 1527. The island remained divided be-
tween nine or so independent states—Klungkung, Karangasem, Mengwi,
Badung, Bangli, Tabanan, Gianyar, Buleleng, and Jembrana—though the
40 • BALI

rulers of Klungkung, whose territory included the temple of Besakih on

Mt. (Gunung) Agung and who were known as the Dewa Agung, were
sometimes regarded as overlords. Slaves were a major export in the 17th
and 18th centuries, the average annual export being 1,000–2,000. This
trade was in the hands of the rajas. Balinese formed an important element
in the Betawi communities around Batavia. Balinese mercenaries also
fought in various wars in Java.
Dutch political interest in the island began in the 19th century. To ex-
clude other Europeans, the Dutch obtained acknowledgments of sover-
eignty from Badung, Klungkung, Karangasem, and Buleleng in 1841 and
launched a series of military operations on the island in 1846, 1848, and
1849. The Dutch were also keen to stop Balinese piracy and plunder of
shipwrecks, and they attempted to intervene to control practices such as
slavery (common) and widow-burning (very uncommon). Buleleng and
Jembrana were brought under closer control in 1853, and Karangasem
and Gianyar were conquered in 1882. The plunder of a Dutch shipwreck
in 1904 provided the pretext for full military operations on the island
against Badung in 1906 and Klungkung in 1908. In the final battles of
each campaign, the respective royal families committed collective sui-
cide (puputan), walking into the guns of the Dutch forces. After a period
of direct rule by the Dutch, during which Singaraja on the north coast
was the island’s capital, the former kingdoms were restored in 1929 to
their former rulers as zelfbesturen (self-governing territories under
Dutch authority) in a massive ceremony at Besakih.
The Japanese military administration continued the Dutch system of
indirect rule but coupled this with an increasingly harsh system of surplus
extraction. Under their rule, existing conflicts intensified especially as the
Japanese attempted to mobilize the Balinese behind their war effort.
When Dutch forces landed in March 1946, they encountered strong mili-
tary opposition that continued until 1948. Using pro-Dutch Balinese ele-
ments, however, they incorporated the island into the Dutch-sponsored
federal state of East Indonesia (see FEDERALISM; NEGARA IN-
DONESIA TIMUR [NIT]) in 1946. After the NIT was dissolved in 1950
many of the old power arrangements remained more or less intact, the
kingdoms being converted into kabupaten and the rajas, or members of
their families, generally taking the office of bupati.
Head of the region (kepala daerah) and from 1958 governor of the
province was Anak Agung Bagus Suteja (?–1965). Close to Sukarno and
officially nonparty, Suteja played an important role in increasing the rep-
resentation of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and other leftists in
 BANDA ISLANDS • 41

the island’s administration and legislative bodies. Social tensions

mounted during the early 1960s, partly as a result of a land reform cam-
paign by the PKI, and apprehension mounted especially after several
thousand people died in an eruption of Mt. Agung in 1963. In the after-
math of the Gestapu, Suteja’s authority weakened, and after he was re-
moved to Jakarta in late November 1965 troops began to arrive from
Java and the massacre began. Perhaps 60,000 people were slaughtered as
alleged communists or leftists in 1965–1966.
Bali had been a significant tourist destination in the early 1930s, but un-
der the New Order, the island became a major international tourist center,
with its attraction expanding exponentially in the 1990s and accounting for
about a third of Indonesia’s revenue for tourism. After Suharto’s fall,
about 1.5 million foreigners were visiting the island annually, for it was
seen as a place largely immune to the ethnic and religious violence that was
plaguing other parts of the archipelago. This impression was shattered on
12 October 2002, when powerful bombs destroyed a nightclub in the Kuta
Beach tourist district, killing about 202 people, 89 of them Australians. See
also HINDUISM; LANGE, MADS JOHANSEN; MASSACRES OF
1965–1966. [0091, 0205, 0711, 0819, 0824, 0825, 0832, 1214, 1216, 1382]

BANDA ISLANDS. Small archipelago in Maluku, known especially for

the cultivation of nutmeg. Dependent on Java for rice, Banda came un-
der the rule of Majapahit in the 14th century and attracted a Portuguese
fleet under d’Abreu in 1511. Dutch trade in the islands began in 1599,
and the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) under Jan Pieterszoon
Coen annexed them in a bloody campaign from circa 1609 that left the
islands largely depopulated, perhaps 15,000 Bandanese being killed. The
islands were divided into nutmeg “groves” or perken, each perk being
under a VOC perkenier with slaves to work for him. Perkeniers were
obliged to deliver their produce to the company and, later, the colonial
government at fixed prices. With abolition of the monopoly in 1864, the
perkeniers became immensely wealthy until the depression of 1894.
During the late colonial period, Banda Neira, the main island in the
group, became a place of exile for prominent Indonesian nationalist lead-
ers, including Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, exiled there in 1928; Iwa
Kusumasumantri (1899–?), who arrived in 1930 (both Mangoenkoe-
soemo and Kusumasumantri were permitted to leave in early 1941); and
Sutan Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta, who were transferred there from
Boven Digul in 1936 and were only allowed to return to Java when the
Japanese invaded in January 1942.
42 • BANDITRY

During the 1980s, the islands were developed for tourism by Des
Alwi (whom Sjahrir had adopted during his exile on the island), but their
popularity declined markedly during the interethnic violence following
the fall of Suharto, which engulfed the Maluku islands. [0087, 0491]

BANDITRY. Crime is presumably as old as human society in Indonesia,

but the earliest known form of organized crime in the archipelago is
rural banditry, along with its marine counterpart, piracy. The plunder-
ing of travelers and the raiding of outlying settlements is often diffi-
cult to distinguish from early state building, and a number of rulers of
parts of Java, notably Ken Angrok, began their careers as rural crim-
inals. Criminal gangs generally formed around a single leader and did
not survive his death or loss of prestige. Leaders commanded not only
martial arts (pencak silat) but also magical powers such as the ability
to confer invulnerability, invisibility, or inaudibility on their followers.
The extent of rural banditry is always difficult to estimate, since there
are ample reasons for both exaggeration and underreporting, but many
areas of Java had a reputation as “unsafe” throughout the colonial
period.
Bandit gangs frequently took part in peasant uprisings against the
colonial power and in the 20th century came into contact with national-
ist groups. Sarekat Islam (SI) and the Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI) in particular valued the bandits both as a source of potential armed
strength and as a representation of the strength of the mass of the people.
Gangs provided some of the armed support for the PKI’s uprising in the
Jakarta region in 1926, but were generally ineffective against the colo-
nial police.
During the Revolution, gangsters in the Jakarta region and elsewhere
joined nationalists in armed resistance organizations (lasykar), but they
were generally unsuccessful in holding back the Dutch and most were
suppressed by the Republic’s own army in the course of the Revolution.
In the chaotic years that followed the transfer of sovereignty, rural ban-
ditry was rife in many regions, though it was often associated with polit-
ical dissent. Under the New Order, greatly increased social control in
the countryside diminished the incidence of banditry there, though urban
crime remained rampant. In the 1982 elections, in particular, figures as-
sociated with the government were said to be employing urban criminals
both to intimidate the other parties and as agents provocateurs. The elec-
tions were followed by a dramatic upsurge in violent crime, perhaps en-
couraged by this rumor of approval, which was suppressed, however, by
 BANJARMASIN • 43

the government’s program of extrajudicial killings known as Petrus

(penembakan misterius), beginning early 1983, which claimed several
thousand victims. See also PEMUDA PANCASILA. [0485, 0734, 0743,
1228]

BANDUNG. Major city in the Priangan, developed by the Dutch after

1810 as a center for the region’s plantation industry. It was the capital of
the Priangan from 1864 and grew rapidly after the arrival of the railway
in 1880. The colonial Department of War transferred there in 1916, and
the city was proposed as an eventual capital of the Netherlands Indies. In
1946, the southern part of the city was burned by Indonesian nationalists
forced to evacuate by the Allies. [0561, 0681]

BANDUNG CONFERENCE. See ASIA-AFRICA CONFERENCE.

BANGKA. Large island off the southeast coast of Sumatra, site of major
tin mines since 1710, operated at first by the sultan of Palembang, who
began to introduce laborers from China, Siam, and Vietnam. British
forces seized Bangka in 1806 and abolished the sultanate in 1816, but the
island was restored to the Dutch, who continued tin mining as a govern-
ment enterprise. The island also became a major exporter of white pep-
per in the 19th century, producing 90 percent of the world supply. After
falling to the Japanese in World War II, Bangka was reoccupied by the
Dutch in early 1946. The Dutch exiled Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta,
Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954), and other Republican leaders to the island
after their second “Police Action” of 19 December 1948. [0658, 0801]

BANGSA INDONESIA (“Indonesian nation”). Ambiguous ethnic term

that may refer simply to those born in Indonesia; more commonly, how-
ever, it describes ethnicity and excludes citizens of European, Chinese,
Indian, Arab, and other exogenous ancestry. See also ASLI; PRIBUMI.

BANJARMASIN. Kingdom on the Barito River in southern Kalimantan,

reputedly founded by Empu Jamatka in 1387. It quickly became an im-
portant source of diamonds, bezoar stones, and dragon’s blood (a plant
exudate) but was dependent on Java for the supply of rice and was trib-
utary in succession to the Javanese states of Majapahit, Demak, and
Mataram. Its ruler converted to Islam in circa 1520, and the sultanate
received many refugees from the north coast of Java after the fall of
Surabaya to Mataram in 1625. In the 17th century pepper, gambier,
44 • BANK PEMBANGUNAN INDONESIA

gold, and rattan became major trading commodities, attracting Chinese

traders as well as the Dutch and English East India Companies. Large
areas of alang-alang grassland in the region today are a legacy of the in-
discriminate clearing of forest for pepper and gambier cultivation in this
period. Both the Dutch and the British attempted to enforce monopolies
in the port, but successive agreements with sultans were unenforceable
as economic and political power collected in the hands of powerful pep-
per planters. The sultan of Banjarmasin formally ceded sovereignty to
the Dutch in 1786–1787, though he retained his throne and continued to
rule with little interference.
Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels abandoned Dutch hold-
ings in Banjarmasin in 1809, but in 1857 the Dutch reasserted their right
to appoint the deceased sultan’s successor and imposed a half-Chinese
son of the previous sultan on the unwilling aristocracy. A full-scale war
of succession ensued (1859–1863), the anti-Dutch party, strongly Is-
lamic, being led by a junior prince, Pangeran Antasari (1797–1862), and
a peasant leader, Sultan Kuning. The Dutch formally abolished the sul-
tanate in 1860. Sporadic fighting continued beyond the formal end of
major hostilities until 1905.
The area was a site of tough resistance to the Dutch by guerrillas un-
der Hasan Basry in the period 1945–1949, and much of the hinterland re-
mained in Republican hands, though, to the indignation of local leaders,
it was not recognized formally as Republican territory in the Linggajati
or Renville Agreements. In January 1948 the Dutch established a fed-
eral state, the Daerah Banjar, to be a constituent of the Indonesian fed-
eral republic (see FEDERALISM), but this was dissolved in March
1950. Resentment against central government policies led to a local up-
rising under Ibnu Hajar, which became associated with the Darul Islam
and lasted until 1963. [0811, 0693]

BANK PEMBANGUNAN INDONESIA (Bapindo, Indonesian Develop-

ment Bank). State owned, the bank employed thousands of employees,
and when it lost half its capital in a loan scam by one of its clients, Eddy
Tansil, which was revealed in 1994, Suharto refused pressure from Fi-
nance Minister Mar’ie Muhammad to liquidate the bank. (Tansil was ac-
cused of diverting to his private use a US$420 million Bapindo loan in-
tended to fund a West Java petrochemical project.) In the resulting trials,
four of Bapindo’s directors were sentenced to 4–8 years in jail. Eddy
Tansil was sentenced to life imprisonment but escaped and fled the coun-
try in 1996. [0761]
 BANKING • 45

BANKING. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) initially drew its
capital from the Netherlands and, having a monopoly of trade in the ar-
chipelago, had no wish to allow local credit facilities for others. In 1746,
however, Governor-General Gustaaf Willem, baron van Imhoff
(1705–1750), established a Bank van Leening (Lending Bank) in Batavia
for the support of trade enterprises. This minor retreat of Dutch capital
from direct investment to the financing of others was continued in the
19th century by the Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij, which be-
gan as a trading company and ended as a largely banking operation.
Other major banks in the Netherlands Indies were the Nederlandsch-
Indische Handelsbank (established 1863), the Nederlandsch-Indische
Escompto-Maatschappij (established 1857), and the Koloniale Bank.
The Java Bank (Javasche Bank) was established in 1828 as a semipri-
vate, semigovernment bank of circulation (issuing currency), while the
Algemene Volkscredietbank (founded 1934) undertook small-scale loans
to and from the public.
During the Japanese occupation, commercial banking was taken
over by the Yokohama Specie bank while the Syomin Ginko replaced
the Volkscredietbank, becoming Bank Rakyat after independence.
When the Indonesian Republic nationalized the Java Bank in 1953,
turning it into the Bank Indonesia, the Bank Industri Negara (origi-
nally the Bureau Herstel Financiering, established by the Dutch in
1948) was made responsible for financing industrial development,
while the BNI financed imports and exports. Other Dutch banks were
nationalized in 1958, Escompto becoming the Bank Dagang Negara
(State Trading Bank), which subsequently especially financed mining.
In 1965 the various state banks were merged into the BNI, but they
separated again in December 1968. A National Development Savings
Scheme (Tabanas, Tabungan Pembangunan Nasional) was introduced
in 1971. On 27 October 1988 Indonesia announced a major deregula-
tion of the banking sector, including easier availability of foreign ex-
change licenses and permitting state enterprises to deposit funds with
private banks.
As a result, the number of banks increased from 112 in 1988 to 239 in
1996, many of which were not financially sound, as they had been mis-
managed or exploited by their owners. There was an immense volume of
uncollectable credits that had often been used to finance property proj-
ects run by other companies under the aegis of a bank’s owners. The cen-
tral bank (Bank Indonesia) had to come to the assistance of the failing
banks, and there was a growing number of financial scandals (see BANK
46 • BANKING

PEMBANGUNAN INDONESIA [BAPINDO]). There were also

charges of corruption against Bank Indonesia, and in December 1997 it
fired four of its seven directors. In 2003, after a one-year trial, three of
its former directors were sentenced to jail sentences ranging from two
and one-half to three years for abuse of power in disbursing liquidity
support funds totaling US$1.1 billion.
In November 1997 in accordance with International Monetary Fund
(IMF) recommendations, the finance minister closed 16 private banks con-
sidered insolvent. Two bankers, both members of the Suharto family—
Bambang Trihatmodjo of Bank Andromeda and Probosutedjo (Suharto’s
brother-in-law) of Bank Jakarta—refused the order, but ultimately both
had to yield. By January 1998, the public had lost all faith in the banking
system and was withdrawing and transferring massive amounts to foreign
banks. During the Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian government had
to extend approximately US$13 billion in emergency loans to shore up lo-
cal banks, and it struck a deal for these loans to be repaid in four years. An
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) was set up in 1998, as a
result of the IMF’s US$76 billion bank bailout. Under measures passed in
November 1998 and May 1999, banking laws were amended to allow for-
eign-owned banks to acquire up to 100 percent of shares in existing banks,
including the former state banks.
Under President Abdurrachman Wahid, oversight of IBRA came
under the Ministry of Finance, and when Megawati Sukarnoputri
succeeded him as president she switched this oversight to the Ministry
of State-Owned Enterprises. IBRA experienced manifold difficulties,
being unable to meet its targets for asset sales and having six different
heads in the 30 months leading up to August 2001. However, in 2002
it proposed extending the debt repayment deadline by six more years
and cutting the interest rate on the outstanding debt. It remained
reluctant to institute criminal prosecution against prominent debtors,
including the eldest daughter of former President Suharto, and in Au-
gust 2002 the appeals court overturned a corruption conviction im-
posed in March on the central bank governor, Syahril Sabirin, stem-
ming from the 1999 Bank Bali scandal. With IBRA scheduled to
terminate in February 2004, the government planned to set up a tem-
porary banking guarantee implementation unit (UP3) under the Min-
istry of Finance to implement the government’s guarantee on bank de-
posits until a deposit guarantee agency (LPS) could be set up. See also
CURRENCY; PAWNSHOPS. [0057, 0381, 0382, 0384 0315, 0390,
0394, 0479, 0761]
 BAPAK • 47

BANTEN (Bantam). On the northern coast of West Java, Banten was

seized by Muslims of the sultanate of Demak in 1527. It rapidly ex-
panded during the 16th century, and under Fatahillah conquered the Pa-
jajaran port of Sunda Kalapa in the early 1520s. After Banten defeated
a Portuguese fleet in Sunda Kalapa harbor in 1527, the city was re-
named Jayakarta. Banten emerged as the dominant entrepôt and outlet
for pepper from West Java and South Sumatra. It was in continual con-
flict with Mataram over control of the Priangan. In 1601 ships of the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) defeated a Spanish-Portuguese
fleet in Banten harbor. The city began to decline after the foundation of
Batavia in 1619. Thomas Stamford Raffles abolished the Banten sul-
tanate in 1813. In 1888 a major anticolonial uprising took place in Ban-
ten, and in 1926 it was one of three regions where the Partai Komunis
Indonesia (PKI) uprising broke out.
During the Revolution, it was not reconquered by the Dutch until
their second “Police Action” and was one of the few regions not drawn
into Dutch federalist projects. There was friction between local leaders
and the Republican government throughout the Revolution, and in 1949
the Republic crushed a revolt against its authority.
As result of the post-Suharto decentralization policies, Banten, now
a province, gained power to regulate activities at some of its ports that
handle the export of the products of Krakatau steel to the United States,
Europe, and other parts of Asia. [0822, 0836, 0660]

BANTENG (Bos javanicus). Bovine similar to cattle, occurring wild or feral

on many islands and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, recognizable by a white
disk on the buttocks. First known to have been domesticated in Thailand
before 3500 B.C., it is valued for its agility, its easy trainability, and more
recently its low-fat meat. Most “cattle” on Bali and Timor are in fact ban-
teng, while the cattle of Madura appear to be a stable banteng-zebu cross
that was developed circa 500 A.D. A banteng’s horned head represents na-
tional unity on the Indonesian coat of arms and was adopted as symbol by
the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and subsequently Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). It is sometimes confused by Westerners with
the buffalo (kerbau), to which, however, it is not closely related. [1154]

BAPAK (“father”). Common term of deferential address for superiors, be-

lieved to promote a collectivist, familial attitude to society. Often abbre-
viated to “Pak.” Under the New Order, it largely replaced the more egal-
itarian “bung” as a term of address for political leaders. In 1981, Suharto
48 • BARISAN PELOPOR

accepted the title Bapak Pembangunan (father of development). Bapak

also denotes a patron who protects, sponsors, and otherwise assists pro-
tégés (anak buah). See also PATRIMONIALISM. [1391]

BARISAN PELOPOR (Vanguard Corps, from Dutch voorloper, pioneer).

Youth wing of the Jawa Hokokai, formed in August 1944 initially to con-
duct propaganda, but in May 1945 becoming a paramilitary brigade of
about 80,000, though training was limited. At the outset of the Revolu-
tion, with the dissolution of the Pembela Tanah Air (PETA), it took the
name Barisan Banteng (Banteng Corps) and was the only quasi-military
force at the disposal of Republican leaders. It was not incorporated into
the army and became one of the more important lasykar units. [0643]

BARISAN TANI INDONESIA (BTI, Indonesian Peasants’ Front).

Founded in November 1945 and affiliated soon after with the Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI), the BTI aimed initially at improving conditions
on state-owned lands and in forest areas. From the mid-1950s, however,
it began to work more widely in rural areas, organizing peasants and us-
ing its party contacts to remedy injustices. Despite a shortage of cadres,
it reached a claimed membership of 16 million by 1965. It was the main
agent by which the PKI promoted land reform and conducted direct ac-
tion (aksi sepihak) in the villages, and it aroused great hostility among
landowners. It was banned in 1966. [0994, 0997]

BARUS. Port on the west coast of Sumatra, north of Sibolga, and probably
the entry place for Indian influences penetrating the Batak interior. The
hinterland of Barus was an important source of camphor and benzoin,
and the port was possibly the one known as “P’o-lu” in Chinese records
of the seventh to eighth centuries. It was certainly the “Fansur” mentioned
as an important source of camphor in Arabic records of the ninth century
onward. By the early 16th century when it appears in the Suma Oriental
of Tomé Pires, it was a rich and busy port. Apparently the Minangkabau
rulers exerted influence over the region, but Acehnese territorial influence
spread there and by the late 16th century Aceh controlled the trade of
Barus along with that of other west Sumatran ports. [0793]

BATAKS. The Batak can be regarded as a single people incorporating sev-

eral ethnic and linguistic subgroups. The largest of these, the Toba Batak,
inhabit mountain valleys near Lake Toba. To their north were the Pakpak
(Dairi), Karo, and Simalungun, and to their south the Angkola and
 BATAM • 49

Mandailing—all of whom speak Batak dialects, some mutually unintel-

ligible. The Bataks were traditionally organized in villages (huta), the
patrilineal kinship system was dominant, and all knew the marga or ex-
ogamous patrilineal clan. A line of priest kings called Sisingamangaraja
played a unifying spiritual role. Ancestor worship was at the center of
traditional religion, though there was some recognition of a creator god,
Mulajadi na Bolon. Contacts with the outside world were limited at first
to trade in benzoin and camphor through Barus on the west coast;
Batak legend also acknowledged some allegiance to Aceh, Minangk-
abau, and Ayudhya (Siam). In general, however, the Batak uplands were
isolated until the mid-19th century when Protestant missionaries, the
Dutch government, and the lowland plantation agriculture encroached
simultaneously.
Dutch rule was gradually established in the period up to 1907, when
Dutch troops shot Sisingamangaraja XII. Most Karo and Simalungun
were administratively incorporated into the East Coast Residency, while
the others were included in Tapanuli. About half the Toba became Chris-
tians, as did numbers of Simalungun and other North Tapanuli Bataks.
The southern Angkola and Mandailing are largely Muslim, having been
converted by the Paderi (see MINANGKABAU) in the 1820s. Many
Batak, however, remained animist. (The 1930 census recorded 345,408
Muslims, 299,000 Christians, and 512,327 “pagans” among the Batak.)
Under Dutch rule the position of traditional leaders steadily weakened,
though the colonial authorities made some attempt to bolster them by
forming a Tapanuli Council in 1938.
Before 1940 members of ruling lineages held most positions of pres-
tige, but peasants largely repudiated their legitimacy during the Revolu-
tion, when there was widespread violence among Batak of both Tapan-
uli and East Sumatra. In its aftermath there were massive migrations,
particularly of Toba, to the former plantation lands of East Sumatra. See
DECENTRALIZATION. [0282, 0660, 0793, 0804, 0901, 1260, 1262]

BATAM. Island in the Riau archipelago opposite Singapore. In 1970 it be-

came a base of oil and gas operations in Indonesian waters and from 1971
was developed under Pertamina as a port to compete with Singapore. The
project was suspended in 1976 after Pertamina’s bankruptcy but was re-
vived by Technology Minister B. J. Habibie to play a more complementary
role with Singapore. In 1974 Suharto had first proposed the possibility of
Batam becoming a free trade zone, and in the late 1980s Singapore sug-
gested the possibility of it forming part of a “triangle of growth” with Johor
50 • BATAVIA

and Singapore within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). In 1989 Singapore, together with the Johor government and the
Indonesian businessman Liem Sioe Liong, began to invest directly in an in-
dustrial estate on the island. Habibie was pivotal in promoting the island’s
development. In the 1990s Singapore investment in the island grew, and by
1995 its value was US$649 million, a little under 50 percent of approved
foreign investment. See also GROWTH TRIANGLES. [0362, 0366, 0369]

BATAVIA. Capital city of the Netherlands Indies, site of a Dutch East In-
dies Company (VOC) post from 1610, and founded in 1619 by J. P.
Coen as regional headquarters for the VOC, on the site of the Banten
port of Jayakarta. It was first constructed as a Dutch city, complete with
canals and walls to resist attack from Mataram, and much of the sur-
rounding countryside was cleared of its inhabitants to create a kind of
cordon sanitaire around the city. Batavia became a major center of set-
tlement by Chinese, who lived within the city under their own laws. Ten-
sion between the Dutch and the Chinese led to a massacre of Chinese in
1740. The social composition of the city was also influenced by a large
slave community, much of it Balinese in origin (see SLAVERY), who
formed the basis for a constantly evolving mestizo culture. By the 19th
century, observers identified the Betawi as a distinct ethnic group. (See
also PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN.)
Chronic health problems as a result of waterborne diseases, especially
malaria, led the colonial authorities in 1810 to shift the center of ad-
ministration to Weltevreden (the area around the Koningsplein, the pres-
ent Medan Merdeka). Further government offices shifted to Bogor and
Bandung. A modern harbor was completed at Tanjung Priok in 1886. In
1905, as part of more general administrative reforms, the city was made
a gemeente (municipality) with limited autonomy (see DECENTRAL-
IZATION). The city’s population in the 1930 census was 435,000. In
1942, Batavia was occupied by Japanese forces, and its name was
changed the following year to Jakarta. See also HEALTH. [0491, 0584,
0585, 0609]

BATAVIAASCH GENOOTSCHAP VAN KUNSTEN EN WETEN-

SCHAPPEN (Batavian Society of the Arts and Sciences). Founded in
1778 by J. C. M. Radermacher (1741–1783) to conduct linguistic, geo-
graphical, and anthropological research in the archipelago. Its library
formed the nucleus of the National Library of Indonesia collection. See
also ARCHEOLOGY. [1196]
 BATIK • 51

BATAVIAN REPUBLIC (Bataafsche Republiek). In 1794–1795 French

revolutionary troops joined “patriots” (patriotten) in overthrowing the
conservative Dutch Republic, founding the Batavian Republic, which
survived until its incorporation into the French Empire in 1806. Among
the various reforms undertaken by the new state was to replace the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)’s Heeren XVII (Seventeen Gen-
tlemen) in 1795 with a Comite tot de Zaken van de Oost-Indische Han-
del en Bezittingen (Committee for the Affairs of the East Indies Trade
and Possessions) and to take possession of the VOC on 17 March 1798.
When the VOC charter, which governed Indies affairs, lapsed at the end
of 1799, the republic set up a Raad van Aziatischen Bezittingen en Etab-
lissementen (Council for Asian Possessions and Establishments) and in
1803 promulgated a colonial charter, preserving most of the existing
system by making the colonial government responsible for the first time
to the metropolitan government. In 1806 the charter was replaced by a
more liberal “Reglement op het Beleid der Regeering enz.” The effect of
these measures was limited, however, by the Napoleonic Wars and the
occupation of the Indies colonies by Britain. The Republic ceased to ex-
ist when the Netherlands was occupied by France in 1811. See also
DAENDELS, HERMAN WILLEM; NETHERLANDS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA.

BATIG SLOT (budgetary surplus). From 1799 to 1903, the treasury of the
Netherlands Indies was part of that of the Netherlands. From the incep-
tion of the Cultivation System in 1831 until 1877, regular batig slot
transfers were made to the Dutch treasury from the Indies, totaling ƒ823
million over the four decades. See also “EERESCHULD, EEN”; INDIË
VERLOREN, RAMPSPOED GEBOREN.

BATIK. Method of cloth dyeing by wax-resist, first reliably reported from

Java in the 17th century. Traditionally, beeswax is applied with a metal
pen (canting), but in the late 19th century metal stamps (cap) were intro-
duced widely, as were German aniline dyes to replace the traditional veg-
etable pigments. Since the 1970s silkscreen prints of fine batik motifs have
become widespread. Batik motifs have symbolic significance, specific de-
signs formerly being reserved for particular social groups and occasions.
In the early 20th century, Pekalongan became the center for a batik style
incorporating European motifs. Batik “painting”(smaller batiks for display
rather than wearing) emerged in the 1960s and in the closing decades of
the century became an accepted art form, distinguished from oil painting
52 • BAUXITE

in that most batik painters employ craftspeople to do the waxing and dye-
ing, based on the artist’s specifications. Batik has generally been seen as
socially conservative, though after independence Sukarno promoted a
bright pattern called “batik Indonesia.” The Solo designer Mohamad Hadi
incorporated left-wing motifs in cloths in the early 1960s.
The time-consuming work of fine batik production is commonly the
work of women, both in villages and in the courts. Village producers
were generally dependent on bakul (suppliers of cloth and materials),
and much batik trading came into Chinese hands in the early 20th cen-
tury, prompting a struggle between indigenous and Chinese merchants
that contributed to the emergence of nationalism (see SAREKAT IS-
LAM). A number of successful trade cooperatives emerged in the 1920s
and 1930s to keep the industry in indigenous hands. Recent dramatic
price rises for high-quality batik have allowed the reemergence of in-
digenous batik entrepreneurs. At the same time, modern mass production
has introduced a new range of motifs and patterns, drawing on the deco-
rative style of non-batik-making cultures. [0144, 0173, 0202, 1403]

BAUXITE. Has been mined on Bintan Island in Riau since the 1920s. Most
of the product has been exported to Japan, but since 1982 some process-
ing to alumina has taken place in the Inalum plant at Asahan. Mining op-
erations were taken over by the state firm, PT Aneka Tambang. In the late
1970s extensive deposits were found in West Kalimantan, but they were
judged not feasible for exploitation. [0413]

BAWEAN. Volcanic island in the Java Sea. Settled by Madurese in the

14th century, it was at first an independent state and was later ruled by
Mataram, until it was conquered by the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC) in 1743 and was administered from Surabaya. The population is
predominantly Muslim with a strong tradition of merantau. Baweanese
formed an important trading minority on Java in the 19th century. [0007]

BECAK. Three-wheeled pedicab, mostly with the driver at rear, introduced

in 1936 but becoming a common form of urban and rural public trans-
port (especially on Java) only during and after World War II. In 1971 be-
caks were banned from some main roads in Jakarta, partly to reduce
congestion, partly because they were considered demeaning to the driv-
ers. Since then the ban has been extended to other roads and cities, and
becaks have been replaced partly by three-wheeled motorized bajaj.
[0469, 0470, 0585]
 BENGKULU • 53

BELITUNG (Billiton). Large island between Sumatra and Kalimantan.

It was formerly under the sultanate of Palembang, but in 1812 was
seized by the British along with Bangka as reparations for the so-called
massacre of Palembang. It was disputed by Britain and the Netherlands
until 1824, and remained barely occupied until 1851, when the Billiton
Maatschappij began mining there. Extensive immigration of Chinese la-
borers began in 1852.

BELO, BISHOP CARLOS FILIPE XIMENES (1948–). Born near Bau-

cau in East Timor in 1948, Belo went to Portugal in 1968 to study for
the priesthood. He returned to East Timor in 1974 after the overthrow of
the Portuguese dictatorship but then went back to Portugal, where he
was ordained to the priesthood in 1980. He left Portugal again for East
Timor in 1981; was named apostolic administrator, the head of East
Timor’s Catholic Church, in 1983; and in 1988 was appointed bishop. In
the early 1980s he began condemning Indonesian military atrocities in
East Timor and in 1984 wrote to the United Nations secretary-general
calling for a democratic referendum in the region. Pope John Paul II vis-
ited East Timor in October 1989 and spoke out on human rights. After
the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, hundreds of demonstrators sought
refuge in Bishop Belo’s home. He continued to speak out for human
rights and was increasingly seen as “the voice of the voiceless.” He was
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1996, together with José Ramos
Horta. During the violence following the 1999 referendum on indepen-
dence, many East Timorese again sought sanctuary in his home, but this
time Indonesian-supported militias stormed the house and seized hun-
dreds of these refugees, transporting them to West Timor.
After East Timor gained its independence, Bishop Belo went to Portu-
gal for medical treatment, announcing in November 2002 that he would
be retiring from his position for health reasons. [0855]

BENGKULU (Benkulen, Bencoolen). Town and region on the southwest-

ern coast of Sumatra, formerly subject successively to Minangkabau,
Banten, and the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). The English
East India Company founded a settlement there, Fort Marlborough, in
1685 after the Dutch had forced them out of Banten. In 1760 the British
named Bengkulu capital of their West Sumatran Presidency, and it was
their only major region of influence in the archipelago until their ex-
pansion during the Napoleonic Wars. Pepper was the principal trade
good, but the colony was seldom more than marginally profitable, being
54 • BENTENG PROGRAM

hampered especially by a poor harbor. After a brief period under the en-
ergetic rule of Thomas Stamford Raffles, who tried to expand the pro-
duction of nutmeg, cloves, and cassia, Bengkulu was ceded to the
Dutch in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. But the Dutch did not move
to subdue the region, which became a center of piracy, until 1868. It
never reemerged as a major trading center. It was Sukarno’s place of
exile from 1938 to 1942, and it became capital of the newly reconsti-
tuted province of Bengkulu in 1967. [0491, 0780]

BENTENG PROGRAM. Measures introduced in 1950 to provide

pribumi entrepreneurs with import licenses in order to hasten the devel-
opment of an indigenous business class. In 1956, however, the program’s
formal discrimination against Chinese was ended, and it was abolished
by Juanda Kartawijaya in 1957. See also ALI-BABA FIRMS; IN-
DONESIANIZATION; SJAFRUDDIN PRAWIRANEGARA. [0313]

BERAU. State in east Kalimantan, founded in the 17th century. It was ini-
tially subject to Banjarmasin but became independent in circa 1750 un-
der Sultan Hasanuddin and dominated the neighboring states of Bulun-
gan and Sumbaliung. Some authorities believe that it was the model for
Patusan in Lord Jim by Joseph Conrad. A Dutch protectorate was es-
tablished there in 1906.

BERI-BERI. Disease caused by lack of vitamin B1 (thiamine). In the

1870s it became a major health problem in the plantation regions of
North Sumatra, where workers were fed with mechanically husked rice.
The idea of deficiency disease was then unknown, and many medical re-
searchers attributed the disease to fungal contamination. In the 1880s C.
Eijkman in Batavia showed that beri-beri was a consequence of eating
hulled rice, but not until 1909 did G. Grijns develop the specific idea that
a substance was lost in the milling process.

“BERKELEY MAFIA.” See BADAN PERENCANAAN PEMBANGU-

NAN NASIONAL.

BESCHIKKINGSRECHT (right of disposal or allocation). With the

strengthening of village (desa) structure on Java in the 19th century, the
colonial government acknowledged the collective right of villages to al-
locate land to their own members or to other purposes, such as tanah
bengkok, according to circumstances. Under the Liberal Policy, this
 BEUREU’EH, TEUNGKU MUHAMMAD DAUD • 55

right enabled village elites to allocate rice land to sugar companies on ro-
tating leases. The different growing cycles and irrigation methods of the
two crops worked against rice production. The term beschikkingsrecht
also applied to the right of the colonial government to allocate woeste or
wasteland, that is, areas not under active cultivation, to European compa-
nies, for sugar production, as forest reserve, or for other purposes, though
Cornelis van Vollenhoven argued in the 1920s that this practice should
not permit villages to be deprived of their usufruct rights over nonagri-
cultural land. See also AGRARIAN LAW OF 1870.

BETAWI (“Batavians”). An ethnic group that emerged in Batavia from

among the many Indonesian residents of the city and the surrounding
countryside (ommelanden). In a broad sense, the term applied to all of
the many Indonesian mestizo cultures that emerged there, but it applies
most strictly to a group that first became apparent in the 19th century.
The Betawi proper spoke Malay with heavy Balinese and Chinese influ-
ence and considered themselves strongly Islamic (though they were less
than orthodox in practice). Because of the dominating presence of the
colonial establishment and Indonesian immigrant communities, and be-
cause of the influence of the particuliere landerijen, Betawi seldom
flourished in their own city: they had an unusually high illiteracy rate and
played little role in the administrative or political life of the capital.
Muhammad Husni Thamrin (1894–1941) founded a political organiza-
tion called Kaum Betawi in 1923. See also MARDIJKERS. [0585]

BETEL. The seed or “nut” of the palm Areca catechu (Arecaceae), jambe,
or pinang, native to the region. It has been reported that it was chewed
as early as the seventh century, generally in combination with other sub-
stances: commonly lime, pepper leaf (sirih), and gambier, and occasion-
ally opium, amomum, cloves, camphor, nutmeg, and/or tobacco. Seeds
were exported to China in the 13th century. Betel chewing is addictive
and leads to loss of appetite, excessive salivation, and general deteriora-
tion. Although partially displaced by tobacco smoking from the 16th cen-
tury, the custom of betel chewing remains widespread, especially in ru-
ral areas. [0576]

BEUREU’EH, TEUNGKU MUHAMMAD DAUD (c. 1900–1987).

Acehnese Muslim scholar and leader, one of the founders of the anticolo-
nial Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA, All-Aceh Union of Ulama) in
1939. In August 1947 Daud Beureu’eh became military governor of Aceh
56 • BHARATAYUDDHA

and was governor of the short-lived Aceh province from January to Au-
gust 1950. Hostile to the inclusion of Aceh in North Sumatra province
along with the Christian Bataks, disappointed at the failure of the central
government to adopt Islam as the basic principle of the state, and alarmed
by the arrest of PUSA activists in August 1951 (at a time when commu-
nists were being arrested elsewhere in Indonesia), he joined the Darul Is-
lam in circa September 1953, declaring Aceh to be part of the Islamic
State of Indonesia and launching a general revolt throughout the region.
The rebels never controlled more than half the province and failed to cap-
ture the capital, Banda Aceh, but they were well entrenched in the coun-
tryside, especially in the north. Beureu’eh headed both civil and military
commands for the Islamic state in Aceh and in January 1955 was ap-
pointed vice president next to Sekarmaji Marijan Kartosuwiryo, but
there was little effective coordination with the rebellion elsewhere. As the
rebellion dragged on, many on both sides began feeling their way toward
a compromise, but it was only after Beureu’eh’s followers deposed him in
a bloodless coup in March 1959 that a settlement was reached, Aceh re-
ceiving the status of a Daerah Istimewa (Special Territory). Beureu’eh
then briefly formed an alliance with remnants of the PRRI/Permesta re-
bellion now formed into the Republik Persatuan Indonesia (RPI), but
ceased resistance in May 1962.
After the advent of the Suharto regime, Beureu’eh was appointed to
the regime-sponsored Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), but was re-
moved two years later, possibly because of his independent stance. He
did not officially support the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), reportedly
because it had not adopted Islam as its ideology, but the government was
fearful enough that he might sympathize with it that they removed him
to Jakarta in 1978. In the early elections of the New Order, he sup-
ported Islamic parties in the elections, but in the final year of his life he
gave his “blessing” to a Golkar victory in the province of Aceh. [0808,
0820, 0827, 1258]

BHARATAYUDDHA (“War of the Bharatas”). Old Javanese kakawin

(poem) based on the Mahabharata and composed in 1157 by Mpu
Sedah and Mpu Panuluh under the patronage of Joyoboyo of Kediri. It
describes the 18-day battle that ends the war between the Kurawa and
Pandawa. [0132, 0159]

BHINNEKA TUNGGAL IKA (Old Javanese “They are many, they are
one,” usually translated as “Unity in diversity”). Phrase reputedly coined
 BINNENLANDSCH BESTUUR • 57

by Empu Tantalar in the 15th century and adopted on 17 August 1950 as

Indonesia’s national motto. See also GARUDA.

“BIG FIVE.” The five major Dutch trading houses in late colonial In-
donesia, which also held a dominant place in the export economy until
they were nationalized in 1957. They were the Internationale Crediet en
Handelsvereeniging Rotterdam (Internatio), Jacobson van den Bergh,
Borneo Sumatra Maatschappij (Borsumij), Lindetevis Stokvis, and Geo.
Wehry. See also NATIONALIZATION. [0315]

BILLITON. See BELITUNG.

BIMA. Kingdom on the eastern half of the island of Sumbawa, founded in

perhaps the 11th century from when there are signs of Hindu influence.
It was a vassal of Makassar in the early 17th century and converted to
Islam in circa 1640. Although the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
assumed suzerainty in 1667, the Bima sultanate remained a powerful re-
gional kingdom into the 19th century, creating Bimanese settlements in
Flores and Sumba. Effective Dutch control was not established until the
late 19th century. After independence, the sultanate was challenged by
young Islamic reformers loyal to the Republic and opposed to the sul-
tan’s cooperation with the Dutch in the federal movement. Most of the
Bima aristocracy, however, was able to retain its influence and formed
the major part of the new bureaucracy. [0574]

BINNENLANDSCH BESTUUR (BB, internal administration). The gener-

alized administrative corps of the Netherlands Indies. Until the 19th cen-
tury, the term meant little more than the body of Dutch East Indies
Company (VOC) officials in the colony, especially those posted to rep-
resent the governor-general outside the capital, Batavia. The BB
emerged as a distinct structure on Java in the early 19th century under
Herman Willem Daendels, who divided the island into prefectures and
created a relatively ordered bureaucratic hierarchy. This structure was
somewhat modified by Thomas Stamford Raffles, who replaced the
prefects with residents, and by the decentralization program of the early
20th century.
Administrative dualism was a central principle of the BB. The organ-
ization was divided into the Europeesch Bestuur, or European adminis-
tration, and the Inlandsch Bestuur, or native administration, the latter
supervising the former, so that, according to the aims of the system, all
58 • BIRDS OF PARADISE

contacts by the Indonesian masses with their rulers would be through fel-
low Indonesians. In 1865 the Europeesch Bestuur on Java numbered
only 175 men, backed of course by the colonial army. On Java, the rank
of controleur was paired with that of bupati in the Inlandsch Bestuur as
a putative advisory “elder brother” to the Indonesian ruler. In time the
Europeesch Bestuur developed an extended hierarchy running (from be-
low) adspirant controleur, controleur, assistent resident, resident, and
gouverneur, and holders of senior posts were generally recruited from
lower ranks in the hierarchy.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, the role of the BB was diminished by
the emergence of distinct specialist branches of government, beginning
with finances in 1854. By the end of the colonial era, departments of jus-
tice, finances, education and religion, economic affairs, transport and
water affairs, war, and naval affairs had emerged alongside the BB, all of
them open at all levels, unlike the EB, to Indonesians. [0479, 0604]

BIRDS OF PARADISE (cenderawasih). Birds of the family Paradisaei-

dae, found principally on the island of New Guinea (Papua) and adja-
cent regions. The males are often spectacularly plumed and have been
used by people of the island for adornment since early times. The first
pelts to reach Europe were sewn so as to conceal the feet, and the belief
grew that the birds never rested but always flew as if in paradise. Trade
in bird of paradise pelts was underway in the 16th century and is proba-
bly much older. China was the principal market at first, but it was dis-
placed by Europe in the 19th century. In 1911, 43,000 pelts were ex-
ported from Ternate. Concern over the effect of this trade helped to
prompt the first nature conservation measures in the Netherlands Indies.

BOEKE, JULIUS HERMAN (1884–1944). Prominent economic advisor

to the colonial government and professor at Leiden University. Influ-
enced by the writings of M. K. Gandhi, he proposed the notion of dual-
ism, rejecting the application of Western economic theory to the Asian
village and urging a dualistic economic policy that would protect and
even restore what he saw as traditional communal village life while pro-
viding general welfare for the Westernized sections of society. He was
interned in Buchenwald 1941–1944 for anti-Nazi activities. See also
DESA; DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY. [0292]

BOGOR. Formerly Buitenzorg, city in the foothills of Mt. Salak south of

Jakarta. Governor-General Gustaaf Willem, baron van Imhoff estab-
 BOROBUDUR • 59

lished a private house there in 1745 and the official residence of the gov-
ernor-general was gradually transferred there. The city was the site of an
agricultural research station that became the basis of the Land-
bouwkundige Faculteit, subsequently the Bogor Agricultural Institute
(Institut Pertanian Bogor; see EDUCATION) and of a botanical
gardens.

BONE. Bugis state in southern Sulawesi, founded in the 14th century and
the main rival of Makassar, which conquered it and converted it to Is-
lam in 1611, though it was left autonomous. Bone was awarded by the
Dutch to Arung Palakka under the Treaty of Bungaya in 1667. The
Bone kingdom became a centralized state, and it was at this time that
Buginese and Makassarese began migrating from its authoritarian rule to
establish themselves in other regions of the archipelago. The rulers of
Bone took advantage of the opportunity offered by the British interreg-
num in the Indies during the Napoleonic Wars to repudiate the treaty of
Bungaya, and in 1824 they launched a war on local Dutch garrisons.
Though defeated by Dutch and Makassarese forces from Gowa in 1825,
Bone continued to resist the Dutch during the Java War and accepted
the renewed treaty only in 1838. The power of the Bone kingdom de-
clined in the 19th century, and its weakening centralized system opened
the way for aristocrats to conduct trade activities and commercialized
agriculture. In 1859 the Dutch sent an expedition against Bone, depos-
ing its queen and formally making the kingdom a subject, rather than an
ally, of the Dutch. A further expedition in 1905 captured the capital,
Watampone, and deposed the ruler, who was not replaced until 1931.
[0502, 0529, 0549]

BOROBUDUR. Buddhist monument in Central Java, constructed circa

800 A.D. under the Sailendras. It is in the form of a massive stupa, with
seven terraces. The quadrangular four lower galleries of reliefs tell the
life story of the Buddha and other Buddhist teachings such as the
Jatakas. One gallery of lower reliefs was later covered with earth to pre-
vent collapse of the structure. Three circular upper terraces are bare but
for 72 small stupas containing statues of the Buddha. A single larger
stupa is at the center. The overall form of the monument is also a repre-
sentation of Buddhist philosophy, the crowded lower terraces symboliz-
ing the distractions of daily life, the bare upper terraces the achievement
of detachment. The reliefs are carved in the Indian style and show a mix-
ture of Indian and Javanese motifs: elephants, for instance, which are not
60 • BOTANICAL GARDENS

native to Java (though formerly they were imported from Sumatra), and
a cockatoo, which is not found in India.
Borobudur was damaged by earthquakes and buried by volcanic ash
some time after its construction and was first reexcavated by Thomas
Stamford Raffles in 1814. A full-scale reconstruction was undertaken
by the colonial archeological service under Theodor van Erp in
1907–1912, and a further restoration occurred under the auspices of
UNESCO from 1973 to 1983, costing US$60 million. In 1985 an ex-
plosion of uncertain origin damaged the upper part of the monument,
though this was subsequently repaired. See also ARCHEOLOGY.
[0113, 0116]

BOTANICAL GARDENS (‘sLands Plantentuin, Kebun Raya). Founded

in Bogor (Buitenzorg) in 1817 by Caspar Georg Carl Reinwardt
(1773–1854) and directed successively by Carl Ludwig Blume
(1796–1862), Melchior Treub (1851–1910), and others, the gardens be-
came one of the finest tropical plant collections in the world. In 1860 a
branch was established in Cibodas. Until the establishment of a separate
conservation section in the Department of Agriculture in 1951, the gar-
dens had primary responsibility for conservation of nature in the
Netherlands Indies and Indonesia. [1194, 1195]

BOTH, PIETER (?–1615). First governor-general of the Netherlands In-

dies. He expelled the Spaniards from Tidore and the Portuguese from
Fort Henricus on Solor, opened Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) of-
fices in Java at Sunda Kelapa (later Batavia) and Japara, and sent the
first Dutch mission to the court of Mataram. [0491]

BOVEN DIGUL (Tanah Merah). Detention center on the upper Digul

River in West New Guinea (Papua), established in 1926 primarily for
those accused of involvement in the 1926–1927 Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI) uprisings. Some 1,308 alleged communists and nation-
alists were detained there in May 1930, a number that declined to
about 446 in 1937. Among those held there under the so-called exor-
bitante rechten of the governor-general (see EXILE) were Moham-
mad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, both of whom were transferred to
Banda Neira in 1936. In 1943 the camp was closed and the remaining
detainees were removed to Australia, where they were later released
under pressure from Australian labor unions. See also TAHANAN
POLITIK. [0634, 0865]
 BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH • 61

BRITAIN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. The English East India Com-

pany was the main agent for British involvement in the archipelago dur-
ing the 17th and 18th centuries. In 1800, after the Dutch colonial ad-
ministration had recognized the pro-French Batavian Republic, British
forces occupied Melaka, West Sumatra, and Dutch possessions in
Maluku. A British fleet appeared before Batavia but lacked forces to
take the city. The colonies were restored under the Treaty of Amiens in
March 1802.
In August and September 1811, after French forces had occupied the
Netherlands in 1810, company forces from British India conquered Java
and other Dutch possessions in the archipelago (Ambon, Minahasa) in
order to remove French influence, and they established an interim ad-
ministration on Java under Thomas Stamford Raffles as lieutenant-
governor, with an advisory council of Dutch and British. Hoping to re-
tain the island for Britain, Raffles undertook major reforms there, but he
was unable to convince the company’s directors that the colony would be
worthwhile, and it was restored to the Dutch in August 1816 under the
terms of an Anglo-Dutch convention signed in 1814. British policy was
also that the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Europe (then including Bel-
gium) should be bolstered as a powerful bulwark against possible French
expansion, and Britain saw the revenues from Indonesia as playing some
role in Dutch power. Britain retained its existing settlements in
Bengkulu until 1824.
From this time on, however, Dutch rule in the colony remained to
some extent at British sufferance. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 al-
lowed the Dutch extensive holdings in the archipelago, but Britain ac-
quiesced in this arrangement partly because the Netherlands had ceased
to be a major European power and thus played a useful role for Britain
in keeping French and later German political influence out of the region.
Britain’s Singapore naval base, established in 1921, became the key-
stone of Dutch defense policy in the colony. At the same time, the Dutch
felt constrained to allow considerable British commercial investment
there as a further guarantee of their tenure. British investments in the
Netherlands Indies in 1929 were valued at ƒ277.9 million, second only
after that of the Netherlands. Only in a few cases, such as the shipping
industry, did the Dutch discriminate actively against British interests (see
also TELEGRAPH). [0077, 0083, 0818, 0583]

BRITAIN, RELATIONS WITH. British and Dutch forces cooperated

with those of the United States and Australia in the defense of the region
62 • BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY

against the Japanese in 1941–1942; and after the Allied counterattack be-
gan, Sumatra was included in the predominantly British South East Asia
Command under Lord Louis Mountbatten. On 16 August 1945, this com-
mand was extended to cover the entire Netherlands Indies, thus giving the
British primary responsibility for accepting the Japanese surrender, evac-
uating Allied prisoners-of-war and internees, and restoring the colonial
government. By the time British forces arrived in Jakarta in late Sep-
tember, however, the Indonesian Republic was relatively firmly estab-
lished. Unwilling to fight a major colonial war to restore Dutch control
(especially since Britain was in the process of withdrawing from India),
the British attempted to play a mediating role between the Dutch and the
Republic, sponsoring first informal contacts and then negotiations that ul-
timately led to the Linggajati Agreement. Britain’s formal postsurrender
responsibilities ended on 30 November 1946.
During the 1950s Indonesia became suspicious of British intentions in
retaining the Singapore naval base, and relations declined sharply as
Britain’s formula for granting independence to its Southeast Asian pos-
sessions involved creation of a Malaysian federation, including Singa-
pore and the north Borneo territories, without giving up its Singapore
base. In response, in September 1963 Sukarno instituted a policy of
Confrontation against Malaysia. In May 1965 he claimed, on the basis
of a letter said to be from the British ambassador Sir Anthony Gilchrist,
that Britain was plotting with army groups to overthrow him.
After Suharto’s accession to power, Confrontation was ended and re-
lations between Britain and Indonesia improved markedly. Within the
context of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI),
British loans to Indonesia totaled more than US$736 million and further
sums were pledged during the 1990s within the framework of the Con-
sultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) and in accordance with a series of
so-called UK–Indonesia Concessional Loan Arrangements (CLA),
which financed projects in such sectors as power, transportation, broad-
casting, higher education, and forestry. [0478, 0661, 0726, 1120]

BROAD OUTLINES OF STATE POLICY. See MAJELIS PER-

MUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT.

BUBONIC PLAGUE (Pasteurella pestis). It is possible that parts of In-

donesia were affected by the plague pandemics of the sixth and 14th cen-
turies, but evidence suggesting this is slender. The disease is first known
definitely to have reached Java in 1910 aboard a rice ship from Burma,
 BUDGETS • 63

and outbreaks continued on the island until the 1940s. The death toll
from the disease in the period 1911–1939 is officially given as 215,000,
but was almost certainly many more. Fears of the virulence of the dis-
ease led the colonial government, through its Dienst der Pestbestrijding
(plague control service), founded in 1915, to undertake a massive control
program, which included extensive quarantine, the destruction and fumi-
gation of property, the reconstruction of 1.25 million houses to rat-proof
designs, and, from 1934, an extensive vaccination program in which 7
million people were vaccinated or revaccinated. The common method of
diagnosing plague deaths, by puncturing the spleen of the deceased, was
strongly resisted by Muslims, who saw it as a violation of the dead. See
also ETHICAL POLICY; HEALTH. [0576, 1204]

BUDDHISM. Theravada Buddhism was probably established briefly in

southern Sumatra in the fifth century, but was soon replaced by Ma-
hayana Buddhism. Srivijaya became a major center of Buddhist stud-
ies in the seventh century, having close ties with Nalanda in Bihar. In
later centuries, strong influences from Tantrism were felt. The massive
stupa of Borobudur was succeeded by Hindu rather than Buddhist tem-
ples, but Buddhism seems to have survived as an aspect of Hinduism
rather than being displaced. The religion of Majapahit was Hindu and
Buddhist, but formal adherence to Buddhism largely ceased among in-
digenous Indonesians with the conversion to Islam in the 13th–16th
centuries, though Buddhism remains an important element in Hindu re-
ligious practice on Bali.
In colonial times Buddhism was largely a religion of Chinese in In-
donesia, but in the 1930s, under influences from theosophy, Buddhism
underwent a revival among Europeans in the colony. After indepen-
dence, Buddhist leaders made determined efforts to recruit indigenous
Indonesian members, forming the Perbuddhi (Perhimpunan Buddhis In-
donesia, Indonesian Buddhist Association) in 1958. Buddhists now con-
stitute approximately 4.5 percent of the population. Under the New Or-
der, the insistence of the Pancasila on “Belief in God” led some
Buddhists to revise their philosophy to include a single supreme deity,
Sang Hyang Adi Buddha. Vesak Day (celebrating the birth of Bud-
dhism’s founder) has been a national holiday in Indonesia since 1983.
See also RELIGION AND POLITICS. [0487]

BUDGETS. Suharto’s New Order based its economic philosophy on the

slogan of a balanced budget, which proved to be an effective political
64 • BUDI UTOMO

device to prevent recurrence of the economic disasters of the early

1960s. By ensuring that expenditure was determined by revenue, the
government was able to control political pressures that demanded larger
expenditure levels. However, the immense international loans on which
the New Order’s economy was based complicated the situation. In the
1980s as oil revenues declined, debt-servicing obligations rose to 30.3
percent of government expenditures in 1987, necessitating sharp reduc-
tions in government subsidies in fields such as rice, fertilizer, and pes-
ticides. After 1990 the need to maintain a balanced budget was increas-
ingly subordinated to political concerns until the financial collapse of
the late 1990s. See also CORRUPTION; DEBT; ECONOMY; FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS. [0301, 0730]

BUDI UTOMO (“Noble Endeavor”). Society founded on 20 May 1908 by

Dr. Wahidin Sudiro Husodo (1857–1917), Dr. Sutomo, and Gunawan
Mangunkusumo and regarded as the start of Indonesia’s national awak-
ening (kebangkitan nasional). It aimed at first to promote the study of Ja-
vanese culture and to improve access to Western education, but slowly
became more political, arguing in 1914, for instance, for an Indies mili-
tia. Dominated by the lesser priyayi of the colonial civil service, it was
always conservative and was viewed with approval by the colonial gov-
ernment as a positive result of the Ethical Policy. As a result, it was
somewhat distrusted by other nationalist parties. In 1935 it dissolved it-
self into the Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra). See also ASSOCIA-
TION PRINCIPLE; NATIONALISM. [0625]

BUFFALO. See KERBAU.

BUGIS. Ethnic group in southern Sulawesi, forming in 1979 approxi-

mately half of the region’s people (3.5 million out of 7 million). Like the
neighboring Makassarese, the Bugis were traditionally divided into
many small states, but their kingdom of Bone became increasingly pow-
erful in the 16th century until it was conquered by Makassar and con-
verted to Islam in the early 17th century. Led by Arung Palakka, many
Bugis joined the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) against Makassar
in the campaigns of 1660, 1666–1667, and 1668–1669, but in the late
17th century, following the defeat of Makassar, many Bugis fled the area
and settled widely on Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the Malay Peninsula,
founding the last dynasty of the sultans of Aceh. Such communities fea-
ture in several works of Joseph Conrad. Bugis troops were often used
 BUPATI • 65

as mercenaries. Bugis are the major inter-island trading community of

eastern Indonesia, establishing a dominance in the archipelago’s sea-
trading network. The regional rebellions of the 1950s triggered further
Bugis migration, this time to Indonesia’s eastern islands, and as the
Suharto regime strengthened control over East Timor and Irian Jaya
(Papua), Bugis merchants followed the military forces. As immigrants
and Muslims, they became one of the major targets of attack in the in-
terethnic, interreligious violence in Maluku and Timor in the late 1990s,
many being forced to return to South Sulawesi. See also RIAU. [0461,
0549, 1245, 1246]

BUITENZORG. See BOGOR.

“BUNG.” Common term of address (for males) during the Revolution, de-
rived from Javanese abang (“brother”) and implying revolutionary
equality; it is now seldom used except to refer to leaders of the Revolu-
tion, especially Bung Karno (Sukarno). The Sundanese equivalent,
“Bang,” is routinely adopted by governors of Jakarta as a populist ges-
ture. See also BAPAK.

BUPATI. In precolonial Java, the bupati was a local chief generally in a

vassal relationship with a nearby king or senior chief. His authority was
over households, or cacah (and thus men-at-arms), rather than over ter-
ritory and was likely to fluctuate widely with the vagaries of war and
economic change. There was a natural tendency for the domain of a bu-
pati (kabupaten) to coincide with economic and geographical bound-
aries, so that although the political geography of Java was always in flux,
the boundaries of kabupaten remained historically relatively stable.
Under Dutch rule, the fealty of the bupati was shifted from the royal
courts to the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), and they were tied
increasingly to specific areas of land rather than to scattered households,
though they retained something of the character of allies, rather than of-
ficials, of the company. They were obliged only to organize the delivery
of crops demanded by the VOC and were left in full control of internal
administration of their territories. Under Herman Willem Daendels and
Thomas Stamford Raffles, however, the bupati became unambiguously
officials of the colonial administration (Binnenlandsch Bestuur), with
the title regent. The Dutch also reduced the number of bupati dramati-
cally in some regions, placing each bupati at the head of a native hierar-
chy within his kabupaten or regency (see INLANDSCH BESTUUR).
66 • BURU

Restraining, and at times reversing, this trend toward bureaucratization

was the need of the colonial government to employ the traditional au-
thority of the bupati as a key to the control of the Javanese peasantry. Un-
der Daendels, and later under the Cultivation System, the bupati were
primarily responsible for mobilizing labor in service of production for
the colonial state, and colonial authorities sought from time to time to
bolster the position of the bupati as small-time kings or princes, espe-
cially by making the office hereditary. In 1913 a conservative Regenten-
bond (Regents Society) was formed.
The bupati were largely retained in office during the Japanese occu-
pation as ken-cho. On independence, the Indonesian Republic retained
the kabupaten, headed by a bupati, as a major administrative unit, and it
has now been extended throughout Indonesia as the principal adminis-
trative division below the province, known formally as Daerah Tingkat
II (second-level region). Between 1957 and 1959, bupati were elected to
office. Under the decentralization policies in the post-Suharto era, the
kabupaten became the principal unit of administration and was no longer
dependent on the province for its budget and direction. See also DESA;
PRIYAYI. [0479, 0636]

BURU. Mountainous island in Maluku, originally inhabited by the highland

Alfurs. From circa 1520 it was under the rule of Ternate, which converted
the coastal areas to Islam, and it was an important clove-producing area
until Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) hongi raids in 1652 destroyed
the plantations. Local resistance to the Dutch in 1657 gave the VOC the
excuse to move the indigenous population to the area around Kayeli Bay.
In the early 19th century, the island became a major center for the produc-
tion of kayuputih oil. After the Gestapu coup of 1965, many thousands of
political prisoners (tahanan politik) were detained in prison camps on the
island, with the last of these prisoners released only in December 1979.
[0025, 0253, 0736, 1189]

BUTON (Butung). Muslim sultanate established in 1540, based on the ear-

lier kingdom of Wolio and covering the islands off the southeast arm of
Sulawesi. It was conquered by Ternate in 1580, and successive sultans
thereafter tried to play off Ternate, Makassar, and the Dutch East In-
dies Company (VOC). With the fall of Makassar, the kingdom came
definitely within the Dutch sphere of influence. They weakened the po-
litical base of the kingdom, however, by exporting slaves on a large
scale. After a Dutch military expedition in 1906, the sultan signed the
 CAMBODIA, RELATIONS WITH • 67

Korte Verklaring in 1912. The sultanate was abolished in 1960. Asphalt

has been mined on Buton since 1926. See also ZELFBESTUREN. [0446]

–C–

CALENDARS. Numerous traditional calendars have been employed in the

archipelago at various times. The Muslim calendar is lunar, with a year of
354 or 355 days divided into 12 months. The counting of years commenced
in 622 A.D. with Muhammad’s flight (hijrah) to Medina, and Muslim dates
are commonly denoted in English by A.H. (anno hijrae), in Indonesian by
H (years according to the Christian calendar being marked with M for
Masehi). The year 1410 A.H. commenced on 3 August 1989 A.D. The Ja-
vanese calendar, also lunar with 354–355 days per year, was adopted by
Sultan Agung of Mataram using much Muslim terminology but with a
somewhat different division of months and arrangement of leap years and a
base year of 78 A.D., the putative start of the Hindu-Javanese era. Years are
now commonly denoted with the initials A.J. (anno Javanicae). For agri-
cultural purposes, the Javanese also used sun-years (mangsa), but these
were not counted. The year 1922 A.J. commenced on 3 August 1989 A.D.
During the Japanese occupation, the traditional Japanese system of
counting years from the founding of the imperial dynasty was used; 1942
thus became 2602. [0032]

CAMBODIA, RELATIONS WITH. The precolonial Javanese state of

Majapahit claimed ties with Cambodia in the 14th century. But there
was little interaction between the two regions throughout the colonial
period, when Cambodia formed part of French Indochina. After World
War II, growing ties developed between their two leaders, Sukarno and
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, both of whom were struggling to maintain
their countries as neutralist states and leading members of the Non-
Aligned Movement. Sihanouk attended the 1955 Asia-Africa Confer-
ence in Bandung. After the fall of Sukarno, when Indonesia entered the
Western camp, relations between Sihanouk and Indonesian president
Suharto were not warm. The Indonesian government acceded to Amer-
ican requests that anti-Sihanouk Cambodian troops be trained in In-
donesia. After the 1970 coup against Sihanouk the United States en-
couraged Indonesia to help in Cambodia, but Foreign Minister Adam
Malik headed off these efforts. He criticized the American/Vietnamese
incursion into Cambodia and convened the Djakarta Conference on
68 • CAMPHOR

Cambodia held in May 1970, which succeeded in keeping Indonesia

neutral in the dispute.
Indonesia played a mediating role in Cambodia when in July 1988 it
hosted the first round of negotiations between Cambodian groups and in-
terested regional states, and subsequently it was instrumental in getting
the warring Cambodian factions to agree to United Nations–sponsored
elections in 1993.
Cambodia was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) in April 1999, and in July 2002 direct trading links were
established between Jakarta (Tanjung Priok) and Sihanoukville. At that
time, Indonesian exports to Cambodia had reached US$72 million in
value compared with less than US$1 million in imports from Cambodia.
Indonesia expressed an interest in importing rice from Cambodia, while
Cambodia wished to import oil and fertilizer. [0748, 0751, 1125, 1144]

CAMPHOR (from Malaysian kapur). Aromatic crystalline substance col-

lected from cavities in the trunks of felled Dryobalanops aromatica
(Dipterocarpaceae) trees, especially in northern Sumatra. It was used in
incense and medicines and for the preservation of corpses, and from the
sixth century it was traded extensively from Kalimantan and from North
Sumatra through the west coast port of Barus to China, India, the Arab
world, and the Mediterranean. Collection was done in great secrecy, and
collectors developed a secret language to conceal their activities. Trade
with China declined after techniques were developed to extract camphor
from the East Asian tree Cinnamomum camphora. Dryobalanops is now
more important as a timber tree. [0527, 0543, 0793]

CANNABIS (Cannabis sativa Cannabaceae, ganja). Native to the area

around the Caspian Sea but reported from Java in the 10th century,
cannabis was used both for its fiber and as an intoxicant, though its use
never approached that of betel, opium, or tobacco. Its use was banned
in 1927, but it is still found wild in northern Sumatra and has been the
subject of a government antinarcotic campaign since the late 1970s. In
the 1990s sections of the Indonesian military reportedly developed a
strong interest in the illegal cannabis trade from Aceh. [0331, 0332]

CATHOLICISM. Although the Franciscan Odoric of Pordonone preached

in Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan in circa 1324, formal Catholic mis-
sionary activity in Indonesia began only after the Portuguese captured
Melaka in 1511 and established outposts in Maluku. Francis Xavier
 CATTLE • 69

worked in Ternate and Ambon 1546–1547, and significant conversions

were made in Ambon, Ternate, Flores, Timor, and the north coast of
Java. Militarized Dominican friars claimed much of the islands of Flores
and Timor for Portugal in the mid-16th century and were the principal
agents of Portuguese domination there until the early 19th century. They
were expelled by the Portuguese government in 1834.
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) banned the promotion of
Catholicism, and though formal freedom of religion was allowed with the
fall of the company in 1800, many practical restrictions remained. The
Catholic Church continued to be banned from certain regions, notably the
Batak regions of northern Sumatra and the Toraja areas of Sulawesi, but
in the mid-19th century was allocated Flores and Timor as mission areas
as part of an agreement with the Portuguese over jurisdictions in east
Nusatenggara. The present Catholic population of about 5 million is
concentrated on Flores and Timor and to a lesser extent in Central Java,
where it has been adopted by many Chinese Indonesians. Albert Sugiy-
opranoto (1896–1963) was the first Indonesian to be appointed bishop.
Youth organizations tied to the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) played
a large role in the student demonstrations that brought Suharto to power,
and their leaders developed close ties to Ali Murtopo, joining with him
in the establishment of the Centre for Strategic and International Stud-
ies (CSIS), which had a substantial influence on shaping the policies of
the early New Order government. Under the Suharto regime, Catholics
then came to play a policy and media role in Indonesian life dispropor-
tionate to their numbers. The Catholic-owned Kompas-Gramedia group
published the respected daily newpaper Kompas and weekly magazine
Tempo, and by the mid-1990s dominated the publishing industry. See also
CHRISTIANITY; MEDIA; RELIGION AND POLITICS. [0835, 1341]

CATTLE (Bos taurus and B. indicus). Cattle were abundant on Java from
the 10th century, and dried meat was exported to China in the 19th cen-
tury. There was little traditional use of milk in the archipelago except in
parts of Sumatra and for ritual purposes. Dairies, however, were estab-
lished by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in Ambon and the
Batavia region in the 17th century, and milk became a luxury especially
associated with European ways of life. From 1880, condensed milk was
imported from Europe and Australia, and use of milk began to spread
increasingly to Indonesians. The colonial agriculture department began
systematic improvement of cattle strains in 1904. The first hygiene reg-
ulations for milk were issued in 1920. Under the New Order, attempts
70 • CELEBES

were made to develop the cattle industry as consumer demand for meat
and milk grew. See also BANTENG; KERBAU; PASTEUR INSTITUTE.

CELEBES. See SULAWESI.

CENDANA GROUP. General term for those business interests associated

with Suharto’s presidential palace, notably the holdings of his wife Siti
Hartinah (Tien) Suharto (especially the charitable organization Yayasan
Harapan Kita); her brother-in-law Probosutejo (especially the Mercu
Buana group); her sons Tommy (Mandala Putra Hutomo), Sigit Harjoju-
danto, and Bambang Trihatmojo; and her daughter Siti Hardiyanti Ruk-
mana (Tutut); and with President Suharto’s banker Liem Sioe Liong. See
also CLOVES; SUHARTO FAMILY. [0313, 0373]

CENSORSHIP. Until 1815 the governor-general had absolute right to re-

strict or ban the circulation of publications in the Indies, though this right
was exercised mainly in the centers of European settlement. Although
the free circulation of Netherlands publications was guaranteed by the
Regeeringsreglement (constitution) of the Netherlands Indies in 1815,
local and foreign publications were subject to censorship. The 1856 Re-
glement op de Drukwerken (Regulation of Publications) provided for
prepublication censorship, and the governor-general had the right, in
consultation with the Raad van Indië, to ban local periodicals on
grounds of agitation or the undermining of state authority. Like the ex-
orbitante rechten, this power was not subject to judicial appeal or re-
view. In 1906 postpublication censorship was introduced: all publica-
tions had to be submitted to the censor within 24 hours and could be
suspended. From 1914 prosecution was also possible under the so-called
haatzaai articles (see SUBVERSION). Revised regulations for press
muzzling (persbreidel) were introduced in 1931, and in the following
five years 27 nationalist newspapers were restricted. Prepublication cen-
sorship was restored under the Japanese.
In the first years of independence, there was virtually no censorship,
but control was restored in 1957 with the imposition of martial law. Pub-
lications were censored by prepublication government instructions, by
bans on distribution, by the blacking out of offending articles (especially
in the case of foreign publications), and by withdrawal of a publication’s
Surat Ijin Terbit (SIT, publication license), introduced in 1958. Heavy
press restrictions were introduced in 1965–1966, when 46 newspapers
were banned and the Indonesian Journalists’ Association (Persatuan
 CENSUSES • 71

Wartawan Indonesia) was purged. Restrictions were formalized in a new

Press Law of December 1966, intended officially to ensure that the press
would be “free but responsible.”
Under the New Order, newspapers, magazines, popular music, and
particularly films were controlled through censorship codes designed to
protect state security and social harmony. In the film industry, a Badan
Sensor Filem (BSF) carried out this censorship. Literature, popular fic-
tion, and magazines were subject to standard censorship procedures—all
book titles had to be cleared by the Attorney-General’s Department, and
magazines required a publishing license subject to recall by the Depart-
ment of Information. Another Press Law in September 1982 replaced the
SIT with a Surat Ijin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (SIUPP, Permit to Operate a
Press Company), withdrawal of which could stop publication not just of
the offending publication but of all other business operations associated
with it. One characteristic of the censorship under Suharto that influ-
enced the nature of what appeared was the fact that the censors evaluated
publications after they appeared, not before, which invited writers to test
the limits of censorship but also to employ self-censorship and avoid
open criticism of the governing regime.
In August 1990 the government announced that there would be no
more banning of newspapers, but after a period of “openness” (see
KETERBUKAAN) over the next few years, it reimposed harsh censor-
ship in June 1994, banning the popular news magazines Tempo and Edi-
tor, together with the political tabloid Detik. Tempo’s editor, Goenawan
Mohammad, challenged the ban in court, but after initial favorable find-
ings the Supreme Court upheld the government’s actions. Throughout
this period, the plays of Willibrordus S. Rendra and the novels of
Pramoedya Ananta Toer were consistently banned. Although much of
the censorship was lifted after the end of the Suharto regime, some re-
strictions remained, with authorization of the attorney general required
before a book could be published. See also MEDIA. [0756, 0761, 1304,
1306.]

CENSUSES. Most rulers in Indonesia have required some form of popu-

lation count for taxation purposes, and Alfred Wallace describes an in-
genious method of counting attributed to the ruler of Lombok. Most
commonly, however, households rather than individuals were counted
and the association with taxation makes early figures, which are not
common in any case, highly unreliable. S. C. Nederburgh conducted the
first census of Java in 1795, and the Dutch conducted a partial count of
72 • CENTRE FOR INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

the population of the Indies in 1905, a more extensive count in 1920, and
a full census in 1930. A further census planned for 1940 was canceled be-
cause of the war. The first census in independent Indonesia was held in
1961 but was incomplete, and many of the detailed results have since
been lost. Full censuses were held in 1971, 1980, 1990, and 2000. In
2000 the census bureau was more ambitious than in previous censuses
and attempted to administer a full questionnaire, involving, in addition to
a complete enumeration of the population on such common topics as
name, sex, and age, more detailed information on such matters as rela-
tionship to head of household, marital status, socioeconomic characteris-
tics, education, fertility, mobility, and housing conditions. [0069, 0071,
0072, 0075, 1318]

CENTRE FOR INFORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

(CIDES). An Islamic think tank set up in 1993 by the Ikatan Cendeki-
awan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) as a counterweight to the Christian-led
think tanks, especially the largely Catholic-led Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). CIDES was the brainchild of B. J. Habi-
bie, then minister for science and technology; under his chairmanship,
CIDES’S major focus was on development issues. Its influence declined
after Habibie lost the Indonesian presidency. [0756]

CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

(CSIS). A research center established in 1971 and associated with Lieu-
tenant-General Ali Murtopo (1924–1984) and Operasi Khusus (Opsus).
CSIS played a major role in developing a political format for New Order
Indonesia, especially a number of important tools for political control
such as the principle of monoloyalitas for civil servants and the notion of
the “floating mass.” In economic policy making, it has taken a somewhat
similar corporatist view, generally arguing against the “internationalist”
views of the technocrats (see BADAN PEREN CANAAN PEMBAN-
GUNAN NASIONAL) and for close coordination between government
and business as in Japan, with the state setting investment priorities and
encouraging import-substitution industrialization. CSIS was close to the
head of Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, and oil revenues provided Indonesia
with a degree of financial independence that made some of the CSIS poli-
cies possible. It has always been active in regional and international is-
sues, especially in U.S.–Indonesia relations and in relations with the other
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. Major fig-
ures in CSIS have been the conservative Catholic Chinese Liem Bian Kie
 CHINA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH • 73

(Jusuf Wanandi), Jusuf Panglaykim, and Harry Tjan Silalahi. With the
death of its highest political sponsors and the establishment of Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI)’s think tank, the Centre for
Information and Development Studies (CIDES), in the early 1990s, the
influence of CSIS declined somewhat, but it maintained its reputation as
an institution producing important research and information in the policy
and international fields. Even after Suharto’s fall, it retained influence es-
pecially with respect to Indonesia’s relations with the United States. See
also KOMITÉ NASIONAL PEMUDA INDONESIA. [0313, 0733, 0756]

CERAM. See SERAM.

CHAERUL SALEH (1916–1967). One of the youth leaders who pressed

Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta to declare independence in August
1945, Chaerul Saleh later moved close to the radical position of Tan
Malaka and briefly joined a lasykar unit in West Java in 1949 to press
for a less accommodating settlement with the Dutch. Twice arrested by
the army, he was exiled to Holland in 1952 but returned in 1955. He was
close to, but not a member of, the Murba and soon became close to
Sukarno, entering the first kabinet karya in 1957. In 1963, after the death
of Juanda Kartawijaya, he became one of three deputy prime ministers
(with Subandrio and Johannes Leimena) and was increasingly seen as
a possible leftist successor to Sukarno, though he was popular with nei-
ther the army nor the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), which tried to
have him “retooled” (i.e., removed) in 1964 after he had promoted the
Badan Pendukung Sukarnoisme. He remained close to Sukarno after
the Gestapu and was jailed by the new government in 1966, dying the
following year. [0643, 0695, 0879]

CHAIRIL ANWAR (1922–1949). Poet. Though his total output was tiny,
Chairil Anwar is credited with enormously widening the scope of Indone-
sian poetry from the formal style of the kakawin and pantun to a terse, per-
sonal style. See also GENERATIONS; JASSIN, H. B. [0225, 0228, 0234]

CHENG HO. See ZHENG HE.

CHERIBON. See CIREBON.

CHINA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Trade created the earliest links

between China and the Indonesian archipelago. The Strait of Melaka was
74 • CHINA, RELATIONS WITH

also an important staging post on trade routes between India and China
(see SRIVIJAYA). This early trade was the basis for a political relation-
ship between China and Indonesian states that is still not clear. Until the
10th century, trade seems to have been largely in the hands of local
traders whose large vessels took spices and forest products to the ports
of South China and carried Chinese goods, especially ceramics and silk,
back to Southeast Asia for local consumption and onward trade. These
traders were permitted to operate in Chinese courts only if their rulers ac-
knowledged Chinese suzerainty and paid tribute to China. Much trade, in
fact, was conducted within this framework, goods from Southeast Asia
being delivered as “tribute” with Chinese goods being returned as impe-
rial “largesse.” Imperial sale of goods obtained in this fashion was an im-
portant source of state revenue, especially during the Sung period, and in
1381 an imperial edict forbade Southeast Asian “envoys” from using
their “diplomatic” status to trade privately. Some rulers, on the other
hand, seem to have courted Chinese imperial favor to mark their senior-
ity over neighboring kingdoms, and a few requested diplomatic and mil-
itary assistance against enemies in a way that suggests true vassal status
(see “HO-LO-TAN”). No practical Chinese assistance, however, ever
appears to have reached the archipelago.
Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the tributary trade was gradually
displaced by so-called private trade, in which Chinese traders came for
the first time to Southeast Asia. The manufacture of ceramics for the
Southeast Asian market was a major industry in southern China during
the Southern Sung (1127–1179) and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties. In the
13th century, the Mongol rulers of China misinterpreted the China–In-
donesia relationship to assume a much closer vassalage. Their effort to
assert this authority on Java in 1292, however, was a failure (see MA-
JAPAHIT). Under the first Ming emperor, the tributary trade was re-
stored, and Chinese exports dramatically declined. With the rise of the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), relations were dominated by the
question of China’s responsibility for and to the local Chinese commu-
nity, and policy varied from outright rejection to enthusiastic espousal of
local Chinese interests. See also CHINESE IN INDONESIA; ZHENG
HE. [0543, 0544, 0545]

CHINA, RELATIONS WITH. Relations between Indonesia and China

since 1945 have been dominated by the question of China’s relationship
with Chinese residents in Indonesia. Indonesia recognized the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in June 1950 but sought to keep relations at a
 CHINESE IN INDONESIA • 75

low level to minimize official Chinese contact with local Chinese. Rela-
tions improved after Sukarno visited China in 1956, and China granted
Indonesia credits of US$11.2 million for rice and textiles in 1958. They
cooled again when China opposed the 1959 law expelling Chinese
traders from the countryside (see CHINESE IN INDONESIA). China’s
global anti-imperialist policy, however, fitted well with Sukarno’s ac-
tivist foreign policy and in 1961 the two countries signed a treaty of
friendship and cooperation. By 1964 there was talk of a Jakarta–Peking
anti-imperialist axis. Initially the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) kept
some distance from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in order to
avoid appearing to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but by 1964
most observers considered the PKI to be pro-Beijing rather than pro-
Moscow. After the 1965 coup, however, China was accused of having
abetted the PKI, especially by allegedly importing 100,000 small arms
for use by the “Fifth Force” under PKI control. Demonstrators attacked
the Chinese embassy, and in October 1967 Indonesia officially broke off
relations. Diplomatic contacts resumed in 1973 and direct trade in 1985,
but did not until 1990 the two countries normalized relations after a 23-
year break. A 1980 citizenship law in China removed all recognition of
dual nationality. Indonesia and China have disputed claims to areas of
the South China Sea, especially over the portion that includes the Natuna
gas field.
After Megawati Sukarnoputri became president in 2001, relations be-
tween the two countries warmed as Indonesia sought to become China’s
major source of oil and gas supplies. Chinese oil companies invested in
Indonesia’s oil and gas fields, looking to double China’s oil supply over
the next decade. Although Indonesia lost out to Australia over a contract
to supply $13 billion worth of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to China over
the next 25 years, China began negotiations with Jakarta with respect to
the Pertamina LNG field in Papua, and on 26 September 2002 the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) signed a long-term contract
worth $12.5 billion (over 25 years) for Indonesia to supply China with 2.6
million metric tons of gas a year from this Tangguh field. CNOOC would
participate with British Petroleum (BP) in developing the field. At the
same time, other Chinese companies pledged investments in Indonesia of
more than $2 billion, including a preliminary accord to construct a gas
pipeline linking Kalimantan and Java. [1130, 1139, 1145]

CHINESE IN INDONESIA. The earliest known Chinese residents of the

archipelago were the Buddhist pilgrims, Fa Xien (414) and I Jing
76 • CHINESE IN INDONESIA

(689–692), who spent time studying in Srivijaya on their way to or from

major monasteries in India. Chinese traders arrived from approximately
the 10th century, forming enclave settlements in the coastal ports. The
initial position of these Chinese was in many ways analogous to that of
Hindu-Buddhist and later Islamic traders. They represented an advanced
culture from which local rulers found it useful to borrow culturally and
politically, though the political influence of Chinese thought in Indone-
sia was never more than superficial. A few traders thus entered court life,
reaching high rank as ministers if they were especially able, while the
majority remained as temporary residents, living in Chinese quarters
similar to those of the Indonesian trading groups. The number involved
was never large, and in adopting local culture and customs they lost their
Chinese identity. Many married local women, and their descendants
merged with the indigenous population. Muslims from the Chinese em-
pire (especially Yunnan) formed a significant community in northern
Java in the 15th century, but claims that one or more of the Nine Walis
(see WALI SONGO) credited with converting the island to Islam were
Chinese remain controversial.
Under the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), the Chinese first be-
gan to emerge as a distinct intermediary class in Indonesia. But they
found the VOC racially and culturally more exclusive and bureaucrati-
cally more rigid than the indigenous courts of Java and Sumatra, and
they found the most profitable employment on the fringes of VOC activ-
ity, as farmers (see PACHT) for the collection of tolls and market taxes
and the sale of salt and opium. In the 19th century, Chinese were im-
portant in the operation of pawnshop, opium, and gambling farms.
There thus emerged a Chinese community that was economically pow-
erful but excluded from access to political power in the colony, a state of
affairs that has applied ever since. Chinese communities were typically
organized as semiautonomous corporations under Chinese “officers,”
with ranks such as captain and major, who were responsible for taxation
and for maintaining order in their communities. In the 19th century, the
separation of the Chinese from the remainder of society was formalized
with the creation of the legal category of Foreign Oriental (see RACE).
Resident Chinese continued to adopt local ways at the expense of their
Chinese customs and a distinct local Chinese culture, called Baba or per-
anakan, emerged, mainly on Java. Peranakan Chinese in general re-
tained Chinese names and religion but spoke Malay and adopted many
other elements of Malay culture, such as the use of batik.
During the 19th century, however, peranakans were joined by large
numbers of new arrivals, generally called totoks or singkeh, often im-
 CHINESE IN INDONESIA • 77

poverished men from the southern provinces of Guangdong, Fujien, and

Guangxi (ethnically described as Hokkien, Hakka, Tiuchiu, Cantonese,
and so on). Many of these came initially as laborers, the earliest coming
in the mid-18th century to the gold mines of West Kalimantan (where
there were 50,000 Chinese miners by the middle of the 19th century; see
PONTIANAK) and to the tin mines of Bangka and Belitung, and later
as indentured laborers on the plantations in East Sumatra. The Chinese
population of Indonesia in 1860 is estimated to have been 222,000. In
Kalimantan, many later settled down as peasants. More, however, moved
into trade and, with family connections in other parts of Southeast Asia,
were able to build up powerful regional trading networks. Singkeh
tended to dominate big capital and small trade, while peranakan were
most often found in credit, agricultural production, and the professions.
The economic power of the Chinese communities led the Dutch to see
them from time to time as dangerous. In 1740 Dutch fears of a Chinese
coup led to a massacre of the Chinese in Batavia and to restrictions on
Chinese residence, and in West Kalimantan to the kongsi wars of the mid-
19th century and the destruction of the independence of the kongsi in the
region. Until 1904 Chinese were banned from residence and travel in ru-
ral areas. Under the Ethical Policy, they were excluded from the revenue
farms that had previously been their mainstay, and they moved into retail
trade and credit, especially in rural areas. In the early 20th century, Chi-
nese interests began to move into the manufacture of batik and kretek.
The status of Chinese in Indonesian nationalism was always ambigu-
ous. Unlike local Arabs, they did not generally share Islam with the local
population. Even before the emergence of Indonesian nationalism, the po-
litical resurgence of nationalism in China drew strong support from the
totok community in Indonesia, and the Guomindang (Kuomintang, Na-
tionalist Party) was active in the colony. In the independence struggle
against the Dutch, most Chinese attempted to remain neutral although
many of them fought alongside the Republic. Sukarno and Mohammad
Hatta appointed several Chinese to prominent positions in the Republi-
can government. Nevertheless, many Indonesians suspected that the Chi-
nese harbored pro-Dutch sentiments, and there were several local anti-
Chinese massacres. In response the Chinese formed local “self-protection
forces” (Pao-an tui) to protect their communities.
In 1946 all resident Chinese were offered citizenship retrospective to
17 August 1945 unless they specifically repudiated it, and a similar provi-
sion was made under the transfer of sovereignty in 1949. Under Chinese
law, however, all such Chinese retained dual nationality. In 1954 the for-
eign ministers of both countries, Sunario and Zhou Enlai, signed a treaty
78 • CHINESE IN INDONESIA

(ratified in 1958) requiring all with dual nationality to choose one or the
other by December 1962. Under the New Order, Indonesia repudiated this
treaty unilaterally in April 1969, thus voiding citizenships taken out under
it and leaving about 80,000 Chinese stateless. There are presently some
5 million people in Indonesia identified as “Chinese,” of whom about two
thirds are Indonesian citizens and 1 million are citizens of the People’s Re-
public of China (PRC). Procedures for resident Chinese to obtain citizen-
ship were simplified in 1980, but corruption and obstruction by officials
and reluctance on the part of Chinese slowed the acceptance rate.
In August 1958 the Guomindang was banned and the army took over
the property of pro-Taiwan Chinese. Then, on 14 May 1959, a govern-
ment order revoked the licenses for alien Chinese to operate in retail
trade in rural areas, affecting an estimated 83,783 out of 86,690 traders.
This led to an exodus to the cities. Some 119,000 left Indonesia for the
PRC and 17,000 for Taiwan. Other restrictions on Chinese Indonesians
since 1965 have included the abolition of the Chinese-language press,
except for the government-controlled bilingual Warta Indonesia; a ban
on the import of Chinese-language materials; encouragement for Chi-
nese to take “Indonesian” (commonly Sanskritic or Muslim) names; and
a 2 percent limit on the proportion of Chinese enrollments at most state
tertiary educational institutions (and a 30 percent limit in private institu-
tions). Still, however, Chinese are widely perceived as being privileged,
especially because of the position of cukong, and anti-Chinese violence
has broken out on many occasions. Particularly extensive riots took place
in Central Java in November 1980.
New Order policy initially tended to equate Chinese culture with com-
munist influence, and the government pressured the overseas Chinese
community to assimilate. After 1966, all remaining Chinese-language
schools had to adopt Indonesian as the sole language of instruction and
a national curriculum. All purely Chinese organizations, whether or not
they were political, were forbidden, as was the use of Chinese characters
even on shop signs. A presidential decree in 1980, which applied to cer-
tain areas of Indonesia with large numbers of ethnic Chinese (including
North Sumatra, Riau, Bangka, Belitung, parts of West Java, and West
Kalimantan), greatly loosened the restrictions on Chinese becoming In-
donesian citizens, and a large proportion of the resident Chinese com-
munity in these areas took advantage of the opportunity.
The growing ties between top Chinese businessmen and the Suharto
family during the closing years of Suharto’s rule made the Chinese com-
munity, and small businessmen in particular, a natural target for protesters
at the collapsing economy. The final years of the New Order were marked
 CHUO SANGI-IN • 79

by increasingly frequent disturbances in parts of Java in which Chinese

houses, businesses, and churches were targeted. Evidence of coordination
in these attacks suggested that they were not always a result of sponta-
neous mob anger, but rather had been “turned on” to pressure Chinese
communities to pay for protection from the security forces. During the ri-
ots of 1998 that accompanied Suharto’s overthrow, Chinese businesses
were among those that were looted and burned, but the extent of anti-
Chinese activity did not approach that in the previous change of regime.
See also CONFUCIANISM. [0024, 0050, 0277, 0285, 0552, 0630, 0801,
1043, 1045, 1048, 1049, 1052–1056, 1059–1068, 1072–1074, 1286]
CHRISTIANITY. Scattered, evanescent communities of foreign-born
Christians, mostly Armenian and Persian Nestorians, existed in the ar-
chipelago from perhaps the fifth century, but there was no significant
conversion to Christianity in the archipelago until the arrival of Catholic
priests with the Portuguese in the early 16th century. Francis Xavier vis-
ited Maluku in 1546, converting the wife of the sultan of Ternate, and
by 1559 there were reputedly 8,000 Catholics on that island and a simi-
lar number on Ambon. Dominican missionaries were the first to enter
Nusatenggara, building a fort on Solor and spreading Catholicism
throughout the eastern archipelago. By the end of the century, there were
reported to be about 100,000 Catholics in the region. With the coming of
the Dutch, Portuguese influence waned, and Catholicism was largely
confined to Flores and parts of Timor.
Under Dutch rule, Protestant missionary activity began and strong
Christian communities emerged among the Bataks in northern Sumatra
(largely proselytized by German missionaries) and among the people of
Minahasa on Sulawesi. The largest shift to Christianity occurred after
the massacres of 1965–1966, when probably at least 1.5 million people
(about 1.5–2 percent of the population), most from communist strong-
holds in Central and East Java, converted to Christianity under govern-
ment pressure for all Indonesians to profess a sanctioned religion. By the
late 20th century, Christians in the country numbered at least 15 million,
about half of whom were Catholic.
After the fall of Suharto, religious tensions rose. While under Suharto
there had been an average of a dozen attacks a year on churches in In-
donesia; in the four years following his fall more than 400 churches were
razed, bombed or ransacked. See also RELIGION, POLITICAL SIG-
NIFICANCE OF. [1003, 1399]
CHUO SANGI-IN (Central Advisory Councils). Consultative bodies es-
tablished by the Japanese military authorities on Java and Sumatra in
80 • CINCHONA

October 1944. Their membership drew on the Indonesian nationalist es-

tablishment, but they had few powers, their duties being largely limited
to offering advice and suggestions in response to questions from the
Japanese. Regional councils (Shu Sangi-kai), set up in September 1944,
seem to have played a similar, limited role. [0661, 0663]

CINCHONA (spp. Rubiaceae). A tree from the Andes regions of South

America, the bark of which is processed to produce quinine, the major
medicine for preventing and treating malaria. In 1852 the colonial gov-
ernment sent Justus Karl Hasskarl (1811–1894) to South America to col-
lect seeds and plants. These were brought to Java in 1854, and after
some experiments were planted successfully at Cibodas in West Java.
Under the vigorous direction of Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn, the strain
was improved and commercial plantations were laid out. In 1930 Java
produced 11,900 tons of kina (cinchona bark), most of the world’s sup-
ply. [0331, 0332, 0347]

CIPTO MANGUNKUSUMO. See TJIPTO MANGOENKOESOEMO.

CIREBON (Cheribon). Port city on Java’s north coast, founded in the

16th century by Sunan Gunung Jati (?–1570) (see ISLAM IN IN-
DONESIA). From 1640 to 1677 it was vassal to Mataram and in 1681
came under Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) rule, but it remained a
major center of pasisir culture. From 1662 sovereignty was shared and
the territory of the state divided between three royal families, Kanoman,
Kesepuhan, and Cirebonan. Today the principality is characterized by its
almost equal number of Javanese and Sundanese speakers and by the rel-
atively high position of its Chinese, or peranakan, minority. See also
PRIANGAN. [0491, 0595]

CITIES. In contrast with the great European cities, many of which have
been major centers for millennia, the location of Indonesian cities has
tended to change with time, and most of the large cities of the modern ar-
chipelago were not important centers 500 years ago. This was partly due
to the custom of traditional rulers shifting their capitals, partly due per-
haps to the impermanence of much traditional architecture and partly
due to the fact that ritual, rather than monument, was the essential fea-
ture of royal display. (See also PORTS.)
Modern urban growth began in the 1870s with the expansion of
Batavia, Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Se-
 CLASS ANALYSIS • 81

marang on Java and Medan and Palembang on Sumatra. The term

“city” was first given administrative meaning with the creation of mu-
nicipalities under the decentralization of 1903. Urbanization was 3.8
percent in 1930 but grew to 14.8 percent in 1961. In 1930 half the in-
digenous population of the cities of Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya
were born outside the cities, though all census figures are inaccurate to
the extent that the administrative divisions used for counting fail to re-
flect the actual extent of urbanization. The 49 municipalities formed by
the Dutch have been retained by the Republic as Kotamadya, with a
status analogous to that of the kabupaten (Daerah Tingkat II). Newly
important towns requiring some form of distinct administration are
now designated kota administratif (administrative towns) within kabu-
paten; there were 29 of these in 1987. The 1990 census showed that
over 50 million people were living in urban areas, a number that in-
creased to over 86 million in 2000, when 42 percent of the population,
as against 30.9 percent in 1990, were living in urban areas. [0069,
0539, 0751, 1388, 1389]

CLASS ANALYSIS. Before 1925, even Marxists rarely used class categories
in analyzing Indonesian society, many believing that the Indonesian-Dutch
conflict transcended class divisions within Indonesian society (see also
NATIONALISM). Most class analysts have acknowledged the existence
of an aristocratic class or classes. Debate has focused rather on the existence
and nature of the commercial bourgeoisie (middle class) and the identifica-
tion of potential allies of the proletariat.
Since early times, extensive commerce has taken place in the coastal
regions of Indonesia, but no indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie emerged to
seize state power. This has been attributed variously to culture (see DU-
ALISM; SHARED POVERTY), religion, and the fact that taxation in
various forms prevented traders from accumulating investment capital.
Colonial policies in turn inhibited the rise of an Indonesian bourgeoisie
that would compete with Dutch interests and instead allowed middle lev-
els of the economy to be dominated by the Chinese. Although the Chi-
nese constituted a bourgeoisie in some senses, they were precluded from
gaining political power because they did not assimilate culturally. In in-
dependent Indonesia, the state itself seized Dutch investments (see NA-
TIONALIZATION), restricted Chinese business, and sought to foster
an Indonesian middle class. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) de-
scribed those who administered state enterprises and profited from gov-
ernment patronage as “bureaucratic capitalists” (kapitalis birokrat,
82 • CLASS ANALYSIS

kabir), but few of these seemed able to accumulate significant invest-

ment capital. Under the New Order, however, the scale of capital accu-
mulation by groups close to the Suharto regime and the extent of their
investments within Indonesia suggested to some that they were acquiring
attributes of the bourgeoisie. (See also CENDANA GROUP; IN-
DONESIANIZATION.)
A separate but related issue has been the relative absence of a class of
large landowners, especially in the countryside of Java, at least until the
late Suharto period. Most observers have noted that, although there are
clear differentiations of wealth and power within Javanese villages, con-
trol of land is not concentrated in a small number of wealthy families as,
say, in the Philippines. This has been attributed both to cultural features
of Javanese rural society (see AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION;
DESA; DUALISM; “SHARED POVERTY”) and to policies of the
Dutch, which limited the opportunities for capital accumulation in the
countryside (see INDIË VERLOREN; RAMPSPOED GEBOREN)
and encouraged the traditional aristocracy of Java to remain or become
primarily agents of the state rather than landowners in their own right
(see CULTIVATION SYSTEM, LIBERAL POLICY). Under the impact
of the Green Revolution, there was evidence that a class of wealthy
agricultural businessmen was developing in many parts of Java. Along
with them, in the late Suharto period high-ranking military and civilian
associates of the regime began to constitute a new group of large
landowners, forcibly acquiring huge tracts of land both for investment
and for use as resorts and golf courses.
The Indonesian proletariat (working class), whether strictly or loosely
defined, has always been small, and revolutionaries have consequently
sought class allies for it. From the 1920s debate focused on whether the
so-called bourgeois nationalists were appropriate allies. This debate,
which reflected similar discussion in Marxist circles elsewhere, was
never satisfactorily resolved. Until the 1950s peasants were seldom con-
sidered, partly because of romantic ideas of village life (see DESA),
partly because of Marx’s Asiatic Mode of Production model. The PKI
under D. P. Aidit (1923–1965) suggested that peasants as a class were op-
pressed by feudalism and (neo)colonialism and thus could also be revo-
lutionary, but the party was seldom able in practice to identify clear class
divisions in rural areas. In the 1980s some observers noted a widening
gap between rich and poor as a result of the Green Revolution and sug-
gested that a rural bourgeoisie and proletariat were emerging. Such a de-
velopment was complicated by the wide-scale appropriation of rural land
 CLOVES • 83

in the late Suharto period both by the state and by speculators from the
urban areas. See also MARHAEN; PATRIMONIALISM. [0313, 0373,
0399, 0895, 0904, 0921]

CLOTH. The earliest cloth in the archipelago was made of felted bark in
a style still found in parts of Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Seram, and
Papua. With the arrival, however, of cotton, weaving became a major
activity, symbolic of creation and preeminently the work of women, as
metalworking was the work of men. Many traditional cultures of the
archipelago use ritual cloths, such as the famous ship cloths of Lam-
pung, to celebrate rites of passage. Indonesian cloth manufacture is
best known for its dyeing techniques, especially ikat, in which the
threads are tie-dyed before weaving, and batik. Traditional dyes were
indigo, soga (a brown dye from plant roots), and the red mengkudu.
The complexity of the production process made cloth a rare commod-
ity and until the 14th century most people continued to wear clothes of
bark and plaited vegetable fiber. Large quantities of Indian cotton cloth
and smaller amounts of Chinese silk began to arrive in the 14th cen-
tury, partly to pay for spices purchased in the archipelago, and the
sarung became a common item of clothing, though local weaving con-
tinued in many areas and the finest of cloth, such as the songket of Is-
lamic Sumatra with its gold and silver thread, continued to be made in
the archipelago.
In the 20th century, Japanese cloth strongly penetrated the Indonesian
market, leading the colonial government to apply quotas in the 1930s.
This encouraged an expansion of domestic production dominated by in-
digenous entrepreneurs such as A. M. Dasaad. Within a few years, how-
ever, the industry was largely in the hands of Chinese businessmen. Au-
tomated weaving began in the 1960s and 1970s, and Japanese industrial
cloth production expanded after 1965. [0147, 0151, 0439]

CLOVES (cengkeh). The dried immature flower buds of Syzygium aro-

maticum (Myrtaceae), used widely in food, medicine, and perfume.
Originally found only on Ternate, Tidore, and adjacent islets, cloves
were traded to China from circa 500 B.C. to India from circa 200 B.C.
and perhaps to Africa. Until the 16th century, Javanese merchants were
prominent in the trade, but they were partly displaced by the Por-
tuguese, who expanded production on Ambon and surrounding islands.
On gaining hegemony in Maluku, the Dutch restricted production out-
side Ambon and destroyed trees in order to keep the price high (see
84 • COAL

HONGI RAIDS). In 1789, however, a tree was smuggled to Mauritius

in French territory and from there spread to Penang and Zanzibar, break-
ing the Dutch monopoly.
Cloves form an important ingredient in Indonesian kretek cigarettes
and were imported from Zanzibar for this purpose until 1987, when do-
mestic production rose dramatically. Production was concentrated in
East Java, and by the 1990s the industry supported an estimated 4 mil-
lion people. In 1968 a lucrative monopoly of clove imports had been
granted to P. T. Mercu Buana (owned by President Suharto’s half-
brother Probosutejo) and P. T. Mega, owned by the president’s banker,
Liem Sioe Liong (see also CENDANA GROUP). Culinary clove pro-
duction for export became well established on Java and other islands.
In the late 1980s, after failing in their effort to control the domestic
clove market, a group of spice traders, with Tommy Suharto as their front
man, proposed setting up a government-sanctioned monopoly in cloves.
President Suharto designated cloves an “essential commodity” that
needed to be regulated by the state, and in 1991 a Clove Support and
Marketing Agency (Badan Penyangga dan Pemasaran Cengkeh, or
BPPC) was set up with Tommy as chairman. The result was declining
sales in cloves and great resentment from farmers and kretek makers. In
1998 under the International Monetary Fund (IMF)–backed reform pro-
gram, Suharto had to agree to end the monopoly, and it was abolished in
May of that year. See also SUHARTO FAMILY. [0313, 0331, 0332,
0527, 0751, 0760, 0896]

COAL. With the development of steamships in the 19th century, the coal
deposits of the archipelago became important as a source of fuel, espe-
cially for the navy. The first coal reserve was discovered in Pengaron,
Kalimantan, and a mine was opened there in 1848, but eventually
failed. Two other coalmines were launched during the 19th century in
Kalimantan and were developed by both private enterprise and the
Dutch colonial government. A major coal deposit of what proved to be
the best quality of coal in the archipelago was found in West Sumatra in
1868, and a second major deposit was found at Bukit Asam in South
Sumatra shortly thereafter. The Ombilin mine at Sawahlunto in West
Sumatra began production in 1892 as a state enterprise, employing both
open-cast and underground mining. Production at this mine reached over
600 tons in 1924, falling to less than 500 tons as a result of miners’
strikes in 1925 and 1926. Total coal production in the Netherlands East
Indies reached a peak in 1930 of nearly 1.9 million tons.
 COCONUT • 85

Under the Japanese occupation, subsidiaries of the Mitsui Company

were allowed to exploit the Bukit Asam and Ombilin coalmines, with
other Sumatran mining areas exploited by other private Japanese com-
panies. The Japanese also constructed a railway to Sumatra’s east coast
to transport coal from the Ombilin mine. But in the later years of the oc-
cupation, production declined drastically as mining companies were
forced to help the Japanese war effort with men and supplies.
In postindependence Indonesia, the government’s poor financial state
impeded its rehabilitation of the mining companies, and coal also faced
growing competition from oil as an energy source. By 1962 coal produc-
tion had fallen to under 500,000 tons. Determined to increase coal pro-
duction, Jakarta carried out repairs and rehabilitation of the Ombilin and
Bukit Asam mines and explored for new coal deposits in Kalimantan.
Under the New Order, development of coalmines was neglected for
nearly a decade. The Ombilin, Bukit Asam, and Mahakam mining com-
panies were merged into one state-owned company, but coal production
steadily decreased to less than 200,000 tons a year. After the oil crises of
the 1970s, however, the government was forced to rethink its energy pol-
icy and put more emphasis on coal production. In the late 1980s, open-cut
production in East Kalimantan was expanded for export and reached full
production in 1993–1994, as the availability of oil for export diminished.
Although the PT Kaltim Prime coalmine was the largest mine there, its
disputes with local landowners meant that it experienced huge losses in
mid-2001. Between 1986 and 1990 Indonesian coal production rose from
2 million tons to 11.2 million tons, of which 42 percent was exported. Ac-
cording to Far Eastern Economic Review yearly figures, Indonesia pro-
duced 58.3 million metric tons of coal in 2000. [0407, 0411, 0413, 0416]

COCONUT (Cocos nucifera Arecaceae). This widespread and versatile

palm tree supplies food, clothing, and building materials in tropical
coastal regions. There is much debate about its origins, but most evidence
suggests that it originated and was domesticated in the western Pacific. It
is closely related to human settlement and most commonly spreads by
planting. Coconuts became a commercial crop only in the mid-19th cen-
tury with a rise in demand for copra for soap making. Extensive planta-
tions were established in this period, but smallholders accounted for 95
percent of production, especially in Minahasa. With 112 million trees in
1918, Indonesia was the world’s largest prewar producer. In 1938 copra
exports reached a high of 556,500 tons. Production declined in the 1970s
and 1980s due to disease and the need to remove old trees for replanting.
86 • COEN, JAN PIETERSZOON

For some producers, sugar production from coconut flowers is now more
lucrative than copra. [0331, 0332, 0449]

COEN, JAN PIETERSZOON (1557–1629). Founder of Dutch power in

the Indies. As fourth governor-general from 1619 (though he was ap-
pointed in 1617), he established a trading post at Sunda Kelapa in 1610
and a fort there in 1618, which later became Batavia and which he
turned into the headquarters of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
operations in the east. In 1621 he brutally conquered the Banda Islands.
His term of office ended in 1623, but he was persuaded by the Heeren
XVII (Seventeen Gentlemen) to resume it in 1627 and defended Batavia
against two unsuccessful attacks by Mataram. [0491]

COFFEE (Coffea spp. Rubiaceae). Native to the Middle East, coffee plants
were brought to Indonesia by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
in 1696. The company encouraged planting by the bupatis in Priangan
in the early 18th century, and it was soon taken up as a cash crop by the
local population. The first Java coffee was sold in Amsterdam in 1712,
and in 1725 production exceeded that of the previous market leader,
Yemen; after 1726, the VOC controlled 50–75 percent of the world’s cof-
fee trade. Cultivation was initially free, but in 1725 came under a VOC
monopoly and became one of the major crops of the West Java Pre-
angerstelsel (forced cultivation system). Production of C. arabica in cen-
tral and eastern Java expanded greatly, especially under Herman Willem
Daendels, so that Java coffee dominated world markets by 1811. Coffee
then became one of the principal crops of the Cultivation System, and a
government monopoly of production on Java was maintained until 1915.
Estate production of coffee began in East Java in 1870. In 1878, the cof-
fee leaf disease Hemileia vastatrix devastated plantations on Java, lead-
ing to a shift to C. robusta in the late 19th century and an expansion of
cultivation in southern Sumatra, Bali, Timor, and Sulawesi, but coffee’s
share of the total value of Indies exports never recovered, standing at 2.27
percent in 1938 and declining further after World War II. Production in
1950 was 12 percent of that before the war, but expansion of cultivation,
especially by transmigrants in Lampung, made Indonesia the world’s
third largest producer, with 7 percent of global production and export.
The smallholder cultivation of coffee has always been linked to the crop’s
price on the international market, and it surged in the late 1970s.
The financial crisis of 1997–1998 stimulated a further spurt in coffee
production as prices for this export crop multiplied to six or seven times
 COMMISSIONER-GENERAL • 87

those of the precrisis period. In the uplands of South Sumatra and Su-
lawesi, migrants joined the local people in planting coffee trees, con-
verting rice land to coffee cultivation, and attempting to maximize their
yield. The subsequent drop in prices reversed the trend. [0331, 0332,
0340, 0765, 0797]

COKROAMINOTO, HAJI UMAR SAID. See TJOKROAMINOTO,

HAJI UMAR SAID.

COLIJN, HENDRIKUS (1869–1944). Dutch prime minister. Colijn

joined the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL) as a young
man and took part both in the conquest of Lombok and, as adjutant to
J. B. van Heutz, in the Aceh War from 1895 to 1904. On his return to
the Netherlands, he entered politics and business, becoming director of
the Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (see OIL) and, in 1923, minister of
finance. He was prime minister in 1925–1926 and from 1933 until 1939.
During the Depression, he was a major spokesman for free trade. He
died in German internment during World War II.

COLONIES, NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF. With the dissolution of

the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), the Netherlands government
established its formal authority over the Indonesian possessions through
a colonial department that went through various names until finally be-
coming the Ministry of Colonies (Ministerie van Koloniën) in 1848. The
ministry’s task was preparing general policy lines and handling relations
between the colony and the Netherlands, rather than direct administra-
tion, and no minister of colonies visited the Indies until 1941. In the 20th
century, however, ministers were generally technical specialists with In-
dies experience; nine of the 25 held the post of governor-general before
or after. In February 1945, the ministry’s title was changed to Overseas
Territories (Overzeese Gebiedsdelen). For successive names of the min-
istry and a list of ministers, see APPENDIX B. See also NETHER-
LANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA.

COMMISSIONER-GENERAL. Under the Dutch East Indies Company

(VOC), commissioners (commissarissen-generaal) were occasionally ap-
pointed as representatives of the Netherlands government in the East. From
1814 to 1819, three commissioners-general—C. T. Elout (1767–1841),
G. A. G. P. van der Capellen (1778–1848), and A. A. Buyskes (1771–?)—
governed the Indies with the tasks of resuming control of the colony from
88 • COMMUNICATIONS

Britain and establishing a new colonial administration, a complex consti-

tutional and technical task after the fall of the Dutch East Indies Com-
pany (VOC) and the interregna under French and British rule. Van der
Capellen was also governor-general (executive head of the government)
and continued in this post as sole commissioner-general until 1826. His
successors B. du Bus de Gisignies (1780–1848) and J. van den Bosch
(1780–1839) also held the post briefly alongside the governor-generalship
to 1834. In 1946–1948 Willem Schermerhorn, Max van Poll, and Feike de
Boer were commissioners-general for the purpose of negotiating a settle-
ment with the Indonesian Republic. [0659]

COMMUNICATIONS. See MEDIA; POSTAL SERVICE; RAILWAYS;

ROADS; SHIPPING; TELEGRAPH.

COMMUNISM. See MARXISM; PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA.

CONFRONTATION (Konfrontasi). Indonesia’s opposition to the creation

of Malaysia as a federation of Malaya, Singapore, and British colonies
in northern Borneo was first expressed as “confrontation” by Subandrio
in January 1963 after Malay and British forces had crushed a rebellion in
the north Borneo sultanate of Brunei, but a compromise was reached be-
tween Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya’s prime minister Tunku
Abdul Rahman at the Maphilindo conference held at the end of July
1963. This compromise called for the United Nations to send a team to
the north Borneo territories to ascertain whether their people wished to
be included in the new Malaysia federation. Before the UN secretary-
general could publish the results of this exercise, the Malay prime min-
ister and British foreign minister announced that Malaysia would be
formed on 16 September irrespective of the results of the UN ascertain-
ment. In response, Sukarno, on 23 September, announced that Indone-
sia would ganyang (literally, “gobble raw,” but generally translated as
“crush”) Malaysia. Initially, Indonesia was joined less vociferously in its
opposition to Malaysia by the Philippine government.
Aside from their objections to Malaysia itself, Indonesian political
forces had their own reasons for Confrontation: the army wished to re-
tain its privileged position and access to funds after the recovery of West
Irian (Papua); the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) wished to engage
key army units away from the centers of power of Java and enhance its
nationalist status; and Sukarno wished to maintain the momentum of
popular mobilization he had begun during the Irian campaign. To in-
 CONSERVATION, NATURE • 89

crease pressure on Malaysia, the army’s Komando Operasi Tertinggi

(KOTI) command was reorganized and border incursions began into
Sarawak, where Indonesian troops were largely unsuccessful against
British Commonwealth forces. In August and September 1964, small-
scale landings took place on the Malay Peninsula. Army enthusiasm for
the conflict soon diminished, partly because they did not want to deploy
capable forces away from the centers of power on Java, and partly be-
cause Confrontation was one of the grounds for left-wing arguments in
favor of a worker-peasant “Fifth Force.” From mid-1965, even before
the rise to power of Suharto, the intelligence officers Benny Murdani
and Ali Murtopo were maintaining contacts with Malaysia, and in May
1966, shortly after the Supersemar order gave Suharto executive power,
negotiations with Kuala Lumpur began. Relations were normalized on
11 August 1966. [0478, 1120, 1123, 1126]

CONFUCIANISM (Konghucu). The general term given to traditional Chi-

nese religion in the archipelago, though what is practiced is an eclectic
blend of Confucianism with Buddhism and Taoism rather than Confu-
cianism proper despite a Confucian revival in the late 19th century. Like
other recognized religions, Confucianism in Indonesia has been under
pressure to conform to official notions of what constitutes a religion and
has tended increasingly to treat Tien (Heaven) as a deity and Confucius
as a prophet and to identify Confucian classics as holy scripture. [1335,
1369]

CONRAD, JOSEPH (1857–1924). Conrad visited the archipelago as a

sailor between 1883 and 1888 and set several of his novels there, espe-
cially Almayer’s Folly (1895), An Outcast of the Islands (1896), and Lord
Jim (1899–1900). Much of his writing describes the venality of Euro-
pean activity in the region. [0243, 0629]

CONSERVATION, NATURE. The director of the Bogor Botanical Gar-

dens, Melchior Treub, suggested creation of a nature reserve on Mt. Gede,
near Bogor, in 1889. Ordinances to protect the bird of paradise were
first issued in 1905 and were revised in 1909 to include the rhinoceros,
elephant, and orangutan. The first nature reserves (natuurmonumenten)
were gazetted in 1916 at the urging of the Nederlandsch-Indische
Vereeniging tot Natuurbescherming (Netherlands Indies Society for Na-
ture Preservation), founded in 1912 by S. H. Koorders and K. W.
Dammerman. By 1942 natural monuments and game reserves covered
90 • CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

130,000 hectares (ha) (55 reserves) on Java, about 500,000 ha on Suma-

tra, and over a million ha on Borneo. Andries Hoogerwerf was appointed
nature protection officer in 1935.
In 1951 Kusnadi was appointed head of the Nature Protection Divi-
sion of the Agriculture Department. In the mid-1970s, Indonesia cooper-
ated with the World Wildlife Fund in developing a national conservation
strategy that resulted in the declaration of the country’s first five national
parks in 1980 and a further 11 in 1982. By the late 1980s, national parks
and reserves covered approximately 6 percent of the country.
The rapid expansion of the logging industry under the Suharto regime
caused widespread deforestation throughout Indonesia, especially in Kali-
mantan and Sumatra, together with loss of rainforest and genetic erosion.
Several approaches have been suggested to conserve remaining forests and
regenerate hardwood species, including trying to involve international
bodies in funding local measures toward environmental conservation. One
of the most hopeful of these was the U.S. Tropical Forest Conservation
Act, whereby debtor nations can obtain a 40 percent cut in certain debts in
return for carrying out conservation measures. Germany also offered a
similar act. See also DEPOK; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
FORESTRY; KOMODO; UJUNG KULON. [0013, 0730, 0943, 1154]

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (Konstituante). Elected in December 1955

to draft a Constitution to replace Indonesia’s provisional 1950 Consti-
tution, the composition of the assembly largely followed that of the 1955
parliament, though there were more independent members. The assem-
bly convened in November 1956 but was unable to reach agreement on
the question of whether Islam or Pancasila should be the foundation of
the state. This deadlock was among the factors leading Sukarno to dis-
solve the assembly and restore the 1945 Constitution by decree on 5 July
1959. [0695, 0982]

CONSTITUTIONS. Until the establishment of crown rule in 1815, the

charter of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) and the various treaty
arrangements with individual states in the archipelago were all that passed
for a constitution. In 1815 the Dutch government promulgated a Regeer-
ingsreglement (RR, Government Regulating Act), which functioned as the
constitutional basis for the state of the Netherlands Indies. Reissued in
various forms up to 1854, the RR of that year, though modified in 1925
and renamed the Wet op de Staatsinrichting van Nederlandsch-Indië, re-
mained in force until the end of Dutch rule. (See also GOVERNOR-
 CONSTITUTIONS • 91

GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE; NETHERLANDS, CONSTITU-

TIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA; SUCCESSION.)
The first Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar, UUD) of the Republic
of Indonesia was adopted on 18 August 1945 by the Panitia Persiapan
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) and was based on a draft prepared by
the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia
(BPUPKI) established by the Japanese in March 1945. This Constitu-
tion was intended to be provisional and replaced by a document prepared
by a constituent assembly. The preamble (pembukaan) established the
Pancasila as Indonesia’s national philosophy, omitting the Jakarta
Charter. The Constitution provided for four branches of government—
the president, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), the Audit Board
(Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK), and the Supreme Court
(Mahkamah Agung)—but in fact it concentrated powers in the hands of
the president. Under the original terms, the president was not accountable
to the DPR, only having to give an accounting at the end of his term to
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), consisting of members
of the DPR, and delegates of the regions and other groups. Under Article
IV, until the DPR and MPR were formed the president held supreme ex-
ecutive and legislative power. A series of subsequent measures, however,
broadened political participation in government and weakened the au-
thoritarian character of the Constitution. Most important, Article IV of
the transitional provisions of the Constitution was abolished, and the leg-
islative power of the DPR and MPR was given to the Komité Nasional
Indonesia Pusat (KNIP) until those bodies could be formed. In No-
vember 1945 the KNIP’s working group initiated a number of measures
whereby the presidential cabinet was replaced by a parliamentary cabi-
net, with ministers accountable to the KNIP rather than to the president.
A second Constitution, federal in structure, was drafted at the Round
Table Conference and came into force with the creation of the Repub-
lik Indonesia Serikat on 27 December 1949. This Constitution provided
for a prime ministerial system and gave extensive constitutional protec-
tion to the federal states (see FEDERALISM). With the dissolution of
the states in 1950, however, it was replaced on 14 August by a provisional
third Constitution, unitary in structure but retaining the prime ministerial
system. According to the 1949 Constitution the government could not be
toppled by parliament, and according to the Constitution of 1950 parlia-
ment could not be dissolved by the president, although it could topple the
government. The 1950 Constitution continued the structure of parliamen-
tary government with the president mainly holding a ceremonial function.
92 • CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INDONESIA

After elections in 1955, a Constituent Assembly attempted unsuc-

cessfully to agree on a new Constitution. On 5 July 1959, Sukarno re-
stored the 1945 Constitution by presidential decree. Parliamentary de-
mocracy was thereby replaced by a system drastically redistributing state
power, with both executive and legislative powers concentrated in the
hands of the president. The DPR became a largely consultative body,
with functional groups added to the elected representatives. The Suharto
government retained the 1945 Constitution but concentrated power even
further in the hands of the president. The 1945 Constitution was apothe-
osized as a sacred pillar of the national identity. Whereas, for example, it
authorized changes to itself by a two-thirds majority of the MPR, in 1983
the sitting MPR renounced this right and prescribed that any change must
be referred to the people by referendum and must be approved by at least
90 percent of the voters in a turnout of at least 90 percent.
After the fall of Suharto, the parliament instituted measures to amend
the 1945 Constitution to prevent it being used again to justify an author-
itarian regime. In October 1999 the president and vice-president were
limited to two terms in office and the MPR authorized itself to hold an-
nual sessions to review presidential performance. More extensive amend-
ments in August 2000 gave a constitutional basis for decentralization
(by requiring governors, bupati, and mayors to be elected), established a
bill of rights for all citizens and brought the security forces under closer
control and scrutiny of parliament. In protecting citizens from retroactive
legislation, however, it also shielded members of the Indonesian armed
forces from legal accountability for atrocities committed in East Timor
and elsewhere. In August 2002 further amendments were introduced. The
MPR’s powers were limited to specific functions and it was to consist en-
tirely of elected representatives from the DPR and a new regional cham-
ber, the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD, Regional Representative
Council). The president and vice president were to be elected by direct
popular vote from 2004, and a president’s tenure was limited to two five-
year terms. In the legal field a Constitutional Court was to be established,
separate from the Supreme Court, and a Commission of Judiciary was
to be formed to propose candidates for appointment to the Court. Consti-
tutional backing was also given to the principles of regional autonomy,
and human rights provisions were added to the Constitution. At the
same time, the MPR rejected an effort to amend the Constitution to allow
the full imposition of Islamic law (syariah) for all Indonesian Muslims,
and it voted to end military and police representation in the parliament as
of 2004. [0643, 0647, 0674, 0982, 0989]
 CONTROLEUR • 93

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INDONESIA (CGI). Successor to the

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). This body was
formed after Suharto disbanded the Dutch-led IGGI in March 1992,
when the Netherlands suspended aid to Indonesia in the aftermath of the
Dili massacre (see EAST TIMOR). The CGI was headed by the World
Bank and in July 1992 allocated US$4.94 billion in new grants and low-
interest loans to Indonesia. This amount held relatively steady through-
out the rest of the Suharto years, but in 1999 the consortium undertook
to extend loans worth a total of US$7.9 billion. At the meeting held in
Tokyo in October 2000, Indonesia committed itself to accelerating the
privatization of state enterprises and of debt restructuring, and it em-
phasized that despite implementation of decentralization the central
government would remain the responsible authority for all development
assistance. It also undertook to institute an equitable and sustainable for-
est management system. [0748, 0760]

CONTINENTAL DRIFT. The present general topography of Indonesia is

largely a result of the breaking up of the former great southern continent
Gondwana and the separate northward movement of several of its parts
into the southern flank of the old Laurasian landmass. One section of
Gondwana, bearing what is now Nusatenggara, parts of Maluku, west-
ern Sulawesi, Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula,
Thailand, and Burma, seems to have begun to move north around 200
million years ago. Initially, this landmass formed an east-west belt
bulging northward over the Tropic of Capricorn, but the northward
movement of the Indian plate during the Cretaceous period (about 136
million years ago) pushed its western end northward, creating the pres-
ent oblique northwest-southeast alignment of Sumatra and Malaya. Aus-
tralia, New Guinea, and eastern Sulawesi broke from Gondwana about
90 million years ago, pushed northward at about 10 cm per year, and col-
lided violently with the rest of what is now Southeast Asia about 19–13
million years ago. The mountains of New Guinea were thrust up, the
Nusatenggara island chain was twisted north to create much of Maluku,
and eastern Sulawesi and the island of Sula were thrust into western Su-
lawesi, opening the gulf of Bone and twisting the northern arm around to
form the gulf of Tomini. See also PREHISTORY; SUNDA SHELF;
WALLACE’S LINE. [1174, 1186]

CONTROLEUR. Lower-level Dutch administrative official, abolished on

Java in 1922. See also BINNENLANDSCH BESTUUR.
94 • COOLIE ORDINANCE

COOLIE ORDINANCE (Koelieordonnantie). Until 1880 contract labor-

ers brought from South China and later from Java to work in the plan-
tations of East Sumatra could be held to their contracts only by indirect
social controls (see GAMBLING; OPIUM) and by the civil legal
process, which was often ineffective. From 1880 the Coolie Ordinance
gave government sanction to the contracts, allowing imprisonment of la-
borers who broke their contracts under the so-called poenale sanctie (pe-
nal sanction). Employers in turn were required to provide defined levels
of wages, accommodation, health care, general treatment, and repatria-
tion, but conditions were very bad. De millioenen uit Deli (1902), a re-
port by J. van den Brand, increased pressure for change under the Ethi-
cal Policy, leading to the formation of a Labor Inspectorate in 1907 and
legislation from 1911 to phase out the penal sanction. The coolie ordi-
nance was strongly criticized in the United States as a form of disguised
slavery enabling Sumatra tobacco to compete unfairly with that of
America, and the threat of import bans hastened the sanction’s disap-
pearance. By this time, however, labor was abundant and employers had
little need to use the sanction. During the Depression, many laborers
hired under contract were released and reemployed at lesser rates. The
sanction was largely abolished in 1936. [0320, 0433, 0817, 0830]

COOPERATIVES. A form of social and economic organization based ide-

ologically on notions of traditional village collectivism (see DESA), co-
operatives were first promoted by the Sarekat Dagang Islam, the forerun-
ner of the Sarekat Islam (SI), in 1913 but encountered little success. In
1920 the Netherlands Indies government established an official Commis-
sion for Cooperative Societies to investigate how to introduce coopera-
tives to Indonesia. In 1927 a “Regulation on Indonesian Cooperative So-
cieties” was promulgated, providing cooperatives with a legal basis and
enjoining the government to aid in their formation. In 1929 the Partai
Nasional Indonesia (PNI) sponsored a Cooperative Congress stimulat-
ing the establishment of cooperatives throughout Java, though again they
were short-lived. The government continued to sponsor their formation,
and by the early 1940s there were 574 cooperative societies in operation
in Indonesia with 52,555 members. Even before Indonesia achieved in-
dependence, the idea of cooperatives was embraced especially by Mo-
hammad Hatta, who saw them as an alternative to both colonialism and
indigenous capitalism. Hatta favored a restructuring of the economy by
the creation of production, consumption, and credit cooperatives. Coop-
eratives thus prospered in the early years of independence, and by 1956
they numbered 12,090, with nearly 2 million members. Most coopera-
 “CORNELL PAPER” • 95

tives, however, have been racked by inefficiency and corruption, and

their history since then has generally been depressing. [0298]

COPPER. Found in West Sumatra, West Java, and Timor, copper was
mined since early times for the production of bronze, often with a high
lead content (see also TIN). Production was never extensive and de-
clined with the large-scale import of Chinese copper cash from the 15th
century and Dutch copper doit in the 18th century. A huge mine in the
Carstensz Mountains of West Irian (Papua) was opened by Freeport
Minerals Inc. in April 1967 to mine the copper and gold existing there.
Its impact on the people and resources of the area was a major factor in
mobilizing support for the separatist Organisasi Papua Merdeka
(OPM). See also CURRENCY; MINING.

COPRA. See COCONUT.

COPYRIGHT. The Dutch copyright law was retained after independence,

but Indonesia withdrew from membership in the Berne Convention on
copyright protection in 1958. By the 1980s, unauthorized copying was
widespread and so-called pirate tapes dominated an estimated 70–90 per-
cent of the domestic market for books, videotapes, computer software,
records, and cassette tapes. By 1985 an estimated 1–2 million pirated
Western tapes were being produced every month for the domestic mar-
ket, with another 1 million tapes a month being exported to the Middle
East and Italy. In September 1987, however, following negotiations with
European recording companies, Indonesia passed a law protecting most
European material and in April 1988 signed an agreement with the Eu-
ropean Community (EC) for reciprocal protection of sound recordings. A
bilateral copyright treaty with the United States was signed on 22 March
1989, going into effect on 1 August of that year. See also MUSIC. [1142]

“CORNELL PAPER.” A preliminary analysis of the origins and details of

the Gestapu coup of 30 September 1965 prepared immediately after the
event by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey at Cornell University. The
report cast doubt on the then generally accepted view that the coup was
the work of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), arguing that it was
most probably the work of junior army officers and provided an excuse
for elimination of the PKI. The report was circulated confidentially to a
small number of scholars but was soon leaked to the wider world, where
its then-unorthodox view challenging the Suharto government’s version
of events earned its authors the enmity of the regime. [0690]
96 • CORRUPTION

CORRUPTION. A phenomenon most easily recognizable in bureaucratic

structures, where employees are expected to carry out their duties effi-
ciently and dispassionately for a fixed, regular salary paid by the em-
ployer. It makes little sense to talk of corruption in Indonesia before the
arrival of the bureaucratically organized European trading companies,
since there were no general, formal standards laying down how much
and under what circumstances officials might obtain money or other ben-
efits from their positions.
Under the Portuguese and the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC),
“corruption” consisted largely of infringing official monopolies of trade,
though the fact that salaries of VOC officials were ludicrously low gave
employees little alternative but to engage in illicit activities of one sort
or other. Senior VOC officials deplored corruption both for its effects on
company profits and for the fact that money-making activities distracted
lower officials from their administrative tasks; the later governor-
general G. W. van Imhoff went as far as suggesting in 1746 that the VOC
trading monopoly be abolished in order to eliminate corruption. This was
not done, and it is widely accepted that corruption made a major contri-
bution to the VOC’s insolvency and collapse at the end of the century.
Only under Herman Willem Daendels and his successors was the no-
tion of bureaucratic propriety taken seriously and attempts made to con-
trol the outside activities of officials. Considerable attention was given to
the question of whether the demands of the bupatis on their subjects
could and should be limited. The polemic novel Max Havelaar argued
that the bupatis’ exactions were corrupt and unjust, and this view gradu-
ally became orthodox, though the colonial government remained ex-
tremely reluctant to discipline officials on these grounds except in the
most extreme cases.
The extent of corruption grew dramatically during the Japanese occu-
pation (1942–1945), partly because salary payments to officials became
increasingly inadequate as the occupation currency depreciated in value,
partly because Japanese attempts to regulate the economy (requiring per-
mits, for instance, for the transport of food from one kabupaten to an-
other) increased the number of opportunities for officials to demand illicit
payment. During the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949), it became dif-
ficult once more to speak unambiguously of corruption: bureaucratic
salaries were paid with such irregularity and at such a depreciated rate that
many officials, and especially sections of the armed forces, were forced
to levy the population for their own survival. Though there was a number
of cases in which officials and military personnel enriched themselves un-
 CORRUPTION • 97

duly, the significance of “corruption” in this period was the habits and
contacts it formed, rather than its direct effect on public welfare.
During the 1950s and 1960s, corruption became part of an adminis-
trative vicious circle, in which lack of revenue led to inadequate salaries
for officials, in turn diminishing government performance and reducing
both the contribution of the state to general economic welfare and the
state’s capacity to collect revenue. These problems remained acute under
the New Order. In 1970 a presidential inquiry, known as the Commis-
sion of Four, investigated corruption in the Badan Urusan Logistik Na-
sional (Bulog), Pertamina, the Department of Forestry, and the state
tin company, P. N. Timah. Such investigations typically caught a number
of small offenders while leaving the most corrupt unscathed. The oil
boom of the 1970s led to even more extravagant instances of corruption
in upper levels of the government.
In the 1980s a trend toward administrative deregulation diminished for
a while some of the opportunities formerly available for corruption. In
1985, for instance, the government contracted the Swiss firm Société
Générale de Surveillance to undertake customs inspections on its behalf,
thus bypassing the notoriously corrupt state customs service. Customs
officials were suspended on full pay but with dramatically diminished in-
come (see also SHIPPING).
However, in the 1990s, as members of the Suharto family and their
close associates solidified control over the most lucrative sectors of In-
donesia’s economy, corruption became endemic in all sections of the
country’s economic life. In 1993 Indonesia was nominated as the most
corrupt of 10 Asian countries by the Hong Kong–based Political and
Economic Risk consultancy. The extent of the corruption was a major fo-
cus of the protests against the Suharto regime during the financial cri-
sis of the late 1990s and was a major reason for the overthrow of the New
Order government. Antigovernment demonstrations protested against
“Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism” (KKN, Korupsi, Kolusi, dan
Neopotisme). But the corruption was so deeply engrained in the society
that it survived the change in regime, and Abdurrachman Wahid’s tol-
erant attitude toward it was a major element in his impeachment in 2001.
Nor did matters improve under his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri,
with news reports asserting in early 2003 that 20 percent of World Bank
and other foreign loans were being siphoned off, and accusations being
made that the situation was even worse than under Suharto, because then
“only Suharto’s cronies were able to commit corruption” while all politi-
cians under Megawati participated in it. [0297, 0748, 0763, 0961, 1398]
98 • CORVÉE LABOR

CORVÉE LABOR. See HERENDIENSTEN.

COTTON (Gossypium spp. Malvaceae). Introduced to Indonesia around

300 B.C. from India, cotton was extensively grown in Java, Bali, and
Nusatenggara for the local cloth industry, though never in sufficient
quantity or quality to supplant imported cloth (see DUTCH EAST IN-
DIES COMPANY; INDIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH). In the late
18th century, production contracted under pressure from Indian imports.
Palembang and Semarang were the main areas of production. From 1858
the colonial government attempted to extend production, especially for the
Dutch cotton mills in Twente, but largely without success. [0331, 0332]

COUNCIL OF THE INDIES. See RAAD VAN INDIË.

COUPERUS, LOUIS (1863–1932). Dutch author, raised on Java. His

novel De stille kracht (The Silent Force, 1900) was a psychological explo-
ration of Dutch society in the Indies, stressing the exoticism of the Indies
environment and the impossibility of Dutch assimilation to it. [0209, 0248]

CREDIT. See BANKING.

CUKONG. A Chinese businessman who receives protection and privilege

from a powerful, often military, patron in exchange for business assis-
tance and/or a share of the profits. The largest cukong in New Order In-
donesia were Liem Sioe Liong and William Suryajaya (Tjia Kian Liong,
1922–).
Although Chinese businessmen once made their way primarily on the
basis of their business acumen, under the Suharto regime significant
economic success was not possible without patronage from within the
state. All or most successful Chinese businessmen were thus cukong to
some degree, and this appearance of favor led to much resentment.
Cukong were a major target of hostility in the so-called Malari riots of
1974. The riots led the government to apply some formal restrictions to
cukong activities, but these were seldom enforced. Cukong were also a
major target in the overthrow of the Suharto regime; and in the early pe-
riod of reformasi, many were forced out of the country’s economic life.
See also ALI-BABA FIRMS. [0313, 0373, 1045]

CULTIVATION SYSTEM (Cultuurstelsel, once commonly but inaccu-

rately translated as Culture System). In 1830 the state finances of the
 CULTIVATION SYSTEM • 99

Netherlands (which included those of the Netherlands Indies) were in

crisis following the Belgian secession and the Java War. To save the
budget, Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch (1780–1844) intro-
duced a system of agricultural deliveries that operated in theory as fol-
lows: the villages of Java were invited to use one fifth of their lands and
approximately 66 days (or one fifth of a year’s work) to grow crops des-
ignated by the government—principally sugar cane and indigo, but also
coffee, tobacco, and tea—in exchange for exemption from land tax,
then levied at 40 percent of the market value of the rice crop. Villages
taking part in the Cultivation System were also to be freed from other
tax-like obligations, such as corvée labor service (herendiensten); were
to be paid the difference in value between the land rent and the value of
produce they had delivered; and were indemnified against crop failures
beyond their control. By 1836 the direct connection between land rent
and product delivery was broken; land rent was levied in full, and sup-
pliers received payment in full for produce delivered. In 1847, it was es-
timated that 60–70 percent of crop payments returned to the colonial
government as tax.
For the Dutch, the system thus was a great success. Valuable tropical
crops were produced in abundance and not only were the costs of gov-
erning the colony readily paid but, under the unified budget system, a
substantial budget surplus (batig slot) was also transferred to the Nether-
lands each year, paying off the country’s international debt and financing
the national railway system. In the 1850s these transfers comprised 31
percent of the Dutch national income. Private investors in Java, includ-
ing the later minister of colonies I. D. Fransen van de Putte, made huge
profits, especially from the sugar factories that processed government
cane. The Dutch royal family profited handsomely through the Neder-
landsche Handel Maatschappij (NHM), now ABM-AMRO Bank.
The effect of the system on the Javanese is less clear. Undisputed are
the following: villages close to factories were often required to plant far
more than one fifth of their land with the designated crops, peasants were
never indemnified against crop losses, bupati and other indigenous offi-
cials continued to demand extensive labor services, and full payment for
the value of the crops was seldom received by the peasants entitled to it.
The system was blamed for widespread epidemics and famines on the is-
land in the 1840s. It also certainly strengthened the position of the
priyayi on Java, since they received until 1868 a percentage of produc-
tion under the system and their quasi-royal status was enhanced as a mat-
ter of Dutch policy. Some scholars have argued that the lucrative income
100 • CULTURE, DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF

to be had from acting as agents of the state discouraged the priyayi from
moving into land ownership and agricultural production themselves and
therefore averted the formation of a powerful class of rural landowners
(see CLASS ANALYSIS).
The system began to be dismantled around 1850, initially because of
a hostility in the Netherlands, under the new more democratic constitu-
tion of 1848, to the favored position of the sugar contractors and the
NHM, and later because of growing interest in larger-scale private inter-
est in the Indies and because of political indignation over the oppressive
practices linked with the cultivation system, especially as described in
the novel Max Havelaar (see CORRUPTION). The Agrarian Law of
1870, which formally abolished forced cultivation, is generally regarded
as the end of the Cultivation System in Java, though some forced culti-
vation continued to 1890 and vestiges of the system lingered on into the
20th century in the form of the coffee monopoly, which was not abol-
ished until 1915. The Cultivation System was not restricted to Java and
was introduced as the Forced Delivery system into other regions of the
archipelago, including Sumatra. In West Sumatra it was introduced in
1847 in an attempt to monopolize coffee production, relying on peasants
to plant, grow, and deliver coffee at low fixed prices to government
warehouses. It was profitable for a while before falling into irreversible
decline. Nevertheless, it lasted longer than on Java before being largely
abolished in the early years of the 20th century. It was one of the factors
sparking the dissidence that led to the 1908 rebellion there. See MI-
NANGKABAU. [0421, 0601, 0603, 0605, 0797, 0838]

CULTURE, DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF. A long-running debate

(Polemik Kebudayaan, polemic on culture) took place in Indonesia on
the nature of modern Indonesian culture and its relation to society. It was
instituted in 1935 by S. Takdir Alisyahbana with the argument, echoing
the beliefs of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, that modern Indonesian cul-
ture should incorporate in some essential way the best of Western culture
and should accept the need to move beyond traditional culture in the
process of becoming part of a universalist world culture. This view was
challenged by Ki Hajar Dewantoro, Sanusi Pané, and many others, who
argued that Western culture was characteristically materialist, intellec-
tual, and individualist and thus essentially both undesirable and hostile to
indigenous Indonesian culture (see also POLITICAL CULTURE). The
latter position was formally ratified in 1959 with the promulgation of
Sukarno’s Manipol-USDEK doctrine, of which the final principle,
 CURRENCY • 101

Kepribadian Nasional or national identity, asserted the cultural auton-

omy of Indonesia. It proved nonetheless difficult to specify the nature of
a modern Indonesian culture that contained no Western influences.
Artists of the “internationalist” Seni Rupa school of Bandung, for in-
stance, argued that painters of the ostensibly “nationalist” Yogya school
were influenced by impressionism and other Western schools.
During the 1950s the terms of the debate shifted somewhat. The uni-
versalists, led by H. B. Jassin and allegedly exemplified by the (then de-
ceased) poet Chairil Anwar, were attacked not by traditionalists but also
by the Left, especially members of the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat
(Lekra) who, in rejecting universalist culture, argued that art should re-
flect local social conditions and should serve to promote social con-
sciousness. Art should be “for the people” and should resist portraying
individualist or bourgeois values. The debate was reignited in 1995 when
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a leading member of Lekra in the early 1960s
who had been imprisoned for 14 years on Buru, was awarded the Ramon
Magsaysay Award. See also MANIFES KEBUDAYAAN. [0159]

CURRENCY. The use of gold and silver coinage in West Sumatra and
Central and East Java dates from at least the eighth century, the earliest
coins being gold masa of 2.42g stamped with a simple sesame seed de-
sign and silver coins of a similar weight stamped with a stylized sandal-
wood flower. The source of the metal is not certain, but early accounts
speak of gold and silver production on both islands and it is reasonable
to assume that some of this went into coinage. These relatively high-
value coins were probably not in day-to-day circulation but were used for
storing wealth and for ritual purposes. Although there is some evidence
of an iron bar currency called iket wsi in use in the late eighth century,
the general use of coins in daily life did not apparently begin until the
11th century, with the appearance of a number of smaller denominations
(kupang = 1/4 masa) in port areas, presumably in response to a greater
marketization of the economy. By the 13th century, gold coins were used
extensively for the payment of salaries, debts, and fines. In Burton (Bu-
tung), in southeast Sulawesi, small squares of cloth were reportedly
used as currency.
Large quantities of low-denomination Chinese copper and copper-
lead cash, or picis, began to appear on Java in the late 12th century,
prompting local imitations in tin, copper, and silver and displacing the
older currency for most purposes by 1300. Picis became the standard
currency of Majapahit and their use spread to Sulawesi, Kalimantan,
102 • CURRENCY

and Sumatra, though from the 14th century several Islamic states on
Sumatra minted their own gold and tin coins. Picis were carried about in
strings of fixed numbers from 200 to 100,000. Leaden and tin-lead picis,
worth much less than copper, were fragile and often broke or disinte-
grated after a few years’ use; copper coins, by contrast, were often taken
from circulation for ceremonial purposes. So great was the flow of cop-
per coins to Indonesia that the Chinese government banned their export
for many years. The widely available picis led to a greater monetariza-
tion of the economy than before, allowing traders, often Chinese, to deal
directly, for instance, with the hill people who provided pepper to Ban-
ten and encouraged the use of credit facilities. Leonard Blussé argues
that the perishable nature of the picis also encouraged people to spend
them quickly, thus promoting the circulation of money.
From circa 1580, silver coinage in the form of Spanish reals, minted
from Peruvian and Mexican silver, became increasingly abundant, espe-
cially as extensive imports of lead by the Dutch and other Europeans in
the 17th century drove down the value of the picis. The Dutch East In-
dies Company (VOC) also produced silver rijksdaalders and from 1733
copper doit, though picis remained in circulation in many places into the
18th century. In the 19th century, locally minted tin currency was the
dominant currency in much of Sumatra.
From 1782 the VOC in Maluku issued promissory notes in denomi-
nations of 25 to 1,000 rijksdaalders; though bearing interest at 6 percent,
these also acted in some respects as paper currency and continued in cir-
culation into the early 19th century, as did bonds issued in 1810 by the
Dutch authorities in East Java on security of 1 million rijksdaalders due
in silver over 10 years from a Chinese pacht holder in Probolinggo. This
confused currency situation was somewhat regularized by the issue in
1815 of Netherlands Indies guilder (gulden) currency notes with hand-
written serial number and signature. In 1851 the Java Bank took on the
production of bank notes (backed by gold reserves), though the colonial
government continued to issue low-value currency notes. Later in the
century plantations companies, especially in East Sumatra, often issued
their own currency notes (muntbiljetten) for the payment of workers.
During the Japanese occupation, the military authorities initially
provided currency notes, but in March 1943 bank notes were issued by
the Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko (Southern Regions Development Bank). This
currency rapidly depreciated in value, but it was retained in circulation
by both the Allies and the Indonesian Republic after the Japanese sur-
render. Postwar Netherlands Indies currency notes were not issued on
 DAENDELS, HERMAN WILLEM • 103

Java until March 1946, and Republican rupiah (ORI, Oeang, i.e., Uang
Republik Indonesia) were first issued only in November. Separate local
emergency Republican currencies were later issued in several parts of
Sumatra and Java. In 1950 a new federal rupiah was issued, and previ-
ous Dutch and Republican currencies were exchanged for it at various
rates. Dutch colonial authorities in West New Guinea (Papua) issued
separate New Guinea notes from 1950, while various rebel governments
such as that of the PRRI/Permesta rebels overprinted Republican cur-
rency for internal circulation.
In January 1950 US$1.00 purchased Rp 3.80. A devaluation on 13
March 1950 took this to Rp 7.60; a system of multiple exchange rates
complicated the picture, but most observers argue that the rupiah was
overvalued in this period, thus encouraging imports and discouraging ex-
ports. After a period of sustained inflation in the late 1950s, the currency
was drastically reformed on 28 August 1959, with the freezing (i.e., de-
monetization) of notes of Rp 25,000 and above and the reduction of other
currency to one tenth of its nominal value (i.e., Rp 1,000 became Rp
100). Further depreciation of the currency under Guided Democracy led
to a similar measure on 13 December 1965, Rp 1,000 becoming Rp 1. In
the early 1970s the exchange rate stabilized at US$1.00 = Rp 415, but
this jumped to Rp 625 in late 1978, to Rp 970 in 1982, to Rp 1,700 in the
late 1980s, and to Rp 2,600 in mid-1997.
The devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 sparked a financial cri-
sis throughout Southeast Asia and had a devastating effect on the value
of the rupiah, which plumetted to more than Rp 10,000 to US$1.00 by
January 1998. Over subsequent years it rarely dropped below Rp 8,000
to US$1 and occasionally rose as high as Rp 16,000. In 2001 it started
the year at Rp 9,450 and ended it around Rp 11,000. During 2002, with
austerity measures being introduced, the rupiah began to strengthen, dip-
ping to below the 9,000 mark in the middle of the year, and by mid-2003
it was one of Asia’s strongest currencies. See also BANKING;
SJAFRUDDIN PRAWIRANEGARA. [0057, 0379, 0391, 0398, 0479]

–D–

DAENDELS, HERMAN WILLEM (1762–1818). Dutch general, lawyer,

and administrator. After gaining military experience in the forces of the
Dutch “Patriotten” who established the Batavian Republic in the
Netherlands in the late 18th century, Daendels was sent to Indonesia in
104 • DANGDUT

1807 by King Louis Napoleon of the Netherlands as governor-general

(1808–1811) with the task of organizing the defense of Java against the
British. In addition to constructing defensive works on the north Java
coast, including the first road along the entire length of the island, he in-
troduced many internal reforms, especially to combat corruption among
European officials and to reform the army. He also reduced the power of
the bupati on Java, placing them under nine regional prefects or landrost.
He was recalled in 1811 when the Netherlands was incorporated into the
French Empire, and he died as governor of Dutch possessions on the
Gold Coast (now Ghana). [0491]

DANGDUT. Style of modern popular music employing electric guitars,

drums, and voices with a sinuous melody line and a heavy irregular beat.
Dangdut first emerged in about 1972 as a blend of Western, Middle East-
ern, and kroncong elements. Its chief exponent has been Rhoma (Oma)
Irama (1947–), who employed it for both political comment and the pro-
motion of Islam. After some years of decline in the early 1980s, it be-
came hugely popular again, with widespread broadcasts and booming
cassette sales. In addition to the usual themes of love and loss, dangdut
continued its moralist tone, protesting the gap between rich and poor and
the neglect of Islamic morality. Although maintaining its character as the
voice of the “little people,” in recent years dangdut became a matter of
controversy because of the rise in popularity of Inul Daratista, who was
criticized by conservatives because of the sensuous dancing that accom-
panied her singing. [0149, 0154]

DANI. Ethnic group in Papua, inhabiting the Baliem Valley of the interior
highlands, “discovered” only in the 1930s. They construct terraced, irri-
gated fields. [1230]

DANISH EAST INDIA COMPANY. See SCANDINAVIA, HISTORI-

CAL LINKS WITH.

DARTS. Propelled from blowpipes and often smeared with poisons such as
upas, they were the classic weapon of hunting in Indonesian jungles, es-
pecially Kalimantan, where room to move was limited and projectiles
were not often deflected by winds. See also WEAPONS.

DARUL ISLAM (DI, House of Islam). General name for the Muslim rev-
olutionary movement launched in West Java in 1948 by S. M. Karto-
 DAYAKS • 105

suwiryo with the twin aims of establishing an Islamic state and vigor-
ously prosecuting the war of independence against the Dutch. The move-
ment arose immediately after the Indonesian Republic had agreed, under
the January 1948 Renville Agreement, to withdraw its armed forces
from West Java. In March 1948 the Darul Islam decided to establish its
own administration in the region, but stopped short of a total break with
the Republic. It formally repudiated the Republic on 7 August 1949, af-
ter the final cease-fire between Dutch and Republican forces, by declar-
ing an Islamic state, the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).
The movement attracted not just those who wanted the implementa-
tion of Islamic law in independent Indonesia but also many who opposed
the strength of Dutch influence in the new Republik Indonesia Serikat
(RIS), and the DI spread in varying degrees to most Muslim parts of the
archipelago, encompassing the rebellion in Aceh under Daud
Beureu’eh, the rebellion of Kahar Muzakkar in South Sulawesi, and
that of Ibnu Hajar in Banjarmasin. From the start the Masjumi was am-
bivalent toward it, sympathetic toward its aims but rejecting its methods.
West Java was always the core of the movement, and fighting was espe-
cially fierce there although DI forces occasionally reached the outskirts
of Jakarta. The movement largely crumbled after Kartosuwiryo was
killed in 1962. In an attempt to discredit opposition to the Suharto gov-
ernment in the 1977 elections, the Darul Islam was reactivated by Gen-
eral Ali Murtopo in the mid-1970s and given the name Komando Ji-
had. [0693, 1019, 1031]

DATUK. See TITLES.

DAYAKS. A collective term for the indigenous peoples of Kalimantan,

comprising at least 20 different ethnic groups. They are generally divided
into three groupings: the Dusun and Murut in the north; the Kenyah,
Kayan, Kayang, and Iban in the center; and the Ngaju in the center and
south. Dayaks traditionally practice shifting agriculture (swidden) and
hunting, and live in multifamily longhouses up to 180 meters long. Po-
litical leadership is ephemeral as power relationships change within fam-
ily groups. In precolonial times, headhunting was said to be common as
a means of accumulating “life force.” Tension between Dayaks and the
Muslims of Banjarmasin led in 1958 to the creation of the province of
Central Kalimantan.
Governments have traditionally been uneasy over the way of life of
the Dayaks, seeing it as unsettled, destabilizing, and, in recent times,
106 • DEBT, INTERNATIONAL

ecologically destructive (see ALANG-ALANG), and there have been

many attempts to encourage Dayaks to establish permanent settlements,
take up commercial crops such as cloves and pepper, and convert to a
major religion. Over the years many Dayaks did convert to Islam, the re-
ligion of the Malay inhabitants of the island’s coastal regions. In 1980,
however, the traditional Dayak religion was recognized under the name
Kaharingan as a branch of Hinduism.
The Dayaks became victims of two of the major policies of the
Suharto government—transmigration and exploitation of the forests.
Between 1980 and 1985 more than 100,000 non-Dayaks were moved
into west and central Kalimantan under the transmigration program, and
the numbers were increased by voluntary migrants, especially from
Madura. (The Dayaks came to constitute only approximately 40 percent
of West Kalimantan’s population and 60 percent of Central Kaliman-
tan’s.) At the same time, Dayaks were forcibly removed from their land
in favor of concession holders who from the 1980s felled an estimated
233,000 hectares of the rainforest every year. Traditional Dayak leaders
and institutions were stripped of their authority and replaced by bureau-
crats appointed by Jakarta. Sporadic clashes with the immigrants began
in 1979. After the huge forest fires of 1997, violence broke out and
spread and intensified as Dayak tribesmen attacked Madurese settle-
ments northwest of Pontianak, killing about 450 and forcing about
20,000 to flee. In early 1999, with the erosion of the central govern-
ment’s authority after Suharto’s fall, the scale of the violence exploded.
Dayak tribesmen attacked Madurese in Sambas (north of Pontianak),
leaving more than 100 dead and forcing thousands more to flee, many to
Sulawesi and others to Madura. Dayaks reoccupied land abandoned by
the refugees, and especially in West Kalimantan took over occupations
from which they had previously been excluded and began to revive their
traditional culture. [0329, 0766, 0811, 1217]

DEBT, INTERNATIONAL. In the colonial period, large amounts of

money were transferred annually to the Netherlands as the so-called
budgetary surplus (batig slot), though this did not constitute a true inter-
national debt. Following World War II the Netherlands claimed ƒ25,000
million in reparations from Japan for losses and destruction during the
occupation; of this, however, only ƒ130 million was received, most of it
by the expropriation of Japanese property in Indonesia itself. After inde-
pendence, Japan paid a further US$223 million in reparations to Indone-
sia. Under the terms of the Round Table Conference of 1949, Indonesia
 DEBT, INTERNATIONAL • 107

took over a total debt of approximately ƒ4,6 billion (US$1.7 billion) from
the former Netherlands Indies. This was a source of considerable resent-
ment, since it included some of the costs of the colonial war against the
Republic and represented a drain on independent Indonesia’s program of
economic development. The Ali Sastroamijoyo government repudiated
85 percent of this debt on 4 August 1956, by which time, however, only
$171 million of the debt was still outstanding. Under Sukarno, Indone-
sia acquired a debt of US$2.4 billion (of which $990 million was to the
Soviet Union and its allies).
In facing the crisis of the late 1960s, the Suharto government was
helped by the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), set up
in 1967, which provided more than 75 percent of development expenses
during the regime’s early years. As a result of these and other loans ne-
gotiated at the beginning of the Suharto era, Indonesia in early 1988 had
the largest foreign debt in Southeast Asia, totaling US$43.2 billion. In
1988 debt servicing accounted for 37 percent of all government expen-
diture and was estimated to total about $6.3 billion for the year. In 1995
total trade and foreign debt were 52 and 57 percent of GDP and GNP re-
spectively. By the end of 1997, the volume of short-term debts was
US$20 billion, with the total debt in November 1997 estimated by Min-
ister of Finance Mar’ie Muhammad at US$65 billion. At the end of De-
cember, a Private Foreign Debt Settlement Team (TPULNS, Tim
Penanggulangan Utang Luar Negeri Swasta) was formed, and its head,
Radius Prawiro, estimated the total of private foreign debts to be US$74
billion, with the debt of the government and state companies at well over
US$60 billion. In 2002 the debt was running at 90 percent of GDP and if
the government were to reduce it to its targeted 60 percent of GDP by
2004 there would need to be an annual growth rate in the economy of 6
percent (rather than an actual 3.3 percent).
On 12 April 2002 the group of creditor nations known as the Paris
Club agreed to reschedule the $5.4 billion of the Indonesian debt that fell
due between 1 April 2002 and 31 December 2003, agreeing to forgo both
principal and interest. Indonesia was granted 20 years to repay foreign
development aid loans, and other official foreign aid would be repaid
over 18 years. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s external debt burden remained
crushing at $140 billion—nearly 100 percent of its GDP, a figure that
dropped to just over 70 percent by the beginning of 2003. Goals set in re-
structuring agreements signed by some of the companies most seriously
in default (e.g., Asia Pulp & Paper, which defaulted on $14 billion in
debts in 2001) were rarely met. To appease international lenders,
108 • DEBT OF HONOR

Megawati Sukarnoputri’s government raised prices for fuel, electricity,

and phone calls in January 2003 on the eve of a major donors’ confer-
ence, which agreed to a $2.7 billion loan request to help the government
plug the budget deficit and repay debt. In August 2003 the cabinet de-
cided not to extend the IMF special program when it expired at the end
of the year. See also WORLD BANK. [0353, 0378, 0387, 0760]
DEBT OF HONOR. See “EERESCHULD, EEN.”
DECENTRALIZATION. Until 1903, all government officials and organ-
izations in the Indies were formally agents of the governor-general for
the administration of the colony and were entirely dependent on the cen-
tral administration for their budgets. A Decentralization Law in 1903,
however, established a limited degree of financial and administrative au-
tonomy in 32 municipalities (gemeenten), mainly on Java, and 15 terri-
tories (gewesten) throughout the colony. This was followed in 1922 by a
so-called bestuurshervorming (administrative reform), under which the
gemeenten became stadsgemeenten (“city municipalities”), and the is-
land of Java was divided into three provinces, West, Central, and East, in
1926, 1930, and 1927 respectively. The Vorstenlanden on Java contin-
ued to be administratively separate as gouvernementen.
The situation in the Outer Islands remained complicated. Dutch rule
in most regions was based on treaty relations with local rulers (zelf-
besturen). In 1922 Dutch authority was represented by three governors
(in Aceh, East Sumatra, and Celebes [Sulawesi]), 15 residents, and one
assistant resident. The 1922 reform provided for the creation of gou-
vernementen of Sumatra, Borneo, and the “Great East” (Groote Oost),
though for financial reasons these were not implemented until July 1938,
except for a proto-gouvernement of the Great East, covering Maluku
and Irian (Papua), formed in 1926. As a further measure, the Dutch es-
tablished so-called adat-law communities (adatrecht gemeenschappen)
in Minangkabau and Banjarmasin in 1938 and in Palembang in 1941.
The distinctive feature of all these new units was the presence of repre-
sentative councils that played some role in the formulation of regulations
and the allocation of budgets. They generally consisted of members elected
(under a restricted franchise) and appointed by the governor-general from
the three racial groups. Europeans were invariably overrepresented in rela-
tion to Indonesians, but the representation of each group varied to some ex-
tent in proportion to its share of the population. From 1924 all regency
councils on Java had an Indonesian majority. The head of the local admin-
istration was both chairperson of the council and chair of its College van
 DECENTRALIZATION • 109

Gecommitteerden or Gedeputeerden (College van Burgemeester en

Wethouders in the case of stadsgemeenten), the executive body for daily
administrative matters of the council. It was these local councils that chose
the elected members of the Volksraad.
The Indonesian Republic’s Law no. 22 of 1948 established provinces
(daerah tingkat I), kabupaten (daerah tingkat II), and villages as the key
levels of government. Law no. 1 of 1957 increased the number of
provinces from nine to 15 and gave local assemblies (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Daerah) the power to elect regional heads (bupati and gover-
nors), but Sukarno rescinded this law in September 1959. Under
Guided Democracy and to an even greater extent under the New Order,
the degree of centralization increased, despite a regional autonomy law
in 1974 (Law No. 5/1974) establishing regional development planning
boards (Bappeda) at the provincial and kabupaten level. Nevertheless,
the president appointed all local officials and further strengthened this
control with military secondments to the bureaucracy (see also DWI-
FUNGSI). The Jakarta government exerted tight control over the whole
administrative and financial structure of the country down to the village
level (see DESA), retaining all power at the center and channeling the re-
gions’ wealth to Jakarta (see TAXATION). It did, however, take a ten-
tative step toward decentralization in 1995 when it launched a two-year
district autonomy pilot project transferring selected functions from cen-
tral and provincial levels to 26 districts, but without making any adjust-
ment to local government finance.
After Suharto resigned in May 1998, the regions demanded a fairer
distribution of wealth and a greater voice in their own affairs. The gov-
ernment of B. J. Habibie took steps to assuage regional discontent by in-
troducing a new decentralization law (Law No. 22/1999), which was
passed by the parliament on 23 April 1999, to go into effect over a two-
year implementation period. It promised extensive autonomy to Indone-
sia’s regions in all matters except foreign, defense, judicial, religious,
and monetary affairs, relinquishing to the regions responsibility for
health, education, land rights, and investments. It was not to the provin-
cial governors that these powers were devolved but to the country’s over
300 district heads (bupati) and mayors. The law provided for these offi-
cials to be elected by their local parliaments, and it ended the practice of
military officers holding posts in the bureaucracy. At the same time, a
law (Law No. 25/1999) was passed under which regional governments
were given so-called equalization funds (dana perimbangan) in the form
of block grants that they could allocate according to local needs. They
110 • DEFENSE POLICY

were also allowed to keep 80 percent of the revenue from mining,

forestry, and fisheries in their territories, as well as 30 percent from nat-
ural gas and 15 percent from oil. Only 40 percent of tax income would
be paid to the central government. This arrangement tended to favor the
resource-rich regions, such as Riau, East Kalimantan, Aceh, and Papua.
Jakarta later had second thoughts about aspects of the program. In Au-
gust 2000 it abolished the Ministry of Regional Autonomy responsible
for implementing the policy and in January 2001 announced that the
mining industry would remain under the central government’s control for
up to five years.
In many parts of Indonesia, however, implementation of the decen-
tralization laws led to a more fluid and dynamic situation, with greater
pressure for establishment of new provinces, districts, and cities. By
2003 parliament had approved the creation of four new provinces and
106 new districts and cities. (Two more provinces were added in August
2003, when parliament voted to divide Papua into three provinces.) See
also FEDERALISM. [0397, 0472, 0591, 0638, 0937, 0948, 0950, 0963]

DEFENSE POLICY. For most of the 19th century, after Britain restored
the Indies to the Dutch in 1816, the principal task of the colonial army,
the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (KNIL), was extending
colonial power throughout the archipelago and guarding against rebel-
lion in areas already controlled. External threats were few and were met
by diplomatic rather than military precautions. In the late 19th century
the rise of German, Japanese, and Russian sea power aroused Dutch
alarm, but colonial defense policy focused on the defense of Java by
land forces. During World War I, extensive debate took place over the
desirability of an Indies militia, and in 1923 military service was made
compulsory for Dutch citizens (thus excluding the majority of Indone-
sians). Possible expansion of the colony’s naval defenses was also much
discussed, but not until 1936 did naval expenditure significantly in-
crease.
Army officers of the Republic after 1945 initially disagreed sharply on
questions of military strategy. In general, former KNIL officers favored
construction of a compact, Western-style, disciplined army that might
defeat the Dutch on their own terms, while former Pembela Tanah Air
(Peta) officers advocated a larger armed force whose strength would lie
in its confidence and commitment to an independent Indonesia. Both,
however, thought in terms of frontal warfare, and only after a long series
of setbacks, beginning with the battle of Surabaya in November 1945,
 DEFENSE POLICY • 111

in which Indonesian forces offered heavy resistance to arriving Allied

troops at great cost, did ideas of guerrilla warfare gradually spread. Mil-
itary thinkers, especially A. H. Nasution, developed the idea of total
people’s war, central to which was the principle that national defense de-
pended on close cooperation between a guerrilla army and the people.
Though this strategy was never fully implemented during the Revolu-
tion, it became the basis for the army’s territorial defense structure in
which considerable operational autonomy was given to regional military
commanders. The names and scope of these regional military commands
have varied from time to time. During the Revolution, the term
Wehrkreis (pl., Wehrkreise) was used on a fairly ad hoc basis within a
separate Java Command. In 1950 these were replaced by seven Terito-
rium dan Tentara (T & T, Territory and Army) commands, covering the
entire country. T & T commanders developed deep local roots, often at
the expense of subordination to the High Command. Between 1957 and
1959 these were gradually replaced by 16 (17 with Irian [Papua]) mili-
tary regions (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam), along with three over-
arching Inter-Regional Commands (Komando Antar Daerah, Koanda),
covering Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Eastern Indonesia. In 1963 the Ko-
dam were replaced by Penguasa Pelaksana Dwikora Daerah (Pepelrada,
Regional Authorities for the Implementation of Dwikora). They were re-
stored in 1967 only to be replaced in 1969 by six Komando Wilayah Per-
tahanan (Kowilhan, Regional Defense Commands) that had authority
over air, naval, and army units.
In 1985 the Kowilhan were abolished and again replaced by Kodam,
then numbering 10. In May 1999 it was announced that there would be
a phased return to the earlier system of 17 Kodam, and the first move
was taken on 15 May when KODAM XVI Pattimura covering Maluku
was established. No timetable was set for establishment of the other
new Kodam.
From the late 1950s, the territorial strategy was reinforced with the no-
tion of dwifungsi, asserting among other things that the military role in
administration contributes to national resilience. In practice, however,
there was some retreat from this broad defense strategy, greater empha-
sis being placed under the New Order on technically sophisticated strike
forces such as Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus) and on domes-
tic intelligence functions. The importance of domestic intelligence agen-
cies stemmed from the contention, prevalent during the Cold War, that
the military needed to counter communist penetration by emphasizing
surveillance against domestic subversion. Defense policy was based on
112 • DEFENSE POLICY

the assumption of a perpetual state of national insecurity and a continu-

ing widespread threat to political stability. The focus on intelligence as
the major tool to combat domestic subversion reached its apogee in the
late 1980s under Armed Forces commander and head of Kopkamtib
Benny Murdani, in a campaign that was widely seen as targeting polit-
ical Islam even more than the earlier predominant communist threat. Af-
ter the fall of the Soviet Union, perceived threats to national security
were broadened to include globalization, which was portrayed as intro-
ducing foreign values that threatened the harmony of the Pancasila state.
Such a stance was used in the closing years of the Suharto regime to jus-
tify its repressive policies in quashing political dissent and democratic
movements. Such movements as those advocating human rights,
greater democracy, and environmental protection were grouped with
former communist organizations under the rubric of organisasi tanpa
bentuk (OTB, formless organizations) and subject to national vigilance
and military suppression. It was under such a rubric that the armed forces
in 1996 cooperated with and directed paramilitary groups in crushing the
supporters in the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) of Megawati
Sukarnoputri.
After Suharto’s fall, there was great pressure for the military to return
to the barracks, stemming from its identification with the more brutal
policies of the New Order regime, including its destruction of opposi-
tion forces and its human rights abuses, especially in East Timor and
Aceh. But with the communal and ethnic violence that plagued many
parts of the archipelago and with East Timor’s separation from Indone-
sia, the major task of Indonesia’s armed forces came to be perceived as
the maintenance of national unity vis-à-vis regional dissidence and vio-
lence, especially in Aceh and Papua. Combating “Islamic terrorism” was
added to Indonesia’s major defense needs after the September 2001 ter-
rorist attacks on New York and Washington and especially after the Bali
bombing of October 2002. But many of the measures in this “war on
terrorism” were conducted under the auspices of the newly independent
police forces.
Strengthened under the presidency of Megawati, the armed forces in
March 2003 made a renewed effort to expand their role drastically when
they introduced a legislative provision removing the authority to declare
a national emergency from the hands of the president to those of the chief
of the armed forces. This proposed new legislation would abrogate a
measure in the Constitution and in the 2002 Defense Act and would give
the armed forces unilateral authority to deploy troops in the event of a
 DEPOK • 113

national emergency. The armed forces chief would be the one to deter-
mine that the well being of the state was at risk and would only need to
inform the president 24 hours after forces were deployed. Although the
measure was unlikely to pass, it signaled the renewed confidence of the
armed forces in the face of civilian authorities’ perceived failure to main-
tain the security of the state. For a list of defense ministers, see APPEN-
DIX E. [0668, 0714, 0731, 0966, 0972, 0974]

DELI. Sultanate in East Sumatra, successor state to the kingdom of Aru,

emerging in the 16th century as an object of struggle between Riau and
Aceh, which finally won suzerainty only to lose it to Siak in a long con-
test for power beginning in 1710. Deli was included in the Siak territo-
ries that submitted to the Dutch in 1858 but was acquired by the Dutch
from Siak in 1884. [0818]

DEMAK. The first Muslim state on Java, founded probably by a Chinese

Muslim trader in the late 15th century. This trader’s grandson, Sultan
Tranggana (1504?–1546), conquered Majapahit in circa 1527 and ex-
tended his influence to south Sumatra and Banjarmasin, attacking
Melaka in 1512. The kingdom was exhausted, however, in a major cam-
paign in Balambangan in 1546, and after Tranggana’s death it was rap-
idly eclipsed by Pajang and Mataram. See also PASISIR. [0560]

DEMANG. See INLANDSCH BESTUUR.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF EAST TIMOR (DRET). This state was

proclaimed in Dili on 28 November 1975, while Indonesian forces were
invading the Portuguese colony from the west, with Francisco Xavier do
Amaral as president and Nicolau Lobato as prime minister. Portugal’s in-
sistence that it retain sovereignty over East Timor was one of the few
diplomatic levers against the Indonesian presence during the 1980s and
1990s. Do Amaral surrendered to Indonesian forces in 1978 and was suc-
ceeded by Lobato, who was killed in battle later the same year. See also
FRETILIN; GUSMÃO, JOSE ALEXANDRE “XANANA.” [0806]

DEPOK. Village south of Batavia. In 1714, the particuliere landerij here

was bequeathed by Cornelis Chastelein to his liberated Christian slaves
and their descendants in perpetuity, and for around two centuries the
“Depokkers” formed a distinct indigenous Christian community on the
outskirts of Batavia. Chastelein also instructed that part of the land never
114 • DEPRESSION OF THE 1930s

be cleared, and this area was handed over in 1913 as a nature reserve to
the Netherlands Indies Society for Nature Protection. See also CON-
SERVATION, NATURE.
DEPRESSION OF THE 1930s. The Great Depression struck the Nether-
lands Indies severely, halving the colony’s exports and forcing dramatic
cuts in the budget. Austerity measures effectively ended the Ethical Pol-
icy’s program of government expenditure, leading on the one hand to the
mutiny on the vessel Zeven Provinciën and on the other to the formation
of the Stuw group of progressive colonial officials. Unemployment rose
and taxes increased. In an effort to preserve the Western-dominated large
rubber plantations, the government placed heavy restrictions on small-
holder production in Sumatra.
DESA (village). According to common belief, the desa was the main unit
of social organization in rural Java in precolonial times. Villages are said
to have been geographically distinct entities comprising rice fields
(sawah), orchards, and dwellings, often in a single cluster, sometimes
distributed among two or more hamlets (kampung). Village life, under an
elected head, or lurah, was said to be a model of Indonesian democracy,
decisions being taken by a process of exhaustive deliberation
(musyawarah) producing a consensus (mufakat) articulated by the lurah.
A sense of common destiny gave the villagers collective responsibility so
that while the interests of an individual would always be subordinate to
those of the desa, the community as a whole took an active interest in the
welfare of all its members. This led to the habit of gotong royong or mu-
tual self-help and, according to Clifford Geertz, ultimately to “shared
poverty” (see AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION). This view of vil-
lage life influenced leaders searching for Indonesian forms of democ-
racy; Guided Democracy was explicitly an attempt to implement village
democratic forms at the national level.
Recent research has cast doubt on this view of the precolonial village and
suggests that rural society was organized in much smaller households
(cacah) that were not geographically clustered and that were in patron–
client relationships with local officials who acted as intermediaries between
rulers, especially bupati, and households. The collectivist enclosed village
seems to have become an article of government faith first under Thomas
Stamford Raffles, who saw the village as an alternative unit of adminis-
tration to the bupati. Villages were convenient administrative units for the
levying of taxes and the mobilization of corvée labor, and British and Dutch
policies on land rent and labor did much to create a communal village life.
 DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY • 115

The process was reinforced by romantic views of traditional village life,

which helped to crystallize notions of a village culture and philosophy dis-
tinct from that of the courts or the trading cities (see ALIRAN; DUAL-
ISM). Whether original or constructed, however, the collectivist nature of
the village was breached by the penetration of the money economy, espe-
cially through taxation and the commercialization of agriculture. (See
GREEN REVOLUTION.)
Since the time of Raffles, the desa has been one of the main adminis-
trative units on Java, headed by a desahoofd or lurah (now kepala desa).
In 1979 new regulations aimed at standardizing local administration
throughout Indonesia established the desa as the lowest administrative
unit, replacing the various village configurations outside Java. Each desa
was to have a Village Consultative Council (LMD, Lembaga
Musyawarah Desa) and an Institute for Village Community Resilience
(LKMD, Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa), headed by the lurah,
which was to promote development, inculcate the Pancasila, and see to
matters such as family planning and local security and order. Irrespec-
tive of the size of its population or territory, each desa would receive the
same amount of development funds from the central government. At the
same time, though village communities were able to nominate the village
heads, government officials appointed them, and these village officials
became salaried civil servants. By 1987 there were 61,439 desa, plus
4,952 urban kelurahan. After Suharto’s resignation, this desa law was a
major target for reform and many traditional local administrations out-
side Java reverted to their earlier forms. See DECENTRALIZATION.
[0335, 0596, 0752, 0807, 0977, 1007, 1386]

DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY. The notion of macroeconomic develop-

ment as a manageable process bringing eventual greater prosperity for all
emerged in Germany in the second half of the 19th century and influ-
enced Dutch colonial thinking by the end of the century. Most thinkers
tied the possibility of self-sustaining growth to the viability of capital-
ism. Followers of J. H. Boeke (see DUALISM), believing that the in-
digenous economy would remain permanently precapitalist, saw West-
ern enterprise as an essential part of such development, while others
sought to use quasi-traditional institutions such as cooperatives to bring
the indigenous economy into the capitalist world.
At the declaration of independence, many Indonesians felt strongly
that colonial economic policies and the ravages of war had left the coun-
try economically backward and that a major program of development
116 • DEWAN NASIONAL

(pembangunan) was necessary, but it was only under the New Order that
Pembangunan, conceived as a long-term process of perhaps 25 years, was
elevated to become a central pillar of government policy. The precise na-
ture of this program was always under debate, especially between the
advocates of a more free-market economy and proponents of import-
substitution industrialization, and more quietly over the extent to which
true national prosperity (kemakmuran) could be divorced from justice
(keadilan). During its early decades the economic policies of the New Or-
der were responsible for massive economic growth, and in 1983 President
Suharto assumed the title Bapak Pembangunan (“father of development”).
See also BADAN PERENCANAAN PEMBANGUNAN NASIONAL;
CLASS ANALYSIS. [0299, 0353, 0358, 0364, 0738, 0914, 0928]

DEWAN NASIONAL (National Council). Formed by Sukarno in May

1957 as an assembly of 41 functional group representatives to advise the
cabinet after the fall of the second Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet. It was dis-
solved in June 1959 with the return to the 1945 Constitution. See also
GUIDED DEMOCRACY. [0706, 0859]

DEWAN PERTAHANAN NEGARA (DPN, State Defense Council). Es-

tablished on 6 July 1946 under State of Emergency regulations, and
comprising the prime minister, senior cabinet ministers, the army com-
mander, and lasykar leaders, the DPN became a central decision-making
body of the Indonesian Republic during the Revolution.

DEWAN PERTIMBANGAN AGUNG (DPA, Supreme Advisory Coun-

cil). A respected but powerless council of senior and retired government
figures that can offer proposals to the government on matters of national
importance as well as opinions on matters raised by the president. The
Republic’s first DPA, formed in 1945, was merged with other bodies into
the parliament of the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS). The council
was reestablished in July 1959 just before the return to the 1945 Consti-
tution. See also DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT.

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT (DPR, People’s Representative Coun-

cil). Indonesia’s principal legislative body, constitutionally subordinate to
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), to which all DPR mem-
bers automatically belong. Though prescribed by the 1945 Constitution,
its role was taken during the Revolution by the Komité Nasional In-
donesia Pusat (KNIP). The unicameral parliament of the Republik In-
donesia Serikat (RIS) was called the DPR and consisted of members of
 DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT • 117

the two chambers of the RIS parliament, together with the members of the
1945 Republic’s Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (DPA) and the Working
Committee of the KNIP. Members of parliament elected in 1955 took their
seats in March 1956. In 1959 members of this elected parliament became,
with a few exceptions, members of a provisional DPR under the restored
1945 Constitution. Sukarno, however, suspended this DPR in 1960 after
it refused to pass his budget and installed instead the DPR–Gotong Roy-
ong, whose members were appointed by him and which could be dissolved
at his will. The DPR-GR was purged of its Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI) and other left-wing members in October and November 1965.
Under the New Order, elections in 1971 reconstituted the DPR, then
numbering 460, of whom 360 were elected and 100 appointed, 75 from
the armed forces and 25 from other groups. In 1987 membership was in-
creased to 500, with 100 appointed from the armed forces. Although con-
stitutionally empowered to initiate legislation and monitor government
actions, the DPR was a very weak institution during the New Order pe-
riod. Government manipulation of the political process ensured that its
membership was overwhelmingly progovernment.
The situation changed dramatically with the resignation of Suharto,
the movement for reformasi, and the 1999 elections. After these elec-
tions, the 500-member body was constituted as follows: Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDI-P), 153 seats; Golongan
Karya (Golkar), 120; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 58;
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), 51; Partai Amanat Nasional
(PAN), 34; with the remaining parties sharing 46 seats and the armed
forces retaining only 38 seats. (Thus, Golkar’s percentage of the seats
fell from 76 percent in 1997 to 26 percent in 1999, and the allocation to
the armed forces was cut by half from the preelection number of 75
seats.) Although Abdurrachman Wahid was able to manipulate the par-
liament to win the presidency despite his party’s poor showing in the
elections, his lack of a majority base was partly responsible for the DPR
moving so consistently toward his impeachment in July 2001 and for his
replacement by Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose PDI-P party held the
largest bloc of seats. Constitutional changes introduced in 2002 created
a new legislative body, the Regional Representatives Council (DPD),
that, together with the DPR, forms the reconstituted MPR. The DPD,
however, is a largely advisory body and cannot veto legislation adopted
by the DPR. Despite Megawati’s close relations with the army, the MPR
passed a measure in 2002 whereby the military would relinquish all its
seats in the DPR in 2004. [0695, 0756, 0765]
118 • DEWANTORO, KI HAJAR

DEWANTORO, KI HAJAR. See SUWARDI SURY ANINGRAT, R. M.

DHARMA WANITA (The Duty of Women). Official association of the

wives of government employees (there was no such association for hus-
bands). Under the New Order, membership was compulsory and the or-
ganization’s hierarchy closely followed that of the bureaucracy; that is,
the wife of a section head was automatically head of the section’s
Dharma Wanita. The function of Dharma Wanita is to separate the bu-
reaucratic corps socially from other parts of the community in the inter-
ests of detaching the bureaucracy from supposedly extraneous interests.
Dharma Pertiwi is the equivalent organization for wives of military per-
sonnel. See also KORPS PEGAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA;
MONOLOYALITAS; WOMEN AND MEN.

DHARSONO, MAJOR GENERAL HARTONO REKSO (1925–1996).

One of the key officers who helped Suharto restore order and seize power
after 30 September 1965. He was commander of the Siliwangi Division
(Kodam VI) of West Java from 1966 to 1969 and became Indonesia’s am-
bassador in Bangkok and later secretary-general of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He later turned against Suharto and
in 1978 openly called for the New Order to return to its original ideals,
urging Suharto to share power or step down. As a result, the president re-
moved him from his position. He became a leading member of the Peti-
tion of Fifty. In 1984 he was jailed for speaking out against the brutal
suppression of the Muslim riots at Tanjung Priok, north of Jakarta (see
WHITE PAPER). He was released from prison in 1990. [0733, 0751]

DIEMEN, ANTHONY VAN (1593–1645). Dutch East Indies Company

(VOC) director-general of trade under J. P. Coen from 1627 to 1629 and
Coen’s successor as governor-general from 1636 to 1645. He presided
over the period of the company’s greatest expansion, when it seized
Melaka, Formosa, and Ceylon and ordered the drafting of the Bataviaasche
Statuten, which formed the basic law of the colony until 1848. [0491]

DIGUL. See BOVEN DIGUL.

DIPONEGORO, PANGERAN (1785?–1855). Javanese prince, son of

Sultan Hamengkubuwono III of Yogyakarta. After being passed over for
the succession to his father, Diponegoro withdrew to his estates and cul-
tivated his reputation as a spiritual leader. He led the Java War
 DUALISM • 119

(1825–1830) against the Dutch but was captured by the Dutch General
Hendrik Merkus Baron de Kock while under guarantee of safe conduct
for negotiations and was exiled to Makassar, where he died. [0597]

DIPTEROCARPS (Dipterocarpaceae, meranti, kruing, and other local

names). Common rainforest trees in western Indonesia, characteristic of
the flora inherited from the ancient supercontinent of Laurasia (see
CONTINENTAL DRIFT). Valued for their tall, straight trunks, they
have been felled extensively for timber since 1966. Since many species
flower and fruit for the first time up to 60 years after germination, long
after they reach marketable girth, the regeneration of some dipterocarp
forests is in doubt. See also FORESTRY; WALLACE’S LINE. [1148]

DIVORCE. See MARRIAGE, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF.

DJAJADININGRAT, PANGERAN ARIA AHMAD (1877–1943). Son

of a bupati family and one of the first of the Javanese elite to receive a
Western education under the Association Principle. The novelty of this
idea is indicated by the fact that when he enrolled at a Dutch primary
school in Batavia, he used the name Willem van Banten, implying that
he was an illegitimate Indo-European, rather than his own, aristocratic
Javanese name (see also NAMES). He became a protégé of Snouck
Hurgronje and after completing secondary school succeeded his father
as bupati of Serang. As later bupati of Batavia, member of the Volk-
sraad, technical adviser to the Dutch delegation at the League of Na-
tions, and member of various government commissions, he was one of
the most senior Indonesians in the colonial government. [0626, 0636]

DOUWES DEKKER, EDUARD (Multatuli; 1820–1887). Author of the

celebrated novel Max Havelaar (1860) based on his own experiences as
assistant resident in Lebak in West Java. There, having accused the lo-
cal bupati of extortion and corruption, he was himself dismissed in
March 1856. [0624]

DOUWES DEKKER. E. F. E. (Setiabudi). See INDISCHE PARTIJ.

DUALISM. 1. Concept formulated by the Dutch economist J. H. Boeke to

describe the existence within a single political order of a Western capital-
ist sector and an indigenous precapitalist one. Accepting much of the pre-
vailing colonial view of the communal village (see DESA), Boeke argued
120 • DURIAN

that the indigenous economy was not driven by wages, prices, and capi-
tal but by mutual social obligations. He saw this precapitalist economy as
an unchanging feature of the society (see GOTONG ROYONG;
SHARED POVERTY), partly because modern capitalism was too ad-
vanced to offer the indigenous economy a point of entry. Boeke’s ideas
were criticized in the volume Indonesian Economics. [0292, 0299, 0304]
2. Characteristic of traditional Indonesian religions identified by
Dutch structural anthropology and described as the symbolic union of
opposites, such as man-woman, earth-sky, and left-right, within a whole.
Hinduism and Buddhism are seen as dual aspects of a single truth.
[0019, 0480, 1222]
3. Dualism was also used to refer to the division of the Binnenlands
Bestuur (BB) into European and native services. [0479]

DURIAN (Durio zibethinus, Bombacaceae). Massive thorny fruit, proba-

bly native to Kalimantan. The specific epithet means civet-like, and
refers to the fruit’s strong smell, described by A. R. Wallace as that of
custard passed through a sewer. Devotees, however, regard it as the
world’s finest fruit. [0100, 1148, 1189]

DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY (VOC, Vereenigde Oost-Indische

Compagnie, lit., United East Indies Company). Formed in 1602 by the
merger of several separate companies founded in the 1590s for trade in
the Indian Ocean (see LINSCHOTEN, J. H. van), it was a joint-stock
company, that is, the separate holdings of the shareholders were not dis-
tinguished in the operations of the company, and profit and loss were
shared equally according to stock holdings. Under its charter from the
States-General, the company had an official monopoly of all Dutch trade
east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Magellan Straits and the
right to exercise sovereignty in that region on behalf of the Dutch state.
General company policy was set by the Heeren XVII (Seventeen Gen-
tlemen), who met in turn in the different provincial cities of the Nether-
lands and appointed a governor-general to govern the company in Asia.
From 1619 the company’s headquarters in Asia was at Batavia (see
COEN, JAN PIETERSZOON).
The VOC aimed from the start to gain a monopoly of the spice trade
in Maluku, using military force to impose restrictive treaties on indige-
nous states, to exclude foreign competitors, and to destroy spice trees
outside Dutch territories (see “AMBOYNA MASSACRE”; ENGLISH
EAST INDIA COMPANY; HONGI RAIDS). In 1641 the company
 DUTCH IN INDONESIA • 121

seized Melaka from the Portuguese and in 1666–1669 conquered

Makassar to deny it as a base for competitors, while in 1682 it success-
fully excluded foreign traders from Banten. The VOC also sought to
control the so-called inter-Asiatic trade, especially between the archipel-
ago and India; it established major interests in Bengal and on the Coro-
mandel coast for the purchase of cotton cloth to be exchanged for spices.
Java became important for the supply of rice and wood.
Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the VOC expanded its terri-
torial holdings in the archipelago, making use of wars of succession, es-
pecially on Java, to extend its control. In the 18th century, however, the
spice trade declined and with it the company. The increased costs of ad-
ministering a land-based empire, together with rampant inefficiency and
corruption, led the company to bankruptcy, and the States-General al-
lowed its charter to lapse on 31 December 1799. All debts (some ƒ140
million) and possessions were taken over by the Dutch government. See
also BATAVIAN REPUBLIC. [0456, 0491, 0552, 0553, 0565, 0571]

DUTCH IN INDONESIA. Dutch traders arrived in Indonesia first as tem-

porary visitors, but the growing scope of the operations of the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) soon led Dutchmen to settle in the archi-
pelago for extended periods. In addition to serving as employees of the
company and as officials, sailors, and soldiers, some entered the service
of indigenous rulers. Although attempts were made in the 17th century to
establish settler colonies in Ambon and Banda, these were soon aban-
doned. Until the 19th century, therefore, Indies Dutch society was pre-
dominantly one of VOC employees, the elite made up of senior officials
in Batavia, the mass consisting especially of European soldiers and
sailors sharing the universal culture of bars and barracks.
Because few Dutch women migrated to the colony before the 19th
century, most Dutch men had permanent or semipermanent liaisons with
Indonesian or other Asian women and gave European status to their chil-
dren (see RACE) even if not to their consorts. Dutch colonial society,
therefore, especially in Batavia, was mestizo in character, and visitors
frequently commented on the apparent readiness with which the Euro-
peans had adopted Indonesian dress, food, and customs such as betel
chewing. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, more Europeans
reached the colony, staying there for briefer periods, and more European
women arrived as semipermanent residents. A sharper social distinction
began to emerge between Europeans and Indo-Europeans, as well as
between trekkers, who planned to return to the Netherlands at the end of
122 • DWIFUNGSI

their period of service, and blijvers, who planned to retire in the Indies.
Colonial society was governed by a strict social hierarchy, with govern-
ment officials at the top, followed then by military officers, businessmen,
and churchmen. In 1930 the European population of Indonesia was about
240,000, of whom 70 percent were Indo-European. Half the European
population was concentrated in nine cities (37,200 in the Batavia-
Meester Cornelis conurbation). In the sociëteiten (clubs) a strong jazz
tradition developed, and the Europeans of the colony produced an exten-
sive literature. Political activity, such as it was, was focused on the
Netherlands rather than on the colony, and a branch of the Nederlandsche
Vereeniging voor Vrouwenkiesrecht (Netherlands Association for Fe-
male Suffrage) was founded in 1908. Only with the rise of Indonesian
nationalism did serious local politicking begin, especially through the
Vaderlandse Club, formed in 1929. During the Depression, the Dutch
Nazi party, NSB, won considerable support in the colony, and some NSB
members were interned after the fall of Holland in 1940.
As the Japanese approached, the governor-general instructed the Eu-
ropean population of Indonesia to stay put and share the fate of the In-
donesians, and approximately 100,000 were interned for the latter part of
the Japanese occupation. Approximately one in six died in the substan-
dard conditions, and many were detained by Indonesian revolutionary
groups after 1945 as hostages for Dutch good behavior; some were not
released until 1947. Dutch citizens were permitted to stay in Indonesia
under liberal conditions after the transfer of sovereignty, but many chose
to leave and on 5 December 1957 the remaining 45,000 were expelled
over the Netherlands’ retention of West Irian (Papua). See also COUPE-
RUS, LOUIS. [0248, 0491, 0584, 0608, 0622, 0659, 1407, 1425]

DWIFUNGSI (“dual function”). The official doctrine of the Indonesian

armed forces under Guided Democracy and the New Order regime,
stating that the function of the military involves both national defense
and participation in the country’s social and political affairs. The army’s
territorial structure, a military hierarchy distinct from the combat com-
mands and running parallel to the civilian bureaucracy from the provin-
cial (Komando Daerah Militer [Kodam, Regional Military Command])
to village (Bintara Pembina Desa [Babinsa, NCOs for Village Develop-
ment]) level, provided military personnel with day-to-day involvement
in the running of the country. The typical career pattern of an officer was
alternating stints in the territorial and combat commands, followed by
“retirement” at age 55 into a post in the civil bureaucracy.
 DWIFUNGSI • 123

Military involvement in administration began during the Revolution,

with the creation of the part-military Dewan Pertahanan Negara
(DPN). In 1948 several military governors (some of them civilians) were
appointed in various parts of the Republic, and A. H. Nasution devel-
oped his theory of “Total People’s Defense” (see GERILYA), under
which the civilian administration was, as it were, put at the disposal of
the armed forces for the purpose of fighting the Dutch. In the early
1950s civilian politicians attempted to restrict the army’s political in-
volvement; in 1954 armed forces were forbidden to campaign in uniform
and senior officers were banned from election. In March 1957, following
a seizure by military officers of the administration in several provinces,
martial law was declared, formalizing the army’s political intervention.
In 1960 five army officers were appointed as provincial governors. In
early 1962 several civilian officials, including Subandrio, received titu-
lar military rank within the Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi (Ko-
toe, Supreme Operational Command for the Economy) in order to have
authority over military officers serving within government departments
and state enterprises.
Only with the advent of the New Order did the doctrine of military
participation in civil affairs become officially known as dwifungsi,
claiming a permanent role for the army in both the defense and sociopo-
litical fields. The armed forces were represented formally in parliament
and in provincial and district legislatures by means of a bloc of reserved
seats—one fifth of the total until 1995, when their number in the Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) was reduced to 75 from the previous 100.
(On the basis of this representation, serving military personnel were not
permitted to vote in elections.) During the 1970s the army’s continued
domination of the state was justified on the grounds that civilians still
needed the strong leadership that only the army could provide. In Febru-
ary 1980 the government announced a program called ABRI masuk desa
(“ABRI enters the villages”), in which armed forces personnel were
posted in the villages ostensibly to familiarize themselves with village
life and problems and to improve their public profile by helping village
development. Dwifungsi was first enshrined in legislation only in Febru-
ary 1988.
Tensions between Suharto and the army leadership in the early 1990s
led to questioning of the dwifungsi doctrine, with the army suspecting
that the president was unwilling to protect their corporate interests. There
was a steady reduction in the number of officers and former officers in
the cabinet, and the armed forces’ activities in East Timor together with
124 • EAST INDONESIA

significant budget constraints after the collapse of oil prices produced

increased pressure for a smaller, leaner armed forces with correspond-
ingly fewer resources to devote to politics and government. With
Suharto’s fall some military officers hoped that the army’s dwifungsi role
would again be strengthened, but the revelations of the army’s abuses un-
der the late New Order regime led to public demands for the elimination
of military involvement in civilian affairs. Under President Abdurrach-
man Wahid and his defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, there was a
strong effort to exert civilian control over the military, and the military
formally abandoned the policy of dwifungsi. General Wiranto felt
obliged to apologize to the people of Aceh for abuses of the system, and
he agreed to the reduction (and eventual elimination) of the armed
forces’ seats in the legislative bodies. But with Megawati Sukarnopu-
tri’s accession to the presidency and her close ties to the military, it
seemed likely that they would continue to play an important role in many
aspects of political life. See also DEFENSE POLICY; “MIDDLE WAY”
FOR THE ARMED FORCES. [0714, 0727, 0731, 0733, 0736, 0872,
0972, 0978]

–E–

EAST INDONESIA. See NEGARA INDONESIA TIMUR.

EAST SUMATRA (Sumatra’s Oostkust). A lowland area around the mod-

ern city of Medan. In early times it was occupied by Batak communities,
who were later conquered and partly displaced by Malay kingdoms and
sultanates. Disputed by Aceh, Siak, and Riau, it finally emerged as a
distinct region through the phenomenal development of its plantation
sector in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Tobacco was introduced
there in 1863, and coffee, coconuts, rubber, sisal, and oil palm some-
what later. The region was the site of the first major expansion of private
investment in the Indies after the government controls of the Cultiva-
tion System were lifted. The Deli Maatschappij was formed in 1869 and
by the end of the century it dominated the region along with three other
companies, Senembah, the Deli-Batavia Maatschappij, and the Tabak
Maatschappij Arendsburg. Labor was obtained from southern China (to
1931) and later from Java (see COOLIE ORDINANCE). There was
also much immigration by Bataks from the interior, and by 1930 the
Malays comprised only 20 percent of the population. As the power of
 EAST TIMOR • 125

Western enterprises grew, that of the original rulers of the region—the

sultans of Deli, Langkat, and Serdang, as well as Asahan, Batubara, and
others—was steadily eroded, though they were compensated by vast in-
comes from rents. Politically, the East Sumatra planters were influential
in colonial circles, J. T. Cremer of the Deli Mij becoming minister of
colonies for a time. Administratively, however, the region was always
rather independent of Batavia.
In March 1946 a social revolution broke out against the sultans and ra-
jas who had leased land to Western enterprises and who were seen as
agents of Dutch colonial rule and exploiters in their own right; many
were killed or driven out. Although the area was formally part of the Re-
public, Medan was soon occupied by Allied forces, and the remainder of
the region was carved up between warlords of various allegiances. The
Dutch reconquered much of the area in July 1947 and formed the federal
Negara Sumatra Timur (NST, State of East Sumatra) on 25 December
1947, though this was dissolved in August 1950 and was incorporated in
the Indonesian province of North Sumatra. See also SUMATRA. [0348,
0460, 0673, 0817, 0818, 0830, 0828]

EAST TIMOR (including the enclave of Oécusse). East Timor became

clearly defined as a Portuguese colony only in 1859, though the Por-
tuguese presence dated from the 16th century (see TIMOR). Until 1896
the colony was ruled directly from Macau, but even after gaining a sep-
arate administration it remained a neglected corner of the Portuguese
empire, exporting little more than coffee and horses. An indigenous up-
rising by Dom Boaventura was crushed in 1910–1912, but by 1928 only
200 civilian officials and 300 troops were sufficient to maintain Por-
tuguese rule. Business and government in the capital, Dili, were domi-
nated by a mestizo and Chinese elite, while in the countryside local
chiefs, or liurai, acted as deputies for the colonial rulers. A third of the
population was Catholic, the rest animist, the most widespread language
being Tetum.
At the outbreak of World War II, Portugal declared its neutrality. Por-
tuguese Timor, however, was briefly occupied in December 1941 by a joint
Dutch-Australian force, with the idea of keeping it out of Japanese hands.
Japanese troops occupied the territory from February 1942, and until 1945
the colony was under Japanese army rule although Japan also formally rec-
ognized Portuguese neutrality. Australian troops fought a guerrilla war
against the Japanese in the hinterland from March to December 1942. Dur-
ing the war, approximately 40,000 Timorese died of famine.
126 • EAST TIMOR

Under the 1953 Organic Law on Overseas Territories, East Timor for-
mally became a province of Portugal, divided into 13 districts called conçel-
hos (councils) under Portuguese administrators. Below these were 58 pos-
tos, of which 60 percent were headed by Timorese. An anti-Portuguese
uprising, which apparently had some Indonesian backing, was suppressed
in 1959.
After the Armed Forces coup in Portugal in April of 1974, the new
authorities announced three possibilities for the future of East Timor:
independence, continued association with Portugal, and integration
with Indonesia. Three political groups—União Democrática Timo-
rense (UDT), Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Indepen-
dente (Fretilin), and Associação Popular Democrática Timorese
(APODETI)—formed to promote these possibilities respectively. In
June 1975 the Portuguese government announced firm plans for a three-
year transitional period to full independence for the territory, including a
general election in October 1976.
Popular support for Fretilin was now such that it was likely to win a
full majority in elections, and UDT sought to forestall this by staging a
coup in Dili on 11 August 1975 with the help of the police force.
Fretilin, supported by Timorese sections of the colonial army, resisted
the UDT move, and full civil war quickly broke out. Fretilin forces
soon seized power in the major centers, but UDT and APODETI sup-
porters fled across the border into Indonesian Timor, where they re-
grouped along with Indonesian “volunteers” in what was called “Op-
erasi Komodo” and began a gradual invasion of East Timor, in the
course of which five journalists from Australia were killed. On 11 Oc-
tober Fretilin formed a “transitional” government and on 28 November
declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
On 30 November, Portugal requested United Nations help in regaining
control of the territory.
With the acquiescence of the United States, Indonesian armed forces
mounted a full-scale attack on Dili on 7 December 1975, deploying an
estimated 20,000 troops in East Timor by the end of the month. They
soon extended their control to all major population centers at the cost of
extensive casualties among the civilian population. UDT, APODETI, and
other anti-Fretilin groups formed a provisional government under In-
donesian auspices, and on 31 May 1976 an Indonesian-sponsored “Peo-
ple’s Representative Council” requested integration with Indonesia as its
27th province; this took place on 15 July. The United Nations never rec-
ognized Indonesian sovereignty.
 EAST TIMOR • 127

Fierce resistance by Fretilin continued. Widely reported atrocities car-

ried out by Indonesian forces in the attack on Dili and continued system-
atic violence by the occupation forces alienated much of the population,
and relative security in the territory was only established after major mil-
itary operations from September 1977 to March 1979 and by means of
resettling parts of the population into strategic hamlets. The disruption of
agriculture associated with the military pacification efforts led to a ma-
jor famine. Some 200,000 Timorese died during the Indonesian occupa-
tion (of an original population of 650,000), most as a result of starvation.
The Indonesian army maintained close control of the province, and
military business operations dominated the coffee and sandalwood in-
dustries. The Indonesian government lifted formal restrictions on visits to
the province on 1 January 1989, believing that Fretilin forces had been
reduced to less than 200 rebel soldiers who no longer posed a serious mil-
itary threat. In November 1990 they arrested the foremost Fretilin leader,
Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão, sentencing him in May 1993 to life
in prison, a sentence later reduced to 19 years and eight months.
The situation changed dramatically in November 1991 with the so-
called Santa Cruz massacre in Dili, when Indonesian soldiers gunned
down scores of Timorese human rights demonstrators, killing some-
where between 50 and 270 of them. This sparked international protests,
with the U.S. Congress cutting its military aid to Indonesia and the UN
passing a resolution condemning Indonesia’s actions.
Over the following years international aid to East Timor expanded,
and Indonesia agreed that much of it could go directly to Timor-based
groups and Catholic Church–run charities, with the United States alone
committing over US$ 4 million in 1994. During the 1990s a new gener-
ation of East Timor dissidents became active, in part in reaction to the
flow of mostly Muslim migrants into the territory from other parts of In-
donesia (in the mid-1990s, a reported 25,000 a year). International atten-
tion was again focused on the situation when 29 Timorese scaled the
walls of the U.S. embassy in Jakarta during the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in November 1994 and spent two weeks
camped in the embassy grounds. Dissidence was further encouraged by
Jakarta’s unwillingness to bring to justice the military officers responsi-
ble for the Santa Cruz massacre, Suharto’s refusal to consider a special
administrative status for the “province,” and suspicion that the Indone-
sian military was sponsoring an influx of masked vigilantes into Dili who
attacked and beat up Timorese known to be opposed to Indonesia’s oc-
cupation. In January 1995 Indonesian soldiers allegedly murdered six
128 • EAST TIMOR

unarmed Timorese civilians. Timorese Catholic Bishop Carlos Ximenes

Belo became more outspoken in his criticisms of the Indonesian occupa-
tion, and he and proindependence advocate Jose Ramos Horta were
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996.
After Suharto’s resignation, Jakarta finally proposed granting a special
status to East Timor and in August 1998 withdrew 1,000 troops from the
territory (though many of these were replaced). UN-brokered talks began in
late 1998 between Portuguese and Indonesian representatives focusing on a
plan for “autonomy with special status” for East Timor. President B. J.
Habibie shocked all sides on 27 January 1999 when he raised the prospect
of offering the territory independence if its people rejected the proposals for
autonomy coming out of these negotiations. The UN supervised a referen-
dum on independence on 31 August, but left security in the hands of the In-
donesians rather than introducing a UN peacekeeping force, and the In-
donesian military began arming pro-Indonesian militia groups. In the
referendum 98.5 percent of East Timor’s voters went to the polls, with 78.5
percent of them voting in favor of cutting ties with Indonesia. When the re-
sults were announced on 3 September, the Indonesia-supported militias
went on a rampage, causing some 2,000 deaths (including UN staff mem-
bers), driving more than 200,000 from their homes, burning down Bishop
Belo’s home, and taking more than 6,000 refugees who had sought sanctu-
ary there into West Timor. On 6 September Indonesia declared martial law
in East Timor. Only after a week of threats from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the United Nations, and Washington did In-
donesia agree to allow an international force to enter the territory to restore
order. A 7,500-soldier UN-backed International Force for East Timor
headed by Australia began to land on 20 September.
The UN set up a transitional government in the territory and together
with foreign governments spent about US$2.2 billion to rebuild the in-
frastructure after its destruction in the postreferendum violence. An esti-
mated 120,000 East Timorese remained in refugee camps in West Timor,
and the continuing tension broke into open violence with the murder of
three UN workers on 6 September 2000 on the West Timor side of the
border. In September 2001 an election was held for a de facto parliament
to draft a constitution for East Timor. The following year Xanana Gus-
mão, who had been released from jail in September 1999 and returned to
Timor the following month, was elected president. On 20 May 2002 the
UN secretary general ceded governing authority to the newly indepen-
dent Democratic Republic of East Timor in a ceremony attended by In-
donesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The East Timor govern-
 ECONOMY • 129

ment immediately signed the Timor Gap oil-and-gas agreement with

Australia. Under this agreement, which was ratified by the East Timor
parliament in December and would allow foreign oil companies to begin
extracting oil from the Timor Gap, East Timor receives 90 percent of to-
tal proceeds, which could, beginning in 2005, earn it $6 billion over 20
years. The World Bank predicted that oil revenues would rise from $21.3
million in 2003 to $76.4 million in 2006. Twenty-nine countries attended
a mid-May donor conference and pledged $440 million to help the coun-
try over the next three years, and the United States also was running a
$25 million annual aid program. Until the oil revenue began to come in,
coffee remained East Timor’s most important export earner, worth on an
average about $10 million per year.
In February 2003 the United Nations indicted General Wiranto, to-
gether with six other military officers and a civilian official, for crimes
against humanity during East Timor’s independence vote in 1999. They
were charged with financing, training, and arming the pro-Indonesia
militias who, together with the Indonesian military, carried out the
slaughter. The Indonesian government refused to accept the indictments.
The following month a special human rights court in Jakarta sentenced
Brigadier General Noer Muis, Indonesia’s last commander in East Timor,
to five years in jail for gross human rights violations in not preventing
the attacks. (He was not immediately imprisoned.) Previously the court
had acquitted 12 defendants and sentenced two lower-ranking officers
and two civilians to jail. [0765, 0799, 0806, 0814, 0855, 0941, 0959,
1140, 1296]

ECONOMY. In 1950 Indonesia’s inherited debt from the Dutch had a de-
bilitating effect on the new nation’s economy. Although most of its lead-
ers favored a modified socialist system with a large cooperative compo-
nent for the economy, many of the country’s major plantations and
industries remained in the hands of the Dutch and other foreign compa-
nies. In 1958 Sukarno nationalized Dutch property and during the pe-
riod of Confrontation also expropriated British and American firms, re-
jecting American aid in 1964. During the closing years of Sukarno’s rule
there was increasing inflation, growing debt, and declining exports,
while foreign reserves shrank to zero.
When Suharto assumed power, he appealed for economic support
from the West and brought into his government a number of American-
trained economists, the so-called Berkeley Mafia headed by Widjojo Ni-
tisastro. At their urging, in 1967 the Inter-Governmental Group on
130 • ECONOMY

Indonesia (IGGI) was set up, and it, together with the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF), provided more than 75 percent of
development expenses during Suharto’s early years. As a result, the in-
flation rate fell from about 600 percent in 1966 to 22 percent for the
years 1969–1972. In the government’s first five-year development plan
(Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun), which began in April 1969,
major attention focused on agriculture, and by the mid-1980s Indonesia
was self sufficient in rice. At the same time the country was opened to
foreign investment. New discoveries of oil and the dramatic surge in oil
prices during the 1970s further boosted the economy. This boom was
threatened in 1975 by the crisis in the state-owned oil enterprise, Perta-
mina, but through project cancellations and further foreign help Jakarta
was able to salvage the situation by late 1977.
The Indonesian economy was hit hard by the collapse in oil prices in
the mid-1980s, and in response the government inaugurated an austerity
program and devalued the rupiah by 31 percent in the fall of 1986, at-
tempting to diversify Indonesia’s exports and increase its non-oil do-
mestic revenues. Between 1969 and 1994, GDP expanded at an average
yearly rate of 6.8 percent and during the early 1990s averaged 8 percent.
At the same time after the mid-1980s inflation was kept to single digits,
being 6 percent in 1997. But at the same time, Indonesia’s economy was
undermined by its huge foreign debt.
The forest fires and drought of 1997 combined with the Asian finan-
cial crisis to plunge Indonesia in the second half of the year into a severe
recession, with the rupiah falling to a rate of Rp 10,000 to US$1. In Oc-
tober 1997 the government announced it would seek help from the inter-
national financial organizations and under strong pressure from the IMF
Suharto finally signed his agreement to the terms of the fund’s $33 billion
bailout plan. The government held down prices of rice and fuel, hoping to
avoid the riots that would break out in the face of the austerity measures
in the plan, but it continued to protect banks owned by Suharto’s family
and friends. When the president then refused to carry out the measures he
had agreed to with the IMF and openly defied it by appointing loyalists
and cronies to his new cabinet, the Indonesian economy was on the brink
of collapse.
After Suharto resigned, the chaos continued with the rupiah dropping
to Rp 16,500 to US$1 by June 1998 and foreign capital fleeing the coun-
try. President B. J. Habibie committed himself to implementing the
IMF’s policies, recalled Widjojo Nitisastro to an advisory role in the gov-
ernment, and launched attempts to reform the entire banking and corpo-
 EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS • 131

rate structure. His successor Abdurrachman Wahid continued efforts to

implement economic reforms, promising to address the problem of cor-
ruption and the wealth of the Suharto family, but his government, too,
became embroiled in corruption scandals.
In 2001 Megawati Sukarnoputri brought in a new economic team
headed by former ambassador to the United States, Dorodjatun Kun-
tjoro-Jakti. Although hoping eventually to restore a 7 percent GDP
growth rate, during 2001 they reached only 3.3 percent (compared with
4.8 percent in 2000) instead of the 6 percent or higher that would be
needed to reduce Indonesia’s debt from a current 90 percent to a targeted
60 percent by 2004. However, the rescheduling of the debt by the Paris
Club of lenders in mid-April 2002 had a positive impact, particularly on
the strength of the rupiah to the dollar, and inflation levels also fell. The
IMF had instituted a four-year, $5.2-billion economic recovery program
for Indonesia in 1999, and this was embraced by Megawati’s economic
team, which began to institute unpopular measures, such as increasing
prices for fuel, electricity, and communications as well as selling In-
donesian assets to foreign companies. Indonesia’s economy expanded at
a rate of 3–4 percent in 2002, with poverty rates declining to 16 percent
by January 2003. Indonesia’s average growth between 1998 and 2002
had dropped to –0.1 percent from 7.6 percent between 1987 and 1996.
Total exports fell from $62.1 billion in 2000 to $57 billion in 2002.
The economy improved markedly in 2003, despite the falloff in foreign
investment as a result of the terrorist bombings in Bali and Jakarta. In July
the government announced that it would not renew its program with the
IMF once it expired at the end of 2003. By October, it had used up $4.7
billion of the loan and the IMF approved a further $493 million. By then
the government had succeeded in curbing inflation to a yearly rate of 5.3
percent and maintaining a stable currency, but the IMF recommended
that it increase its efforts to attract foreign investment and curb the still-
endemic corruption. In response to the IMF’s optimistic assessment of In-
donesia’s economic policies, the stock market rose to a three-and-one-
half-year high, and economic growth in 2004 was forecast at between
4 and 5 percent. See also CURRENCY; FORESTRY; INDUSTRIAL-
IZATION; TRADE. [0290, 0294–0296 0301–0303, 0312, 0313]

EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS. This entry is concerned

mainly with formal, Western-style training (see also EDUCATION, PRI-
VATE AND ISLAMIC), but what follows should be read with the under-
standing that home-based education traditionally played an important role
132 • EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS

in Indonesia and was probably responsible, for instance, for a high level of
literacy in precolonial times (see WRITING SYSTEMS).
Under Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) rule, schools were small,
locally based, and mostly religiously oriented. The company distrusted
the effects of education on its indigenous subjects and gave schools little
encouragement, and from 1648 to 1778 the giving of any kind of lessons
required a government license. Only after the company’s fall did exten-
sive, government-sponsored education begin. A Dutch-language primary
school was set up in Batavia in 1816 followed by a three-year public el-
ementary school in 1849 and a teacher training school in 1852. From 1864
the colonial state maintained so-called Europeesche Lagere Scholen
(ELS, European Lower Schools), offering a seven-year, Dutch-language
course, though it was not until 1867 that a Department of Education was
established. Western education at this time was intended primarily for Eu-
ropeans, and it was expected that the children of Dutch residents would
return to the Netherlands for more advanced studies if desired. The ELS,
however, were opened to “qualified” Indonesians, and some 1,870 were
enrolled by 1900. From 1860 the colonial government began to establish
Hogere Burger Scholen (HBS, Higher Civil Schools), rigorous secondary
schools following the Dutch metropolitan curriculum and so qualifying
graduates for admission to Dutch universities.
General education for Indonesians was taken up on a large scale first
by the Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap (see PROTESTANTISM)
from 1830. In 1848, the state set up 20 “regentschapscholen” (regency
schools) to teach the children of the priyayi, but general education for In-
donesians was not provided until 1907, when J. B. van Heutsz estab-
lished Volksscholen (dessascholen) offering a three-year course in local
languages with indigenous teachers. In 1940, about 45 percent of children
received some education at this level, though graduation rates were low.
In 1908 Hollandsch-Chineesche Scholen (HCS) and in 1914 Hollandsch-
Inlandsche Scholen (HIS) were established to provide more advanced pri-
mary education to Chinese and Indonesians. The curriculum was much
the same as that of the ELS, but the first years were taught in Chinese or
Malay/Indonesian. From 1914, a kind of lower secondary education was
provided by the Meer Uitgebreide Lagere Onderwijs (MULO, Broader
Lower Education), which fed in turn into the Algemene Middelbare Sc-
holen (AMS, General Secondary Schools) from 1919, intended to prepare
MULO graduates for tertiary education. The interlinking of the lower ed-
ucation system was completed in 1921 with the creation of so-called
schakelscholen (bridging schools) to prepare Volksschool graduates for
 EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS • 133

the MULO. The rise of nationalism, however, led to Dutch complaints

that overeducation was producing a kind of intellectual proletariat ripe for
disruptive ideas, and from the mid-1920s the provision of Dutch-language
education was reduced. (See also ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLE.)
University-level education began much later in the Netherlands Indies
than in British India or French Indochina; the few Indonesians and Chi-
nese who received it commonly went to the Netherlands for tertiary ed-
ucation along with Europeans. Quasi-tertiary education was offered by
the Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA, Training
school for native civil servants) and the School tot Opleiding van In-
landsche Artsen (STOVIA, School for the training of native physicians),
both founded in 1900. A veterinary school offering advanced secondary
training was founded in Bogor in 1907 and a secondary law school in
Batavia in 1909. Resident Europeans formed an Indische Universiteits-
beweeging (Indies University Movement) in 1910, but the authorities ar-
gued that there were too few high school graduates to support a full uni-
versity. Instead, a series of tertiary colleges were established, beginning
with the Technische Hogeschool (THS, Institute of Technology) in Ban-
dung in 1920 and followed by the Rechtshogeschool (RHS, Law School)
in 1924, the Geneeskundige Hogeschool (GHS, Medical School) in
1927, and a Literaire Faculteit (Faculty of Letters) in 1940, all in
Batavia. A Landbouwkundige Faculteit (Agricultural Faculty) was
founded in Bogor in 1941. A few days before the Japanese landed on
Java, the Volksraad passed a resolution merging these faculties into a
single university. An estimated 230 Indonesians possessed tertiary edu-
cation qualifications by 1942. All tertiary institutions were closed by the
Japanese at the start of the occupation, but in April 1943 a medical
school, the Ika Daigaku, was reestablished (see HEALTH). The Dutch
opened a “Nooduniversiteit” (emergency university) in Jakarta in Janu-
ary 1946, with faculties of medicine, arts, law, and agriculture, merging
these with the other prewar faculties in 1947 to create the Universiteit
van Indonesië.
From about January 1946, Republicans conducted limited tertiary ed-
ucation in Jakarta at various Perguruan Tinggi (tertiary colleges); in De-
cember 1949 these were merged into Gadjah Mada University in Yo-
gyakarta. In 1950 national literacy was estimated at 10 percent, and a
massive expansion of both public and private education at all levels took
place. Foreign-language schools for Indonesians were banned in 1958.
The Suharto regime set a basic educational strategy in 1969 that in-
augurated a dramatic expansion in the educational system over the next
134 • EDUCATION, PRIVATE AND ISLAMIC

three decades. In 1974 it launched a nationwide building program to ex-

pand primary education, and between 1973–1974 and 1990–1991 the
number of primary schools increased from 65,910 to 146,558. In 1984
five years of primary school education became compulsory for all In-
donesian children between the ages of seven and 12. The number of pri-
mary pupils enrolled doubled from 13.1 million in 1973–1974 to 26.5
million in 1990–1991. In 1994–1995 compulsory education was ex-
panded to encompass three years of lower secondary/junior high school.
In tertiary education the Suharto government enacted a policy whereby
at least one university was to be established in each province, with the
total number of public tertiary institutions reaching 78 in 1994, while
student enrollment in both public and private advanced educational in-
stitutions rose from 815,000 in 1984 to 1.61 million in 1994.
It has, however, been argued that the growth in school enrollment has
been accompanied by a decline in the quality of the education offered
and that there has also developed a great discrepancy in standards among
the regions and between rural and urban areas (with the highest quality
education being offered in a few urban centers in Java). The poor qual-
ity of education was probably exacerbated by the Suharto government’s
use of educational institutions to impart government propaganda, with
Pancasila values being incorporated into all school curricula from the
late 1970s and influencing in particular the teaching of such subjects as
history, Indonesian language and literature, and religious education.
Other factors influencing the quality of education were its cost and the
poor teaching standards. In part to offset the latter deficiency, the gov-
ernment introduced a new curriculum for primary and secondary schools
in the 1994–1995 school year and during the 1990s also attempted to in-
volve private companies in education to help fit the skills acquired by
graduating students to the needs of the job market. Nevertheless, a dis-
proportionate number of students continued to graduate with nontechni-
cal skills and were faced with a resulting lack of job opportunities. [0069,
0353, 0479, 0576, 0626, 0756, 1277, 1278, 1280, 1286, 1287, 1289]

EDUCATION, PRIVATE AND ISLAMIC. The classic traditional educa-

tional institution in Indonesia, derived from Indian models, was the as-
rama, a residential school where pupils gathered to receive largely reli-
gious instruction from a guru or teacher. This model of instruction was
retained after the arrival of Islam in the form of madrasah, pesantren,
or surau. As in the West, this relatively formal education helped to de-
fine for both sexes a period of youth between childhood and adolescence.
 EDUCATION, PRIVATE AND ISLAMIC • 135

The emerging Indonesian nationalist movement realized the importance

of education in inculcating values and increasing national self-confidence,
and from the 1920s members of the pergerakan founded large numbers of
so-called wilde scholen (wild schools), whose diplomas were not recog-
nized by the colonial government. Best known of these were the sekolah
rakyat (people’s schools) of the Sarekat Islam, the Taman Siswa, and the
Kartini schools. On Sumatra the most known were the modernist Islamic
Thawalib and Diniyah network of schools and the vocational INS in West
Sumatra. In September 1932 the colonial government attempted to restrict
the operation of these schools by issuing a “wild schools ordinance” that
required private schools to have government permission, although finan-
cial support of government schools was being reduced because of the De-
pression. A national campaign against the ordinance, led by Ki Hajar De-
wantoro of Taman Siswa and Mohammad Sjafei of the West Sumatran
INS, succeeded in having the ordinance withdrawn. The number of wild
schools reached 2,200 by the late 1930s with an estimated enrollment of
142,000 pupils.
State support for Muslim education began only in 1937, when the
colonial government subsidized the establishment of a Muhammadiyah
MULO in Yogyakarta; Muhammadiyah schools already established in
other regions also received financial subsidies from the Dutch govern-
ment, but most other private religious schools refused such subsidies.
In 1904 Dewi Sartika had established Sekolah Isteri (Women’s
Schools) in West Java to provide education for women; and in 1911 Ro-
hana Kudus (1884–1972, a sister of Sutan Sjahrir) founded a school for
women (Kerajinan Amai Setia, or KAS) in Kota Gedang in West Suma-
tra. Probably the most popular school for girls was Diniyah Putri school,
established in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra, by Rahmah El Yunusiah
(1900–1969) in 1923, which attracted students not only from the East In-
dies but also from the Malay Peninsula and reached an enrollment of
500 in 1939. The school is currently still active.
After independence, the government allowed the emergence of a full
Muslim educational system, run by the Department of Religion, along-
side the national, secular system under the Department of Education.
Primary and secondary schools are classified as madrasah, providing
70 percent secular and 30 percent religious education, whose diplomas
are considered equivalent to those of secular schools; diniyah, in which
the proportions are reversed and which qualify students mainly for re-
ligious and quasi-religious careers; and Pendidikan Guru Islam (Is-
lamic teachers’ colleges), teaching 50 percent secular and 50 percent
136 • “EERESCHULD, EEN”

religious material. Islamic education at all levels expanded under the

New Order. The number of pupils in the lower secondary system in-
creased to 1.8 million by 1997–1998. The tertiary religious institutions,
the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, State Islamic Institutes) first
established in 1960 by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, had 14
branches throughout the country by the 1990s. Religious education is
also compulsory in secular schools. See also ISLAM; RELIGION
AND POLITICS. [0627, 0807, 1273, 1274, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1288]

“EERESCHULD, EEN” (“a debt of honor”). Title of an August 1899 ar-

ticle by the Dutch lawyer Conrad Theodor van Deventer (1857–1915) in
De Gids, arguing that the millions of guilders received by the Nether-
lands state under the Cultivation System and by Dutch companies since
1870 had left the Dutch with a “debt of honor” to Indonesia, an obliga-
tion to raise living standards and bring about economic development.
The article contributed to the emergence of the Ethical Policy, but only
two capital transfers from the Netherlands took place. In 1905 ƒ40 mil-
lion was transferred on condition that it was used for the economic im-
provement of the Javanese and Madurese, while in 1936 ƒ25 million was
transferred as compensation to the Indies for reserving part of their mar-
ket for the Netherlands during the Depression. See also BATIG SLOT.

EGYPT, RELATIONS WITH. See ARAB WORLD, RELATIONS WITH.

ELECTIONS. These were first held in the Netherlands Indies in 1903 for
members of municipal councils. Although the franchise was highly re-
stricted and Europeans dominated the councils, with reserved seats for
each racial group, these elections provided Indonesia with its first expe-
rience of electoral competition (see DECENTRALIZATION). Mem-
bers of the Volksraad were elected by members of these councils.
During the Revolution, village elections were held in many parts of
Republican territory in early 1946 and in Yogyakarta in 1948. Indone-
sia’s first general elections after the transfer of sovereignty were not held
until 1955. Voter turnout was 91 percent. Using proportional representa-
tion with effectively a single electoral district for the entire country, they
produced what many saw as an inconclusive result, the Partai Nasional
Indonesia (PNI) gaining 57 seats with 22.3 percent of the vote,
Masjumi 57 seats (20.9 percent), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 45 seats (18.4
percent), and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 39 seats (16.4 per-
cent) in a parliament of 257. Twenty-four other parties, including inde-
 ELECTIONS • 137

pendents, were represented. General elections due for 1959 were never
held, partly because a substantial gain in PKI votes seemed likely.
Under the New Order, government-controlled elections were held in
1971, then every five years in 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 (for de-
tailed results, see APPENDIX). In all these elections, with the exception
of the first, only the government electoral organization Golongan Karya
(Golkar) and the two officially sponsored political parties, Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP), were allowed to participate, and campaigning was restricted to a
period of 60 days before polling day. All parties had to submit their can-
didates and campaign slogans to the security authorities for approval.
Challenging the Pancasila or the Broad Outlines of State Policy and crit-
icizing racial, social, or religious groups (see SARA) were not permitted.
Civil servants normally had to vote at their offices and were expected,
under the doctrine of monoloyalitas, to vote for Golkar. In the villages,
too, Golkar drew extensively on support from the army and the bureau-
cracy, sometimes banning campaigning by nongovernment groups on the
grounds that the residents had already decided to vote for Golkar. In the
New Order elections it was not possible for any party but Golkar to win
overall, and government rhetoric portrayed the occasion as one of danger
when the social antagonisms of the 1950s and 1960s risked being revived.
After 1971 elections used proportional representation by province, the
provincial allocation of seats being weighted to ensure that the provinces
on Java, with two thirds of the voters, nonetheless elected only half the
members of parliament. The final election under the New Order, that of
May 1997, was the bloodiest ever. Divisions within the PDI and govern-
ment attempts a year earlier to suppress the faction headed by Megawati
Sukarnoputri led many of the party’s faithful supporters either to boy-
cott the election or vote for another party. As a result PDI received only
3 percent of the vote, and the election as a whole lacked even the legiti-
macy of the previous ones.
The 1999 election was the first free election since that of 1955. Of the
more than 140 parties that were registered, 48 were allowed to contest
the election (for the results, see APPENDIX F). Megawati’s Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) received the most votes
(35,589,073), with Golkar coming in second (23,741,758), and the three
largest Islamic parties, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), PPP,
and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), taking the next three positions.
Twenty-four parties met the criteria laid out in the Law on General Elec-
tions (No. 12/2003) for participating in the general elections scheduled
138 • ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY

for 5 April 2004. In these elections voters were to elect party candidates
for the national, provincial and district legislatures (DPR and DPRD) and
also individual candidates for the new Regional Representative Council
(DPD). Law No. 23/2003 provided for the direct election of the presi-
dent and vice president. Nomination of candidates for these offices was
limited to political parties that won at least 3 percent of the seats or 5 per-
cent of the votes in the April 2004 general election (in later elections the
limit would be raised to 15 percent of the seats or 20 percent of the
votes). If no presidential candidate received more than 50 percent of the
votes in the 5 July 2004 presidential election, a run-off between the top
two vote-getters was be held on 20 September.
The final number of eligible voters for the 2004 elections was
145,701,637, a 23-percent increase over the 118.15 million voters in the
1999 legislative elections. See also PARTIES, POLITICAL. [0695,
0739, 1004–1015]
ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY. Chartered by Queen Elizabeth I in
1600, this was, like the Dutch East Indies Company, a joint-stock com-
pany enjoying a national monopoly of trade in the region. The company’s
first expedition to Java in 1601 brought back so much pepper that the
market was glutted and the company began to diversify. It established
bases in Banten, Aceh, Makassar, Maluku, and Masulipatam (southern
India) in the first decades of the 17th century, but by the end of the century
had been driven out of the archipelago by the Dutch, except for the West
Sumatra colony of Bengkulu. (See also “AMBOYNA MASSACRE.”)
The company was taken over by the British crown in 1858 after the Indian
Mutiny. See also BRITAIN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. [0491]
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. Three issues have dominated en-
vironmental concerns in the Indonesian archipelago since the late 19th
century: the preservation of unique animal and plant species (for which
see CONSERVATION, NATURE), the maintenance of a stable water
regime by maintaining forest cover and preventing erosion, and the con-
trol of pollution.
Forest protection for environmental reasons (rather than from illicit
collectors of forest products) became an element of Dutch colonial pol-
icy only late in the 19th century, though in the middle of the century
F. W. Junghuhn had suggested that areas above 500 meters should not
be cleared. It was realized already that rainfall and runoff were more reg-
ular on forested slopes and that the agricultural prosperity of Java de-
pended in part on leaving areas of the island with their forest cover in-
tact, though the preservation of forests for timber production was also a
 ETHICAL POLICY • 139

major consideration. Under the New Order regime, there was large-
scale indiscriminate clearing in the 1970s. Protests against this caused
the government to pay attention to protection of forests, reforestation (re-
boisasi), and afforestation (penghijauan), but efforts in this direction lost
out generally to the perceived needs of the timber industry. (See also
FORESTRY; HASAN, MUHAMMAD “BOB”.)
To deal with the environmental consequences of economic growth,
President Suharto appointed Emil Salim (1930–) as the first minister for
the environment in 1978, with the mandate to find a way of combining
economic development with protection of the environment. Salim lacked
the authority to be effective in this task. An environmental nongovern-
mental organization (NGO), the Indonesian Environmental Forum (Wa-
hana Lingkungan Hidup, Walhi), was established in October 1980 as an
umbrella organization for groups and individuals interested in protecting
the environment. It played an important role in drafting environmental
laws, especially the basic law of 1982, and it brought several lawsuits
against corporations negligent in implementing environmental regula-
tions. Domestically it has worked with other influential NGOs and has
close ties with environmental groups and NGOs in other Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, through the Southeast
Asian Coalition (SEACON) established in 1990. It has not yet, however,
developed an autonomous organization and is dependent on funding
from other agencies. In 1990 the government set up the Environmental
Impact Management Agency (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkun-
gan, Bapedal), and in the early 1990s the minister of the environment
also launched the Clean Rivers Project (Prokasih), which had limited
success in compelling industrial polluters to install sewerage treatment
facilities. It also established an Environmental Achievements Award
(Kalpataru), which helped spread environmental awareness. See also
WERENG. [0730, 0756, 0763, 0943, 1160, 1169, 1183]

ETHICAL POLICY. Common name given to Dutch colonial policy in the

first decades of the 20th century, following a speech from the throne by
Queen Wilhelmina in 1901 announcing: “As a Christian power, the
Netherlands is obliged to carry out government policy in the Indies in the
consciousness that the Netherlands has a moral duty to the people of
these regions.” This policy was expressed in a new willingness of gov-
ernment to involve itself in economic and social affairs in the archipelago
in the name of rational efficiency. It was a time of improved health care,
extended education, expansion of communications facilities, irrigation
and other infrastructure, and the commencement of transmigration mea-
140 • ETYMOLOGY

sures that brought benefits to Western commercial interests as much as to

the Indonesians themselves. The Depression of the 1930s led to budget
cuts in most of these areas, effectively ending the Ethical Policy, which
has been criticized most sharply for its paternalist approach. The sharp
contrast between the growing indigenous Indonesian capacity to manage
a modern state and economy and the persistent Dutch supervision was
one of the factors that strengthened the nationalist movement. See also
“EERESCHULD, EEN”; NATIONALISM; STUW, DE. [0620]

ETYMOLOGY. Vocabulary in the Indonesian language changes rapidly,

and the derivation of words has taken on some political significance from
time to time. The reforming role of the brief British occupation of Java,
for instance, has been emphasized at the expense of the Dutch by folk
legend, which attributes many Indonesian words to Thomas Stamford
Raffles. Since independence, there has been some attempt to reduce the
number of words in Indonesian that are derived from Dutch, while a
growth in the number of formerly Javanese words has been seen as a sign
of Javanization. Anda was introduced as a neutral form of the pronoun
“you” in 1957. The Komisi Bahasa Indonesia coined about 7,000 new
words during World War II, and its successor, the Komisi Istilah (Termi-
nological Commission), had coined or ratified 321,710 new terms by
1970, seeking words first from Malay, second from other Indonesian lan-
guages, third from Arabic and Sanskrit, and fourth from European lan-
guages. Since the 1970s, however, the media have played a dominant
role in the coining of words.
Many new words emerge from acronyms; raker, for instance, from ra-
pat kerja, means working meeting. Sukarno was especially well known
for such coinages, one of his best known being berdikari, from berdiri di
atas kaki sendiri, “to stand on one’s own feet.”

EURASIANS. See INDO-EUROPEANS.

EXILE. A common technique in both the Netherlands Indies and Indonesia

for the removal of politically troublesome people. From 1854, under the
so-called exorbitante rechten, the governor-general could, in the inter-
ests of peace and order, expel from the colony anyone with European or
Foreign Oriental status and could exile any Indonesian within the colony.
This was an administrative right, not subject to judicial appeal or review,
and was employed 1,150 times in the period 1855–1920. Diponegoro
was exiled to Manado, E. F. E. Douwes Dekker to Surinam, Sukarno to
Flores and Bengkulu, and Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and
many others to Boven Digul in West New Guinea and to Banda. For oth-
 FAMILY PLANNING • 141

ers, going on the haj to Mecca was a means of voluntary exile. After in-
dependence, figures such as Chaerul Saleh were informally exiled
abroad on study tours, while under the New Order many senior army of-
ficers have been didubeskan (“ambassadored off”). In 1961 Sukarno re-
sumed the right to place citizens under internal exile, and this right was
reaffirmed by the Suharto government in 1969. Though the inherited
provisions of the exorbitante rechten have not been used in New Order
Indonesia, the enforced residence of political prisoners (tahanan politik)
on Buru amounted to much the same thing. The Portuguese practice of
exiling dissidents from their African colonies to East Timor contributed
to the radicalization of political opinion there. [0634, 0865]

EXORBITANTE RECHTEN. See CENSORSHIP; EXILE; GOVERNOR-

GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE.

–F–

FAMILY PLANNING. In colonial times, the publication of information

on birth control techniques was a criminal offense. Sukarno’s view that
a large population was a sign of national power helped ensure that this
remained so after independence, though limited promotion of family
planning was carried out from 1952 by the Yayasan Kesejahteraan Kelu-
arga (Foundation for Family Prosperity). The first family planning clinic
was established in Jakarta in 1956, followed by the Perkumpulan Kelu-
arga Berencana Indonesia (PKBI, Indonesian Family Planning Associa-
tion) in 1957, though both were limited by the technical illegality of their
work. Indonesia’s population policy was primarily one of transmigra-
tion from more to less densely settled areas.
Only after the advent of the New Order did family planning become
a part of public policy; in 1966 Ali Sadikin, governor of Jakarta, made
the city available for a pilot project by the PKBI. In 1967 the Suharto
government signed the United Nations Declaration on Population and in
1970 established the Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional
(BKKBN, National Family Planning Coordinating Body), which began
an extensive program on Java and Bali to spread information on family
planning and to provide free contraceptive services. Much of the earliest
family planning work was done, however, by the semigovernmental
Lembaga Keluarga Berencana Nasional (National Family Planning In-
stitute), founded in 1968. From 1974 the campaign was extended from
Java and Bali to other islands. The program concentrated on providing
142 • FEDERALISM

information and free contraceptives and was conducted largely without

coercion but with a good deal of community pressure; it resulted in high
acceptor rates (24 percent by 1977), which in turn contributed to falling
birth rates. Total fertility fell from an average of more than six children
per mother in the 1960s to less than three children per mother in the
1990s, when the government reported that half of all married women of
childbearing age were using some form of contraception. In 1991 the
most common techniques used by married women were reported as pills,
IUDs, injections, implants, and tubectomies in that order (use of con-
doms was apparently much less frequent). See also WOMEN AND
MEN. [0761, 0990, 1202]

FEDERALISM. The notion that Indonesia’s many ethnic groups might co-
exist more happily in a relatively decentralized federal state than in a
centralized unitary one was a matter of relatively uncontentious discus-
sion by Indonesian nationalists before World War II. Figures such as Mo-
hammad Hatta could then be proponents of a federal system for inde-
pendent Indonesia without in any way compromising their nationalism.
The Dutch bestuurshervorming law of 1922 (see DECENTRALIZA-
TION) might have encouraged this trend if it had been earlier and more
extensively implemented.
In 1946, however, in the midst of the national Revolution, Dutch au-
thorities proposed a federal system as part of their political alternative to
the independent Indonesian Republic. Conceived originally as a means of
easing the reunification of the country, which had been administratively
divided since 1942, federalism soon became a part of Dutch plans to iso-
late and ultimately to suppress what they saw as the radicalism of the In-
donesian Republic. By playing on outer-island fears of communism and
of Javanese domination, they established a series of federal states (negara)
in the territories they controlled. They hoped thereby to entrench a con-
servative coalition of bureaucrats, aristocrats, Hindus, and Christians in
the constitution of independent Indonesia and so ensure continuing polit-
ical and economic Dutch influence. Thus the first of the federal states, the
Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT), covered the entire, ethnically diverse
eastern end of the archipelago (except West New Guinea [Papua]) and
was intended as a powerful counterweight to the Indonesian Republic.
During the late 1940s, however, federalism became less a vehicle for
political conservatism and more a format for ethnic separatism. Plans
were abandoned for a negara in Kalimantan because of the island’s eth-
nic diversity, and the negara Pasundan, formed in 1948, was explicitly
 “FIFTH FORCE” • 143

a state of the Sundanese people of West Java. Within the NIT itself, sev-
eral semiautonomous ethnically based regions were established from
1947. From July 1948 the federal states and protostates were assembled
in a permanent Bijeenkomst voor Federale Overleg (BFO, Meeting for
Federal Consultation), and it was the BFO with which the Republic of
Indonesia fused to form the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), which
gained independence in 1949. The official recognition of ethnic subna-
tionalism, however, later encouraged the revolt of the Republik Maluku
Selatan (RMS) and provided a basis for the Dutch to retain control of
West New Guinea after the transfer of sovereignty in 1949.
This Dutch experiment wholly compromised the idea of federalism in
the eyes of Indonesian nationalists, and the federal negara were quickly
dissolved after the transfer of sovereignty, the last disappearing on 17
August 1950. After that, advocacy of a federal state was viewed as tan-
tamount to treason, and it compromised the chances of success for any
movement aimed at creating either a decentralized or federal state.
In March 1960, after government troops had defeated the major forces
of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, its leaders on Sumatra proclaimed the
establishment of a federal system, the Republik Persatuan Indonesia (RPI,
United Republic of Indonesia), consisting of 10 component states (incor-
porating the regions under rebel control on Sumatra and Sulawesi, to-
gether with those in which the Darul Islam was active). According to the
RPI’s constitution, each of these states would form individual governments
in accordance with the culture and wishes of their peoples. This RPI really
existed only on paper and disappeared with the surrender of the rebels.
Only after the fall of Suharto was the issue of federalism again tenta-
tively raised in the context of the 1999 decentralization law, when some
form of federal relationship seemed to offer a possible rubric for main-
taining the loyalty of such dissident regions as Aceh and Papua. After
Megawati Sukarnoputri became president, however, her adherence to
the idea of the unitary state seemed to preclude the possibility of any
moves toward federalism. See also NATIVE TROOPS; PROVINCES;
SUCCESSION. [0563, 0674, 0679, 0695, 1146]

FEDERASI BURUH SELURUH INDONESIA. See LABOR.

“FIFTH FORCE” (Angkatan Kelima). During Indonesia’s Confronta-

tion with Malaysia, Sukarno called at one point for 21 million volun-
teers to fight Malaysia. This idea was taken up in a smaller way by the
leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), who in November 1964
144 • FILM

offered Indonesia 100,000 small arms for the new force, and by the Par-
tai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), which pointed to Article 30 of the Con-
stitution (“Every citizen shall have the right and duty to participate in
the defense of the state”) and argued that victory in the struggle de-
manded the arming of the workers and peasants. In May 1965 Sukarno
described such a body as a “fifth force” alongside the four existing
armed forces (army, navy, air force, and police) and ordered the exist-
ing armed forces to prepare plans for it. Zhou Enlai repeated China’s of-
fer of arms in April 1965, and in July the air force began training some
2,000 PKI civilians at Halim Air Force Base. The army saw this as a PKI
attempt to gain weapons for an insurrection and its leaders resisted the
proposal strenuously, except for General Ahmad Jusuf Mokoginta in
North Sumatra, who made use of the directive to arm his own force of
workers and peasants. In the weeks before the Gestapu coup of Septem-
ber, extensive rumors circulated of a clandestine shipment of arms from
the PRC to equip the force, though the truth of these rumors was never
proven. [0714, 0807, 0859]

FILM. Indonesia’s film industry began before World War II, with several
local studios, especially Tan Brothers, producing a range of films,
mainly on romantic and adventure themes. The 1925 Filmordonnantie
(revised in 1940) gave the colonial government power to ban films on
moral or social grounds, and films were thus little used by the national-
ist movement, although the Gerindo leader A. K. Gani starred in some
productions. Films from the United States were widely shown during
the 1950s, though Chinese and Indian films also held an important
share of the market. This sparked a hostile reaction that criticized both
the effect of foreign films on the domestic industry and the allegedly
corrupting effect of displaying Western lifestyles. During the early
1960s, the campaign against Western film was spearheaded by the left-
wing cultural organization Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra)
while local filmmakers produced a number of left-oriented films. After
the Gestapu coup of 1965, the Indonesian film industry was thoroughly
purged and many films of the early 1960s were destroyed. Film cen-
sorship was strict and most contemporary filmmakers concentrated on
romantic and historical topics, eschewing any social criticism. When
these films dealt with recent history, they hewed closely to the govern-
ment’s propaganda, the most notable example being Pengkhianatan
G30s/PKI (The Treason of GESTAPU/PKI, 1984). See also MEDIA.
[0188, 0189, 1306]
 FISHERIES • 145

FINANCIAL CRISIS (krismon). The devaluation of the Thai baht in July

1997 began the economic crisis in East and Southeast Asia. Initially In-
donesia experienced only moderate effects, but the country soon entered
into a severe recession. During the second half of 1997 the value of the
rupiah plunged, and by January 1998 only 22 of Indonesia’s 286 publicly
listed companies remained solvent. In October 1997 the government an-
nounced it would seek help from the international financial organizations
and postponed or put under review 76 projects planned by government
ministries or state companies. The value of foreign debts was enormous.
Under strong pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
Suharto finally signed his agreement to the terms of the fund’s $33 bil-
lion bailout plan. The government, however, continued to hold down
prices of rice and fuel, hoping to avoid the riots that would break out in
the face of the austerity measures the plan demanded. At the same time,
it continued to protect the banks and other business interests owned by
member of the Suharto family and cronies. The crisis was one of the
major factors in Suharto’s forced resignation in May 1998. See also
BANKING; CURRENCY. [0396, 0455, 0760, 1316]

FISHERIES. Fishing has been a major industry in the archipelago since

early times, and salt fish was always a major trade item between the
coast and inland regions, controlled by Chinese middlemen rather than
by the fishermen themselves. Fish still provide over 60 percent of the
protein intake of most Indonesians and the industry employs approxi-
mately 1.3 million, though fishermen are traditionally one of Indonesia’s
poorest groups and Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) fishermen’s or-
ganizations were strong before 1965. Major technological change took
place after 1965 with the introduction of trawlers and later purse seines
by Chinese entrepreneurs. This modern sector, which in 1980 accounted
for 23 percent of the catch but only 2 percent of the fishing fleet, aroused
much resentment among traditional fishermen, leading to violence in
many areas. Trawling was banned by the government off Java and
Sumatra in 1980 and elsewhere except the Arafura Sea in 1983. For
years commercial fishing was also discouraged because, in order to pro-
tect the domestic shipbuilding industry, Jakarta imposed high tariffs on
the import of fishing boats, making them too expensive for most fisher-
men to buy. The government relaxed these restrictions to some extent in
1996, but not enough to allow much expansion.
One result was the rapid growth in aquaculture where shrimp and
milkfish were farmed in ponds along the coasts of North Java, East
146 • FLAG

Sumatra, and Bali. Although these farms provided a profitable export

trade, especially in shrimp, they necessitated removal of vast areas of
mangrove and other swamp forests, the traditional spawning grounds for
the larvae and breeding grounds for other marine life. [0403, 0408, 1175]

FLAG. The national flag of red over white (merah-putih) was formally
adopted by the pergerakan at the second Youth Congress in 1928.

“FLOATING MASS.” Policy formulated in the 1975 Law on Political

Parties and Golkar, separating the populace, especially in the rural ar-
eas, from political activity except during elections. It was intended to en-
sure that the masses remained fully responsive to government direction
ostensibly for the sake of national development. See also DEVELOP-
MENT IDEOLOGY; MONOLOYALITAS. [0736]

FLORES (from Portuguese labo de flores, cape of flowers). Island in

Nusatenggara. In the 13th century, the kingdom of Larantuka came un-
der rule of Majapahit, but a century later Makassar was the dominant
power. Portuguese missionaries arrived in 1613, though extensive con-
version to Catholicism did not take place until the 19th century. In the
17th century the island was dominated by the Topasses (see SOLOR
ARCHIPELAGO; TIMOR). After Makassar submitted to the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) in 1660 and 1667, the Dutch regarded
Flores as within their domains, and in 1838 and 1856 they sent military
expeditions to suppress slavery and the plundering of shipwrecks. The
island was not fully conquered until 1907–1908. It was the first place to
which the colonial government exiled Sukarno in the 1930s. [1241]

FOREIGN INVESTMENT. See INVESTMENT, FOREIGN.

FOREIGN POLICY. Indonesia’s foreign policy was originally formulated

as an adjunct to the struggle for independence in the 1940s, during which
two persistent principles in Indonesian foreign policy making were es-
tablished. First was a deep suspicion of foreign intentions toward In-
donesia. Indonesian policy makers see their country as wealthy and
strategically located but politically and economically vulnerable to for-
eign adventurers. The chief focus of these suspicions has varied: in the
1950s and early 1960s it was the United States and the Netherlands;
later it was China and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam for political reasons
and Japan for economic ones. Australia and the Arab World have also
 FORESTRY • 147

come under suspicion. Second, while eschewing formal military al-

liances as incompatible with an “active and independent” foreign policy,
Indonesia has sought international friends in a variety of forums: the
South East Asia League in 1948; the Non-Aligned Movement in the
1950s and early 1960s, and to a lesser extent in the late Suharto and
post-Suharto eras; the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo)
and the brief Jakarta–Hanoi–Peking axis (see NEKOLIM) of the mid-
1960s; and, since 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
The best-remembered elements of Indonesian foreign policy, however,
have had less to do with these general principles than with questions of
national security. Indonesia’s long-running conflict with the Netherlands
over the province of West Irian (Papua) was an attempt to recover what
it saw as part of the national territory; Confrontation with Britain and
Malaysia was partly over the continued presence of British bases close
to Indonesian territory and over the right of Indonesia, as the largest re-
gional power, to be consulted on matters of regional political develop-
ment; the brutal annexation of East Timor was, at least ostensibly, an at-
tempt to forestall the emergence of a left-wing government on
Indonesia’s borders; and Indonesia’s often tactless handling of Papua
New Guinea is related to the threat it sees from Organisasi Papua
Merdeka (OPM) guerrillas in Papua. Because of this security dimen-
sion, foreign policy is often effectively negotiated between the Depart-
ments of Foreign Affairs (Deplu) and Defense (Hankam). For a list of
foreign and defense ministers, see APPENDIX E. See also ARCHIPEL-
AGIC CONCEPT; DEFENSE POLICY; PHILIPPINES; SOVIET
UNION; UNITED NATIONS. [1102, 1103, 1123, 1125, 1140, 1144]

FORESTRY. From early times, forest products were major items of trade
in the archipelago, while the teak forests of Java were an important eco-
nomic resource for the island’s rulers for housing, shipbuilding, and fire-
wood. A government forestry service (Dienst van het Boschwezen) was
established on Java under Herman Willem Daendels and with it
emerged a category of forest villages exempt from other forms of taxa-
tion in exchange for carrying out the often difficult and onerous tasks of
forest management. The colonial government introduced German ex-
perts to give training and advice from 1849 and laid down comprehen-
sive forest laws in 1865. Patrols of the state forests began in 1880. Dur-
ing the Japanese occupation, large areas of forest were cleared both for
firewood and construction and to release land for the planting of other
148 • FORESTRY

crops, and a shortage of fuel during the Revolution led to further cutting.
In the early 1960s the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) often took the
side of peasants in the vicinity of state forests in claiming land or the
right to collect firewood.
In 1967 under the New Order, the Basic Forestry Law (BFL, Undang-
Undang Dasar Kehutanan) established state control over forests on the is-
lands outside Java. Logging then became a major area of foreign invest-
ment, since the allocation of logging permits and the clearing of tropical
forests required relatively little economic infrastructure. Between 1967
and 1980 logging rights over 4 million hectares were given to state-owned
forestry enterprises. Typically concessions were granted to joint opera-
tions between large Western firms such as Weyerhaeuser and Indonesian
sleeping partners who contributed no capital to the venture and were
members or friends of the ruling elite. On Java and Madura, forestry was
managed by the state-owned Perum Perhutani (State Forestry Corpora-
tion). Timber became the country’s second largest export after oil, and in
1973 Indonesia exported 18 million cubic meters of tropical timber.
In 1975 the Indonesian government began to encourage loggers to
process timber in Indonesia rather than exporting raw logs. In 1980 each
company’s export of raw logs was limited to 32 percent of its total out-
put, and on 1 January 1985 all export of unprocessed logs was banned.
This policy led many Western firms such as Weyerhaeuser to withdraw
from Indonesia, but their place was taken by Japanese and Korean firms
and a dramatic expansion of plywood production occurred. With
Suharto’s backing, Muhammad “Bob” Hasan transformed the In-
donesian Wood Panel Processors Association (Asosiasi Produsen Panel
Kayu Indonesia, Apkindo) into a cartel controlling the trade practices of
111 plywood producers. Indonesia became the world’s largest exporter
of plywood, with annual exports totaling US$1 billion in value. In 1988
Hasan formed a joint venture with a Japanese trading company to be-
come Japan’s sole importer of Indonesian plywood.
By the late 1980s there was growing concern that after 15 years of in-
tensive logging in Kalimantan and Sumatra, a great part of their forests
had been degraded. The government instituted a “sustainable forestry”
policy to rehabilitate the degraded forests and increase the yield from
other forestland. This, however, led to even greater clear-cutting, espe-
cially in Kalimantan, as money from the reforestation fund was used to
finance establishment of state-owned plantations, especially of oil palm.
The collapse of the Suharto regime was soon followed by a huge up-
surge in illegal logging. Between 1995 and 2000 Indonesia’s forest cover
 FREEPORT • 149

fell from 162 million hectares to only 98 million hectares, and defor-
estation rates in 2001 were in excess of 1.7 million hectares a year even
by official government figures. This situation led Indonesia’s largest en-
vironmental nongovernmental organization (NGO) to call for a complete
moratorium on logging for two to three years. An unpublished report
from the World Bank predicted that all the lowland forests in Sumatra
would be extinct before 2005 and in Kalimantan by 2010. To help con-
trol the worst effects of the destructive large-scale logging, an indepen-
dent working group of local NGOs and academics had formed an In-
donesian Ecolabeling Institute (LEI), which in 2000 signed a Joint
Certification Protocol with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), an in-
ternational nonprofit organization promoting responsible forestry, to is-
sue certificates for Sustainable Forest Management, an internationally
recognized labeling system for timber products. But their efforts seemed
unable to counter the growth in illegal logging, exacerbated by the new
decentralization legislation under which local authorities in the regions
began granting thousands of small logging concessions to companies to
take over local forest areas. In 2002 Indonesia placed a temporary ban on
log export, and in June Malaysia banned import of logs from Indonesia.
The disastrous forestry policies were a major factor in the fires that en-
gulfed many of the forests of Kalimantan and Sumatra in late 1997 to
1998 and again in subsequent years, spreading a pall of smog over In-
donesia’s neighbors, especially Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, and
costing an estimated $9 billion in damages to health, tourism, transport,
and agricultural losses. The dry conditions returned in 2002, again spark-
ing widespread forest fires, particularly on Kalimantan. See also CON-
SERVATION, NATURE; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. [0329,
0343, 0375, 0404, 1173, 1379]

FREEPORT. Freeport Indonesia is 81 percent owned by Freeport-Mc-

Moran Copper and Gold Inc. of the United States and has been active in
the mining of copper and gold in southern Irian Jaya (Papua) since
1966. It signed its first contract with the Indonesian government in 1967,
and this was renewed in 1976. Its current 30-year contract was signed in
1991. The Indonesian state’s share in the company is only 9.4 percent.
From the beginning, Freeport’s operations provoked widespread opposi-
tion from the local Amungme people. Local landholders were removed to
make way for the mining operations, receiving compensation only for dis-
ruptions to current gardens but no land rent or royalties. Subsequent min-
ing caused surface degradation, river water pollution, and destruction of
150 • FRETILIN

wildlife, and it helped fuel local resistance in association with the Or-
ganisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). In 1977 the local people, assisted by
the OPM, sabotaged the mine’s operations by blowing up the pipeline car-
rying the copper concentrate to the coast. In response the Indonesian mil-
itary carried out reprisals, killing hundreds, perhaps thousands, of vil-
lagers and forcibly resettling the people in lower altitudes. By 1980
epidemics swept through the resettled villagers, killing more than 20 per-
cent of their infants.
In an effort to gain local support, Freeport claimed to have spent more
than $150 million to build schools, houses, places of worship, a modern
hospital, and community facilities over the 1990s. After the fall of
Suharto when the company became an increased target for dissidents,
including the OPM, the share price of Freeport’s stock fell drastically
(from around $35 in 1998 to $7.50 in 2000).
Freeport provides the Indonesian armed forces with approximately
$6 million a year to pay for a 550-man task force to guard the company’s
properties in Papua. At the end of August 2002, gunmen fired on vehi-
cles near the Freeport mine, killing two Americans and an Indonesian
and injuring 12 others. It was later discovered that this incident had prob-
ably been carried out by members of the Indonesian army and was
blamed by them on the OPM. FBI investigators were sent to Papua to de-
termine whether this was in fact the case. Landslides in October and De-
cember 2003 disrupted Freeport’s operations, cutting its daily extraction
of copper ore by more than a half, down to approximately 100,000 met-
ric tons a day in the early months of 2004. See also UNITED STATES,
RELATIONS WITH. [0730, 0754, 0755, 0760]

FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente, Revolu-

tionary Front for an Independent East Timor). Founded on 22 August
1974 as the Associação Social Democrática Timorense (ASDT),
Fretilin was a grouping of young East Timor intellectuals and civil ser-
vants, many of them Portuguese-Timorese, who pressed for the terri-
tory’s immediate independence after the Portuguese coup of 1974. Lib-
eration movements in Africa influenced not only the choice of the name
Fretilin but also the party’s program, which included literacy classes, the
establishment of cooperatives, and the creation of a multitude of affili-
ated mass organizations for women, farmers, students, and the like.
Fretilin defeated a coup in Dili by the conservative União
Democrática Timorense (UDT) in August 1975 and began to establish
an administration, but it did not declare independence in the form of the
 GABUNGAN POLITIK INDONESIA • 151

Democratic Republic of East Timor until November 1975, when the

Indonesian invasion from the west was already underway. Driven from
Dili and other centers in December 1975, Fretilin retained control of
most of the countryside until September 1977 to 1979, when a series of
Indonesian operations shattered both its political leadership and its army,
the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor (Falintil, Armed
Forces for the National Liberation of Timor). During the 1980s, under
the leadership of Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão, Fretilin and Fal-
intil were reorganized, with Falintil becoming a largely guerrilla force di-
vided into small mobile groups linked to networks of civilian resistance,
and a broader alliance of nationalist groups inside and outside East Timor
was constructed. Gusmão was captured by the Indonesians in November
1990 and jailed by them until his final release in mid-September 1999 af-
ter the East Timorese had voted overwhelmingly for independence from
Indonesia.
Fretilin was the largest party registered under the United Nations
Transitional Administration, and in the election of 30 August 1991 it won
57 percent of the vote, gaining 55 seats in East Timor’s 88-seat Con-
stituent Assembly. [0799, 0806, 0814, 0941, 0959]

FRONT DEMOKRASI RAKYAT (FDR, People’s Democratic Front). A

coalition of left-wing parties (Partai Komunis Indonesia [PKI], Partai
Buruh, Partai Sosialis, and Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia [Pesindo]), for-
merly part of the Sayap Kiri, established in January 1948 following the
fall of the Amir Sjarifuddin government. Until 1948 the left-wing par-
ties had been in government and generally pursued a line of negotiation
with the Dutch and accommodation, in the short term, with Western busi-
ness interests, but the formation of the FDR marked a radicalization of
their policy and a shift to promotion of armed struggle and rejection of
foreign investment. The FDR dissolved on 1 September 1948 when the
parties merged into the PKI. See also MADIUN AFFAIR. [0661, 0674,
0683, 0684, 1128]

–G–

GABUNGAN POLITIK INDONESIA (Gapi, Indonesian Political Feder-

ation). Assembly of Indonesian nationalist organizations formed in May
1939 on the initiative especially of M. H. Thamrin of the Partai In-
donesia Raya (Parindra) and including Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia
152 • GAJAH MADA

(Gerindo) and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). It called for In-
donesian self-determination and an elected parliament, using the slogan
Indonesia berparlemen (“Indonesia with a parliament”). In December
1939 it sponsored a Kongres Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s
Congress), which called unsuccessfully for cooperation between Indone-
sians and Dutch in the face of the deteriorating world situation. See also
SUTARJO PETITION. [0586]

GAJAH MADA. Prime minister of Majapahit from 1330 to 1364. As a

young man he helped defeat rebels against King Jayanegara, but later
had Jayanegara killed after he had stolen Gajah Mada’s wife. Under
Queen Tribuwana, he rose to become prime minister and under her and
her successor Hayam Wuruk (Rajasanagara r. 1350–1389) was effective
ruler of the kingdom until his death. He resumed the expansionist mili-
tary program of King Kertanegara and is said to have sworn not to con-
sume palapa until the Outer Islands (Nusantara) had been conquered.
Majapahit maintained a powerful fleet, but it is not certain that it had any
real control beyond the shores of Java. Gajah Mada’s palapa oath was
widely publicized by Muhammad Yamin as an early manifestation of
nationalism. [0484, 0515]

GAMBLING. Gambling existed in Indonesia in many forms from early

times, with contests such as boat races and cockfights, and it was soon
recognized as a useful source of state revenue. Thomas Stamford Raf-
fles organized a lottery to help pay for the postal road along the northern
coast of Java. Gambling farms were allocated on the pacht system and
were commonly operated by Chinese. On the plantations in East Suma-
tra, gambling became an important means for planters to keep their
workforce tied by bonds of indebtedness. The Netherlands Indies gov-
ernment ran a state lottery that was taxed at 21 percent (20 percent for
the government, 1 percent for the poor). Although the Sarekat Islam
(SI) and other religious and nationalist parties campaigned strongly
against government promotion of gambling, governments after indepen-
dence have found the sponsoring of lotteries and casinos a convenient
and lucrative source of finance. Religious and social organizations have
consistently objected to it, especially on the grounds of its effects on the
poor. Gambling was formally banned throughout the country in 1981,
but in 1985 the government introduced soccer pools, called porkas
(“forecast”), to finance sport. Tickets purchased in the porkas are for-
mally designated as donations to social projects, with prizes, though
 GAMELAN • 153

even this is banned in Aceh. The net revenue from the porkas in 1988
was approximately Rp 962 billion. See also SADIKIN, ALI. [0576]

GAMELAN. Traditional gong-chime music of Indonesia. Neolithic litho-

phones (stone slabs tuned to a seven-note scale) have been found in
Vietnam, and these may have been part of a general Southeast Asian
musical tradition represented in Indonesia by (wooden) xylophones
that have not survived. The first reliable traces of music in the archi-
pelago, however, are cast bronze gongs resembling kettle drums, which
reached Indonesia in about 300 B.C. with the spread of Dongson cul-
ture from Vietnam. They were probably used first for signaling in bat-
tle but soon took on a ceremonial significance. The so-called Moon of
Pejeng in Bali is one such “drum.” Shortly afterward the first Indone-
sian gongs were produced on Java and were probably cast and ham-
mered, rather than directly cast like the Dongson instruments (see
METALWORKING). By the second or first century B.C., these
gongs, large kettle-like objects with a raised boss suspended horizon-
tally on cords, were made with specific pitches in three-note gamelan
ensembles. (See also ALOR.)
From this basis, the Javanese gamelan elaborated into a great variety
of form and more complex instrumentation. A five-tone scale (slendro)
was in use probably by the sixth or seventh century, and the seven-tone
pelog by the 12th century. The gong agung, a larger, flatter, vertically
suspended gong with a deep pitch and resonant voice, appeared in the
10th century. The saron, or metallophone, was added in the sixth or sev-
enth century and may have been based on traditional xylophones. These
instruments create interlocking strata of rhythms, said by some to derive
from the rhythm of mortars used to husk rice. Bamboo flutes (suling) and
spike fiddles (gending or rebab) were in use by the eighth century, the
plucked zither (celempung or kecapi) by the 14th century, and the oboe
(serunai) perhaps a century later; all these instruments, and later the
voice, added a melodic line of a kind not possible on the basic gamelan.
This complexity turned the drum (kendang) into the pivotal instrument
of the ensemble as rhythm-giver. Nonetheless, no true solo tradition has
developed; the basic instruments of a gamelan cannot be tuned and are
manufactured as a single entity rather than as a fortuitous assembly of in-
struments. Most players are expected to be able to shift easily from one
instrument to another.
Bronze gamelan ensembles reached Bali around the 10th century, gener-
ally displacing traditional wind and string instruments. Around 22 distinct
154 • GANGSTERS

gamelan types are still in use on Bali. During the Majapahit era (13th–16th
centuries), gongs and gamelan ensembles were apparently exported exten-
sively from Java and Bali to other parts of the archipelago and to the South-
east Asian mainland, though development of distinctive local styles was
rapid.
Gamelan on Java has become “high” art associated with the courts and
with ritual (one scholar has described it as “music not to listen to”), but
it is nonetheless played on a great number of occasions, though increas-
ingly the use of cassettes is reducing demand for musicians. On Bali,
gamelan remains much more popular, partly because of the importance
of musical offering in Hindu ceremonies, partly because musicians have
consciously developed brighter rhythms and more exciting forms. Keb-
yar style on Bali now recognizes individual musicians, composers, and
dancers as artists.
Gamelan has attracted considerable attention among Western musi-
cians. Claude Debussy was inspired by gamelan performances at the
Paris Exposition of 1896 to include gamelan motifs in his composition,
while Olivier Messiaen has also made extensive used of gamelan
themes. See also DANGDUT; KRONCONG. [0091, 0135, 0159, 0174,
0175, 0177, 0179, 0183, 0184, 0204]

GANGSTERS. See BANDITRY; MILITIAS.

GANI, ADNAN KAPAU (1905–1958). Indonesian nationalist and busi-

nessman from South Sumatra, trained as a physician. In the prewar pe-
riod, he starred in various quasi-nationalist romantic films, such as As-
mara Murni (Pure Passion, 1940) but was also active in politics, being
one of the leaders of the Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo). At the
end of the Japanese occupation, he was one of the two foremost na-
tionalist spokesmen on Sumatra and enjoyed close relationships with
Sukarno, Sutan Sjahrir, and Amir Sjarifuddin. He was a founder of
the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) on Sumatra and was appointed
coordinator and organizer of the armed forces on that island, though he
failed in his ambition to become Sumatran governor. He was appointed
the Republic’s minister of prosperity (menteri kemakmuran) in Novem-
ber 1946, in which position he continued to play an important role in
conducting “oil diplomacy” and in developing an economic program for
both Sumatra and the Republic as a whole. After independence he built
up a fortune trading rubber and pepper from South Sumatra. See also
PALEMBANG. [0661, 0839]
 GAS • 155

GARIS BESAR HALUAN NEGARA (GBHN, Broad Outlines of State

Policy). See MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT.

GARUDA. 1. Mythological eagle, the vehicle of the god Vishnu, and the
conqueror of serpents in Hindu mythology. In 1951 it was chosen as the
Republic’s official coat of arms, with a symbolic representation of the
Pancasila on a shield around its neck and the motto Bhinneka tunggal
ika. 2. Garuda is also the name of Indonesia’s international airline, formed
on 31 March 1950. Initially a joint venture with KLM, it became wholly
Indonesian in 1954. After a period of declining standards and profitability
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the loss of many staff in the purges
of 1965–1966, Garuda improved its position during the 1970s. Wiweko
Suparno, appointed by Suharto to head the airline in 1968, expanded the
fleet of wide-bodied jets as well as its domestic routes, though at the cost
of a considerable accumulation of debt. By 1980 Garuda had the second
largest fleet of planes in Asia. Merpati Nusantara Airlines was founded in
1962 to operate domestic flights and became a Garuda subsidiary in 1978.
In 1989 Garuda faced its first real competitor when Tommy Suharto and
Bob Hasan’s Sempati air challenged its monopoly on the use of jet engine
aircraft and flying international routes; three years later Suparno was fired
from his job as the airline’s president apparently because of his unwilling-
ness to accommodate the needs of the Suharto family. During the finan-
cial crisis of the late 1990s, Garuda was faced with bankruptcy and had to
abandon six of its 10 routes to Europe and return several of its leased air-
craft. See also AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY; INDONESIAN AIRWAYS.
[0467, 0748, 0760]

GAS (LNG, liquefied natural gas). Indonesia’s first major natural gas re-
serves were found in the 1970s in the waters around Natuna Island in the
South China Sea (see map 11), where gas fields contained reserves of an
estimated 45 trillion cubic feet. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) was also
found in Aceh and East Kalimantan. The fields in Arun in north Aceh
(an estimated 17 trillion cubic feet) began exporting LNG in 1978. These
reserves were expected to run out by 2012–2014, though they still gen-
erated $1.2 billion a year in exports in 2001. In 1982 Indonesia’s LNG
exports were valued at US$2.6 billion. In the early 1990s new fields were
discovered in east Aceh (with an estimated 24 trillion cubic feet of natu-
ral gas), and during that decade Indonesia became the world’s largest ex-
porter of natural gas. Acehnese gas exports to Japan and Korea were in-
terrupted by violence from armed militants in March 2001, and
156 • GAYO

ExxonMobil was forced to stop production at its oil and gas fields until
August of that year. After the plant reopened, more than 3,000 Indone-
sian troops patrolled its perimeter. Local villagers filed a lawsuit in
United States federal court against ExxonMobil in July 2001 alleging it
ignored the brutality of these troops, a suit that the U.S. State Department
urged the court to dismiss.
Huge fields were also opened up in East Kalimantan at the Bontang
natural gas facility, giving Pertamina flexibility in managing its exports
to north Asia. Further exploration began at Tangguh natural gas field in
the Birds Head region of western Irian Jaya (see PAPUA), where British
Petroleum (BP) planned to use a low-impact program in developing the
reserves of an estimated 24 trillion cubic feet. It was hoped that these
enormous deposits would fill the supply gap after the Acehnese fields ran
out or if guerrilla activity in that area forced suspension of operations
there. In 2002 Pertamina signed a $12.5 billion deal to supply gas to
China from the Tangguh field over 25 years.

GAYO. Ethnic group in the highland areas of central and southern Aceh,
culturally intermediate between the Acehnese and Batak peoples. Mus-
lim since the 17th century, the Gayo were incorporated into the Acehnese
kingdom by Iskandar Muda and were annexed to the Netherlands In-
dies in 1904. Strong local resistance continued until 1913 and during the
late colonial period the Indonesian nationalist movement was strong in
the area. There is a tradition of merantau. Many from the region joined
in the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s, and resentments fueled by the
rebellion led to the killing of many people accused of communist affili-
ations in 1965 (see MASSACRES OF 1965–1966), with estimates rang-
ing from 800 to 3,000 deaths. [0783]

GELIJKSTELLING. See RACE.

GENERATIONS. Because of the succession of dramatic political changes

in 20th-century Indonesia, the notion of generational groups has been a
strong one in Indonesian historiography. The term Angkatan ’45 (Gener-
ation of ’45) was originally applied by Hans Baguë Jassin in 1951 to
writers active immediately after the declaration of independence, notably
Chairil Anwar and Idrus, who transformed the literary use of the In-
donesian language, but the expression soon became general for the for-
mer pemuda, that is, the young people who had fought for independence
after 1945. Angkatan ’45 remains the name of the official organization of
 GERILYA • 157

veterans of the Revolution. The students who helped to topple Sukarno

after 1965 referred to themselves as Angkatan ’66, while later student ac-
tivists have sometimes identified themselves as Angkatan ’74, ’78, and
so on. Some historians have identified generations of ’08, ’26–’27, or ’28
associated with Budi Utomo, the uprisings of the Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI), and the Youth Pledge. It is in the Indonesian army that
the notion of generation is perhaps most apt, since senior positions were
occupied from the 1940s to the 1980s by men regarded as members of
the Angkatan ’45 (see NASUTION, A. H.; SUHARTO). The term
angkatan also means “force” as in Angkatan Kelima, or “Fifth Force.”

GERAKAN ACEH MERDEKA (GAM, Free Aceh Movement). See

ACEH.

GERAKAN RAKYAT INDONESIA (Gerindo, Indonesian People’s

Movement). Left-wing nationalist party formed 24 May 1937 to succeed
the Sukarnoist Partindo and in opposition to the conservative Parindra.
Its leaders included A. K. Gani, Amir Sjarifuddin, and Muhammad
Yamin. More strongly antifascist than anticolonialist, it attempted to co-
operate with the colonial government against the Japanese threat but re-
ceived little attention. Yamin left the party in mid-1939, and its activities
were severely curtailed from May 1940 by the declaration of a State of
War and Siege. [0586]

GERAKAN WANITA INDONESIA (Gerwani, Indonesian Women’s

Movement). Left-wing women’s movement, founded on 4 June 1950 as
Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar (Gerwis, Movement of Aware Indone-
sian Women), primarily to lobby for women’s interests in the govern-
ment. In March 1954 it took the name Gerwani, becoming increasingly
close to, though never formally affiliated with, the Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI). It worked for equal rights of women and men in mar-
riage and greater penalties for rape and abduction, as well as establish-
ing kindergartens and midwifery and literacy courses. In 1961 it claimed
9 million members. In the suppression of the Left in Indonesia after
1965, special attention was given to the destruction of Gerwani, on the
grounds that it allegedly encouraged women to abandon their duties
within the family and promoted sexual promiscuity. See also SEX, PO-
LITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF. [0994, 1430]

GERILYA (guerrilla warfare). The period following the Second “Police

Action” during which the Dutch overran all the major population centers
158 • GERMANY, LINKS WITH

of the Indonesian Republic and a Pemerintah Darurat Republik In-

donesia (PDRI, Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
under Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was established in central Sumatra.
The Republic’s armed forces remained under General Sudirman, who
led the struggle in the Javanese countryside. This period came to an end
with the restoration of Yogyakarta to the Republic and the release of
Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta in July 1949. See also DEFENSE POL-
ICY; ROEM-VAN ROIJEN AGREEMENT. [0668, 0686, 0714, 0877]

GERMANY, LINKS WITH. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Germans

were prominent amongst the European inhabitants of the Indies. The sci-
entists F. W. Junghuhn, C. G. C. Reinwardt, and Carl Ludwig Blume
conducted important research; many Germans served in the colonial
army; and German Protestant missions were active in the region. Ger-
man industrialization in the 19th century made Germany a major market
for Netherlands Indies products, and major German commercial penetra-
tion began under the Liberal Policy, the shipping and trading interests
of Norddeutscher Lloyd becoming most important. The Straits-und-
Sunda-Syndikat, founded in 1911, took major interests in trade, planta-
tions, and mining, and by 1912 German investment had reached
120–180 million marks, ranking fourth after Dutch, British, and Franco-
Belgian capital. Germany’s late unification (1871) left it little chance for
annexation of indigenous states in the region, and Britain’s naval power
repeatedly thwarted any German ambitions to seize Portuguese Timor
and part or all of the Netherlands Indies. German business thus aimed at
greater access to the colony through commercial penetration of the
Netherlands. Germany’s respect for Dutch neutrality in World War I was
aimed partly at preserving its investments and coaling facilities in the In-
dies from seizure by Britain. German citizens in the Netherlands Indies,
including the painter Walter Spies (1895–1942), were interned after the
German occupation of the Netherlands in 1940, partly to forestall a
Vichy-style claim to the colony, but many were released under the
Japanese.
During B. J. Habibie’s period of influence in the 1980s and 1990s, eco-
nomic ties between Germany and Indonesia were strong. When he was
minister of research and technology, many German firms won contracts in
the strategic industries he controlled, including one for military helicopters
and a controversial deal in 1994 when Indonesia purchased 39 warships
from the former East German navy. By 1997, 150 German firms operated
in Indonesia and German direct investment stood at US$4.5 billion.
 GESTAPU • 159

GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, G-30-S, September 30th

Movement). Late on the evening of 30 September 1965, army units led
by Lieutenant-Colonel Untung launched a limited coup in Jakarta os-
tensibly to remove a Council of Generals (Dewan Jendral) said to be
plotting against Sukarno with the help of the United States and Britain.
They killed six leading generals (Ahmad Yani, Suprapto, S. Parman,
Haryono, Sutoyo Siswomiharjo, and D. I. Panjaitan), seized state radio
and telecommunications facilities, and declared a revolutionary council
(Dewan Revolusi). General A. H. Nasution escaped the plotters, though
his daughter and an aide were killed in the melée. A lesser coup took
place in Central Java involving units of the Diponegoro Division. The
coup was crushed within 24 hours by Komando Cadangan Strategis
Angkatan Darat (Kostrad) forces under General Suharto (who had not
been targeted by the plotters) and Siliwangi Division units. These events
(most of them on 1 October rather than 30 September) laid the basis for
Suharto’s gradual seizure of power and the installation of the so-called
New Order. The security organization Komando Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan (Kopkamtib) was put in place to suppress remnants of the
coup, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was banned for its alleged
role, and left-wing elements were purged from the bureaucracy, the
armed forces, and society in general by imprisonment and massacre (see
MASSACRES OF 1965–1966). Untung, other direct participants in the
coup, and senior left-wing figures were put on trial in the special tribu-
nal Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Mahmillub). For many years,
from November 1973, Kopkamtib required citizens to obtain a certificate
of noninvolvement in the coup (Surat Bebas G-30-S) in order to travel or
to obtain certain kinds of work. This was later substituted by a general
requirement that those holding sensitive posts (including in the educa-
tion system and the oil industry) come from a clean (bersih) social envi-
ronment.
Conservative forces and public opinion in general attributed the coup
immediately to the PKI, and the Suharto government rigidly enforced
that view; G-30-S/PKI became the common official term for both the
coup and the party. Evidence of direct PKI involvement in planning the
coup, however, was slender and was mainly based on dubious confes-
sions and on testimony concerning a so-called Biro Khusus (Special Bu-
reau) of the PKI formed to recruit military officers for the party. Those
arguing that the party is unlikely to have planned the coup point to its
failure to follow up on the actions of the 30 September Movement in
Jakarta. Outside Indonesia, some academics have suggested that the
160 • GIYANTI, TREATY OF

coup was the work of a group of middle-ranking army and senior air
force officers patriotically concerned over their superiors’ hostility to
Sukarno and that Sukarno himself may have inspired them. Some have
speculated that Suharto planned or contributed to the affair in a Machi-
avellian plot to remove Sukarno, his commanding officers, and the PKI,
a view that was openly propagated after Suharto’s fall. That no orthodox
scholarly interpretation has yet emerged is due partly to the formidable
problems of evidence and plausibility, and partly to the difficulty of con-
ducting research on the event during the New Order period in Indonesia,
when many of the participants had been killed or jailed, and it was diffi-
cult for impartial scholars to query the official version of events. The of-
ficial interpretation was only allowed to be questioned within Indonesia
after Suharto’s resignation in 1998, when several members of Sukarno’s
government were released from jail and some began to publish their own
versions of what occurred in 1965. See also “CORNELL PAPER”;
GUIDED DEMOCRACY; SUPERSEMAR. [0689, 0690, 0692, 0702,
0712, 0714, 0715, 0857]

GIYANTI, TREATY OF. Signed in 1755 by the Dutch East Indies Com-
pany and the rebel prince Mangkubumi, it partitioned the rump of the
kingdom of Mataram into the Sunanate of Surakarta under Pakubu-
wono III and the Sultanate of Yogyakarta under Mangkubumi, who took
the name Hamengkubuwono I. [0577]

GIYUGUN. People’s armies formed in accordance with a Japanese gen-

eral policy directive of 29 June 1943 that indigenous volunteer armies
should be established in Java, Sumatra, North Borneo, and Malaya to
assist Japanese forces in defending the region against an anticipated Al-
lied counterattack. On Sumatra, indigenous officers for the Giyugun
were drawn frequently from prewar Islamic nationalist youths. See also
PEMBELA TANAH AIR. [0660, 0675]

GOA. See MAKASSAR.

GOLD. Ancient Indian texts vaguely refer to Southeast Asia as Suvarnad-

wipa (“Land of Gold”) and in his Guide to Geography, Claudius Ptolemy
(?90–168) described a “Golden Chersonese” or peninsula in the South-
east Asian region, which many scholars have identified as Sumatra
and/or the Malay Peninsula. It seems, however, that major exports of
gold from the archipelago did not begin until the first century A.D., after
 GOLKAR • 161

the emperor Vespasian banned the export of gold from the Roman em-
pire. At various times Banjarmasin and Minangkabau were major cen-
ters of the gold trade. Gold coins were minted in the region from the
eighth century (see CURRENCY). Major gold extraction began in west-
ern Kalimantan in the 1740s, largely in the hands of Chinese (see
KONGSI WARS), and in the mid-19th century the same area was cov-
ered with concessions to around 150 European mining companies, most
of which failed within a few years. In 1987 a further gold rush began in
the interior of East Kalimantan. Since the 1960s PT Freeport has mined
the gold in Papua, which has the largest-known gold reserve of any sin-
gle operating mine in the world. [0413, 0526, 0538, 0540, 0791, 1048]

GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups, formerly Sekber, i.e.,

Sekretariat Bersama [Joint Secretariat], Golkar). Golkar was formed in
October 1964 by army leaders to succeed the Badan Kerja Sama as a
coordinating body for and later a federation of anticommunist social or-
ganizations, a number of which were themselves federations, especially
Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI), Koperasi
Serba Guna Gotong Royong (Kosgoro), and Musyawarah Kekeluar-
gaan Gotong Royong (MKGR). In 1967 the Suharto regime announced
that Golkar would be the regime’s parliamentary vehicle, and the New
Order used it after 1971 to reshape Indonesia’s electoral system. Al-
though the organization itself remained a federation of social groups, it
was dominated by the army and to a lesser extent the bureaucracy. In
general elections civil servants were obliged to vote for Golkar, and the
government controlled the system so completely that Golkar could rely
on a consistent vote of over 60 percent of the electorate.
Over the years attempts to make Golkar a more independent organiza-
tion foundered on President Suharto’s reluctance to permit any revital-
ization of the political system and the large military contingent in its
membership. In October 1983, when state secretary Sudharmono be-
came chairman of Golkar, he attempted to lessen its dependence on the
executive but ran into determined opposition from both Suharto and the
military. The army succeeded in pushing him out of the chairmanship in
1988 in favor of Wahono (1925–), a military man who had been
Suharto’s assistant in Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat
(Kostrad) in 1965. Wahono served as chairman until 1993, when
Suharto ensured that Information Minister Harmoko (1939–) should suc-
ceed to the post, and two of Suharto’s children (Siti Hardijanti Rukmana
and Bambang Trihatmodjo) were appointed to Golkar’s executive board.
162 • GORONTALO

In May 1998 Harmoko’s announcement of his lack of support for

Suharto’s leadership was one of the critical factors in the president’s
downfall, but subsequently other Golkar leaders pressed for Harmoko’s
removal from office, and in the Golkar congress of July 1998, Akbar
Tanjung (former chairman of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam [HMI] and
close to Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie) was elected to head the
party.
In the 1999 elections Golkar came second behind Megawati
Sukarnoputri’s Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)
and Akbar Tanjung became speaker of parliament. In September 2002
Tanjung was sentenced to a three-year jail term for allegedly embez-
zling $4.5 million in state funds meant for the poor and channeled
through the Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog). The sentence was up-
held by the Jakarta High Court in January 2003, but overturned on ap-
peal by the Supreme Court on 12 February 2004. Throughout the
process Tanjung refused to resign his leadership position in Golkar and
was expected to be a leading contender for the party’s nomination in
the July 2004 presidential election. Its organizational strength through-
out the country and the widespread popular disillusionment with the
PDI-P augured well for Golkar to achieve a strong showing in the April
2004 general elections. See also DWIFUNGSI; MONOLOYALITAS.
[0736, 0748, 0760, 0998, 0999]

GORONTALO. City and kingdom in northern Sulawesi. The Suwawa

kingdom was founded here in the eighth century, but its links with the
14th-century trading kingdom of Gorontalo are unknown. Ternate dom-
inated the area in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the vassal King Ma-
tolodulakiki declared Islam the state religion in the 16th century. A fed-
erated kingdom of Lima Pohalaa emerged in 1673.

GOTONG ROYONG. “Mutual self-help” was said to be the principle in-

spiring village life throughout Indonesia, especially on Java (see
DESA). While the existence of social differentiation in the village was
acknowledged, under gotong royong all members of the village had a
right and a duty to participate in the economic activities of other vil-
lagers. Thus, for instance, if a house were to be built, all would join in
the construction; if a field were to be harvested, all had a right to take
part and to receive a share of the crop as their reward. The share a har-
vester received was intended to be in proportion to the amount she or he
 GREEN REVOLUTION • 163

had collected, but as the number of harvesters grew with the village pop-
ulation, the share of the crop received by the harvesters en masse tended
to grow in accord with the principles of gotong royong. Landlords, how-
ever, have often tried to restrict access to the harvest to smaller groups of
privileged workers, sometimes entirely from outside the village, in order
to increase their own crop share and to ensure a more docile workforce.
The concept was also discredited during World War II when Japanese
authorities instructed village officials to use it in extracting forced labor
from the villagers in projects for the Japanese war effort. Similarly under
the Suharto administration, people outside Java in particular viewed go-
tong royong as a method by which the government sought local cooperation
in imposing its centralizing policies. See also LAND REFORM; RICE.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE. Post created in 1610 by

the directors of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) to centralize
control over the company’s trade operations in the East and to organize
its military operations. The governor-general was also in charge of the
administration of law in the colony. Headquarters of the governor-general
were first on Ambon but shifted under Jan Pieterszoon Coen to
Batavia. From 1815 to 1848 the governor-general was appointed per-
sonally by the Dutch king and thereafter by the Crown on the advice of
cabinet. From 1815 to 1836 and from 1854 to 1925, the governor-general
(also known as the Landvoogd) ruled jointly with the Raad van Indië,
but he remained the sole official point of contact between the colonial
government and the metropolitan power: all instructions and requests
from The Hague passed formally through the governor-general. A lieu-
tenant governor-general was occasionally appointed, and under Huber-
tus Johannes van Mook, when no governor-general was appointed, this
was the highest administrative post in the colony. In November 1948 the
post of governor-general was abolished and replaced by that of Hoge
Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon (HVK, high representative of the
Crown). For a list of the governors-general, see APPENDIX A. See also
COMMISSIONER-GENERAL; NETHERLANDS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. [0491, 0638]

GOWA. See MAKASSAR.

GREEN REVOLUTION. General term for the dramatic increase in agri-

cultural production, especially of rice, begun in the mid-1960s. The
164 • GROWTH TRIANGLES

program started as an agricultural extension program in the Karawang

area of West Java in 1963 and from 1964 was extended to the rest of the
island under the name Bimbingan Massal (Bimas, Mass Guidance), cov-
ering 462,000 hectares (ha) by 1966 and over 2 million ha by 1969. The
program included the introduction of new high-yielding varieties (HYV)
of rice and new cultivation techniques, especially with machinery, ex-
tended irrigation, and the use of pesticides and fertilizer, that allowed up
to five crops in two years. It is said to have nearly doubled production on
Java between 1968 and 1985. It was supported by the international
chemical producers CIBA and Hoechst. Problems with the program have
included the vulnerability of HYVs to disease and weather variation, the
high cost and unreliability of seed and chemical supplies, the poisoning
of fishponds and rivers by pesticides and fertilizers, corruption, and the
fact that the continual cultivation of rice fails to break the life cycle of
insect pests such as the wereng. [0319, 0333, 0341]

GROWTH TRIANGLES. Indonesia has been involved in three regional

“growth triangles” in which adjacent regions in three different countries
are given a special association on the basis of complementary economic
strengths. The Singapore–Johor–Riau (Sijori) growth triangle covers
Singapore, the Malaysian state of Johor, and the Indonesian provinces of
Riau and West Sumatra. It was proposed by Singapore in December
1989 as a measure to complement the developing relationship between
Singapore and the Indonesian island of Batam. Private companies in
Singapore provided capital for establishing labor-intensive industries on
the territory of its partners, with the local governments providing man-
power and facilities. Trilateral agreements establishing the growth trian-
gle were signed in December 1994, but connections between Johor and
the Indonesian provinces remain meager.
An Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT) cover-
ing the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, and West
Sumatra, together with the Kedah and Langkawi in Malaysia and the
southern part of Thailand, was formalized in 1993. In the following
year, 1994, the Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines Eastern
ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) was established, but both it and
the IMTGT have yet to show significant results. [0362, 0363]

GUIDED DEMOCRACY (Demokrasi Terpimpin). General term for the

years 1959–1965, in which Indonesia was dominated politically by
Sukarno and during which enormous political tension arose between the
 GUIDED ECONOMY • 165

army and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Guided Democracy

was initially a reaction to the apparent mendacity and divisiveness of par-
liamentary governments in the 1950s, and to the fact that the parties were
unable to agree on a cabinet after the fall of the second Ali Sastroami-
joyo cabinet in 1957 or on a constitution to replace the provisional 1950
Constitution. Parliamentary democracy was further discredited by the in-
ability of the central government to maintain control in the provinces and
by the participation of members of the Masjumi and Partai Sosialis In-
donesia (PSI) in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. The transition to Guided
Democracy began with a declaration of martial law and Sukarno’s ap-
pointment of himself as prime minister, and it ended with Sukarno’s
restoration of the country’s original 1945 Constitution on 5 July 1959.
The rhetoric of Guided Democracy was both radical and conservative;
on the one hand, Sukarno dedicated the nation to completing the unfin-
ished Revolution and incorporated Marxist ideas extensively in his nu-
merous ideological statements, especially Nasakom (Nasionalisme,
Agama, Komunisme). He praised the PKI, attempted to protect it from
army hostility, and promoted its participation in the institutions of the
state. On the other hand, Sukarno consistently eschewed class conflict,
promoting instead a corporatist view of the state in which there were no
fundamental conflicts of interest between different social groups. He ar-
gued especially against what he described as the Western notion of 50
percent + 1 democracy, which enabled a tyranny by the majority. (See
also MANIFESTO POLITIK.)
Institutionally, too, the picture was confused: the PKI made use of
Sukarno’s protection and the favorable ideological climate to expand its
membership dramatically, while, as a result of martial law and the na-
tionalization of Dutch property, the armed forces became firmly estab-
lished in government and the economy. It became common to speak of
a political triangle consisting of Sukarno, the army, and the PKI, but the
strengths of each were very different and uncertainty over where Guided
Democracy was leading the country contributed to growing tension in
the 1960s, which culminated in the Gestapu coup attempt of 30 Sep-
tember 1965. See also GUIDED ECONOMY. [0696, 0697 0704, 0706,
0850, 0859]

GUIDED ECONOMY (Ekonomi Terpimpin). Sukarno’s vision of a polit-

ical reconstruction of Indonesia under Guided Democracy was paired
with plans for a thoroughgoing restructuring of the country’s economy.
Whereas parliamentary governments in the 1950s had generally aimed at
166 • GUSMÃO, JOSE ALEXANDRE “XANANA”

Indonesianization of the economy by encouraging indigenous entrepre-

neurs, Sukarno proposed massive state direction of and intervention in
the economy by means of regulation and direct state involvement. In
Sukarno’s view, much of Indonesia’s economic difficulty stemmed from
its subordination to economic imperialism, and he aimed by means of
state investment both to do without foreign capital investment and to
create an industrial base that would lessen Indonesia’s import of manu-
factured goods. These plans were laid down in an Eight-Year Plan an-
nounced in August 1960 and were restated in the Economic Declaration
(Deklarasi Ekonomi, Dekon) of March 1963.
The nationalization of Dutch enterprises in 1957–1958 provided the
state with control of major parts of the economy, and government con-
trols on other sectors tightened considerably. The money for reinvest-
ment, however, was not there. Nationalized businesses, many of them in
military hands, were milked for funds both corruptly and to cover short-
falls in the government budget. Plantations in particular, already badly
neglected in the 1940s and short of funds in the 1950s, were starved of
reinvestment capital needed for replanting. Production declined steadily,
leaving the budget steadily less able to meet government commitments.
Inflation reached 500 percent a year by late 1965 as the government cov-
ered expenditures by printing money and the balance of payments
steadily declined.

GUSMÃO, JOSE ALEXANDRE “XANANA” (1946–). Born in a small

town on the north coast of East Timor, Gusmão attended a seminary in
Baucau in the early 1960s. He fulfilled national service in the Por-
tuguese army from 1968 to 1971. He joined the Frente Revolucionária
do Timor Leste Independente (Fretilin) leadership shortly before the
1975 Indonesian invasion and fought with them against the Indonesian
assault. After fleeing to the mountains in late 1978 he assumed leader-
ship of both the party and its military army Falintil after the death of its
guerrilla leader, Nicolau Lobato, at the end of that year. Gusmão changed
Fretilin’s strategy in the mid-1980s, constructing a broad alliance with
nationalist groups inside and outside East Timor under an umbrella
group Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT), of which
he became chairman. In the late 1980s he urged Fretilin to establish con-
tacts with urban young people and begin a campaign of nonviolent re-
sistance. Indonesian forces captured Gusmão in 1992 in a house on the
outskirts of Dili, and in May 1993 he was sentenced to life in prison, a
term later cut to 19 years and eight months.
 HABIBIE, BACHARUDDIN JUSUF • 167

On 10 February 1999, President B. J. Habibie’s government trans-

ferred Gusmão from prison to house arrest in Jakarta, and he was finally
released in mid-September, returning to East Timor the following month.
After initially participating in the territory’s interim parliament, he quit
in April 2001, stating that the internal squabbling was hampering East
Timor’s transition to independence. Despite initial reluctance, he an-
nounced in August that he would run for president, and he was over-
whelmingly elected in the presidential elections of April 2002 with ap-
proximately 80 percent of the vote. He presided over the ceremony of
independence on 19 May and became the first president of the indepen-
dent Republic of East Timor.

–H–

HAATZAAI ARTIKELEN. See SUBVERSION.

HABIBIE, BACHARUDDIN JUSUF (1936–). Born in Pare Pare, South

Sulawesi, Habibie became acquainted with Suharto in the early 1950s
when Suharto was serving in South Sulawesi and regularly visited the
Habibie family. He was educated at the Bandung Institute of Technology
(1954–1955) and graduated from Aachen Institute of Technology in Ger-
many in 1960. After working in Germany, Habibie was appointed in 1973
as technology and aeronautics advisor to Suharto and adviser to Pertam-
ina. In 1978 he became minister of research and technology, and he
founded and chaired the Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi
(BPPT, Body for the Management of Strategic Industries) and the Dewan
Riset Nasional (DRN, National Research Council). Habibie helped found
the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) in 1990 and became
its chairman. In 1992–1993 he was also director-general of PT PAL, the
state naval dockyard in Surabaya; of PT Pindad, the army industrial com-
pany for the manufacture of arms and ammunition; and of the state-owned
Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, National Aircraft Industry)
founded in 1976. Suharto also gave him control over the economic devel-
opment of eastern Indonesia and Batam and of the exploitation of the
Natuna gas field in the South China Sea. In March 1998 Suharto chose him
as his vice president. He succeeded Suharto as president on 19 May 1998
and served until defeated in the election of May 1999.
Despite his short and rather erratic tenure as president, Habibie insti-
tuted basic changes in the government of Indonesia, the most significant
168 • HAJ

being his willingness to allow East Timor to move along the path to in-
dependence and his approval of measures for decentralizing the Indone-
sian political and economic structure. [0760, 0761]

HAJ. The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam.
The steady stream of Indonesian pilgrims was and remains one of the
important channels of political and cultural contact between Indonesia
and the Arab world. Already itself a sign of faith, the haj tends to in-
crease the conviction of those who undertake it and for this reason the
Dutch feared it as a potential source of political unrest. From 1825,
therefore, they tried to discourage pilgrims by requiring them to obtain a
passport and to pay a tax of ƒ110. They also encouraged the local tradi-
tion that seven pilgrimages to Demak, site of the first Muslim state on
Java, were equivalent to one to Mecca. The tax, however, was abolished
in 1852, and numbers began to increase, raising Dutch fears and leading
to increasing surveillance of those making the haj. Until the early 20th
century, most pilgrimages were arranged by so-called pilgrim sheikhs,
who organized tickets, accommodation, and often finance for the jour-
ney. From 1922, however, the haj came under state control under the so-
called Pelgrimsordonnantie, which regulated shipping, passports, vacci-
nation, quarantine, and the welfare of Dutch subjects in Arabia. In
1926–1927, 52,412 pilgrims traveled from the Netherlands Indies to Ara-
bia, the largest group from any country.
After independence the government maintained tight control over the
haj for similar reasons and also to preserve Indonesia’s foreign exchange
and to prevent people from selling rice lands to finance the pilgrimage.
Under the New Order, the Suharto government removed the subsidy to
those undertaking the haj and in 1969 forbade pilgrims from using any
programs except those organized by the government. In 1989 the num-
ber of pilgrims was 57,903, and this number increased to 205,000 by
2001. President Suharto made the haj in 1991, and in the 1990s many
government officials also undertook the pilgrimage as Islam became an
acceptable part of the political scene. [0627, 0637, 0641, 0983]

HALMAHERA (Gilolo, Jailolo). Large island facing Ternate and Tidore.

The coastal people are largely Malay, with aboriginal tribes (“Alfurs”) in
the interior. A sultanate of Jailolo briefly emerged in the 17th century but
was conquered by Ternate. Christian conversions under the Dutch were
largely confined to northern Halmahera, while the southern regions re-
mained mostly Muslim. The sultans of Ternate and Tidore competed for
 HAMKA • 169

influence in the area, with the Ternate sultan drawing his major support
from Christians in the north, while the Tidore sultan’s basis of support
was largely among Muslims in the center and south.
In the early 1990s as Muslims made political gains in Jakarta, tension
arose between the religious communities in Halmahera. When the gov-
ernment of B. J. Habibie created a new province of north Maluku con-
flict was renewed, fueled by competing claims to the proceeds of a local
gold mine between Muslims and Christians allied with the two sultans.
At the end of 1999 violence broke out in northern Halmahera, with at
least 907 people killed by early January 2000. [0026, 0570, 0781, 1341]

HAMENGKUBUWONO IX (1912–1988). Sultan of Yogyakarta. After

studying Indology in Leiden, he became sultan on 18 March 1940, steer-
ing the sultanate to slightly greater autonomy under the Japanese from
1942. He is best remembered, however, for siding immediately with the In-
donesian Revolution in 1945 and for putting his domains at the disposal
of the Republic. Yogyakarta became first de facto and then formal capital
of the Republic and the sultan, as minister of state and general in the Re-
publican army, took part in the senior counsels of the Republic, especially
in 1948–1949. His refusal to cooperate with the Dutch after the fall of Yo-
gyakarta in December 1948 helped to force the Dutch to restore Republi-
can government in July 1949. Hamengkubuwono held the Defense Min-
istry in 1949–1950 and 1952–1953 and was governor of the Yogyakarta
Special Territory until his death. He reentered the cabinet in 1963 as head
of the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). In the early New
Order he emerged as a prominent figure in the Suharto regime, becom-
ing deputy prime minister for economics, finance, and development in
March 1966 and vice president in 1973–1978. [0643, 0695, 0854]

HAMKA (Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdulkarim Amrullah) (1908–1981).

Muslim writer and journalist. His best known work was the biography
(Ajahku) he wrote of his father, the renowned modernist ulama, Haji Ab-
dul Karim Amrullah (better known as Haji Rasul), but he was also a pro-
lific and widely read novelist. He was active in the Muhammadiyah
throughout his life and was one of the most influential Islamic leaders in
New Order Indonesia, becoming head of the leadership council of the
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Islamic Leaders)
in 1975. In the 1960s he had been the subject of a virulent attack by the
Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra) on the basis of alleged plagia-
rism. [0234, 0847, 0848, 0863]
170 • HAMZAH FANSURI

HAMZAH FANSURI (fl. late 16th century?). Poet born in the west Suma-
tran camphor port of Barus (also called Fansur). He lived for a time in
Ayudhya in Siam and may have joined the mystic Islamic Wujudiyyah
sect there. He also spent time in Baghdad. His poems, especially “Sharab
al-ashiqin” (The Lovers’ Beverage), were highly regarded in the court of
Iskandar Muda but were later strongly criticized by Nuruddin Raniri
as heretical.

HARAHAP, BURHANUDDIN (1917–?). Masjumi leader and from Au-

gust 1955 to March 1956 prime minister in a Masjumi-Partai Sosialis
Indonesia (PSI) coalition government. His government oversaw the first
general elections in September 1955 in which the Masjumi did less well
than expected and the PSI was devastated. Although Harahap carried out
the dissolution of the Netherlands Indonesian Union in February 1956,
he was deeply suspicious of the trend to radicalism in Indonesian politics
and joined the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in February 1958, for which he
was jailed 1962–1965. [0695]

HASAN, MUHAMMAD “BOB” (1931–). Born The Kian Sing in Se-

marang, he was adopted by Central Java Army commander Gatot Soe-
broto and became a Muslim. In the mid-1950s Subroto was Suharto’s
supervisor, and Suharto and Hasan became friends and, after Suharto
was named to the Diponegoro Central Java command in 1955, business
partners. During Suharto’s presidency, Hasan became head of a vast and
diversified business empire, including the Nusantara Ampera Bhakti
(Nusamba) group—in which he and Suharto’s son Sigit Harjojudanto
each held a 10 percent share—a number of banks, and most notably a
large number of forestry concessions. He headed Masyarakat Per-
hutanan Indonesia (MPI, Indonesia Forestry Society) and, as head of the
Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia (Apkindo, Indonesian Wood Panel Asso-
ciation), he controlled all plywood exports from Indonesia and fixed
their prices.
After the death of Mrs. Tien Suharto, he became an even closer confi-
dant of Suharto and his family. In March 1998 he was appointed minister
of trade and industry in Suharto’s Seventh Development Cabinet, a direct
challenge to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had called for
the abolition of Apkindo. B. J. Habibie dropped Hasan from his “Devel-
opment and Reform cabinet” two months later. Hasan was later convicted
and jailed for corruption, being released in 2004 after serving four of his
sixty-year sentence. See also SUHARTO FAMILY. [0404, 0760]
 HATTA, MOHAMMAD • 171

HATTA, MOHAMMAD (1902–1980). Political leader, born in West

Sumatra, where he came early under the influence of modernist Islamic
teachers. He studied economics in Rotterdam 1923–1932 and was active
as chair of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI). In 1927 he was arrested
and tried with three others on charges of promoting resistance to Dutch
rule in Indonesia on the basis of articles he wrote for the PI journal In-
donesia Merdeka, but he was acquitted for lack of evidence. Struck by
the ease with which the Dutch were able to break up Sukarno’s Partai
Nasional Indonesia (PNI) by arresting its top leaders, Hatta founded
with Sutan Sjahrir the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI Baru) as
part of a long-term plan to build cadre for the nationalist movement. On
his return to Indonesia in August 1932, he quickly became prominent
among the noncooperating nationalists. In 1934, however, he was sent
into internal exile to Boven Digul from where he was transferred to
Banda in 1936, being allowed to return to Java only in January 1942 at
the time of the Japanese invasion.
Hatta was released by the Japanese and agreed to work for them as po-
litical advisor, along with Sukarno. Though the two leaders were kept
from direct organizational contact with the masses in this period, their
public prominence confirmed them as the two dominant nationalist lead-
ers. Together with Sukarno, Hatta was involved in negotiations with the
Japanese over independence for Indonesia and after the Japanese surren-
der the two declared independence on 17 August 1945. Hatta became the
country’s first vice president on 18 August. (See also NATIONALISM.)
Though the vice presidency held no executive power, Hatta was promi-
nent in economic and administrative policy making in the early Revolu-
tion and was a consistent advocate of negotiation with the Dutch. He was
the leader who had the greatest influence in the regions, especially on
Sumatra, and was resident in West Sumatra from July to December 1947.
Sukarno appointed him prime minister on 31 January 1948 after the fall
of the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet, and Hatta then set out to implement the
unpopular Renville Agreement and to dismantle the power of the Left,
especially after the Madiun Affair of September–October 1948. He was
captured by the Dutch in the second “Police Action” and exiled with
other Republican leaders to Bangka. He headed the Republican delega-
tion at the Round Table Conference and signed the transfer of sover-
eignty in December 1949 on behalf of the Republic. He resigned as prime
minister in September 1950.
Hatta’s influence shrank sharply in the 1950s. He differed with Sukarno
over the relative emphasis to be given to economic reconstruction and to
172 • HAYAM WURUK

political goals such as the recovery of West Irian (Papua) and on 26 July
1956 he resigned as vice president (effective 1 December). Many saw him
as a possible focus for opposition to Sukarno and to Guided Democracy,
but he was unwilling to join openly with the dissidents, being always re-
luctant to break the unity of the Republic.
Under the New Order he initially became an advisor to Suharto, but
the president thwarted his plans to create a new political party (Partai
Demokrasi Islam Indonesia), and during his final years Hatta became in-
creasingly critical of the new government, lending his name to various
movements that were trying to change its political path, including the
Sawito affair and the Petition of Fifty, though he did not live long
enough to see the latter presented to the government.
Hatta’s ideology was complex. Though strongly influenced by both Is-
lam and Marxism, and immensely knowledgeable of both, he was sus-
picious of Islamic radicalism and opposed communism. He wished to
promote a moral capitalist economy in which prosperity could be
achieved without exploitation, and he saw cooperatives as a path to this
goal. He was willing to accept extensive foreign investment in the ad-
vanced sectors of the economy but was especially hostile to smaller Chi-
nese businesses, which he saw as exploitative. [0613, 0661, 0643, 0849,
0869, 0875, 0884]

HAYAM WURUK. See GAJAH MADA; MAJAPAHIT.

HEALTH. The early history of health and disease in the Indonesian archi-
pelago is difficult to reconstruct because of generally vague descriptions
of ailments. It seems likely that diseases such as malaria, dysentery, and
hookworm have long been established in the region, while bubonic
plague, cholera, influenza, smallpox, and syphilis are more recent in-
troductions. Beri-beri is a product of recent technological change. Dur-
ing the 18th century Batavia especially had a reputation for unhealthi-
ness, and during the Napoleonic Wars Governor-General P. G. van
Overstraten suggested that in the event of attack, Dutch forces should
weaken the enemy by letting them capture Batavia and thus contract the
diseases occurring there. (See also PIG.)
Epidemic diseases that struck the workforce and the armed forces
first drew the attention of colonial authorities, and the earliest public
health care was in the form of smallpox vaccination and the treatment to
sufferers of syphilis. Batavia became a major center for research into
tropical diseases. In 1910 a Civil Medical Service was established sepa-
 HEIHO • 173

rate from that of the military, and from 1925 the Dienst voor Volksge-
zondheid (Public Health Service) conducted major campaigns emphasiz-
ing public hygiene (drainage, sanitation, and so on). Nonetheless, in
1938 the colonial government provided only 116 hospitals, with 17,976
beds, for the entire colony. A further 38,122 beds were provided by pri-
vate, often mission-based, hospitals, which created unease in Muslim
communities who, often correctly, saw provision of medical care as an
attempt at conversion.
The earliest official medical training was of smallpox vaccinators and
midwives from circa 1817. In 1857 midwifery training was abandoned,
but from 1849 a school for paramedical dokter Djawa (Javanese doctors)
was attached to the hospital in Batavia. A full European-style medical
course was offered from 1875, and in 1898 the School tot Opleiding van
Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA, School for the Training of Native Doctors)
was founded. The Nederlandsch-Indische Artsenschool (NIAS, Nether-
lands Indies Doctors’ School) was established in Surabaya in 1913 and
a medical college (Geneeskundige Hogeschool) in Batavia in 1927. (See
also EDUCATION.)
The need for an extensive system of health care for the villages of In-
donesia was realized from the time of independence, and a public health
education program was launched in 1954. These early efforts, however,
were hampered by lack of personnel and by poor coordination between
government departments. One of the major aims of the New Order gov-
ernment was to provide universal basic health services, an important as-
pect of which was an innovative family planning program. In 1968 a
new plan was developed for village health centers or Pusat Kesehatan
Masyarakat (Puskesmas, Centers for Society’s Health), and since the
1970s these have played a central role in bringing health care to most In-
donesians. In the late 1980s the government launched a control plan to
limit the spread of HIV/AIDS, and in April 2003 it declared the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) a national epidemic threat. [0576,
1197–1206, 1420]

HEEREN XVII (Seventeen Gentlemen). See DUTCH EAST INDIES

COMPANY.

HEIHO. Indonesian paramilitary units recruited for auxiliary service by

the Japanese forces in Indonesia from mid-1943. Some saw action
against the Allies in eastern Indonesia, and their experience was later
welcome in the Republican army. Unlike the Pembela Tanah Air
174 • HENDRA GUNAWAN

(Peta) and Giyugun, the Heiho trained no Indonesian officers, but their
forces numbered 25,000 by the end of the war and provided many troops
of the postwar Republican army. [0661, 0663]

HENDRA GUNAWAN (1918–1983). One of the “fathers” of modern In-

donesian painting, Hendra was born in Bandung and came under the in-
fluence of Affandi in 1939. After fighting in the Revolution, he was one
of the founders of the Pelukis Rakyat (People’s Painters) in Yogyakarta
and also taught at the Akademi Seni Rupa Indonesia (ASRI). A member
of the central committee of the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat
(Lekra), he was jailed for 13 years following the 1965 Gestapu coup.
After his release in 1978, he spent most of his remaining years in Bali.
In his early work his constant theme was ordinary people at work and
play, often depicted in profile and with exaggerated facial features recall-
ing characters of the wayang. During the early 1960s he turned to nation-
alistic subjects, returning to this subject, usually in the context of the his-
torical anti-Dutch struggle, after his release from jail. His prison paintings,
however, are more personal and emotional, Astri Wright describing them
as “filled with themes of longing, intimacy and togetherness remembered.”
Although Hendra borrowed certain stylistic elements from the West,
he synthesized these with his indigenous experience to become one of In-
donesia’s greatest pioneers of modern art and one of its most versatile
painters. [0159, 0202]

HERENDIENSTEN (services to the lord). Alongside the allocation of rev-

enue farm rights (see PACHT), corvée, or compulsory, labor, was a ma-
jor “income” source for traditional rulers in the archipelago and was the
means by which many tasks of the state, such as road maintenance, were
carried out. The demand for labor went under a wide variety of names,
but herendiensten was probably the most common and important. Ten-
sion arose over the issue of herendiensten in the 19th century when the
colonial government sought to channel taxation as far as possible to it-
self. In 1882, several categories of herendiensten on Java were replaced
with an annual poll tax (hoofdgeld) of ƒ1, but the institution remained in
place in some zelfbesturen until 1942. A form of compulsory labor ser-
vice remains in force today as kerja bakti, “voluntary labor” required for
development works and community services. See also SLAVERY.

HEUTSZ, JOANNES BENEDICTUS VAN (1851–1924). Professional

soldier, from 1898 civil and military governor of Aceh and from 1904 to
 HINDUISM • 175

1909 governor-general. His extensive military campaigns, especially in

Aceh and eastern Indonesia, marked the final stage of Dutch territorial
consolidation.

HIMPUNAN MAHASISWA ISLAM (HMI, Muslim Students’ Associa-

tion). Large Muslim student organization, formed in 1947. It was close
to the modernist Muslim party Masjumi but survived the party’s ban-
ning in 1960 to become one of the most vocal opponents of the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) under Guided Democracy. It was a major
element in the so-called New Order coalition of military, students, and
Muslims, and initially it favored the program-oriented policies of the
Suharto regime. In the early 1970s it was dominated by the so-called re-
newal group, under Nurcholis Majid, who headed HMI from 1966 to
1971, which argued in favor of secularization. In 1983 it resisted gov-
ernment attempts to impose the Pancasila as its sole basic principle.
[0927]

HINDERORDONNANTIE. Regulation issued in 1926 requiring permis-

sion from the local authorities for the establishment of any factory or en-
terprise that might cause damage or danger in the immediate environ-
ment. See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. [0045]

HINDUISM. Hinduism arrived in Indonesia along with Buddhism in

about the fourth to fifth centuries A.D. (see INDIA, HISTORICAL
LINKS WITH), and merged with traditional beliefs to become the folk
religion of much of Java and the coastal regions of the western archi-
pelago. Saivism was the dominant form of Hinduism, though Buddhism
often also became an aspect of Hinduism in Indonesian practice. A class
of priests (pedanda) conducted rituals, and local belief emphasized the
importance of dharma (destiny, duty), but the Indian class and caste sys-
tem was only weakly transferred. With the penetration of Islam, how-
ever, Hindu belief was restricted to Bali and isolated pockets elsewhere
such as Tengger in the mountains south of Pasuruan in East Java, though
much of Balinese “Hinduism” pays attention to pre-Hindu local deities
rather than to the philosophical principles derived from India. Balinese
Hinduism was studied and to some extent protected by Dutch colonial
officials, and after independence Sukarno, who was half Balinese,
played a similar role. The Muslim-dominated Ministry of Religion, how-
ever, was reluctant to recognize it since it was not monotheist and had no
sacred book and no prophet, these being regarded as the characteristics
176 • HIZBULLAH

of true religions; it classified Hinduism with animism, thus opening Bali

officially to Muslim and Christian missionary activity. In response, Ba-
linese Hindus formed the Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali (PDHB) in 1959
both to lobby in favor of Hinduism in government circles and to stan-
dardize, define, and democratize Hindu doctrine and practice on Bali.
Arguments that Hinduism recognized a single supreme god in the form
of Sang Hyang Widi resulted in the religion’s formal recognition by the
ministry in 1962. In 1964 the PDHB changed its name to Parisada Hindu
Dharma.
In 1963 Hindu authorities celebrated the ritual of Eka Dasa Rudra, a
two-month-long cleansing ceremony needed once a century but previously
held probably in the 18th century. On 18 February 1963, three weeks be-
fore the climax of the ritual, the volcanic Mt. Agung erupted, causing ex-
tensive destruction and loss of life on Bali. The eruption was taken by
many Balinese as a sign that much was wrong on the earth, and some
scholars have argued that the mass killing of Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI) members on Bali in 1965–1966 was seen by many Balinese as a
necessary cleansing operation (see MASSACRES OF 1965–1966). The
ceremony was repeated without volcanic intervention in 1979.
Since 1965, Hinduism has grown dramatically outside Bali. Growth
took place first on Java, where from 1967 many abangan Muslims, ap-
palled by the santri role in the massacres there and by the prospect of
stricter enforcement of Islamic religious law, and driven also by the gov-
ernment insistence that all citizens adhere to a religion, turned instead to
Hinduism as the religion of Majapahit. In other parts of Indonesia,
moreover, Hinduism provided a convenient rubric for government recog-
nition of the traditional beliefs of communities such as the Toraja and
the Dayaks. See also RELIGION AND POLITICS. [0536, 1229, 1345,
1364, 1371]

HIZBULLAH (“Army of God”). Paramilitary force founded by the

Japanese in West Java in December 1944 affiliated with the Masjumi,
as a Muslim counterpart to the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta). At the end of
the occupation, it had around 500 members and was in no way strong
enough to press for an Islamic state. During the Revolution, however,
the name Hizbullah was adopted by armed groups affiliated with the
Muslim political party Masjumi and with local Muslim leaders. After
1948 many Hizbullah members joined the Darul Islam (DI), partly be-
cause of belief in an Islamic state, partly because of fear of demobiliza-
tion. See also ARMY; LASYKAR; SABILILLAH. [0661, 0693]
 HORTA, JOSE RAMOS • 177

HOGENDORP, DIRK VAN (1761–1882). Dutch East Indies Company

(VOC) official on Java from 1791 to 1798. He sharply criticized VOC
rule on the island for its “feudal” exactions from the population, and he
proposed extensive changes to the structure of government and finance
there, including property rights for the Javanese, transforming the bupati
into a salaried bureaucracy and reforming the taxation system, many of
which foreshadowed the ideas of Herman Willem Daendels and
Thomas Stamford Raffles. In 1798 he was jailed for these views by the
conservative Commissioner-General S. C. Nederburgh but in 1799 es-
caped to the Netherlands where he continued his campaigns in a series of
polemic brochures. [0491]

“HO-LO-TAN.” Chinese transcription of the name of an otherwise un-

known kingdom on the north coast of West Java. It sent seven tributary
missions to China from 430 to 552, that on 436 from King Vishamvar-
man requesting diplomatic and military assistance against internal and
external enemies. The kingdom may have been conquered by Taru-
manegara soon after 552. See also “KAN-T’O-LI”. [0538, 0542, 0543]

HONGI (“fleet”) RAIDS. Named for the war canoes, or kora-kora, of east-
ern Indonesia but referring generally to Dutch naval operations in the
17th century to destroy spice plantations in Maluku outside their areas
of control in order to ensure their own monopoly of the lucrative trade.
See also DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY. [0491, 0565]

HORTA, JOSE RAMOS (1949–). Born of a Portuguese father and East

Timorese mother, he went through the colonial school system and became
a journalist in 1969. His reports on the colonial government led to his ex-
ile to Mozambique in 1971. After returning to East Timor Horta became
chief of external affairs and information for Fretilin, traveling to Jakarta
in 1974 and receiving an explicit promise from Foreign Minister Adam
Malik that Indonesia would respect the integrity and independence of
East Timor. In early 1975 he pushed for Fretilin to go into coalition with
União Democrática Timorense (UDT) in the interests of achieving in-
dependence, and in November of that year was a member of a diplomatic
delegation that went to New York to appeal to the United Nations. After
the Indonesian invasion he remained in exile and became East Timor’s
most effective spokesman in the UN and elsewhere and a personal repre-
sentative of Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmão. He was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, together with Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes
178 • HOUTMAN, CORNELIS DE

Belo. When East Timor achieved its independence, he was appointed the
country’s foreign minister.

HOUTMAN, CORNELIS DE (c. 1565–1599). Houtman commanded the

first Dutch commercial expedition to Indonesia in 1595–1597, which
demonstrated the possibility of direct trade with the Indies. He was,
however, authoritarian and tactless and was murdered on orders of the
sultan of Aceh on his second voyage to the Indies. His brother Frederik
(1571–1627) was imprisoned in Aceh for two years and made important
early linguistic and astronomical studies there. Frederik later became the
first governor of Ambon (1605–1611) and governor of Maluku
(1621–1623) and is commemorated by Houtman’s Abrolhos off the West
Australian coast. [0491]

HUMAN RIGHTS. Human rights became an important issue in Indonesia

in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War, when the Western donor na-
tions began to tie human rights standards to the granting of aid. Indone-
sia came under particular pressure at the end of 1991 after the Dili mas-
sacre in East Timor. Indonesian spokesmen, like those of other Asian
nations, stressed the importance of maintaining a balance between indi-
vidual or community rights and the people’s “fundamental right to eco-
nomic and social development.” Meeting in Jakarta in September 1992,
the Non-Aligned Movement declared that disputes over human rights
should be settled in a “spirit of cooperation, not confrontation” while ac-
cepting “in principle” the “universality of human rights.” Indonesia had
joined the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in early 1991,
and in 1993 it established a Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Kom-
nas HAM, National Committee for Human Rights) by presidential de-
cree. Despite its origin, the Komnas HAM has acted as a largely inde-
pendent body, gaining the people’s trust by its effective handling of
several cases of human rights abuses.
In February 1999 the government submitted a Human Rights Act,
which was passed that September, calling for the establishment of a hu-
man rights tribunal. In the aftermath of the massacres in East Timor fol-
lowing the September 1999 referendum, the issue of human rights be-
came inextricably tied to the government’s willingness and ability to try
those responsible for these massacres, particularly from the military. In
November 2000 parliament accepted an Act on Human Rights Tribunals
that stipulated that past human rights abuses could be tried by an ad hoc
tribunal, approved by parliament and the president. Under this act, high-
 IDRUS • 179

ranking officers and civilians could be held responsible for crimes com-
mitted by their subordinates. The maximum sentence was a prison term
of 25 years. In February 2002 international prosecutors indicted 17 pro-
Jakarta militiamen and Indonesian students for crimes against humanity
allegedly committed in East Timor in 1999, including a leader of the
youth wing of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDI-P).
In June the government charged pro-Jakarta militia leader Eurico Guter-
res and six others with crimes against humanity for violence that killed
more than 1,000 people in East Timor during its 1999 independence ref-
erendum. Ten of the Indonesian security officers tried for crimes against
humanity in these killings were acquitted by the Indonesian human rights
court—six of them in August and four more in December 2002. Two
civilians, both from East Timor, were found guilty of related charges.
The military was also opposed to investigations into the Trisakti incident
and the shooting of student protesters in May 1998.
In February 2003 the United Nations indicted General Wiranto, six
other military officers, and a civilian for crimes against humanity during
the independence vote in East Timor in 1999, but the Indonesian gov-
ernment refused to carry out the arrests. The following month a special
human rights court in Jakarta sentenced Brigadier General Noer Muis,
Indonesia’s last commander in East Timor, to five years in jail for not
preventing the attacks. Previously the court had acquitted 12 defendants
and sentenced two lower-ranking officers and two civilians to jail sen-
tences. See also UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH. [0748, 0760]

HUNTING. This was an important source of food for many peoples of the
archipelago, though vegetables, both cultivated and collected, were al-
ways a more important source of protein and starch. In areas of intensive
rice cultivation, the purpose of hunting was principally to protect crops
and human and animal lives, rather than for food. Tigers were hunted for
use in public fights, elephants for ivory, and rhinoceros for their horns
and bezoar stones. Hunting was also a popular sport of the European
community in the late colonial period. See also CONSERVATION,
NATURE.

–I–

IDRUS (1921–1979). Author known especially for his “Surabaya” (1947)

and other short stories of the Japanese occupation and Indonesian
180 • IKATAN CENDEKIAWAN MUSLIM INDONESIA

Revolution, many of which dwell on the brutal and grubby aspects of

the events described. His terse style is reminiscent of the poetry of
Chairil Anwar. [0234]

IKATAN CENDEKIAWAN MUSLIM INDONESIA (ICMI, All Indone-

sia League of Muslim Intellectuals). Founded in December 1990 and
chaired by then minister of research and technology, B. J. Habibie,
ICMI was essentially a body set up by President Suharto to maintain his
control over the political system and to press his development and fi-
nancial policies that were being opposed by the technocrats on whom he
had previously relied. But despite the fact that its major officeholders
were presidential appointees and that it was backed by the Suharto gov-
ernment, ICMI attracted several opposition Muslim leaders, including
Sri Bintang Pamungkas, though not Abdurrachman Wahid, Deliar
Noer, or Ridwan Saidi, who accused it of being merely a vehicle for the
president’s reelection and of being used by Habibie for his own political
ambitions and by the government to co-opt Islam. Its supporters, how-
ever, contended that the organization strengthened the Islamic devotion
of the middle class and government officials. It established a think tank,
the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), in
September 1992 (with prominent liberal Islamic intellectuals Adi Sasono
and Dewi Fortuna Anwar on its steering committee), which embraced
human rights issues and became a major competitor to the other long-
time think tank established in the 1960s by Ali Murtopo, the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which was accused of be-
ing dominated by Catholics. [1030, 1033, 1328]

IKATAN PENDUKUNG KEMERDEKAAN INDONESIA (IPKI,

League of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence). Political party
formed in May 1954 by supporters of A. H. Nasution, who attributed the
country’s postindependence malaise to selfish politicians. They called
themselves a movement, rather than a party, and were strongest in West
Java, where Nasution’s old Siliwangi Division was based, though they
obtained only 1.4 percent in the 1955 elections. Initially in favor of
Guided Democracy, which they saw as a way of ending party politics,
they turned against it when it appeared that Sukarno intended to leave
them out of his Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat—Gotong Royong (DPR-
GR). Some branches joined the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and were
banned, but the party survived Guided Democracy to be merged in 1973
into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). [0695, 0714, 0872]
 INDIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH • 181

IMAM BONJOL, TUANKU (1772–1864). A second-generation Mi-

nangkabau religious leader (tuanku) of the Paderi movement, which
spread reformist Islam through central Sumatra. After remnants of the
anti-Paderi aristocracy asked for Dutch help and transferred the region
to Dutch sovereignty in exchange, Imam Bonjol became the major mili-
tary leader resisting the Dutch in the so-called Paderi War (1821–1834).
He was captured by the Dutch in 1834, shortly after the fall of his strong-
hold at Bonjol in the Minangkabu highlands and was exiled first to West
Java and Ambon and finally (in 1841) to Manado. [0791]

INDEPENDENCE, DECLARATION OF. Indonesia’s declaration of in-

dependence was made by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta in the
grounds of Pegangsaan Timur 56 in Jakarta, on the morning of 17 Au-
gust 1945. Within a more extensive statement, the independence text
read: “We the Indonesian people hereby proclaim the independence of In-
donesia. All matters concerning the transfer of power etc. will be carried
out in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time. In the name of
the Indonesian people, Sukarno-Hatta.” Since 1945, 17 August has been
celebrated as independence day and has been the occasion for a major
speech by the president. See also SUCCESSION. [0643, 0662, 0663]

INDIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Indian civilization fused with in-

digenous cultural traditions to produce a distinctive Southeast Asian
Hindu-Buddhist civilization that, in various forms, dominated the archi-
pelago as far east as the coast of New Guinea from the fifth century un-
til the arrival of Islam. The principal historical sources for studying this
process of “Indianization” or “Hinduization” are Sanskritic inscriptions
found in various parts of the archipelago (see TARUMANEGARA),
archeological discoveries of Indian trade goods, and the accounts of
Chinese travelers, none of which have been adequate to demonstrate the
nature or extent of the process. Historians have been unable to agree on
whether the primary initiative for the spread of Indian culture came from
Indians or Indonesians, whether it was Indonesian rulers who sent traders
to the ports of India and summoned Hindu priests to their courts to pro-
vide details of Hindu ritual for royal glorification, or whether missionary,
commercial, and imperial motives brought Indians themselves to the ar-
chipelago. It now appears likely that all these processes played a role,
though the movement was more one of ideas than of people. Trade be-
tween the archipelago and India began in the first or second century
A.D., but there is no evidence of major Indian settlement in the region,
182 • INDIA, RELATIONS WITH

and the 11th-century raids of the Cholas on Srivijaya were the only sig-
nificant military excursions across the Bay of Bengal.
It is clear, nonetheless, that most influence was exercised by Brah-
mans (most Sanskrit vocabulary in Indonesian languages is religious,
and there is no sign of an Indian-influenced traders’ pidgin), while the
courts of local rulers were the major channel for Indian influence. The
growth of trade with India and China from early in the Christian era
must have significantly changed that distribution of power and wealth in
local societies. Rulers saw in Hindu-Buddhist cosmology a means of ex-
alting their own positions (see KEDIRI; MATARAM; SAILEN-
DRAS). As adopted in Indonesia, Hinduism and Buddhism argued for
an analogy between the state and the cosmos, the ruler analogous to the
supreme god, and often a temporary incarnation (avatar) of a Hindu de-
ity. From this followed the construction of palaces (kraton) that physi-
cally resembled the cosmos and the entrenchment of the ruler’s right to
demand corvée labor from his subjects. Scholars have differed over the
extent to which Indian cultural influence reached beyond the court. J. C.
Van Leur argued that it was never more than a “thin and flaking glaze”
over powerful indigenous traditions, but more recent scholars have held
that influence went rather deeper and that “culturally Southeast Asia be-
came nearly as ‘Indian’ as parts of India” (I. W. Mabbett). (See also
MEGALITHS.)
Hindu-Buddhist Indonesia maintained close cultural contact with India,
especially through the Buddhist monastery at Nalanda in Bihar, where a
Sailendra ruler of Java helped to endow a monastery and which received
many pilgrims from Srivijaya. The use of the zero, though an Indian in-
vention, is recorded earlier in Java (732) than in India itself (870).
The early Indonesian nationalist movement was inspired to some ex-
tent by the successes of the older Indian movement. Partai Indonesia
(Partindo) in particular adopted the principle of swadeshi (use of locally
made products) at its foundation in 1931, and a few figures were im-
pressed by Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence, but on the whole direct
influence was sparse. See also MAHABHARATA; RAMAYANA;
WRITING SYSTEMS. [0518, 0521, 0539, 0540, 0543, 0544]

INDIA, RELATIONS WITH. When Indonesia declared independence in

1945, India was still a British colony, but large areas of government had
been devolved to Indians and full independence was in the offing. Jawa-
harlal Nehru’s insistence that the Indian troops, who formed a large per-
centage of the British forces sent to accept the Japanese surrender,
 INDIË VERLOREN, RAMPSPOED GEBOREN • 183

should not be used to suppress an Asian nationalist movement was one

of the factors leading Britain to attempt to balance Dutch and Indone-
sian interests in 1945 and 1946, and India later assisted Indonesia with
supplies of cloth (in exchange for rice) and with diplomatic support. In
1948–1949, shortly before the so-called second “Police Action,” Nehru
unsuccessfully attempted to send in a plane to evacuate Sukarno and
Mohammad Hatta from Yogyakarta, and India, together with other
Asian states, later hampered the Dutch military effort by denying them
overflight rights. In March–April 1949 India invited Indonesian dele-
gates to the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi. The two countries
signed a treaty of “perpetual peace and unalterable friendship” on 3
March 1951, and Sukarno was, with Nehru, a prominent figure in the
Non-Aligned Movement. The two countries drifted apart, however, in
the closing years of Sukarno’s tenure as Indonesia grew closer to China
in the early 1960s, and relations became even more distant under
Suharto when Indonesia aligned more closely with the Western powers.
See also FOREIGN POLICY. [0661, 1104]

INDIË VERLOREN, RAMPSPOED GEBOREN (“The Indies lost, disas-

ter follows”). Title of a 1914 pamphlet by C. G. S. Sandberg, deploring
the gradual constitutional separation of the Netherlands Indies from the
Netherlands (see NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELA-
TIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA) but taken up later as a slogan, espe-
cially during the Indonesian Revolution, by those in the Netherlands
who believed that Dutch prosperity depended on continuing colonial
rule of Indonesia. They pointed especially to the return on Dutch invest-
ments in Indonesia, to Dutch markets there, and to the supply of materi-
als for Dutch industry, as well as to the calculations of 1938 that the
colonies contributed 13.7 percent of Dutch national income, arguments
that reinforced the nationalist view that Dutch rule was the source of In-
donesia’s major problems. The example of the Cultivation System,
which had rescued the Dutch economy after 1830, was certainly influ-
ential here. A subsidiary argument was that possession of Indonesia gave
the Netherlands world power status and that without it they would be re-
duced to “the rank of Denmark.” Recent scholars have shown, however,
that Dutch investment in Indonesia at the close of the colonial period (40
percent of the country’s external investment) was lower in proportion
than that of Britain in its empire (50 percent), and that returns on that in-
vestment were modest (3.9 percent in 1938). After 1945, a powerful
counterargument to the rampspoed geboren proposition was the likely
184 • INDIGO

enormous cost of postwar reconstruction, though this argument was not

widely made. See also BATIG SLOT; “EERESCHULD, EEN.” [0589]

INDIGO (Indigofera spp., Fabaceae). Dye plant introduced to Indonesia

from the Middle East and widely found in the archipelago by the 17th
century. It was traded from Java to China in the 18th century. Produc-
tion declined after the late 19th century with the development of German
aniline dyes. [0331, 0332]

INDISCHE PARTIJ (Indies Party). Founded in 1911 by the Eurasian E. F.

E. Douwes Dekker (1880–1950), the party initially reflected a growing
feeling in parts of the Indo-European community that their primary ties
were with Indonesia rather than the Netherlands. It was, however, soon
joined by the Javanese intellectuals Suwardi Suryaningrat and Tjipto
Mangoenkoesoemo and became one of the first political organizations
explicitly to transcend ethnic, religious, and regional divisions within the
colony and to call for the independence of the Indies (“Indië los van Hol-
land”) from Dutch rule. The party collapsed in 1913 after the government
refused it official recognition and sent its leaders into exile, though a few
members continued party activities, first in the Nationale Indische Partij
(1918) and from 1937 under the name Insulinde. Douwes Dekker was in-
terned by the Indies government in 1941 and exiled to Surinam. He re-
turned to Indonesia in 1946, joining the Republic and taking the name
Danudirja Setiabudi. See also NATIONALISM. [0887]

INDISCHE SOCIAAL-DEMOCRATISCHE VEREENIGING (ISDV,

Indies Social Democratic Association). Founded in May 1914 by Henk
Sneevliet (1883–1942) and others as the first Marxist organization in In-
donesia. Initially European in its membership and orientation, it soon be-
gan recruiting Indonesians, including Semaun, Tan Malaka, and Alimin
Prawirodirdjo. Sneevliet was sent into exile in December 1918, and on
27 May 1920 the association transformed itself into the Perserikatan Ko-
munis di Hindia (Communist Association of the Indies), later the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI). [0621]

INDO-EUROPEANS. During the first two centuries of the Dutch pres-

ence in Indonesia, few European women reached the colony and through
concubinage and casual liaisons between European men and Indonesian
women there emerged a large community of people of mixed descent,
many with official European status (see RACE). The extent to which
 INDONESIA • 185

such people were socially accepted as equal to other Europeans varied

from time to time (see DUTCH IN INDONESIA), but with the arrival
of large numbers of European women in the 20th century, the mixed race
group became increasingly sharply demarcated as a distinct social group,
called Indo-Europeans (with the derogatory abbreviation “Indo”), occu-
pying subaltern positions in society as clerks, petty officials, and NCOs.
Nevertheless, if legally recognized by their fathers, the offspring of
Dutch men and Indies women were officially classified as “European.”
This European status excluded them from the purchase of land (see
AGRARIAN LAW OF 1870), though in 1904 the government began to
lease small plots to individuals for gardens.
This separation, accompanied by increasing racial discrimination, led
to two divergent tendencies: on the one hand, Indo-Europeans came to
see Indonesia as their primary home and to downplay the connection
with the Netherlands; the Indische Partij was at first a strong sign of
this. On the other hand, especially with the growth of Indonesian na-
tionalism, many Indo-Europeans became worried by the threat to their
still-privileged position in relation to Indonesians, and they became
strong supporters of the colonial order. The Indo-Europese Verbond
(IEV, Indo-European Association), founded in 1919, sought to defend
Indo-European interests in the Volksraad and argued for economic as-
sistance and social emancipation. Among the Dutch motives for retain-
ing the province of Irian (Papua) after 1949 was as a possible place of
settlement for displaced Indo-Europeans, and about 6,000 went there in
a largely unsuccessful settlement scheme.
About 100,000 Indo-Europeans left Indonesia for Holland shortly af-
ter independence, only a little over 10 percent taking Indonesian citizen-
ship at once, partly because they were subject to similar restrictive regu-
lations as Chinese Indonesian citizens. In 1951, the IEV became the
Gabungan Indo Untuk Kesatuan Indonesia (GIKI, Indo Association for
Indonesian Unity) and restricted its membership to citizens. There was a
further exodus of Indo-Europeans during the West New Guinea dispute
in 1957–1958 when the Indonesian government repatriated all nonessen-
tial Dutch nationals to the Netherlands. Indo-Europeans made up a large
portion of the 35,000 Dutch citizens who reached the Netherlands by
September 1958. [0480, 0584, 0608, 0639, 1046]

INDONESIA (from Greek indos, India, and nesos, island). The fixing of a
clear terminology for the region now called Indonesia has been bedev-
iled by changing political realities and changing understandings of the
186 • “INDONESIA RAYA”

cultural and biological character of the region. Southeast Asia (itself a

relatively recent term) was once referred to commonly as Further India,
the East Indies (Oost Indië in Dutch), the Indian or Malay Archipelago,
or simply the Indies, in recognition of the Indian cultural influences
there. The Dutch possessions were thus simply called Netherlands India,
the Netherlands Indies, or occasionally Tropical Netherlands. Attempts,
mainly by anthropologists, to differentiate the predominantly Malay,
Muslim world of island Southeast Asia from the Buddhist realms of the
mainland led to the coining of the words Malesia, Insulinde, Nusantara,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, the latter being initially used by a British an-
thropologist, J. R. Logan, in 1850, in analogy with Polynesia, and popu-
larized by the German anthropologist Adolf Bastian in his book Indone-
sien (1884). The Malay term for the region was at first simply Hindia
Timur (East India), but in 1917 Indonesians in the Netherlands formed
the Indonesisch Verbond van Studeerenden (Indonesian Students Soci-
ety) and in 1922 the Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) in the
Netherlands adopted the name Indonesische Vereeniging, or Perhim-
punan Indonesia. In 1928 the nationalist movement formally adopted
the name Indonesia to designate the future nation, its citizens, and its
language. This was long rejected by the Dutch as implying a false unity
of the colony’s ethnic groups, but in their 1948 constitution, the Dutch
formally adopted the term Indonesië for the colony.

“INDONESIA RAYA.” Indonesia’s national anthem, composed in 1928

by Wage Rudolf Supratman (1903–1938) for the All-Indonesia Youth
Congress. See also MUSIC; YOUTH PLEDGE.

INDONESIAN AIRWAYS. Commercial airline established in Burma in

late 1948 to obtain funds for Republican representatives abroad during
the latter part of the Revolution. It operated first with a single Dakota
and flew primarily under contract for the government of Burma. Wiweko
Suparno was managing director. See also GARUDA.

INDONESIAN LANGUAGE (Bahasa Indonesia). The national language,

derived from Malay, the language of the coastal regions of eastern
Sumatra, the Riau archipelago, and the Malay Peninsula (see also
LANGUAGES). From the 17th century, Malay became increasingly the
lingua franca of the archipelago, and it was adopted by the Dutch East
Indies Company (which called it Maleis, Malay) in its dealings with in-
digenous authorities. The Balai Pustaka was influential in promoting
 INDONESIANIZATION • 187

Malay as a literary language. Malay was preferred by nationalists over

Javanese especially because it was not associated with any major ethnic
group and because it has no formal levels of speech as does Javanese,
which was thus considered to be a “feudal” language. On 28 October
1928 a nationalist youth congress adopted it as the national language (see
YOUTH PLEDGE). Use of Indonesian for administrative purposes in-
creased during the Japanese occupation when the use of Dutch was
banned. Although spelling authorities have tried to reduce the influence
of European languages on Indonesian vocabulary (see ETYMOLOGY),
European influence on Indonesian syntax has been strong, for instance in
the use of prefixes such as pra- (pre-) and tuna- (without) and the use of
dari (Dutch, van) to mean “of.”
A spelling system for Indonesian was formalized by Ch. A. van
Ophuijsen in 1901, but this was altered after independence, first by the
substitution of u for oe (introduced by Suwandi in 1947) and then by a
more extensive set of changes under an Indonesian-Malaysian Lan-
guage Agreement signed in August 1973, which provides for the har-
monization of the two countries’ versions of Malay. The 1973 spelling,
known as ejaan yang disempurnakan (EYD, perfected spelling),
changed tj to c, dj to j, j to y, and ch to kh, and it removed the distinc-
tion between e and é. Vocabulary and grammatical change in Indone-
sian are rapid, and the two versions of the language remain distinct. An
earlier agreement to harmonize the two languages, Melindo, reached in
1959, was never implemented because of Confrontation. See also
MALAYSIA, RELATIONS WITH. [0262, 0267, 0271, 0275, 0277,
0280, 0281]

INDONESIANIZATION. General term applied to programs of Indone-

sian governments in the 1950s to place a greater share of the economy
in the hands of Indonesian (by which was generally meant pribumi) busi-
nessmen. It was in many ways a continuation of the philosophy of the
colonial Liberal and Ethical Policies, under which government sought
to create a conducive environment for economic activity without being a
major entrepreneur itself. The Benteng (Fortress) program, begun in
1950, aimed to help indigenous businessmen accumulate capital by giv-
ing them privileged access to lucrative import licenses. In practice, how-
ever, much of the money and most of the licenses went to political and
bureaucratic associates of the government or to Ali-Baba firms. In 1951
an Economic Urgency Program, formulated by Sumitro Djojo-
hadikusumo, aimed at using state funds to set up viable enterprises for
188 • INDRAPURA

later transfer to cooperatives or private ownership. From 1956 these pro-

grams were abandoned, and Indonesianization began to be replaced by a
program of direct state intervention in the economy and regulation of in-
digenous business. See also GUIDED ECONOMY; NATIONALIZA-
TION; STATE ENTERPRISES. [0315, 0313]

INDRAPURA. It emerged as a sultanate on the southern edge of the Mi-

nangkabau realm in the early 16th century, after the fall of Melaka to
the Portuguese diverted Muslim traders to the western coast of Suma-
tra. A major exporter of pepper, Indrapura was conquered by the
Acehnese forces of Iskandar Muda in 1633. With the decline of
Acehnese power, it rose again but was wracked by disputes between the
sultans and regional lords, in which the Dutch and British East Indies
Company became heavily involved. Sultan Muhammad Syah was
forced to abdicate in 1696, and thereafter Indrapura was under Dutch
domination. [0564]

INDUSTRIALIZATION. For most of the colonial period, Indonesia was

for the Netherlands primarily a market and a source of raw materials, and
local industrialization was not encouraged. This policy was reversed dur-
ing World War I when it was realized how vulnerable dependence on
manufactured imports had made the colony; under the Ethical Policy,
too, the colonial government wished to provide more employment op-
portunities for the growing population. In 1915 a Commissie tot Ont-
wikkeling van de Fabrieksnijverheid in Nederlandsch-Indië (Commis-
sion for the Development of Industry in the Netherlands Indies) was
formed to encourage industrial development; its major but modest
achievement was a paper factory in Bandung established in 1923.
After independence, import substitution industrialization became a
strong element in economic policy. With the coming of the New Order,
investment, especially foreign investment, was seen as the major tool
for growth of the capitalist economy. Industrial activity was centered in
and around the major urban centers, especially in Java, and the factories
attracted large numbers of workers from the rural areas. The factories
stimulated a parallel growth of service industries for their labor forces.
In the mid-1970s, the government began an aggressive program to pro-
mote high-technology industralization, under the direction of B. J. Habi-
bie. There was an influx of new technologies from abroad, and large-
scale capital-intensive investments stimulated industrialization in fields
from military hardware to electronics. Between 1965 and 1995, indus-
 INLANDSCH BESTUUR • 189

trial output expanded rapidly from 13 percent to 42 percent of Indone-

sia’s gross domestic product (GDP). After 1985 there was a striking in-
crease in manufactured exports, which between 1985 and 1991 grew at
an annual rate of 30 percent. Although initially many of the industries
contributing to this expansion were based on the processing of petroleum
(see OIL) and natural gas, by 1995 these two activities accounted for less
than one tenth of total manufacturing output. They were replaced by such
industries as automobile, garment, footwear, and electronic manufactur-
ers. Plywood constituted an ever-larger proportion of Indonesia’s export
production (see FORESTRY). Mining accounted for less than 7 percent
of GDP growth during the period. During these years, Java’s share of
manufacturing output and employment declined steadily. See also AIR-
CRAFT INDUSTRY; BADAN PERENCANAAN PEMBANGUNAN
NASIONAL; IRON; RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN.
[0295, 0353, 0409, 0417, 0479, 0730]

“INLANDER” (“native”). The legal category into which all indigenous

subjects of the Netherlands Indies were placed. Though this was a sub-
ordinate category, with distinctly fewer privileges than that of the Euro-
peans, the shared status it gave contributed to the development of an In-
donesian identity. See also LAW; NATIONALISM; RACE.

INLANDSCH BESTUUR (“Native Administration”). In the directly ruled

territories of Java and Madura, the colonial administration (Binnen-
landsch Bestuur) was divided into distinct European and native (inland-
sch) corps. This situation arose out of the manner of Dutch expansion on
Java, in which the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) took over the
fealty of bupati from the rulers of Mataram, but the system was pre-
served after the reforms of Herman Willem Daendels and Thomas
Stamford Raffles so that colonial officials dealing directly with the In-
donesian population would as far as possible be drawn from the tradi-
tional elites and would thus enjoy greater authority. The Inlandsch
Bestuur, accordingly, was not subject to the same demands for expertise
and competence as the Europeesch (European) Bestuur.
Its precise role in successive eras, however, varied considerably. Both
Daendels and Raffles introduced administrative reforms to bypass the In-
landsch Bestuur for the sake of more efficient government. In the early
19th century, on the other hand, the Dutch reemphasized the traditional
authority, especially of the bupati, encouraging them to assume the sta-
tus of minor royalty (the correspondence of Raden Ajeng Kartini,
190 • INPRES

daughter of a bupati, was published as Letters of a Javanese Princess)

and generally ignoring their abuses of power (see MAX HAVELAAR).
From 1870 the Dutch placed greater emphasis on developing the admin-
istrative and technical expertise of the Inlandsch Bestuur. The most sen-
ior rank in it was the bupati. His deputy was normally the patih and he
presided over a hierarchy of regional officials: the wedana, camat, and,
at the head of the village or desa, the lurah.
In the directly ruled territories outside Java and Madura, no uniform
system was in force, though in general the colonial government sought
to preserve the so-called Inlandsche gemeenten (native communities) as
the basic unit of government. In many parts of Sumatra, the colonial
government installed demang and assistant-demang as regional links be-
tween the European and traditional governments. In Java and elsewhere,
the participation of the Inlandsch Bestuur in Dutch rule was often re-
sented, and there were violent social revolutions against it in many areas
at the start of the Revolution. See also PAMONG PRAJA; PRIYAYI;
TIGA DAERAH. [0479, 0636, 0638]

INPRES (Instruksi Presiden). Annual development funds granted by pres-

idential authority under the Suharto government to provincial and lower
levels of administration to finance such activities as schools, meeting
halls, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure. [0397, 0730]

INSULINDE (from Latin insula, island, Inde, India). Poetic term for the
Indonesian archipelago, coined by Multatuli in Max Havelaar in 1860.
The name was adopted in 1913 for remnants of the Indische Partij and
was displaced in poetic usage (except in French) by Nusantara. See also
INDONESIA. [0887]

INSULTING THE HEAD OF STATE. See PRESIDENT, POSITION OF;

SUBVERSION.

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. The Republic’s first postindependence in-

telligence agency, Badan Istimewa (Special Agency), was headed by
Zulkifli Lubis, who had received intelligence training from the Japan-
ese during their occupation. In early 1946 its name was changed to
Badan Rahasia Negara Indonesia (BRANI, Indonesian State Secret
Agency), which had a Field Preparation (FP) training unit.
After the transfer of sovereignty, the intelligence section of the Min-
istry of Defense (Intelijen Kementerian Pertahanan, IKP) was still
 INTELLIGENCE SERVICES • 191

headed by Lubis, and he established the Armed Forces Information Bu-

reau (Biro Informasi Angkatan Perang, Bisap) to prepare strategic infor-
mation for defense and military leaders. Later in the 1950s, when inter-
nal struggles within the armed forces compelled Lubis to flee to join the
regional PRRI/Permesta rebellion, IKP lost its influence. Under
Guided Democracy, Subandrio was put in charge of the Central Bureau
of Intelligence (Badan Pusat Intelijen, BPI), which claimed authority
over intelligence units of the three services, the police, the prosecutor’s
office, and Hankam (Ministry of Defense and Security).
Another intelligence organization, Operasi Khusus (Opsus), had
been formed in 1961. It was headed by Ali Murtopo and Soedjono Hoe-
mardani (1919–1986), and was used to establish covert contacts with the
Malaysian government during Confrontation. Opsus later helped ensure
progovernment votes in the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” in West Irian
(Papua) and in Indonesia’s general elections in 1971 and after. It was
also believed responsible for the political party manipulation in the af-
termath of these elections, whereby the political party opponents of the
Golkar were reduced to only the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP) and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). In 1974 competition
between the heads of the three intelligence services—Ali Murtopo;
Soemitro, head of Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan
Ketertiban (Kopkamtib); and Sutopo Juwono (1927–), chief of Badan
Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin, State Intelligence Coordinating
Agency)—came to a head. That same year, Benny Murdani was trans-
ferred to Hankam and began to take over control of much of Indonesia’s
intelligence operations when he became intelligence assistant to armed
forces headquarters and in 1977 was also appointed chief of Pusat In-
telijen Strategis (Pusintelstrat, Center for Strategic Intelligence). In addi-
tion, in the early 1980s, Murdani became deputy chief of Bakin and chief
of Kopkamtib intelligence task force. In 1983 Pusintelstrat became
Badan Intelijen Strategis (Bais, Body for Strategic Intelligence), which
Benny continued to head after being appointed armed forces commander.
Kopkamtib affairs were gradually handed over to Bais. The first two Bais
operations were Petrus (pembunuhan/penembakan misterius, mysteri-
ous killings) and Operasi Woyla, the freeing of the hijacked Garuda air-
liner in March 1981.
In January 1994, Bais was replaced by Badan Intelijen ABRI (BIA,
Armed Forces’ Intelligence Body) under ABRI chief of staff for govern-
mental affairs, Lieutenant General H. L. Mantiri. This change was a re-
sult of Suharto’s attempts to dismantle Murdani’s personal networks and
192 • INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP ON INDONESIA

undermine any autonomous military powers outside the president’s con-

trol; but the intelligence body eventually reverted to its old name, and af-
ter the fall of Abdurrachman Wahid in 2001 it was again strengthened.
When the police were separated from the military in 1999–2001, Bakin
was reorganized, assuming the name Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN, State
Intelligence Agency), with police intelligence as its operational arm.
The importance of the intelligence services increased in 2001–2002,
as the United States and other countries pressured Indonesia to more ac-
tively pursue groups suspected of being tied to the al Qaeda organization.
After the October 2002 bombings in Bali President Megawati
Sukarnoputri appointed BIN as the sole coordinator for all intelligence
activities in the country, and assigned its director, Hendro Priyono, to
lead the bombing investigation under the antiterrorism legislation
adopted on 18 October 2002. In early 2004 Hendro Priyono disclosed
plans to establish BIN branches at the provincial, district and municipal
levels throughout the country. See also POLITIEK INLICHTINGEN DI-
ENST (PID); SUBVERSION [0731, 0972]

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL GROUP ON INDONESIA (IGGI). Estab-

lished in 1967 as a forum for discussion of the socioeconomic conditions
in Indonesia and the coordination of foreign economic aid. The Nether-
lands chaired the organization, which also included Australia, Britain,
France, Japan, the United States, Austria, Belgium, Canada, West
Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland, along with the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development
Bank, and the United Nations Development Program. In the early years
of the New Order, the IGGI had great influence on Indonesia’s economic
policies, emphasizing the rehabilitation of infrastructure, currency stabi-
lization, guarantees for foreign investment, and limits on the role of the
state in the economy. The IGGI provided 60 percent of Indonesia’s de-
velopment budget under the first five-year plan. In 1989 Indonesia re-
ceived US$4 billion in aid via the IGGI, of which $1.4 billion was pro-
vided by Japan. An International Non-Governmental Group on Indonesia
(INGI, also Inter-NGO Conference on IGGI Matters) was formed in Am-
sterdam in 1985 to discuss issues raised at the annual IGGI meeting and
to marshal alternative information to influence IGGI decision making.
When the Dutch suspended aid to Indonesia in the aftermath of the
Dili massacre in East Timor, Suharto responded by disbanding the
IGGI. A new aid group, the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI),
which was headed by the World Bank, replaced it. The consortium’s
 INVESTMENT, FOREIGN • 193

yearly commitment to supporting Indonesia’s economy was some $5 bil-

lion by the mid-1990s. See also BADAN PERENCANAAN PEMBAN-
GUNAN NASIONAL; RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN.
[0295, 0371, 0748, 0896, 1136]

INTERNATIONAL DEBT. See DEBT, INTERNATIONAL.

INVESTMENT, FOREIGN. This primarily denotes the employment of

foreign capital in productive operations such as plantations and factories.
Direct foreign capital investment remained at a low level for much of the
colonial period. The colony was opened to European private enterprise
in the 1870s under the so-called Liberal Policy, but most capital was
generated locally by the reinvestment of profits rather than by imports.
Only after the sugar crisis of 1884 and during the 1890s and 1900s,
when many estates contracted debenture loans, did significant capital
transfer take place (see also BATIG SLOT). Few restrictions, however,
were placed on foreign investment in colonial times, partly because the
Netherlands wished to involve the great powers, especially Britain and
the United States, in the defense of the colony.
During the Japanese occupation, existing enterprises were first taken
over by the occupation authorities and then parceled out both to govern-
ment departments in lieu of taxation revenue and to Japanese private
companies, but there was no significant introduction of capital. At the
start of the Indonesian Revolution, the Republic issued a Political Man-
ifesto guaranteeing the security of foreign investments, partly to facili-
tate an agreement with the Dutch and partly to reassure the United States
and Britain. The final settlement between the Republic and the Dutch in
1949 provided for protection of foreign investments against national-
ization and excessive taxation, but many foreign firms, such as the
Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM), found their economic
room to maneuver heavily constricted by foreign exchange and labor
regulations, and began to disinvest. The nationalization of Dutch invest-
ments in 1957 further discouraged foreign investment, as did the seizure
of some British and American interests in 1963. Under Guided Democ-
racy, a number of production-sharing agreements were concluded, espe-
cially with Japanese companies, for production of oil, tin, and timber.
Restoration of a favorable climate for foreign investment was a major
part of New Order economic policies from 1966 (see BADAN PEREN-
CANAAN PEMBANGUNAN NASIONAL), and a law on Foreign In-
vestment Capital (Penanaman Modal Asing) was passed in January 1967,
194 • INVESTMENT, FOREIGN

giving a renewed guarantee against nationalization, a three-year tax holi-

day, freedom to repatriate profits, full authority to select management,
and some exemption from import duties to foreign firms willing to invest
in the country. Japan became the largest foreign investor, with virtually
all its investments in such industries as textiles, machinery, printing,
banking, transportation, and automobiles being in Java while its proj-
ects in the outer islands centered on such sectors as agriculture, fishing,
mining, and logging (see FORESTRY). Freeport from the United
States and Inco from Canada soon arrived to mine copper in Papua and
dig nickel in Sulawesi. These two firms remained the largest individual
investors (other than in the oil and gas industry) in 1996.
Total foreign investment had reached a value of US$4.72 billion in
1989, but at that time foreign investment was restricted by more stringent
conditions than in some other Asian countries. This changed in March
1992 when the government announced that investors could start up enter-
prises under their full control, with a few limitations, especially with re-
spect to minimum size. In June 1994 it virtually eliminated the require-
ment to divest so that foreigners could not only own 100 percent of a
company from the start but could also retain 99 percent over time. As a re-
sult there was a new influx of foreign investment proposals and approvals.
In the post-Suharto period, the situation changed again as the power
of labor unions increased, and they succeeded in obtaining better condi-
tions for workers and establishing and raising the minimum wage. In re-
sponse, foreign corporations began to shift their businesses to other
Asian countries with fewer worker protections. The footwear industry
was especially hard hit, with such companies as Nike severely cutting
back their presence in the country. Reluctance of foreign countries to in-
vest in Indonesia was exacerbated by the growing ethnic and religious vi-
olence and by uncertainty over the effect of decentralization on foreign
operations in Indonesia. This affected in particular the mining industry,
with total investment in it falling from US$9.15 billion in 2000 to
US$4.13 billion in 2001.
Total foreign investment fell from an approved US$34 billion in 1997
to US$9 billion in 2001 and plunged a further 39 percent in the first eight
months of 2002, compared with the same period in 2001, to US$3.5 bil-
lion. After the Bali bombings of October 2002 the situation deteriorated
even further, with Sony, for example, announcing in late November that
it would close an audio equipment factory in West Java (reportedly trans-
ferring it to Malaysia), while Japanese investment was totaling about
US$380 million for 2002 (only 7 percent of 1997 levels). One exception
 ISKANDAR MUDA • 195

was China, which began to invest on a large scale in developing the

Tanggung gas field in Papua and pledged investment of more than US$2
billion, including an accord for construction of a gas line between Kali-
mantan and Java and a projected bridge between Java and Madura.
[0409, 0730, 1147]

IRIAN. The word Irian, derived from a Biak phrase meaning “shimmering
land,” can be used for the whole of the island of New Guinea or, up to
2001, for its western, Indonesian portion, covering the province of
Papua, formerly Irian Jaya (“Victorious Irian”), the territory of West
New Guinea under the Dutch.

IRON. Traditionally imported from China and the Ryukyus and mined and
locally smelted in West Sumatra, West Kalimantan, Bangka, Belitung,
and Central Sulawesi, iron was used for the manufacture of agricultural
and fishing tools, household goods, and weapons. Iron exports may have
been the basis of the economy of Luwu in Sulawesi. It was exported from
Kalimantan and Sulawesi to Majapahit in the 14th century, but from the
late 18th century imports from outside the archipelago dominated the
market. Dutch plans for a steel industry in Central Sulawesi in 1917 were
abandoned, though a small-scale industry was established in the Banjar-
masin area in the 1920s. See also INDUSTRIALIZATION. [0576, 1272]

ISKANDAR MUDA (c. 1581–1636). Iskandar Muda came to power as

sultan of Aceh in circa 1607 and, like his contemporary Sultan Agung
on Java, launched a campaign of military expansion, using a navy of
heavy galleys and an army that included corps of elephants and Persian
horses as well as artillery. He briefly conquered Riau in 1613 and pushed
Acehnese control far down the east and west coasts of Sumatra. His
only major defeat was the destruction of several hundred ships in an
abortive attempt to seize Melaka from the Portuguese in 1629. Iskandar
Muda’s military power was based on his success in controlling the pep-
per trade, which he centralized in the capital Kutaraja (now Banda
Aceh), but he always had difficulty controlling the hinterland, where his
rule was based on an uncertain alliance with regional war leaders or
uleëbalang. He seems to have kept his courtiers in a state of fear through
frequent purges—he had his own son killed—but his court became a cen-
ter of learning, patronizing for instance the poetry of Hamzah Fansuri.
The experience of Iskandar Muda’s rule, however, led the Acehnese elite
after his death to prefer a line of more pliable queens as rulers. [0484]
196 • ISLAM IN INDONESIA

ISLAM IN INDONESIA. The roots of Islam in Indonesia go back to at

least the 11th century, but extensive conversion did not begin until the
14th century when the Sumatran port city of Pasai converted, followed
by Melaka on the Malay Peninsula in the 15th century; Aceh, Banten,
and the Java Pasisir in the 16th century; and Makassar, Minangkabau,
and Central Java in the 17th century. The reasons for conversion are
complex, varied, and not wholly clear, though trading contacts usually
formed an integral part. Muslim authorities stress the missionary ele-
ment, especially the role of the so-called Nine Walis (Wali Songo) on
Java (see also CHINESE IN INDONESIA). Islam first attracted size-
able numbers of Indonesians in the form of Sufism, whose mystical ele-
ments fitted easily with the existing blend of Hinduism, Buddhism, and
traditional religion on Java. Political and economic factors, however,
also seem to have been important. The fall of the sultanate of Melaka dis-
persed Muslims to other parts of the archipelago. Especially under threat
from the Portuguese, rulers found that conversion to Islam brought valu-
able alliances; there is no evidence of Islamic revolutions from below
playing any role in the conversion of states. Several kingdoms, such as
Pontianak, were founded as Muslim states; in others, such as Aceh and
Minangkabau, Muslim hegemony was established or strengthened at var-
ious times by civil war. Perhaps more important, Islamic commercial law
provided a sounder framework for conducting trade than did traditional
and Hinduistic law, while individual traders found that conversion made
them part of an extensive trading diaspora within which they could more
easily obtain credit, information, and other facilities; they perhaps also
found that it released them from otherwise costly community responsi-
bilities that made capital accumulation difficult. Those who had made the
haj to Mecca were often well placed to use contacts made there to com-
mercial advantage, and in parts of Java the word haji became more or
less synonymous with “wealthy trader.”
The term “Islamic traditionalism” is generally applied to followers of
the four traditional schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Although sultans
were the protectors of religion, religious authority lay with Islamic
scholars, called ulama and kyai, who devoted their lives to studying not
just the Qur’an and Hadiths but also the enormous body of supplemen-
tary literature, and to teaching in Islamic schools, called pesantren or
surau. Indigenous traditional law (adat) in many cases became entwined
with this corpus of religious and legal doctrine, so that pious Islamic ob-
servance was often combined with acceptance of customs not recognized
in the Islam of the Middle East, such as the matriliny of the Minangk-
 ISLAM IN INDONESIA • 197

abau. Within this category are various groups influenced by successive

waves of Islamic reformism, especially Wahhabism.
From the early 20th century, Islamic traditionalism was challenged by
the rise of Islamic modernism. In religion, modernism asserted the pri-
macy of the Qur’an and Hadiths and the need for direct individual study
of these texts. The modernists also emphasized the importance of the
community (ummat) of believers and discounted the religious authority
of the ulama and kyai, at least as far as it was based on the exhaustive
study of other texts. In much Western writing, the term “Islamic mod-
ernism” is used primarily for a variety of Islam that shares many features
of Western Christian humanism, such as tolerance of religious diversity,
compassion for the socially disadvantaged, enthusiasm for democracy
and for technological developments, and moral conservatism. Histori-
cally, this stream of modernism saw the heavy weight of traditionalist
learning as a barrier to the mastery of modern science and the develop-
ment of a democratic society; its adherents have often been compared to
European Christian democrats and are sometimes described as “Islamic
socialists.” Though apt in the context of the anticolonial struggle, this
comparison is somewhat misleading in later periods, since it ignores the
commitment by most modernists to the introduction of Islamic law
(syariah) and by many of them to an Islamic state as prescribed by the
Qur’an and Hadiths. In general, the Islamic socialists accept the Indone-
sian Republic as an appropriate framework within which to promote Is-
lam into the foreseeable future. Ever since the achievement of indepen-
dence, there have been extralegal Muslim organizations arguing for a
more rapid transition to an Islamic state to replace the Indonesian Re-
public, if necessary through armed struggle. The potency of the call be-
came especially marked in the late Suharto period, after many Muslim
leaders fled repression to Malaysia and the Middle East, some of them
joining with other radical Islamic movements and being influenced by
teachings of prominent scholars in the Middle East.
Formal Muslim organizations date only from the 20th century. The
modernist Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912, and the traditionalist
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded in 1926, are the most important social
organizations of Indonesian Islam. Muslim political organizations have
been more ephemeral. Sarekat Islam, founded in 1909 as an extended
traders’ cooperative, was for a time the main vehicle for Indonesian na-
tionalism but suffered badly from internal division and Dutch restric-
tion. The Masjumi party during the early Revolution was the major
Muslim political party, but it was essentially a marriage of convenience
198 • ISLAM IN INDONESIA

among traditionalists and modernists, and the Partai Sarekat Islam In-
donesia (PSII), the successor of the Sarekat Islam, never joined it. Soon
after independence was achieved, the Nahdlatul Ulama split from it, be-
coming a party in its own right, and in 1961 Sukarno outlawed the
Masjum and arrested several leaders.
After allying with Muslim organizations in 1965–1966 in destruction
of the Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia), Suharto through-
out the 1970s and 1980s sought to depoliticize Islam, amalgamating all
the Muslim parties within the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)
in 1973. The government also aroused strong opposition from Muslim
groups in that year when it unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a mar-
riage law that Muslims considered to be contrary to Islamic principles of
marriage. Not allowed to assume a Muslim name, and in the 1977 elec-
tions being denied its traditional campaign symbol of the ka’bah, the PPP
could only in a very limited sense be described as a Muslim party. In
1984 all organizations, including religious bodies, had to adopt the Pan-
casila as their sole foundation. Denied any legal political expression,
some Muslims turned to fundamentalism and militancy (see PALEM-
BANG; WHITE PAPER), while others, associated previously with
Masjumi and with the Persatuan Islam (Persis), turned to social and ed-
ucational activities tied particularly to the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah In-
donesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Preaching Council), an association
established by former Masjumi leaders in 1967 that had contacts with
and some funding from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries.
From the mid-1980s the government began to court middle-class Mus-
lims, a policy reflected especially in the establishment of Ikatan Cen-
dekiawan Muslimin Indonesia (ICMI) as an acceptable mouthpiece for
these members of the Muslim community. At the same time the Suharto
regime supported religious education, the building of mosques, and the
implementation of Islamic law in matters concerning family and marriage.
After Suharto’s resignation, in the 1999 elections parties were estab-
lished representing every shade of Islamic teaching. The Partai Ke-
bangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), headed
by the two best-known Muslim leaders, Abdurrachman Wahid and
Amien Rais, explicitly appealed to consituencies wider than their Is-
lamic base. They came in third and fifth respectively (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan [PPP] was fourth) in the election behind the nondenomi-
national Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDI-P) and
Golkar. Although PKB head Abdurrachman Wahid held the presidency
for the first two years after the elections, in general the splitting of the
 ISLAMIC LAW • 199

Muslim vote among so many parties lessened the potency of Islam as a

political force, especially after Megawati Sukarnoputri became presi-
dent in 2001.
In the immediate aftermath of Suharto’s fall, religious tensions between
Muslims and Christians exploded into violence in many parts of the ar-
chipelago. Several of these outbreaks were spontaneous, but some were
instigated or supported by forces of an organization called the Lasjkar Ji-
had, whose members were often drawn from graduates of modernist Is-
lamic schools. The violence was also allegedly often the work of Jemaah
Islamiah (JI, Islamic Community), a militant group set up in Malaysia in
the mid-1990s aimed at establishing an Islamic State. On 24 January
2002, under pressure from the United States, Indonesian authorities de-
tained and questioned Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (b. 1938), a leading Muslim
cleric and follower of S. M. Kartosuwiryo and his Darul Islam who was
alleged to have links to the al Qaeda terrorist group. Principal of the Al
Mukmin school in Surakarta (Solo), which he established after graduat-
ing from the Gontor school in East Java, Ba’asyir was and is a proponent
of an Islamic state. He had been jailed by Suharto in the 1980s and had
then fled to Malaysia, returning to Indonesia in 2000. Singapore and
Malaysia believed him to be a leader of JI, and Singapore handed over ev-
idence suggesting the existence of JI operational cells in Indonesia.
In September 2002 Singapore authorities arrested 21 men accused of
involvement in JI, but it was only after the October Bali bombings that
the Indonesian government moved against suspected members of the or-
ganization, issuing an emergency decree granting legal authority to deal
with terrorist suspects and again detaining Ba’asyir and other prominent
figures. Ba’asyir was brought to trial in April 2003 on charges of plotting
to topple Indonesia’s legitimate government. He was acquitted in Sep-
tember of terrorist charges though sentenced to four years in jail for sedi-
tion. The sentence was later reduced to three years for immigration of-
fenses. The government also arrested a number of JI members believed
to be responsible for the Bali attacks. Imam Samudra, Amrozi, and ali
Ghufron (Muklas) were sentenced to death, and Ali Imron to life impris-
onment. In August, the alleged head of JI, Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali),
was arrested in Thailand. See also ARAB WORLD, HISTORICAL
LINKS WITH; KEBATINAN. [0004, 0039, 0577, 0627, 0791, 0983,
1016–1040, 1052, 1207, 1326, 1328–1329, 1336–1339, 1342–1344,
1346–1352, 1354–1356, 1358, 1359, 1361–1363, 1366, 1373–1375]

ISLAMIC LAW. See LAW, ISLAMIC.

200 • ISLAMIC STATE, DEMANDS FOR

ISLAMIC STATE, DEMANDS FOR. The creation of an Islamic state,

which will administer and enforce Islamic law (syariah), is one of the
central political demands of Islam. This demand was satisfied in many
parts of precolonial Indonesia by sultanates, states in which the sultan
acted as protector of Islam and appointed officials to enforce Islamic law.
The extent to which Islamic law was actually enforced varied consider-
ably from place to place, but the imposition of colonial rule was a major
step backward in Muslim eyes from the ideal state of affairs. A number
of anticolonial revolts attempted to restore Islamic rule by (re)establish-
ing sultanates, but especially in the 20th century many Muslims were re-
luctant to return to this autocratic form and proposed instead an Indone-
sian Islamic state, probably in the form of a republic.
Closer definition of what a modern Islamic state might mean was ham-
pered by division within the Islamic community over such matters as the
proper role of Islamic scholars and by the fact that Indonesia, wherever its
borders might be drawn, was bound to contain substantial non-Muslim
minorities as well as Muslims to whom Islamic law was uncongenial. An
Islamic state, therefore, was never part of the platform of the nationalist
movement, and arguments for an Islamic state were rejected during the
drafting of the 1945 Constitution by the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Per-
siapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) on grounds that this would
discriminate against non-Muslim minorities. A compromise requiring
Muslims alone to follow Islamic law (the Jakarta Charter, Piagam Jakarta)
was agreed on for the preamble but omitted from the final version. After
Sukarno in 1953 publicly rejected the possibility of an Islamic state, the
Islamic case was argued again in the l957–1959 Constituent Assembly
but foundered once more on the problem of the non-Muslim minorities,
though the reluctance of abangan Muslims was probably a more impor-
tant barrier. The New Order argued that the Constitution’s recognition
of both religion and “belief” precludes a religious state. Since 1948 sev-
eral groups have pursued an Islamic state by armed means, notably the
Darul Islam and the Komando Jihad, and after the fall of Suharto the
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community). The JI is allegedly a network
of Islamic radical groups, set up in Malaysia in January of 1993 largely
by Indonesian Muslims who had fled Suharto’s repression. It is reportedly
willing to employ violent means to establish an Islamic state embracing
not only Indonesia but also Malaysia, the Philippines, and Islamic re-
gions of southern Thailand.
In the post-Suharto period, increasing numbers of Muslims espoused
introduction of an Islamic state, or at least of Islamic law. Groups ranged
 JAKARTA • 201

from the illegal Jemaah Islamiyah to the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia

(MMI), a group founded in August 2000 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, but
most of whose leadership consisted of moderate Muslim intellectuals
working for the introduction of Islamic law through parliamentary
means. A 2001 survey by Tempo magazine found that 58 percent of re-
spondents supported establishment of an Islamic state.
In 2002 it became clear that several of Indonesia’s autonomous
provincial and district governments were attempting to skirt the Consti-
tution and introduce Islamic law into their areas. In addition to Aceh,
which is the only place where the government has legally permitted
syariah law, other provinces considering its introduction are South Su-
lawesi, Garut, Tasikmalaya in West Java, Banten province, West Suma-
tra, and Central Kalimantan. In August 2002 the Majelis Per-
musyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) rejected a constitutional amendment put
forward by the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and other
smaller Islamic parties that would have allowed imposition of syariah
for all Indonesian Muslims. In early 2003, a poll in Tempo magazine
found that 71 percent of Indonesians now supported the imposition of
syariah law. See also KEBATINAN; PANCASILA. [0693, 1031, 1039,
1329, 1333]

–J–

JAKARTA. Known until 1943 as Batavia, Jakarta became Indonesia’s cap-

ital with the declaration of independence in 1945. British forces occupied
the city in October 1945, and most Republican offices shifted to Yo-
gyakarta, but until July 1947 local administration was shared uneasily by
a Republican city hall (Balai Agung) and a Dutch municipal administra-
tion. With the signing of the Renville Agreement, Jakarta ceased for-
mally to be the Republic’s capital but was given special status by the
Dutch as future capital of the projected federal republic. The special fed-
eral territory of Jakarta was abolished along with federalism, and in the
mid-1950s many proposals were made to shift the capital elsewhere,
partly for climatic reasons, partly because of resentment over corruption
and government expenditure in the city; in a celebrated article, Takdir Al-
isyahbana described the city as a leech on the country’s head. In 1957,
however, these proposals were abandoned and the expanded city was
given a status equivalent to province as the Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI,
Special Capital Territory). A master plan for urban development was
202 • JAKARTA CHARTER

accepted in 1967 and from 1977 expanded to encompass the so-called

Jabotek (Jakarta–Bogor–Tanggerang–Bekasi) region, extending beyond
the boundaries of the DKI.
The city’s southward expansion, begun in colonial times, has contin-
ued. In 1948 Kebayoran Baru was created in the southwest as an elite
residential suburb, and new elite areas have since developed still further
south. Ringroads and a freeway to Bogor, the so-called Jagorawi high-
way, have been built. In recent years penetration of seawater into the wa-
ter table for several kilometers inland has made coastal areas less livable,
though it is precisely in these areas that the greatest number of kampung
are found. All parts of the city are subject to periodic flooding during the
rainy season, and in February to March 2002 floods displaced about
380,000 Jakarta residents.
Food shortages reduced Jakarta’s population during the Japanese oc-
cupation, but since 1945 the population has increased steadily as people
seek work in the growing service and administrative sectors. The city
was closed to further immigration in 1970. In 1989 the population was
officially estimated at 7 million, and the 2000 census recorded a popula-
tion of 8,389,443. Successive governments have been keen to make the
city a showcase of Indonesian development. Sukarno installed numer-
ous monuments, especially the National Monument (Monas) in Medan
Merdeka. Ali Sadikin, who became governor in 1966, promoted the de-
velopment of the Jalan Sudirman artery while his successors attempted
to shift kampung residents to the fringes of the city by razing the kam-
pung, repossessing land, and restricting a number of economic activities
followed by the poor such as street selling and becak riding.
Under the New Order, Jakarta was a center of political dissent, erupt-
ing into violence in the Malari riots of 1974 and the Tanjung Priok af-
fair in 1984 (see WHITE PAPER), and registering strong votes for the
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), especially in 1977. Student
demonstrations in the capital in early 1998 and their occupation of the
parliament building were a major factor in Suharto’s forced resignation
in May of that year. [0585, 0660, 0913]

JAKARTA CHARTER (Piagam Jakarta). See ISLAMIC STATE, DE-

MANDS FOR.

JAMBI. Along with Srivijaya, Jambi emerged as a minor trading and raid-
ing state on the Strait of Melaka in the fifth century and after (see
PIRACY). It became subordinate to Srivijaya in 683, but after the fall of
 JAPAN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH • 203

Srivijaya in the early 11th century, Jambi briefly rose to replace it as the
dominant power on the strait. It was never able to establish the same de-
gree of hegemony and was raided in circa 1275 by King Kertanegara of
Singasari, thereafter remaining under Javanese suzerainty until it was
incorporated into the Minangkabau kingdom of Adityavarman, though
it was later also subject to Palembang.
In the 17th century, an independent sultanate rose once again, based
on the pepper trade, over which it fought a protracted war with Riau-
Johor (see RIAU). Sultan Muhammad Fahruddin recognized Dutch sov-
ereignty in 1834, but the rebellion of a later sultan, Ratu Taha Saifuddin,
lasted until 1904. The post of sultan was left empty after 1901. From the
late 19th century Jambi became an important area of Dutch rubber es-
tates, and it is today Indonesia’s largest rubber producer. [0439, 0543,
0546, 0547, 0550, 0840]

JAPAN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Although Austronesian lan-

guages may have contributed slightly to the vocabulary of modern Japan-
ese and although some Japanese musical traditions, especially the drum
music of the south, may owe something to the traditions that led to game-
lan, early historical contact between Indonesia and Japan was infrequent.
Japanese ships did call at Jayakarta (Batavia) Nagasaki was one of the
trading posts of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), and from 1612
Japanese served as soldiers and occasionally officials of the company in
Southeast Asia. After Japan closed its doors in 1640, the small Japanese
communities abroad soon assimilated with local populations.
Contact resumed with the opening of Japan in 1854. Japan was first
known for providing prostitutes for the region, but its rapid industrial-
ization quickly made it a model to which burgeoning Asian nationalist
movements looked, especially after its victory in the Russo-Japanese War
(1904). The assimilation of Japanese to European status (see RACE) un-
der the “Japannerwet” of 1899 also provided a model. Japanese immigra-
tion to the Indies increased markedly in the early 1900s, especially in the
Outer Islands, and Japanese capital began to flow in, often through Chi-
nese banks. From circa 1914 Japanese trade with the archipelago ex-
panded rapidly, Japan providing cheap manufactured articles and cloth
and receiving oil and sugar from the Indies. Between 1913 and 1932
Japan’s share of Indies imports rose from 1 percent to 32 percent (though
it took only 5 percent of Indies exports). In 1933 the so-called Crisis Act
provided for discriminatory tariffs against imports from Japan. Several
Japanese political leaders had interests in companies trading in the region,
204 • JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH

and from the 1930s Japanese shipping carried a major part of the cargoes
in eastern Indonesia. Japanese firms were involved in fishing and silk in-
dustries in Minahasa in the 20th century.
In July 1941, with the consolidation of Japanese power in China, the
Netherlands Indies followed the United States in banning exports of oil,
tin, rubber, and other strategic materials to Japan. Japan had previously
tried to pressure the colonial government to guarantee these supplies by
threatening to “liberate” the colony. The Netherlands declared war on
Japan on 8 December 1941, after Pearl Harbor, and Japanese forces be-
gan landing in Borneo in January 1942. The fall of the British naval base
in Singapore and the Allied defeat in the battle of the Java Sea was fol-
lowed by Japanese landings on Sumatra in February 1942 and on Java
the following month. Dutch forces on Java surrendered on 8 March and
on Sumatra on 27 March. See also JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF IN-
DONESIA. [0594, 0637, 0638, 0774]

JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH. Japan’s attitude to the Indonesian declara-

tion of independence on 17 August 1945 was ambiguous. The declara-
tion took place with the active cooperation of a Japanese admiral,
Tadashi Maeda, and many in the military were both more sympathetic to
Indonesian nationalism than to the Allies and afraid of a popular upris-
ing if they suppressed the Republic. They were required, on the other
hand, by the terms of the surrender to maintain the political status quo,
and they attempted thus a middle way, neither assisting the Republic nor
suppressing it, though some local commanders handed over weapons to
Republican armed units (see also PEMBELA TANAH AIR).
Formal diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Japan, however,
were not established until 1957, following exhaustive discussions over
Japan’s reparations debt to Indonesia, which was finally agreed at
US$223 million, plus $400 million in aid and cancellation of a $177 mil-
lion trade debt. An expansion in Japanese investment followed, espe-
cially resource exploitation (oil, the Asahan aluminum project, rubber,
and later forestry and fisheries) and textiles. Japan maintained relatively
good ties with Indonesia during Guided Democracy, providing credits
of $49 million in 1963–1965. In return, Japan received 46 percent of In-
donesia’s total oil exports between 1960 and 1970.
Resentment over Japanese economic power was among the factors
leading to the Malari (Malapetaka 15 Januari) Affair in 1974. Japan
subsequently expanded its foreign aid to Indonesia, especially through the
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), becoming the largest
 JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF INDONESIA • 205

single donor in 1989, with $1.4 billion. Japan’s economic power, how-
ever, continued to cause friction. In 1987 Indonesia began a protracted
dispute with Japan over the allocation of production from the Asahan alu-
minum refinery. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s Japan was the destina-
tion of more than 50 percent of Indonesia’s exports and the single largest
foreign investor and most important donor of development assistance to
Indonesia. After the financial collapse of the late 1990s, Japan’s leader-
ship role in Southeast Asia’s economies declined drastically, though it re-
mained the top aid donor to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the largest donor to Indonesia in the Consultative Group
on Indonesia (CGI). [0446, 0736, 0846, 1131, 1137, 1147]

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF INDONESIA. Under Japanese rule

(1942–1945), Indonesia was divided administratively, Java coming un-
der the 16th Army, Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula initially under the
25th Army, and Kalimantan and eastern Indonesia under the 2nd south-
ern squadron of the Japanese navy (Kaigun). In 1943 New Guinea
(Papua) was separated and placed under the 4th southern squadron, and
Malaya was separated from Sumatra and placed under the 29th army.
The Japanese authorities began by restricting the nationalist move-
ment to a greater extent than the Dutch. All political parties were
banned, tertiary educational institutions were closed, and the Kenpeitai
closely monitored political activity. On Java the military administration
(Gunseikanbu) allowed Indonesians to participate only in Japanese-
sponsored mass organizations (Tiga A Movement, PUTERA, and Jawa
Hokokai), whose main aim was to mobilize support for the war effort.
The occupation also dislocated the economy. Cut off from their tradi-
tional markets in the West, the plantations of Java and Sumatra were
forced to close or to change crops; machines, equipment, and wealth
were shipped to Japan; and Indonesian laborers (romusha) were re-
cruited, often with coercion, for work on defense projects in Indonesia
and elsewhere in the Japanese empire, where they were treated harshly
and fell victim to disease and malnutrition. In the final year of the war,
Allied submarine raids in the South China Sea prevented virtually all im-
port of manufactured goods from Japan, leaving the country desperately
short of cloth, medicines, and the like.
Japanese rule, however, prepared Indonesia for independence in a num-
ber of ways. The Japanese victory shattered the prestige of Dutch colonial
rule and irreparably damaged the administrative capacity of the colonial
state. Indonesians, moreover, were appointed to higher administrative
206 • JASSIN, HANS BAGUË

positions during the occupation than they had ever held under the Dutch.
The military training of Indonesians in the Heiho, Pembela Tanah Air
(Peta), and Giyugun provided a core of experience valuable in the later
war of independence. And the prominence of Sukarno and Mohammad
Hatta within the PUTERA and Jawa Hokokai helped to confirm their po-
litical preeminence in the postwar period.
Japan’s long-term political intentions for Indonesia were not clear.
There is evidence that they intended to incorporate Sumatra and East In-
donesia into the Japanese empire, while Java, with less economic and
strategic importance, might well ultimately have been granted autonomy.
On 7 September 1944, however, with Japan’s deteriorating military situ-
ation, the Japanese Prime Minister Kuniaki Koiso announced vague
plans for granting independence to an Indonesian state embracing the
whole of the former Netherlands East Indies. The 25th Army on Suma-
tra objected to the island being included in these plans until the final
weeks of the occupation, when it allowed representatives to be included
on a Committee to Prepare for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persi-
apan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI), which was established on 7 Au-
gust 1945, succeeding the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Ke-
merdekaan (BPUPKI) set up the previous March. Nothing had been
done to implement the independence plans when Japan surrendered on
15 August. See also JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH; SUCCESSION.
[0644, 0653, 0657, 0659, 0661, 0663, 0667, 0670, 0671. 0675, 0677,
0680, 0846]

JASSIN, HANS BAGUË (1917–2000). Critic, essayist, and editor with

the Balai Pustaka and Poedjangga Baru and of many postwar literary
and cultural magazines. He played a major role in placing figures such
as Chairil Anwar in the canon of national literature, and he established
an important documentation center for Indonesian literature. He strongly
opposed the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra)’s emphasis on the
social engagement of writers and artists and in 1963 signed the Manifes
Kebudayaan. See also GENERATIONS. [0234]

JAVA (Jawa). The most densely populated of the major Indonesian islands,
and politically and economically central to the archipelago since the 13th
century. For statistical purposes it is generally combined with Madura,
but historically it is useful to distinguish from the Javanese lands of the
central and eastern part of the island, not just Madura but also the Sun-
danese regions of West Java (see SUNDA).
 JAVA • 207

The epigraphic evidence is meager, but it appears that Hindu and

Buddhist states began to emerge in Central Java in the eighth century.
The earliest of these to achieve any prominence were the Buddhist king-
dom of the Sailendras and the Hindu kingdom of Mataram under King
Sanjaya and his successors. The former was responsible for the con-
struction of the Borobudur and Mendut temples, the latter for Pram-
banan and Candi Sewu. The precise sequence of and relationship be-
tween these kingdoms is unclear. In the 10th century, for reasons also
unclear, the center of Javanese power moved to the valley of the Brantas
River in East Java, which became the base of a succession of major
Hindu kingdoms: Janggala (11th century), Kediri (c. 1059–1222), Sin-
gasari (1222–1292), and Majapahit (1294–c. 1527).
Trade with other parts of the archipelago and beyond grew in this pe-
riod, strengthening the position of the port towns on the north coast (see
PASISIR), which converted to Islam between the 14th and 16th cen-
turies. In circa 1527 Muslim armies led by the sultanate of Demak de-
feated Majapahit, leading to a period of disorder in the interior. A state
called Pajang briefly emerged but was displaced in the 1570s by a sec-
ond, Muslim, state of Mataram in central Java. The Dutch East Indies
Company (VOC) established itself in the coastal regions in the early
17th century and began military intervention in Mataram’s affairs in the
late 17th century, finally breaking the power of the sultanate with the
treaty of Giyanti in 1755, which partitioned it between the successor
courts of Surakarta (Solo) and Yogyakarta.
Approaching its eventual bankruptcy, the VOC did little to change the
social or economic order in Java, but in the early 19th century the
Napoleonic-Dutch rule of Herman Willem Daendels from 1808 to
1811, a British interregnum under Thomas Stamford Raffles from 1811
to 1816, and Dutch rule under the Crown from 1816 saw increasing in-
tervention in the island. The Java War of 1825–1830 was the last major
attempt by the old aristocracy to assert its power on the island, and un-
der the Cultivation System Javanese felt the full force of Dutch colo-
nialism, though scholars have still not agreed on its effects. From 1870,
with the onset of the Liberal Policy, Java ceased to be the main producer
of Indies wealth for the Dutch; population increased, and the share of
the Outer Islands in export production expanded. The Ethical Policy,
introduced in 1901, was in part an attempt to deal with the increasing so-
cial problems on the island. Nationalism began to emerge on Java first
in the form of organizations for cultural preservation and renewal, but
soon took a political dimension. Many leaders of the movement came
208 • JAVA BANK

from outside Java, but it was the nationalist influence on the Javanese
masses that most worried the colonial authorities. By 1930, 70 percent of
the population of the Netherlands Indies lived on Java.
Java-Madura was administratively separated from the rest of the archi-
pelago at the start of the Japanese occupation in 1942, and as the war pro-
gressed it became increasingly isolated economically. With both exports
and imports severely hampered, the people of the island suffered greatly.
During the national Revolution, Java formed, with Sumatra, the
heartland of the Indonesian Republic and although the Dutch had occu-
pied the entire island by the end of 1948, widespread guerrilla resistance
made their position untenable. From the 1950s Java became even more
the center of politics, and fears of Javanization were among the factors
leading to regional rebellions such as the PRRI/Permesta rebellion,
though part of Outer Island hostility was reserved for the non-Javanese
capital, Jakarta. Despite efforts by the Dutch and postindependence
governments through transmigration programs, Java still constituted
around 59 percent of Indonesia’s total population in 2000. [0345, 0524,
0532, 0557, 0575, 1228, 1239]

JAVA BANK. See BANKING.

JAVA MAN. A skull cap and wisdom tooth about 500,000 years old, found
in Trinil (East Java) by Eugène Dubois in 1891, has been identified as
that of Pithecanthropus (now Homo) erectus. This was the first human
fossil find outside Europe, and it led to speculation that Java had been
the “Garden of Eden.” It is now believed, however, that humans (H. erec-
tus) arrived a million years ago or earlier, thus predating Peking Man.
These early inhabitants appear to have been displaced by later migra-
tions. See also PREHISTORY.

JAVA SEA, BATTLE OF THE. On 27–28 February 1942, a Japanese fleet

under T. Takagi defeated an Allied fleet under Karel Doorman in the Java
Sea. Although numerically about equal to the Allies, the Japanese were
superior in air power and sank all but a few of the Allied vessels either
in the battle or soon after. The defeat left Java open to the landing of
Japanese land forces. See also JAPANESE OCCUPATION; NAVY.
[0659]

JAVA WAR (1825–1830). A major uprising against Dutch domination of

central Java, led by Pangeran Diponegoro and drawing together several
 JAWA HOKOKAI • 209

strands of discontent in the central Javanese kingdoms of Yogyakarta

and Surakarta. Increasing taxation and harvest failures in the early
1820s had unsettled the peasants, while both Islamic leaders and younger
members of the Yogyakarta aristocracy were disturbed by the rise of
Dutch power and what was seen as the moral decay of the courts. Ja-
vanese messianic expectations focused on Diponegoro as a potential ratu
adil (just prince) who would establish an era of justice and prosperity.
Although the widespread uprising was only loosely coordinated by
Diponegoro, it was able to shake Dutch power in the region until
Diponegoro’s defeat at Gowok near Surakarta in October 1826. There-
after Dutch counterguerrilla strategies of dividing the Javanese forces
and keeping them short of food wore the rebels down. Disunity arose be-
tween Diponegoro and his main religious adviser Kyai Maja, and in 1827
Diponegoro’s nephew and chief lieutenant Sentot deserted. Dipone-
goro’s capture at Magelang in 1830 ended the war, in which perhaps
250,000 Javanese died. See also JOYOBOYO. [0597]

JAVANESE ABROAD. See AFRICA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH;

SURINAM, JAVANESE IN.

JAVANESE LANGUAGE. Although numerically spoken by the largest

number of Indonesians, Javanese became neither a lingua franca nor the
national language. This was partly because the grammatical complexity
and distinct script of Javanese led the Dutch to choose Malay as their
language of administration, and it was partly because other ethnic groups
(and a good many Javanese) rejected it as feudal in structure. In common
with many languages, Javanese speech varies according to the respective
ranks of the speaker and the addressee, thus, in the view of many, pre-
serving social inequalities. In 1917 an organization called Djawa Dipa
was founded in Surabaya with the aim of abolishing high (kromo) Ja-
vanese and making low (ngoko) Javanese standard. See also INDONE-
SIAN LANGUAGE; JAVANIZATION; LANGUAGES; TJIPTO MAN-
GOENKOESOEMO. [0272, 0269, 0270, 0283, 0287]

JAWA HOKOKAI (Java Service Association). The association was

founded in January 1944 to mobilize the Javanese population (over 14
years of age) for the Japanese war effort. Sukarno and Hasyim Asyari
were senior advisors, Mohammad Hatta and Mas Mansur managers.
The organization was run at each level by regional Indonesian officials
and thus provided a means of government control outside the normal
210 • JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH

channels. The structure of the Hokokai was repeated to some extent in

the PNI-Staatspartij and in Golkar. See also BARISAN PELOPOR.
[0644, 0649, 0661]

JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI, Islamic Community). See ISLAMIC STATE;

ISLAM IN INDONESIA.

JOURNALISM. See NEWSPAPERS.

JOYOBOYO (r. 1137–1157). Ruler of Kediri, chiefly remembered for his

prophecies of Java’s future, which foretold alternating periods of pros-
perity (jaman raharja) and suffering (jaman edan). After a period of un-
precedented suffering, he foretold, this cycle would be broken by the ap-
pearance of a just prince (Ratu Adil) who would found a golden age of
prosperity and justice. New versions of the prophecies have appeared
regularly, often as part of growing peasant discontent with colonial rule.
The most celebrated version was that current during the Japanese occu-
pation, which asserted that the Javanese would be ruled by white men
for three centuries and by yellow dwarves for the lifetime of a maize
plant, prior to the achievement of a golden age. See also JAVA WAR;
SAMA RASA SAMA RATA. [0159, 0597]

JOYOHADIKUSUMO, SUMITRO. See SUMITRO DJOJO-

HADIKUSUMO.

JUANDA KARTAWIJAYA (1911–1963). A Sundanese Muslim, Juanda

graduated with an engineering degree from the Bandung Technical
School in 1933. Though never linked to a political party, he served in
many Republican cabinets after 1945 in economic portfolios and in 1957
was appointed by Sukarno as nonparty prime minister following the in-
ability of the parties to form a government. In 1959 Sukarno appointed
himself prime minister but retained Juanda as first minister with much
the same duties as before. Juanda’s death in office in 1963 contributed to
the absence of an economic policy in the later years of Guided Democ-
racy. [0696, 0706]

JUDAISM. In contrast to India and China, Indonesia never became the

home of large, settled, partly acculturated Jewish communities. Jews en-
tered the archipelago as part either of the European colonial elite or of
the general Middle Eastern trading diaspora (see ARABS IN INDONE-
 KAHAR MUZAKKAR • 211

SIA). The Jewish community in Surabaya maintains a synagogue. Pres-

ident Abdurrachman Wahid, who had visited Israel in 1994, argued in
favor of opening diplomatic relations with Israel and attempted to enter
into commercial and cultural relations with the Jewish state. The uproar
of protest compelled him to postpone and probably cancel the plan. See
also ARAB WORLD, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. [1050, 1367]

JUNGHUHN, FRANZ WILHELM (1809–1864). German-born scientist,

responsible for the first detailed geographical survey of Java’s interior.
He measured and climbed most of Java’s peaks and studied the pattern
of vegetation changes with altitude. He was the first scientist to warn
against the ecological consequences of deforestation, and he suggested a
ban on forest clearing above 1,500 meters. He also published a major
study of the Bataks in Sumatra. See also CINCHONA; ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION.

–K–

KAHAR MUZAKKAR (also spelled Qahhar Mudzakkar) (1921–1965).

Born in Luwu, he was educated in Muhammadiyah schools in Su-
lawesi and Surakarta (Solo). He returned to Luwu in 1941 to teach in a
Muhammadiyah school until banished by the local council in 1943, when
he went into business in Makassar, then in Surakarta. He led a force of
South Sulawesi emigrés in Java during the national Revolution and re-
turned to South Sulawesi in April 1950. Though strongly opposed to the
Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT), he resented its abrupt dismantling by
central government forces, which, he said, acted like an army of occupa-
tion. In August 1951 he launched a rebellion against the central govern-
ment and affiliated his movement broadly with S. M. Kartosuwiryo and
his Darul Islam (DI) in August 1952. In 1953 he proclaimed Sulawesi
to be part of the Negara Republik Indonesia Islam (NRII, Indonesian Is-
lamic Republic) and attempted to establish Islamic rule in the region,
limiting private property, establishing schools and hospitals, and banning
titles, lipstick, and jewelry. Kahar controlled much of the hinterland of
Makassar until the early 1960s. He was finally shot by government
forces in 1965. His defense minister, Sanusi Daris, reappeared in the
mid-1980s as a link between South Sulawesi radicals and Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir’s group in Java. See ISLAM IN INDONESIA. [0695, 0699,
1031]
212 • KAHARINGAN

KAHARINGAN. See DAYAKS.

KAKAWIN. Classic Javanese poetic form, mostly long and divided into
four-line verses with a fixed number of letter groups per line.

KALIMANTAN. Used to denote both the island of Borneo and, as here, its
southern, Indonesian portion, approximately 73 percent of its area, with a
population of about 11.3 million in 2000. Most Indonesians believe the
name signifies Kali Intan, “River of Diamonds,” (kali intan, i.e., the Bar-
ito in southeast Kalimantan), though it probably derives from “land of
raw sago” (lamanta). Kalimantan has no active volcanoes, and its topog-
raphy is dominated by a low central mountain spine running roughly
northeast-southwest from which a number of rivers—the Kapuas, Sam-
bas, Barito, and Mahakam—flow, often through swampy coastal plains,
to the sea. Most of the island is below 200 meters in elevation. The dozens
of indigenous ethnic groups, the most numerous of them generally called
Iban or Dayaks, were pushed from the coastal regions in early times by
Malay peoples, who established a series of small states such as Kutai at
or near the mouths of rivers. These states, most notably Pontianak and
Banjarmasin, provided reprovisioning facilities for interregional trade,
acted as outlets for produce from the interior (rattan, dragon’s blood,
birds’ nests, gold, and resins), and generally engaged in piracy, as did
states on the Strait of Melaka (see SRIVIJAYA). Usually, however, they
remained subordinate to one or the other dominant regional power (Sriv-
ijaya, Kediri, Majapahit, Melaka, Banten). The coastal states converted
to Islam around the 16th century. During the 18th century there was ex-
tensive settlement by Bugis from southern Sulawesi in coastal regions.
Through Banten, the Dutch inherited a nominal interest in western
Kalimantan and put trading posts at Sambas and Sukadana in the early
17th century. These, however, were soon evacuated. In the late 18th and
early 19th century the Dutch established greater control in Pontianak,
Sambas, and Mempawah to forestall possible British annexation and to
restrict what they saw as piracy. From 1790 to 1820 large numbers of
Chinese came to gold fields between the Kapuas and Sambas Rivers,
where some later settled as farmers (see also KONGSI WARS). Dutch
control in Banjarmasin was not established until the 19th century. From
1938 the Dutch portion of the island was ruled as a gouvernement (see
DECENTRALIZATION). Oil, discovered on the east coast in the late
19th century, transformed that region economically, making it a major
target of the Japanese invasion in 1942. The Dutch divided Kalimantan
 KARTINI, RADEN AJENG • 213

into two residencies: (1) South and East Borneo and (2) West Borneo
(Westerafdeeling). During the national Revolution, they briefly toyed
with the idea of creating a federal state of Borneo on the island, but even-
tually declared a number of smaller states (see FEDERALISM). The is-
land became a single province at the time of independence, but in 1957
it was divided again, this time into three provinces: South, East, and Cen-
tral Kalimantan.
During Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia, Indonesian troops
fought British Commonwealth forces along the border with Sarawak. Af-
ter 1965 the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) briefly organized guerrilla
resistance in West Kalimantan. Many local Chinese communities, sus-
pected of involvement with the rebels, were expelled by the government.
After 1967 East Kalimantan became a major logging region (see
FORESTRY) and the island has been an important transmigration set-
tlement site, with immigrants arriving from Java and Madura during the
1970s and 1980s, while large numbers of Bugis pepper farmers came to
East Kalimantan from the 1960s on. Widespread deforestation and the oil
palm plantations that replaced much of the native forests were among the
reasons contributing to the enormous fires that destroyed about 3.2 million
hectares (ha) of forest areas of East Kalimantan in 1982–1983 and swept
through much of the island in 1997. Following the 1997 fires, Dayak
tribesmen in West Kalimantan began attacking Madurese settlements, re-
asserting their claim to their ancestral lands. About 450 Madurese were
killed, and thousands fled. Attacks against the Madurese by both Malays
and Dayaks followed the fall of Suharto, with most of the Madurese mi-
grants fleeing Kalimantan and seeking asylum in Sulawesi and Madura.
Under the decentralization law of 2001, Kalimantan was divided into four
provinces: West, South, Central, and East Kalimantan. [0118, 0264, 0329,
0788, 0795, 0805, 0811, 0812, 1048, 1058, 1158, 1378]

“KAN-T’O-LI.” Chinese transcription of the name of an otherwise un-

known kingdom on the southeastern coast of Sumatra. It sent tribute to
China from 441 and traded with China, India, and other parts of the ar-
chipelago. It was superseded by Srivijaya in the late seventh century.
See also “HO-LO-TAN.” [0542, 0543]

KARTASURA. See MATARAM.

KARTINI, RADEN AJENG (1879–1904). Javanese feminist writer and

activist, she was the daughter of a progressive bupati. She received some
214 • KARTOSUWIRYO, SEKARMAJI MARIJAN

Western education but at puberty was secluded in preparation for mar-

riage. Nevertheless she opened a school in her father’s residence at
Japara in 1903 and, after marrying in November of that year, maintained
the school in her husband’s residence at Rembang. She died in childbirth
in 1904. She is known largely for her memorandum to the colonial gov-
ernment, “Educate the Javanese!” (1903), and her letters, published
posthumously as Door duisternis tot licht: gedachten over en voor het
Javaanse volk (From Darkness to Light, Thoughts about and on Behalf
of the Javanese People, 1911), edited by J. H. Abendanon and with a
foreword by Louis Couperus, and in English translation as Letters of a
Javanese Princess (1964). Her correspondence is important for its asser-
tion of women’s right to education and freedom from polygamy and
child marriage. Royalties from the publication of her letters in the
Netherlands helped to found a number of “Kartini schools” giving edu-
cation to girls. [0876, 0885, 1277, 1287]

KARTOSUWIRYO, SEKARMAJI MARIJAN (1905–1962). Foster son

of Haji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto (Cokroaminoto) and activist in the
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) until his expulsion in 1939 over
policy differences. In 1940 he established a school, the Suffah Institute, in
Garut (West Java) to give religious and general education to young Mus-
lims; this was closed by the Japanese in 1942, but Kartosuwiryo used con-
tacts made then to form a branch of the Hizbullah in 1945. He joined
Masjumi but felt betrayed by the party’s agreement to implement the
Renville Agreement and by the Siliwangi Division’s abandonment of
West Java in early 1948. He established the Islamic Army of Indonesia
(Tentara Islam Indonesia, TII) and in May of 1948 an Islamic administra-
tion in the Garut region with the name Darul Islam (DI) and with himself
as imam, or religious leader. On 7 August 1949 he officially proclaimed an
Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), which fought
the Republic of Indonesia. He remained the central figure in the West Java
DI until he was captured by government forces in April 1962 and executed
in September. He is one of the inspirations for Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and oth-
ers involved in radical Islamic activities in the early 2000s. [0693]

KARYAWAN (from karya, task, and -wan, person). A term coined in the
1960s to describe all employees of a firm or office, including manage-
ment. It was used as an alternative to the word buruh (worker, laborer)
to avoid the implication that workers might have interests separate from
those of management. See also LABOR; LABOR UNIONS. [0430]
 KENPEITAI • 215

KEBATINAN (also called kejawen, agama Jawa, or “Javanism”). Javanese

mysticism, incorporating animist, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic (espe-
cially Sufi) mystical elements but often denying adherence to Islam. Of-
ficially legitimized by Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, which dis-
tinguishes and acknowledges both religion (agama) and belief
(kepercayaan), it is organized in hundreds of separate associations (e.g.,
Paguyuban Ngèsti Tunggal [Pangestu]) and is administered by the
Ministry of Education and Culture rather than by Religious Affairs. Pres-
ident Suharto was personally associated with kebatinan, although dur-
ing the last decade of his rule he stressed more publicly his Islamic be-
liefs. See also ABANGAN; ISLAMIC STATE, DEMANDS FOR. [1242,
1357, 1368]

KEDIRI. Kingdom in East Java created by the decision of Airlangga in

the mid-11th century to divide his kingdom. Kediri sponsored a major
flowering of Javanese culture but was overthrown by Ken Angrok,
founder of Singasari in 1221–1222. See also JOYOBOYO.

KEIBODAN. Civil guard formed on Java during the Japanese occupation

to undertake routine security tasks such as evening village patrols. Though
Keibodan units were generally armed only with bamboo stakes, the quasi-
military experience they provided laid a basis in parts of Java for the for-
mation of badan perjuangan during the Revolution. [0661, 0663]

KEJAWEN. See KEBATINAN.

KEMPEITAI. See KENPEITAI.

KEN ANGROK (?–1227). According to both the Nagarakrtagama and

the Pararaton, the former brigand Ken Angrok first came to prominence
when he murdered the regent of Tumapel with a kris he had specially
commissioned from the master smith Mpu Gandring, whom he also
killed. Having implicated the dead regent’s bodyguards in the murder,
Ken Angrok seized power, married the regent’s widow Ken Dedes, and
launched a revolt against the king of Kediri, whom he defeated at the
battle of Genter (1221). He founded the kingdom of Singasari at
Tumapel in 1222 and reigned as Rangga Rajasa until his death in 1227.

KENPEITAI. Japanese military police force, founded in 1881, whose role

was extended in occupied Indonesia and elsewhere to surveillance of the
216 • KEPERCAYAAN

civilian population, censorship, and the collection of intelligence. The

Kenpeitai gained a reputation for gratuitous cruelty and of 538 members
of staff on Java at the end of the war, 199 were later committed for trial
on war crimes charges. [0663, 0667, 0680]

KEPERCAYAAN. See KEBATINAN.

KERBAU. Water buffalo (Bubalis bubalis; not to be confused with the ban-
teng). Kerbau were introduced to Indonesia after 1000 B.C., probably
from India via Thailand. They quickly took on great importance as draft
animals and sources of milk, becoming a measure of wealth and, by ex-
tension, a symbol of power. Buffalo and tiger fights were a common en-
tertainment on Java, and buffalo fights occasionally replaced battles; ac-
cording to legend, the Minangkabau averted certain defeat in battle with
Javanese by proposing a buffalo fight. Against the Javanese buffalo they
sent a thirsty calf with knives tied to its head, which gored the Javanese
beast while the calf nuzzled for milk. Individual buffalo can be identified
by distinctive hair whorls, which are sometimes believed also to reflect
individual character. [1154]

KERINCI. Isolated upland valley situated on the border between West

Sumatra and Jambi, taking its name from Mt. Kerinci, the highest
mountain (3,806 meters) on Sumatra and an active volcano. Culturally
and politically, too, Kerinci exists on the fringes of the Minangkabau re-
gion and the sultanate of Jambi. Gold was an important export from the
region in the 17th and early 18th centuries, but was gradually overshad-
owed by rice and by cinnamon produced for trade with the British in
Bengkulu. [0834, 0840]

KESATUAN AKSI MAHASISWA INDONESIA (KAMI, Indonesian

Students’ Action Front). Founded on 25 October 1965 to spearhead the
suppression of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and the Left in
general following the Gestapu coup of 30 September, it staged street
marches and launched a campaign of pamphleteering. It was sponsored
by and worked closely with the anticommunist Brigadier General Kemal
Idris and Colonel Sarwo Edhie. From January 1966 it expressed its de-
mands as the Tritura (Tri-Tuntutan Hatinurani Rakyat, Three Demands
from the Bottom of the People’s Hearts): abolish the PKI, purge the cab-
inet, and reduce prices. In much of its action, it cooperated closely with
the Komando Aksi Pemuda dan Pelajar Indonesia (KAPPI) representing
school children, and the Komando Aksi Sarjana Indonesia (KASI) repre-
 KOLUSI, KORUPSI, DAN NEPOTISME • 217

senting graduates. In the early 1970s KAMI split between those who
were absorbed into the government establishment and those who became
increasingly critical of New Order policies. In 1973 the progovernment
group became the core of the new Komité Nasional Pemuda Indonesia
(KNPI). See also STUDENTS. [0727]

KETERBUKAAN (“openness”). A tentative and ultimately unsuccessful

effort in the early 1990s to open up Indonesian society to greater freedom
of speech and expression. It began in December 1989 when Army Chief
of Staff Edi Sudrajat advocated more open discussion of differences, and
Suharto followed up in his 1990 independence day speech by calling for
greater expression of differences of opinion. However, when Nano Ri-
antiarno in a satirical play, Suksesi, accepted the offer, the government
closed the play down after only 11 days and again imposed restrictions
on such opposition playwrights as W. S. Rendra. After he had arranged
his reelection to a sixth five-year term in 1993, Suharto made another
step toward keterbukaan, when he reached a compromise with a few dis-
sidents and released some Islamic radicals from jail. This effort, too, was
tentative and short-lived, and in early 1994 the labor activist Mochtar
Pakpaham and a number of other labor leaders were arrested and the
most outspoken news magazines, Detik, Editor, and Tempo, were closed
down. See also CENSORSHIP. [0748, 0751, 0940]

KIDUNG SUNDA. Semihistorical Javanese poem. Hayam Wuruk, king of

Majapahit, obtained the hand of the daughter of the king of Pajajaran,
but on the arrival of the Sundanese wedding party at Bubat in East Java,
the Majapahit courtiers insisted that the marriage meant Pajajaran would
accept Javanese overlordship and that, in some versions, the princess
would be Hayam Wuruk’s concubine, not his queen. The Sundanese king
refused to accept this insult, fought the Javanese, and was slaughtered
along with his men while his daughter committed suicide. [0159]

KOELIEORDONNANTIE. See COOLIE ORDINANCE.

KOLUSI, KORUPSI, DAN NEPOTISME (KKN, Collusion, Corruption,

and Nepotism). The call to arms of the antigovernment demonstrators in
the reformasi movement characterized the failings of the Suharto
regime that they were determined to change. It remained a potent charge
that was brought against leading politicians in the subsequent B. J. Habi-
bie, Abdurrachman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri regimes.
218 • KOMANDO JIHAD

KOMANDO JIHAD (Holy War Command). A shadowy Islamic organiza-

tion probably founded at the instigation of Ali Murtopo and his security
apparatus in the mid-1970s and said to be fighting for an Islamic state
in Indonesia, much as the Darul Islam (DI) did in earlier years. Former
DI leaders reportedly headed the command, but most were arrested in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Actions attributed to or associated with the
Komando Jihad include the hijacking of a Garuda DC9 aircraft and an at-
tack on the Cicendo police station near Bandung in 1981 and a suppos-
edly Islamic rising in Lampung in 1989. Imran Muhammad Zein was
executed in February 1985 for his part in the 1981 events. It has been re-
ported that the Komando Jihad provided a foundation for the Jemaah Is-
lamiyah (JI, Islamic Community), a shadowy and loose-knit association,
allegedly advocating establishment, if necessary by violent means, of an
Islamic state embracing not only Indonesia but also Malaysia and the
Philippines. See also ISLAM IN INDONESIA. [1031, 1039]

KOMANDO OPERASI PEMULIHAN KEAMANAN DAN KETERT-

IBAN (Kopkamtib, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security
and Order). Extraconstitutional body established on 10 October 1965 un-
der Suharto’s command to suppress the so-called Gestapu coup. Its tasks
soon extended beyond its original mandate of tracking down Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI) supporters. It became the Suharto regime’s major
instrument of political control with respect to civilian dissidents, such as
student and Muslim demonstrators, the press, and conduct of the elec-
tions. Its terms of reference included defense of the Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution. Operating outside regular legal channels, it had exten-
sive authority to arrest, interrogate, and detain. It was a command within
the Indonesian armed forces, giving the Kopkamtib commander direct au-
thority over troops independent of the formal military hierarchy, rather
than being a distinct institution such as the Badan Koordinasi Intelijen
Negara (Bakin), and it was thus a form of permanent martial law com-
mand. Its commander was theoretically able to act without reference to the
president, as Suharto did in 1965–1966. On 22 September 1988 it was re-
placed by the much less powerful Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemanta-
pan Stabilitas Nasional (Bakorstanas) as part of a move by Suharto to
undermine the power of its head, Benny Murdani. For a list of Kopkamtib
commanders, see APPENDIX E. [0727, 0733, 0972, 1099, 1100]

KOMANDO OPERASI TERTINGGI (Koti, Supreme Operations Com-

mand). Military command formed in December 1961 for the liberation
 KOMITÉ NASIONAL INDONESIA • 219

of West Irian (see PAPUA), with Sukarno, A. H. Nasution, and A. Yani

as commander, deputy, and chief of staff; actual fighting was under the
Mandala Command, headed by Suharto. In January 1962 Indonesian
forces were defeated and a deputy navy commander, Yos Sudarso, was
killed, but military pressure was among the factors removing the Dutch
later that year. The command was reorganized in July 1963 to take
charge of Confrontation. An operational Komando Siaga (Koga,
“Readiness Command”) under air force commander Omar Dhani was
created in May 1964, but in October its authority was limited to Kali-
mantan and Sumatra with the title Komando Mandala Siaga (Kolaga).
Army units formerly assigned to Koga for a projected invasion of the
Malay Peninsula were assigned to Komando Cadangan Strategis
Angkatan Darat (Kostrad) and posted to Java. In February 1966 Koti
was renamed Komando Ganyang Malaysia (Kogam, Crush Malaysia
Command), but it was abolished in July 1967. See also DEFENSE
POLICY. [0714]

KOMANDO PASUKAN KHUSUS (Kopassus, Special Forces Com-

mand). Elite paracommando unit (formerly Komando Pasukan Sandi
Yudha [Kopassandha, Secret Warfare Commando Unit], which suc-
ceeded Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat [RPKAD]) em-
ployed in 1966 against regions in Java and Bali that were believed to be
procommunist and later in East Timor and Irian Jaya (Papua). Under
command of presidential son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, who held the
post from 1995 to 1998, the number of men in Kopassus doubled to ap-
proximately 7,000. Its forces were blamed for the killing of students at
Trisakti University in Jakarta during the demonstrations prior to
Suharto’s resignation. Under his successors, there were growing criti-
cisms of the Kopassus, and in January 2001 the army announced a de-
crease in its forces by about 2,000. Seven of its members were accused
in the 2001 assassination of moderate Papuan leader “Theys” Eluway.
See also MASSACRES OF 1965–1966. [0714, 0727]

KOMANDO TERTINGGI OPERASI EKONOMI. See DWIFUNGSI.

KOMITÉ NASIONAL INDONESIA (KNI, Indonesian National Commit-

tee). Local committees established at every level of government shortly af-
ter the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic in 1945. In the absence of
direction from the Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP), local KNIs
were initially responsible for most areas of government activity, including
220 • KOMITÉ NATIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT

formation of the army. In many cases, the authority of the KNI was exer-
cised mainly through a small Working Committee (Badan Pekerja).
Though put together in a very ad hoc manner, KNIs generally represented
most political streams in their regions and, depending on the capacity of
their members, were often key political decision-making bodies during the
first years of the Revolution until their role was somewhat taken over by
the regional defense councils (Dewan Pertahanan Daerah). See also DE-
WAN PERTAHANAN NASIONAL. [0643, 0661, 0674, 0681]

KOMITÉ NATIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT (KNIP, Central Indonesian

National Committee). Representative body that originally grew out of
the Japanese-sponsored Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia
(PPKI). Initially the KNIP served merely as an advisory body to the
president and his cabinet, but at its first session on 16–17 October 1945,
it was vested with full legislative power and became the acting parlia-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia during the Revolution. The Repub-
lic’s prime minister was responsible to the KNIP, although the Constitu-
tion prescribed a presidential system of government. KNIP membership,
however, was effectively by presidential nomination, and Sukarno
greatly expanded its size in order to have the 1947 Linggajati Agree-
ment ratified. While the full KNIP generally exercised only legislative
powers, closer supervision over the government and cabinet was exer-
cised by a Working Committee (Badan Pekerja) that met every 10 days.
[0643, 0661, 0674]

KOMODO. With a few neighboring islets, the only habitat of the Komodo
“dragon” or monitor, Varanus komodoensis, of which approximately
1,600 remain. A nature reserve was declared there in 1966 and a national
park in 1980. In 1995 the Komodo National Park, which comprises Ko-
modo and Rinca Islands and the surrounding seas, became a United Na-
tions heritage site, but the park fell into disrepair, with the number of vis-
itors declining by two thirds from the 36,000 in 1996. In 2002 the largest
environmental group in the United States, The Nature Conservancy
(TNC), proposed that Jakarta cede responsibility for the park for 25
years to a private company, Putri Naga Komodo, owned by TNC and a
Malaysian businessman, Feisol Hashim, which would invest about $2
million a year in the park, or about 100 times its current budget. [0078,
1155]

KONFRONTASI. See CONFRONTATION.

 KONGSI WARS • 221

KONGSI WARS. The term kongsi refers commonly to a firm commercial

partnership, often of several people, cemented by a sense of loyalty as
well as self-interest. It was a characteristic organizational form of Chi-
nese in Indonesia. On the goldfields of West Kalimantan, local kongsi
became so powerful as to resemble ministates, with their own territory,
government, justice system, religious centers, currency, taxation, and
schools entirely independent of the sultanates of Sambas and Pontianak,
and largely responsible for importing miners and exporting gold to
China. Their independence and involvement in trading salt, opium, and
gunpowder led the Dutch to suppress them in the so-called Kongsi Wars.
The term refers to three periods of warfare (1822–1824, 1850–1854, and
1884–1885) separated by periods of uneasy peace and resulting in the
dissolution of all the kongsi and the imposition of Dutch control. [1048]

KONINKLIJK NEDERLANDSCH INDISCH LEGER (KNIL, Royal

Netherlands Indies Army). The three decades following the fall of the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in 1800 were militarily disastrous
for the colonial government in Indonesia. Not only did Dutch posses-
sions fall into British hands (see BRITAIN), but several major uprisings,
notably the Java War, also took place. In 1830, therefore, Governor-
General Johannes van den Bosch founded the KNIL to provide the colo-
nial government with its own reliable military forces. The governor-
general was commander-in-chief and from 1867 the KNIL was
supported by a department of war, whose head was the KNIL com-
mander. Dutch naval forces in the archipelago, operating from a large
base in Surabaya, remained formally a part of the metropolitan navy.
An air wing of the KNIL was formed in 1914.
The officer corps of the KNIL was always predominantly Dutch,
though toward the end of the colonial period a small number of Indone-
sians received officer training at the Military Academy in Breda. In ad-
dition, the Sunan of Surakarta was a titular major-general in the KNIL
and many other Javanese aristocrats held courtesy ranks. Troops were di-
verse in origin. In 1861, 54 percent were “native” and 46 percent “Euro-
pean.” The European category included not only a great many Germans
but also a number of Africans, the so-called blanda hitam (black Dutch-
men) from Guinea. Like the British in India, the Dutch favored specific
indigenous ethnic groups for recruitment. Ambonese and Menadonese
were regarded as especially reliable, though Javanese always formed the
largest bloc; in 1936 there were 4,000 Ambonese in the KNIL to 13,000
Javanese (see also NATIVE TROOPS).
222 • “KONINKLIJKE”

The KNIL carried out the conquest of indigenous states in the Outer
Islands in the 19th and early 20th century, but its primary role was the
maintenance of internal security and order (rust en orde) (see HEUTSZ,
J. B. VAN). KNIL troops thus were most heavily concentrated on Java
and in Aceh and North Sumatra. From 1917 male European residents of
the colony were subject to conscription for service in the militia and
landstrom (home guard) for the defense of the colony, but in the 20th
century the authorities relied increasingly on the British naval base in
Singapore for their defense. The KNIL capitulated to Japanese forces at
Kalijati in West Java on 9 March 1942, and much of the European com-
ponent of the army spent the rest of the war in prisoner of war camps.
KNIL soldiers who had escaped to Australia played a small role in the
reconquest of eastern Indonesia in 1944–1945.
The postwar KNIL under General S. H. Spoor (1902–1949) recovered
rapidly and took part with the Dutch army (Koninklijke Landmacht, KL)
in the “Police Actions” to crush the Indonesian Republic. In 1948 the
KNIL comprised 15,500 Europeans and 50,500 non-Europeans. It was
formally abolished on 26 July 1950, its troops being transferred to the
KL, transferred to the Indonesian army (APRIS), or demobilized. Troops
to be demobilized were entitled to be discharged at a place of their own
choosing, and around 4,000 Ambonese requested demobilization in Am-
bon, where they would have been able to join the uprising of the Re-
publik Maluku Selatan (RMS) against the Republic. To avoid this, they
were unilaterally transferred to the KL and “repatriated” with their fam-
ilies to the Netherlands in 1951 for demobilization. [0479, 0642, 1421]

“KONINKLIJKE” (the “Royal”). Common name for a group of companies

involved in the extraction and sale of oil from Indonesia. The Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Petroleumbronnen in
Nederlandsch-Indië was formed in 1890 to extract oil from concessions in
Langkat in East Sumatra and began refining oil at Pangkalan Brandan in
1892. Under J. B. A. Kessler and (from 1901) Henri Deterding, the firm
moved into the sale and distribution of oil in Asia. Cooperation with the
Nederlandsch-Indische Industrie- and Handel-Maatschappij, a subsidiary
of the Shell Transport and Trading Company, led in 1903 to creation of the
Asiatic Petroleum Co. In 1907 the parent companies merged their re-
maining holdings into the Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij (now Shell
Petroleum NV) and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. (now Shell Petroleum
Co.); each owned respectively 60 percent and 40 percent by the Dutch and
British partners. The Koninklijke sold most of its Indonesian holdings in
 KOSGORO • 223

1966 after experiencing great difficulties under Guided Democracy. In

1970 the group took over the Billiton (Belitung) tin companies. [0448]

KONINKLIJKE PAKETVAART MAATSCHAPPIJ (KPM, Royal

Packetship Company). Formed in 1888 to take over interisland mail
routes in the colony, the KPM was able to establish an extensive network
and a virtual monopoly of interisland trade in the 20th century, as well
as a reputation for high-quality, expensive service. The company was a
major target for economic nationalism after independence and from
1952 began to disengage from Indonesia, moving its resources into deep-
sea shipping and steadily running down its Indonesian operations. On
3 December 1957, its offices in Indonesia were seized by workers, and
on the same day the company transferred its management to Amsterdam
and ordered all its ships to leave Indonesian territorial waters. Those
ships seized in port were later restored to the company after Lloyds in-
surance agents pressured the Indonesian government to release them. See
also SHIPPING. [0736, 0741, 0898]

KONSTITUANTE. See CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

KORPS PEGAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA (Korpri, Corps of Civil

Servants of the Indonesian Republic). The compulsory official associa-
tion of Indonesian government officials, formed in November 1971 by
the merger of various Korps Karyawan (Kokar, Employees’ Corps) of
government departments. It is the sole social organization to which civil
servants are ordinarily permitted to belong, ostensibly to prevent civil
servants from becoming associated with sectional social interests. Korpri
is affiliated with Golkar and under Suharto played an important role in
marshaling civil servant support for the government at election time (see
MONOLOYALITAS). Its hierarchy (like that of the parallel wives’ or-
ganization, Dharma Wanita) closely mirrored that of the departments in
which its members worked.

KORTE VERKLARING. See NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL

RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA.

KOSGORO (Koperasi Serba Guna Gotong Royong, All-Purpose Gotong

Royong Cooperative). Large cooperative formed on the basis of the East
Java student army of the revolutionary period, Tentara Republik In-
donesia Pelajar (TRIP, Student Army of the Indonesian Republic), and
224 • KOSTRAD

led by Mas Isman (1924–1984), one of the major constituent bodies

within Golkar.

KOSTRAD (Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Army Strate-

gic Reserve). Called Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat, Army General
Reserve, until 1963, it was formed in March 1961 as a crack unit under
direct control of the General Staff, thus independent of the army’s pow-
erful regional commanders. It drew on the existing paracommando unit
Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD) and selected
units from the three Java commands and formed the military power base
of General Suharto in his crushing of the Gestapu and rise to power. See
also ARMY. [0714, 0727]

KRAKATAU (Krakatoa, Rakata). Island in the Sunda Strait between Java

and Sumatra and the site of major eruptions on 20 May and 26–28 Au-
gust 1883. Most of the volcano collapsed into an immense caldera, caus-
ing tsunamis 20 meters high that flooded neighboring coastlines, killing
perhaps 36,000 people. Approximately 18 cubic kilometers of ash was
thrown into the atmosphere, causing bright red sunsets for two years af-
ter. The sound of the explosion was audible over a quarter of the earth’s
surface. Further eruptions resulted in the appearance of a new island,
Anak Krakatau (Child of Krakatau), in January 1928. It was included in
the Ujung Kulon national park in 1980. [1180, 1181]

KRATON. The palace of an Indonesian, especially Javanese, ruler, typi-

cally constructed on a north-south alignment with numerous pavilions
(pendopo) and enclosed courtyards. Traditionally the kraton was re-
garded as the physical center of the kingdom and the point from which
royal power radiated. See also ARCHITECTURE. [0518]

KRETEK. The mixing of addictive drugs, such as betel and opium, with
other substances was already widespread in the archipelago before the
arrival of tobacco, but by the 1930s tobacco and clove cigarettes known
as kretek (perhaps onomatopoeic from the crackling sound they make as
they burn) had become especially common. Initially a cottage industry,
production of kretek came largely into Chinese hands in the 1950s and
expanded greatly at the expense of conventional cigarettes (rokok putih)
after 1968, partly with the help of a differential tariff that disadvantaged
non-kretek brands. The largest firm, Gudang Garam, based in Kediri and
with 41 percent of national production in 1981, had an annual budget
 KUTAI • 225

four times that of East Java province. In the late 1980s a group headed
by Suharto’s son, Tommy Suharto, set up a clove monopoly that caused
great losses to kretek farmers and producers, until the president was
forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to end the monopoly.
See also SUHARTO FAMILY. [0406, 0761]

KRIS. See METALWORKING; WEAPONS.

KRISMON. See FINANCIAL CRISIS.

KRONCONG. Music of the port cities of eastern Indonesia, introduced by

the Portuguese in the 16th century but rapidly assimilated, especially
before the arrival of cassette decks, as the music for pasar malam (night
markets). It reached Java in the late 19th century but is now closely as-
sociated with the Betawi ethnic group. Kroncong typically features a
simple melody line, is generally sung by a woman, and has guitar ac-
companiment and sentimental lyrics. In the 20th century its form was in-
fluenced by Hawaiian styles. Far more than gamelan, kroncong became
a vehicle for nationalist music, typified by the works of Ismail Marzuki
(1914–1958). Since the 1970s the popularity of kroncong has been some-
what diminished by the rise of dangdut. [0168]

KUBU. Primitive tribe in south Sumatra, once thought to be of mixed

Veddoid and Negrito origin, and thus probably descendants of pre-
Austro-Melanesian inhabitants of the archipelago (see MIGRA-
TIONS), but now believed to be of mixed Austro-Melanesian and
Austronesian origin. They are or were seminomadic forest dwellers,
whose main contact with the outside world was by so-called silent
barter, in which goods for trade were left at an agreed spot, without
the Kubu and traders ever meeting.

KUTAI. Region around the lower Mahakam River in east Kalimantan.

Known only from epigraphic evidence, a Hindu or Buddhist state per-
haps a couple of generations old existed there in the early fifth century,
followed by the state of Martapura ruled by King Mulavarman. In circa
1280 refugees from Singasari on Java settling near the river mouth
founded the kingdom of Kertanegara, which converted to Islam in 1565
and later conquered the upstream remnants of Martapura. The sultanate
was subject to Banjarmasin from time to time. The Dutch signed a mo-
nopoly treaty with the sultan in 1635 and annexed the region in 1699, but
226 • KYAI

warriors from Wajo’ in Sulawesi conquered the area in 1726 and a pro-
longed period of Bugis settlement followed.
The Dutch exerted formal control over Kutai from 1844 when they
signed a treaty with the sultan. But their control was primarily aimed at
stopping the threat of British expansion. Sultan Mohammad Sulaiman
(r. 1845–1899) was able to lease out his lands for coal exploitation and
plantation purposes to English traders and other merchants. He never-
theless was obliged under terms of the treaty to provide the Dutch with
men, gunpowder, and ships to prosecute their wars. The sultan signed a
further treaty with the Dutch in 1873, and coal and oil extraction began
in 1882. His successor, Sultan Alimuddin, was effectively appointed by
the Dutch and signed new treaties with them that further restricted his
power, transferring much of the governance of the sultanate to an aristo-
cratic bureaucracy. The oil wells in the region were a target of the Japan-
ese invasion in 1942 and an Australian counterinvasion in July 1945.
The sultanate of Kutai was abolished in 1960. By 1958 it had become
part of the province of East Kalimantan, which emerged as the leading
timber exporter in Indonesia in the late 1960s. See FORESTRY. [0812]

KYAI. Javanese title of respect for learned men, now confined to specialists
in Islamic learning. See also ISLAM. [1336, 1383]

–L–

LABOR. No clear picture of population patterns in the archipelago before

the 19th century has yet been drawn, but it seems that while land was rel-
atively abundant labor was often scarce, and control of labor thus was a
major key to political and economic power. The adoption of Hinduism
and the resulting exaltation of the king seem to have enabled rulers to shift
beyond carefully negotiated patron–client relations with a small number
of followers to the large-scale raising of corvée labor from the community
(see STATE-FORMATION). The mobilization of labor on this large
scale enabled the construction of monuments such as Borobudur and
Prambanan and underpinned the Dutch decision to retain the services of
traditional elites for the recruitment of labor, especially under the Culti-
vation System (see also HERENDIENSTEN). Slavery also existed as a
means of labor control, mostly at household level.
Immigration of laborers from China began on a small scale in the 17th
century but continued in waves until the 1930s, successive colonial au-
 LABOR • 227

thorities finding the Chinese politically and socially more amenable than
Indonesians. In the early 19th century labor was still scarce enough for
the colonial authorities to introduce strict regulations on travel and resi-
dence by Indonesians, and even in 1880 the plantations of East Suma-
tra still needed the state-enforced Coolie Ordinance to keep workers in
place. In the early 20th century a scarcity of skilled labor enabled the
emergence of labor unions, especially on Java, while after indepen-
dence unions drew strength from their association with political parties.
In 1921 the Dutch established a Kantoor van de Arbeid (Labor Office),
which collected information on labor conditions and drafted labor laws.
On the whole, however, the steadily growing abundance of labor weak-
ened the bargaining position of workers.
The implications of rising population for agricultural labor have been
discussed extensively. The Agricultural Involution thesis of American
anthropologist Clifford Geertz suggested that there was little true em-
ployment of labor in the Javanese countryside; rather, a complex system
of lease, lease-back, sale, and sharecropping ensured that all had some
right to land and that income was based on that right rather than on a
strict calculation of wage for service. Fields were thus planted, tended,
and harvested in a cooperative way designed to ensure the welfare of all
members of the community. More recent research has cast doubt on
whether this system was ever as extensive as Geertz seemed to imply,
and most observers now see, in any case, a trend away from diffuse land
rights and toward a distinct class of wage-earning agricultural laborers,
whose bargaining position is severely weakened by the abundance of ru-
ral labor.
After independence, the weakness of labor’s position was increased by
the growing role played by the military in the economy and the identifi-
cation of the strongest labor union during the Sukarno period, Sentral
Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI), with the Partai Komunis
Indonesia (PKI). The institutional arrangement of state–labor relations
in the New Order period has been viewed by some observers as “a legacy
of the struggles between the army and the Left prior to the mid-1960s.”
After the fall of international oil prices, the Suharto regime adopted a
more export-led industrialization strategy based in large part on the
growth of a low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing sector, employing
large numbers of female workers. Manufacturing zones grew up around
major cities, especially in Java, and this was one reason for a change in
the status of workers of the period. Although unemployment was offi-
cially put at 2.2 percent in 1987, most observers believed the figure to be
228 • LABOR UNIONS

much higher than this, perhaps 11 million out of a workforce of 67.5 mil-
lion, though extensive underemployment makes reliable estimates im-
possible. An industrial working class began to develop during the late
1980s, leading to a growth in militancy among some sectors of the labor
force and a notable increase in the number of strikes. (According to gov-
ernment statistics, about 350 strikes occurred in Indonesia in 1996, com-
pared to just 19 in 1989.) Although the government responded in large
part through repression, they also implemented a policy in the early
1990s of raising the minimum wage annually, so that by 1997 it was al-
most three times that in 1990.
Suharto’s resignation led to a rise in the number of labor unions and to
a further increase in wages so that in November 2001 the minimum wage
was raised in Jakarta by 38 percent to nearly US$60 a month. Under the
decentralization law the provincial governments, not the labor ministry,
had authority to set local minimum wages, so this rise was not followed
throughout the country. (Some provincial governments, however, ex-
ceeded Jakarta’s rate of increase, East Kalimantan declaring a 66 per-
cent increase for 2002.) Economic research groups and companies com-
plained that raising the minimum wage would only result in more
unemployment, which stood at the end of 2003 at 42.7 million workers,
10.8 million of them fully unemployed and 31.9 million in the disguised
unemployment category. The labor movement, however, which was be-
coming increasingly assertive after the change from Suharto’s authori-
tarian rule, held out not only for higher wages but also for healthier
working conditions and freedom of association for Indonesia’s workers.
The minimum wage continued to rise, so that in January 2004 it was
US$79.3 per month in Jakarta, a 6.3 percent increase over the previous
year. [0295, 0320, 0334, 0421–0437, 0595, 0748, 1321]

LABOR UNIONS. Rising demand for skilled and semiskilled labor in the
growing cities and in the colonial sugar industry dramatically strength-
ened the position of workers in the colony in the early 20th century,
leading first to a large number of small-scale strikes in the first decade
of the century and then to the formation of labor unions. European gov-
ernment employees were unionized earliest (1905), followed by railway
workers in the Vereeniging van Spoor-en Tramweg Personeel (VSTP,
Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel) in 1908 and the European postal
and pawnshop workers in 1912 and 1913. Since the program of these
unions often included preservation of the favorable treatment of Euro-
pean employees over Indonesians, indigenous workers soon began to
 LABOR UNIONS • 229

form their own unions, especially in the pawnshop service and the rail-
ways, where the VSTP had come under Indonesian domination by 1918.
There were few unions among ethnic Chinese or amongst the employ-
ees of smaller private firms. The Sarekat Islam (SI) and the Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI) were both active in organizing unions, though
their organizers often found themselves torn between promoting the spe-
cific interests of the workers and supporting the broader program of the
political movement.
By 1920 there was no longer a critical shortage of skilled labor; em-
ployers became less tolerant of what they regarded as agitation and they
began resisting union claims and, in some cases, dismissing union lead-
ers. Major strikes broke out in the railway service in 1920 and 1923, in
the pawnshops in 1921, and in the ports in 1925, all of them unsuccess-
ful. Although unions claimed large memberships, union discipline in-
cluding the payment of membership fees was hard to enforce. By 1932
there were 132 unions registered in the colony with a total of 82,860
members.
Banned during the Japanese occupation, labor unions emerged in the
hundreds during the Revolution, often completely taking over the man-
agement of factories and plantations. Many were affiliated through the
labor federations Barisan Buruh Indonesia (BBI) and Sentral Organisasi
Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI) with the PKI, and in 1948 when the
Mohammad Hatta government began attempting to reassert managerial
control, in order to gain control of agricultural and industrial products,
political and class antagonisms coincided. A bitter strike in a state textile
factory at Delanggu in Central Java in May, in particular, contributed to
the tensions that produced the Madiun Affair. During the 1950s and
1960s left-wing control of trade unions diminished with the establish-
ment of more conservative trade union federations, such as Sentral Or-
ganisasi Karyawan Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI). From 1957 severe lim-
its were placed on the right to strike, strikes being prohibited in essential
industries (including communications, development projects, the tourist
industry, and government corporations) in 1963, and unions in general
became vehicles for the mobilization of support for political parties,
rather than purely industrial organizations.
Under the New Order, the government rejected the idea that unions are
institutions for defending worker interests against management and gov-
ernment, and argued instead that they are corporatist bodies for coordinat-
ing the workers’ role in an essentially cooperative venture with manage-
ment. The Basic Manpower Law of 1969 acknowledged the right of
230 • LABOR UNIONS

workers to form unions and to strike, but the principle of Pancasila Indus-
trial Relations (Hubungan Industri Pancasila) laid down in 1974 specifically
denied that workers may have interests distinct from those of business and
industry as a whole. Organizationally, too, unions were brought under close
control. On 20 February 1973 all unions except Korps Pegawai Republik
Indonesia (Korpri) were required to join the Federasi Buruh Seluruh In-
donesia (FBSI, All-Indonesian Workers’ Federation). Peasant organizations
followed on 26 April with the formation of the Himpunan Kerukunan Tani
Indonesia (HKTI, Association of Indonesian Peasant Leagues) and the
Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (HNSI, All-Indonesia Fishermen’s
Association) in September 1973. Each of these organizations became in
turn a member of Golkar. Subsequently, there was a major restructuring of
unions into 21 largely industry-based (“vertical”) organizations with ap-
pointed officials, replacing the former occupation-based (“horizontal”) as-
sociations. In November 1985 this process was completed with the trans-
formation of the FBSI into the Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (SPSI,
All-Indonesia Workers’ Union), which was even more hierarchical and eas-
ily controlled than its predecessor.
Ten years later a further restructuring took place, with the formation of
the Federasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (FSPSI, All-Indonesia
Workers’ United Federation), an apparent response to the growth of la-
bor unrest and strikes in the early 1990s. It was hoped that this new fed-
eration could prevent the growth of independent organizations outside
the control of government. A few independent unions had formed in the
early 1990s, including the short-lived Serikat Buruh Merdeka Seti-
akawan (Solidarity Independent Labor Union) and Muchtar Pakpa-
han’s Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SBSI, Indonesian Prosperous
Workers’ Union). The more radical Pusat Perjuangan Buruh Indonesia
(PPBI, Indonesian Workers’ Struggle Center) linked to the Partai
Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) was suppressed after the 27 July 1996 riots
in Jakarta. In early 1998 Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
(ICMI) established a union called the Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim In-
donesia (PPMI, Indonesian Muslim Workers’ Brotherhood).
After the fall of Suharto a number of local and national labor groups
came into existence, many with strong ties to nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs). They were successful in winning better wages and con-
ditions for workers in several industries, but their future influence re-
mained unclear, particularly with the renewed strengthening of the
military and security apparatus under Megawati Sukarnoputri. See also
LEGAL AID. [0425, 0430, 0436, 0612]
 LAMPUNG • 231

LADANG. Swidden (slash-and-burn) agriculture, assumed to be the earli-

est form of farming in the archipelago and still practiced, especially in
parts of Kalimantan. Typically, swiddeners clear and burn an area of up-
land rainforest, plant crops for a year or more, and then, as soil fertility
diminishes or weed growth becomes insurmountable, move on to a new
area, returning perhaps a generation later once the forest has regrown.
Over the last century, swidden agriculture has aroused strong hostility
among ecologists and agricultural scientists, who have argued, among
other things, that it irreparably damages the rainforest, causing erosion,
disrupting rainfall patterns, and promoting the spread of the grass alang-
alang, and that it needlessly wastes the precious genetic and timber re-
sources of the forest. More recent research, however, has suggested that
swidden agriculture, while contributing some erosion in the short term,
seldom leads to alang-alang infestation or to permanent damage to the
forest, and that much of the ecological change attributed to swidden has
been a consequence of commercial exploitation of rainforest areas.
Swidden agriculture has been found to be more productive in some re-
spects than intensive wet-rice cultivation and certainly than the wide-
spread oil palm plantations.

LAMPUNG. Southernmost province of Sumatra, settled according to tra-

dition by three tribes, the Abung, Publian, and Peminggir, probably in the
14th century. The region became an important pepper-producing area in
the 16th century and came under the rule of Banten in circa 1530. The
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) founded a fort at Menggala in
1668 and took general control of the region in 1751, Herman Willem
Daendels formally annexing it in 1808. A long war of resistance led by
Muslim communities followed (1817–1856). In 1883, coastal regions
were devastated by flooding following the eruption of Krakatau.
Lampung was the site of the first attempts at transmigration and in the
1970s became an important area of settlement, but it was closed to fur-
ther settlement in 1984. Much settlement, however, was already too
dense and the clearing of forest for agriculture created major hydrologi-
cal problems. Lampung became Indonesia’s major coffee-producing
area.
In 1989 a Muslim school in Way Jepara, Lampung, was the site of a
bloody confrontation between local Muslims and the Suharto govern-
ment. Members of the school had close ties with former Darul Islam (DI)
members from West Java and Aceh and with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Is-
lamic Community) students in Central and East Java. In the confrontation
232 • LAND

the regional military command attacked the school compound, killing

close to 100 of the Muslims. See ISLAM IN INDONESIA.

LAND. For much of human history, land was relatively abundant in the ar-
chipelago. Although the effort involved in clearing it for agriculture in-
evitably gave it value, and religious beliefs may have invested it with
spiritual significance, land scarcity was not a major problem and control
of labor and trade seem to have been more important sources of politi-
cal power. Land may have been held collectively within communities,
but individual rights also seem to have been respected. Forest lands and
land not in active cultivation seem to have been more freely at the dis-
posal of rulers, and the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) allocated
to private individuals large tracts of freehold land on the northern coast
of Java (see PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN). The growth of popu-
lation and the rise of commercial production of crops, however, put an
end to this abundance and from at least 1800, control of land was one of
the major issues in politics, first on Java and later on other islands.
During the brief British interregnum, Thomas Stamford Raffles
deemed all land on Java to be government property and on this basis be-
gan to charge peasant farmers a land rent. Under the Cultivation Sys-
tem, however, collective control of land was emphasized, the village re-
ceiving the right (beschikkingsrecht) to allocate and reallocate land to its
members, villagers being required in turn to devote one fifth of their land
to crops for the government. Land rights, thus, were something of a bur-
den, and the complicated land tenure arrangements described by, among
others, Clifford Geertz as an aspect of “agricultural involution” were at
least in part an attempt by landowners to shed the taxation burden. Cor-
respondingly, Europeans were expected not to have land rights, and even
leasehold of land by Europeans was banned from 1836 to 1853; even af-
ter a slight liberalization of regulations in 1856, little land came into Eu-
ropean hands.
Major changes took place with the introduction of the so-called Lib-
eral Policy in 1870. In that year a colonial government Domeinverklar-
ing declared all “waste” land, that is land that was not actively and per-
manently cultivated, on Java and Madura to be government property.
Traditional activities such as wood collecting were deemed to represent
usufruct rights but not ownership, though the extent to which the state
could override traditional use was a topic of continued debate. Also in
1870 the Agrarian Law allowed a form of lease called erfpacht for up
to 75 years, while continuing to ban the sale of land by indigenes to non-
 LAND • 233

indigenes. Regulations on the sugar industry specified that no more than

one third of village land might be leased out, fixed a minimum rent, and
required that land be returned to the village for cultivation at least every
three years, though these regulations were often not enforced. In 1885
regulations were introduced to permit so-called conversierechten (con-
version rights), under which village land might be converted from col-
lective ownership (subject to periodic redistributions) to private owner-
ship, but these were little used, partly because an estimated 75 percent of
land was already under individual hereditary title.
Colonial land laws remained in force until 1960, when a new law sim-
plified landholding by distinguishing between hak milik (ownership and
disposal, restricted to Indonesian citizens) and hak guna bangunan
(usufruct). A 1963 law on land reform was only weakly implemented.
Under the New Order, restrictions on foreign ownership of land were
relaxed, and expropriation of land for major public and private develop-
ment projects led to clashes over competing public and private and na-
tional and local land claims. Land conflicts multiplied as the Indonesian
economy industrialized and farmers were forced off their land to make
way for urban and industrial expansion. The increasing value of land,
particularly that close to major commercial centers, attracted speculators,
and agricultural land was increasingly bought up as an investment by the
urban middle class, as well as millions of hectares being part of the hold-
ings of the Suharto family and being acquired by companies under their
control. In the early 1990s the expropriation of land for huge government
projects, such as the Kedung Ombo dam in Central Java, led to increas-
ingly violent disputes with the local people supported by student sympa-
thizers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Land disputes be-
came the largest category of cases handled by the national human rights
commission in the 1990s.
After the fall of the Suharto regime, there were huge demonstrations
demanding the return of land in Sumatra and Java, and displaced farm-
ers occupied the Suharto ranch near Bogor and the resort areas and golf
courses that had been forcibly acquired over the previous decade. The
government issued new regulations requiring that all land with cultiva-
tion or other long-term rights attached to it be worked productively, and
new measures were passed aimed at reforming legislation with respect to
land ownership.
The registration of land ownership, however, still presents major prob-
lems in densely populated rural areas, where complicated tenure rela-
tionships cannot easily be summed up in a title deed; in urban areas
234 • LAND REFORM

where large numbers of people have been resident for years on what is
technically government or private land and are thus subject to expulsion
at short notice and with meager compensation; and in outlying regions
where indigenous rights over land for purposes such as hunting and
gathering have been disregarded in the acquisition of land for transmi-
gration sites. See also LEGAL AID. [0335, 0337, 0338, 0372, 0595]

LAND REFORM. While many government measures have attempted to

modify the pattern of landholding in Indonesia, the term “land reform”
frequently refers to measures for the redistribution of land provided for
by the 1960 Basic Law on Agriculture (Undang-Undang Pokok
Agraria), which applied mainly to Java. The law, passed at the urging
of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), provided for the breaking up
of larger concentrations of land in the Javanese countryside. Although
there was no class of large landholders in Java, there were clear social
differences in access to land as well as a general trend toward concen-
tration of landholdings. The land reform law did not so much envisage
the arbitrary distribution of land to the poor—there was clearly nowhere
near enough land to go around—but rather aimed to assist those small-
holders who had recently lost or were in danger of losing their land as a
result of indebtedness. The PKI turned the issue into one of popular con-
cern by linking it to the attempts of landlords to restrict participation of
the population in production, especially at harvest time (see GOTONG
ROYONG).
Only in rare instances was the land reform law implemented.
Landowners commonly reduced the size of their holdings by distributing
them among relatives or by donating them to religious institutions, espe-
cially mosques and pesantren, or they relied on delaying tactics by the
land reform committees. In late 1963 the PKI announced aksi sepihak
(unilateral or direct action) to implement land reform measures, accom-
panied by a campaign against the so-called seven village devils. In sev-
eral areas land was seized and commonly restored to former owners, but
the party was accused of choosing its victims more for their hostility to
the PKI than for their class, and most of the landlords targeted were
santri Muslim supporters of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The actions
aroused enormous tensions in the countryside of Java and contributed to
the motives for the massacres of 1965–1966.
Although under the New Order the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 was
never rescinded, few efforts were made to implement its provisions. Af-
ter 1971 the state also discontinued its annual financial support of the
 LAND RENT • 235

land reform program, further weakening the hand of the small landhold-
ers via-à-vis the government. Land was expropriated for large-scale de-
velopment often after bloody clashes with landholders, who received lit-
tle if any compensation. In 1978 a Joint Ministerial Interim Report on
agrarian reform tried to reaffirm the importance of the law and urged a
redistribution of land and more equitable rural relations, but none of
these recommendations were carried out. In the final years of the
Suharto regime, land reform courts were abolished and legal limitations
on landholding gave way to commercial interests.
After the fall of Suharto, there were moves to implement comprehen-
sive land reform measures. The National Land Agency and the post of
minister of agrarian affairs were abolished, and in October 1999 a draft
regulation was accepted in the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
(MPR) asserting that agrarian reform had to be based on recognition of
cultural diversity and associated resource rights, including the control,
exploitation, and management of land through a pluralist tenure system
taking into account local adat law. [0337, 0338, 0954]

LAND RENT (landrente). From the late 18th century a number of re-
formers, such as Dirk van Hogendorp and H. W. Muntinghe, sought
ways of streamlining Dutch rule of Java by bypassing the entrenched po-
sition of the bupati as prime agents of the colonial government and
bringing peasants into the money economy as a market for European
manufactured goods. They proposed to achieve this by creating, among
other things, a direct taxation relationship with the peasantry, and to do
so they suggested recognizing peasants’ land rights, which could then be
taxed. Thomas Stamford Raffles first introduced land rent in Kedu and
Banten in 1812 and it was gradually extended, but, because of the need
to obtain surveys of landholding, the whole of Java (excluding the
Vorstenlanden and particuliere landerijen) was not covered until 1872,
while a unified system of assessment based on fairly accurate surveys
was established only between 1907 and 1921. Land rent was also levied
in Bali, Lombok, and South Sulawesi. Land rent provided nearly half
the revenue of the colonial government in 1867, but this proportion had
sunk to 10 percent by 1928. After independence, land rent was formally
abolished, though it seems still to have been collected in many regions.
In 1959 it was replaced with an agricultural produce tax (pajak hasil
bumi), and the proceeds were allotted to local (kabupaten) authorities. In
1965 it was renamed Iuran Pembangunan Daerah (Ipeda, Regional De-
velopment Tax). [0392, 0588]
236 • LANGE, MADS JOHANSEN

LANGE, MADS JOHANSEN (1806–1856). Danish trader and adven-

turer, one of a number of Europeans who were able to prosper as inter-
mediaries between the indigenous courts and Western traders. After op-
erating in the Balinese court on Lombok from 1834, Lange settled at
Kuta on the south coast of Bali in 1839, where he worked closely with
the raja of Badung, who was also the chief trader of his kingdom. Both
became immensely wealthy from the trade in slaves and other goods,
but war and an outbreak of smallpox in Bali in midcentury undermined
their position. After the sultan’s death, Lange was unable to find a suit-
able new patron and died, probably of poison, in 1856. See also WHITE
RAJAS. [0825]

LANGKAT. Sultanate in East Sumatra, acquired by the Dutch from Siak

in 1858. Like the rest of East Sumatra it became a major area of Dutch
tobacco plantations and in 1892 was the site of the colony’s first com-
mercial oil well at Telaga. The sultan was deposed in the social revolu-
tion of 1946. [0818, 0673]

LANGUAGES. Though it is often difficult to distinguish languages and

dialects, it is commonly said that around 200 indigenous languages are
spoken in the Indonesian archipelago. Most of the languages of western
and central Indonesia are of the Western Austronesian division, formerly
known as the Indonesian branch of the Malayo-Polynesian family, which
includes also Malagasy (see MADAGASCAR, HISTORICAL LINKS
WITH) and the indigenous languages of Taiwan. Languages of the Pa-
cific islands belong to the Eastern Austronesian division. Linguistic and
archeological evidence suggests that the Austronesian languages first
reached the eastern archipelago and had begun to disperse by at least
3000 B.C. (see MIGRATIONS). Features of these languages are a rela-
tively simple morphology for nouns and verbs, use of roots that can be-
come nouns or verbs, reduplication of words, and distinct forms for the
second person including and excluding the listener. Within the Western
Austronesian division, the Sumatran languages Malay, Minangkabau,
Acehnese, Rejang, and Kerinci, together with Madurese, form one sub-
group, with Gayo and Batak somewhat more distant relatives. Malay
expanded from a relatively small base in east and south Sumatra and the
Malay Peninsula in the 13th century to become a major lingua franca in
the archipelago by the 16th century, and it was the basis of modern In-
donesian (see INDONESIAN LANGUAGE). Javanese and Sundanese,
numerically the largest and second largest language groups (excluding
 LASKAR JIHAD • 237

Indonesian), form a distinct subgroup strongly influenced by Sanskrit. A

large number of indigenous languages exist in Kalimantan, but Ngaju,
a language of the southeast, acts as a lingua franca for much of the south-
ern part of the island. In eastern Indonesia, approximately 100 Austrone-
sian languages are spoken, but these are usually classified into Bima-
Sumba, Ambon-Timor, Sula-Bacan, south Halmahera–western Irian,
and several Sulawesi groups. Buginese is the most widely spoken of the
Sulawesi languages. A number of Eastern Austronesian languages are
spoken in the province of Papua, mainly along the north coast. All West-
ern Austronesian languages show successive vocabulary influences from
Sanskrit, Arabic, and/or European languages, depending on the history of
their speakers.
Entirely distinct from the Austronesian family is the Papuan, or Indo-
Pacific, group of languages, whose speakers occupy three quarters of the
island of New Guinea, with communities on Halmahera, Timor, and
Alor. Insufficient research has been done to say that all languages clas-
sified as Papuan are related, but it seems probable that this is the case.
Most are spoken by relatively few people and are highly complex gram-
matically. Verbs, for instance, vary enormously depending on the num-
ber and other characteristics of both subject and objects. Many are tonal;
that is, changes in the pitch of a vowel or syllable change its meaning.
Of the European languages, Portuguese was an important lingua
franca in the archipelago in the 16th and 17th centuries, and Portuguese-
speaking communities survived in some regions until the late 19th cen-
tury. The Dutch generally did not promote the use of their own language
by Indonesians, developing Malay instead as the principal language of
administration.
A number of Malay words have entered English: amok (from amuk),
compound (from kampung), kapok, mandarin (via Portuguese from
menteri, itself derived from a Sanskrit word), paddy, and sarong. Gong
derives from Javanese. See also ETYMOLOGY. [0262, 0264–0272,
0275–0287]

LASKAR JIHAD. This group was founded in early 2000 in central Java
and headed by Ja’far Umar Thalib, a religious leader of Yemenese an-
cestry who fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s.
Its stated agenda was to wipe out Christians in Maluku and central Su-
lawesi, and establish an Islamic state. Although Thalib reportedly met
with Osama bin Laden, there was no concrete evidence of links between
al Qaeda and the Laskar Jihad.
238 • LASYKAR

The Laskar Jihad forces arrived in Poso (Sulawesi) in August 2001,

long after other Muslim militias were well established, but they were be-
lieved to be responsible for much of the violence both there and on Am-
bon. The Laskar Jihad was a suspect in a massacre of 14 Ambon vil-
lagers on 28 April 2002, and the following month the government
ordered the arrest of Ja’far Umar Thalib, who was taken into custody in
Surabaya, for allegedly inciting new violence on Ambon and making
threats against the family of former President Sukarno. Two weeks ear-
lier Alex Manuputty, a leader of the Maluku Sovereignty front, a mainly
Christian separatist group, had been arrested. The Laskar Jihad was then
reported to have shifted its major operations to Papua. In mid-October
2002 in the wake of the Bali bombings, about 1,000 of its members re-
turned to Java from Ambon and Ja’far Umar Thalib announced that the
militia had been disbanded. [1021, 1028]

LASYKAR. Originally denoting a militia or home guard, this term referred

in the Revolution to well-organized irregular armed units that supported
the Republic but resisted incorporation into the army. Most lasykar op-
posed negotiation with the Dutch, preferring a policy of armed struggle.
See also BADAN PERJUANGAN. [0674]

LATAH. Sociopsychological condition occurring among Javanese, which

leads them to utter obscene words or phrases or to imitate the words or
actions of others. See also AMUK.

LAW. The early legal systems of Indonesia are difficult to reconstruct since
these were amongst the first institutions affected by the successive waves
of Indian, Muslim, and European juridical thinking. Codified adat law
represents an attempt by Dutch scholars to record the traditional legal
thinking of the archipelago, but this attempt was affected inevitably by
Dutch political conceptions. The idea of civil actions between private in-
dividuals was not well developed. Punishment commonly included mon-
etary fines, enslavement, torture, and death (reserved for treason, lèse-
majesté, murder, and theft) but rarely imprisonment or beating. Islamic
law (syariah; see LAW, ISLAMIC), introduced in some regions from
the 13th century, greatly clarified commercial and personal law and
added whipping and amputation to the catalog of acceptable punish-
ments.
When the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) arrived in Indonesia in
the 17th century, it had little interest in territorial jurisdiction except as far
 LAW • 239

as was necessary for its commercial purposes, and it therefore left non-Eu-
ropeans as far as possible under the authority of their traditional rulers.
Within VOC territories, European law applied to all. Law for VOC posses-
sions was codified first under Governor-General Anthony van Diemen in
1650, when Joan Maetsuyker compiled the Bataviaasche Statuten; these re-
mained the basis of European law in the colony until 1848 (see also
DUTCH IN INDONESIA; NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA). Courts to administer Dutch law
were established in Batavia in 1629 and Maluku in 1651. In 1747, how-
ever, as it acquired more territory (see MATARAM), the company decided
to retain native law for its indigenous subjects outside the cities and estab-
lished inlandsche rechtsbanken or landraden to apply native law on the
northern coast of Java. Chinese and other nonindigenous minorities were
subject to the same courts, though legal issues within each community were
often left to Dutch-appointed community chiefs.
In the 19th century, with the introduction of direct Dutch rule, this plu-
ralistic system was formalized with the specification of legal racial cate-
gories for Dutch subjects in the Indies (see RACE). In 1824 adat law
was declared applicable to all natives (including those in the cities). In
1848, with the adoption of a new Dutch constitution, the Bataviaasche
Statuten were abolished and a large part of metropolitan Dutch law was
declared applicable to Europeans in the colony. From 1919 sections of
this law (excluding family law) were also applied to foreign orientals,
though they continued to be administered through native courts. Not un-
til the late 19th century, however, was a major program to codify adat
carried out. At the close of the colonial period, the legal system was di-
vided into native (“inheemse”) and government jurisdictions, which co-
incided generally though not always with the distinction between di-
rectly ruled territories and zelfbesturen. Native rulers, aristocrats, and
their families were not subject to civil legal action except with permis-
sion of the governor-general. In 1918 the various branches of criminal
law in the colony were united in a new criminal code, the Wetboek van
Strafwet (now Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, KUHP), but this
was never actually implemented for Indonesians and in 1941 it was sup-
plemented by a separate criminal code for natives, the Herzien Inlandsch
Reglement (HIR, Revised Native Regulations). Islamic courts (priester-
raden) were established on Java and Madura in 1882 to administer Mus-
lim marriage and family law.
The 1945, 1949, and 1950 Constitutions of the Indonesian Republic
all validated Dutch colonial law insofar as it did not conflict with other
240 • LAW, ISLAMIC

provisions of the constitution. Especially during Guided Democracy,

this created some legal uncertainty, as many laws of the colonial era
could be regarded as in conflict with principles of social justice. Law
came to be administered in a three-tier system, cases passing from the
Pengadilan Negeri through the Pengadilan Tinggi (appeal court) to the
Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court).
Under the New Order the judiciary lost virtually all of its indepen-
dence as the government, through the Department of Justice, used the
system of dual court administration to bring the judicial apparatus under
its political control. A new procedural code for criminal law, the Kitab
Undang-undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP), was adopted on 31 De-
cember 1981, but many practical aspects of these regulations remain to
be determined. A network of over 300 religious courts continues to adju-
dicate on marriage, inheritance, and other domestic disputes. See also
LEGAL AID; SUBVERSION; YAP THIAM HIEN. [0027, 0479, 0576,
1075–1078, 1082–1084, 1087, 1090, 1095, 1099, 1100]

LAW, ISLAMIC (syariah). Prior to the coming of the Dutch, Islamic jus-
tice was administered in the archipelago in a variety of ways. By the
early 17th century there were Islamic courts in Aceh and Banten and
probably in other of the Islamic states. Among the Javanese, the
penghulu was responsible for administering Islamic justice. Under a
Dutch law of the 1830s, any decisions by the Islamic courts had to be rat-
ified by the civil courts. This changed in 1882 when a Royal Decree for-
mally chartered a system of Islamic tribunals called “Priests’ Councils”
(priesterraden) operating alongside regular courts in Java and Madura.
In 1937 a series of regulations was passed setting up Islamic appeals
courts in Java, Madura, and Kalimantan and transferring authority over
inheritance from Islamic to civil courts.
After independence, the 1951 law on judicial organization and proce-
dure provided the foundation for the establishment of a nationwide sys-
tem of Islamic courts, and in 1957 a regulation was passed authorizing
establishment of Islamic courts everywhere in the Outer Islands where
they did not already exist, with their competence including inheritance as
well as marriage and divorce cases. Under the New Order, in the early
1970s the government attempted to transfer laws governing marriage to
the civil courts, thus weakening the Islamic courts and marginalizing Is-
lamic doctrine, but these efforts failed and the 1974 Marriage Act re-
tained the role of the Islamic courts. The 1989 Religious Judicature Act
provided a uniform designation for Islamic courts throughout the coun-
 LEMBAGA KEBUDAYAAN RAKYAT • 241

try, placing their organization under the minister of religion and defining
their powers over marriage, inheritance, and charitable foundations. See
also ISLAMIC STATE; SUPREME COURT. [1080, 1081, 1085, 1089,
1094, 1097]

LEGAL AID SERVICES. These began in Indonesia with the formation of

informal consultation bureaus run by law students in Jakarta in 1967. A
full Legal Aid Bureau, the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH), was formed
in 1971 by the legal association Persatuan Advokat Indonesia (Peradin,
Indonesian Advocates’ Union) with financial assistance from the Jakarta
governor Ali Sadikin. Since then over 100 legal aid organizations have
sprung up, with varying degrees of affiliation to the government and
other organizations. They have taken an especially active role in siding
with the poor in land and labor disputes. See also LAW. [1090]

LEIMENA, JOHANNES (1905–1977). Medical doctor and one of the

founders of the Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) in 1945. As min-
ister of health in several early cabinets, he usefully represented the
Protestant minority in government and became a deputy prime minister
in Sukarno’s first nonparliamentary Kabinet Kerja in 1957. He resigned
from Parkindo in 1959 but remained deputy prime minister along with
Chaerul Saleh and Subandrio in 1963 after the death of Juanda
Kartawijaya. He had, however, little influence on policy under Guided
Democracy and was permitted to retire in peace after 1966. [0695]

LEMBAGA KEBUDAYAAN RAKYAT (Lekra, Institute of People’s

Culture). Lekra was founded in August 1950 in opposition to the
“Gelanggang [Arena]” group, a literary renewal movement that saw it-
self as heir to Chairil Anwar (who had died in 1949) and whose mem-
bers included H. B. Jassin, Rivai Apin, Asrul Sani, and initially
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. In early 1950 the “Gelanggang” group,
which was loosely associated with the Partai Sosialis Indonesia
(PSI) and also the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), had published a
“Surat Kepertjajaan” (Letter of Belief) glorifying their views of the
Revolution. In response, a group of younger intellectuals founded the
Lekra and published its manifesto, “Mukadimah” (Introduction), ex-
pressing the disillusionment of the young people at the perceived fail-
ure of the older political leaders to achieve the Revolution’s aim of es-
tablishing a People’s Democratic Republic. The Lekra manifesto
called on artists to help realize this goal. Young people affiliated with
242 • LESSER SUNDAS

the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), such as Dipa Nusantara Aidit

(1923–1965) and Njoto (1925–1965), were closely tied to its founda-
tion, as was the essayist and poet A. S. Dharta, who became the orga-
nization’s first secretary-general.
In 1956 Lekra published a new “Mukadimah” and adopted the doc-
trine of socialist realism, arguing that art should reflect social realities
and promote social progress rather than simply explore the human per-
sonality. In particular, it promoted the idea of “People-ness” (kerakyatan)
in art and urged artists to move downward (turun ke bawah) to draw in-
spiration from the mass of the people. Lekra was rather more successful
in recruiting in the visual arts than in literature; well-known painters such
as Affandi, Henk Ngantung, and Hendra Gunawan applied Lekra ideas
to their work with success, whereas works produced by Lekra writers
were generally less successful. (Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who became in-
creasingly associated with Lekra during the 1950s, and Rivai Apin, who
now edited its journal Zaman Baru, were notable exceptions.) The prose
of the Lekra writers tended to be realistic but their poetry became in-
creasingly propagandistic, and most of their writings were in the form of
short stories and poetry rather than novels.
Lekra associated itself with Sukarno’s “concept” (konsepsi) of an In-
donesian form of democracy, and the president was present at its first Na-
tional Congress held in Solo in 1959. It consistently argued that artists
should receive state support and became itself a major patron of the arts
during Guided Democracy. In 1963 it claimed 200 branches and
100,000 members. After 1962 it began a series of sharp attacks on those
it regarded as opponents of kerakyatan, notably Hamka (Haji Abdul Ma-
lik bin Abdulkarim Amrullah) and H. B. Jassin, to which Jassin and his
colleagues responded with a Manifes Kebudajaan (Manikebu, “Cultural
Manifesto”) in 1963 defending the independence of art. Lekra organized
a campaign against the Manikebu, which Sukarno banned the following
year. During this period, however, work by Lekra writers also faced in-
creasing restriction and censorship by the military. The bitterness engen-
dered by these exchanges created lasting animosities in the literary
world. Along with other PKI affiliates, Lekra was banned after the in-
stallation of the New Order. See also CULTURE, DEBATE ON THE
ROLE OF. [0221, 0225, 0994]

LESSER SUNDAS (Nusatenggara). See BALI; FLORES; KOMODO;

LOMBOK; ROTI; SAVU; SOLOR ARCHIPELAGO; SUMBA; SUM-
BAWA; TIMOR.
 LIGA DEMOKRASI • 243

LIBERAL POLICY. Term generally applied to the colonial policy in force

from 1870 to 1900, though signs of economic liberalism emerged as early
as 1853 when some renting of land to Europeans was permitted. In 1870
the Cultivation System was formally abolished (though many of its fea-
tures remained in force), and private Western businesses were admitted to
the colony. In contrast with the state-directed exploitation of the Cultiva-
tion System, the Liberal Policy was a time of extensive investment by
large companies, especially in the rubber and tobacco plantations of East
Sumatra, the sugar and tea plantations of Java, and the oil wells of
Kalimantan. See also AGRARIAN LAW OF 1870. [0601]

LIEM SIOE LIONG (Sudono Salim) (1916–). Born in Fujian in southern

China, he arrived in Java in 1936. He established a business supplying
cloves to kretek factories in Kudus before the war and during the Revo-
lution was apparently an important supplier to the Republican army in
Central Java. In the 1950s he was involved in various business dealings
with Suharto, then commander of the Diponegoro Division, and began
to diversify into manufacturing and banking. When the PRRI/Permesta
rebellion cut off clove supplies from Minahasa, he pioneered imports
from Madagascar and Zanzibar.
Under the New Order, Liem Sioe Liong emerged as a major business
partner of members of the Suharto family and was allocated monopolies
and licenses that enabled his group to expand into trade, manufacture,
property, finance, and logging. He founded the Salim Group in 1968,
which by the 1990s was reputed to be the largest conglomerate in South-
east Asia. Liem was granted a monopoly over clove imports in 1968, and
his capital base derived especially from that and later from automobile
distributorships. In the late Suharto period, through the Salim group he
was heavily represented in manufacture (especially cement and flour)
and banking, with extensive offshore interests (see also CENDANA
GROUP). Liem was also involved in many joint ventures with foreign
investors as well as partnerships with local state and private enterprises.

LIGA DEMOKRASI (Democratic League). Coalition formed by the Par-

tai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), Masjumi, Ikatan Pendukung Ke-
merdekaan Indonesia (IPKI), and others in 1960 to oppose Sukarno’s
dissolution of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) in March. It was
hampered by the complicity of members of the Masjumi and PSI in the
PRRI/Permesta uprising, and it disappeared when both parties were
banned in August 1960.
244 • LIMBURG STIRUM, J. P. GRAAF VAN

LIMBURG STIRUM, J. P. GRAAF VAN (1873–1948). Governor-general

(1916–1921), closely associated with the Ethical Policy. In November
1918, with political upheavals in the Netherlands suggesting an imminent
socialist revolution there, van Limburg Stirum promised constitutional re-
visions to give greater say to Indonesians in the running of the colony.
These “November promises” (November beloften) were not fulfilled and
came to be seen by nationalists as a sign of Dutch unreliability, though a
government inquiry completed in 1920 did lead to constitutional changes in
1922. See also NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP
WITH INDONESIA. [0620]

LINGGAJATI AGREEMENT. Initialed by the Netherlands and the Re-

public of Indonesia on 12 November 1946 and signed on 25 May 1947
as a settlement to the Indonesian-Dutch dispute. Its principal provisions
were that the Dutch government recognized the Republic as the de facto
authority in Java and Sumatra, and that both sides would work toward
establishment of “a sovereign, democratic, federal state” consisting of
the Republic of Indonesia (Java and Sumatra), Borneo (Kalimantan),
and the Great East (Sulawesi, the Lesser Sundas, Maluku, and West
New Guinea [Papua]) (see FEDERALISM). The federal state would
then join with the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Ne-
gotiations were conducted under strong British pressure (see BRITAIN),
and the agreement was the result of a personal rapprochement between
the leaders of the two delegations, Sutan Sjahrir and the former Dutch
Prime Minister Willem Schermerhorn (1894–1977). It was immensely
unpopular in both countries. Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta were only
able to have it ratified by the Republican parliament (Komité Nasional
Indonesia Pusat [KNIP]) by stacking the membership and making the
issue one of confidence in their leadership, and the Dutch parliament rat-
ified it only after adding unilaterally a number of additional interpreta-
tions and conditions. The agreement broke down formally over the
Dutch refusal to allow Republican participation in decision making for
the Dutch-controlled territories and over continued breaches of the
cease-fire by both sides. See also POLICE ACTIONS; RENVILLE
AGREEMENT. [0661, 0674, 0682, 1146]

LINSCHOTEN, JAN HUYGEN VAN (1563–1611). As secretary to the

archbishop of Portuguese Goa (1583–1589), he traveled much in the In-
dian Ocean region, later publishing two books describing what he had
seen. His 1596 Itinerario naer Oost ofte Portugaels Indien (Itinerary to
 LUBIS, MOCHTAR • 245

the East or Portuguese Indies) was read widely in western Europe and
stimulated formation of both the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
and the English East India Company. He argued especially that poor
Portuguese relations with Asian peoples gave other European countries
an opportunity to compete in the markets there, and he identified Java as
a suitable base for Dutch operations. [0081]

LITERACY. See EDUCATION; WOMEN; WRITING SYSTEMS.

LOMBOK. The indigenous Sasak people of Lombok came under Muslim

Javanese influence in the 16th century, but from the early 17th century
Muslim Makassar and Bima fought the Hindu Balinese kingdom of
Karangasem for control of the island. Balinese power grew from 1677,
and by 1740 Karangasem controlled the whole island. Many Balinese
settled in the west, and by the early 19th century four independent Bali-
nese kingdoms had emerged there, based partly on rice exports to China,
Singapore, and Australia. The kingdom of Mataram emerged as the
dominant power in 1838 but faced continual resistance and occasional
rebellion from the Sasaks in the east. The raja accepted Dutch sover-
eignty in 1843, but in the late 19th century the Dutch sought closer con-
trol to suppress opium trading and slavery. A major Sasak rebellion in
1891 was supported by the Dutch in 1894. After heavy fighting, Mataram
was destroyed, and the defeated court committed ritual suicide
(puputan). See also BALI; NAGARAKRTAGAMA. [0100, 0529, 0810]

LONTAR (Borassus flabellifer, Arecaceae). From Sanskrit ron tal, leaf of

the tala tree, it was probably introduced from India but is now well es-
tablished especially in eastern Indonesia. Palm leaves were used for writ-
ing on Bali from the seventh century, though earliest use was probably of
Corypha leaves rather than lontar. The fragile nature of palm leaves, es-
pecially in the tropics, is a major reason for the tiny proportion of tradi-
tional literature preserved in the archipelago. Lontar was gradually dis-
placed by paper from about the 17th century. See also ROTI. [0576, 1220]

LUBIS, MOCHTAR (1922–). Journalist and novelist, founder of the

newspaper Indonesia Raya (1949–1974) and author of various novels,
including Road with No End (Jalan tak ada ujung, 1952) and Senja di
Jakarta (Twilight in Jakarta, 1957). He was a prominent part of the lib-
eral opposition to various aspects of both Guided Democracy and the
New Order and was jailed by both governments. [0247, 0926]
246 • LUBIS, ZULKIFLI

LUBIS, ZULKIFLI (1923–1994?). A Mandailing Batak born in Aceh,

Lubis was a cousin of A. H. Nasution. Trained as an intelligence officer
by the Japanese, he was responsible for setting up the Republic’s intelli-
gence services in 1945. During the Revolution he headed successive
Republican intelligence organizations, notably the Polisi Militer Khusus
(Special Military Police) and the Field Preparation. In October 1952, he
opposed army officers (including Nasution) who organized demonstra-
tions urging Sukarno to dissolve parliament. As acting army chief of
staff, Lubis led a boycott of the installation ceremony of his successor,
Bambang Sugeng (1913–1977) in 1955 and attempted a coup against
Nasution in 1956. He was accused of responsibility for the assassination
attempt against Sukarno in November 1957 and fled to Sumatra, where
he emerged as a military commander of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion.
Jailed in 1961 after the rebellion failed, he was released in 1966. [0695,
0708, 0714, 1121]

LUWU. The earliest Bugis state in southern Sulawesi, which emerged in

the ninth century at the head of the gulf of Bone. Little is known of its
early history, but it may have been based partly on trade in nickel from
the interior. From the 15th century it began to lose influence to states
such as Wajo’ and Bone. It was converted to Islam in the 17th century.
[0549]

–M–

MADAGASCAR, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Extensive Austrone-

sian migration to Madagascar took place from the fifth century, continu-
ing in sporadic waves until the 12th or even 15th century. The specific
ethnicity of the migrants, who were probably pirates or traders or both
and who probably traveled via Ceylon or South India, is uncertain.
Ninety-four percent of the basic vocabulary in modern Malagasy is of In-
donesian origin and is closest to the languages of the Batak and the
Manyaan Dayak. The Austronesians brought with them a number of
Asian plants, including probably rice, yam, and banana, and created on
Madagascar a hybrid Indonesian-African culture. Cultural and techno-
logical influences include rice cultivation in irrigated terraces, outrigger
canoes, double funerals, and the use of megaliths in ancestor worship.
Hinduistic cultural influence from Indonesia, including an established
aristocracy, is strongest among the Imerina in central Madagascar. Ap-
 MADJID, NURCHOLISH • 247

proximately one third of the genetic composition of contemporary Mada-

gascar population is Austronesian. See also AFRICA, HISTORICAL
LINKS WITH; MIGRATIONS. [0537]

MADIUN AFFAIR. Uprising by sections of the Partai Komunis Indone-

sia (PKI) in Java in September and October 1948. After the first Dutch
“Police Action,” the Republican enclave in east and central Java faced
an economic crisis that forced the government of Mohammad Hatta to
dismiss large numbers of government employees and to demobilize sig-
nificant parts of the armed forces. Prime targets for demobilization were
those associated with the leftist former prime minister, Amir Sjarifud-
din, and politics in the Republic polarized increasingly between left and
right as the austerity program bit deeper. PKI leaders probably did not in-
tend to stage a rebellion at this time, but when tensions reached the point
of armed clashes and the Hatta government treated the left as rebels, PKI
leaders in Madiun declared a communist government. Party leaders in-
cluding Musso and Amir then sided with the rebels, accusing the Hatta
government of having betrayed the ideals of the Revolution. Full-scale
civil war followed, in which Muslim-communist antagonisms led to a
number of massacres on both sides. Within a month, the rising was sup-
pressed, especially by the West Javanese troops of the Siliwangi Divi-
sion. Musso was killed, while Amir was arrested, only to be killed by
government forces during the second Dutch “Police Action.” The affair
made a lasting impression on Indonesian politics: the PKI was accused
not only of gratuitous brutality in its massacres of Muslims but also of
stabbing the Republic in the back as it defended national independence
against the Dutch; the party in turn accused Hatta of cynically provoking
the affair so as to have an excuse to remove the proponents of armed rev-
olution and to come to a compromise with the Dutch. [0645, 0683, 0684,
1128]

MADJID, NURCHOLISH (1939-). A leading Muslim intellectual who

was born in Jombang, East Java, into a Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) family,
but whose father remained with the Masjumi when the NU split off in
1953. Schooled first in pesantren in East Java, including the Gontor
school in Ponorogo, he continued his studies at the State Institute of Is-
lam in Jakarta. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, he was active in the
Muslim student organization, Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI),
becoming its chairman. Later, as director of the student action committee
Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI), he cooperated with the
248 • MADRASAH

military in the demonstrations leading to the overthrow of Sukarno. In

the debates over the government’s banning of the Masjumi party, he ar-
gued for the secularization of the political arena and against an Islamic
state. In the late 1970s Nurcholish attended the University of Chicago,
gaining his Ph.D. in 1984 with a thesis on the thinking of Ibnu Taimiyah.
Two years later he established Paramadina, an association aimed at urban
proselytization, and he became rector of Paramadina Mulya University in
Jakarta. He was an influential member of Ikatan Cendekiawan Mus-
limin Indonesia (ICMI), and has been a constant voice for moderation
in the Muslim intellectual community, arguing for pluralism and demo-
cratic values. In May 2003 he announced that he would be a candidate in
the 2004 presidential election. [1029, 1034, 1355, 1356]

MADRASAH. Nonresidential private Islamic schools offering a mixed re-

ligious and secular curriculum. Although tracing their roots back to 11th-
century Sunni educational institutions, madrasah became widespread in
Egypt in the late 19th century where development of their curricula was
tied to educational reforms of the modernist movement. Many founded
in Java in the early 20th century by the Muhammadiyah competed with
the traditionalist pesantren and took their method of instruction from
European models. The Sumatra Thawalib, an extensive network of
modernist schools offering both religious and secular education, devel-
oped out of the traditionalist surau in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra,
from the early 20th century, and in 1915 an even more modern Diniyah
school was established by Zainuddin Labai (1890–1924), also in Padang
Panjang. See also EDUCATION, PRIVATE AND ISLAMIC. [0045,
0807, 1039, 1273]

MADURA. Island off the northeast coast of Java, generally united with it
for statistical purposes. Dry, relatively infertile, and suffering regularly
from famine, it was ruled by Majapahit until 1466, when a revolt under
Kyai Demung founded Sumenep (Bangkalan) as an independent state.
Islam was established in the early 16th century (c. 1528) and the three
sultanates of Sumenep, Pamekasan, and Madura became trading powers,
though the island was best known for salt production and military forces.
Sultan Agung of Mataram conquered Madura in 1623, installing the
Cakraningrat dynasty as his vassals. In 1671, however, the Madurese
prince Trunojoyo rebelled, conquered the island, captured the court of
Amangkurat I of Mataram, and was only beaten back from the mainland
after the intervention of Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) troops.
 MAHKAMAH MILITER LUAR BIASA • 249

During this time, many Madurese settled in eastern Java. The company
was able to conquer the eastern part of Madura in 1705, and the Mataram
ruler ceded the remainder in 1740, though not until 1745 was Dutch con-
trol firmly in place, the company placing restrictions on the rulers’ for-
eign relations and demanding tribute in the form of cash, cotton, co-
conut oil, and troops. Madurese barisan (formed 1831) were an
important element in the colonial armed forces until the early 20th cen-
tury (see NATIVE TROOPS). In the 19th century, although the Cakran-
ingrats remained the dominant family, their status was steadily eroded as
they lost taxation rights; in 1813 Thomas Stamford Raffles introduced
a government salt monopoly, which was largely farmed out to wealthy
Chinese entrepreneurs (see PACHT). In 1885 the Dutch introduced di-
rect rule, the sultans being demoted to the rank of bupati. A later mem-
ber of the family was employed by the Dutch to head the Negara
Madura, formed on 21 January 1948, as part of the proposed postwar In-
donesian federation (see FEDERALISM). [0008, 1265]

MAHABHARATA. Epic poem originally from India, the earliest known

Old Javanese text dating from the late 10th century. Episodes (lakon) are
widely performed in wayang kulit, golek, and wong, and are often pre-
sented as allegories of contemporary events. The story tells of the pro-
longed struggle between the five Pandawas (sons of Pandu) and 100 Ku-
rawas (sons of Dhrarashta), which culminated in the destruction of
almost all the characters in a final cataclysmic battle, the Bharatayudha.
See also RAMAYANA. [0132, 0159]

MAHKAMAH MILITER LUAR BIASA (Mahmillub, Extraordinary

Military Tribunal). First established by President Sukarno on 24 De-
cember 1963 to try those deemed by the president to be a threat to the se-
curity of the Indonesian state and people, but used primarily after 1965
to try those accused of involvement in the Gestapu coup of 1965. Trials
began on 13 February 1966 with the surviving Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI) leader Nyono and went on to include Subandrio, the air
force chief Omar Dhani, and the coup leader Untung. Sukarno was not
brought to trial, but evidence presented, especially at the trial of Jusuf
Muda Dalam, appeared to implicate his regime in corruption and abuse
of power. A total of 894 people were tried until March 1978, most being
sentenced to death or to prison terms of 20 or more years. Many of the
accused were defended by Yap Thiam Hien. See also TAHANAN POLI-
TIK. [0727, 0741]
250 • MAJAPAHIT

MAJAPAHIT. Kingdom in East Java, generally regarded as the high point

of Hindu-Javanese culture, though relatively little is known of it. After
the overthrow of King Kertanegara of Singasari by rebels from Kediri,
Java was abruptly invaded in 1292–1293 by a Mongol army seeking re-
venge for Kertanegara’s expulsion of Mongol envoys in 1289. Unaware
of the details of Javanese politics, they were persuaded by Kertanegara’s
son Wijaya (?–1309) to help him overthrow the Kediri prince Jayakat-
wang. With Kediri defeated, Wijaya then turned on the Mongols and
drove them out. He moved his capital to Trowulan, established the king-
dom of Majapahit, and took the name Kertarajasa Jayavardhana.
Majapahit experienced a golden age under the rule of Hayam Wuruk
(Rajasanagara, r. 1350–1389) and his prime minister, Gajah Mada. Agri-
cultural production was the basis of the state, but Majapahit also seems
to have traded food, especially to Maluku, and the king was probably a
major trader in his own right. State religion was Sivaitic Hinduism in
which the Buddha was also worshipped. Majapahit society was exten-
sively described by the court poet Prapanca in the Nagarakrtagama,
which also includes a list of supposed dependencies covering the whole
archipelago, including parts of New Guinea as well as the Malay Penin-
sula, the southern Philippines, and perhaps northern Australia. This list
has sometimes been used to give the idea of an archipelago-wide state a
respectable, noncolonial antiquity (see NATIONALISM; SUCCES-
SION), and even to imply vague Indonesian claims on surrounding ter-
ritories, but most scholars now believe that Majapahit’s influence outside
East and Central Java was limited to coastal areas of Kalimantan and
Sumatra and parts of Maluku and Nusatenggara, though a military ex-
pedition to Bali in 1343 is said to have established Old Javanese culture
there. Majapahit apparently declined after Hayam Wuruk’s death and
was wracked by civil war and rebellion through much of the 15th cen-
tury. Either it or a Hindu successor state was conquered by the coastal
Muslim state of Demak in circa 1527. [0528, 0535, 0573]

MAJELIS ISLAM A’LAA INDONESIA (MIAI, Supreme Islamic Coun-

cil of Indonesia). Federation of Muslim organizations, founded in Sep-
tember 1937 by K. Mansur, Ahmad Dahlan, and Abdul Wahab for the
discussion of religious matters. At the 1938 All Islam Congress, dele-
gates from the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) and the Partai
Islam Indonesia (PII) pushed the organization to take a stand on politi-
cal issues, and in 1942 a conference of Muslim leaders under Japanese
auspices agreed to recognize it as a central coordinating body for Mus-
 MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT • 251

lim affairs. The Japanese in the event declined to deal with the MIAI, in-
stead creating on Java the Masjumi. [0648]

MAJELIS PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT (MPR, People’s Delibera-

tive Assembly). Indonesia’s supreme representative body, which meets
once every five years following the national elections and has had the ma-
jor functions of electing the president and vice president; determining
the Broad Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN),
which state the broad aims and principles of government policy for the
next five years; and amending the Constitution, though in 1966 it de-
clared that the preamble to the constitution, containing the Pancasila,
was inalterable. It also has the power to impeach the president. The 1945
Constitution provided for the MPR, but it was not assembled until 1959,
when Sukarno added presidential nominees (94 from the provinces and
200 from the functional groups) to the existing 281-member house of rep-
resentatives to create a 575-member MPR-Sementara (MPRS, Provi-
sional MPR). This MPRS met in 1959, 1963, and 1965 under Sukarno; in
1966 to ratify the transfer of power to Suharto; in 1967 to appoint
Suharto acting president; and in 1968 to elect him full president.
Under regulations passed in November 1969, a full MPR (no longer
provisional) was constituted with 920 members, comprising all 460
members of the largely elected Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) to-
gether with 207 presidential nominees, 121 nominees from elected par-
ties, 130 provincial representatives, and two nominees from parties un-
successful in the DPR elections. In 1987 membership was increased to
1,000, about half of whom wre not DPR members.
A turning point leading to the fall of Suharto occurred when the head
of the MPR, Harmoko, who was a Suharto loyalist, called on the presi-
dent to resign in an MPR session on 18 May 1998. The MPR also came
into conflict with Suharto’s successors, especially Abdurrachman
Wahid. It urged him in August 2000 to take stronger measures against
separatist movements, and it refused to endorse his decision to change
Irian Jaya’s name to Papua. In June 2001 it removed him from office
through impeachment, naming as his successor his vice president,
Megawati Sukarnoputri. In August 2002 the MPR voted to introduce
direct presidential elections in 2004, under which if no single candidate
receives more than 50 percent of the vote, there will be a second round
of balloting. In the same session it also voted to abolish in 2004 the 38
parliamentary seats reserved for the military, and it rejected calls from
the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and other smaller parties to
252 • MAKASSAR

introduce Islamic law. Starting in 2002 a series of constitutional amend-

ments stripped the MPR of much of its power. Under Article 11 of Law
No. 22/2003 its functions were limited to amending the constitution,
making the final decision on the impeachment of the president or vice
president, formally installing the president and vice president and se-
lecting a new president and vice president in emergency situations. A
constitutional amendment in August 2002 provided for MPR member-
ship to be drawn entirely from elected members of the DPR and the new
Regional Representative Council (DPD). See also KOMITÉ NA-
SIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT. [1100]

MAKASSAR (Gowa, Goa). Kingdom in South Sulawesi, which grew af-

ter circa 1530 from the ports of Gowa and Tallo. Reorganized from a
loose federation to a centrally governed state by Karaëng (King) Tuma-
pa’risi in the early 16th century, partly with the assistance of Malay
refugees from the fall of Melaka, it dominated the west coast of south-
ern Sulawesi by the end of the century. With the decline of the rice trade
from Java, Karaeng Matoaya, ruler of Tallo and prime minister of
Makassar, expanded local rice production for trade to Maluku in ex-
change for nutmeg and cloves. In 1605 Makassar converted to Islam
and began a series of campaigns to control the region, conquering its
main rival, Bone, in a campaign from 1608 to 1611. Overseas expansion
followed, with operations against Sumbawa (1617), Buru, Seram, Ban-
ten, and eastern Kalimantan, though in all cases it ruled through vassals
rather than directly. It may have been these campaigns that dispersed the
Bajau from the region. From early in the 17th century, Makassar became
a major base for Portuguese, British, Danish, and Asian traders attempt-
ing to thwart the Dutch spice monopoly in Maluku, and it came under
corresponding pressure from the Dutch to grant them a monopoly. In
1666 Cornelis Speelman launched a major expedition against Sultan
Hasanuddin (1653–1669), who was defeated in 1667 by the Dutch and
Bugis (see ARUNG PALAKKA) forces. Under the treaty of Bungaya
(1667), Makassar was reduced to little more than the port of Gowa. A re-
bellion by Hasanuddin in 1668–1669 was suppressed.
After a period of decline in the 18th century, the city emerged in the
19th century as a major trade center in eastern Indonesia and the capital
city respectively of the gouvernement of the Grote Oost (see
PROVINCES), the Japanese naval administration in eastern Indonesia,
and the Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT). Local support for the Indone-
sian Republic was suppressed first by Australian troops and then, in a bru-
tal fashion, by Dutch forces under R. P. P. Westerling. In 1971 the city’s
 MALARIA • 253

name was changed to Ujung Pandang, but it was changed back to Makas-
sar after Suharto’s fall. [0508, 0549, 0574, 0660, 0786, 0787, 0831, 1246]

MALACCA. See MELAKA.

MALARI (Malapetaka 15 Januari, Disaster of 15 January). Student demon-

strations in Jakarta on 15–16 January 1974, which were seen as the first
major political challenge to the New Order. Occurring at a time when oil
prices were skyrocketing, a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka became the occasion for widespread demonstrations not only by
students but also by large numbers of Jakarta’s poor people. Japanese cars
were among the targets of the demonstrators, but the growing strength of
foreign companies in general, the increasing wealth of military bureaucrats
and their Chinese business partners (cukong), and the general corruption
and extravagance of the government were the principal complaints. Stu-
dent demands, like those of the 1966 Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa In-
donesia (KAMI), were summarized as Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (Tritura,
Three Demands of the People), namely the dissolution of the presidential
staff or ASPRI (Asisten Presiden Republik Indonesia), lower prices, and an
end to corruption. The play The Struggle of the Naga Tribe by W. S. Ren-
dra and the song “Tante Sun” by Bimbo played some role in focusing dis-
content, but the demonstrations were also a vehicle for intraregime rival-
ries between General Soemitro, head of Komando Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), and General Ali Murtopo of
the Operasi Khusus. A student, Hariman Siregar, and a lecturer, Syahrir,
both of Universitas Indonesia, were later tried and sentenced under the
Anti-Subversion Law for inciting the riots. (See also SUBVERSION.)
Malari led to important changes in New Order policy that calmed the
opposition. Soemitro was dismissed, six newspapers (Abadi, Harian
KAMI, Indonesia Raya, Mahasiswa Indonesia, Nusantara, and Pedoman)
were closed, and Daud Yusuf was appointed education minister with the
task of depoliticizing the universities. At the same time Suharto intro-
duced a number of regulations encouraging greater participation by in-
digenous entrepreneurs in the economy by stipulating that all new foreign
investment would have to be in the form of joint ventures with pribumi
partners rather than with Chinese and that foreign investors would have
to present plans for the local businessmen to achieve eventual majority
ownership of the joint business ventures. [0399, 0733, 0736, 0742]

MALARIA. A fever disease caused by the protozoan parasite Plasmodium

that has been one of the blights of life in Indonesia since early times and
254 • MALAY PENINSULA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH

may have been one of the factors limiting state formation and the growth
of complex societies in the region. Cinchona bark was recognized from
the late 18th century as offering relief and sometimes cure, and its ex-
tensive cultivation on Java helped to make the tropics habitable. The
connection between the disease and the bites of various species of the
mosquito Anopheles was discovered only in 1898, and from 1924 a Cen-
tral Malaria Bureau of the colonial government began eradication pro-
grams, both by water management and by use of insecticides. Extensive
spraying with DDT began in 1951. See also HEALTH. [1204]

MALAY PENINSULA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Although at-

tached to the Southeast Asian mainland by the isthmus of Kra, the Malay
Peninsula belonged historically to the island world of the Indonesian ar-
chipelago almost as much as neighboring Sumatra. The indigenous
Malay population of the peninsula was ethnically identical to the Malays
of the eastern coast of Sumatra and the Riau archipelago, and states
along the Strait of Melaka traditionally sought control of both sides of
the waterway, regardless of which shore they happened to be on (see
ACEH; JAMBI; SRIVIJAYA). Buddhism and later Islam reached
both sides of the strait at about the same time, and with comparable im-
pact, though the peninsula was much later in developing major kingdoms
than was Sumatra. The cultural and political influence of Siam, on the
other hand, was not significantly felt beyond the northern and eastern
parts of the peninsula.
The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 separated the peninsula from the
archipelago politically, but economic ties remained strong. Penang,
founded in 1786, became the major port for produce from East Sumatra,
first pepper and later rubber, and Singapore became a major entrepôt
for much of the western archipelago. During the 19th and 20th centuries,
there was extensive migration from Sumatra and Java to the peninsula;
Minangkabau communities are especially strong in Negeri Sembilan.
Sumatra and the peninsula were both under the Japanese 25th army from
1942 to 1943, and in the period immediately after the Japanese surren-
der, an organization called Kesatuan Raayat Indonesia Semenanjung
(KRIS, Union of Indonesian People of the Peninsula) under Ibrahim
Yaakob briefly campaigned for the inclusion of Malaya in the new In-
donesian Republic. During the Revolution, Singapore and Penang were
major centers for the smuggling of weapons to the nationalists and for
the legal and clandestine sale of Indonesian produce. In the 1950s, the
Federation of Malaya provided support and encouragement to the
 MALAYSIA, RELATIONS WITH • 255

PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Sumatra. See also MALAYSIA, RELA-

TIONS WITH. [1068, 1110, 1121, 1363]

MALAYSIA (term). See INDONESIA; MALESIA.

MALAYSIA, RELATIONS WITH. After World War II, the British in

Malaya began to move gradually to grant greater autonomy to their
Southeast Asian possessions (the Malay Peninsula and Singapore,
Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo [Sabah]). In 1961 these moves crys-
tallized in plans to create a federal state of Malaysia incorporating all
British territories. Indonesia was unhappy about this proposal for several
reasons: Britain was to retain its naval base in Singapore, the Malay sul-
tans were to retain a powerful political role, people in northern Borneo
seemed hostile to the federation, and Indonesia, although the largest
power in the region, had not been consulted on the plan. Sukarno an-
nounced in January 1963 that the Malaysia proposal was unacceptable, a
position that was also adopted by the Philippine president, Diosdado
Macapagal. At Macapagal’s instigation, leaders of the three countries
met first in Tokyo and then in Manila (see MAPHILINDO), where they
agreed that the federation would be formed after a United Nations’ as-
certainment of attitudes toward it in North Borneo and Sarawak (Brunei
had by this time pulled out of the proposal). But in late August Britain
announced the federation would form regardless of opinion in the Bor-
neo states. Indonesia then announced a Confrontation against Malaysia,
which ended only on 11 August 1966 after the overthrow of the Sukarno
regime.
In 1970 a “Friendship Treaty” regulated the complex marine border
between the two counties, dividing the Melaka Strait along a median
line while acknowledging Malaysian traditional fishing rights and a gen-
eral right of free passage in the South China Sea between East and West
Malaysia, though this left unresolved a dispute over the ownership of
two islands off the eastern coast of Borneo near the Sabah–Kalimantan
border. Since the 1970s the Malaysian government has informally per-
mitted the migration of significant numbers of Indonesian Muslims to
Malaysia to increase the “indigenous” (“bumiputera”) proportion of the
population. Malaysia became the first country to recognize Indonesia’s
archipelagic concept in February 1982. In December 1987 Indonesia and
Malaysia signed an agreement to cooperate in the marketing of oil palm,
rubber, and other agricultural products. Both countries are members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
256 • MALESIA

On 1 August 2002 a new Malaysian law went into effect calling for the
imprisonment and caning of all illegal workers, which led to the depor-
tation and exodus of thousands of Indonesian migrant workers (some es-
timates as high as 400,000). [0478, 1027, 1120, 1319]

MALESIA. Latin-Italian term for the Malay world, first popularized by

Odo Beccari (1843–1920) in his three-volume natural history work
Malesia (1877). Up until 1962 the term “Malaysia” was more common,
but the imminent creation of the state of Malaysia (1963) demanded a
change in usage, and the term Malesia was adopted for the botanical re-
gion encompassing insular Southeast Asia, peninsular Malaysia, and
New Guinea, including the Bismarck Archipelago. See also INDONE-
SIA; WALLACE’S LINE.

MALIK, ADAM (1917–1984). Journalist and nationalist politician, one of

the early leaders of the Antara news agency before the war and an em-
ployee of the Japanese news agency Domei during the occupation. Dur-
ing the Revolution, Malik was close to Tan Malaka and in 1948 joined
the Murba party. Although a strong supporter of the general structure of
Guided Democracy, he opposed the rising strength of the Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI), helping to form the anticommunist Badan Pen-
dukung Sukarnoisme (BPS) in 1964. After the Gestapu coup, he be-
came minister of foreign affairs (1966–1977) in a symbolic New Order
triumvirate with Suharto and Hamengkubuwono IX. His greatest
achievement in this position was probably his success in 1970 in keep-
ing Indonesia out of the Cambodia conflict. He served as vice president
from 1977 to 1982. [0741, 0862]

MALUKU. The large archipelago lying between Sulawesi, Papua, and

Timor, consisting especially of the islands of Ambon, Aru, Banda,
Buru, Halmahera, Seram, Tanimbar, Ternate, Tidore, Sula, Kai, and
Wetar. The area around Ambon formerly known as the South Moluccas
is now known as central Maluku. The region is ethnically and culturally
diverse, showing both Malay and Papuan influences (see also MIGRA-
TIONS; WALLACE’S LINE). It has been economically significant
since early times for its spices (e.g., cloves and nutmeg). In the 14th cen-
tury it seems to have been dominated by the Javanese kingdom of Ma-
japahit, while in the 16th century the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore
ruled many of the islands. The Portuguese signed an alliance with Ter-
nate in 1511 and for much of the following century and a half, the Por-
 MANGKUBUMI • 257

tuguese, Spanish, and Dutch competed with each other and with local
powers for control (see also DUTCH EAST INDIES COMPANY;
HONGI RAIDS). Extensive Christianization took place in the region. It
was the center of the strongest opposition to the Republic’s imposition of
authority after the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch (see REPUB-
LIK MALUKU SELATAN).
After Suharto’s resignation in 1998, Maluku became a center of in-
terethnic and interreligious violence. From January 1999 there was fight-
ing in Ambon and southern areas of Maluku, and after the establishment
in October 1999 of a new province in North Maluku (which encompasses
Halmahera and the surrounding islands, including Ternate and Tidore
[see map 12] and also the Sula archipelago to the southeast), fighting
spread to that area. The North Maluku provincial government estimated
that over 2,000 people died over the next five months, and in Maluku as
a whole more than 5,000 people were killed between 1999 and 2002. In-
ternal displacement was estimated at between 123,000 and 370,000.
Many refugees began returning in mid-2001, but a large proportion of
the Christians decided not to go back, the largest group (approximately
30,000—mostly from Ternate, Tidore, and southern Halmahera) being in
refugee camps in northern Sulawesi. In February 2002 Christian and
Muslim leaders from the Moluccan Islands signed a peace accord in
Makassar (Malino II) agreeing to surrender their weapons, but two
months later violence again broke out with at least 12 people killed. On
29 April the military asked for martial law to be imposed on Maluku.
[0079, 0650, 0781, 0967, 1221]

MANADO. See MINAHASA.

MANDAR. Region on the western coast of South Sulawesi, traditionally

divided into several small communities that sometimes coalesced, espe-
cially for warfare, into one or two confederations. In the early 17th cen-
tury, it came under the domination of Makassar. [0549]

MANGKUBUMI (?–1792). Prince of Mataram who rebelled against

Pakubuwono II in 1742 and again in 1745, especially as a result of
Pakubuwono’s 1743 decision to lease the north coast of Java to the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). He had himself declared king on
Pakubuwono’s death in 1749, taking the title sultan and the name
Hamengkubuwono (I) in 1755. After a protracted war with the VOC and
its protégés in Mataram, he agreed in the Treaty of Giyanti to accept half
258 • MANGKUNEGARAN

the kingdom together with 10,000 reals as his share of proceeds from the
VOC lease on the north coast. He established his court in Yogyakarta
and was founder of the present dynasty. See also HAMENGKUBU-
WONO IX.

MANGKUNEGARAN. Minor court in Surakarta, established in 1757 by

the partition of the Sunanate. The court’s armed forces, the Legiun
Mangkunegaran, were reorganized by Herman Willem Daendels, mak-
ing them one of the few significant indigenous military forces on Java
in the late colonial period (see NATIVE TROOPS). Mangkunegoro II
(1796–1835) and IV (r. 1853–1881) established an extensive sugar and
tobacco plantation sector in the Mangkunegaran lands. In 1946 the
Mangkunegaran was formally abolished, along with the Surakarta court,
after it failed to support the Republic unequivocally, but its informal po-
sition improved during the Suharto presidency due to its family con-
nection with his wife, Siti Hartinah (“Tien”).

MANIFES KEBUDAYAAN (Manikebu, Cultural Manifesto). Issued in

October 1963 by a group of writers, intellectuals, and artists, including
H. B. Jassin, Gunawan Muhamad, and Wiratmo Sukito, as an affirma-
tion of the values of “universal humanism” and a rejection of the idea,
promoted by Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra), that artistic qual-
ity was better judged by social criteria than by self-referencing aesthetic
notions. After extensive debate, the manifesto was banned by Sukarno
on 8 May 1964. See also CULTURE, DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF.
[0159, 0225]

MANIFESTO POLITIK. 1. Statement issued by Republican leaders on 1

November 1945, promising inter alia that the Indonesian Republic would
respect the property rights of foreign investors. The government hoped
in this way to win international approval, but the policy aroused strong
domestic opposition. [0643, 0913]
2. (Also called MANIPOL.) The ideology of Guided Democracy
as set out in Sukarno’s independence day speech on 17 August 1959
and adopted by the Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (DPA) as the Broad
Outlines of State Policy (Garis Besar Haluan Negara, GBHN) in Sep-
tember 1959. In it Sukarno called for social justice, a return to the
spirit of the Revolution, and a “retooling” of state organs. In 1960
MANIPOL was elaborated with the addition of the acronym USDEK
(Undang-undang ’45, 1945 Constitution; Sosialisme à la Indonesia,
 MARHAEN • 259

Indonesian socialism; Demokrasi Terpimpin, Guided Democracy;

Ekonomi Terpimpin, Guided Economy; and Kepribadian Indonesia,
Indonesian Identity). The precise meaning of each of these terms re-
mained vague, but MANIPOL soon became associated as a slogan
with the Left in Indonesian politics, and it was formally repudiated by
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—Sementara (MPR-S) in 1967.
[0859]

MAPHILINDO. Rubric for the proposed confederation of Malaya, the

Philippines, and Indonesia, proposed by President Diosdado Macapagal
of the Philippines and discussed by leaders of the three states in a series
of meetings and conferences held in May–August 1963. Both Indonesia
and the Philippines, however, had already announced their reservations
regarding the formation of Malaysia, and the Maphilindo idea disap-
peared with the full launching of Indonesia’s Confrontation against the
new federation in September 1963, though it provided some basis for the
later formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
[0478, 1123, 1144]

MARDIJKERS. Portuguese-speaking descendants of freed slaves, who

formed a separate, large social category in 17th-century Batavia. See
also DEPOK. [0584, 0585]

MARÉCHAUSSÉE. The failure of conventional military tactics in the war

in Aceh led the colonial authorities in 1890 to form small military units
of mixed race to operate as counterguerrilla or commando forces largely
independent of the tactical command of Koninklijk Nederlands-
Indisch Leger (KNIL) officers. These units, familiar with the country-
side and each other, and small enough to move unobtrusively, were a
qualified success and in the early 20th century were used in other areas
as a kind of militarized police force.

MARHAEN. The term adopted by Sukarno (probably from a Sundanese

word for a small farmer) to denote the large numbers of Indonesians, es-
pecially peasants, who, although poverty-stricken and oppressed by
colonial capitalism, were nonetheless owners of some of the means of
production (e.g., a small plot of land or a few tools) and were thus not
proletarians. In Sukarno’s early usage, the term encompassed most In-
donesians; later it was restricted to poorer sections of society. See also
CLASS ANALYSIS; MARXISM. [0859, 0918]
260 • MARIJUANA

MARIJUANA. See CANNABIS.

MARRIAGE, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF. Among aristocracies

in early Indonesia, marriage seems to have been, as it was in Europe, a
tool for allying families and kingdoms. On the one hand, rulers typically
had many wives, drawn from the families of vassals and allies, and the
status of those wives was often a measure of the vassals’ and allies’ sta-
tus (see KIDUNG SUNDA). On the other hand, women were in some re-
spects at least the locus of power, and rulers gained their legitimacy in
part by virtue of the women they married. Thus, Ken Angrok married
his predecessor’s widow and the sultans of Yogyakarta symbolically
marry the Queen of the South Seas, Nyai Loro Kidul, when they ascend
the throne. The queens of Aceh were more or less prevented from mar-
rying in order to prevent them from allying formally with any of the in-
ternal forces in the state. In a later time, Sukarno’s marriage to a Japan-
ese former nightclub hostess, Nemoto Naoko (Ratna Dewi Sari), led to
suggestions that he was too close to Japan. The political value of mar-
riage tended to mean that both sons and daughters were married at or
soon after puberty, but in the rest of society, later marriages (between the
ages of 15 and 21) seem to have been more common and monogamy was
the general rule, though divorce by either side was easy and frequent. A
bride price was commonly paid, but it went to the bride herself rather
than to her family.
The arrival of Islam transformed the character of marriage, though the
extent to which Islamic marriage law was followed varied widely. Where
Muslim influence was strongest, daughters in particular married earlier,
arranged marriages became more common, and women lost the right to
initiate divorce. In European society, formal marriage between Euro-
peans and Indonesians was always strongly discouraged and sometimes
prohibited, but concubinage was common. A nyai or concubine was
sometimes little more than a sexual slave, but many became powerful
partners of their European husbands and some were strong traders and
managers in their own right. The status of children from these unions
varied: if the father formally acknowledged them they had European sta-
tus, if not they took that of the mother. When interracial marriages were
permitted, the wife took the legal status of her husband (see RACE).
Jean Taylor has shown that in 17th- and 18th-century Batavia, political
alliances between senior and junior Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC) officials were often cemented by marriages between junior offi-
cials and the Eurasian daughters of their seniors.
 MARXISM • 261

In the 20th century the Dutch allowed Muslim marriages to be con-

ducted and registered by Muslim officials of the Department of Religious
Affairs. This system was retained by the Republic. Protests against early
marriage for girls began in the early 20th century, with, for example,
R. A. Kartini writing against it and letters also appearing in the West
Sumatran women’s paper Soenting Melajoe arguing against parental
pressure for girls to marry early. The women’s branch of the Sarekat Is-
lam embraced policies to combat child marriage.
The Republic retained the practice of marriages being conducted by
Muslim officials of the Religious Affairs Department. A series of unsuc-
cessful efforts was made to enact legislative reforms of Islamic marriage
law, but none was successful. In 1973, however, the government pre-
pared a draft marriage law that would have enforced monogamy, re-
quired state registration of all marriages, and permitted cross-religion
marriages, which are anathema to Islam. The draft law led to fierce op-
position by the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and other Mus-
lim groups, and to heated debate in parliament. The amended law, which
was eventually passed in 1974, permitted polygamy but put greater re-
strictions on husbands’ rights to divorce and take multiple wives. It also
set guidelines for all marriages, set minimum ages for marriage, and in-
troduced greater security and equity for Indonesian wives, making it eas-
ier for Muslim women to achieve divorce. It contained a provision that
Muslim couples settle their differences in the religious courts. See also
LAW, ISLAMIC; PROSTITUTION. [0552, 0584, 1036, 1400, 1421]

MARXISM. Although the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) adhered in

general to Marxism-Leninism, it developed Marxist theory in a number
of distinctive ways. Pointing to the enormous social and cultural diver-
sity in Indonesia, it argued that the historical stages identified by Marx
were telescoped in Indonesia into a single, comprehensive struggle
against capitalist imperialism of which most Indonesians were victims.
The party accordingly downplayed open class struggle (though this was
less the case after 1963), arguing that the primary enemies of the In-
donesian people were foreign. The clear influence of elements from
Marxism on nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta
assisted this analysis. From this followed the theory of the Dual Nature
of the State, which asserted that although Indonesian society was “semi-
colonial” and “semifeudal,” the independent Indonesian state after 1949
was at least partly “pro-people” and the party’s struggle should thus be
to maximize the pro-people element and not to overthrow the state as
262 • MASJUMI

such. The party, accordingly, never had a well-formulated program for

armed rebellion. Party philosophy instead emphasized the promotion of
socialist ways of thinking and put a high priority on establishing the
hegemony of Marxist ideas in philosophy and the arts. See also CLASS
ANALYSIS; LEMBAGA KEBUDAYAAN RAKYAT. [0621, 0912,
0917, 0919, 0922, 0931]

MASJUMI (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of

Indonesian Muslims). The Masjumi was established on Java on 7 No-
vember 1945. It was a new Muslim political organization and should not
be confused with its predecessor on Java, which had been established un-
der the Japanese as an amalgamation primarily of the Muhammadiyah
and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The postindependence Masjumi subsumed
also prewar Islamic political organizations. On Sumatra the Masjumi
was established in February 1946 as a fusion of the Muhammadiyah and
the Majelis Islam Tinggi (MIT, High Council of Islam), a major Islamic
federation that had existed on the island during the Japanese occupa-
tion. The military organizations Hizbullah and Sabilillah had been
formed previously, and they acted as the Masjumi’s armed militias dur-
ing the early Revolution when the party strongly opposed the govern-
ment’s negotiations with the Dutch. However, many Hizbullah units cut
their ties with Masjumi in 1948 when the party backed the negotiating
policy of the Mohammad Hatta government, some joining S. M. Kar-
tosuwiryo in the Darul Islam (DI) movement.
The Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) declared its independence
of Masjumi in 1947, and the NU left the organization in 1952, despite
the efforts of the Masjumi’s Javanese chairman, Sukiman Wiryosan-
joyo, to bridge the differences between the religious socialists—among
whom Mohammad Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara were most
influential—and the more traditionally oriented rural Javanese leaders
of the NU. After the departure of the NU, the subsequent major division
in the Masjumi was between modernist elements, including the religious
socialists, and the Islamic purists, especially Isa Anshary, who advocated
early realization of an Islamic state. The NU’s secession was largely re-
sponsible for Masjumi’s disappointing showing in the 1955 elections
when it received only 20.9 percent of the vote (with the NU gaining 18.4
percent).
These elections showed that Masjumi’s strength lay mainly in the Sun-
danese regions of West Java and in the Outer Islands. The party sym-
pathized with the democratic and anticommunist goals of the
 MASS ORGANIZATIONS • 263

PRRI/Permesta rebellion of the late 1950s. Under harassment in

Jakarta, three of its prime leaders (Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin
Prawiranegara, and Burhannudin Harahap) joined the rebels at the end
of 1957. When the party’s central leadership refused to expel these men,
splits developed in the Masjumi leadership in Jakarta, which led to a de-
cline in its influence and provided an excuse for Sukarno to move to re-
place party government with Guided Democracy. Excluded from the
councils that Sukarno then established, the Masjumi became a major
leader of the ineffective Liga Demokrasi protesting against the dissolu-
tion of parliamentary democracy. On 14 April 1961 Sukarno outlawed
the Masjumi, arresting several of its leaders, including some who had not
participated in the rebellion.
After the installation of the New Order, former Masjumi leaders
hoped that the party might be allowed to re-form, and the Partai Mus-
limin Indonesia (Parmusi) was initially intended as a direct successor to
Masjumi. The military authorities, however, banned former Masjumi
leaders from executive positions in the new party and also forbade them
from engaging in politics. The influence of the Masjumi, however, did
not completely disappear, and in the 1999 elections, at least two political
parties made use of its name—the Partai Politik Islam Indonesia
Masyumi (PPIM) and the Partai Masyumi Baru—though they gained
few votes and only one seat in the parliament. [0648, 0695, 0706, 0983,
1036, 1329]

MASS ORGANIZATIONS (organisasi massa, ormas). Term referring to

organizations with mass memberships, generally organized around social
categories such as students, women, workers (see LABOR UNIONS),
and the like, and commonly associated with political parties, though par-
ties themselves are formally also ormas. Ormas emerged on a massive
scale during the Indonesian Revolution, and parties typically recruited
much of their support through affiliated ormas rather than by appealing
directly to the public. Thus the peasant organization Barisan Tani In-
donesia (BTI) with a claimed membership of 12 million was a major pil-
lar of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), and one of the main strate-
gies of the army in resisting the rise of the Left was the coordination of
mass organizations, first in the badan kerja sama and later in Golkar.
Under the New Order, the government sought to deprive potential oppo-
sition groups of access to the political base represented by the ormas, both
by direct intervention in individual ormas and in 1985 by passing a Law
on Mass Organizations, which required them to accept the Pancasila as
264 • MASSACRES OF 1965–1966

their sole basic principle (see AZAS TUNGGAL), restricted their access
to foreign funds, and gave legal grounds for closer government control.
After the passing of this law, a clearer distinction emerged between ormas
and orsos (organisasi sosial, social organizations), which were con-
structed as foundations without public membership and were thus free of
some of the formal restrictions placed on ormas.

MASSACRES OF 1965–1966. The suppression of the ostensibly left-

wing Gestapu coup of 30 September 1965 was followed not only by the
banning of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and affiliated organi-
zations but also by an extensive massacre of people associated with the
Left. The killings, which began in October 1965 and continued for six
months, were most extensive in East and Central Java, Bali, and North
Sumatra, but few regions were left untouched. No reliable figures exist
on the number of people killed. The first official figure was 78,000 and
other estimates seldom exceed 1 million; most scholars today accept a
figure of at least 500,000.
In part the killings were a planned operation by the army to remove
the PKI as a political force. In Central Java in particular, units of the Res-
imen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD) engaged in the sys-
tematic slaughter of communists in several areas. In some other areas,
the initiative seems to have come from local people: longstanding social
tensions aligned with political antagonisms created deep hatreds between
groups so that the killings, when they came, were not directed simply at
destroying communist leaders but at extirpating whole communities. In
East Java, where such antagonism was strongest, santri communities,
represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) youth group Ansor, waged a
sustained campaign of destruction against their abangan neighbors; in
Bali, (where it is estimated that about 80,000 people died, roughly 5 per-
cent of the population) as on Java, military authorities encouraged rival
political parties, particularly the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), to
destroy the PKI. On Sumatra the most extensive killings occurred in
Aceh and on the plantation estates of East Sumatra, where an estimated
27,000–40,000 people died. Another important stimulus to the killing
was the fact that many people who had made accommodation with the
left-wing trends of Guided Democracy felt a need to demonstrate their
anticommunist credentials clearly by promoting the destruction of the
Left. Some observers initially described the killings as a kind of massive
running amuck (see AMUK), but this seems an inadequate explanation
for the systematic character of the murders.
 MATARAM • 265

Until the fall of Suharto, Indonesians remained reluctant to talk about

the massacres. The general memory of this time continued to play an im-
portant role in the political legitimacy of the New Order, which stressed
the extent to which the killings were conducted by ordinary citizens and
attributed them to the tensions created by the free operation of political
parties under Guided Democracy and earlier periods. Since 1998 the at-
mosphere has been more open, but the deep divisions engendered by the
killings remain. Abdurrachman Wahid failed in his efforts to heal the
wounds by apologizing for the killings and admitting that many NU
members had participated. Most Muslim leaders rejected his suggestion
that the 1966 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) decision out-
lawing the PKI should be revoked. [0691, 0702, 0711, 0763, 0783, 0807,
0830]

MATARAM. Name of two states on Java and one on Lombok. The early
state on Java was brought to prominence by the Hindu ruler Pu Sanjaya
(732–c. 760), who is generally credited with establishing Hindu notions
of god-kingship on the island (see HINDUISM; INDIA, HISTORI-
CAL LINKS WITH). He erected a lingga (phallic monument) on the
Dieng plateau, the Javanese center for the worship of Siva, and claimed
a special personal relationship with Hindu gods and with his ancestors.
His successors built the temple of Prambanan and struggled for power
in central Java with the Sailendras. In the early 10th century, King Sin-
dok shifted his capital to East Java for reasons still unclear.
The Javanese sultanate of Mataram emerged in the 1570s under Kyai
Gede Pamanahan (? –c. 1584) in the vicinity of modern Surakarta. It
began major expansion under his son and heir Panembahan Senapati In-
alaga (r. 1584–1601), who defeated Pajang and pushed his control to the
northern coast and into the Madiun valley. Senapati fought Surabaya
and established his kraton at Kuta Gede, near modern Yogyakarta. His
successor Panembahan Seda-ing Krapyak (r. ca 1601–1613) allowed the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) a trading post at Japara on the
north coast. Sultan Agung, the greatest of Mataram’s rulers, defeated
Madura (1624) and Surabaya (1625), thus establishing hegemony over
most of central and eastern Java. In 1628 and 1629 he tried unsuccess-
fully to drive the Dutch from Batavia. The latter part of his reign was oc-
cupied with campaigns against rebellious vassals in Giri (1636) and Bal-
ambangan (1636–1640).
Agung’s son and successor Sunan Amangkurat (Mangkurat) I (r.
1646–1677) lost control of the north coast and faced a major uprising by
266 • MATOAYA, KARAENG

the Madurese Trunojoyo. After Amangkurat was driven from his own
court by Trunojoyo, the VOC intervened on Mataram’s behalf to defeat
Trunojoyo (1678–1679) and establish Amangkurat’s son Amangkurat II
(r. 1677–1703) on the throne, with his court at Kartasura. The following
decades were a time of cultural flowering but political disorder. In the
First War of Javanese Succession (1704–1705), Amangkurat II was de-
posed by his uncle Pakubuwono I, who ceded Cirebon, Priangan, and
half of Madura to the VOC. A Second War of Succession broke out on
Pakubuwono’s death in 1719, lasting until 1723, when Amangkurat IV
was installed on the throne with VOC help. In 1740 the revolt of the Chi-
nese in Batavia spread along Java’s north coast and was joined by
Pakubuwono II. In a series of complicated maneuvers, however, he at-
tempted to deal with the Dutch, was deposed by his followers, and was
restored to power by the Dutch in 1743, establishing his court at
Surakarta (Solo) and ceding the entire north coast of Java and all territo-
ries east of Pasuruan to the VOC. A Third War of Succession broke out
in 1746, when the king’s brother Mangkubumi revolted. Pakubuwono II
meanwhile ceded the remains of his kingdom to the VOC and promptly
died in 1749. Mangkubumi was declared sultan by his followers in 1749,
taking the name Hamengkubuwono, while the Dutch installed Pakubu-
wono’s son as Pakubuwono III. The rebellion ended with the partition of
Mataram into distinct kingdoms of Yogyakarta and Surakarta under the
treaty of Giyanti. For a list of rulers of Mataram, see APPENDIX C. See
also MAP 3. [0572, 0578, 0581]

MATOAYA, KARAENG (c. 1573–1636). A prince of the royal family of

Tallo in South Sulawesi, he became chief minister under King Tunipa-
sulu and headed a coup by the nobility that overthrew the king after he
had tried to reduce noble privileges. He continued as chief minister and
was architect of the alliance with Bugis states, which became the basis
of the powerful Makassar state. As the campaigns of Sultan Agung
devastated the north coast of Java, Matoaya turned Makassar into a ma-
jor free port for trade from Maluku, which the Dutch were then trying
to monopolize. He also presided over the peaceful conversion of Makas-
sar to Islam. To defend Makassar against the expected Dutch attack, Ma-
toaya also sponsored the development of firearms manufacture. See also
PATTINGALLOANG.

MAX HAVELAAR. Semiautobiographical novel by Eduard Douwes

Dekker, writing under the pseudonym Multatuli (“I have suffered
 MEDICINE • 267

much”) and describing his experiences as assistant-resident in Lebak in

Banten in the mid-19th century. The central character, an idealistic
young colonial official, attempts to redress wrongs inflicted on local peo-
ple by the indigenous aristocracy but discovers that the colonial authori-
ties have no interest in the welfare of their Indonesian subjects and is
himself eventually dismissed for his pains. The novel, often compared in
spirit to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, played some role in mobilizing Dutch pub-
lic opinion against the Cultivation System and is considered a classic of
Dutch colonial literature. It was filmed in a joint Dutch-Indonesian ven-
ture in 1976, but the result was banned in Indonesia from 1977 to 1988
on the grounds that it showed that people “were exploited not by the
Dutch but by the local aristocracy.” [0248, 0624]

MEDAN. See DELI; EAST SUMATRA.

MEDIA. Prior to the New Order, all newspapers had to be affiliated with
a political party or mass organization. This regulation was annulled in
1966, leading to a depoliticization of the media, with its emphasis shift-
ing to popular culture and economic development. Economic growth and
concomitant social changes in the 1970s shaped the development of
films, magazines, and pop music. A publishing boom developed in the
1970s and 1980s when new newspapers and popular novels flourished,
together with glossy magazines directed to specific social groups and in-
terests. Popular music found a wide market among young people. In the
film industry, a levy was introduced on foreign films in 1967 with the
money used to finance Indonesian productions, which thus increased in
number. Radio had long been a popular medium in Indonesia, and a state
television service had been established in 1962, which expanded greatly
in the late 1970s after the launching of Indonesia’s Palapa satellite. State-
owned Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) was a monopoly until 1989
when the government licensed five private television channels to com-
pete with it. In the later years of the Suharto regime, members and as-
sociates of the Suharto family acquired control of several of the grow-
ing media conglomerates, especially in the commercial television sector
but also in the print media. Through these ties and through the govern-
ment’s control of licensing and its selective closure of outlets that aired
dissenting views, the regime was able to maintain control over the range
of public discourse. See also CENSORSHIP. [0730, 0761, 0763]

MEDICINE. See HEALTH.

268 • MEGALITHS

MEGALITHS. Prehistorians once identified a “megalithic” stage in the

development of Indonesian culture, based on widespread signs of rever-
ence for large stones (megaliths). Prehistorians today, however, are in-
creasingly skeptical of this view, arguing that there is insufficient knowl-
edge of the ancient use of megaliths, little evidence that their use had a
common origin, and no certainty that they were a central feature of the
cultures involved; it may be that they survived other more important cul-
tural features simply because they were stone. Megalithic traditions sur-
vive today in Nias, Sumba, and parts of Kalimantan, and some ob-
servers have attributed the easy acceptance of Hinduism and Buddhism
to a blending of megalith worship with reverence for the lingga of Siva
and the stupa of Buddhism. [0487, 0533]

MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI (1948–). Sukarno’s second child and

oldest daughter, Megawati was a 39-year-old housewife with no political
experience in 1987 when she and her husband agreed to run for parliament
on the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) ticket after her elder brother
Guntur had refused the PDI’s invitation. In part because of the enthusias-
tic public response to her campaign, the PDI’s percentage of the vote in-
creased from 7.9 to 11 percent in the 1987 elections. She was a largely pas-
sive member of the PDI delegation in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
(DPR) over the next six years. Nevertheless, the party’s Jakarta branch
nominated her to chair the PDI in 1993 after the government refused to rec-
ognize the reelection of chairman Soerjadi (1939–) at the PDI conference
in Medan in July of that year. (The authorities had been angered by Soer-
jadi’s parliamentary motion after the previous election that the number of
presidential terms should be restricted.) Though the government initially
attempted to sabotage Megawati’s nomination, it eventually acquiesced
when a special PDI convention elected her to its leadership. But two years
later, in June 1996, the PDI held a special congress in Medan under gov-
ernment auspices and protection that deposed her and unanimously rein-
stated Soerjadi as party head. Megawati stated her determination to contest
this action in the courts, and her supporters refused to give up PDI head-
quarters in Jakarta, where they held a daily “free speech forum” (mimbar
bebas) demanding democratization. In response, army and government-
backed militias took over the building and forcibly ejected 150 PDI adher-
ents, sparking widespread riots in Jakarta. From then on, Megawati be-
came the major figure around whom opposition to Suharto coalesced.
Megawati submitted a slate of candidates for the 1997 elections that
the government rejected, resulting in widespread demonstrations and
 MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI • 269

continuous protests when the Soerjadi slate was allowed to compete. She
did not direct her supporters to boycott the elections, but did ask them
not to vote for PDI and said she herself would not vote. She played no
direct role in the events leading up to the overthrow of Suharto, but in the
first free post-Suharto elections in 1999 the new party that she had
formed (the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan [PDI-P]) out-
voted all the other parties, gaining 153 seats in the parliament. Never-
theless, Megawati lacked the political skills of her rivals and was out-
maneuvered by Abdurrachman Wahid in the parliament, so that he was
elected president. To placate the outrage of her followers, he nominated
her as vice president. Initially the position was largely ceremonial, ex-
cept that she was charged with responsibility for the eastern half of In-
donesia, a task in which she did not excel.
As dissatisfaction with Wahid’s presidency grew, he was compelled to
grant Megawati greater powers, and after his impeachment she was
unanimously elected to replace him as president on 23 July 2001. She
does not seem to have acquired an interest in politics but holds to a few
strong beliefs, largely mirroring those of her father—particularly main-
tenance of a unitary state and moving harshly against any secessionist
movements. Like him, she appears to mistrust the political force of Is-
lam, but nevertheless chose Hamzah Haz, the leader of the Partai Per-
satuan Pembangunan (PPP), as her vice president in an attempt to ap-
peal to Muslim opinion. She also follows Sukarno in her desire to pursue
a neutral foreign policy, and at least until the Bali bombing of October
2002, she tried to resist pressures particularly from the United States to
pursue an aggressive policy against suspected Islamic terrorists. Subse-
quently she did cooperate in the “war on terrorism,” searching out and
arresting a number of suspects in the Bali bombing, but she opposed any
war on Iraq without United Nations sanction. She differs from Sukarno
in her closeness to the military and her willingness to grant them stronger
powers than they enjoyed under either B. J. Habibie or Abdurrachman
Wahid, as she shares with army leaders an overriding concern for In-
donesian unity. In the economic field after coming to office in July 2001,
Megawati cut fuel subsidies and passed a budget keeping spending in
check. As her tenure lengthened, she displayed an increasingly conser-
vative bent, expanding the powers of the military to crack down on
protest demonstrations, initially opposing the Majelis Per-
musyawaratan Rakyat (MPR)’s proposal for direct election of the
president, and choosing to pursue a military solution to the rebellion in
Aceh. [0725, 0867, 0882, 0964]
270 • MELAKA

MELAKA (Malacca). Port city on the peninsular coast of the Melaka Strait,
founded in circa 1400 by Parameswara, a prince of Palembang. In the tra-
dition of Srivijaya, with which it claimed a dynastic connection, and
Jambi, Melaka attracted traders by virtue of its strategic position, its ser-
vicing facilities, and its regularized taxation, becoming the most powerful
state on the strait in the 15th century. It competed with Siam for control of
the Malay Peninsula and established outposts in Sumatra, especially in
Siak. From 1400 to 1430 it received several visits from the Chinese ad-
miral Zheng He and worked closely with the Ming rulers of China to sup-
press piracy and to keep trade flowing smoothly. Its commercial orienta-
tion later turned westward, and it became a major entrepôt for the flow of
goods from the archipelago to India and the West. It also moved into pep-
per production and trade for the Indian market and in 1436 adopted Islam.
Melaka’s wealth, described in glowing terms by Tomé Pires, contin-
ued to come principally from its entrepôt role and made it in many re-
spects a model for later sultanates in the region. Wealth also made it a
prime target for the Portuguese, who captured it in 1511 with a force of
1,200 men and 18 ships (see also UPAS). Much of Melaka’s trade then
went to Aceh and Banten, and the city was attacked repeatedly by Aceh
and by Riau, where descendants of the Melaka sultans had reestablished
their kingdom. Melaka fell to a combined Dutch-Riau force in 1641, but
under Dutch rule the city declined further as the Dutch East Indies
Company (VOC) directed trade as much as possible to Batavia. British
forces seized Melaka in 1795 during the Napoleonic Wars, but it was re-
stored to the Dutch in 1818. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 placed it
definitively under Britain’s rule as part of a general tidying up of colo-
nial borders in the region. [0543, 0556, 0571]

MELAYU. See JAMBI.

MENTAWAI. Archipelago off the west coast of Sumatra. The indigenous

inhabitants cultivate taro, yams, and sago and raise pigs and fowl. Their
society shows many supposedly primitive features, such as little social
differentiation between men and women, an absence of political leaders
(though a category of traditional healers, or kerei, exists), and a belief
that all things have a soul. The main island of the group, Siberut, is also
the habitat of four endemic primate species.

MERANTAU (from rantau, regions around). Temporary migration by

males to other regions to earn money, especially in trade, is a common
 “MIDDLE WAY” FOR THE ARMED FORCES • 271

feature of many Indonesian societies (see ACEH; BAWEAN; GAYO;

MINANGKABAU). It generally reflects and reinforces a social struc-
ture in which the domestic influence of women is strong. [1237]

MERAUKE. See PAPUA; SABANG TO MERAUKE, FROM; SUCCES-

SION.

“MERDEKA!” (“Freedom!”). Common greeting during the Revolution.

MESTIZO CULTURES. See DEPOK; INDO-EUROPEANS; MARDIJK-

ERS; PERANAKAN.

METALWORKING. Indonesia’s neolithic societies first gained access to

metal in the form of bronze objects introduced from mainland Southeast
Asia in the third to second centuries B.C. (see GAMELAN). The cast-
ing of bronze by the lost wax method, however, was quickly developed
for both weapons and musical instruments. The working of bronze is
known from mainland Southeast Asia from 2000 B.C., and most bronze
used in the archipelago was probably imported, since the local deposits
of tin in Bangka and Belitung were not known before 1709. Iron work-
ing is known from the 10th century. The Javanese kris was traditionally
made using alternating fine layers of dark nickelous meteoric iron and
lighter colored terrestrial iron, the result symbolizing a fusion of heaven
and earth and forming a distinctive striated pattern on the blade. Master
smiths (mpu) were said to forge kris on their knees using the heat of their
fists. The fiery transformation of ore into metal and of metal into fine
shapes was seen widely, perhaps under the influence of Tantrism, as
analogous to the transformation of the soul after death. See also COP-
PER; GOLD. [0143, 0576, 1272, 1360]

“MIDDLE WAY” FOR THE ARMED FORCES. Doctrine articulated in

November 1958 by A. H. Nasution in response to the declaration of
martial law in 1957 (though the term “middle way” was coined by the
lawyer Jokosutono). Nasution argued that the armed forces should not be
a “dead tool” of the government of the day, nor should they seize power
from it. Rather they should follow a “middle way” of responsible in-
volvement in political decision making. This doctrine was the basis of
the army’s partnership with Sukarno in Guided Democracy but was
subsequently superseded by the doctrine of dwifungsi. [0714, 0727,
0733, 0872]
272 • MIGRATIONS

MIGRATIONS. Prehistorians once identified successive waves of so-called

proto- and deutero-Malays said to have entered the archipelago from main-
land Southeast Asia via the Malay Peninsula, but it now seems that the in-
habitants of western Indonesia are descended from Austronesians who
emerged first in what is now Taiwan and who moved southward from 4000
B.C. through the Philippines and into Sulawesi before turning west and
east to establish themselves in much of the archipelago by 3000 to 2000
B.C., partly displacing and partly absorbing the established Austromelane-
sian peoples. Others went on to reach Madagascar, Easter Island, and
Hawaii by 1000 A.D. They brought with them the bow and arrow, canoes
with outriggers, pottery, and timber and thatched houses, as well as pigs,
fowl, rice, and millet. The Austronesian migration was followed by a se-
ries of smaller migrations of Mongoloid peoples from the Asian mainland,
especially and most recently Chinese, who assimilated into and con-
tributed culturally to Austronesian societies rather than displacing them.
The distinction formerly made between proto- and deutero-Malays is now
believed to reflect differing degrees of Austromelanesian and Mongoloid
influence. See also LANGUAGES; PREHISTORY.

MILITARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS. During the Indonesian Revolu-

tion, most armed units established so-called badan ekonomi (economic
organizations) to help fund military operations, and such outfits have re-
mained in place under various names. Initially most were involved in
taking plantation produce to markets outside Indonesia, notably Singa-
pore, to be exchanged for weapons and other necessities. After the Rev-
olution the military moved into a wide range of commercial, construc-
tion, and other fields. This was especially the case after the
nationalization of Dutch businesses in 1957, most of which were handed
over to the army to run.
In the New Order years, the military was forced to rely on its own re-
sources for half of its annual spending and until the financial crisis most
of this came from its business enterprises. Komando Cadangan Strategis
Angkatan Darat (Kostrad) owned Mandala airline and Komando Pa-
sukan Khusus (Kopassus) owned a shopping mall near its headquarters.
Army-owned companies numbered in the hundreds and included PT Tri
Usaha Bakti, formerly headed by Sujono Humardani (1919–1986); the
Yayasan Dharma Putra, associated with Kostrad; and the Propelat group,
associated with the former Siliwangi Division.
A second avenue of military involvement in business has been through
state enterprises, both those seized from the Dutch in 1957 and those set
 MILITIAS • 273

up since then. Prior to the economic downturn of 1997, the most impor-
tant of these were Pertamina and Badan Urusan Logistik (Bulog). In
1974 active duty officers were forbidden to engage directly in business,
but this regulation was enforced only sporadically. The army’s holding
company Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) had 11 subsidiaries and 22
affiliated companies, including logging and plywood operations, a bank,
a pharmaceutical company, and a small airline. These enterprises were
severely hurt by the Asian financial crisis, and in 2001 an outside audit
revealed that only two of the 38 enterprises then under YKEP were gen-
erating profits. Although the government increased the military budget
from Rp 7.7 trillion in 2001 to Rp 13 trillion in 2002, this amount still
fell far short of its needs. Most of its budgetary shortfalls were met by
payoffs from provincial governments and increasing military involve-
ment in drug smuggling (it was reportedly disagreements over shares in
this that led to the September 2002 clash near Medan with the police),
protection rackets, illegal mining and logging, fuel smuggling, gam-
bling, and prostitution. See also CUKONG. [0313, 0373, 0727, 0731]

MILITIAS. Irregular armed units formed during the Revolution by polit-

ical parties and other interest groups (see LASYKAR). In the late Guided
Democracy period, militias tied to the Pemuda Pancasila offered to go
to fight in support of the West Irian (see PAPUA) campaign. Under
Suharto, both the military and security forces made use of militias or
gangs that were believed responsible for inciting riots and extorting
money from businesses. After riots were carried out against “Tien”
Suharto’s Mini Indonesia project at the end of 1971, the Komando Op-
erasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib) outlawed
all independent gangs of youths, but by instituting training programs for
their leaders, the Kopkamtib incorporated many of them into the state’s
security apparatus. After Suharto’s fall, militias became responsible for
much of the violence in dissident regions. From the time that President
B. J. Habibie proposed a referendum in East Timor, armed forces set
about organizing militias in each of its 13 districts. Chief operative was
former military intelligence chief Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim,
and before the vote on 30 August 1999 some 10,000 militia members, in-
cluding 2,000 heavily armed irregulars, “had flooded East Timor.” Other
militias, particularly the Laskar Jihad, were suspected of inciting vio-
lence in Maluku and subsequently in Papua. After the invasion of Aceh
in May 2003, it was announced that the army would be setting up mili-
tias in that province. [0743, 0754, 0959, 1021, 1028]
274 • MINAHASA

MINAHASA. Region at the end of Sulawesi’s northern peninsula, often

including the neighboring Sangir and Talaud islands. The early inhabi-
tants of the region have left little trace but for impressive sandstone sar-
cophagi (waruga), but they seem to have been culturally similar to the in-
land tribes of the southern Philippines. The major political unit was the
walak, a territorially based clan or clan-group, and the name Minahasa is
said to refer to an alliance of such groups against the neighboring king-
dom of Bolaäng-Mongondouw. They cultivated rice in labor coopera-
tives (mapalus) and raised pigs and fowl; from the 17th century maize
became a major crop. The Spanish established settlements at Kema and
Manado (Menado) circa 1560, and Catholic missionaries were active
during the next century. The Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch competed
for control of the coastal regions in the 17th century, the Dutch becom-
ing dominant from 1679, when they signed an alliance with Minahasa
chiefs. Catholic converts in the region were then unilaterally declared to
be Calvinist. The region came under British rule from 1801 to 1816, and
a major uprising took place in Tondano in 1807–1809. Missionary activ-
ity by the Nederlandsch Zendelingsgenootschap (see PROTES-
TANTISM) began in 1824, and the region was largely converted by the
late 19th century. An independent regional church, the Gereja Masehi In-
jil Minahasa, was formed in 1934.
Under the treaty of 1679, the Minahasa chiefs agreed to supply a num-
ber of products (e.g., gold and fibers) to the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC). Coffee was introduced in 1797 and became a government mo-
nopoly in 1822, labor being obtained by corvée. Forced cultivation of ca-
cao, nutmeg, and manila hemp followed. Labor conscription ended in
1893, but coffee remained a government monopoly until 1899. Under
Dutch rule, the walak were initially preserved as the units of administra-
tion, though their number was steadily diminished from 27 in 1824 to six
in 1940. In 1877, following the Agrarian Law of 1870 on Java, the colo-
nial government declared all “waste” land to be its property. This caused
great debate over the status of the region, whether allied or subject to the
Netherlands Indies. In 1881 the majoor, or walak heads, became salaried
government officials. In the early 20th century, coconut cultivation for
copra became a major industry largely conducted by smallholder produc-
ers, who frequently, however, became seriously indebted to Chinese mid-
dlemen. A Copra Contracten Ordonnantie in 1939 attempted to regulate
copra contracts in favor of producers, but had no time to have effect.
From early times, a militia had been necessary in the colony for pro-
tection against pirates from the southern Philippines, and from the early
 MINANGKABAU • 275

19th century Minahasa became a major recruitment area for the Konin-
klijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL). The presence of missionary
schools led to a relatively high level of education and of fluency in Dutch
in the region. Government education also expanded in the 1880s, and
many people left the region to find employment elsewhere, especially as
teachers and in other government services, so that along with the Am-
bonese, Menadonese (the colonial-era term for Minahasa Christians)
gained a reputation as indigenous agents of Dutch rule. A Perserikatan
Minahassa (Minahasa Association) was established in 1910 by G. S. S. J.
Ratulangi (1890–1949), but it argued for promotion of trade and indus-
try in the region rather than for independence.
The Revolution brought deep divisions to Minahasa, with Ratulangi
espousing the unitarian doctrine and being appointed as the Republic’s
governor for Sulawesi (Celebes), while another party formed in March
1946 campaigned for the integration of Minahasa into the Dutch state as
the 12th province. One of the most effective Republican military organ-
izations was the Minahasan militia Kebaktian Rakjat Indonesia Sulawesi
(KRIS, Loyalty of the Indonesian People from Sulawesi), which in-
ducted Minahasans of all political shades into the Republican struggle.
In the latter part of the revolutionary period, a Minahasa organization,
the Komité Ketatanegaraan Minahasa (Minahasa Constitutional Com-
mittee), was formed that opposed the increasingly pro-Republican Ne-
gara Indonesia Timor (NIT) and argued against the region’s inclusion
in independent Indonesia.
In the 1950s, in opposition to the central government’s attempts to im-
pose a monopoly over copra purchase and marketing, the region became
a major center of smuggling. An unsuccessful attempt by the central gov-
ernment in 1956 to close the port of Manado was among the causes of
the Permesta revolt, which became part of the PRRI/Permesta rebel-
lion. From 1958 the Minahasans were the only group offering serious re-
sistance to the central government. [0028, 0100, 0450, 0802, 0823]

MINANGKABAU. Making up approximately 90 percent of the population

of the province of West Sumatra, the Minangkabau are one of the largest
matrilineal societies in the world and at the same time devoutly Islamic. The
Minangkabau region is traditionally known as Alam Minangkabau (the Mi-
nangkabau world) rather than by a state name. Their original settlements
were in three upland valleys of the region, particularly around the Merapi
volcano: Agam, Tanah Datar, and Limapuluh Kota. Two broad customary
law traditions existed: the rather autocratic Kota Piliang, which was most
276 • MINANGKABAU

prevalent in Tanah Datar, and the more democratic Bodi Caniago tradition,
which was followed mostly in Agam and Limapuluh Kota. The first histor-
ical record of the Minangkabau appears in 1347 when inscriptions indicate
that Adityavarman, a prince of mixed Javanese-Sumatran parentage, threw
off allegiance to Majapahit and ruled the gold-rich regions of Tanah Datar
until at least 1375. The Minangkabau were traditionally organized not in
kingdoms but into largely autonomous villages (nagari), themselves feder-
ations of kinship groups. Gold mines in the Tanah Datar area were the prin-
cipal economic base of Minangkabau communities and up to the 17th cen-
tury the area was the main gold producer on the archipelago. A Dutch East
Indies Company (VOC) post was established on the coast under the treaty
of Painan (1663).
Islam reached the region in the 16th century, spreading first through
Islamic schools (surau). Christine Dobbin argues that economic change
in the late 18th century stimulated the dramatic growth of Islam. Gold
production declined; production of cinnamon, coffee, gambier, and salt
expanded; and Minangkabau men became increasingly involved in long-
distance trade with the outside world. Islam offered not only a means for
creating a trading diaspora, whose members helped each other with
credit and commercial information, but also gave a platform for a polit-
ical challenge to the old order. This challenge took the form of the so-
called Paderis, a modernist Muslim movement following Wahhabi prin-
ciples, which sought to purify Islam in West Sumatra from accretions
deriving from adat practices. Many Paderi opponents fled the highlands
and sought assistance from the Dutch, whose presence hitherto had been
largely confined to the coastal trading ports. The Dutch began military
actions against the Paderi in 1821 and sporadic warfare continued until
they defeated the Paderi forces and exiled their leader, Imam Bonjol,
in 1837.
The Dutch directed much of their administration to controlling and
monopolizing coffee production through the cultivation system, and the
Minangkabau region became a major coffee producing and exporting
area. With the relaxation of the monopoly and forced cultivation in the
early 20th century, the Minangkabau moved extensively into private pro-
duction of coffee, copra, and rubber. Anticolonial uprisings took place
in 1908 and 1927 (see also PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA), and
many Minangkabau leaders (e.g., Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir,
Muhammad Yamin, and Tan Malaka) assumed prominent leadership
roles in the nationalist movement. Strongly loyal to the Indonesian Re-
public during the Revolution, West Sumatra was the seat of the Pemer-
 MINING • 277

intah Darurat Republik Indonesia (PDRI) after the second Dutch

“Police Action” of December 1948.
In the 1950s dissatisfaction with the centralist policies of the Sukarno
government led the Minangkabau region to become the major locus of the
1958 PRRI/Permesta rebellion. The government’s repression of the re-
gion after defeating the rebellion demoralized the local people and accel-
erated traditional Minangkabau migration (merantau), causing large-scale
population movements to the major urban centers of Sumatra and Java,
especially Jakarta. The centralizing policies of the Suharto regime and
the stringent control it exercised over political and religious expression
undermined particular characteristics of the region, but after his fall many
Minangkabau embraced the new decentralization policies, and there were
signs that local forces were reasserting their regional identity. [0776,
0791, 0797, 0798, 0807, 0838, 1077, 1207, 1235–1237, 1263]

MINING. Indonesia has fabulously rich mineral resources, many of which

have only recently been opened up for exploitation. Principal among
mining operations, other than those for oil and gas, are bauxite (Bintan
Island, Riau), coal (Sumatra, Kalimantan), copper (Papua), gold
(Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua), nickel (Sulawesi, Kali-
mantan, Halmahera, Papua), and tin (Riau archipelago). The Sukarno
government nationalized Dutch mining companies for bauxite, tin, and
coal in 1957, which resulted in falling output because of lack of invest-
ment to replace and repair equipment. Under the Suharto government,
the mines were again opened to foreign investment. The 1967 Mining
Law, together with the 1967 Foreign Investment Law, allowed foreign
companies to act as contractors for the exploitation of Indonesia’s natu-
ral resources. In the 1970s and 1980s there were growing worries about
the effects of mining on the environment, but generally government reg-
ulations continued to favor industry needs over those of the environment.
With the financial crisis of 1997 and the fall of Suharto, mining became
a much less attractive proposition for foreign investors. Spending on ex-
ploration in Indonesia dropped from $160 million in 1996 to an esti-
mated $22 million in 2001. Total investment in the mining industry fell
from $915 million in 2000 to $413 million in 2001, with revenue drop-
ping to $738 million (from $888 million in 1999). Decentralization has
also affected mining operations, as after January 2001 district govern-
ments were empowered to pass their own legislation regarding mining in
their regions. See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. [0407,
0411, 0413, 0416, 1379]
278 • MINISTRY OF COLONIES

MINISTRY OF COLONIES. See COLONIES, MINISTRY OF;

NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN-
DONESIA.

MISSIONARY ACTIVITY. See CATHOLICISM; PROTESTANTISM.

MOESO. See MUSSO.

MOLUCCAS. See MALUKU.

MONEY. See CURRENCY.

MONGOL INVASION. See CHINA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH; MA-

JAPAHIT.

MONOLOYALITAS (monoloyalty). Exclusive loyalty to the state and gov-

ernment demanded by the Suharto government of all state employees,
especially in elections. First articulated in 1970, monoloyalitas was in-
tended to prevent the bureaucracy from being an arena for competing in-
terests and to guarantee the bureaucratic base of the New Order. See
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES;
FLOATING MASS; KORPS PEGAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA.
[0736]

MOOK, HUBERTUS JOHANNES VAN (1894–1965). Indies-born colo-

nial official and politician, van Mook studied Indology at Leiden Uni-
versity where he was strongly influenced by the “Ethical” ideas of Cor-
nelis van Vollenhoven and others. He returned to the Indies, where he
held the increasingly senior administrative posts of director of economic
affairs in 1937–1941, lieutenant governor-general in 1941–1942 and
1944–1948, and minister of colonies in 1941–1945. Unusually for colo-
nial civil servants, he was also involved in politics, as leader of the Stuw
group and from 1931 member of the Volksraad. He was an advocate of
increased autonomy for the Indies and the gradual elimination of racial
distinctions.
Van Mook headed the colonial government-in-exile in Australia dur-
ing World War II and returned to Indonesia in October 1945 as head of the
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) and later of the re-
stored colonial government, though he was never promoted to governor-
general. His hope that the Indonesian-Dutch conflict could be resolved
 MUHAMMADIYAH • 279

by dealing reasonably with “moderate” nationalists such as Sutan

Sjahrir was frustrated by the metropolitan Dutch insistence on restoring
Dutch authority and on limiting concessions to nationalism, but his own
insistence that the Dutch retain a tutelary role during an extended transi-
tion to independence was unacceptable to a great many Indonesian na-
tionalists. By 1948 his unpopular role in the development of federalism
and in the launching of the first “Police Action” had made him a liability
in Dutch negotiations with the Republic, and he was dismissed on 25 Oc-
tober 1948. See also SUCCESSION. [0478, 1146]

MUFAKAT. See MUSYAWARAH.

MUHAMMADIYAH (“followers of Muhammad”). Muslim organization

founded in 1912 by Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1933), a mosque of-
ficial in Yogyakarta to promote the modernist Islamic thought devel-
oped by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida in Cairo. Modernists be-
lieved that the condition of Muslims under colonial rule and other
despotism was in part a consequence of their own straying from the ba-
sic principles of the religion, and their aim was thus, as they saw it, to
cleanse and revitalize Islam by discarding tradition and ritual and re-
turning to the central texts, that is, the Qur’an and the Hadiths. These
views brought them into direct conflict with Islamic traditionalists who
stressed the importance of studying the full body of Islamic texts in or-
der to understand the Qur’an correctly (see NAHDLATUL ULAMA
[NU]). The modernists stressed the strict observance of the five pillars of
Islam (the confession of faith, prayer five times a day, fasting during Ra-
madan, paying the religious tax or zakat, and making the haj if possible).
They also advocated the use of head-covering by women and the segre-
gation of the sexes in public.
Muhammadiyah’s main aims were to spread adherence to Islam and to
promote the religious understanding of believers. It emphasized social
welfare, including education, and under the Dutch advocated nonin-
volvement in politics, though individual branches of the organization,
such as that in West Sumatra, defied such directives. In 1945 it advo-
cated an Islamic state for Indonesia and joined Masjumi, which soon
came to be dominated by modernist ideas. It survived the banning of
Masjumi in 1960 and continued to be a major Muslim cultural and edu-
cational institution, claiming a membership of over 20 million.
Throughout much of the Suharto regime it maintained its apolitical
stance, concentrating on social and religious activities promoted through
280 • MUIS, ABDUL

its schools, health clinics, mosques, and welfare institutions. This

changed when Amien Rais became chair of the organization and used it
as a podium for stringent criticisms of the corruption and malfeasance
of the president and his family and cronies. Though much of the
Muhammadiyah distanced itself from these criticisms, emphasizing that
it favored a gradual and peaceful approach to reform, younger members
enthusiastically embraced the oppositional stance of its chairman. [0627,
0648, 1016, 1358, 1361]

MUIS, ABDUL (1890–1959). Journalist and politician, educated as a pro-

tégé of J. H. Abendanon (1852–1925) under the Association Principle,
but best known for his novel Salah Asuhan (A Wrong Upbringing, 1928),
which describes the difficulties faced by European-educated Indonesians
in fitting into their own society. [0224]

MULTATULI. See DOUWES DEKKER, EDUARD; MAX HAVELAAR.

MURBA (Partai Murba, Proletarian Party). Founded in October 1948 by

followers of the radical nationalist communist Tan Malaka, after the
government of Mohammad Hatta crushed the Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI) in the Madiun Affair. The party strongly opposed nego-
tiations with the Dutch, and Hatta banned it shortly before the second
Dutch “Police Action” of December 1948. It revived in the early 1950s
as a bitter competitor of the PKI but though several of its leaders (notably
Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh) played influential political roles, the
party only won 0.5 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections, gaining two
seats. It strongly supported Guided Democracy and moved closer to the
Soviet Union when the PKI was adopting a more pro-China stance. In
1964, in a move to combat the growing influence of the PKI, Adam Ma-
lik and others associated with the Murba formed an organization under
the name of Body to Support Sukarno (BPS), portraying it as an alterna-
tive to Marxism. The PKI persuaded Sukarno that this was in fact a
move to undermine him and persuaded the president to ban both the BPS
(in December 1964) and Murba (in January 1965). Murba reemerged un-
der the New Order, but won no seats in the 1971 elections and was ab-
sorbed in 1973 with other secular parties into the Partai Demokrasi In-
donesia (PDI). See also BADAN PENDUKUNG SUKARNOISME;
PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN. [0695]

MURDANI, L. BENNY (1932-). A Javanese Catholic, born in Cepu, Mur-

dani joined the revolutionary struggle at the age of 16 in December 1948.
 MURDANI, L. BENNY • 281

He was trained in the Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat

(RPKAD) after the Revolution and became a company commander. As a
paratroop officer in the Cakrabirawa regiment, he took part in the com-
mando raid on West Sumatra in 1958 to quell the PRRI/Permesta re-
bellion. He was associated with Suharto in 1964 when Suharto headed
the Mandala Command for the Liberation of West Irian (Papua), and Mur-
dani won acclaim for leading a successful parachute attack in Merauke.
Suharto appointed him to the General Staff, and he began his intelligence
career in Komando Cadangan Strategic Angkatan Darat (Kostrad).
Murdani acted as liaison for Ali Murtopo in the negotiations to end
Confrontation, and in August 1966 he was sent to head the new In-
donesian liaison office in Kuala Lumpur. After a tour as consul general
in Seoul, South Korea, in the early 1970s, he was recalled to Indonesia
at the time of the Malari Affair and resumed his intelligence career as as-
sistant for intelligence in the Defense Ministry from August 1974. From
August 1977 he was also concurrently head of the Center for Strategic
Intelligence (Pusintelstrat) in the Defense Ministry, and from early 1978
deputy head of Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin). By the
early 1980s he had become one of the most powerful men in Indonesia,
holding key intelligence positions in the (Departemen) Pertahanan dan
Keamanan (Hankam, Department of Defense and Security), Komando
Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), and
Bakin and having been entrusted by Suharto with sensitive clandestine
tasks in foreign affairs, such as negotiating purchase of jet fighters from
Israel, planning and directing the invasion of East Timor, acting as liai-
son with the Vietnamese government in Hanoi, and supervising the
storming of a highjacked Garuda jetliner in Bangkok in 1981.
Murdani became commander in chief of the armed forces in 1983,
while continuing to head Pusintelstrat (now reorganized into Badan In-
telijen Strategis [Bais]), holding the post until 1988. During his tenure he
increasingly centralized power over the military in his own hands, a sit-
uation that raised the suspicions of the president, who abruptly removed
him from the post of commander in chief in February 1988, appointing
him instead as minister of defense. During the following five years, Mur-
dani unsuccessfully attempted to regain his powers, but Suharto dis-
missed him from the Defense Ministry in 1993, shortly afterward re-
placing Bais by a new intelligence body (BIA), thus further undermining
Murdani’s personal ties in the intelligence community. Thereafter Mur-
dani’s influence drastically declined, though several officers retained
feelings of loyalty to him and even after B. J. Habibie became president
282 • MURTOPO, ALI

there were indications that his advice was still heeded. [0031, 0680,
0733, 0972]

MURTOPO, ALI (1924–1984). Murtopo was born in Blora in 1924 the son
of a batik trader in an impoverished priyayi family. Toward the end of the
Japanese occupation, he joined the Hizbullah, becoming a company
commander when it was absorbed into the Indonesian army. He served in
Ahmad Yani’s Banteng Raiders unit of the Diponegoro division in 1952,
becoming deputy chief of the Diponegoro’s territorial and political affairs
branch in 1957. He followed Suharto into army intelligence headquar-
ters and from there into the West Irian (Papua) campaign and Komando
Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad). During the West Irian
campaign in the early 1960s, Murtopo developed a new combat intelli-
gence unit that became Operasi Khusus (Opsus). As head of Opsus he
opened secret contacts with Malaysian officials in August–September
1964, and in November he went to Bangkok for secret negotiations aimed
at limiting and eventually ending Confrontation. He also established
contacts with former PRRI/Permesta rebels and with them organized
massive regional smuggling in rubber and other commodities. He spent
much of this period outside Indonesia arranging emergency funding for
Suharto from Chinese business sources in Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan. In 1969, as head of Opsus, he was deeply involved in persuading
(largely through arrests and bribes) leaders in West Irian to opt for In-
donesia. He became one of Suharto’s closest advisors (SPRI) and deputy
head of Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (Bakin).
Murtopo was closely tied with a group of Catholic intellectuals of Chi-
nese descent who cooperated with him in the early postcoup period, and
he sponsored and headed their think tank, the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). He was closely involved in directing the
success achieved by Golkar in the first New Order elections in 1971,
and in the amalgamation of the political parties immediately afterward.
In October 1974 Suharto put him in charge of negotiations with Portugal
over East Timor, and he took control of the Operasi Komodo (Komodo
Operation), which was closely involved in fomenting the civil war in the
region that eventually led to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in De-
cember 1975. Murtopo remained until his death one of Suharto’s closest
advisers. [0031, 0736, 0845]

MUSIC. The long tradition of cultural hybridization, especially in Indone-

sian port cities, was also reflected in musical history. Although tradi-
 MUSSO • 283

tional gamelan music on Java has been relatively resistant to Western

influence, a form of creole music called kroncong developed in the 16th
and 17th centuries and gradually spread throughout the archipelago. In
the 20th century something of an independent jazz tradition began to de-
velop in the clubs of Batavia, and records were produced locally from
the 1920s. Music was at first relatively free of the debate over the role of
culture and even Indonesia’s national anthem, “Indonesia Raya,” com-
posed in 1928, shows no distinctly Indonesian motifs. In the 1950s, how-
ever, Muslim and nationalist groups increasingly opposed the spread of
Western pop and rock music, arguing that it was corrupting and incon-
sistent with Indonesian identity. Although the suppression of Western
music was never entirely successful, later decades saw the growth of
strong national (pop Indonesia) and regional (pop daerah) traditions, of-
ten bearing a loose resemblance in style and content to country and west-
ern music (see also DANGDUT). A thriving domestic cassette market
exists for all these forms of music. See also COPYRIGHT. [0159,
0174–0176, 0179, 0183, 0204]

MUSSO (or Moeso) (1897–1948). One of the major leaders of the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) until killed by Republican forces after the
Madiun Affair. He was born in the residency of Kediri and attended
teacher training school in Batavia. Musso lived for a while in Surabaya
at the boarding house run by the wife of Umar Said Tjokroaminoto,
with whom he became close and where he met Sukarno. A leading fig-
ure in the PKI when it broke off from the Sarekat Islam (SI), Musso was
arrested by the Dutch over the Afdeling B affair. After his release he be-
came active especially in the PKI’s relations with labor. He was proba-
bly present at the Prambanan meetings where the party decided to mount
the 1926–1927 uprising, but was in Moscow seeking Comintern support
for the revolt during the planning period. He was in Singapore when the
revolt broke out and was briefly arrested by the British authorities, but
then released and allowed to return to the Soviet Union. Musso returned
briefly to Indonesia in 1935, where he established the so-called Illegal
PKI. He finally returned to Yogyakarta in August 1948, where he
headed a new coalition of communist and leftist forces under the PKI and
posed a direct challenge to the Sukarno-Hatta leadership. When the Ma-
diun rebellion broke out in September 1948, he was on a tour of central
Java with other leaders, including Amir Sjarifuddin, but he came out
in support of the rebellion and publicly challenged the people to choose
between him and Sukarno. The rebellion was soon put down and Musso
284 • MUSYAWARAH

fled to the countryside, where he was captured and killed at the end of
October 1948. [0478, 0661, 0683, 0684]

MUSYAWARAH. Discussion of issues, often at exhaustive length, by all

involved in order to reach a consensus (mufakat). Many nationalists, es-
pecially Sukarno, argued that musyawarah was the basis of traditional
village democracy in Indonesia and that it should be used in place of a
Western-style system of decision making by majority vote. See also GO-
TONG ROYONG.

MYSTICISM. See KEBATINAN.

–N–

NAGARAKRTAGAMA. Also known in many other spellings, including

Negarakertagama, this lengthy panegyric poem in Old Javanese was
composed by Prapanca, poet to the 14th-century court of Hayam Wuruk,
king of Majapahit. The poem praises the king while providing a detailed
description of the life and social structure of Majapahit. A lontar leaf
manuscript of the Nagarakrtagama was captured by Dutch troops on
Lombok in 1894; further copies were found on Bali in 1978. [0528]

NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU, Revival of the Religious Scholars).

Founded in Surabaya in 1926 by K. H. Hasyim Asyari (1871–1947) to
resist the rise of modernism in Indonesian Islam that, in emphasizing di-
rect recourse to the Qur’an and Hadiths, largely dispensed with the learn-
ing of religious scholars or ulama. The organization quickly developed a
strong following in East Java and South Kalimantan and was also ac-
tive in founding schools and cooperatives. It joined Muhammadiyah,
however, in the Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia (MIAI) in 1937 to pro-
mote Islamic unity, and in 1943 it was given a prominent role by the
Japanese in the Japanese-sponsored Masjumi organization on Java.
NU joined the Masjumi, formed in 1945, but there was friction be-
tween the traditionalist leaders of NU and the modernists who dominated
the Masjumi leadership and in 1952 under Wahid Hasyim NU seceded
from the party. Led by K. H. Idham Khalid (1917–?) after Wahid
Hasyim’s death, NU’s political priorities were always strictly religious
and it was willing to trade its support on what it saw as peripheral issues
for other parties’ support on religious matters. NU was represented in all
 NAHDLATUL ULAMA • 285

cabinets from 1955 to 1971 (generally holding the Ministry of Religion),

and Idham Khalid became a deputy prime minister in Sukarno’s first
kabinet karya in 1957. Its constituency was based largely in the santri
communities of East and also Central Java and especially in the pe-
santren. It ferociously opposed government policy on matters of public
morality, such as state-sponsored gambling, and in 1973 the marriage
law. Under its supervision, the Ministry of Religion grew into the largest
government department. NU surprised most observers by coming in third
in the 1955 elections, but it shared little of Masjumi’s unhappiness at the
end of parliamentary rule in the 1950s. It was a willing partner in
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, representing the “A” (for agama, or re-
ligion) in Nasakom, but its rural landowning supporters were strongly
opposed to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)’s land reform activi-
ties in the countryside, and it called for and spearheaded attacks on com-
munists and their sympathizers in the killings that followed the 1965
coup.
NU subsequently became one of the pillars of the so-called New Or-
der coalition, but it soon grew unhappy with the regime’s failure to fa-
vor Islam. It did, however, largely preserve its vote in the 1971 elections
and formed a major electoral component of the Partai Persatuan Pem-
bangunan (PPP) from 1973. Its influence within the PPP was always far
less than its numerical following warranted, and in 1984 it formally left
the party in order to return to its original charter and concentrate on its
social, educational, and religious goals. In fact, however, the NU leader-
ship soon began to criticize the PPP and draw closer to Golkar. At this
time, the government was insisting that all political parties and organi-
zations adopt the Pancasila as their azas tunggal (sole foundation). Un-
der the leadership of Achmad Siddiq and Abdurrachman Wahid, NU
was the first Islamic mass organization to accept this directive. In the
NU’s national congresses of 1989 and 1994, there were strong moves to
remove Wahid as chairman because of his reformist stands, but he weath-
ered both efforts, in part because in the 1994 election many NU members
resented government interference in the electoral process. Opposition
continued, however, within NU to Wahid’s tolerant stands and his close-
ness with Megawati Sukarnoputri, opposition that was nurtured partic-
ularly by adherents of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
(ICMI).
In the political maneuvering following the fall of Suharto, NU sup-
port was divided among several political parties, the two strongest being
the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) and the Partai Nahdlatul Ulama
286 • NAMES, PERSONAL

(PNU), which received 51 and five seats respectively in the postelection

parliament. [0695, 0765, 1026, 1029, 1343, 1351]

NAMES, PERSONAL. Reference to Indonesian personal names often

causes considerable difficulty to Westerners, the classic gaffe being the
“Achmad” sometimes (but now rarely) added to Sukarno’s name to give
it an impression of completeness. Many Indonesians, particularly on
Java, have only one name, though there is an increasing tendency for
people to follow the priyayi custom of giving their children multiple
names, which now show some tendency to become fixed surnames.
When an individual possesses two or more names, there is not necessar-
ily any firm rule as to which should be used. Ali Sastroamijoyo was
generally “Ali,” whereas Ahmad Yani was always “Yani.” Although the
1973 government regulation on spelling is generally applied to historical
figures (Tjokroaminoto, for instance, being spelled Cokroaminoto),
many contemporary Indonesians retain or have adopted Dutch-style
spelling for sentimental, idiosyncratic, or prestige reasons. Nor is the di-
vision between names firmly fixed: the former vice president Adam
Malik was once commonly known as Adammalik, while a name such as
Suriakartalegawa may also be given as Suria Karta Legawa. A further
complication is the use of titles as proper names. Among the Bataks and
the people of the Minahasa, surnames in the Western sense are common,
while some Chinese Indonesians used traditional Chinese surnames.
Changes of name, however, are not uncommon when an individual
wishes to mark some important change in his or her life: Suwardi
Suryaningrat changed his name to Ki Hajar Dewantoro as he became
more deeply involved in Taman Siswa, while the Indo-European E. F. E.
Douwes Dekker became Setiabudi to symbolize his political allegiance
to Indonesia. Under pressure from the New Order government, many
Chinese Indonesians adopted quasi-Indonesian names that they use as
surnames, Liem, for example, becoming Salim. Among other ethnic
groups, however, the appropriate name for address or reference is often
not clear, and one must be guided by common usage rather than firm
rules. A fairly common practice, especially on Sumatra, is for a son to
take his father’s first name as his second name. On the spelling of names
in this volume, see READER’S NOTE.

NASAKOM (NASionalisme, Agama [religion], KOMunisme). Political doc-

trine formulated by Sukarno as a counter to the ideological and religious
diversity of the nationalist movement before World War II, though he did
 NASUTION, ABDUL HARIS • 287

not coin the term Nasakom until the late 1950s. Sukarno argued that re-
ligious belief, communism, and nationalism were not fundamentally in-
compatible ideologies but aspects of a concern for spirituality, social jus-
tice, and national self-respect that all Indonesians shared. His refusal to
accept the division between these ideologies contributed to his success as
a uniting national leader.
In installing Guided Democracy in 1957–1959, Sukarno renewed his
stress on the fundamental unity of the various ideological streams within
Indonesia, and Nasakom became the grounds for including the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in a broad range of government institutions
from 1960 and including a few far left members in the cabinet from
1962. Opinions differ on whether “Nasakomization” meant the “domes-
tication” of the PKI within the state or whether it was a step in the di-
rection of a communist takeover, but in the latter years of Guided De-
mocracy, Nasakom was closely associated with the Left in general; the
Right appealed rather to the principle of Pancasila, which emphasized
belief in God and made no reference to communism. After the victory of
the Right and the banning of the PKI in 1965, Sukarno tried briefly to re-
vive Nasakom as Nasasos, with sosialisme in place of communism. See
also MARXISM. [0859, 0934]

NASUTION, ABDUL HARIS (1918–2001). Born in North Sumatra, Na-

sution was one of Indonesia’s leading military commanders and principal
theoreticians. Trained before World War II at the Dutch military academy
at Bandung, he was serving in the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger
(KNIL) at the time of the Japanese invasion. During the Indonesian Rev-
olution, he soon emerged as one of the Republic’s most capable military
commanders, heading the West Java Siliwangi Division from 1946 and the
Java Command from 1948. After initially favoring a Western-style frontal
strategy, he developed a range of guerrilla tactics whose success con-
tributed to the Dutch withdrawal in 1949.
As army chief of staff in 1949–1952 and 1955–1962 and minister of
defense in 1956–1966, Nasution played a major role in strengthening in-
ternal military discipline. On 17 October 1952, after politicians associ-
ated with regional military leaders attempted to end his reforms, he
backed public demonstrations in Jakarta calling for the dismissal of par-
liament and was suspended from his post for indiscipline, but he was re-
instated in 1955. He made energetic but largely unsuccessful attempts to
combat corruption in the army. In 1957 he proposed declaring martial
law in order to defuse military rebellions in the Outer Islands, and his
288 • NATIONALISM

alliance with Sukarno was instrumental in establishing Guided Democ-

racy. He formulated a theory of limited military involvement in politics,
known as the “Middle Way” thesis, but in practice he intervened heav-
ily in politics, restricting opposition political activity and sponsoring the
Badan Kerja Sama. In June 1962 Sukarno maneuvered him into the rel-
atively powerless post of armed forces chief of staff, but he remained
powerful as defense minister.
In 1965 Nasution narrowly escaped being killed in the Gestapu coup
attempt of 30 September but, apparently for personal reasons (he was in-
jured and his daughter was killed in the attempt), took a back seat to Gen-
eral Suharto in suppressing the affair. He played a relatively small role
in the construction of a political format for the New Order and was rel-
egated to the post of speaker of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
(MPR). After the 1970s he became increasingly critical of what he de-
scribed as corruption and maladministration under the New Order and
was a signatory of the Petition of Fifty in 1980. He also began to ques-
tion the role that Suharto and his allies had played in the Gestapu. [0668,
0669, 0709, 0714, 0733, 0872]

NATIONALISM. Although a number of early opponents of Dutch rule in

the archipelago, such as Diponegoro in Central Java and Imam Bonjol
in West Sumatra, have been mythographically promoted as national he-
roes, many historians hold that the emergence of modern Indonesian na-
tionalism coincided with what nationalist historians themselves call the
kebangkitan nasional, or the national awakening of the early 20th cen-
tury. The distinctive feature of this “awakening” was that it drew on
Western thinking and took account of the socioeconomic changes
brought about by colonialism to argue for an end to colonialism without
a simple return to the precolonial order. Indonesian nationalism was
never united by a single ideology or by a single organization, but its
members shared a strong sense of participation in a movement (perger-
akan), which was historically bound to win.
In comparison with the Philippines and British India, where fully
fledged movements were campaigning for independence before the turn
of the century, nationalism was rather late to develop in Indonesia. This
was probably a result of the limited range of educational facilities avail-
able in the Netherlands Indies until the 20th century, which meant that
Indonesians had little access to the formerly European ideas that initially
inspired movements elsewhere (see EDUCATION). The emergence of
modern nationalism indeed generally coincided with the rise of a techni-
 NATIONALISM • 289

cal elite, trained for employment in company and government offices un-
der the Liberal and Ethical Policies or as professionals (physicians,
lawyers, engineers, and the like). The fact that this nationalism was In-
donesian and not more regionally based owed much to colonial admin-
istrative and education policies. It was also probably indebted to the Is-
lamic religious ties and trading connections among many groups in the
archipelago. Although the Netherlands Indies was in some senses a
patchwork of distinct administrations and legal systems (see LAW;
NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
INDONESIA; ZELFBESTUREN), the palace of the governor-general
in Batavia remained the unequivocal seat of power in the colony and the
principal focus of nationalist action.
The pergerakan included some hundreds of organizations, but it has
been customary to identify the following main lines of development.
Budi Utomo (founded 1908), with its emphasis on progress, represented
a first awakening of protonationalist consciousness, though the focus of
the organization was Javanese and elitist rather than Indonesian and pop-
ular. The Indische Partij, dominated by Indo-Europeans, was the first to
demand full independence for the Indies, but it aimed otherwise to pre-
serve many of the structures of colonial society. Sarekat Islam (SI) (es-
tablished in 1912) was the first Indonesia-wide mass party but faced in-
superable problems of working out both a common political program and
a plan of action. By the early 1920s it had split, with its strongest faction
organizing the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). The PKI, however,
was suppressed by the Dutch after its unsuccessful rebellions in
1926–1927, and the center of the nationalist stage was then taken by the
so-called secular or radical nationalists, who emphasized a common In-
donesian identity irrespective of religion, race, or class. Partai Nasional
Indonesia (PNI), Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI Baru), and
Partai Indonesia (Partindo) and leaders such as Sukarno, Moham-
mad Hatta, and Sutan Sjahrir were only briefly able to operate before
a final decade of Dutch repression restricted political freedom to rela-
tively moderate cooperative parties, notably Partai Indonesia Raya
(Parindra) and Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo). Only during
the Japanese occupation were the radical nationalists able to resume
leadership of the pergerakan.
Some scholars have argued that this general view is misleading be-
cause it gives the eventual victors (the radical nationalists) a more cen-
tral role than they in fact played, and that more “moderate” and regional
organizations such as the Pakempalan Kawula Ngayogyakarta and
290 • NATIONALISM

Paguyuban Pasundan and conservative figures such as Ahmad Djaja-

diningrat and Noto Suroto need to be given more emphasis. Another ar-
gument, however, states that both views overestimate the roles of both
radical and conservative nationalists. It instead emphasizes the Islamic
character of much of the nationalist movement and points to the fact that
Muslim organizations were the most effective in keeping nationalism
alive during periods of Dutch repression and that these organizations
were the basis of the strongest militias that opposed the reassertion of
Dutch rule.
From the start, all nationalist groups acknowledged that they faced an
enormous obstacle in the form of the colonial state, especially the political
police (Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst), and strategy for overcoming this
was a major topic of debate. The PKI unsuccessfully ventured armed re-
bellion in 1926–1927, but for most nationalists the issue was how much to
cooperate with the colonial government in quasi-representative institutions
such as the Volksraad. Those favoring cooperation (“Co”) hoped that this
would ameliorate the conditions of Indonesians under colonialism and
would lead eventually to responsible government. Those rejecting it
(“Non-Co”) argued that the Volksraad was no more than window-dressing
and that progress could only be made by withdrawing cooperation from
the colonial government so that it would eventually cease to operate. The
nationalists were also divided on whether to expect support from abroad.
Members of the PKI looked to the Comintern for aid. Some Muslims
hoped for assistance from the Muslim world, while others looked to
Japan, especially after the Russo-Japanese War. In the late 1930s, on the
other hand, the Left was keen to cooperate with the colonial authorities
against Japanese fascism, and toward the close of the Japanese occupa-
tion younger nationalists were anxious that Japanese plans for a puppet
state in Indonesia should not lead to independence being achieved as a
“gift” of any other country. This view developed during the Revolution
into a preference for military action to defeat the Dutch rather than nego-
tiation toward a compromise settlement.
During the Revolution, the Dutch endeavored to promote and recog-
nize regional identities in a federal system (see FEDERALISM), but
only in Ambon did a serious separatist movement emerge at this time.
After the transfer of sovereignty, the Dutch retained control of West New
Guinea (Papua) and encouraged hopes for independence among the
Papuans that survived the territory’s transfer to Indonesian rule in 1963.
These hopes, together with insensitive and at times brutal actions by In-
donesian forces, form the ideological underpinning of the Organisasi
 NATIVE TROOPS • 291

Papua Merdeka (OPM) or Free Papua Movement. [0502, 0586, 0593,

0613, 0621, 0626, 0627, 0651, 0661, 0807, 0844, 0907, 0925]

NATIONALIZATION. Under the Liberal Policy, the colonial govern-

ment promoted foreign investment and resorted to nationalization only
of German and Italian firms after the occupation of the Netherlands in
1940. During the Japanese occupation, firms belonging to Allied sub-
jects were appropriated, and handed in some cases to government bodies
as a source of finance, in other cases to existing Japanese firms (see
SUGAR). At the start of the Revolution, most such firms came into the
hands of their workers, though the Republican government was publicly
committed to handing all but a small number of essential industries, such
as the railways and public utilities, back to their foreign owners.
In December 1957, workers and labor unions throughout Indonesia
took over the offices of Dutch firms in the name of worker control.
Within a few weeks, control was put in the hands of the armed forces
(see MILITARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS) and the seizures were
ratified by parliament. Some 246 enterprises were taken over, account-
ing for 90 percent of the country’s plantation output and 60 percent of
foreign trade. British and American property was nationalized in
1963–1965, but much of it was returned after 1966. Strong guarantees
were also given at this time against further nationalization. See also IN-
DONESIANIZATION; STATE ENTERPRISES. [0315]

NATIVE STATES. See ZELFBESTUREN.

NATIVE TROOPS. Alongside the colonial army (see KONINKLIJK

NEDERLANDSCH INDISCH LEGER), the Dutch retained a num-
ber of auxiliary units more or less descended from the armies of de-
feated or subordinated indigenous rulers. Some of these, such as the
Legiun Mangkunegaran, remained under the command of the zelf-
besturen, while others such as the prajurits of Java and the barisans
on Madura operated as a kind of auxiliary police force under the com-
mand of the Dutch civilian government, though the barisans also took
part in military expeditions to other islands. During World War I many
Indonesians agitated for the establishment of a native militia to aid in
the defense of the colony. The Dutch, however, rejected this for secu-
rity reasons. In the latter part of the Indonesian Revolution, the Dutch
established several quasi-auxiliary units. Hare Majesteits Ongeregelde
Troepen (Her Majesty’s Irregular Troops) consisted of former lasykar
292 • NATSIR, MOHAMMAD

recruited to the Dutch cause. In West Java especially, ondernem-

ingswachten (plantation guards) recruited many Indonesians, while
Veiligheidsbataljons in North Sumatra and West Java and the Barisan
Cakra in Madura were intended partly to maintain law and order,
partly as military backing for the federal states (see FEDERALISM).
See also MARÉCHAUSSÉE.

NATSIR, MOHAMMAD (1908–1993). One of the outstanding mod-

ernist Islamic leaders in independent Indonesia, Natsir was born in Ala-
han Panjang, West Sumatra, and received scholarships to continue his
education, graduating from the Algemene Middelbare School (AMS,
General Secondary School) in Bandung in 1930. He became a member
of the Jong Islamieten Bond, but was associated most closely before the
war with the Persatuan Islam (Persis) and with an Islamic education
organization that he organized and led until it was closed by the Japan-
ese in 1945. He also became known through his exchange in the late
1930s with Sukarno (then in exile in Bengkulu), in which he argued
against what he viewed as Sukarno’s overemphasis on rationalism as the
key to understanding Islam. In November 1945 Natsir was one of the
leaders of the “progressive” wing of the Masjumi party (often termed
the “religious socialists”) and in September 1950 headed the first cabi-
net of the unitary Indonesian Republic. His pro-Western government
emphasized national reconstruction and enjoyed the benefits of the Ko-
rean War boom, but fell in April 1951, partly over the financial auster-
ity program it pursued under Finance Minister Sjafruddin Prawirane-
gara. Natsir remained a strong proponent of democratic government
and differed with Sukarno over this and over the president’s Irian (see
PAPUA) policy.
At the end of 1957, after he was harassed, with other Masjumi leaders,
over an assassination attempt against Sukarno in which members of the
party’s youth branch had been involved, Natsir fled to Sumatra to join
the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. He was one of the last rebels to surren-
der in September 1961, and he was subsequently jailed until after the fall
of Sukarno in 1966. He and his Masjumi colleagues were forbidden to
play any political role under the New Order, and he turned his major at-
tention to education and social work, especially the missionary work of
the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic
Preaching Council), which he helped found in 1967. He remained an in-
fluential critic of the corruption of Indonesian society under the
Suharto regime, and in 1980 was one of the signers of the Petition of
 NEDERLANDSCHE HANDEL MAATSCHAPPIJ • 293

Fifty, as well as joining 10 years later with A. H. Nasution and a senior

leader of the former Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) in a public appeal
deploring the Suharto government’s departure from the social and polit-
ical goals of the Revolution and Indonesian Constitution. [0627, 0695,
0844, 0929, 1121]

NAVY. Whereas the colonial army (Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch

Leger [KNIL]) was institutionally distinct from the metropolitan army,
the naval forces in colonial Indonesia were formally part of the Dutch
navy placed at the operational disposal of the governor-general, an
arrangement that led to continued disputes over the appropriate division
of costs between the two governments. Colonial security policy placed
more emphasis on the maintenance of order within the colony than on
defense from external attack, and especially after the construction of the
Singapore naval base in 1921–1938 the colonial government tended to
rely on Britain for naval protection. The Dutch fleet in the east was
largely destroyed in 1942 in the battle of the Java Sea.
In 1945, former members of the Kaigun Heiho (naval auxiliaries)
formed by the Japanese occupation forces founded the Angkatan Laut
Republik Indonesia (ALRI, Navy of the Indonesian Republic), which
was, however, mainly a commercial operation, trading plantation pro-
duce to Singapore and elsewhere; after 1949, the high capital costs of
maintaining a navy and the demands of internal security kept the navy
small, though it received some equipment from the Soviet Union after
1960, and from Germany in the 1980s. [0714]

NEDERLANDSCHE HANDEL MAATSCHAPPIJ (NHM, Netherlands

Trading Company, also known as the Factorij). Founded on 29 March
1825 by King Willem I on the advice of H. W. Muntinghe as a quasi-
official trading corporation, the NHM acted initially as agent for the sale
of government produce acquired under the Cultivation System, earning
enormous profits. Multatuli’s novel Max Havelaar was subtitled “The
Coffee Auctions of the Netherlands Trading Company.” The NHM was
also responsible for supplying produce, especially textiles, to Dutch in-
dustry, and from 1827 to 1833 it had a monopoly of opium sales in
Dutch territory. After losing government preference in 1872, the firm
moved increasingly into the financing of plantations and thence into gen-
eral banking, which became its major activity in the 20th century. In
1964 the NHM merged with the Twentse Bank to form the Algemene
Bank Nederland.
294 • NEGARA INDONESIA TIMUR

NEGARA INDONESIA TIMUR (NIT, State of East Indonesia). Federal

state formed on 24 December 1946 after the Malino conference of July
that year, encompassing Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusatenggara as a
model of Dutch postcolonial plans for Indonesia. Makassar was its cap-
ital. From March 1947 semiautonomous regions (daerah) were formed
within the NIT itself. Although conservative, its leaders were sufficiently
aware of nationalist strength to seek good relations with the Republic,
and it was NIT’s insistence after the second Dutch “Police Action” that
the Republic be included in negotiations on the country’s future, which
ended Dutch hopes of using federalism to destroy the Republic. In April
1950 the Minahasa daerah seceded from NIT and merged with the In-
donesian Republic, and it was followed by the remaining daerah except
South Sulawesi. In May 1950, the NIT walinegara (head of state), Coko-
rde Gde Rake Sukawati, agreed to dissolve the state on 17 August 1950.
The arbitrary actions by Republican troops sent from Java to take con-
trol, however, aroused resentment that contributed to the revolt of Kahar
Muzakkar. See also REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN. [0660, 0661,
0674, 0784]

NEGARA KALIMANTAN TIMUR. See PONTIANAK.

NEGARA SUMATERA SELATAN. See PALEMBANG.

NEGARA SUMATERA TIMUR. See EAST SUMATRA.

NEKOLIM (neocolonialism, colonialism, and imperialism). Term coined

by Ahmad Yani but popularized by Sukarno to describe what he saw as
the major international enemies of the Indonesian people and reflecting
his understanding that formal independence did not necessarily mean an
end to imperialist control. Sukarno amplified the concept in 1960 by con-
trasting the progressive NEFO (new emerging forces) with the reac-
tionary OLDEFO (old established forces), and he sought to make this
idea a rallying point for progressive countries, holding a Games of the
New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in November 1963 and attempting to
convene a Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) in 1965.
See also FOREIGN POLICY. [0859]

NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IN-

DONESIA. From shortly after the first Dutch trading expeditions to the
archipelago, Dutch power in the region was represented almost exclu-
 NETHERLANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA • 295

sively by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) under a charter from
the Netherlands States General. On rare occasions, the Dutch govern-
ment itself dispatched one or more commissioners-general to the East
to act on its behalf, but for the most part it left the company with un-
trammeled freedom of action in the region. The company’s possessions,
however, were not thought of as strictly sovereign, since they derived
neither from older ideas of divine appointment nor from newer ideas of
popular assent. In practice, moreover, under the racially based legal or-
der (see RACE) in VOC territories, the company exercised much less
than full sovereign power. Even in 1795, when the Batavian Republic
took over the assets of the VOC, it seems to have regarded them as pri-
marily commercial rather than territorial and sovereign, though by that
time the company was already the dominant power on Java.
From 1795 to 1815, the constitutional relationship remained confused
and often vague. Until 1800, States General ruled formally through the
VOC. When the company’s charter lapsed in 1800, the colony came un-
der direct rule, but the Napoleonic Wars and later British occupation of
Java made this of little significance. A Ministry of Colonies was formed
in 1806, though it was often united with other departments, especially
that of the navy, until 1842. From 1815 to 1848 the Ministry of Colonies,
and thus the colony itself, was directly under the authority of the Dutch
king, who used his position and shareholding in the Nederlandsche
Handel Maatschappij (NHM) to make a considerable personal fortune.
In the late 1820s the post of commissioner-general, as representative of
the Dutch government, was first united with that of governor-general,
as agent of the Ministry of Colonies, and then abandoned.
In the 20th century the Netherlands Indies gradually developed as a
state distinct from the Netherlands. In 1903 the colonial treasury was
separated from that of the Netherlands, and in 1913 the colonial govern-
ment received the right to contract public loans. The colonial govern-
ment established quasi-diplomatic representation in Arabia (in connec-
tion with Muslim pilgrimage, see HAJ). Governors-General J. B. van
Heutsz (1904–1909), A. W. F. Idenburg (1909–1916), and J. P. G. van
Limburg Stirum (1916–1921) increasingly defended what they saw as
Indies interests (which were not necessarily the interests of the indige-
nous population) against those of the metropolis. The establishment of
the Volksraad in 1918 gave a quasi-democratic weight to those Indies
government actions that it supported. In 1922 the colony became for-
mally a rijksdeel on a notionally equal footing with the Netherlands in
the Dutch Constitution, though remaining under the Ministry of
296 • NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH

Colonies. On 27 November 1949 the Netherlands government trans-

ferred sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies, excluding West New
Guinea (Papua), to the Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), which was
linked to the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian
Union under the Dutch Crown. See also NETHERLANDS INDIES, EX-
PANSION OF; NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH; SUCCES-
SION. [0006, 0638, 0674]

NETHERLANDS, RELATIONS WITH. Indonesian-Dutch relations be-

gan in 1949 with a legacy of mistrust stemming from the experience of
colonialism and the Revolution, from the unpopular Netherlands-
Indonesian Union (see also DEBT, INTERNATIONAL), and from
what was seen as Dutch support for the Republik Maluku Selatan
(RMS) and other dissidents. Dutch unwillingness to contemplate a trans-
fer of West Irian (Papua) to the Republic at or after the transfer of sov-
ereignty in 1949, however, became the major stumbling block in rela-
tions during the following years, especially after the Netherlands
categorically refused to transfer the territory in 1952 and began plans to
bring it to separate independence. Indonesia attempted to pressure the
Netherlands on the issue by cooling relations: negotiations on the disso-
lution of the Union began in 1954, though the two sides were unable to
agree on how to achieve this and the Union was finally dissolved unilat-
erally by Indonesia in 13 February 1956. The inherited debt was repudi-
ated on 4 August of the same year, though practically all of it had by then
been repaid. In October 1957, after the United Nations again refused to
discuss the Irian issue, the government coordinated an anti-Dutch boy-
cott that was followed by the nationalization of Dutch firms in Decem-
ber. Indonesia finally cut all links on 17 August 1960, but relations were
restored in March 1963, after the Dutch finally surrendered West Irian.
Cordiality returned to the relationship only after the New Order came
to power in 1965–1966. Indonesia asked the Netherlands to chair the
Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), while the Nether-
lands became Indonesia’s largest trading partner in Europe. Indonesia
saw the Netherlands as a useful counterweight to the United States and
Japan in international affairs, but became irritated by Dutch complaints
over human rights abuses in Indonesia. Tension over this issue reached
a head in 1991 when the Dutch suspended aid to Indonesia after the Dili
massacre in East Timor, and Suharto responded by disbanding the
IGGI, which was replaced by the Consultative Group on Indonesia
(CGI) from which the Netherlands was excluded. Relations between the
 NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION OF • 297

two countries warmed slightly over succeeding years, and Queen Beat-
rice became the first Dutch monarch to visit Indonesia in September
1995, the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence. [0695, 1138,
1143, 1146]

NETHERLANDS INDIES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (NICA). Mili-

tarized Dutch colonial administrative corps attached to the advancing Al-
lied forces during World War II to take over the government of areas lib-
erated from the Japanese prior to the formal restoration of civil
government. The prospect of a return to colonial rule aroused such hos-
tility among Indonesians that the term was soon dropped officially, but
NICA remained a derogatory shorthand word for the postwar Dutch ad-
ministration until the end of the Revolution. See also MOOK, H. J.
VAN. [1146]

NETHERLANDS INDIES, EXPANSION OF. Although Indonesian na-

tionalists and Western historians alike were inclined to speak of “350
years of Dutch colonial rule,” the growth of Dutch power in the archi-
pelago was gradual and uneven. The Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC) established influence first by means of treaties with indigenous
rulers. The earliest of these treaties typically gave the VOC a monopoly
of trading rights in certain commodities (e.g., cloves and nutmeg) and
the right to build trading posts. Coming from a Europe that had only re-
cently emerged from the complex hierarchy of medieval feudal relation-
ships, the VOC did not see its activities as formally diminishing the sov-
ereignty of indigenous states. In successive years, however, both the
character of new treaties and the interpretation of old ones changed to
give the Dutch what increasingly amounted to sovereign powers. After
1825, at the end of the disruption caused by the abolition of the VOC and
the Napoleonic Wars (see BATAVIAN REPUBLIC), Dutch authority
extended over Java, parts of West Sumatra (Minangkabau), Palem-
bang, Bangka, Belitung, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, Makassar, the Mi-
nahasa, and much of Maluku; in addition, the Dutch held nominal au-
thority over Lampung, Siak, and Riau. The independent regions thus
still included Aceh, East Sumatra (including the Batak regions of the
interior), Siak, Kutai and the interior of Kalimantan, the remainder of
Sulawesi, Bali, Lombok, West Irian (Papua) and many regions of
Maluku, and Nusatenggara.
The situation, however, was rather confused, with the Netherlands
asserting a general sphere of influence over the entire archipelago yet
298 • NEW EMERGING FORCES

formally acknowledging the independence of “native states in amity

with the Netherlands government,” a term that only disappeared in
1915 (see ZELFBESTUREN). From the mid-19th century and espe-
cially after 1870, the colonial state began to fill out the territorial
boundaries of modern Indonesia by conquering or incorporating these
independent states. Increasingly, the colonial government preferred to
demand verklaringen (declarations) of submission from indigenous
rulers, rather than signing formal treaties with them. The sultan of Deli
made such a declaration in 1862, a model formula for declarations was
prepared in 1875, and in 1898 the so-called Korte Verklaring was
adopted as a relatively standardized acknowledgment by indigenous
rulers that they accepted the general suzerainty of the Netherlands In-
dies, agreed to follow instructions from the governor-general, and
agreed to have no relations with foreign powers. Dutch sovereignty
was effectively established over the entire archipelago (with the possi-
ble exception of the interior of Papua) by 1911. See also NETHER-
LANDS, CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA.
[0006, 0491, 0553, 0583, 0629, 0818]

NEW EMERGING FORCES. See NEKOLIM.

NEW GUINEA: WEST, see PAPUA; see PAPUA NEW GUINEA.

NEW ORDER (Orde Baru, Orba). General term for the political system in
force after the accession of Suharto to power in 1966 (see SUPERSE-
MAR) until his fall in May 1998. It was first used to refer to the so-called
New Order coalition of army, students, intellectuals, and Muslims op-
posed to Sukarno and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). The term
soon came to imply a sharp contrast with the so-called Old Order (Orde
Lama, Orla) of Sukarno, especially in government policies. The New Or-
der abandoned Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia as well as the
Jakarta–Peking axis (see FOREIGN POLICY), opened the country to
foreign investment, suppressed the PKI, purged both state and society of
left-wing influence (see MASSACRES OF 1965–1966), and abandoned
the rhetoric of popular democracy. Indonesia became strongly anticom-
munist (especially anti-Chinese) in its foreign policy, promoted economic
stabilization based on political stability, and emphasized the suppression
of allegedly particularist interests in the cause of development.
Many authors have suggested, however, that the contrast between the
Old and New Orders may not be as sharp as first appeared. They point in
 NEWSPAPERS • 299

particular to the continuing and expanding role of the military, to contin-

ued political repression, and to the patrimonial, neomonarchical styles of
both Sukarno and Suharto. See also POLITICAL CULTURE.
[0716–0752]

NEWS AGENCIES. The Algemene Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap

(ANETA, General News and Telegraph Agency), founded by D. W.
Berretty (1890–1934), was the first news agency in the Indies, but it was
followed quickly by a number of small Dutch and Indonesian firms, in-
cluding the Borneo Pers en Nieuws Agentschap (1926) and the Indone-
sische Pers Agentschap (Inpera) in 1936. Complaints that ANETA was
neglecting local news led to the establishment of Antara in 1937. Many
journalists tied to Antara worked in the Domei agency during the Japan-
ese occupation. ANETA closed in 1940–1946 and changed its name in
1954 to Persbiro Indonesia. In 1963 it was merged into Antara. See also
NEWSPAPERS. [1293, 1304]

NEWSPAPERS. From 1615, Governor-general J. P. Coen sent news from

the Indies to Europe in a handwritten circular later called Memorie der
Nouvelles, but the first true newspaper produced for sale to the public,
the Bataviase Nouvelles, appeared only in 1745 and was banned in 1746
on order of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC). From 1810 the
colonial government published the Bataviasche Koloniale Courant,
which became the Java Government Gazette during the British interreg-
num, and resumed publication as the Bataviasche Courant in 1816 and
the Javasche Courant in 1828. Independent newspapers (apart from ad-
vertisement bulletins) began publishing after 1848, the Java-Bode
(Batavia) appearing in 1852 and De Locomotief (Semarang) in 1863.
The earliest indigenous newspapers were the Javanese-language Bro-
martani (1855) and the Malay Soerat Chabar Melajoe, and from the
1870s the number of newspapers in most regions grew dramatically. The
nationalist press began with Abdul Rivai’s Bintang Hindia in West
Sumatra (1902) and with the Medan Prijaji of Tirtoadisuryo appearing
in Bandung in 1906. There was also a lively Chinese-language press, in-
cluding Sin Po (1910). The Persatuan Jurnalis Indonesia (Indonesian
Journalists’ Association) was formed in 1933 under Moh. Tabrani. It was
replaced in February 1946 by the Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI,
Indonesian Reporters’ Association).
During the Japanese occupation, publication was restricted to gov-
ernment papers, notably Jawa Shinbun, but press publishing blossomed
300 • NEWSPAPERS

again during the Revolution and the early 1950s; a national survey in
1954 recorded 105 dailies, though many of these were closer in style to
political pamphlets than to conventional newspapers. During the 1950s
and early 1960s the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) newspaper Har-
ian Rakjat had the largest circulation, followed by Pedoman (Partai
Sosialis Indonesia [PSI]), Suluh Indonesia (Partai Nasional Indonesia
[PNI]), and Abadi (Masjumi), with Indonesia Raya under Mochtar Lu-
bis a major investigatory paper. From the mid-1950s, however, and es-
pecially after the declaration of martial law in 1957, increasing restric-
tions were placed on the press, causing circulation and numbers to drop.
When Suharto came to power, his government closed about a quarter
of Indonesia’s 160 or so newspapers because of their alleged communist
links. Thereafter the remaining newspapers enjoyed a period of relative
freedom, though any questioning of the official version of the events in
September–October 1965 was forbidden. In 1974, however, in the after-
math of the Malari incident, 12 newspapers were closed down, includ-
ing Mochtar Lubis’s Indonesia Raya, and he and several other leading
journalists were arrested; as a result, the press became more cautious.
Any challenge to the Suharto government usually resulted in printing
bans; for example, after the student protests of 1977–1978 seven Jakarta
papers were temporarily banned, and after they published criticisms from
the members of the Petition of Fifty, newspapers were forbidden from
printing the members’ pictures or their comments. From July 1978 the
government began a program known as koran masuk desa (newspapers
enter the village), under which free copies of the armed forces newspa-
pers Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha were distributed to villages
throughout the country, but these were replaced in December 1979 by a
new series of 27 weekly newspapers and magazines published by the
government especially for distribution to the villages. In 1980 all news-
papers were restricted to 12 pages in length.
Newspaper publication flourished during the 1980s, dominated in
Jakarta by the dailies Kompas and Suara Pembaruan, and the weekly
Tempo, joined in 1985 by the financial daily Bisnis Indonesia, financed
by Liem Sioe Liong’s business interests. These groups in the capital
competed also in publishing regional newspapers, alongside the Jawa
Pos group in Surabaya and the Jakarta daily Media Indonesia. For ex-
ample, the Kompas group collaborated with such regional newspapers as
Sriwijaya Pos in Palembang, Serambi Indonesia in Aceh, Berita Na-
sional in Yogyakarta, and Mandala in Bandung. The Suharto govern-
ment maintained control over the press, however, by various forms of
 NUSATENGGARA • 301

censorship and by having various members of the president’s family

(see SUHARTO FAMILY) and close associates buy into the media in-
dustry. In 1993 Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI)
launched the daily newspaper Republika, which became a major outlet
for B. J. Habibie’s policies.
The fall of Suharto led to an immediate burgeoning of newspapers
when the information minister canceled the need for press publication
permits and issued more than 1,200 licenses, and parliament in Septem-
ber 1999 enacted a new Press Law guaranteeing freedom of the press.
See also NEWS AGENCIES; KETERBUKAAN. [0756, 1290, 1293,
1295, 1304, 1307, 1309]

NGANTUNG, HENK (1921–). Painter especially noted for his landscapes

and portraits of becak drivers and other people. He was elected to par-
liament on the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) ticket in 1955 and was
appointed by Sukarno to represent artists on the Dewan Nasional in
1957. In 1961 he became vice mayor of Jakarta and was city governor
in 1964–1965. He was chairperson of the Central Committee of Lem-
baga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra). [0159]

NIAS. Island off the west coast of Sumatra, known especially for what
was once seen as its surviving megalithic culture, associated with an-
cestor worship, though this receded greatly when missionary activity be-
gan in the late 19th century. Precolonial society was strictly divided into
three classes: aristocrats, farmers, and slaves.

NICKEL. Formerly obtained both from meteorites and from mines in cen-
tral Sulawesi (see LUWU). A large mine was opened at Soroako in south-
east Sulawesi by the Canadian firm International Nickel in 1978. The
state mining firm Aneka Tambang has been mining nickel on Pulau Gebe
off Halmahera since 1978. See also METALWORKING. [0413, 0416]

NUSANTARA. Used in the Nagarakrtagama for the Outer Islands as dis-

tinct from Java, but revived in the early 20th century as a poetic name
for the Indonesian archipelago. See ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT; IN-
DONESIA.

NUSATENGGARA (Lesser Sundas). The chain of islands stretching east

from Java: Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Komodo, Sumba, Savu, Flores,
Roti, Timor, and the Solor archipelago.
302 • NUTMEG

NUTMEG (pala). Nut of Myristica fragrans (Myristicaceae), native of

Maluku and far western New Guinea (Papua), and cultivated from early
times on Banda. Highly prized as a spice, the nuts were traded to China,
India, and Europe from the sixth century. Like cloves, they were a ma-
jor target of Portuguese expansion in the region. After the Dutch seized
Maluku in the early 17th century, they extirpated wild and cultivated
trees from all places they could find them except Banda in order to keep
a close control of the trade and to drive up prices (see DUTCH EAST
INDIES COMPANY; HONGI RAIDS). In 1769 the French success-
fully smuggled plants to Mauritius, from where they spread to Singa-
pore, Penang, and Grenada (West Indies), breaking the Dutch monopoly.
Extensive cultivation began in Minahasa in 1840, but declined after
plantations were struck by disease in 1873. [0527]

–O–

OEI TIONG HAM (1886–1924). The biggest Chinese businessman in

prewar Indonesia. He began as the holder of an opium farm or pacht
from the colonial government, but after the Opiumregie was founded he
diversified into sugar, banking, real estate, and general trading. His em-
pire was managed after his death by his sons, but was nationalized in
1961. [0373]

OIL. Seeping naturally from the ground in northern Sumatra in early

times, oil was collected for use as medicine, for fuel, for caulking boats,
and as an incendiary, especially in naval warfare. The commercial search
for oil began in 1866, after the development of drilling techniques in the
United States, and the first sales of oil, extracted by the Dortsche Petro-
leum Maatschappij from wells near Surabaya, took place in 1889. Ex-
ploratory drilling began in Sumatra in 1883 in Langkat, where oil was
found at 100 meters in depth. From 1890 the wells at Langkat and from
1892 the refinery at Pangkalan Brandan became the center of the oil in-
terests of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot Exploitatie
van Petroleumbronnen in Nederlandsch-Indië (generally known as the
“Koninklijke”). Another company, later called Shell Oil, began drilling
in Kutai in East Kalimantan in 1891. After an oil boom in the last
decade of the 19th century, which saw dozens of companies rise and fall,
the Koninklijke and Shell merged in 1907 to form the Bataafse Petro-
leum Maatschappij (BPM). Although the BPM dominated the Indonesian
 OIL • 303

oil industry from that time and launched a number of joint ventures with
the colonial government (see also STATE ENTERPRISES), a signifi-
cant part of the production was in the hands of the Nederlandsche Kolo-
niale Petroleum Maatschappij, a subsidiary of the American Standard Oil
Company.
Although production began on Java, fields there were soon overshad-
owed by those of Sumatra, which produced a light grade of oil, and, even
more important, those of East Kalimantan, which produced a heavy
grade suitable in some cases for direct use as ship’s fuel. The Netherlands
Indies fields were especially important to Japan, and it was an embargo
on oil supplies from the colony to Japan that, among other things,
prompted the Japanese to invade the region in 1941–1942. The wells of
East Kalimantan were a major target, though considerable damage was
done to them by Dutch scorched-earth tactics before the Japanese arrival.
They were also among the first areas seized by the Allies on their return
to the archipelago in 1945.
Oil from Cepu in Java was an important source of fuel for the In-
donesian Republic during the Revolution, and the south Sumatra fields
were contested by the Republic and the Dutch. The American compa-
nies Stanvac and Caltex as well as Japanese firms took important
shares of postwar production, but all foreign companies were under
pressure to distribute a larger share of the profits to Indonesia. Indone-
sia joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
in 1962, and foreign companies increasingly operated as production-
sharing agents of the three state oil firms, all under army control: Per-
mina, headed by Ibnu Sutowo and based in the south Sumatra fields;
Permigan (formerly Nglobo Oil Mining) in Central Java and eastern In-
donesia, controlled by the army’s Diponegoro Division; and Pertamin
(formerly Permindo), formerly a BPM-government joint venture. Oil
was a major, though insufficient, source of state income under the
Guided Economy.
Production-sharing agreements continued and expanded under the
New Order. The state companies merged in 1968 to form Pertamina,
which rode a wave of enormous profits, with new oil discoveries and a
dramatic increase in oil prices, until its debt crisis in 1975. In 1977 the
United States replaced Japan as Indonesia’s largest customer. The de-
cline of oil prices in 1982 and 1986 imposed severe budget restrictions.
The government responded by attempting to diversify Indonesia’s ex-
ports, so that oil and liquefied natural gas fell from 73 percent of In-
donesia’s exports in 1984 to 51.7 percent in 1987.
304 • OIL PALM

In the late 1990s oil companies increased their exploration activities,

pumping $4.8 billion into exploration in 1997, compared with $3.6 bil-
lion the previous year. In 2002 ExxonMobil discovered possibly the
largest oilfield on Java (at Cepu), perhaps containing 1 billion barrels of
oil, and offered Pertamina a 10 percent stake in the field. Pertamina,
however, was holding out for a 50 percent share of the profits together
with a $400 million signing fee. The decentralization law drawn up in
1999 planned to allow the regions to keep 15 percent of all their oil rev-
enues (except for Aceh, which was to be allowed 70 percent of the
province’s net oil income), and the Oil and Gas Act of 2001 attempted to
force Pertamina to cede its control over production-sharing contracts
with foreign and domestic oil companies to a separate regulatory agency
by November 2002. Violence continued to plague the operations of
ExxonMobil in Aceh, which was forced to close down production for
four months in 2001 and thereafter employ 3,000 Indonesian troops to
guard its facilities. In 2002 Acehnese villagers brought a suit against the
company in U.S. courts for tolerating the brutality and human rights
abuses of the troops guarding its facilities. See also MAP 11. [0294,
0371, 0375, 0400, 0405, 0448]

OIL PALM (Elaeis guineensis, Arecaceae). Originally from Africa, the oil
palm first appeared in Indonesia as an ornamental tree in 1848. The first
commercial plantation was established on Java in 1859, but oil palm did
not become a major crop until the laying out of extensive estates in East
Sumatra from 1911. Not until the Suharto regime, however, did oil
palm plantations begin to replace the forests in many parts of Sumatra
and Kalimantan. Suharto sanctioned the conversion of large areas of
Kalimantan and coastal Sumatra from native vegetation to oil palm plan-
tations, aiming to make Indonesia the world’s largest palm oil producer.
According to some estimates, the land affected could be measured in
millions of hectares. Land clearing was carried out during severe drought
conditions, and this was one of the major causes of the fires that swept
through both islands in 1997. Many of the plantations were developed on
a sensitive peat soil base that, when burned, loosed large carbon emis-
sions into the air. By 2001 Indonesia and Malaysia accounted for more
than 80 percent of global palm oil output, and in that year Indonesia low-
ered its export tax from 5 percent to 3 percent. See also FORESTRY.
[0316, 0331, 0332, 0765]

OLD ORDER. See NEW ORDER.

 OPIUM • 305

ONTVOOGDING. See DECENTRALIZATION; ZELFBESTUREN.

OPERASI KHUSUS (OPSUS, Special Operations). Organization estab-

lished within Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat
(Kostrad) in circa 1963 by Ali Murtopo, an intelligence officer and
member of Suharto’s inner circle, and Sujono Humardani (1919–1986).
It was used initially to establish covert contacts with the Malaysian gov-
ernment during Confrontation. Opsus later helped to ensure progovern-
ment votes in the 1969 “Act of Free Choice” in West Irian (Papua) and
in the general elections in 1971 and after. It played an important role in
the restructuring of political parties after 1971 and was officially dis-
banded in 1974, partly in response to the Malari Affair. See also IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICES.

OPIUM (Papaver somniferum Papaveraceae). Widely cultivated in India

from the 15th century, extensive exports of opium to Indonesia began
soon after. Opium had some use in Tantric religious rituals, but its main
use was recreational. From about 1670 the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC) dominated the trade to Indonesia, and sale on Java was subject
to a loosely enforced company monopoly, for the sake of which produc-
tion in the archipelago was banned.
Various methods were used to market opium. Initially it was sold di-
rectly by the VOC, but company rights were transferred in 1745 to an
Opium Society consisting of private traders; this society was replaced in
1794 by a state Opium Directorate, which Herman Willem Daendels re-
placed in turn with a system of farms or pachten. Thomas Stamford
Raffles attempted to restrict sales, partly for humanitarian reasons, partly
because of extensive smuggling, but he was overruled by the British au-
thorities in Bengal. Control of opium sales was given to the Nederland-
sche Handel Maatschappij (NHM) from 1827 to 1833, when the farms
were restored. In 1894, after a prolonged humanitarian campaign in the
Netherlands, the farm system was replaced once more by a state monop-
oly, the Opiumregie, which imported raw opium, refined it in Batavia,
and sold it to registered addicts through a network of government shops.
Sales continued on a smaller scale during the Japanese occupation, and
the Indonesian Republic earned important foreign exchange during the
national Revolution by selling the remaining Opiumregie stocks within
Indonesia and abroad. The Regie was abolished in 1950.
Proceeds, direct or indirect, from opium sales were a significant part
of state revenues, especially during the 19th century, and were most
306 • ORANGUTAN

commonly associated with forced labor. Opium addiction helped to

keep laborers pliant and subservient through both clinical dependence
and debt. Opium farms were generally in the hands of Chinese entre-
preneurs who maintained private security forces to enforce their re-
gional monopolies. During the 19th century the vast majority of addicts
were Javanese, but in the 20th century a strong campaign by both na-
tionalists and Ethical Policy–minded colonial officials, combined with
the effects of the Depression of the 1930s, dramatically reduced con-
sumption, and by 1942 most users were Chinese. [0599, 0630, 1061]

ORANGUTAN (Pongo pygmaeus, formerly known as Simia satyrus).

Large ape occurring widely in Kalimantan and less commonly in
Sumatra. It first drew attention as a possible “missing link” in the Dar-
winian evolution of humankind. Hunting on behalf of wildlife collectors
became a serious threat to its existence. These depredations were minor,
however, compared to the extensive logging and destruction of the
forests during the late New Order period and the resulting extensive for-
est fires of 1997 and thereafter (see FORESTRY). There is a preserve
that is attempting to save them from extinction in Sabah, Malaysia. See
also CONSERVATION, NATURE. [1158]

ORGANISASI MASSA. See MASS ORGANIZATIONS.

ORGANISASI PAPUA MERDEKA (OPM, Free Papua Movement).

Founded in 1965 in the Central Highlands of West Irian (Papua) to op-
pose Indonesian rule, the OPM drew its support initially from members
of the Dutch-sponsored former Papuan Volunteer Corps and from the
coastal Arfak people. Under the influence of Indonesian policies in the
interior such as transmigration, however, it gained wide though uneven
support throughout the province by the early 1990s. Its support was es-
pecially strong in the Baliem Valley, along the border with Papua New
Guinea, and in the Carstensz Mountains. Its armed forces, the Pasukan
Pembebasan Nasional, were regularly augmented by the desertion of
Papuan troops from the Indonesian army, but they remained poorly
armed and trained. In 1971 Seth Rumkorem declared a Republic of West
Papua, and the movement claimed to control about one quarter of Papua.
The OPM was racked by factionalism, partly tribal, partly ideological,
and many of its leaders went into exile.
After the fall of Suharto, the OPM cooperated with other groups in
Papua and gained some success in persuading the administrations of
 PACHT • 307

presidents B. J. Habibie and Abdurrachman Wahid to grant greater

autonomy to the province. Several exiled leaders returned to participate
in discussions and in the national congress held in May–June 2000, but
many mistrusted the new leadership under Theys Eluay and others, who
were seen as too close to the Indonesian political and military leadership.
On 29 November 2000 the police arrested Theys Eluay and other lead-
ers, refusing to release them at the request of President Wahid. Theys
Eluay’s murder a year later, allegedly at the hands of Indonesia’s Special
Forces (Kopassus), contributed to further alienation of both the OPM
and of the Papuan people in general. Other militias arose during this pe-
riod, and the OPM seems to have been affiliated with the National Lib-
eration Army (Tentera Pembebasan Nasional, TPN), which trained op-
position forces to the Indonesian government. See also MELANESIAN
BROTHERHOOD. [0754, 0755, 0809, 0815, 0816]

OTTOMAN EMPIRE. See TURKEY, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH.

OUDHEIDKUNDIGE DIENST. See ARCHEOLOGY.

OUTER ISLANDS. Term equivalent to the Dutch buitengewesten, outer

regions, and sometimes considered slightly pejorative, for the Indonesian
islands other than Java, Madura, and occasionally Bali. In general,
these “outer” regions are less densely populated, lack extensive wet-rice
fields, and are in some cases rich in natural resources. Shifts in the focus
of economic activity can be seen in the fact that the Outer Islands ac-
counted for only 10 percent of Indonesian exports in 1890, but 70 per-
cent in 1940. The term also contains a sense of political distance from the
center. The term is a convenient one but carries little analytical weight.
See also NUSANTARA. [0323]

–P–

PACHT (revenue farm, pl. pachten). One of the most common sources of
state revenue before the 20th century. The state typically sold or granted
rights over a particular sector of the economy to a private entrepreneur,
who was then at liberty to extract what he could from it and to enforce
his rights with his own private police force. Pachten were commonly
granted for the running of toll houses, pawnshops, and gambling dens;
the sale of opium and salt; the collection of land, market, and poll tax;
308 • PADANG

the management of forests; and the harvesting of produce such as birds’

nests, pearls, trepang, and sponges. In the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, the colonial government replaced many of these farms with state
monopolies. See also TAXATION.

PADANG. Capital of the province of West Sumatra, Padang was a fish-

ing and salt-making village, until under Acehnese control in the 17th
century it became a major entrepôt for the pepper trade. It was seized
by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1664, and then by the
British in 1793, who restored it in 1819 to the Dutch. It became a ma-
jor center for the export of coffee in the late 19th century. The Dutch
built a railway line to connect it with the interior and with a new port
(Emmahaven, now Teluk Bayur), which was established approxi-
mately 10 km south of the town. From there coal was shipped from the
Ombilin coalfields, as well as cement from Indarung (PT Semen
Padang), and it is the main port for West Sumatra’s other major ex-
ports of rubber, copra, cloves, coffee, cinnamon, and rattan. See also
MINANGKABAU. [1380]

PADERI WAR. See MINANGKABAU.

PAGUYUBAN PASUNDAN. Sundanese cultural association founded in

1914 initially to promote Sundanese cultural identity, though it later
founded schools and took part in local councils. Under Oto Iskandardi-
nata (1897–1946?), it became the largest mass organization in West
Java, but it never promoted Sundanese separatism. Like the Pakem-
palan Kawula Ngayogyakarta (PKN), it was part of a movement for
the support of regional culture within the broader nationalist pergerakan.
The prewar popularity of the Paguyuban Pasundan, however, was a fac-
tor encouraging the Dutch to create the federal state of Pasundan in
1948. See also NATIONALISM; SUNDA.

PAJAJARAN. The last Hindu kingdom in West Java, founded in 1344 at

Pakuan (near modern Bogor). Although primarily an agrarian kingdom,
it traded pepper and other produce through Sunda Kalapa, near modern
Jakarta, until that was lost to Banten in 1527. Banten captured the cap-
ital and slaughtered the royal family in the 1570s.

PAJANG. Central Javanese successor state to Majapahit, based probably

near modern Surakarta. It was defeated by Mataram in 1587–1588.
 PALEMBANG • 309

PAK (“father”). Term of affectionate but deferential address. See BAPAK.

PAKEMPALAN KAWULA NGAYOGYAKARTA (PKN, Yogyakarta

People’s Party). Founded in June 1930 by Pangeran Sosrodiningrat,
whom many of his followers saw as a new ratu adil, or just prince (see
JOYOBOYO). With 250,000 members, it was the largest political or-
ganization in 1930s Indonesia, but it worked mainly on local issues, es-
pecially forming cooperatives and preserving the powers of Yo-
gyakarta’s traditional rulers. See also NATIONALISM.

PAKPAHAN, MUCHTAR (1953–). Muchtar Pakpahan established the

Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (SMSI, Indonesian Prosperous Work-
ers’ Union), the first independent labor organization under Suharto, in
1992 (see LABOR UNIONS). He was arrested in 1996 and the SMSI
banned in 1997. After Suharto’s fall he was one of the first political pris-
oners to whom President B. J. Habibie granted amnesty, and he was in-
vited to register his SMSI again and to join the Indonesian contingent at
the annual meeting of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in
Geneva. He used the SMSI as a springboard to launch a National Labor
Party (Partai Buruh Nasional, PBN) to contest the 1999 elections, but it
only gained about 111,000 votes and no seats. [0424, 0760, 1010]

PAKUALAMAN. Minor court established in Yogyakarta in 1812 under

the sponsorship of Thomas Stamford Raffles, with separate apanage
rights from the Yogyakarta sultanate.

PALAPA. Indonesia’s domestic satellite communications system, named

for a vow by Gajah Mada, prime minister of Majapahit, to abstain
from palapa (perhaps a fruit, a spice, or possibly sex) until the kingdom
was united. Initially planned in Repelita II, it was finally commissioned
in August 1976. See also MEDIA; TELEGRAPH.

PALEMBANG. City and state on the Musi River in south Sumatra. Proba-
bly the capital of the kingdom of Srivijaya, Palembang lost its importance
after the Chola raids of 1025 and fell into the hands of the Chinese pirate
Liang Danming (see PIRACY; ZHENG HE). A new sultanate of Palem-
bang became a major exporter of pepper in the 16th century, but it de-
clined and fell subject to Riau in 1659. Palembang reemerged in the 18th
century after the discovery of tin on Bangka and Belitung in 1709, and
from 1722 monopoly contracts for tin mining provided the sultanate’s
310 • PAMONG PRAJA

most important source of income. In 1812–1816, however, Thomas Stam-

ford Raffles forced Sultan Ahmad Najamuddin to cede the tin-rich islands.
In a series of military and political maneuvers, the Dutch gradually tight-
ened their control, annexing the sultanate in 1823. Sultan Taha launched an
unsuccessful revolt in 1858, and the Dutch did not subdue the upland Re-
jang and Pasamah areas until the 1860s. They remained unable to control
the smallholder producers of coffee and rubber, who succeeded in build-
ing up an international network of trade in both these products. The
Palembang region also had extensive reserves of coal and particularly oil,
becoming the largest source of oil exports for the Netherlands East Indies
in the late colonial period. During the early Revolution, trade in rubber to
Singapore was a major source of Republican finance. Much of the area
was occupied in the first “Police Action” in 1947, and on 18 December
1948 the Dutch established a Negara Sumatra Selatan (NSS) under Abdul
Malik based in Palembang (see FEDERALISM). The NSS was abolished
on 9 March 1950. South Sumatra was the economic base of two of the
early New Order’s most important “financial generals,” Ibnu Sutowo and
Ratu Alamsyah Perwiranegara. [0569, 0837, 0839]

PAMONG PRAJA (“guardians of the realm”). Formerly pangreh praja

(“rulers of the realm”), the civil service on Java conceived as an institution
dating from precolonial times. See BUPATI; INLANDSCH BESTUUR.

PALM OIL. See OIL PALM.

PAMUNGKAS, SRI BINTANG. Educated at the Bandung Institute of

Technology (ITB) and then at Iowa State University, Sri Bintang Pa-
mungkas became a lecturer in the Department of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Indonesia and in the late 1980s gained a reputation as a coura-
geous critic of government policies and corruption. He refused to join
Golkar and was elected to parliament in 1992 as a member of the Par-
tai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). His speeches in Bandung and
Germany demanding higher teacher salaries, questioning aspects of the
Pancasila, and outlining future challenges to the Indonesian economy
sparked a police investigation into his activities in April 1995. In 1996
Pamungkas founded and led the Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia
(PUDI). He was blamed for anti-Suharto demonstrations in Germany
during the president’s state visit there and was arrested and sentenced in
May 1996 to 34 months in prison. After his appeal, he was rearrested in
March 1997 on a charge of subversion. He was released when B. J.
Habibie became president in 1998. [0760]
 PANCASILA • 311

PANCASILA. The five principles of state ideology, as follows: Ketuhanan

yang maha esa, belief in the one supreme God; Kemanusiaan yang adil
dan beradab, just and civilized humanitarianism; Persatuan Indonesia,
Indonesian unity; Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan
dalam permusyawaratan/perwakilan, popular sovereignty governed by
wise policies arrived at through deliberation and consensus; and Keadi-
lan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia, social justice for the entire In-
donesian people.
The Pancasila was formulated by Sukarno on 1 June 1945 in a speech
to the committee drafting Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution and was incor-
porated into the preamble of that constitution and its 1949 and 1950 suc-
cessors. The general character of the silas allows widely varying inter-
pretations of the Pancasila’s content. Early Western observers saw it as a
promising synthesis of Western democracy, Islam, Marxism, and in-
digenous village democratic ideas, while it was initially embraced most
enthusiastically in Indonesia by those wishing to avert the creation of an
Islamic state; during the 1950s, and especially in the sessions of the
Constituent Assembly, secularists and members of other religions put
forward the notion of a state based on the Pancasila as a preferable al-
ternative to a state based on a single religion. Under Guided Democ-
racy, on the other hand, conservative groups stressed the religious con-
tent of the Pancasila, in the form of the first principle, in order to
distinguish it from ideas of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and
from leftist concepts of Sukarno, such as Nasakom. After 1965, with the
PKI vanquished, the Pancasila became once more a tool used by the gov-
ernment to resist pressures for an Islamic state.
From the start, the New Order government frequently referred to its
political system as “Pancasila Democracy,” but it was not until 1978 that
it attempted to appropriate the Pancasila by formulating the Pedoman
Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (P4, Guide to Realizing and Ex-
periencing the Pancasila), promoting the values of “hierarchy, harmony,
and order.” These became a compulsory part of education curricula at all
levels and part of the indoctrination process for civil servants and all sec-
tors of society. In 1985 all noncommercial, nongovernment organizations
were required by law to adopt the Pancasila as their sole guiding princi-
ple (azas tunggal) as a presumed guarantee of future political orthodoxy
and harmony (see PETITION OF FIFTY; WHITE PAPER).
The Pancasila was used to underpin a corporatist, authoritarian state
system; in particular, while interpreting silas 2–5 as precluding politics
based on class or other adversarial social divisions, the Suharto regime
312 • PANGESTU

ignored their prescriptions of popular sovereignty and social justice. See

also GARUDA; KEPERCAYAAN. [0480, 0661, 0844, 0859, 0911, 0920,
0924, 1040]

PANGESTU (Paguyuban Ngèsti Tunggal, Association for Striving toward

Harmony with God). Javanese mystical organization, founded in 1949 by
R. Sunarto Mertowardoyo (1899–1965). With over 20,000 members, it is
one of the largest of the kebatinan groups. [0714]

PANGLIMA. Military commander, originally referring to senior

uleëbalang (regional chiefs) in Aceh but adopted by the Republican
army in 1945 as its senior appointment. Initially used for any division or
military region (Kodam) commander, it is now restricted to the Tentara
Nasional Indonesia (TNI) commander.

PANGREH PRAJA. See PAMONG PRAJA.

PANITIA PERSIAPAN KEMERDEKAAN INDONESIA (PPKI, Com-

mittee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence). Formed on 7
August 1945 to replace the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Ke-
merdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), it acted as a kind of protoparliament
for the impending state. It consisted entirely of Indonesians with
Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta as chairman and vice chairman re-
spectively. After the declaration of independence, it met to enact the
new Republic’s constitution, adopting the draft previously prepared by
the BPUPKI, and elected Sukarno and Hatta as president and vice pres-
ident; and on 29 August, it transformed itself into the Komité Nasional
Indonesia Pusat (KNIP). [0647, 0661, 0674]

PANJI STORIES. Cycle of stories derived from East Java and based on
the adventures of Prince Panji in search of his bride, a princess of Daha
(Kediri), who disappeared mysteriously on their wedding night. [0159]

PANTUN. Malay verse form in four lines rhyming a-b-a-b. Typically the
first couplet contains a cryptic allusion to the second, which may take the
form of a proverb or message.

PAPER. Produced on Java from at least 1200, using the inner bark of the
paper mulberry Broussonetia papyrifera (Moraceae). It was probably a
development from earlier felted cloth under the influence of Chinese pa-
 PAPUA • 313

per technology and was used mainly for painting and wrapping, lontar
leaves being the preferred writing surface. Lontar, however, was not
suited to the writing of Arabic curves and dots, and the use of paper grew
from the 14th century with the spread of Islam. In the 17th century, pa-
per was an important item of trade for the European companies, and the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) established a paper mill in
Batavia. See also WRITING SYSTEMS.

PAPUA. The territory of West New Guinea under the Dutch, and thereafter
called Irian Barat (West Irian), a term that was abandoned in 1972 as im-
plying possibly territorial claims on the eastern part of the island and re-
placed with the official name Irian Jaya. Indigenous separatists on the is-
land preferred the term Papua, or West Papua, derived from the
Portuguese papuas, said to be from a local word meaning “curly hair,”
and in 2001 the Indonesian government under President Abdurrachman
Wahid named the province Papua. The indigenous population in 2000
numbered 2.2 million, speaking 200 distinct languages.
The island was settled by Melanesians around perhaps 20,000 B.C.
Archeological evidence of increased erosion and charcoal deposits sug-
gests that extensive agriculture began in 7000 B.C. Domestic pigs,
which are not native to the island, were present from 6000 B.C., and by
4000 B.C. a strong economy based on tropical tubers such as taro was in
place, enabling the Melanesians to resist the later Austronesians, though
some Papuan tribes came to speak Austronesian languages (see MI-
GRATIONS). Bronze tools were in use by 1000 B.C., and irrigation
ditches in the highlands date from at least the first century A.D.
The island had little contact with western Indonesia until the 20th
century, though there is evidence of trade with Majapahit. In the early
17th century the Portuguese Luis Vaez de Torres discovered acciden-
tally that the island was separate from Australia. Offshore islands and
some coastal regions were claimed by the sultan of Tidore, and the
Dutch claim rested on their conquest of Tidore. During the 19th cen-
tury, repeated European expeditions mapped the coastline and investi-
gated the natural history of the island, but a Dutch settlement at Lobo
in 1828 was abandoned in 1836 because of cost overruns and debilitat-
ing disease, and permanent occupation was not restored until 1896
when the Netherlands feared expansionism by Australia on the island.
The border between Dutch, Australian, and German holdings was fixed
at 141°E in 1875. Much of the coastal region was “explored” in the
1920s, and a penal settlement for Indonesian nationalists and those
314 • PAPUA

involved in the uprising of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) was

established at Boven Digul in the southeast in 1926. The densely pop-
ulated Baliem Valley of the interior was “discovered” only in 1938.
Merauke, in the far southeastern corner, remained under Dutch rule
throughout World War II, and the rest of the island was reconquered by
Allied troops (those of the United States and Australia) in 1944, before
the Japanese surrender.
When the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the Indonesian Re-
public in 1949, it retained provisional control over Papua, arguing that
the indigenous inhabitants were ethnically and culturally dissimilar to
other Indonesians and would become victims of “Javanese imperialism.”
Wishing to provide a place of settlement for displaced Indo-Europeans,
some Dutch also saw retention of the region as a way of maintaining
their status as a world power and were impressed by the mining poten-
tial of the province. Since, however, it had never been constitutionally
distinguished from the rest of Indonesia in the colonial era, Indonesians
regarded this separation as an attack on national sovereignty and an at-
tempt to preserve colonialism in the region. The status of the territory
was left unresolved by the Round Table Conference in 1949, and when
the Dutch refused to negotiate the issue it quickly became a running sore
in relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Dutch actions to
bring the Papuans to a separate independence included the establishment
of a semirepresentative Nieuw-Guinea Raad (New Guinea Council) and
the official raising of the “Morning Star” flag next to that of the Dutch
on 1 December 1961.
Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno stepped up pressure on the
Dutch, announcing a military campaign (Trikora [Tri Komando Rakyat],
People’s Triple Command) for its recapture on 19 December 1961. Mil-
itary infiltration began in early 1962. After protracted negotiations and
heavy pressure from the United States, the Dutch administration handed
over the territory to the United Nations on 15 August 1962; the United
Nations in turn handed it to Indonesia on 1 May 1963, establishing a UN
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to oversee the transfer and as-
sist in preparation for an “Act of Free Choice” to be held in five years to
determine the wishes of the people of the territory. No details of this Act
were specified, and Ali Murtopo’s Operasi Khusus led the campaign
for integration and carried out the Act of Free Choice in July–August
1969 by inviting the opinions of 1,025 selected tribal leaders, assembled
especially for the occasion, who agreed without a vote to confirm inte-
gration with the Republic.
 PAPUA • 315

Under the Suharto regime, the economy of the province was trans-
formed by the expansion of forest exploitation, by a massive Freeport
gold and copper mine, by the arrival of Javanese settlers under the
transmigration program, and by the immigration of Bugis smallholders.
Christian and, to a lesser extent, Muslim missionary activities were ex-
tensive, and Indonesian officials encouraged tribespeople to abandon
their traditional dress and customs.
Resentment over government cultural and economic policies and over
the domination of government posts by non-Papuans had led in 1965 to
the founding of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), which con-
ducted sporadic guerrilla war against government forces. Indonesian mil-
itary operations along the border with Papua New Guinea (PNG) were
a source of friction between the two countries, especially as Papuan
refugees from Irian crossed the border into PNG.
With the fall of Suharto, hopes for independence were reignited and
the “morning star” flag was raised throughout the region in July 1998.
The military quickly responded, killing or wounding hundreds of
Papuans. President B. J. Habibie, however, was more conciliatory,
meeting with a hundred Papuans on 26 February 1999 and listening to
their grievances. On 1 December, thousands raised the Papuan flag and
leading members of the community called on the provincial parliament
to convey their demand for independence to the central government.
Habibie’s successor as president, Abdurrachman Wahid, held public
talks with Papuan leaders, agreeing to their flying the “morning star” flag
alongside, but below, that of Indonesia, and using the name Papua in-
stead of Irian Jaya. At a National Congress held in Jayapura at the end of
May 2000, representatives from throughout Papua outlined plans for
achieving independence.
Since 1999, a number of militia groups have arisen in the region, the
two main ones being the Papua Taskforce (Satuan Tugas Papua/Satgas
Papua), led until his death by Theys Eluay, which supports independence;
and the Red and White Taskforce (Satgas Merah Putih, SMP), which sup-
ports continuation of Indonesian rule. A third group, the National Liber-
ation Army (Tentera Pembebasan Nasional, TPN), was believed to be af-
filiated with the armed opposition group, the OPM. Tensions rose
between those advocating independence and their opponents after Wahid
gave Megawati Sukarnoputri, then vice president, responsibility for
government relations with eastern Indonesia. Following the example of
her father, Sukarno, Megawati strongly opposed Papuan independence
and allowed the military to conduct a much more aggressive campaign to
316 • PAPUA NEW GUINEA, RELATIONS WITH

maintain control of the territory. She recommended that Wahid rescind

his promise to open the Papuans’ National Congress and urged him to act
forcefully against Papuan separatism. In October 2000, when the police
cut down the “morning star” flag in Jayapura, riots broke out with dozens
of non-Papuans being killed and many fleeing the area.
When Megawati succeeded Wahid as president in July 2001, she coop-
erated with the army leadership in inaugurating a stricter policy of military
repression against the possibility of Papuan separatism. The largest opera-
tion took place from April to October 2001 after an armed group of
Papuans attacked logging companies in the Wasior district, killing nine. In
response units of the Police Mobile Brigade detained over a hundred peo-
ple, imprisoning and torturing many of them and allegedly executing seven
of the detainees. The moderate Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay
was assassinated in November 2001, further strengthening Papuan distrust
of the Jakarta government and military. Three special forces (Komando
Pasukan Khusus [Kopassus]) officers were initially charged with his
murder, and in early May 2002 a national investigation commission also
named three other soldiers as suspects. A total of seven Kopassus members
faced trial in Surabaya for his murder in April 2003. On 31 August 2002
an ambush near the Freeport mine left two Americans and an Indonesian
dead, an incident that was later discovered to have been the work of the In-
donesian army. On 4 April 2003 OPM forces attacked a weapons ware-
house in Wamena and killed two soldiers, Army chief of staff Ryamizard
Ryacuda blaming this upsurge in violence on the earlier withdrawal of the
Kopassus troops. Despite widespread opposition in Papua, in August 2003
the government divided the province into three: Papua, Irian Jaya Barat,
and Irian Jaya Tengah (see MAP 12). See also ASMAT; DANI. [0744,
0754, 0755, 0809, 0813, 0815, 0816, 0821, 0946, 1105, 1124, 1252]

PAPUA NEW GUINEA (PNG), RELATIONS WITH. Since PNG be-

came independent in 1975, relations have been dominated by Indonesian
fears that PNG may be a base for Operasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) sep-
aratists, and by PNG fears that Indonesia may at some time attempt to
take it over. PNG formally denies sanctuary to the OPM, though con-
trolling the 750-km, poorly marked border is difficult and there is much
popular sympathy for the OPM in PNG. Indonesian policies aimed at di-
luting the Melanesian character of Papua and heavy-handed operations
against the OPM sent a flood of refugees across the border from Indone-
sia to PNG in the early 1980s, with a peak in 1984, and PNG confidence
in Indonesian intentions diminished when Indonesian armed forces
 PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA • 317

crossed the border without permission on a number of occasions. It was

also discovered in 1983 that the Indonesian-built Trans-Irian Highway
was being built on PNG territory for part of its length. In October 1986
the two countries signed a Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship, and Co-
operation that provided, among other things, that neither side would al-
low its territory to be used for purposes hostile to the other.

PARARATON (“Book of Kings”). Javanese text dated 1613, telling stories

of Ken Angrok and Raden Wijaya (see MAJAPAHIT). The manuscript
was discovered on Bali in the late 19th century. [0170]

PARLIAMENTS. See CHUO SANGI-IN; DEWAN PERWAKILAN

RAKYAT; KOMITÉ NASIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT; MAJELIS
PERMUSYAWARATAN RAKYAT; VOLKSRAAD.

PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL (PAN, National Mandate Party). A po-

litical party established 23 August 1998 on the basis of the Majelis
Amanat Rakyat (MARA), an organization founded in the last days of the
Suharto regime by 50 opposition figures, notable among them Amien
Rais, Gunawan Mohammad, Adnan Buyung Nasution, and Emil Salim.
It was headed by Amien Rais and came in fifth in the 1999 elections,
with 7,528,956 votes (7 percent), gaining 34 seats in the parliament.
[0763, 1010]

PARTAI BULAN BINTANG (PBB, Crescent Moon and Star Party). An

Islamic party established in July 1998 as the heir of the former Masjumi,
it described its basis as “Islamic modernism” and advocated an Islamic
state for Indonesia. In the 1999 general elections, it received 2,049,708
votes and gained 13 parliamentary seats. It qualified to contest the 2004
elections under leadership of Yusril Ihza Mahendra.

PARTAI BURUH INDONESIA (PBI, Indonesian Labor Party). A Marx-

ist party established in Kediri in November 1945 by S. K. Trimurti, Se-
tiajit, and Sakirman. It was a member of the Sayap Kiri and merged with
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in September 1948. The party
reappeared after the Madiun Affair but rejoined the PKI in February
1951. A short-lived splinter Partai Buruh was formed in December 1949
by members opposed to the Madiun uprising. [0674, 1128]

PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA (PDI, Indonesian Democratic

Party). Formed in January 1973 by a government-enforced merger of the
318 • PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA

Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), Partai Katolik, Partai Kristen In-

donesia (Parkindo), Murba, and Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan
Indonesia (IPKI). As its largest component, the PNI formed the new
party’s core, but with the new government policy of monoloyalitas the
party lost much of the bureaucratic vote to the Golkar and was reduced
to a narrow “natural” constituency, especially among the Christian com-
munity. Government intervention in support of the conservative faction
of Mohammad Isnaeni and Sunawar Sukowati against that of the more
progressive Usep Ranuwijaya and Sanusi Harjadinata weakened the
party’s internal organization.
The party’s poor performance in the 1977 and 1982 elections raised
the prospect that it might disappear entirely, leaving the Muslim Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) as the only opposition party. After the
late 1970s, therefore, the government gave the PDI discreet assistance in
the form of direct financial grants and aid in the preparation of election
materials and the conduct of campaigns. Sections of the party always
sought to present it as the heir to the ideas of Sukarno and his portrait
was prominent at PDI rallies, but the government restricted the extent to
which the former president’s name could be used. In large part as a re-
sult of the candidacy of Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of the for-
mer president, the party registered a substantial recovery in 1987, over-
taking the PPP as second party in the Jakarta region.
In the 1992 election campaign, Soerjadi, general chairman of PDI, at-
tacked some of the business ventures of the Suharto family and also pro-
posed limitations on presidential terms. This challenge lost him the presi-
dent’s support, and the government refused to recognize his reelection in
July 1993. The PDI then elected Megawati to replace him. But in 1996 the
government reversed itself and supported Soerjadi, pushing through his
election at a special congress of the PDI in Medan in June of that year.
When Megawati’s supporters continued to occupy the PDI headquarters in
Jakarta, government-backed mobs forcibly ejected them, sparking wide-
spread riots. Megawati commanded wide popular support, and when in
September 1996 the government rejected a slate of candidates submitted
by her group, further antigovernment demonstrations erupted. These con-
tinued for months, and on 15 April 1997 thousands of Megawati’s sup-
porters protested in front of the parliament building in Jakarta demanding
that her slate and not that of Soerjadi be accepted in the forthcoming elec-
tions as representing the PDI. Shortly before the elections, Megawati an-
nounced that she would not be casting a vote and, though she did not ask
her supporters to follow her lead in boycotting the elections, she requested
 PARTAI INDONESIA RAYA • 319

that they not vote for the PDI. Soerjadi and his supporters in the PDI ran a
lackluster campaign, facing demonstrations from Megawati’s supporters at
all their rallies. In the May elections, the party received only 3.5 million
votes and was allotted only 11 seats in the parliament. At the PDI party
congress in 1997, Budi Hardjono replaced Soerjadi as party chairman.
Megawati’s split from the party and formation of her Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDI-P) gutted the PDI’s support.
In the post-Suharto general election of 1999, the PDI only succeeded in
gaining 655,049 votes and 2 seats in parliament. [0736, 0760, 1010]

PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA—PERJUANGAN (PDI-P, In-

donesian Democratic Party of Struggle). The PDI-P developed out of
Megawati Sukarnoputri’s faction of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
(PDI). After the PDI congress in August 1998 in Palu, Sulawesi, when
the new chairman, Budi Hardjono, refused to disband the party,
Megawati’s faction held a congress in Bali from 8–10 October. In her
speech there, she referred to the congress as a gathering of the Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). Most of the PDI’s base and
many of its former leaders moved to Megawati’s party, which in the 1999
elections gained 35 percent of the vote (35,689,073) and the largest num-
ber of parliamentary seats (153) [0760, 1010]

PARTAI INDONESIA (Partindo). 1. Party founded in 1931 by Mr. R. M.

Sartono to replace the recently dissolved Partai Nasional Indonesia
(PNI). After failing to bridge the differences between Partindo and the
Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia of Mohammad Hatta and Sutan
Sjahrir, Sukarno joined Partindo in 1932. The party pressed for inde-
pendence by means of mass action, and its membership soon swelled to
a claimed 20,000. Its mass rallies soon attracted Dutch repression; its
leaders were arrested and exiled, its 1934 party congress was forbidden,
and the party decided to dissolve in November 1936. [0613, 0661]
2. A small left-wing party that seceded from the Partai Nasional In-
donesia (PNI) in July 1958, partly to back the policies of Sukarno. Its
existence was used to justify the appointment of more left-wingers to of-
ficial posts alongside the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), to which it
became increasingly close. It was banned in 1966. [0475]

PARTAI INDONESIA RAYA (Parindra, Greater Indonesia Party). Formed

as a merger of Budi Utomo and the Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia in De-
cember 1935 it was led by Sutomo, M. H. Thamrin, Susanto Tirtoprojo,
320 • PARTAI KATOLIK

and Sukarjo Wiryopranoto. More conservative than Gerakan Rakyat In-

donesia (Gerindo), it was willing to cooperate with the Dutch and was
instrumental in forming the moderate nationalist coalition Gabungan
Politik Indonesia (Gapi). It claimed 10,000 members in 1940. In 1938 it
founded a commercial company, the Pertanian Bumi Putera, to initiate
party-controlled agricultural and industrial enterprises. Parindra was
hopeful that Japanese pressure on the Indies would lead to reforms, and
the Dutch detained Thamrin in February 1941 on suspicion of “treason-
ous” dealing with Japan. The party was banned, like all others, during the
Japanese occupation, but it reemerged in November 1949 under R. P.
Suroso, who sat in several cabinets until the party disappeared in the 1955
elections. [0586, 0888]
PARTAI KATOLIK (Catholic Party). The earliest political association of
Indonesian Catholics was the Pakempalan Politik Katolik Jawi (Political
Association of Javanese Catholics), founded in February 1923 and
headed from 1925 by Ignatius Joseph Kasimo (1900–1987?). The PPKJ
was represented in the Volksraad from 1924 and in the nationalist fed-
erations Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia
(PPPKI) and Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Gapi). It changed its name
several times, becoming the Persatuan Politik Katolik Indonesia (PPKI,
Political Union of Indonesian Catholics) in 1930, the Persatuan Katolik
Republik Indonesia (PKRI) in December 1945, and the Partai Katolik in
August 1950, still led by Kasimo. With a small but solid constituency in
Flores and Central Java, it was present in all parliaments from 1945 un-
til it was merged into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) in 1973.
[0695, 1003]
PARTAI KEADILAN (PK, Justice Party). A modernist Muslim party, es-
tablished in July 1998 after Suharto’s fall and led by Nur Mahmudi Is-
mail. More progressive than the Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), the other
major heir to Masjumi, it had ties with anti-Suharto student activist or-
ganizations and had support among university graduates hoping to see
Indonesia become a modern Islamic society. It received 1,436,565 votes
in the 1999 general elections, gaining seven parliamentary seats. Several
of its leaders are graduates of Saudi Arabian universities, and the party
espouses the introduction of Islamic law (syariah) in Indonesia. After
failing to qualify for the 2004 elections, the Partai Keadilan joined with
another Islamic party to form the new Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS,
Justice and Welfare Party), which was expected to support Amien Rais
as presidential candidate. [1010, 0765]
 PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA • 321

PARTAI KEBANGKITAN BANGSA (PKB, Rise of the People Party).

Founded in July 1998 with close ties to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
the electoral vehicle of Abdurrachman Wahid, it was chaired by
H. Matori Abdul Djalil. In the 1999 elections its platform was pluralistic
and nationalistic, advocating Pancasila and asserting that it served all In-
donesians irrespective of race, religion, or profession. At least four other
parties competed with it for the NU’s following (the Partai Solidaritas Uni
Nasional Indonesia [SUNI, Indonesian National Solidarity Party], the
Partai Nahdlatul Ulama [Partai NU], the Partai Kebangkitan Ummat
[PKU, Awakening of the Muslim Nation Party], and the Partai Persat-
uan Pembangunan [PPP]), each of them representing different factions
within the organization. The PKB came in fourth in the 1999 elections,
with its 13,336,982 votes concentrated mostly in the NU strongholds of
East and Central Java. This meant that it gained fewer seats in the parlia-
ment (51) than its proportion of the votes would seem to justify. It coop-
erated with other Islamic parties in parliament to ensure Wahid’s victory
over Megawati Sukarnoputri in the struggle for the presidency in Sep-
tember 1999. After his impeachment, Wahid remained as advisory chair-
man of the PKB (its chairman was now Alwi Shihab, former minister of
foreign affairs), and he dismissed two PKB leaders from their positions in
the party because of their support for his impeachment two years earlier.
In April 2003 the Jakarta High Court upheld this action and prohibited
the two from using the party’s flag, symbols, and anthem for the new
splinter party they formed after their ouster. The PKB is likely to name
Wahid as its presidential candidate for the 2004 election, although the
names of NU head Hasyim Muzadi and former general Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono have been mentioned as possible alternatives. [0765, 1010]

PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI, Indonesian Communist

Party). Founded on 23 May 1920 as successor to the Indische Sociaal-
Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV) and initially named Perserikatan
Komunis di Hindia (Communist Association of the Indies). The PKI
was the first communist party in Asia outside the borders of former
tsarist Russia and joined the Comintern in December 1920. Its leaders
initially followed a “bloc within” strategy, joining the Sarekat Islam
(SI) and attempting to shift it to the Left, but this led to bitter disputes
within SI and in October 1921 PKI members were effectively expelled.
The party then campaigned vigorously in its own right among Indone-
sia’s small proletariat and via so-called Sarekat Merah (Red Unions) in
the countryside. Encouraged by the party’s popularity and alarmed by
322 • PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA

the effectiveness of the colonial security forces in dismantling the

party apparatus (including the exile of Tan Malaka in 1922 and Se-
maun in 1923), the leaders Musso and Alimin (1889–1964) planned an
uprising but were strongly opposed by Tan Malaka. Intended as an In-
donesia-wide rebellion, the rising fizzled out in revolts in Banten in
November 1926 and West Sumatra (see MINANGKABAU) in Janu-
ary 1927. The party was banned, and alleged leaders of the rebellions
were exiled to Boven Digul. Thereafter Dutch repression kept the
party small and underground, though it developed a remarkable re-
silience that enabled it to survive, recruit, and campaign despite Dutch,
and later Japanese, repression.
The party reemerged in November 1945, though it continued to work
also through such parties as the Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI) and the
Partai Sosialis (PS), with which in 1948 it made up the Sayap Kiri. The
party argued initially that the national Revolution should be safeguarded
by making concessions to Western economic interests, but in early 1948
after the fall of the government of Amir Sjarifuddin the party took a
radical turn, arguing in A New Road for the Indonesian Republic for so-
cioeconomic reform as a condition for achieving independence. After the
return of Musso from protracted exile in the Soviet Union in August
1948, the Sayap Kiri parties federated first into the Front Demokrasi
Rakyat (FDR) and then into an expanded PKI. After the party’s sup-
pression for its part in the abortive Madiun Affair, it resumed the strat-
egy of divided parties under leadership of Tan Ling Djie (1904 to
1965–1966), but in 1951 strategy changed dramatically under a new
party leadership of Dipa Nusantara Aidit (1923–1965), M. H. Lukman
(1920–1965), Nyoto (1925–1965), and Sudisman (1920–1968).
The new leaders emphasized the party’s commitment to the legal po-
litical process and marked out a strong nationalist position, rejecting the
continuing ties with the Netherlands and the privileges given to Western
business. The lack of a large proletariat and of a clear poor peasant class
was a strategic difficulty, but the party emphasized attitude rather than
class origin and it pursued a mass education program through party
schools, training courses, and a university, the Aliarkham Academy, using
recruits to build up an organization second only to the army in purpose
and discipline, though its strength was heavily concentrated among aban-
gan Javanese. This effort was rewarded when the party came fourth, with
16.4 percent of the vote, in the 1955 elections. The growth of PKI sup-
port and influence was among the reasons for the PRRI/Permesta re-
bellion, and army commanders in many regions, remembering the party’s
role in the Madiun Affair, put restrictions on its activities. Certain of in-
 PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA • 323

creasing its vote at future elections, the party was at first unhappy with
Sukarno’s proposals for a Guided Democracy. Facing full-scale sup-
pression by the army, however, if it did not accede, the PKI became an
enthusiastic supporter of the president, offering him the popular backing
that he needed to balance the growing power of the army. In return the
party received considerable freedom to operate on Java, building its
membership to perhaps 3 million by 1965; affiliated organizations such
as the Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) accounted for many millions more.
Through its cultural affiliate, Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra), it
attempted to establish Marxist discourse as orthodoxy in cultural affairs.
And under the principles of Nasakom, it was given an increasing say in
legislative and other official bodies. It was never, however, given impor-
tant executive functions, and Donald Hindley has argued that the party,
for all its apparent strength, was in fact “domesticated”—implicated in a
regime that failed to implement social reforms and that was losing con-
trol of the economy, but denied access to the levers of power.
When the party attempted, moreover, a program of direct action
(aksi sepihak) in rural Java to implement land reform laws in late
1963, it was swiftly curbed. The party remained generally aloof from
the Sino-Soviet split, but in the mid-1960s swung somewhat to China,
following Indonesian foreign policy. Opinions are still deeply divided
on whether and to what extent the party was involved in the Gestapu
coup of 1965, but the outcome of the affair was fatal to it. Within
weeks, the army had begun to detain PKI cadres and to oversee the
killing of party members and supporters (see MASSACRES OF
1965–1966). The party was formally banned on 12 March 1966. Sur-
viving members attempted to begin guerrilla resistance in Blitar (East
Java) and in West Kalimantan (see PONTIANAK), and a PKI analy-
sis of its mistakes, called Otokritik, was prepared, but these movements
were crushed by 1968, leaving the party represented primarily by scat-
tered exile communities, the most prominent being the so-called PKI
Delegation in China led by Jusuf Ajitorop.
In the closing years of the Suharto regime, the Indonesian govern-
ment showed continuing concern over the alleged existence of PKI ele-
ments in Indonesian society, and a number of acts of sabotage were at-
tributed unconvincingly to the party. After the fall of Suharto, President
Abdurrachman Wahid sought to loosen restrictions on the party, but
these attempts were combated by the army and Islamic political figures,
and the party remained an outcast in Indonesian society. [0621, 0667,
0674, 0683, 0695, 0798, 0836, 0858, 0904, 0917, 0921, 0931, 0991,
0992, 0994, 0997]
324 • PARTAI KRISTEN INDONESIA

PARTAI KRISTEN INDONESIA (Parkindo, Indonesian Christian Party).

Protestant party based in Minahasa, Ambon, and the Batak regions of
Sumatra, formed in November 1945. From the 1950s it was led by Jo-
hannes Leimena, who enjoyed a close relationship with Sukarno and
became a long-term deputy prime minister under Guided Democracy.
In 1973 the party was merged into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
(PDI). See also PROTESTANTISM. [0695, 1003]

PARTAI MURBA. See MURBA.

PARTAI MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (Parmusi, Indonesian Muslims’ Party).

The banning of Masjumi in 1960 left the modernist Muslim stream largely
unrepresented in Indonesian party politics, though some former Masjumi
members were active in the so-called New Order coalition that helped to
bring down Sukarno. Parmusi was created on 20 February 1968 as a legal
successor to Masjumi, but the military government, wary of Muslim
power, excluded former Masjumi members from leadership positions. Jae-
lani (Johnny) Naro, an associate of Ali Murtopo, emerged as a major pro-
government powerbroker and with party leaders Jarnawi Hadikusumah
and Mintareja removed the Jakarta Charter from the party’s platform.
After a poor election performance in 1971, Parmusi was merged into the
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) in 1973. [1002]

PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party).

1. Nationalist party founded by Sukarno and members of the Algemene
Studieclub on 4 July 1927 with the name Perserikatan Nasional Indone-
sia (Indonesian Nationalist Union) and becoming Partai Nasional In-
donesia in May 1928. It aimed from the start at full independence and
sought to represent Indonesians of all religious, ethnic, and class groups,
though its support was strongest among the middle class and the aban-
gan peasantry. It refused to seek membership of the Volksraad and in-
stead aimed to build a mass following, claiming 10,000 members by
1929. Though smaller than Sarekat Islam (SI) had been, it alarmed the
colonial government, which arrested and jailed Sukarno and his col-
leagues in December 1929. The remnants of the party formally dissolved
in April 1931. [0613, 0661, 0844]
2. The name PNI-Baru (New PNI) was given to the nationalist organ-
ization Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia.
3. On 21 August 1945, immediately after the declaration of indepen-
dence, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta announced the formation of a
 PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN • 325

single state party, generally called PNI-Staatspartij (State Party). It was

based on the cadre of the Jawa Hokokai and was intended to mobilize
popular support for the Revolution. Internal divisions and hostility to its
Japanese origins, however, made it unworkable, and it was dissolved on
31 August 1945, though some branches survived to join the PNI (defini-
tion 4). [0661, 0643]
4. Formed in 1945 after the collapse of the PNI-Staatspartij, the PNI
inherited the name of Sukarno’s prewar party but not Sukarno’s leader-
ship. During the Revolution it became a broadly based party drawing
support especially from the administrative elite and from the abangan
peasantry on Java and containing a wide range of ideological view-
points. Its leaders included conservative exponents of peace, order, and
good administration; populist nationalists distrustful of the outside world
and committed to improving welfare without promoting social conflict;
and left-wing reformers willing to bring about radical social change. It
summed up these views as Marhaenism or “proletarian nationalism.”
The party took a radical, often anti-Western view on international affairs
and opposed liberalism and individualism domestically. Under the prime
ministership of Ali Sastroamijoyo, it became even more strongly en-
trenched in the state bureaucracy and by a narrow margin won the largest
vote in the 1955 elections. Already, however, the party had begun to lose
peasant support as activity by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in
rural areas developed, and some leaders approved of Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy as a means to stop communist growth. During the early
1960s, with Ali as chairman and Surakhman (?–1968) as secretary, the
party increasingly shifted to the Left, and in 1964 it adopted the
Deklarasi Marhaenis, which maintained that Marhaenism was Marxism
adapted to Indonesian conditions.
After the Gestapu coup of 1965, the PNI was heavily purged of its left
wing and in April 1970 the Semarang party boss, Hadisubeno Sosrower-
doyo (1912–1971), formerly associated with the business activities of pres-
ident Suharto, was imposed as party chairman. More than other surviving
parties, the PNI suffered from the establishment of Golkar as a state party,
for it was precisely the PNI’s bureaucratic base that Golkar seized. After a
poor performance in the 1971 election, PNI was merged into the Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) in 1973. [0643, 0661, 0695, 1000]

PARTAI PERSATUAN PEMBANGUNAN (PPP, Unity Development

Party). Formed on 5 January 1973 as a forced merger of the four legal
Muslim parties, Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi), Persatuan
326 • PARTAI RAKYAT DEMOKRATIK

Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Perti), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Partai

Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), together with the nonparty Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), though all the constituent elements continued
to retain their separate identities. The party was not permitted to have an
Islamic name but until 1986 was allowed to use the Ka’abah as its party
symbol. It was also not permitted to advocate an Islamic state, but was
generally pro-Muslim in international affairs, opposed to foreign cultural
influences in Indonesia, and in favor of extending religious education.
In 1973 it was instrumental in having a Marriage Bill significantly
amended to bring it closer to Islamic law (syariah). In 1977 PPP mem-
bers of the Majelis Permusyawaraten Rakyat (MPR) walked out over
government plans to give official recognition to belief (kepercayaan)
alongside religion. The party suffered a major blow in 1984, when the
NU, which had been its most successful component in maintaining elec-
toral support, left in order to concentrate its efforts on religious renewal.
The PPP did, however, continue to receive electoral support from most
of the NU members during the Suharto era.
After Suharto’s fall, the PPP competed with at least four other parties
for the vote of the traditionalist Muslim base of the NU, most notably
with the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) associated with Adur-
rachman Wahid’s leadership. It did so by sharpening its Islamic iden-
tity, basing the party on Islam, and again adopting the Ka’abah as its
symbol. It was better organized than the PKB and had a network of sup-
porters in provincial and local assemblies, which gave it an advantage
over its competitor. Although it won fewer votes than the PKB in the
1999 elections (11,329,905), its broader support in the Outer Islands as
well as on Java enabled it to gain a larger number of parliamentary seats
(58). When Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded Abdurrachman Wahid
as president, she chose Hamzah Haz, PPP’s leader, as her vice presi-
dent. Shortly afterward, a number of retired generals entered the party.
On 20 January 2002 some members of the party broke off to create a
new party, PPP Reformasi, in part as a protest against Haz’s postpone-
ment of the party’s leadership election and in part, too, to register the op-
position among younger members to its stance in favor of the introduc-
tion of Islamic law (syariah). The party was one of five Islamic parties
to oppose the Megawati government’s antiterrorism law in September
2002. See also KEBATINAN. [0736, 0765, 1010]

PARTAI RAKYAT DEMOKRATIK (PRD, Democratic People’s Party).

A pioneer of the new parties that only formed after Suharto’s fall, the
 PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA • 327

PRD had its origins in the student committees of Yogyakarta in 1994,

which spread to Bogor and other universities. Budiman Sudjatmiko es-
tablished it as a political party in July 1996 with the goal of expanding
democratic structures in the fields of politics, economy, and culture. This
was at a time when it was illegal to form political parties. When on 27
July the nearby headquarters of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI)
was attacked, the government accused the PRD of being a subversive or-
ganization and behind antigovernment unrest. Thirteen of its leaders
were arrested, with its head Budiman Sudjatmiko sentenced to 13 years
in jail, Garda Sembiring to 12 years, and Indah Sari to six years. Many
of its leaders were kidnapped and some were killed, and the party was
thus unable to consolidate. Its top leaders were not released from jail un-
til March 1999. Several went on hunger strike to protest the treatment of
their colleagues, and as a result, some of them, including Sudjatmiko,
were hospitalized. They only received 78,730 votes in the 1999 elections
and no parliamentary seats. [0760, 1010]

PARTAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA (Pari, Indonesian Republican Party).

A nationalist communist party established in Bangkok in 1927 by Tan
Malaka, Soebakat, and Djamaloedin Tamin, three nationalist commu-
nists who had broken with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) over
the launching of the 1926–1927 uprising. [0635, 0807, 0873]

PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA (PSII, Party of the Indonesian

Islamic Union). Formed in 1923 by H. U. S. Tjokroaminoto and Haji
Agus Salim (1884–1954) to formalize the political status of the Sarekat
Islam (SI). Shorn of SI’s left-wing components, it soon shrank further with
the secession of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The party on Java was con-
servative and pan-Islamic, though some of its branches, notably in West
Sumatra, maintained a political and anticolonial stance until their leaders
were arrested and exiled by the Dutch in 1933. After the death of
Tjokroaminoto, the party came into the hands of Abikusno Cokrosuyoso
and S. M. Kartosuwiryo. Salim and Mohamad Roem (1908–1983) were
expelled, and the party took a hard-line, noncooperative attitude to the
colonial government at a time when other parties had begun to soften un-
der pressure of Dutch repression. Kartosuwiryo himself was expelled in
1940 and formed a “PSII Kedua” (Second PSII) in Malangbong, which
later became part of the political base of the Darul Islam (DI). PSII activ-
ity was banned by the Dutch in 1940 under State of War and Siege regula-
tions, but it reemerged in 1947 under Aruji Kartawinata and the brothers
328 • PARTAI SOSIALIS

Anwar and Harsono Tjokroaminoto, refusing to join the Masjumi coali-

tion. Never large, it campaigned incessantly for an Islamic state, but was
a supporter of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. In 1973 it was forced to
join the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). [0695, 1329]

PARTAI SOSIALIS (PS, Socialist Party). The PS was formed in Decem-

ber 1945 as a merger of the Partai Rakyat Sosialis (Paras, Socialist Peo-
ple’s Party) of Amir Sjarifuddin and the Partai Sosialis Indonesia
(Parsi, Indonesian Socialist Party) of Sutan Sjahrir. It formed the basis
of the successive governments of Sjahrir and Amir, but from early 1947
became increasingly factionalized between the two leaders and effec-
tively split when Amir deposed Sjahrir in June 1947, though a formal di-
vision did not take place until February 1948, when Sjahrir established
the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). See also SAYAP KIRI. [0661,
0674, 0865, 0916]

PARTAI SOSIALIS INDONESIA (PSI, Indonesian Socialist Party). In

November 1945 Sutan Sjahrir formed a political party of this name (but
abbreviated Parsi) that soon merged with Amir Sjarifuddin’s Partai
Rakyat Sosialis (Paras, Socialist People’s Party) to form the Partai
Sosialis (PS). A second party called PSI emerged from the Partai Sosialis
in February 1948, again associated with Sjahrir. It had a generally Fabian
socialist program, emphasizing economic planning, modernization, and
social welfare, but it accepted the need for continued foreign capital in-
vestment in Indonesia and the political consequences of that. Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo was a prominent member of the party in the 1950s
and influenced its emphasis on regional development programs, small-
scale industry, and cooperatives. Popular among intellectuals, in some
sections of the officer corps and among some minorities, the PSI never
developed a significant mass base and won only five seats in the 1955
elections. After Sumitro’s participation in the PRRI/Permesta rebel-
lion, the party was banned in 1960. Under the New Order, however,
Sumitro and a number of other PSI figures regained important policy in-
fluence to the extent of being viewed at times as a malign secretive in-
fluence, being accused for instance of involvement in the Malari Affair.
[0661, 0695, 0865, 0916]

PARTAI UNI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA (PUDI, Indonesian Democ-

racy Union Party). Sri Bintang Pamungkas, previously a member of the
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), founded the PUDI in May
 PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN • 329

1996 because he believed that the existing political parties had no

ideals. This was at a time when the establishment of independent politi-
cal parties was forbidden. The following year, Sri Bintang summarized
PUDI’S political position as a rejection of the 1997 general elections and
of the nomination of Suharto for president and calling for setting up a
new political structure in the post-Suharto era. The party suffered from
the fact that it was a “one-man show” and received only 140,980 votes
in the 1999 elections and no seats in parliament. [0760, 1010]

PARTICULIERE LANDERIJEN. Private estates, especially on the

northern coastal plain of West Java, given or sold by the Dutch East
Indies Company (VOC) from 1630 to its servants and supporters.
Owners held not only freehold title to the land but also quasi-feudal
rights over its inhabitants, including compulsory labor services (heren-
diensten), a portion of all crops, and a wide range of incidental taxes. In
some texts these rights are described as “sovereign” and the landlords
likened to the semiautonomous native rulers or zelfbesturen. It was on
these estates that commercial sugar cultivation was first introduced, but
by the 19th century rice for Batavia was the main crop. By the 20th
century some of the estates, such as the British-owned Pamanukan-
& Tjiasemlanden (P & T Lands), had developed into efficient commer-
cial operations with well-trained staffs; other estates remained de-
pressed backwaters. Such estates remained outside the colonial govern-
ment’s provision of education, health, and other social services under
the Ethical Policy, and became a byword for agricultural misery. Liter-
acy rates were very low, morbidity was high, and bandit gangs were
powerful. From 1912 the colonial government began the repurchase of
estates, which were then incorporated into the administrative structure
of the rest of Java. Repurchases stopped during the Depression, but in
1935 the government established a semiofficial company, the Javasche
Particuliere Landerijen Maatschappij, to acquire and administer estates,
using the proceeds both for further purchases and to bring social ser-
vices and infrastructure to a level where the estates could be turned over
to the government without placing extra strain on the treasury. Under
the Japanese the remaining estates were nationalized, but the landlords
were generally retained as administrators. Estate workers and bandits
took control of the estates during the Revolution, but former owners
were restored with freehold title, but without feudal rights, after the
Dutch seized West Java in 1947. The last of the foreign-owned estates
was nationalized in 1954. [0585]
330 • PARTIES, POLITICAL

PARTIES, POLITICAL. The formation of political parties in the Nether-

lands Indies was first permitted in 1918, though several parties had ex-
isted effectively earlier as nominally cultural, social, or commercial as-
sociations. In 1912, the Indische Partij had been banned, and throughout
the 1920s and 1930s the colonial government frequently banned or re-
stricted the activities of individual parties (see NATIONALISM). The
Japanese dissolved all party organizations for the duration of their oc-
cupation, and the independent Republic of Indonesia briefly considered
permitting only a single all-encompassing national party, the Partai Na-
sional Indonesia (PNI-Staatspartij). Parties, however, quickly emerged
after the declaration of independence, and the multiparty system was of-
ficially authorized by Decree “X” of 16 October 1945. Twenty-seven
parties won seats in the 1955 parliamentary elections.
From 1956 feeling arose increasingly that the parties were too strong in
defending their sectional interests and too weak in considering the na-
tional interest. In 1956 Sukarno urged the parties to “bury themselves,”
and Guided Democracy was in part a system designed to diminish the ac-
cess of parties to state power. Presidential Edict no. 7 of 1959 required all
parties to adhere to the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila, and MANIPOL-
USDEK and sought to eliminate smaller parties by requiring all parties to
have 150,000 members spread over 65 electoral districts. In 1960 Sukarno
issued a decree banning parties that had taken part in rebellions against
the state; this was used to ban Masjumi and the Partai Sosialis Indone-
sia (PSI) but not the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Further bans fol-
lowed, leaving only 11 legal parties at the close of Guided Democracy.
The PKI and Partai Indonesia (Partindo) were banned in 1966.
At the outset of the New Order, the army was determined that the
open multiparty system of the 1950s should not be restored and a con-
siderable debate opened over just what role parties should play. The par-
ties themselves were given little opportunity to influence this debate:
leading figures from before 1965 were often removed from party posi-
tions under government pressure and compliant supporters of the gov-
ernment were put in their places. Some army groups favored an en-
trenched two-party system; others suggested a “simplification” into five
groups: Islamic, Christian, nationalist, socialist-Pancasila, and func-
tional. The 1969 Law on Political Parties banned independent candidates
and denied legal status to any party with fewer than 1.2 million members,
100 branches, and 2 percent of the vote in the coming election. Nine par-
ties were elected to parliament in 1971, but the government forced their
representatives in parliament to form two blocs (and allowed each bloc
only one formal spokesperson). In 1973 these semiformal parliamentary
 PARTIES, POLITICAL • 331

groupings were formalized under government pressure by a fusion of the

party organizations into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP),
comprising the four Muslim parties, and the Partai Demokrasi Indone-
sia (PDI), comprising the rest. The 1975 Law on Political Parties and
Golkar banned parties from maintaining permanent branches below
kabupaten level, as well as removing their right to challenge Pancasila.
The government electoral organization, Golkar, was not regarded offi-
cially as a party and was exempt from these restrictions, although it in-
creasingly assumed the character of a party. There were persistent sug-
gestions during the latter years of Suharto’s rule that it should become
the basis of a partai tunggal, or sole party.
The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened up the political process and political
parties proliferated. Initially 234 parties were established. However, a
Team of Eleven was assigned to verify which political parties were eligi-
ble to compete in the forthcoming elections, and eventually only 48 met the
guidelines imposed. Under these, the party had to demonstrate among
other things that it had branches in nine provinces with offices in at least
half the districts in each of these provinces. In the 1999 elections, 21 of
these parties received enough votes for them to be allotted at least one seat
in parliament, but the top five (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuan-
gan [PDI-P], Golkar, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB], PPP, and Par-
tai Amanat Nasional [PAN]) received 86.7 percent of the vote. The other
parties gaining more than one seat were the Partai Bulan Bintang (13
seats), Partai Keadilan (7 seats), Partai Keadilan dan Kesatuan (PKK,
Justice and Unity Party, 4 seats), Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (PNU, Party of
the Revival of Religious Scholars, 5 seats), Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa
(PDKB, People’s Love for Democracy Party, 5 seats), and the PDI (2
seats). Twenty-seven of the 48 contending parties rejected the election re-
sults, so they were never approved by the General Elections Commission.
In 2001–2002 splits occurred in many of the major parties, which had
been plagued by widespread dissatisfaction with their ineffectiveness and
corruption. Only six of the 1999 parties (PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, PAN,
and PBB) qualified to run in the 2004 elections, along with 18 new parties
(see APPENDIX F). Although the Partai Keadilan failed to qualify, it
joined with another Islamic party to form the new Partai Keadilan Se-
jahtera (PKS, Justice and Welfare Party). In order to nominate a presiden-
tial candidate in 2004 a party has to win 16 seats (3 percent) or 4 percent
of the votes in the April election. Two new parties, the Partai Karya Peduli
Bangsa (PKPB), headed by former army chief of staff General
R. Hartono, and the Partai Demokrat (PD, Democratic Party) were hoping
to nominate General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Siti Hardijanti
332 • PASAI

Rumnana (Suharto’s daughter, usually known as Mbak Tutut) respectively

as their presidential candidates. See also ELECTIONS. [0695, 1001, 1012]

PASAI (Samudra). This state in northern Sumatra was based near modern
Lhokseumawe. After converting to Islam at the end of the 13th century,
Pasai became the major port of the Strait of Melaka, maintaining diplo-
matic contacts with China, India, and Siam. It exported pepper, oil
(from seeps close to the surface), and perhaps silk. It was visited by
Marco Polo in 1292 and Ibn Battuta in 1355 and was raided by Ma-
japahit in the 1360s. In the late 15th century it was increasingly eclipsed
by Melaka and by Aceh, which conquered it in 1524.

PASISIR (Javanese, “coast”). The northern coast of Java (and by extension

coastal regions of Sumatra and elsewhere), especially as distinguished
from the kingdoms and courts of the interior. Opportunities for trade to
and from Java gave rise from at least the 13th century to a succession of
prosperous city states along this coast—Banten, Demak, Cirebon, and
Surabaya—which were incorporated only with difficulty, if at all, into
the agrarian kingdoms of the interior. With the conversion of these cities
to Islam from the 15th century, political tension between the two regions
grew. The inland kingdom of Majapahit was defeated by a coalition of
coastal states led by Demak, and Majapahit’s successor Mataram only
briefly controlled the Pasisir rulers, who increasingly recruited assis-
tance from the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) to resist the court,
giving the VOC a foothold in Javanese politics.

The term pasisir has also been applied particularly to the culture of
this coastal region, suggesting an alternative Javanese cultural tradition
to that of the courts of the interior. This culture is identified as interna-
tionally minded (many rulers of pasisir states were not Javanese), com-
mercially oriented, and culturally eclectic. The batik of this region, for
instance, shows considerable Chinese and European influence. [1371]

PASTEUR INSTITUTE. Established in 1895 for the treatment of rabies

victims and attached to the already existing Parc Vaccinogène (see
SMALLPOX). The institute began research on cholera in 1910, on
bubonic plague in 1911, and later on typhus, staphylococcus, and other
diseases. [1194]

PASUNDAN. Official prewar name for the colonial province of West Java
and the name commonly used for the political party Paguyuban Pasun-
 PAWNSHOPS • 333

dan. On 24 April 1948 the Dutch sponsored a federal state called Pasun-
dan in the territories they controlled in West Java, led by the former bu-
pati of Bandung, R. A. A. M. Wiranatakusumah, in an attempt to exploit
Sundanese fears of Javanese domination (see FEDERALISM). After the
second Dutch “Police Action,” however, the West Java state largely dis-
integrated, under pressure not only of the forces of the Republic’s return-
ing Siliwangi division but also of the Darul Islam (DI). In late 1949,
leaders of the state toyed briefly with the idea of seeking full indepen-
dence as an Islamic state on the model of Pakistan, perhaps with backing
of the DI, and also negotiated with the Dutch adventurer R. P. P. West-
erling for armed backing. After Westerling’s abortive putsch in Bandung
and Jakarta in January 1950, Pasundan was discredited, and it was dis-
solved on 9 February 1950. [0661, 0674, 1146]

PATRIMONIALISM. Term coined by Max Weber to describe states in

which a single ruler disposes of state wealth and power by virtue of tra-
ditional authority, rather than charisma or a regularized legal and admin-
istrative system. As an ideal type, it has some application to traditional In-
donesia and fits closely with the Indian-derived ideology of the
dharma-raja or all-powerful king (see INDIA, HISTORICAL LINKS
WITH). Some authorities have questioned, however, whether traditional
states were truly patrimonial, pointing both to elements of collegiality
among powerful men within each kingdom (especially regional authori-
ties such as the bupati) and to supposedly democratic elements in the re-
lationship between ruler and subject. The term “neopatrimonialism” has
been used to describe the concentration of state authority in the hands of
leaders of independent Indonesia. See also WHITE RAJAS. [0521, 0796]

PATTINGALLOANG (c. 1600–1654). Son of Matoaya, chief minister of

Makassar, and from 1639 also chief minister. Fluent in several Euro-
pean languages, he was a keen follower of the latest developments in ge-
ography and astronomy, and also had European works on gunnery trans-
lated into Makassarese. He maintained his father’s policy of keeping
Makassar an open port for all traders, but fractured the previous alliance
between Bugis and Makassarese by conquering Bone in 1646, laying the
basis for the later rebellion of Arung Palakka.

PAWNSHOPS. The right to run pawnshops was farmed, like other state
revenue sources (see PACHT), until 1903 when a government pawnshop
service was created for Java and Madura. The service operated to some
extent in the Outer Islands, but most of the 457 government pawnshops
334 • PEARLING

in the Netherlands Indies in 1931 were on Java and Madura. Annual

profits were ƒ6 to ƒ11 million.

PEARLING. This was widespread in the archipelago in early times, and

pearls were among exports to China from the 10th century. The coasts of
Java were once known for seed pearls, used in medicine, but with the grad-
ual exhaustion of shell beds fishing retreated to eastern Indonesia. Western
companies began to move into the industry from the 1860s after the in-
vention of the diving suit. Since the early 20th century, the Aru islands
have been the industry’s main center. Culturing of pearls has been done by
the Marine Fisheries Research Institute in Aru and Sulawesi since 1960.

PEDIR (Pidië). Muslim state in northern Sumatra in the 15th century.

Like Pasai, it was an important entrepôt for pepper. It was conquered by
Aceh in 1524.

PEMBANGUNAN (“development”). See DEVELOPMENT IDEOLOGY.

PEMBELA TANAH AIR (Peta, Defenders of the Fatherland). Military

force formed by the Japanese in October 1943 on Java (equivalent to
the Giyugun on Sumatra) to involve Indonesians in defending the ar-
chipelago against the Allies. The Peta consisted of 65 battalions by Au-
gust 1945, with 37,000 men. Battalion commanders were generally lo-
cally prominent Indonesian civilians—teachers, officials, and the
like—whose role was to recruit and to maintain morale rather than to
command. Military leadership was mainly in the hands of company com-
manders and Japanese instructors. Training included use of weapons and
elementary tactics, but it emphasized spirit (semangat) and intense disci-
pline. In February 1945 a Peta unit at Blitar revolted under command of
Supriyadi (?–1945) but was crushed by Japanese forces. Between 18 and
25 August, after the surrender and before Indonesia’s declaration of in-
dependence was widely known, the Japanese disarmed and disbanded
most Peta units. Many, however, soon reassembled to form part of the
basis of the Republic’s army. See also HEIHO. [0663, 0664]

PEMERINTAH DARURAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA (PDRI, Emer-

gency Government of the Republic of Indonesia). In November 1948
Vice President Mohammad Hatta sent Sjafruddin Prawiranegara to
Sumatra to establish a government presence there should the Dutch suc-
ceed in overrunning Java. After the Dutch in their second “Police Ac-
tion” of 19 December 1948 arrested Sukarno, Hatta, and most of their
 PEMUDA PANCASILA • 335

cabinet, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara proclaimed an Emergency Govern-

ment on 22 December. The PDRI was headquartered in the interior of
West Sumatra and viewed itself as a legal successor to the Republican
government. Headed by Sjafruddin, it had Sumatra governor Tengku Mo-
hammad Hassan as his deputy, and the Republic’s representative in India,
Mr. Maramis, as minister of foreign affairs. The PDRI was recognized by
the Republic’s guerrilla forces on Sumatra and Java (under General
Sudirman), but it was ignored by the Dutch and by the jailed Republic
leadership when in April 1949 they entered into the talks that led to the
Roem–van Roijen Agreement of the following month. Both the PDRI
and General Sudirman opposed the concessions made in these agree-
ments but were ultimately persuaded to go along. Sjafruddin returned his
mandate to Sukarno in Yogyakarta on 13 July 1949. [0660, 0686]
PEMUDA (youth). The notion of youth was a strong element in the na-
tional awakening of Indonesia in the early 20th century, especially
through their role in promulgation of the “youth pledge” of 1928. The
term pemuda came into common political use, however, only during the
national Revolution of 1945–1949, when young Indonesians spear-
headed the declaration of independence and flocked in tens of thousands
to the armed units that endeavored to defend that independence against
the Dutch. Pemuda in that time came to denote a spirit of daring and re-
fusal to compromise. Pemuda were later important instruments in
Sukarno’s ouster when they acted in close cooperation with the army in
establishing the New Order government. See also GENERATIONS;
STUDENTS. [0643, 0652]
PEMUDA PANCASILA. Founded as a subordinate wing of A. H. Nasu-
tion’s Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) party on
28 October 1959, Pemuda Pancasila was formally inaugurated at IPKI’s
1961 congress. It became prominent in the closing years of Sukarno’s
rule when it offered to send troops in support of the West Irian (see
PAPUA) campaign (Trikora). Pemuda Pancasila had centers in Jakarta
and Medan, where it was largely an extortion agency, operating prima-
rily against Chinese businesses. It was active in both areas after the
1965 coup (see GESTAPU), taking a leading role in killing suspected
communists particularly in North Sumatra. Under Suharto it became
one of the foremost organizations of gangs, carrying out “thug” politics
(politik premanisme). These gangs formed part of the security apparatus
and were closely tied to the military in organizing riots and extracting
money from businesses. Pemuda Pancasila groups reemerged in the
336 • PEMUDA RAKYAT

early 1980s in the aftermath of the Petrus (Pembunuhan Misterius)

killings, when they were reportedly the major instrument used by
Suharto and Benny Murdani in wiping out Ali Murtopo’s gangster or-
ganization. Their ties to the military became closer in the late 1980s
when their regional branches were matched with the army’s Komando
Daerah Militer (Kodam) structure, and their militias were used by the
army in maintaining local control. Pemuda Pancasila was suspected of
providing many of the gangs that attacked Megawati Sukarnoputri’s
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) headquarters in July 1996, and the
organization’s leaders were some of Suharto’s last outspoken supporters
in May 1998, again being suspected of responsibility for much of the
destruction of businesses on 13–14 May. Their influence apparently de-
clined after Suharto’s fall. [0743]

PEMUDA RAKYAT (People’s Youth). Youth organization affiliated with

the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), formed in 1950 to replace the Pe-
muda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo). It used educational and social ac-
tivities to draw the interest of young people, especially in the urban and
rural kampung, but was banned along with the PKI in 1966. [0994]

PEMUDA SOSIALIS INDONESIA (Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth).

Armed youth wing of the ruling Partai Sosialis (PS), founded in Novem-
ber 1945. Pesindo fought the Dutch and also provided quasi-military back-
ing to the government when its policies aroused the hostility of the army
and other sections of society. It became increasingly trusted and favored
under Amir Sjarifuddin, who made it the core of the so-called TNI
Masyarakat (People’s Indonesian National Army), created to balance the
power of the more conservative conventional army. In 1948 it joined the
left-wing Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR) and was heavily involved in
fighting during the Madiun Affair. In 1950 it became firmly affiliated with
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and changed its name to Pemuda
Rakyat. [0661, 0674]

PENDIDIKAN NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI, Indonesian National

Education; also called PNI-Baru, New PNI). A nationalist party founded
by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir in December 1931. Both were
concerned by the relative ease with which the Dutch had been able to de-
stroy the first Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) by arresting its leader-
ship, and they proposed instead to build a strong, less obtrusive party of
nationalist caders that would have the strength to resist Dutch repression.
 PERDIKAN VILLAGES • 337

They were given, however, relatively little time to put these ideas into
practice since both were arrested and exiled in February 1934 to Boven
Digul and then to Banda. [0613, 0661, 0865, 0875, 0915]

PENGHULU. The title of a Minangkabau clan head, but also used in

colonial times for religious officials in state employment. See RELI-
GION AND POLITICS. [0648]

PEPPER (Piper nigrum Piperaceae). Properly not the fleshy hollow fruit
of various Capsicum species (chili peppers) but the small hard berries of
a woody vine. Whereas the sirih, P. betle, leaves of which are used in the
chewing of betel, is probably native to the archipelago, true pepper was
introduced from India, probably as early as 100 B.C. Commercial pro-
duction was well established on Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java by the
14th century. Pedir and Pasai in northern Sumatra were the earliest
states to depend heavily on the pepper trade, followed in the 16th cen-
tury by Aceh and Banten. Indiscriminate clearing of forest for pepper
production in this era created large areas of alang-alang in Sumatra and
Kalimantan. At the end of the 16th century, Banten produced 25,000
bags of pepper a year and all male inhabitants were obliged to maintain
500 pepper plants and to deliver the produce to the sultan at a fixed price.
Pepper was traded especially to the West, becoming a major target of
Portuguese and, from the late 16th century, Dutch commercial expan-
sion in the archipelago. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) at-
tempted to enforce monopoly contracts in pepper ports as they had done
in Maluku with cloves and nutmeg but were relatively unsuccessful due
to the wide distribution of the plant and the relative ease with which it
can be cultivated. From the18th century, China’s market for pepper grew
while Europe’s declined. Production on Java had largely ceased by the
end of the 18th century. Although pepper production in North Sumatra
increased in the 19th century and Chinese immigrants became important
growers, the center of the trade shifted to Penang and Singapore. [0331]

PERANAKAN (“native born”). Term applied to those of non-Indonesian

ethnic origin born in Indonesia, and generally implying some degree of
cultural adaptation to local conditions. See CHINESE IN INDONESIA.

PERDIKAN VILLAGES. The traditional rulers of Java occasionally

freed a village of the obligation to pay land tax or provide corvée labor,
either as a reward for service or in exchange for the village’s acceptance
338 • PERGERAKAN

of the obligation to carry out some task, such as the maintenance of a

school or holy place. Such villages, called perdikan desa, were found
most commonly on Madura and in Central Java and were preserved un-
der Dutch rule. They were commonly major centers of handicrafts, in-
cluding batik. The tax exemption of perdikan villages was abolished by
the Indonesian Republic in 1946.

PERGERAKAN. See NATIONALISM.

PERHIMPUNAN INDONESIA (PI, Indonesian Association). Organiza-

tion of Indonesian students in the Netherlands founded in 1922, based
on the Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association), founded in 1908. The
PI was small, with only 38 members at it peak, but its members included
such later national leaders as Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Ali
Sastroamijoyo, and Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo. Its major aim was to pre-
pare Indonesian students to provide political leadership on their return,
but it also sought to inform the Dutch public on conditions in the colony.
Its ideology was strongly influenced by Marxism and especially by
Lenin’s theory of imperialism, but many of its members, including Hatta,
despaired of communism after the Comintern decision in 1927 to aban-
don cooperation with noncommunist nationalists, and the organization
gradually split between a Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) wing led by
Rustam Effendi and the radical nationalists led by Hatta and Sjahrir, who
were finally expelled in 1931.

PERIODIZATION OF INDONESIAN HISTORY. The conventional

historiography of Indonesia commonly divides the country’s history into
three broad periods, precolonial, colonial, and independent, normally
subdivided as follows: traditional societies, Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms,
the arrival of Islam and the emergence of Muslim sultanates, European
commercial penetration and company rule, British interregnum, Culti-
vation System, Liberal Policy, Ethical Policy, the rise of nationalism,
Japanese occupation, Revolution, parliamentary democracy, Guided
Democracy, New Order, and now the post-Suharto or reformasi era.
This sequence can be criticized on a number of grounds. First, the earlier
of these periods are visible clearly only on Java, though it is possible to
apply them to other regions by, for instance, omitting the Muslim period,
setting the date of colonial penetration later, and so forth. More impor-
tant, as a system of periodization based on government policy and or-
ganization, it ignores deeper structures, patterns, and continuities. J. C.
 PERSATUAN ISLAM • 339

van Leur and John Smail, in particular, have criticized it for the promi-
nence it gives to the European role in Indonesian history and have argued
for an “autonomous” (Smail’s term) approach concentrating on the ex-
periences of Indonesians rather than of their European rulers. Indonesian
historians have often used the notion of successive generations in peri-
odizing. [0502, 0504, 0505, 0521]

PERMUFAKATAN PERHIMPUNAN POLITIK KEBANGSAAN IN-

DONESIA (PPPKI, Confederation of Indonesian Political Organiza-
tions). Conference of nationalist groups, especially the Partai Nasional
Indonesia (PNI), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), Budi
Utomo, and Paguyuban Pasundan, formed in Bandung in December
1927 to give a relatively united voice to the nationalist movement. Deci-
sions were taken by exhaustive deliberation (musyawarah), intended to
avoid the imposition of majority views on minorities. In April 1929 the
PPPKI recognized the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI) as its representa-
tive in the Netherlands. The term Permufakatan in its title changed in
1930 to Persatuan (Unity, Association) and the word Kebangsaan (Na-
tionality) to Kemerdekaan (Freedom) in 1933. The PPPKI strongly op-
posed the restrictive labor regulations of the time (see COOLIE OR-
DINANCE) and promoted nationalist education, but its internal
diversity prevented it from acting decisively. In 1933 the colonial gov-
ernment refused to permit its annual conference, and the PPPKI with-
ered. See also GABUNGAN POLITIK INDONESIA. [0613, 0661]

PERSATUAN BANGSA INDONESIA (PBI, Association of the Indone-

sian People). Successor to one of the study clubs of Sutomo, formed in
1930 to promote self-help among Indonesians. It was involved in the
promotion of cooperatives, education, and village banks and credit
unions. In 1935 it merged with Budi Utomo to form the Partai Indone-
sia Raya. [0661, 0888]

PERSATUAN INDONESIA RAYA (PIR, Greater Indonesian Associa-

tion). Conservative party of civil servants and aristocrats founded in
1948. In 1953 it split over the issue of participation in the government of
Ali Sastroamijoyo, and two PIRs, under respectively Hazairin and
Wongsonegoro, competed in the 1955 elections, losing heavily. [0695]

PERSATUAN ISLAM (Persis, Islamic Union). Modernist Muslim organ-

ization founded in Bandung in 1923. It opposed nationalism on the
340 • PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN

grounds that it divided Islam and because it was Western and humanist
in origin. It was active in establishing Muslim schools and was strongest
in West Java. Its leaders included Mohammad Natsir. In 1939 it joined
the Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia (MIAI). [1023]

PERSATUAN PERJUANGAN (PP, Struggle Union). Coalition of radical

nationalist organizations formed on 4–5 January 1946 to oppose the Re-
publican government’s negotiations with the Dutch and Mohammad
Hatta’s attempts to create a multiparty state rather than uniting Indonesian
forces into a national front. Tan Malaka’s ideas of total struggle inspired
the PP and the organization was supported at first by the army commander,
Sudirman. The movement brought down the first cabinet of Sutan Sjahrir
in February 1946, but was unable to agree on a coalition to replace him,
partly because Sukarno moved deftly to break its fragile consensus on
what should be done. On 17 March 1946 the government arrested Tan
Malaka and some of his most prominent supporters. The PP then disinte-
grated, though some of its members were involved later in 1946 in an am-
biguous confrontation with Sukarno known as the 4 July Affair, and even-
tually formed the core of the Gerakan Rakyat Revolusi (GRR,
Revolutionary People’s Movement) and the Murba. [0643, 0674, 0807]

PERSATUAN TARBYIAH ISLAMIYAH (Perti, Islamic Education Asso-

ciation). Founded in West Sumatra in 1930 to combat the influence of
modernist Islamic associations, Perti was an organization of Minangk-
abau and Acehnese Islamic traditionalists, based in religious centers and
pesantren. Similar in style to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), it was willing to
trade its support on general political issues for specific concessions to Is-
lam. It retained its major strength in West Sumatra, where it ran second to
Masjumi in the 1955 elections. In the regional unrest of 1957, it sided first
with the dissidents, then when the PRRI/Permesta was proclaimed in
1958 it shifted to the government side. Under Guided Democracy, it
strongly supported the president and was sometimes considered pro-Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI); its leader H. Sirajuddin Abbas frequently vis-
ited communist countries and was briefly detained because of alleged in-
volvement in the Gestapu coup. After his release he returned to a leading
position in the Perti, which was heavily purged after 1966. In 1973 it was
merged into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). [0695, 0807]

PERTAMINA (Perusahaan Tambang Minyak Negara, State Oil Mining

Company). Created in 1969 as a state-owned monopoly with the task of
 PERTAMINA • 341

managing the country’s oil and gas development, Pertamina was In-
donesia’s sole state oil company, responsible for managing concessions
and production-sharing agreements but little involved in production it-
self. Oil was already an important source of discretionary funds for
Suharto’s government early in the New Order, but the sudden increase
in oil prices in 1973 gave Pertamina under its president-director Ibnu Su-
towo (1914–2001) enormous wealth that was funneled, along with bor-
rowed funds, into a wide range of development projects and economic
ventures, including an air service, Pelita, telecommunications, real es-
tate, and the P. T. Krakatau Steel works in Cilegon, West Java. Sutowo
was close to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) think tank, which promoted import substitution industrializa-
tion rather than comparative advantage trading, and his freewheeling
style attracted admiration from economic nationalists and condemnation
from the so-called technocrats of Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan
Nasional (Bappenas). An investigation in 1970 criticized Pertamina
sharply for loose auditing, for failure to pass on profits to the govern-
ment, and for the luxurious lifestyle of its senior executives.
In March 1975 Pertamina was unable to meet payment on some short-
term debts and a Bappenas investigation under J. B. Sumarlin revealed a
huge debt problem (US$10.5 billion), brought about by corruption, op-
timism, incompetence, and waste. Sutowo was dismissed from his post
in 1976 and replaced by General Piet Haryono. Pertamina’s activities
outside the oil business were curtailed and an austerity policy was intro-
duced, so that the firm was solvent once more by 1978. In 1980 the In-
donesian government took legal action in Singapore to try to recover al-
legedly corrupt income from the estate of the former Pertamina
employee H. Tahir. But Pertamina retained its power because it was a
critical source of capital for Suharto’s family and cronies, giving some
of the president’s children their start in business through lucrative deals
that included exclusive distribution contracts. It was estimated that in
two years in the mid-1990s, Pertamina lost nearly $5 billion due to inef-
ficiency and corruption.
After Suharto’s fall, the government made an effort to break up Perta-
mina’s oil monopoly, with the B. J. Habibie administration failing in an
attempt in 1999 to place major foreign oil firms directly under the Min-
istry of Mines and Energy. In June 2000 the ministry tried again, draw-
ing up legislation to break Pertamina’s monopoly by handing the control
of production-sharing contracts to an agency created under the office of
the president. In October 2001 the legislature passed an Oil and Gas Act,
342 • PESANTREN

giving Pertamina two years to transform itself into a state-owned com-

mercial enterprise, relinquishing control over foreign and local oil com-
panies and surrendering its downstream role to a separate regulatory
agency (while maintaining control over its LNG contracts). But it was
unclear whether the Megawati Sukarnoputri administration would
have any more success than previous administrations in curbing the pow-
erful company. In October 2002 the company signed an $8.5 billion deal
to supply China with LNG from the Tanggung field in Papua. [0375,
0400, 0405, 0736, 0951]

PESANTREN. Called surau in Minangkabau and dajah in Aceh, these

are traditional rural Islamic schools, headed by a kyai (religious teacher).
Formerly, influenced by the style of Hindu-Buddhist asrama, pesantren
instructed resident pupils in religious knowledge and mystical practice,
emphasizing absolute submission to both Allah and the kyai. In the 19th
century, influenced by returning pilgrims from Mecca (see HAJ), they
took on the role of more formal religious instruction, though without dis-
carding their primarily religious orientation. In the 1920s classroom
teaching and a partly secular curriculum were introduced. The first pe-
santren for female students was opened at Jombang (East Java) in 1924.
In the early 20th century, the place of pesantren as the main providers
of Muslim religious education on Java was challenged by madrasah,
many of which were sponsored by the modernist Muhammadiyah,
which disliked the traditionalist teaching in the pesantren.
Although reliable enrollment figures are not available for many of the
pesantren and madrasah in the postwar period, they have continued to
provide a significant part of the education of Indonesian children since
1945. Pesantren were valued both because of the moral values they
taught and because they contributed to local social cohesion. Enroll-
ments in Islamic schools apparently declined under the New Order but
have had growing influence in the post-Suharto years. [0045, 1273,
1283, 1352]

PETITION OF FIFTY (Petisi Lima Puluh). In March and April 1980

President Suharto made speeches implying that he was the embodiment
of Pancasila, describing it as under threat from nationalism, religion,
and other ideologies, and calling on the armed forces to defend it against
these challenges. The speeches aroused special alarm in two dissident
groups whose members were generally associated with the establishment
of the New Order in 1965–1966, namely, the Forum Studi dan Komu-
 PHILIPPINES • 343

nikasi (FOSKO), including H. R. Dharsono, and Lembaga Kesadaran

Berkonstitusi (LKB, Institute for Constitutional Awareness), including
A. H. Nasution and Ali Sadikin. In response, a group of 50 former gen-
erals, politicians, academics, students, and others, including Nasution,
Sadikin, Mohammad Natsir, and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, signed a
petition dated 5 May 1980 expressing concern about the speeches and
inviting the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) to “review”
them. The government reacted strongly to this criticism, banning news
coverage of the petitioners, preventing them from traveling, and depriv-
ing firms associated with them of their government contracts. [0733]

PETRUS (Pembunuhan Misterius, mysterious killings, or Penembakan Mis-

terius mysterious shootings). An acronym given to a paramilitary operation
lasting for two years from March 1983 to curb the incidence of violent
crime, in which at least 5,000 and perhaps more than 10,000 people la-
beled criminals were murdered in a number of Indonesia’s main cities, be-
ginning in Yogyakarta. The operation was probably planned and organ-
ized by Benny Murdani and the Komando Operasi Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Kopkamtib), which he then headed. [0721,
0734, 0969]

PHILIPPINES. The Austronesian people reached Indonesia through the

Philippines (see MIGRATIONS), and contacts between the southern is-
lands and eastern Indonesia remained strong, especially in trade. In the
17th century the Dutch and Spanish fought for influence in Mindanao,
and the Dutch alliance with the Mindanao sultanate was partly responsi-
ble for its emergence as paramount power in the region. After the United
States conquered the Philippines in 1898, the Americans initially saw the
Netherlands Indies as offering many lessons in the management of a
tropical colony, and American welfare expenditure in the Philippines
found echoes in the Ethical Policy. As the Philippines progressed toward
self-government, however, the Dutch grew increasingly uneasy, fearing
both encouragement for Indonesian nationalism and possible southward
expansion by Japan. These fears were heightened by the visit of Manuel
Quezon to Indonesia in 1934 and the later founding of a (short-lived)
Pan-Malayan People’s Union under Philippine leadership. During the In-
donesian Revolution, Manila was an important source of supplies for the
beleaguered Republic.
Since 1950, Indonesia and the Philippines have combined to limit
commerce and other traffic across their borders, so as to discourage links
344 • PIAGAM JAKARTA

between the Muslim Moro rebels in Mindanao and Sulu and radical Mus-
lims in Indonesia, and between Christian communities in Minahasa and
the northern Philippines. But during the PRRI/Permesta rebellion,
American and rebel pilots made use of bases in the Philippines to bomb
sites in eastern Indonesia, raising tensions between the two countries.
The two did, however, cooperate in 1963 in initial opposition to the es-
tablishment of Malaysia and in attempting to realize Philippine Presi-
dent Diosdado Macapagal’s concept of Maphilindo, an effort that failed
though it contributed to the later formation of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN). As another archipelagic nation, the
Philippines has strongly supported Indonesia’s archipelagic concept,
but has been in dispute with Indonesia over jurisdiction over seas around
the Indonesian island of Miangas, off Mindanao, known by the Filipinos
as Las Palmas. [0833, 1106]

PIAGAM JAKARTA (Jakarta Charter). See ISLAMIC STATE, DE-

MANDS FOR.

PIG (Sus scrofa). Until the 20th century, it is difficult to distinguish ac-
counts of the introduced domestic pig from those of indigenous warty
pigs (S. verrucosus of Java, S. barbatus on Kalimantan and Sumatra,
and S. celebensis on Sulawesi). It seems likely, however, that S. celeben-
sis was the first species to be domesticated and was taken by people to
Timor and that the pigs of Papua are a stable hybrid of S. celebensis and
S. scrofa developed between 8000 and 4000 B.C. Wild pigs were an im-
portant food source for most peoples until the arrival of Islam, and Dou-
glas Miles has shown that the adoption of Islam among Dayaks has had
significant nutritional effects. Feral and warty pigs are widespread in the
archipelago and seem to do best where human cultivation provides abun-
dant accessible food. Since the early 1970s, the introduction of the pig
tapeworm Taenia solium into Papua has had serious health conse-
quences. See also TIGER. [1154]

PIRACY. A distinction between the regular depredations of the state and

the irregular depredations of criminals was slower to emerge on the sea
than on land in traditional Indonesia (see BANDITRY). “Piracy,” in the
form of waterborne raids against neighboring communities and the plun-
dering of passing vessels, formed an important part of the political order
in maritime societies in Indonesia (see also HONGI RAIDS). It pro-
vided an important source of income in the form of products and slaves
 PLURAL SOCIETY • 345

(see SLAVERY), and within communities it established the social basis

for rule by pirate chiefs. It also gave successful chiefs the means to sub-
jugate rivals and to regularize their plunder by guaranteeing safe passage
through their sphere of influence in exchange for a fixed payment. The
suppression of piracy and the subjugation of rivals were thus often two
sides of the same coin. Conversely, when trade declined or departed,
kingdoms often returned to piracy. Although this approached a system of
customs collection, war vessels were often still needed to force passing
merchant vessels to call at the required port. This system was adopted
by the Portuguese on their arrival in the East.
From the early 19th century Dutch and British colonial authorities, in
the name of free trade, worked not just to suppress slavery and unam-
biguous piratical activities but also to prevent local rulers from collect-
ing customs dues. For much of the 19th century, Dutch efforts to crush
piracy were impeded by the fact that people moved freely between piracy
and other occupations, and were thus often easily able to evade attempts
at capture. By the early 20th century, however, piracy was in retreat, in
part because Europeans were able to hunt down the pirates’ ships with
steam-powered vessels that were able to sail against the wind and also
because the colonial state had spread its control to many of the periph-
eral areas that harbored the pirates. Occasional incidents of piracy con-
tinue to occur in the Strait of Melaka. It was reported that more than a
quarter of the world’s 445 major piracy incidents in 2003 occurred in In-
donesian waters, including the Melaka Strait. [0637, 0833]

PIRES, TOMÉ (1468-1539?). Portuguese apothecary and author of the

Suma Oriental, which describes his residence in Melaka from 1512 to
1515. Rediscovered in 1937, this work is a major account of daily life and
political and economic conditions in Southeast Asia in this period. [0082]

PLAGUE. See BUBONIC PLAGUE.

PLANNING, ECONOMIC. See ECONOMY; GUIDED ECONOMY;

RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN.

PLURAL SOCIETY. Term coined by J. S. Furnivall to characterize a so-

ciety in which “two or more elements or social orders . . . live side by
side . . . without mingling in one political unit,” by which he was refer-
ring to the legal and social separation of ethnic groups in the Netherlands
Indies. See DUALISM; LAW. [0606]
346 • POENALE SANCTIE

POENALE SANCTIE. See COOLIE ORDINANCE.

POLICE. Until the 20th century, police tasks in the Netherlands Indies were
primarily the responsibility of local authorities. Indonesian officials com-
manded their own local police squads under a variety of names, the offi-
cers of Chinese communities were in charge of policing their own peo-
ple, and policing functions in the European community lay largely with
the civil bureaucracy itself, while all policing forces were backed ulti-
mately by the colonial army (see KONINKLIJK NEDERLANDSCH
INDISCH LEGER; LAW; MARÉCHAUSSÉE; NATIVE TROOPS).
Some centralization of policing was achieved with the creation of mobile
“armed police” (gewapende politie) in 1897, but it was only after the es-
tablishment of the Office of the Attorney-General (Procureur-Generaal)
that central control of the police emerged. The police force nonetheless re-
mained divided into distinct rural police (veldpolitie, who absorbed the
gewapende politie in 1920), urban police (stadspolitie), and political
(Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst) sections.
The Japanese (1942–1945) dismissed some senior staff from the
Dutch period and handed political surveillance to the Kenpeitai, but oth-
erwise preserved and strengthened the police force. During the Revolu-
tion (1945–1949), the police were at first formally under the control of
the Internal Affairs ministry but shifted in July 1946 to the Prime Minis-
ter’s Office. Much of the police force, however, was dispersed by social
revolutions, and a multitude of local police forces emerged, generally at-
tached to regional armed forces, regular and irregular. Dual control by
Internal Affairs and the prime minister was established in 1950, but in
1962 the police were formally militarized and placed under the authority
of the armed forces commander.
After the fall of Suharto, tensions rose between the police and armed
forces particularly over the violence in Maluku and other regions, and
moves began in 1999 to separate the police from the army and place
them under civilian control, a division that formally went into effect in
April 1999 but was not completed until early 2001. The effectiveness of
the 190,000-strong police force was hindered by its insufficient numbers
and lack of training, and there was dissatisfaction among younger offi-
cers with police chief Surojo Bimantoro. However, when President Ab-
durrachman Wahid attempted to dismiss Bimantoro in June 2001 and
ordered the deputy chief to assume command, 100 top police officers de-
fied him and were instrumental in Wahid’s downfall the following
month. The police were expected to have a better relationship with Pres-
 POLITICAL CULTURE • 347

ident Megawati Sukarnoputri, but it was unclear whether they would

be any more effective in their peacekeeping functions. Tension continued
between the police and the army, particularly over internal security re-
sponsibilities, with the most violent clash breaking out in North Suma-
tra on 30 September 2002, allegedly over control of the marijuana trade,
when a five-hour gun battle between them resulted in eight people dead
and more than 20 wounded.
Mocked for their ineptitude in the pursuit of Tommy Suharto (see
SUHARTO FAMILY), the police gained more respect in their inves-
tigation of the Bali bombings and other terrorist actions when, working
in conjunction with investigators sent from the United States and Aus-
tralia, they succeeded in capturing and bringing to trial a number of
suspected leaders of the terrorist network. See also BAKIN. [0635,
0653]

“POLICE ACTIONS” (Politionele acties). Military operations launched

by the Netherlands Indies against the Indonesian Republic in Java and
Sumatra on 21 July 1947 and 19 December 1948. They were called po-
lice actions to stress their allegedly internal character and to avoid giv-
ing the Indonesian Republic the formal recognition as belligerent im-
plied by an act of war. The first, called Operation Product, was aimed
primarily at seizing plantation areas to improve the parlous financial sit-
uation of the colonial government. The resulting demarcation line was
known as the van Mook line and left the Republic on Java crowded into
heavily populated parts of the island’s center and east and Banten. On
Sumatra, the Dutch did no more than significantly expand their coastal
enclaves in east, west, and south Sumatra. The second Police Action was
intended to destroy the Republic, and Dutch troops entered all regions
except Aceh. Guerrilla warfare (see GERILYA), however, kept Dutch
forces too thinly spread to consolidate their initial advances, and inter-
national pressure brought the Dutch to negotiate once more with the Re-
public, leading to the Round Table Conference. Indonesian texts gen-
erally refer to the “police actions” as Agresi or Clash I and II. [0660,
0661]

POLITICAL CULTURE. The proposition that shared cultural values can

lead to a shared attitude toward politics is a plausible one and has led
many analysts, Indonesian and foreign, to argue for the existence of a
distinctive Indonesian political culture. A major objection to this has tra-
ditionally been the ethnic and cultural diversity of the archipelago. The
348 • POLITICAL PARTIES

Dutch in particular saw pronounced cultural dissimilarities among the

peoples of the colony and at times claimed on this basis that only their
rule would preserve Indonesian unity. The argument, however, is gener-
ally not that particular values are universally held, but that they are dom-
inant values that to a greater or lesser extent establish the terms on which
people must operate politically. Hildred Geertz identified a “metropoli-
tan super-culture” as providing such dominant values.
Indonesian political leaders have often argued that the collectivist vil-
lage culture of traditional Indonesia leads to a preference for consensual
politics with especial attention being given to the wisdom of the elders
in society (see DESA; MUSYAWARAH; SUKARNO), making Indone-
sia unsuited to the supposedly adversarial style of Western party politics.
Under the New Order, this has led to the labeling of criticism of Presi-
dent Suharto and his family as un-Indonesian (see SUBVERSION).
Other observers, such as Mochtar Lubis, have argued that Indonesian
political culture is characterized by a feudal deference to constituted au-
thority, while still others have seen this deferential submissiveness
(nrimo) as typical only of Javanese society and as contrasting with more
dynamic and independent styles in the other islands.
Western observers have been intrigued by apparent parallels in style
between both Sukarno and Suharto on the one hand and traditional Ja-
vanese kings on the other. Most of the parallels refer to elements of in-
dividual style: Sukarno’s monument building (especially the lingga-like
National Monument in Jakarta; see SEX, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF), his unification of seeming irreconcilables, and his sexual encoun-
ters; Suharto’s reluctance to exercise his power visibly; both leaders’ em-
phasis on unity, the centralization of authority, and the use of powerful
words; and both leaders’ avoidance of naming a successor. The principal
objection to this line of argument is that it provides at best only a partial
explanation of those leaders’ actions and that much of the behavior in-
volved can be explained in terms of realpolitik calculations. [0132, 0891,
0896, 0897, 0906, 0926]

POLITICAL PARTIES. See PARTIES, POLITICAL.

POLITICAL POLICE. See BAKIN; INTELLIGENCE SERVICES;

KENPEITAI; POLITIEK INLICHTINGEN DIENST.

POLITICAL PRISONERS. See BOVEN DIGUL; EXILE; TAHANAN

POLITIK.
 PONTIANAK • 349

POLITIEK INLICHTINGEN DIENST (PID, Political Intelligence Ser-

vice). A clear distinction between political and conventional policing
developed in the Netherlands Indies only after the rise of Indonesian na-
tionalism in the early 20th century and led to the formation of the PID
in 1916. The PID was formally abolished in 1919, but its place was
taken in 1920 by the Algemene Recherche (Criminal Investigation Di-
vision) and the term PID remained in common use until the end of
Dutch rule. The political police worked both by the collection of intel-
ligence on political organizations and by directly intervening in their ac-
tivities, for instance, by breaking up meetings. It was largely due to
prior arrests and other preventive measures that the 1926–1927 Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) uprisings in Banten and West Sumatra
were not more widespread. The Algemene Recherche’s monthly Poli-
tiek-Politionele Overzichten (Police Political Surveys), appearing first
in 1927, became the colonial government’s principal source of informa-
tion on the nationalist movement. After World War II the political in-
telligence functions of the Algemene Recherche were partly taken over
by the Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Nefis). See also
BAKIN; INTELLIGENCE SERVICES; KENPEITAI; POLICE. [0628,
0635, 0652]

POLO, MARCO (1254?–1324?). Venetian traveler. On his return from

China to Europe in 1292–1295, Polo traversed the Strait of Melaka, vis-
iting Pedir and Pasai. His account is most often mentioned for his state-
ment that some of the states of northern Sumatra were already Muslim
at that time, but his description is vague. [0085]

POLOWIJO. Subsidiary crops grown on wet-rice land (sawah) after the

rice harvest, including chili, soya beans, eggplant, maize, onions, and
sugar cane.

PONTIANAK. City and state on the Kapuas River in West Kalimantan,

founded in 1772 by a part-Arab pirate Syarif Abdurrahman (see
PIRACY), who in 1778 accepted Dutch suzerainty in exchange for
recognition as sultan and Dutch aid in establishing control of the Kapuas
basin. Pontianak’s history has been dominated by three major ethnic
groups—Dayak, Malay, and Chinese—with Dayaks and Malays each
about 40 percent of the population and Chinese well over 10 percent. The
kingdom’s source of wealth was its control of trade down the Kapuas in
gold, diamonds, and forest products. The Dutch East Indies Company
350 • POPULATION

(VOC) withdrew its presence in 1791 but the Dutch returned in 1818, in-
stalling a resident to ensure closer control of affairs.
Several thousand, a majority of them Chinese but also including the
sultan and most of his family, were killed by the Japanese between 1943
and 1945, leaving a younger son, Hamid Algadrie, to reign as Hamid II.
He was persuaded by the Dutch to head a federal state of West Borneo
(Kalimantan Barat), founded on 11 May 1947 (see FEDERALISM),
and became a major figure in Dutch attempts to influence the constitu-
tional and political shape of postwar Indonesia. He was implicated in a
failed coup d’état on 22 January 1950 by R. P. P. Westerling and was
jailed. The Negara Kalimantan Barat was dissolved on 4 April 1950.
During Confrontation, West Kalimantan was an important base for In-
donesian infiltration into the Malaysian state of Sarawak, partly con-
ducted by the ethnic Chinese Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Serawak (PGRS,
Sarawak People’s Guerrilla Movement). After the change of regime, the
New Order forces used the issue in 1967 to encourage anti-Chinese ac-
tions especially by the Dayak community, with the local military com-
mander alleging that all Chinese were supporters of Communist China
and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Most of the Chinese (a re-
ported 50,000–80,000) fled the interior, together with many immigrants
from Madura and Java.
During the 1970s and 1980s large numbers especially of Madurese ar-
rived in the Pontianak region under the transmigration program, and by
the late 1990s they were estimated to constitute between 2 and 3 percent
of West Kalimantan’s population. During the downturn in the economy in
1997, Madurese became the major target of Dayak violence. Tribesmen at-
tacked their settlements northwest of the town, killing about 450 and forc-
ing about 20,000 to flee, attacks that were renewed in 1999 in other regions
of West Kalimantan. See also KONGSI WARS. [0002, 0607, 1048]

POPULATION. Indonesia’s first full census was taken in 1930 and gave
the country a population of 60.7 million. Population figures before this
date are based on partial surveys and guesswork with varying degrees of
inspiration; consequently, they yield often widely varying results.
Demographers have given greatest attention to Java because of the is-
land’s greater density of population. Early scholars, extrapolating back-
ward from the 19th-century estimates, assumed that Java’s population in
early times was between 1 and 3 million. The scope of irrigation works,
monument construction, and political organization on the island, how-
ever, suggests perhaps a fairly steady population of around 10 million
 PORTS • 351

from about the 10th century. Thomas Stamford Raffles surveyed Java’s
population in 1815 at 4.6 million, but this is certainly an underestimate:
those responsible for reporting population were already long accustomed
to underreporting population in order to minimize taxation. From 1815
to 1865, Java’s population probably grew at around 1 percent per year,
and then at around 1.2 percent until the end of the 19th century, reaching
30 million in 1900. Although Dutch authorities and many later re-
searchers attributed this growth to Malthusian factors such as increased
health care and the absence of war, economic changes seem also to have
been important, specifically the expansion of rice cultivation and the im-
provement of rice technology, together with the opening of employment
opportunities on commercial estates. Paul Alexander has argued that the
heavy labor demands made on women under the Cultivation System
reduced the period of breastfeeding and thus also the period of postpar-
tum infertility. From 1900 population grew at an average of 1.4 percent
per year (though there was probably little growth in the 1940s). From
1961 to 1971, the rate was about 2 percent. Until 1900 most of the other
islands, except Bali, were relatively sparsely populated, but population
has grown dramatically in North Sumatra, Lampung, South Sulawesi,
and Minahasa, especially as a result of immigration, transmigration,
and the shift to intensive agriculture.
Until about the end of the 18th century, population was a valuable po-
litical resource for rulers and there was no question of population control
as policy, though women were able to space children by prolonging
breastfeeding to 2–3 years and abortion by massage and herbs was ap-
parently common. In the early 19th century, however, Raffles raised the
prospect of overpopulation on Java, and since then the topic has seldom
been off the political agenda. Transmigration was the first solution pro-
posed, but from the 1970s more emphasis was put on family planning.
Fertility rates declined in the period 1967–1985 from an average of 5.5
births per woman to an average of 3.3, due to the increased availability
of contraceptives, awareness of the costs of educating children, and the
availability of other consumption options. The total population of
Indonesia grew from 147.5 million in 1980 to 206.3 million in 2000,
but the rate of population increase declined from 1.97 percent in the
1980–1990 decade to 1.49 percent in the decade between 1990 and 2000.
[0069, 0075, 0295, 0479, 1311–1324]

PORTS. Lying mostly outside the cyclonic zone, many Indonesian ports
were traditionally little more than roadsteads, ships anchoring offshore to
352 • PORTUGUESE IN INDONESIA

be loaded and unloaded by lighter vessels. Geographical location, the

provision of naval protection, and the availability of supplies rather than
the technical characteristics of the harbor itself were most important. The
development of steam shipping and of larger draft vessels, however, led
to the building of more elaborate facilities. A modern port for Batavia
was constructed at Tanjung Priok in 1886–1887; Teluk Bayur, the port
for Padang, was constructed at the end of the 19th century under the
name Emmahaven to make coal embarkation from the Ombilin mine
more efficient; Surabaya was turned from a roadstead into a port in
1917–1920; new wharves were installed in Makassar in 1918; and
Belawan, the port for Deli, was opened in 1922. In 1954 port service fa-
cilities were transferred to Indonesian firms (see NATIONALIZA-
TION). A major element in Indonesian port policy has been the desire to
establish direct “gateways” to the rest of the world, bypassing Singa-
pore. From early times, ports also formed the nuclei for the growth of
cities and were much more important centers of urbanization than the in-
land settlements around the courts of Javanese rulers. See also BATAM;
CORRUPTION; PASISIR; SHIPPING. [0460, 0464]

PORTUGUESE IN INDONESIA. The commercial reputation of

Melaka led the Portuguese to establish a post there in 1509, as part of
their Asia-wide string of ports and offices. Expelled by the sultan, they
returned in 1511 under Alfonso de Albuquerque (c. 1459–1515) and af-
ter a prolonged struggle captured the city, going on to found settlements
in Ternate, Ambon, Timor, and Tidore. Except for guns and clocks,
Portuguese goods had little demand in Asia, and they concentrated on
using their naval supremacy to tax intra-Asian trade (see PIRACY).
Portuguese became a lingua franca in much of the archipelago, leaving
many words in the local languages. High tariffs in Melaka, however,
drove traders to Aceh, Riau, and ports on Java, diminishing Portuguese
revenue and leading them into a series of military and diplomatic ad-
ventures especially on the eastern coast of Sumatra, where they fought
and negotiated intermittently with Aceh, Pedir, and Pasai. Illegal trade
by Portuguese officials, a lack of manpower, a lack of tact in dealing
with local powers (which contributed to the rapid spread of Islam), and
the growth of the power of the Dutch and English East Indies Com-
panies contributed to their decline. After losing Melaka in 1641, they
ceased to be a major power in the region, though they retained posses-
sions in Nusatenggara. See also CATHOLICISM; EAST TIMOR.
[0554–0555]
 PRABOWO SUBIANTO • 353

POSTAL SERVICE. Letters are, of course, a phenomenon nearly as an-

cient in the archipelago as writing and, as a means of communication be-
tween people, were not always encouraged by rulers. From 1636 to 1701,
for instance, the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) banned all private
correspondence to protect its trade secrets. The first official post office
was established by Governor-General G. W. van Imhoff, 12.5 cents be-
ing charged to send a letter to the Netherlands and 25 cents to receive
one, though the “poor” were exempt from these charges. Postal services
were initially the responsibility of police officials, but from 1789 they
were farmed out to private contractors (see PACHT), rates being fixed by
the company. Postmarks were used to indicate the amount to be paid by
the addressee. Herman Willem Daendels restored state control of the
system and recruited forced labor to construct a 1,000-km post road
along the northern coast of Java from Anyer to Panarukan. Lodgings and
horse stations were provided every 15 km, and the road was maintained
by compulsory labor services from the local population. A commission
for roads and posts was installed in 1808 to ensure regular services. Reg-
ulations in 1862 provided for the first postage stamps for prepayment (is-
sued 1864) and formally made the postal service a government monop-
oly, though the mail contract to the Outer Islands was always let out to
private tender. See also SHIPPING; TELEGRAPH. [0462]

PRABOWO SUBIANTO (1952–). Son of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo,

Prabowo spent his early years in England and Switzerland during his fa-
ther’s exile. When his family returned from Europe in 1967, he entered
the military academy. He joined the special forces (Komando Pasukan
Khusus [Kopassus]) in 1974 and spent 10 years in East Timor and was
believed to have been in charge of the campaign of intimidation against
students and demonstrators there in 1991. He attended training courses
in the United States and in 1995 was appointed commander of Kopas-
sus, a post he held until March 1998, during which time he doubled the
number of its troops. A favorite with Americans because of his English
and smooth manners, he married one of Suharto’s daughters, Siti
Hediyati Harijadi. In May 1998 at the age of 46 he was the army’s
youngest three-star general and the head of Army Strategic Reserves
(Kostrad). He was in charge of the security forces that fired on the stu-
dents at Trisakti University on 12 May, killing several of them. Prabowo
had developed a reputation for treating his troops brutally and was
known for his outspoken anti-Chinese and anti-Semitic rhetoric. In the
closing days of Suharto’s rule, he was suspected of trying to engineer a
354 • PRAMBANAN

takeover, inciting rioting so that his forces had the excuse for a crack-
down. Removed by Wiranto on 21 May 1998 and assigned to the Staff
College in Bandung, he was brought before a military tribunal charged
with involvement in kidnappings and torture of political activists. He
was dismissed from the military, and the tribunal recommended further
investigation into his role in the mid-May riots. Prabowo left the country
for extended travel abroad, spending most of his time in Jordan, ostensi-
bly looking after his family’s business interests. Apparently he also vis-
ited Kupang, meeting with West Timor militia leaders, including Enrico
Guterres, shortly before the murder of United Nations representatives
there.

PRAMBANAN. Ninth-century Hindu temple in Central Java, dedicated

to Durga, the consort of Siva. [0115]

PRAMOEDYA ANANTA TOER (1925–). The son of a schoolteacher in

Blora, in central Java, Pramoedya is Indonesia’s greatest, best-known,
and most controversial prose writer. During the Japanese occupation he
worked in the Domei news agency, and after 1950 he became an editor
at Balai Pustaka, the government publishing house, and editor of In-
donesia, a leading cultural journal. His early writings, many of which
were written while in a Dutch jail from 1947 to 1949, show a terse, per-
sonal style. A nationalist and humanist, he was harshly critical of the
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) because of its role in the Madiun Af-
fair, but his viewpoint changed during the 1950s with disillusionment at
the corruption and ineffectiveness of the postrevolutionary political sit-
uation. After being a member of the Gelanggang group in 1950 he be-
came a major figure in the Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (Lekra), ar-
guing for popular commitment in literature and helping to formulate the
doctrine of socialist realism as it applied to Indonesia in the 1960s. In
1965 he was detained and later sent to the penal island of Buru, where
he wrote his major quartet of historical novels based on the emergence
of Indonesian national consciousness in the early 20th century. These
have all been translated and published in English as This Earth of
Mankind, Child of All Nations, Footsteps, and House of Glass.
Pramoedya was not released until late 1979 and was kept under city
arrest, barred from traveling outside Jakarta, until 1998. The awarding
of the Ramon Magsaysay Award to Pramoedya in 1995 raised a storm of
protest among his ideological enemies from the 1960s, notably Mochtar
Lubis, and the government forbade him from going to Manila to receive
 PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE • 355

the prize. His books were banned throughout the Suharto era, and re-
mained technically so even after Suharto’s fall. Still controversial,
Pramoedya himself remained bitter, refusing to accept an apology of-
fered by President Abudurrachman Wahid in 2000. See also CUL-
TURE, DEBATE ON THE ROLE OF. [0221, 0227, 0234, 0250–0257]

PREHISTORY. The prehistory of the archipelago is relatively little

known. Remains of the hominids Pithecanthropus modjokertoensis and
Meganthropus palaeojavanicus have been found in volcanic deposits on
Java dated to 1.9 million years ago, while Java Man (Homo [Pithecan-
thropus] erectus and Pithecanthropus soloensis) lived in Central Java 1
million or more years ago. The earliest known Homo sapiens is Wajak
Man, who lived in East Java about 40,000 years ago (though similar re-
mains in Sarawak date from 50,000 years ago), while other H. sapiens
remains from eastern Indonesia seem to date from about 30,000 years be-
fore present. Wajak Man was probably an Austromelanesian (Australoid)
close to the ancestors of today’s Australian Aborigines, but whether
H. erectus and the rest were the ancestors of Wajak Man is uncertain—
some authorities believe the Austromelanesians migrated from the Asian
mainland between 50,000 and 100,000 years ago. They appear to have
occupied most of what is now Indonesia and Australia, but were divided
15,000 to 8,000 years ago by a 130-meter rise in sea level, which created
the Indonesian archipelago and made contact with Australia vastly more
difficult. It was not until 4000–2000 B.C. that the Austronesian ancestors
of the modern inhabitants of western Indonesia reached the archipelago.
See also CONTINENTAL DRIFT; MIGRATIONS; SUNDA SHELF.

PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE. Under Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution,

the president is the head of state and of executive government and is the-
supreme commander of the armed forces. She or he must be asli Indone-
sian, more than 40 years old, believe in God, and not have been involved
in subversive activities. She or he is officially mandatory of the Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) for the execution of government pol-
icy during a five-year term, though the MPR-S conferred on Sukarno the
title president-for-life in 1963 and revoked it in 1966. Presidents report to
the newly elected MPR at the end of their term in office, and there is
commonly no procedure to hold them accountable to the MPR. For the
first nearly 60 years of independence, the MPR elected the president, but
in 2002 it passed a measure that, beginning in 2004, the president would
be directly elected by the people. The successful candidate would need to
356 • PRIANGAN

win more than 50 percent of the votes cast, and if this were not achieved
on the first ballot, there would be a second round. The president can be
dismissed by the MPR at any time, as happened to Sukarno, and can also
be impeached, as was Abdurrachman Wahid in 2001. The president ap-
points and dismisses ministers and cooperates with the Dewan Perwaki-
lan Rakyat (DPR) in the passing of legislation and the state budget,
though she or he can also make extensive use of presidential decrees
(Keputusan Presiden, Keppres) and government regulations (Peraturan
Pemerintah, PP), which do not require legislative ratification. See also
VICE PRESIDENT. [1100]

PRIANGAN (Dutch, Preanger). A mountainous region in southern and

central West Java, extending roughly from Sukabumi to Tasikmalaya.
The heartland of the Sundanese, it was the first extensive region on Java
to fall under Dutch rule (in 1677) and was governed through local rulers
(regenten) in a form of indirect rule. Under the “Preanger-Stelsel” (Pri-
angan system), the Dutch obliged these rulers to supervise the forced cul-
tivation of coffee, pepper, and tea. [0358, 0561]

PRIBUMI (“indigene”). Often abbreviated to “Pri” and distinguished from

“Nonpri,” it is ostensibly a racial distinction between broadly Malay and
Melanesian ethnic groups long settled in the archipelago and more re-
cently arrived minorities (e.g., Chinese and Arabs), but is most com-
monly used to distinguish unassimilated Chinese (nonpri) from others.
See also ALI-BABA FIRMS.

PRIYAYI. The traditional, largely hereditary, bureaucratic aristocracy of

Java. Although access to the priyayi might be by descent, political posi-
tion, or both, the defining feature of the class was its culture, which
stressed the often pre-Islamic courtly arts of literature, music, drama,
and philosophy, as well as justice and integrity in government (see
GAMELAN; KEBATINAN; WAYANG). A (male) priyayi was expected
to possess, it is said, a wife, a house, a horse, a kris, and a singing bird,
representing social stability, military prowess, and aesthetic sensibility. A
wide range of aphorisms, many still in use, urged these values on the
priyayi. Tut wuri handayani, for instance, the motto of the Department of
Education and Culture, means “helping unobtrusively from behind.”
Although these values were ostensibly traditional, they were encour-
aged among the priyayi by the Dutch, especially during the 19th century,
as a means of increasing the dignity and prestige of the traditional au-
 PROTESTANTISM • 357

thorities and so facilitating the system of indirect rule (see BUPATI; IN-
LANDSCH BESTUUR). This tended to widen the apparent gap between
Javanese village culture (see ABANGAN; DESA) and that of the courts.
Especially after 1966, the New Order government has encouraged tra-
ditional priyayi values as a way of bolstering corporatism in the bureau-
cracy (see KORPS PEGAWAI REPUBLIK INDONESIA). Priyayi
cultural forms, expressed especially in weddings, are now commonplace
among village elites. See also ALIRAN; PAMONG PRAJA. [0485, 0572,
0636, 1244]

PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Proklamasi). See INDE-

PENDENCE, DECLARATION OF.

PROSTITUTION. Not easy to define or trace in precolonial Indonesia,

prostitution must certainly have existed, especially in the port cities. Sex-
ual relations seem to have been relatively easy, divorce was common, and
quasi-contractual liaisons seem to have been frequent, especially between
foreign traders and indigenous women (continued today as kawin kontrak)
or by the purchase of slave women for sexual purposes. Prostitution began
to grow in the 16th century, perhaps because Muslims disapproved of tem-
porary marriage, but large-scale prostitution emerged only in the 19th cen-
tury with the decline of concubinage among soldiers of the Koninklijk
Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL) and among European officials and
with the increase in labor mobility, which saw large numbers of indige-
nous men leaving their families temporarily to seek employment in the
cities and on plantations. During the 19th century, government concern
over the spread of syphilis led to supervision of prostitution, without, how-
ever, any attempt to improve working conditions in the industry. From
1912 the Sarekat Islam (SI) campaigned against prostitution, and in the
1970s Islamic groups strongly objected when the Jakarta governor, Ali
Sadikin, legalized prostitution in order both to improve conditions and to
generate tax revenue. See also MARRIAGE, POLITICAL SIGNIFI-
CANCE OF; WOMEN AND MEN. [0576, 1411, 1421]

PROTESTANTISM. Protestant missionary activity began in Indonesia in

the 17th century, soon after the arrival of the Dutch East Indies Com-
pany (VOC). From 1623 to 1633 a seminary existed in Leiden under
company sponsorship for the training of missionaries, and by 1795 the in-
digenous Christian population of the archipelago was estimated at 70,000,
much of it on Java and in Maluku. In 1820 the various Protestant
358 • PROTO-MALAYS

churches were brought under government supervision through the Com-

missie tot de Zaken der Protestantse Kerken in Nederlandsch Oost- en
West-Indië (Commission on the Affairs of the Protestant Churches in the
Dutch East and West Indies), also known as the Haagse Commissie,
which acted as a kind of embassy from the Dutch churches to the colonial
government. In the mid-19th century, however, an independent Javanese
Protestant community was founded in Central Java by Kiai Sadrach
(1841–?). All official Protestant churches in the colony were united into a
single, state-sponsored church, the “Indische Kerk,” which was disestab-
lished only on 1 August 1935.
English methodism and German pietism prompted another wave of
European missionary activity from the late 18th century, especially by
the Nederlandsch Zendelingsgenootschap (estabished 1797). By 1906,
30 missionary societies, including many of German origin, were mem-
bers of the so-called Zendingsconsulaat (Mission consulate), which co-
ordinated mission relations with the colonial government. Most missions
were given their own area for proselytization, and all missions were ex-
cluded from certain areas (Bali, Lombok, Sumbawa, Flores, and large
areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan). German Protestant missions were
active in the Toba area of North Sumatra from 1861 and later on Nias and
in southern Kalimantan. The indigenous Protestant churches conduct ser-
vices in local languages and are thus administratively divided according
to ethnic group, though most churches are represented in the Dewan
Gereja Indonesia (DGI, Indonesian Council of Churches). Protestantism
is strongest in the Batak area of Sumatra and in Maluku and Minahasa.
See also CATHOLICISM. [0835, 1003, 1341, 1365]

PROTO-MALAYS. See MIGRATIONS.

PROVINCES. Although some steps toward decentralization were taken

under Dutch rule, the establishment of a full set of provincial governments
in Indonesia was not carried out until the abolition of the last federal states
(see FEDERALISM) in 1950. Provinces have been the major subnational
administrative division in modern Indonesia and provincial governors, as
important agents of central rule, have always been appointed by the cen-
tral government, except for a brief period from 1957 to 1959 when they
were elected. Under the 1974 law on regional government, however, gov-
ernors were appointed from a panel of candidates chosen by a partly
elected provincial assembly, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah
Tingkat I (Level I Regional People’s Representative Council), with which
 PROVINCES • 359

they co-legislate on provincial matters. The formal title of governors is

thus Gubernur/Kepala Daerah (governor/regional head).
On 18 August 1945 the Indonesian Republic divided the country into
eight provinces: Sumatra, Borneo [sic], West Java, Central Java, East
Java, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Sunda Kecil (Lesser Sundas or Nusateng-
gara). This structure was overtaken by the Revolution and the formation of
the federal Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS), but was partly re-created in
1950 with the dissolution of the RIS and the establishment of provinces in
West, Central, and East Java and North, Central, and South Sumatra; the di-
vision of Sumatra had been announced by the Republic in 1948 but never
implemented. Aceh had been briefly separated from North Sumatra as a
distinct province in 1949 but was reincorporated into it under the Moham-
mad Natsir government the following year. In 1950, too, Yogyakarta and
the Pakualaman were separated from Central Java as the Daerah Istimewa
Yogyakarta (DIY, Yogyakarta Special Territory). Kalimantan, which re-
gained provincial status in 1953, was divided into West, South, and East
provinces in 1957. As part of a settlement with the rebels there, Aceh be-
came a province once more in 1956 and a daerah istimewa in 1959. In 1957
Maluku was restored as a province, while Central Sumatra was split into
Jambi, Riau, and West Sumatra, with Jambi initially including Indrapura
on the west coast. Jakarta was also declared a capital territory (Daerah
Khusus Ibukota, DKI) in 1957. In 1958 the provinces of Bali, Nusatenggara
Barat, and Nusatenggara Timor were established in the lesser Sundas, while
Central Kalimantan was removed from South Kalimantan. (See MAP 8.) In
1960 provinces of North and South Sulawesi were formed; Central Su-
lawesi and Southeast Sulawesi separated from North and South respectively
in 1964. Lampung separated from South Sumatra in 1964, and Bengkulu
followed in 1967. Irian formally became a province with the “Act of Free
Choice” in 1969. Timor Timur (East Timor) was annexed and constituted
Indonesia’s 27th province from 1976 until 1999, when it voted to break its
ties with Jakarta. In 2002 East Timor completed the process of its indepen-
dence from Indonesia.
The introduction of the decentralization laws in 1999 resulted in more
regions wishing to establish themselves as provinces. That same year
North Maluku split from Maluku; in 2000 Banten split from West Java,
Bangka-Belitung split from South Sumatra, and Gorontalo split from
North Sulawesi. Thus in 2002 there were 27 provinces:

Bali
Bangka-Belitung
360 • PRRI/PERMESTA REBELLION

Banten
Bengkulu
Gorontalo
Jambi
West, Central, and East Java (3)
West, South, Central, and East Kalimantan (4)
Lampung
Maluku and North Maluku (2)
West and East Nusatenggara (2)
Papua (whose name had been changed from Irian Jaya)
Riau
South, Central, Southeast, and North Sulawesi (4)
West, South, and North Sumatra (3)
There were also two special regions (Aceh and Yogyakarta) and one
special district (Greater Jakarta). Proposals for further divisions included
splitting the Riau Islands from the mainland of Riau province (which was
enacted in 2003) and separating Flores, together with the nearby island
of Lembata, from the province of East Nusatenggara. The government
proposal to split Papua into three provinces was strongly condemned by
the Papuan people but was formally enacted in August 2003 with the es-
tablishment of the provinces of Central and West Irian Jaya. See MAP
12. [0359, 0661, 0944, 0948, 0950]

PRRI/PERMESTA REBELLION (PRRI = Pemerintah Revolusioner Re-

publik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indone-
sia; PERMESTA = Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Universal Strug-
gle Charter). A regional, but not separatist, rebellion based primarily in
the Minangkabau region of central Sumatra and the Minahasa region
of northern Sulawesi, though it had adherents in other parts of Sumatra
and Sulawesi and throughout Indonesia. Generally anticommunist, it was
intended to establish a conservative national government in the face of
Indonesia’s swing toward Guided Democracy. The rebellion had three
distinct roots: the political polarization of national politics in the late
1950s, in which a coalition of Sukarno, Partai Nasional Indonesia
(PNI), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI),
all based on Java, grew increasingly powerful at the expense of
Masjumi and the Outer Islands; the economic discrimination, whereby
the regions outside Java saw most of their wealth and resources chan-
neled to Java, particularly Jakarta; and the discontent of regional mili-
 PRRI/PERMESTA REBELLION • 361

tary commanders with attempts (especially by A. H. Nasution) to cen-

tralize the army and strengthen military discipline by transferring offi-
cers from their home bases.
The revolt began on 20 December 1956, when Ahmad Husein
(1925–1998?), the local commander in West Sumatra, took over civil
government, appointing a Banteng Council (Dewan Banteng) to admin-
ister the region. Other units followed suit in North and South Sumatra
and later in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku. On 2 March 1957,
Lieutenant Colonel H. N. V. Sumual (1923–) unilaterally issued a docu-
ment (Permesta) announcing martial law in eastern Indonesia
(Nusatenggara, Sulawesi, and Maluku). Army councils (particularly on
Sumatra) moved against corruption, arrested PKI members, and began
to repair roads in an effort to win support, while demanding that a new
government headed by Mohammad Hatta replace the crumbling Ali
Sastroamijoyo cabinet. On 14 March 1957, however, Sukarno an-
nounced a “working cabinet” under Juanda Kartawijaya, and Nasution
declared martial law throughout the country in an effort to undercut the
local armies’ support. Juanda moved to compromise with the rebels, but
the situation became polarized after an assassination attempt against
Sukarno in November 1957, which was blamed on Zulkifli Lubis and
youths tied to the Masjumi party. Intimidation by Sukarno supporters
led Masjumi leaders Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara,
and Burhannudin Harahap to flee to Sumatra. They were joined there,
too, by Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Zulkifli Lubis, and others. Many
PRRI supporters hoped they could achieve their goals by reaching a
compromise with the central government and without resort to rebellion,
but on 10 February 1958 their leaders on both Sumatra and Sulawesi is-
sued an ultimatum that Sukarno withdraw to a figurehead presidency,
that Hatta form a cabinet, and that Nasution be dismissed. When this was
rejected, they declared a new national government, the PRRI, on 15 Feb-
ruary, with Sjafruddin as prime minister. Two days later, the Permesta
rebels allied with the declaration.
The rebels received clandestine support from the United States prin-
cipally in the form of arms and training. Malaya, Singapore, and the
Philippines also provided them with bases and sanctuary. The govern-
ment’s military response was harsh, and after landings in March and
April 1958 it occupied the major rebel strongholds on Sumatra. After
subsequent attacks in Sulawesi, the major towns in both regions were
largely under government control by August, and the PRRI/ Permesta
soon found its power base limited to the rural areas of central Sumatra
362 • PURBAKALA, DINAS

and the rich Minahasa region of North Sulawesi. Guerrilla warfare on a

gradually decreasing scale continued for about three more years before
the rebels finally conceded defeat in 1961. The rebellion enabled a far-
reaching purge of the armed forces to take place and provided the
Sukarno government with a basis for banning Masjumi and the Partai
Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) in 1960 on the grounds that members of the
parties had participated in the rebellion and their leadership had not con-
demned it. [0697, 0699, 0708, 0828, 1111, 1121]

PURBAKALA, DINAS. See ARCHEOLOGY.

PUSAT TENAGA RAKYAT (PUTERA, Center of the People’s Power).

Japanese-sponsored mass organization on Java that succeeded the Tiga
A Movement in March 1943, under the leadership of Sukarno, Mo-
hammad Hatta, Ki Hajar Dewantoro (see SUWARDI SURYAN-
INGRAT), and Mas Mansur (1896–1946). Its principal task was to in-
crease public enthusiasm for the war effort and to drive out remnants of
Western cultural and political influence, and its activity was limited to
little more than radio broadcasts and other propaganda. It operated un-
der strict Japanese control and was given only limited access to the coun-
tryside. It nonetheless gave massive public exposure to Sukarno and
Hatta and reinforced their standing as national leaders. It was replaced in
January 1944 by the Jawa Hokokai. See also JAPANESE OCCUPA-
TION OF INDONESIA. [0644, 0657, 0661, 0663]

–R–

RAAD VAN INDIË (Council of the Indies). Senior council for Indies af-
fairs, generally with the task of advising the governor-general on mat-
ters of state. [0032, 0045, 0638]

RACE. In traditional societies, where the notion of genetic characteristics

is absent, it is difficult to judge the extent of “racial” consciousness as
opposed to a simple distinction between locals and outsiders. Evidence
suggests, however, that just as the traditional societies of the archipelago
were rather open to cultural influences from abroad, so they were rela-
tively accepting of those who assimilated culturally to Indonesian ways
of life, the most important “ethnic” marker being religion. In the trading
cities of the coastal regions, in particular, there seems to be a long tradi-
 RACE • 363

tion of settlement and acculturation by other Asians, to the extent that it

is difficult or impossible from available records to identify those who
might by today’s norms be called “Chinese,” “Arab,” or “Indian.” On the
other hand, expatriate communities in these ports have a long tradition
of maintaining their distinct cultural identities.
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) also used religion at first as
its main criterion of ethnicity, regarding Christian Indonesians, in some
respects at least, as Europeans for legal purposes (see LAW). Although
separate native courts were established in 1747, a formal legal distinction
between Europeans and others did not come into effect until 1848, when
the new commercial and civil codes and codes of civil and criminal pro-
cedure were declared applicable to Europeans only. Article 109 of the
1854 Regeeringsreglement (constitution) formally distinguished be-
tween Europeanen, who were thereby equalized to Dutch citizens in the
Netherlands, and Inlanders (natives). While this distinction enabled
some special protection to be given to Indonesians, for example, in the
Agrarian Law of 1870, it generally permitted discrimination against in-
digenes in conditions of employment and the provision of services. The
exact criteria for racial classification were not specified, but in general
legitimate children followed the race of their father, illegitimate children
that of their mother. Groups that did not fall clearly into either category
were allocated to one or the other: Armenians, for instance, as Euro-
peans; wives of Europeans (from 1896) as Europeans; and Arabs as na-
tives. In 1885 Chinese were made subject to European commercial law
in order to simplify their dealings with European business houses and a
third category, foreign orientals (vreemde oosterlingen), gradually
emerged, though it was not legally defined until the revised constitution
of 1925 (Article 163). From 1899 Japanese were classified as Europeans,
and they were joined by Turks in 1926 on the grounds that Turkey had
adopted a European style of legal system.
Movement between legal categories was also possible by means of
gelijkstelling (“alike-making”), under which a person of native or foreign
oriental status could gain full legal European status if he could demon-
strate that he was culturally assimilated to the European community or
had special legal need for European status. In the late 19th century a cam-
paign began in Dutch circles for the abolition of racial classification as a
hindrance to social development, but this was blocked by a coalition of
colonial conservatives and adat law specialists, who argued for the sanc-
tity of traditional, ethnically based law; steps toward legal unification
were abandoned in 1928. From 1910, with the introduction of limited
364 • RADICALE CONCENTRATIE

elections, a further legal distinction was made between Dutch citizens and
Dutch subjects (Nederlands onderdaan, niet Nederlander). All formal
racial distinctions were abolished by the Indonesian constitution of 1945
(but see ASLI), though discimination against Indonesian citizens of for-
eign descent (warganegara Indonesia keturunan asing), especially Chi-
nese, continues in a number of respects. See also INDO-EUROPEANS.

RADICALE CONCENTRATIE (Radical Concentration). Coalition of

progressive parties, Indonesian and non-Indonesian, formed in the Volk-
sraad in November 1918 to press for movement toward responsible gov-
ernment in the colony, especially after the colonial government had re-
jected the recommendations of the Carpentier Alting Commission on
constitutional reform. The coalition fell apart as the demands of Indone-
sian nationalism for full independence became stronger. [0661]

RADIO. The first radio station in the Netherlands Indies was established in
Sabang in 1911 for naval communications; amateur broadcasts began
soon after and the first commercial station, the Bataviase Radio
Vereeniging, started broadcasting in 1925. The official Nederlandsch-
Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij (NIROM) began in 1934. The first
indigenous radio station, Perikatan Perkumpulan Radio Ketimuran (Fed-
eration of Asian Radio Associations), was permitted in 1937 but could
only broadcast on cultural and social affairs. During the Japanese occu-
pation, radios were used widely for propaganda in the villages, and fig-
ures such as Sukarno received unprecedented national coverage as a re-
sult. A national station, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), was founded in
August 1945. Like television and cassettes, broadcasts from this national
station have provided the government with a powerful tool for projecting
its message and spreading a national culture. Local stations have also
proliferated and been active in promoting regional music, languages,
and culture, but throughout the Suharto regime none of the hundreds of
private radio stations were allowed to carry their own news broadcasts.
After the fall of Suharto, requirements on broadcasters were eased and
radio journalists were free to report critically. See also CENSORSHIP;
MEDIA. [0154, 0622, 0761, 1300, 1301]

RAFFLES, THOMAS STAMFORD (1781–1826). An official of the En-

glish East India Company, Raffles was appointed lieutenant-governor
of Java in 1811 after Britain’s seizure of the island during the
Napoleonic Wars (see BATAVIAN REPUBLIC). Hoping to persuade
 RAIS, AMIEN • 365

his superiors to retain control of the island, he attempted to restructure

the Javanese economy to create a market for British manufactured
goods, especially cotton, and attempted to break open the subsistence
economy of the rural interior by abolishing the system of forced labor
(except in Priangan) and requiring peasants to pay a land rent that
would require them to earn money by bringing cash crops onto the mar-
ket. He reduced the role of the traditional aristocracy on Java (see IN-
LANDSCH BESTUUR), abolished the sultanates of Banten and Cire-
bon, and captured the city of Yogyakarta in 1812, installing a new ruler
there. Many of his reforms were based on ideas already in circulation
among Dutch opponents of Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) policy,
such as Dirk van Hogendorp. He made extensive studies of the natural
history and culture of the island, publishing a History of Java (2 vols.,
1817). In March 1816 he was removed from his post after accusations of
corruption. In 1817, after Java was returned to the Dutch, Raffles was
appointed British lieutenant-governor of Bengkulu. He founded Singa-
pore in 1819. [0291, 0588, 0843]

RAILWAYS AND TRAMWAYS. Railways were constructed, mainly

on Java, from 1873 by both the state railways (Staatsspoorwegen) and
11 private companies, of which the largest was the Semarang-based
Nederlandsch-Indische Spoorwegen Maatschappij. Separate small
systems also existed in South, West, and North Sumatra and in Aceh.
State railways accounted for 1,870 miles of track in 1942, private lines
for 531 miles. There were also many Decauville lines, which were
usually two-foot gauge, serving mines, plantations, and industrial in-
stallations. Most traffic was short-haul: freight traveled an average of
62 miles, passengers under 19 miles. The rail system fell into decline
after 1931, when little new investment was made and much rolling
stock and some rails were removed by the Japanese during the occu-
pation. Under the New Order, however, the World Bank provided
aid for a national program of rehabilitation. See also ROADS; SHIP-
PING. [0060, 0465, 0622, 0977]

RAIS, AMIEN (1944–). Born in Surakarta, Amien Rais studied at Gadjah

Mada University and the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN, State Is-
lamic Religious Institute) in Yogyakarta, before going to the United
States in 1968 to continue his studies, gaining a Ph.D. from the Univer-
sity of Chicago in 1981, writing a thesis entitled “The Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt: Its Rise, Demise and Resurgence.” He became a lecturer
366 • RAMAYANA

in political science at Gadjah Mada and general chairman of the

Muhammadiyah. During the 1980s he developed a reputation for re-
sponding quickly to threats to Islam and was a strong critic of the
“Christianization” of Indonesian society. Rais joined the Ikatan Cen-
dekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) and became chairman of its
Council of Experts. In 1997, however, he was publicly critical of the
Suharto government, of the “nepotism” in that year’s elections, and of
the government’s “collusion” with foreign investors in exploiting In-
donesia’s natural resources (see KOLUSI, KORUPSI, DAN NEPO-
TISME). As a result, B. J. Habibie forced him from his position in
ICMI. Nevertheless, he retained widespread support in Muhammadiyah,
and after the installation of the People’s Congress in October 1997 he
expressed his willingness to stand as a presidential candidate against
Suharto, proposing that a poll be conducted to determine the people’s
choice. In December, he publicly spoke out against Suharto’s reelection.
Amien Rais was a prominent leader of the reformasi movement
against Suharto in 1998, being sidelined, however, at the last moment
when he canceled a scheduled May demonstration because of his fear of
it sparking widespread violence. After Suharto’s resignation, Rais left his
post in Muhammadiyah to form a new Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN),
which he tried to make into a grouping that would appeal to Indonesians
of different faiths and backgrounds. It gained only 7 percent of the vote
and 13 parliamentary seats. Recognized, however, as second only to Ab-
durrachman Wahid as an Islamic leader, Rais was elected chairman of
the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) in October 1999 with
the backing of Wahid and Golkar, as well as some other Islamic factions.
[0760, 1029, 1362]

RAMAYANA. Epic story derived from India and set down in Old Javanese
as the Ramayana Kakawin by Yogaswari, probably in the 10th century.
Reliefs depicting the story decorate the Hindu temples of Prambanan
and Panataran in Java and many temples in Bali. The story is presented
in wayang kulit, wayang golek, and wayang wong, though the celebrated
moonlight performances at Prambanan are a recent innovation. As with
the Mahabharata, episodes from the Ramayana are often used as alle-
gories of contemporary events.
In the story, Prince Rama, his wife Sita, and his brother Laksamana are
exiled from their father’s kingdom of Ayodhya. As they wander in the
forest, Sita is kidnapped by the demon king, Rawana, who takes her to
his palace in Alengka (Sri Lanka). With the help of a white monkey,
 REFORMASI • 367

Hanuman, Rama discovers Sita’s whereabouts and leads a monkey army

to rescue her. Reunited, they return to Ayodhya and live, according to
some versions, happily ever after. In other versions, however, Rama re-
jects Sita on suspicion that she may have been unfaithful to him during
her captivity. See also MAHABHARATA. [0132, 0159]

RAMI (Boehmeria nivea Urticaceae). Fiber plant, perhaps native to Sulawesi,

it can be used to produce tough cord and extremely hard-wearing, coarse
cloth. Attempts at commercial cultivation began in the early 19th century
but were always hampered by the difficulty of separating the fiber from the
other plant materials. When this is done by hand it is a labor-intensive
process, but 454 rami processes and machines patented between 1873 and
1900 were unable to make the crop commercial. During World War II both
Japan and the United States developed effective processing techniques, and
the Japanese planted it extensively on Java as a substitute for jute from
India. [0331, 0332]

RANIRI, NURUDDIN AL- (?–1666). Gujerati Muslim scholar who ar-

rived in Aceh in 1637 and was appalled by what he saw as the mystical
heresies being followed at the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani, especially
in the writings of Hamzah Fansuri and Syamsuddin of Pasai. After win-
ning over Iskandar Thani, he began to persecute the followers of Hamzah
and Syamsuddin and ordered their books to be burned. He himself, how-
ever, composed one of the classics of Malay literature, the Bustan as-
Salatin (Garden of Kings), which covered the history of Islam as well as
recent scientific knowledge. He lost favor under the rule of Iskandar
Thani’s widow and successor Taj al-Alam and returned to India in 1644.

RATTAN (Arecaceae, rotan). Climbing rainforest palms of several genera

harvested extensively for their strong pliant stems, and preferred to bamboo
for pliability, durability, and appearance. Overcollection and the clearing of
jungle have steadily reduced supplies and increased prices, but Indonesia
still produces around 80 percent of the world’s supply. In October 1986 ex-
port of unprocessed rattan was banned in order to encourage local process-
ing; semiprocessed rattan was included in the ban in July 1988. [0342]

RATU ADIL. See JAVA WAR; JOYOBOYO.

REFORMASI. Reform movement spearheaded by students that began in

late 1997 demanding a reform of Indonesia’s political and economic
368 • REGENTS

structures. It escalated in 1998 to calls for President Suharto’s resigna-

tion and for an open and democratic election to select his successor. Af-
ter Suharto’s fall, the term came to denote the struggle for a more dem-
ocratic and inclusive Indonesia wherein ideals of accountability and
transparency would replace the corruption and cronyism of the Suharto
era. See also KOLUSI, KORUPSI, DAN NEPOTISME (KKN).

REGENTS. See BUPATI.

RELIGION AND POLITICS. The division between religion and state

now common in the West is of relatively recent origin and has little
meaning for most of Indonesian history. While it is true to say that rulers
and religious leaders have used religion for political ends and have used
politics for religious ends, the distinction is not really valid in societies
where every aspect of social organization and behavior was in some re-
spect a matter for religious concern. Religions were inevitably closely
associated with the political order and with challenges to it. All the ma-
jor religions of Indonesia, however, recognize at least some division of
responsibility between religious and secular authorities, and the sharpen-
ing or blurring of this distinction was often driven by political motives.
Traditional rulers found that successively Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam,
and Christianity could be used as buttresses to their rule, either as a
means of acquiring allies or to reinforce the loyalty of their subjects. Un-
der the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), Dutch Reformed Protes-
tantism was the established religion and in Minahasa, for instance, peo-
ple previously converted to Catholicism were arbitrarily declared to be
Protestant when the region came under Dutch rule. Freedom of religion
was granted in 1818, after the fall of the company, except where it dis-
turbed public order.
Islam, strongly offended by kafir (infidel) rule and with its strong em-
phasis on the community of Muslims, became an important focus for revolt
both against traditional rulers (see ACEH; MINANGKABAU) and against
the Dutch (see JAVA WAR). In the late 19th century, after failing to sup-
press Islamic radicalism, the colonial authorities adopted suggestions of
Christian Snouck Hurgronje to “domesticate” Islam and undermine much
of its political thrust by supporting religious practice, particularly in the area
of law. A network of government religious officials (penghulu) was estab-
lished to administer Islamic family and property law. In the early years of
the nationalist movement, Islam became a vehicle for opposition to the
commercial position of the Chinese (see SAREKAT ISLAM).
 RELIGION AND POLITICS • 369

Independent Indonesia did not become an Islamic state. Nor, how-

ever, is it wholly secular: not only does the state ideology, Pancasila, set
down “belief in God” as a basic principle of the state but religious affairs
are also administered by a Department of Religion, founded on 3 Janu-
ary 1946, which was for many years the largest government department.
The department was at first entirely Muslim and its primary goal was the
promotion of Islam but, especially after January 1965 when the official
definition of religion was broadened to recognize Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Confucianism as well as Islam and Christianity as official religions,
its political agenda became the promotion of religion (agama) in general
(though Islam still took a major part of its budget and energies). After
1966, under the New Order regime, the promotion of religion had the
added purpose of “immunizing” people against communism, and only a
tiny proportion of the population was classed as belum beragama (not
yet having a religion), though this was achieved partly by allowing ani-
mist peoples such as the Dayak and Toraja to have their beliefs classi-
fied as Hindu. In 1969 President Suharto confirmed the legal right of
people to change religions, and in the 1960s and early 1970s there was
substantial conversion from Islam to Christianity and Hinduism in parts
of Java. In 1978, however, the Department of Religion issued regula-
tions forbidding proselytization among followers of recognized religions
and limiting the extent to which local religious organizations could re-
ceive support from abroad.
Through his policies regarding political parties, Suharto attempted
to depoliticize religion, culminating in 1982 with his emasculation of
the religious parties through his decree that the Pancasila was to be the
sole foundation of all parties and organizations. Removal of religion
from the country’s political life was reinforced by SARA, whereby re-
ligion, as well as other potentially contentious issues, was excluded
from public debate. But after repressing Islam, particularly its political
expression, up to the mid-1980s, Suharto then began to encourage its
freedom of action as evidenced in such measures as his promotion of
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) in 1990, his expan-
sion of the authority of Muslim courts, his support of an Islamic bank,
and his personal demonstration of piety by undertaking the haj pil-
grimage in 1991.
In the aftermath of Suharto’s fall, around 20 new political parties based
on Islam qualified to contest the 1999 elections and they garnered just
about 38 percent of the vote. At the same time religious tensions, partic-
ularly in Eastern Indonesia, led to widespread violence between Muslims
370 • RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN

and Christians. The government, whether under former Nahdlatul

Ulama (NU) head Abdurrachman Wahid or his successor Megawati
Sukarnoputri, still committed itself to the principle of a Pancasila state,
though Aceh and some other majority Muslim provinces introduced mea-
sures to institute Islamic law (syariah) on a regional basis.
There are no current reliable numbers of the breakdown of religious
groups in Indonesia, but in 1982 the official percentages of religious ad-
herence were
Muslim 88.0 percent
Protestant 5.8 percent
Catholic 2.9 percent
Hindu 2.0 percent
Buddhist 0.9 percent
However, an alternative unofficial estimate gave the figures Muslim
77 percent, Protestant 11 percent, Catholicism 4 percent, Hinduism 3
percent, Buddhism and Confucianism 0.4 percent, and Kebatinan 17
percent (Kebatinan had some overlap with other categories). [0983,
1016–1040, 1274]

RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN (Repelita, Five-Year De-

velopment Plan). Official title of successive economic plans under the
New Order. Repelita I ran from 1969 to 1974 and stressed rehabilitation
of the economy after the Guided Economy of Sukarno and increased
rice production and the improvement of infrastructure; Repelita II
(1974–1978) stressed raising living standards by increasing availability
of food, clothing, housing, and so on; Repelita III (1978–1984) aimed to
expand employment by extensive public sector investment and to pro-
mote more equitable distribution of income (though it was vague on the
latter point) and its aims, dependent on heavy capital inflow, had to be
curtailed sharply after the fall in oil prices; Repelita IV (1984–1989)
stressed agriculture and industry; Repelita V (1989–1994) shifted its
educational emphasis from primary to secondary education; and Re-
pelita VI (1994–1999) established a target of universal education for
children up to the lower secondary school level (i.e., nine years of
schooling) and also aimed to reduce the numbers of people below the
poverty line to 6 percent by 1999 and to zero by 2004. Although the ini-
tial inclinations of the New Order’s economic policy makers in the
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas) were for
economic liberalism, the unrestricted operation of market forces was nei-
 REPUBLIK INDONESIA SERIKAT • 371

ther politically acceptable nor economically desirable, and successive

economic plans aimed especially at import-substitution industrialization,
particularly in fertilizer, cement, and textiles, as well as at the improve-
ment of infrastructure. [0295, 0313, 0718]

RENDRA, WILLIBRORDUS S. (1935–). Poet and dramatist. Admired

initially for his lucid, straightforward use of language in poetry, Rendra
became increasingly known for his drama, in which he attempted to
adapt the techniques of Western experimental drama to Indonesian con-
ditions and styles. His best known work is The Struggle of the Naga
Tribe (1975). Throughout the late New Order period, he used his plays
to give voice to the people’s needs and to criticize the regime’s attempts
to silence their depiction and artistic expression in general. From the late
1970s, his plays were therefore frequently banned. See also CENSOR-
SHIP; MALARI. [0258, 0761]

RENVILLE AGREEMENT. The agreement signed on 17–19 January

1948 aboard the USS Renville, anchored in Jakarta Bay, between repre-
sentatives of the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Indies and
providing, like the Linggajati Agreement, for a peaceful end to the
Indonesian-Dutch conflict by merger of the Republican and Dutch terri-
tories into a federal republic. Whereas the Linggajati Agreement had lim-
ited the number of component states of this federation to three, Renville
opened the possibility for people in Dutch-occupied territories to opt by
plebiscite for separate negara (federal state) status (see FEDERALISM)
or for inclusion into the Republic. On the basis of these states, but ex-
cluding the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch proceeded to establish a
Provisional Federal Government (Voorlopige Federale Regeering) in
1948. One key provision of Renville that was never implemented was the
Dutch agreement to hold plebiscites to determine the people’s preference
between the Republic and the Dutch-sponsored state in areas their troops
had occupied in the first “Police Action.” In December 1948, Dutch
forces launched a second “Police Action” to incorporate all Republican
territory into the federation. [0478, 0661, 0674, 1117]

REPUBLIK INDONESIA SERIKAT (RIS, Republic of the United States

of Indonesia, also RUSI). Formed on 27 December 1949 as a conse-
quence of the Round Table Conference. The RIS was a member of the
Netherlands Indonesian Union (Unie), along with the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, and was guaranteed to consult the Netherlands on matters
372 • REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN

of common interest such as international debt and foreign investment.

It was governed under a prime ministerial system with a bicameral leg-
islature consisting of a popular assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)
and a Senate, with two representatives from each of the states (negara)
and territories (daerah) making up the federation. The figurehead presi-
dent of the federation, elected 16 December 1949, was Sukarno. In its
fullest form, the federation consisted of seven negara—the Republik In-
donesia, founded 17 August 1945; Negara Indonesia Timur, formed 24
December 1946, dissolved 17 August 1950; Madura (21 January
1948–9 March 1950); Pasundan (24 April 1948–9 February 1950);
Sumatra Timur (25 December 1947/16 February 1948–17 August 1950,
see EAST SUMATRA); Sumatra Selatan (18 December 1948–9 March
1950, see PALEMBANG); Jawa Timur (East Java; 26 November
1948–9 March 1950)—and nine other territories of varying statuses:
Banjar, Bangka, Billiton (Belitung), Riau, and Dayak Besar, all called
neo-landschappen, denoting that they had formerly been directly ruled
territories; Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Timur, and Kalimantan Teng-
gara, all of the preceding federations of landschappen, or formerly zelf-
besturen; and Jawa Tengah, Padang in West Sumatra, and Pulau Weh
(Sabang) off Aceh, whose status was indefinite. All these entities were
represented in the RIS Senate, but the RIS also included the capital ter-
ritory of Jakarta and several other smaller unaffiliated territories. The
Republik Indonesia, with borders as at the signing of the Renville
Agreement, held one third of the seats in the federal parliament but in
fact dominated the federation from the start, the remaining negara hav-
ing, with two or three exceptions, little popular support or administrative
strength. With the exception of the Republik Indonesia, the federal states
were dissolved in the course of 1950, and the RIS was dissolved into the
Republik Indonesia on 17 August 1950. See also FEDERALISM; SUC-
CESSION. [0661, 0674, 0679, 0695]

REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN (RMS, Republic of the South Moluc-

cas). Proclaimed on 25 April 1950 by Christian Ambonese, led by Ne-
gara Indonesia Timur (NIT) justice minister C. R. S. Soumokil, who
were dissatisfied with the incorporation of the NIT into the Republik In-
donesia Serikat (RIS). Fighting took place on Ambon and Buru from
July to November 1950 and continued on Seram until 1956, though
Soumokil was not captured until 1963. Moluccan exiles in the Nether-
lands continued to campaign for the RMS, but their energy was dimin-
ished in the late 1980s by agreements permitting the exiles to return to
 REVOLUTION • 373

Indonesia without risk. During the violence in Ambon that followed the
fall of Suharto, the remnant RMS organization in the Netherlands was
allegedly sending financial aid to Protestant relatives in Maluku. De-
spite army claims that they had unearthed RMS weapons caches and
training camps, however, it was unlikely that the RMS organization in
Ambon had revived and was again seeking a separation from Indonesia.
Nevertheless, there was growing disillusionment with Jakarta and some
support for the earlier aims of the RMS. As many as 129 separatist sup-
porters were arrested in April 2003 for actions connected with celebrat-
ing the 53rd anniversary of the declaration of the RMS. See also
KONINKLIJK NEDERLANDSCH INDISCH LEGER. [0782, 0967]

RESIMEN PARA KOMANDO ANGKATAN DARAT (RPKAD, Army

Para-Commando Regiment). Formed in 1956 as part of the army com-
mand’s effort to reduce the power of regional commanders by creating
a mobile strike force under the direct authority of the center. Under
Colonel Sarwo Edhie (1927–1989), the RPKAD played a major role in
the massacres of 1965–1966 in Central Java. Under the names Kopas-
sandha (Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha, Secret Warfare Unit Com-
mand) and Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Unit Com-
mand), it later played a major role in the suppression of dissent in
Papua and East Timor and in the so-called mysterious killings (see
PETRUS) of 1982–1983. See also ARMY; PRABOWO SUBIANTO.
[0714, 0727]

RETOOLING. See MANIFESTO POLITIK.

REVENUE FARMS. See PACHT.

REVOLUTION. The years 1945–1949 are commonly referred to as the

“Revolution” (Revolusi), reflecting both the usage of the time and the per-
ception that the violent change from colonial rule to independence was in-
deed revolutionary. Especially during Guided Democracy, Sukarno
maintained that the Revolution had not been completed in 1949 with the
formal transfer of sovereignty by the Dutch and that not only did the
province of West Irian (see PAPUA) have to be recovered but Indonesia’s
social, political, and economic order also had to be transformed. Under
the New Order, the rhetoric of continuing revolution was soon dropped
and the period 1945–1949 came increasingly to be referred to as the war
of independence (perang kemerdekaan), partly to emphasize the role of
374 • RHINOCEROS

the army in securing independence, partly to avoid the suggestion that

revolutions might be desirable events. [0643, 0661, 0674]

RHINOCEROS. Both the one-horned Javan rhinoceros (Rhinoceros

sondaicus) and the two-horned Sumatran rhinoceros (Dicerorhinus
sumatrensis), once common, have been hunted close to extinction. The
Javan rhino is now restricted to Ujung Kulon, the Sumatran to small
pockets in southern Sumatra and Burma. By 1998 it was believed that
the number of Sumatran rhinoceros had declined to only about 250, and
several zoos in Britain and the United States were returning rhinoceros
to the island in the hopes of increasing the population. Most parts of the
animal were used medicinally, bezoar stones being most highly prized.
Poachers today usually take only the horn. Many roads on Java are said
to follow ancient rhino tracks through dense jungle. [1154]

RIAU (Rhio). Sultanate established on Bintan Island, south of Singapore,

by Sultan Mahmud I of Melaka after the fall of his capital to the Por-
tuguese in 1511. It controlled a fluctuating territory in the Riau archi-
pelago, on the coast of Sumatra and on the Malay Peninsula, and de-
rived its income as an entrepôt. The capital shifted frequently between
the Riau archipelago and Johor on the peninsular mainland, and in 1641
the kingdom joined the Dutch in expelling the Portuguese from Melaka.
After the assassination of Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1685–1699), Riau was
riven by a prolonged civil war. The bendahara (chief minister) of the
kingdom, Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah (?–1721), seized the throne and with
the help of his able younger brother, Tun Mahmud, attempted to concen-
trate trade at Riau. He quickly faced rebellions in Palembang and Perak
and among the Bajau, and he was eventually deposed in 1718 and later
murdered (see SIAK). Bugis mercenaries then gained control of the
hereditary office of Yang di Pertuan Muda, and they effectively domi-
nated the state until it was occupied by the Dutch in 1784. The last inde-
pendent ruler, Mahmud Riayat Syah III (r. 1761–1812), attempted to play
off Bugis, Malay, Dutch, and British interests but was unable to end the
internal chaos.
In 1819, Britain obtained the island of Singapore in the heart of the
kingdom, and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 definitively divided the
former territory of Riau between the two colonial powers, depriving Raja
Ali Haji Ibn Ahmad (1809?–1870?) of office. An accomplished writer,
Raja Ali is best known for his Tuhfat al-Nafis (Gift of the Prophet), which
he expanded from a shorter draft by his father, Raja Ahmad.
 RICE • 375

After independence Riau was incorporated into the province of Cen-

tral Sumatra, but in 1957 it became a separate province embracing the
contrasting ecological regions of mainland Riau (Riau daratan) and is-
land Riau (Riau kepulauan). The majority of its inhabitants were classi-
fied as Malay, though there were large minorities of Minangkabau,
Mandailing, Buginese, and Javanese. Under the centralizing policies of
late Guided Democracy and the New Order, the people of Riau did not
enjoy the fruits of their province’s vast wealth, which provided more
than half of Indonesia’s oil production and possessed significant gas re-
serves as well as large tracts of oil palm and forest. Not only did almost
all of the wealth from these resources flow to Jakarta, but the low edu-
cation standards in the province also meant that the oil companies re-
cruited their employees largely from Java and West Sumatra and not
from the local people. It was estimated that at the turn of the 21st cen-
tury, only 3 percent of Riau natives were college graduates.
Under the 1999 decentralization law the situation drastically
changed, for the provincial and district governments were now to receive
15 percent of the oil revenues, 30 percent of the gas, and 80 percent of
the forestry revenues. In 2001 their budgets multiplied sixfold and were
expected to increase further with the expansion of oil production. In
2003 Riau was divided into two provinces, Mainland Riau and Island
Riau. See MAP 12. [0502, 0550, 0774, 0785, 1386]

RICE (Oryza sativa Poaceae). Wild rice occurs naturally in mainland South-
east Asia, and it was cultivated there perhaps as early as 6000 B.C. It ap-
pears, however, to have entered the archipelago much later, the earliest
known cultivation being at Ulu Leang in Sulawesi around 3500 B.C., prob-
ably because the early varieties were highly sensitive to climatic change
(see MIGRATIONS). It was probably a staple food of Srivijaya but does
not appear on the reliefs of Borobudur, suggesting that other staples, per-
haps including millet, were in use. Rice was certainly well established by
the mid-13th century, but even as late as the 19th century it had not reached
its current status of preferred food for most of the people of the archipelago.
In the late 18th and early 19th century, the colonial government sponsored
a major expansion of wet-rice agriculture, with the expansion of irrigation
and the clearing of land, and in 1905 it began a sustained program to breed
improved varieties. Increasing rice production was also a major aim of the
Japanese occupation government in World War II.
It was initially hoped that production would increase with independence,
and Java actually exported rice to India in 1946, but in the 1950s and 1960s
376 • ROADS

production failed to keep pace with population growth and imports in-
creased, despite the introduction of new varieties developed in the Philip-
pines by the International Rice Research Institute. Promotion of rice pro-
duction became a major program of the New Order, and self-sufficiency
by 1973 was an aim of the first five-year plan (see RENCANA PEM-
BANGUNAN LIMA TAHUN). But outbreaks of wereng (brown plant
hopper) pest appeared in the 1974–1975 season, devastating the rice crop,
and by the late 1970s Indonesia was importing up to one third of the world’s
traded rice. Nevertheless, the introduction of high-yielding varieties, with
their attendant shorter growing cycles and heavy application of fertilizers,
herbicides, and pesticides, helped achieve a rapid increase in rice produc-
tion after 1978. In November 1985 President Suharto announced that rice
self-sufficiency had been achieved. Subsequently, however, rice production
markedly slowed, with its output growing by only 2.5 percent per year be-
tween 1986 and 1995. The drought of 1991 led the government to suspend
its prohibition on rice imports, and a further serious drought in 1997 forced
it to begin again importing rice. After the fall of Suharto, rice production
continued to decline, with figures for 2001 4.45 percent less than those for
2000, due mainly to a decline both in the area harvested and in productiv-
ity. The government estimated that production in 2002 would be 48.65 mil-
lion tons, or a further decline of 1.89 percent. See also AGRICULTURAL
INVOLUTION. [0055, 0295, 0296, 0319, 0331, 0332, 0333, 0341, 0345,
0346, 0353, 0730]

ROADS. These have naturally played a relatively small role in long-distance

communication in the archipelago; even within islands, geographical bar-
riers such as forests, mountains, and swamps tended to make waterborne
communication far more important than overland links. The first road to
run the length of Java was laid by Herman Willem Daendels in the early
19th century, and the colonial authorities began a trans-Sumatra road in
the 20th century. Responsibility for roads was one of the tasks devolved to
the provinces in 1931 (see DECENTRALIZATION), but by the end of
the colonial era Indonesia was still relatively underprovided with asphalted
roads.
Between 1939 and 1959 the length of asphalted roads decreased by
about 20 percent due to lack of investment, while the number of vehicles
on those roads doubled. Plans for the Trans-Sumatra Highway were re-
vived in the early 1960s, but extensive road building did not resume un-
til after 1966, when the World Bank assisted in a number of highway re-
habilitation projects. The Trans-Sumatra and Trans-Sulawesi Highways
 ROTI • 377

were completed in the 1980s (though some sections need major upgrad-
ing), and highways across Kalimantan and Papua were constructed in
the late Suharto period. The fact that Indonesia drives on the left-hand
side of the road (unlike the Dutch) is attributed (perhaps apocryphally)
to the English colonial official Thomas Stamford Raffles. See also
RAILWAYS. [0060, 0357, 0367, 0372, 0977]

ROEM–VAN ROIJEN AGREEMENT. The result of negotiations begun

on 14 April 1949 between J. H. van Roijen, chief of the Netherlands del-
egation, and Mohamad Roem, representing the imprisoned Republican
government of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. The agreement, which
was formally accepted by both sides on 7 May, provided for the Dutch to
release political prisoners and for the Republican leaders to return to
their capital in Yogyakarta. It was also agreed that a Round Table Con-
ference would be held in which Republican representatives together with
those of the Dutch-supported Federal Consultative Assembly (BFO)
would negotiate with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty from the
Netherlands to Indonesia. See also PEMERINTAH DARURAT RE-
PUBLIK INDONESIA (PDRI); SUDIRMAN. [0661, 0674, 0686, 0807]

ROMUSHA (Japanese, “laborer”). Forced laborers drafted from October

1943 by the Japanese occupation authorities especially on Java for
work on defense and other projects not only on Java and Sumatra but
also in many parts of Southeast Asia. Perhaps 200,000–500,000 were
taken to work in appalling conditions with high death rates. Only 70,000
are known to have survived, and many were left stranded in various parts
of the region by the end of World War II. The social dislocation caused
by the removal of romusha from Javanese society contributed both to the
hatred of officials involved in recruiting and to the sense of crisis at the
end of the war. Some regarded Sukarno’s role in recruiting as constitut-
ing a war crime. See also LABOR. [0646, 0649, 0653, 0663]

RONGGOWARSITO, RADEN NGABEI (1802–1873). Court poet of

Surakarta and author of the Paramayoga and the Pustakaraja Purwa,
which describe a mythical history of Java from the time of Adam to the
year 730 A.J. (see CALENDARS). He is generally regarded as the last
of the great Javanese court poets. [0217, 0578]

ROTI. Island near Timor whose people are noted especially for their ex-
tensive use of the lontar palm for food and manufacture. The Dutch
378 • ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

East Indies Company (VOC) signed a treaty with local rulers in 1662
in order to obtain a supply base and a possible refuge in its operations in
the region. Extensive conversion to Christianity took place in the 18th
century, and during the 19th century the Dutch encouraged Christian
Rotinese to settle around Kupang on Timor to create a buffer zone
against the Timorese. Rotinese also moved extensively into administra-
tive posts. [0029, 1220]

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE. Following the Roem–van Roijen

Agreement of 7 May 1949 in which the Dutch and the Indonesian Re-
public agreed to work toward a settlement on the basis of the Renville
Agreement, a Round Table Conference took place in The Hague from 23
August to 2 November 1949 to prepare a formal transfer of sovereignty
to a fully independent Indonesia, draft a constitution for the new state,
and prepare an agreement of Union between the new state and the
Netherlands. The conference was attended by delegates of the Republik
Indonesia; of the Bijeenkomst voor Federale Overleg (Federal Consulta-
tive Meeting), consisting of representatives of the various negara and
daerah (see FEDERALISM); and of the Dutch, with a number of mi-
nority representatives attending as “advisors” to the Dutch delegation. In
part because of pressure from the United States, the Indonesian delega-
tion to the conference agreed to assume the entire internal debt of the
colonial government (approximately US$1.3 billion) as well as $589
million of its external debt. The conference deferred agreement on the
status of West New Guinea (West Irian, Papua), which remained tem-
porarily under Dutch control. Sovereignty over the remainder of the ar-
chipelago was transferred from the Netherlands to the Republik In-
donesia Serikat as a result of the conference. [0661, 0674, 1117]

RUBBER (Hevea brasiliensis Euphorbiaceae). Of Brazilian origin, rubber

was not cultivated in Indonesia until the 1880s, when plantation produc-
tion began in East Sumatra. Production began to expand dramatically in
the 20th century, and the plantations were joined by numerous small-
holders, especially in central and southern Sumatra. Oversupply during
the Depression led to an international production agreement that the
colonial government implemented very much at the expense of small-
holders, but the industry survived to become a major economic pillar for
the Republic in Sumatra during the national Revolution. The cutting off
of rubber by the Japanese occupation had led to the development of
synthetic rubber in the United States, but this did not have a serious im-
 RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RELATIONS WITH • 379

pact on rubber markets until 1960. In 1980 Indonesia signed a further in-
ternational rubber agreement intended to stabilize prices. After the out-
break of AIDS, the rubber industry benefited considerably from the in-
creased demand for rubber gloves and condoms. On 1 January 1989,
Indonesia banned the export of some categories of raw rubber to promote
domestic processing. Falling rubber prices at the turn of the century led
Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia to form a Tripartite Rubber Corpo-
ration in 2002 in an effort to limit supply and so raise prices. Almost im-
mediately, however, rubber prices began to rise, climbing in 2003 to a
seven-year high, with the annual average price of 85¢ per lb on the Sin-
gapore commodity exchange in 2003, up from 47¢ in 2001. [0316, 0317,
0324, 0331, 0332, 0817, 1118, 1170]

RUKUN TETANGGA (lit., neighborhood basis or foundation). Adminis-

trative division below the village level, formed initially during the
Japanese occupation as tonari-gumi and reestablished in 1954, they are
especially important for social control and the marshaling of popular par-
ticipation in government projects. [0663]

RUMPHIUS (Georg Everhard Rumpf) (1628?–1702). Born in Germany,

he was recruited by the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) and in
1653 posted to Ambon. He pioneered botanical investigation of the ar-
chipelago with his posthumously published Herbarium Amboinense (6
vols., 1741–1750), much of which he completed after he fell blind in
1670. He also devised for the Ambonese an improved method of pro-
cessing sago. See also UPAS. [1189]

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RELATIONS WITH. Over the 13 years fol-

lowing the visit of Suharto to the Soviet Union in September 1989, there
were few direct ties between Indonesia and the new Russian Federation,
and total trade between the two countries amounted only to approxi-
mately US$203 million. On 25 September 2002, however, the Indonesian
foreign minister on an official visit to Moscow attended the first session
of the Joint Commission of the Republic of Indonesia–Russian Federa-
tion, where efforts were initiated to strengthen bilateral ties between the
two countries, particularly in the fields of economy and trade but also
with respect to technology, agriculture, and security measures. The com-
mission held a second session in Indonesia the following February, Pres-
ident Megawati Sukarnoputri paid a visit to Russia in April, and that
same month a much-criticized deal was made for Indonesia to buy six
Russian-made combat aircraft.
380 • SABANG TO MERAUKE, FROM

–S–

SABANG TO MERAUKE, FROM. The symbolic dimensions of the In-

donesian Republic. Sabang is a port town on Pulo Weh off the north-
western tip of Sumatra, and Merauke is in the far southeastern corner of
Papua. Used during the Revolution as a simple affirmation of national
unity, the phrase later became an assertion especially of Indonesia’s re-
jection of Dutch control of West New Guinea (Papua).

SABILILLAH (“Way of God”). Auxiliary wing of the Hizbullah during

the Revolution but often forming frontline units in its own right. Many
units joined the Darul Islam in 1948. [0648, 0663, 0693]

SADIKIN, ALI (1927–). Marine commander appointed by Sukarno as

governor of Jakarta in April 1966. Sadikin’s energetic rule transformed
the face of the city: infrastructure such as highways was built, and com-
mercial construction was encouraged. His ruthlessness toward those who
stood in the way of a showcase city (becak drivers, kampung dwellers,
and the like) was somewhat balanced by his efforts to provide services
such as public transport, electricity, and recreation of benefit to much of
the population. His legalization of prostitution and use of lotteries as a
source of city revenues—29 percent of total city revenue in 1968 (see
GAMBLING)—aroused hostility in Islamic circles, but he retired in
1977, one of the most popular figures in the New Order. His association
with the dissident groups who produced the Petition of Fifty was a ma-
jor source of political concern to the Suharto government. See also LE-
GAL AID. [0585, 0733]

SAGO (Metroxylon rumphii and M. sagu and other palms, Arecaceae).

Palm trees found widely in swamps, especially in eastern Indonesia,
where flour prepared from the pith of the trunk is a staple food. Wild and
domestic varieties are indistinguishable and sago was seldom an object
of trade, being mainly consumed by its producers. Only in the early 19th
century was sago briefly in commercial demand for use in sizing cotton,
until it was displaced by maize starch. [0344]

SAILENDRA. A powerful family of Buddhist rulers who arose in Central

Java in the mid-eighth century and adopted the title maharaja (see IN-
DIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH). Their court became a major cen-
ter of Buddhist scholarship, and they were responsible for the construc-
 SALT • 381

tion of Borobudur. Although they almost certainly ruled through a dif-

fuse system of alliances and vassalages, they promoted a largely Indian
doctrine of divine kingship. Through intermarriage, Sailendras also came
to rule Srivijaya in the late ninth century after they had been displaced
on Java.

SALEH, CHAERUL. See CHAERUL SALEH.

SALEH, RADEN (Raden Saleh Bustaman) (1814–1880). After showing

interest in Western culture, especially painting, Raden Saleh was spon-
sored by Governor-General van der Capellan to study art in the Nether-
lands. He came under the influence of Delacroix and lived in Europe for
20 years, becoming royal painter at the Dutch court. On his return to
Java, he was in some demand as a painter of landscapes and portraits.
He is recognized as the first modern native painter in the Indies, and he
influenced the “Beautiful Indies” school whose naturalistic landscapes
and portraiture dominated modern Indonesian art in the first decades of
the 20th century. [0159, 0202]

SALIM GROUP. Incorporated in 1968, the Salim group was successor to

PT Waringin, a trading company that had been granted lucrative official
licenses to export primary products. It was headed by Liem Sioe Liong,
Djuhar Sutanto (Liem Oen Kian), Suharto’s cousin Sudwikatmono, and
Ibrahim Risyad. Its major foreign partners were Datsun and Mazda. The
crown jewel of the Salim group was Bank Central Asia, but this was
taken over by the government after a multibillion-dollar bailout in 1998.
In early 2002, when Indonesia was preparing to seize a majority stake in
the bank, the Salim group tried to buy it back. Of growing importance in
the Salim group’s holdings was Indofood, the world’s largest manufac-
turer of instant noodles, which became one of Indonesian’s leading com-
panies in 2002. See also BANKING. (0314, 0761)

SALT. As an essential for life, salt was manufactured from seawater from very
early times along the coasts of Indonesia and from mineral sources in a few
inland regions; in Grobogan in Central Java, salty mud volcanoes are
tapped, while the Dani in Papua extract it by soaking palm and banana
leaves in saltwater seeps, drying and burning them. The southern coastal re-
gions of Madura and north coast of East Java, however, have long been the
main areas of salt production, local rulers traditionally farming out pachten
to Chinese businessmen. In 1813 Thomas Stamford Raffles established a
382 • SAMA RASA SAMA RATA

government monopoly on salt production and sale, though the operation

was still run through pachten. In 1904 the trade in salt was placed under a
government production and selling agency, the Zout-Regie, whose opera-
tions were combined with those of the state opium monopoly. The salt mo-
nopoly was abolished in 1957, the state salt works becoming a formal state
enterprise in 1960.

SAMA RASA SAMA RATA (lit., “same feeling, same level”). Term coined
by Mas Marco Kartodikromo (?–1932) in 1918 to express the egalitarian
element in nationalist thought. It was modern socialist in its inspiration
but reflected traditional ideas of a “golden age” of justice and prosperity.
See also JOYOBOYO. [0632]

SAMIN MOVEMENT. Peasant movement founded around 1890 by

Surontiko Samin (?–1914) in the Blora area of Central Java. Saminists
attracted Dutch attention by refusing to pay taxes, but their beliefs were
broader, encompassing egalitarianism, individual ownership of land, and
a “religion of Adam” that apparently predated Hindu and Muslim influ-
ence on Java (see ASLI). Samin was exiled in 1907 but the movement
survived until at least the 1960s. [0472, 0486]

SANDALWOOD (Santalum album, Santalaceae, cendana). Small, para-

sitic evergreen tree, probably native to Indonesia, cultivated for its aro-
matic heartwood and root, which are most fragrant in trees growing in
dry, rocky soils. Sandalwood occurs extensively from East Java to
Timor and was exported to China and India for incense, medicines, per-
fumery, and cosmetics. [0339, 0527]

SANGIË (or Sangir) ISLANDS. See MINAHASA.

SANTRI. Term originally referring to a student of any religion (hence pe-

santren) but now commonly used, after Clifford Geertz, for one of the
broad sociocultural groupings or aliran of modern Java, that is, the so-
called pious or orthodox Muslims, also called putihan or white ones, whose
religion contains relatively fewer or no influences from the pre-Muslim tra-
ditions of Java. Like the expression “Outer Islands,” the term is immensely
useful for general discussion but has serious flaws when used for detailed
analysis, largely because the term has been taken from Geertz’s East Java
context and applied to many different cases where Muslims of different de-
grees of orthodoxy face each other. See also ISLAM. [1340]
 SAREKAT ISLAM • 383

SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan, or ethnicity, religion, race, and

intergroup relations). Areas that under the New Order were to be
avoided as topics of public discussion, especially in the field of politics,
in order to limit the possibility of conflict among contending groups.

SAREKAT ISLAM (SI, Islamic Association). Founded in 1909 as Sarekat

Dagang Islam (SDI, Islamic Traders’ Association) by Kyai Samanhudi
(1868–?), a batik manufacturer and merchant from Surakarta, along
with R. M. Tirtoadisuryo and Haji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto, both
priyayi involved in the batik trade. The initial aim of the association was
to combat Chinese penetration of the batik industry, and SDI sponsored
cooperatives among indigenous traders and organized boycotts of the
Chinese. On 10 September 1912 the SDI took the name Sarekat Islam
and adopted a broader political program challenging the colonial gov-
ernment while continuing its promotion of cooperatives and publishing
the nationalist newspaper Oetoesan Hindia (Indies Courier).
SI’s expression of discontent with the colonial order won it wide pop-
ular support, and in 1919 it claimed a membership of 2,000,000, though
its practical following was always far smaller. Its program, however, was
confused. It aimed at the promotion of Islam and of commercial spirit
among Indonesians, but it was also influenced by the anticapitalism of
the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV), many of
whose members, including Semaun, also joined SI. At its first national
congress in June 1916, SI promised cooperation with the colonial gov-
ernment for the good of the country, and in 1918 SI leaders accepted
seats in the Volksraad, but already in 1917 the party had condemned
“sinful” (i.e., exploitative and foreign) capitalism and in 1919 a secret
branch within the SI, called the Afdeling B (Section B), was implicated
in subversive activities in West Java. Arrests and surveillance by the
colonial authorities followed, and much of SI’s following fell away.
Although relatively conservative urban traders initially dominated SI,
more radical Muslim kyai from the villages, together with members of
the ISDV and later the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), had gradually
gained more influence, sharpening the contrast between SI’s Islamic and
Marxist wings. At the Surabaya congress in October 1921, Abdul
Muis and Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954) forced a break with the PKI by
insisting that SI members could belong to no other party. PKI leaders left
the central SI in 1922 and local branches divided into “Red” and “White”
SI according to their allegiances, the Red branches later calling them-
selves Sarekat Rakyat (People’s Unions) and affiliating with the PKI.
384 • SAREKAT RAKYAT

This infighting further damaged SI’s support and by 1923, when

Tjokroaminoto transformed the SI rump into the Partai Sarekat Islam
Indonesia, it was only a minor political force. [0632, 0661]

SAREKAT RAKYAT. See SAREKAT ISLAM.

SASAKS. See LOMBOK.

SAVU (Sawu). Small island in Nusatenggara. As on Roti, the economy

was based on tapping lontar palms. The Dutch signed a treaty with lo-
cal rulers in 1756. Savunese were extensively recruited by the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) as soldiers, and Savunese Christian mi-
grants formed much of the elite in Sumba and Dutch Timor in the 19th
and 20th centuries. The island was devastated by smallpox in 1869.
[1220]

SAWITO KARTOWIBOWO (1932–). In 1976 Sawito prepared a series

of documents, some of which were signed by such eminent figures as
Mohammad Hatta, Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdulkarim Amrullah
(Hamka), Cardinal Darmojuwono, and T. B. Simatupang (1920–1990),
criticizing alleged failures in national development under the New Or-
der and calling on Suharto to resign and hand over power to Hatta.
Though Sawito had no institutional base and no prospect of success, his
challenge was unexpected and unwelcome. The affair was described as a
“constitutional coup” by government spokesmen, and in 1978 Sawito
was convicted of subversion and sentenced to eight years in jail. [0722]

SAYAP KIRI (Left Wing). Semiformal coalition of left-wing parties, the

Partai Sosialis (PS), the Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI), and the Par-
tai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), formed in December 1946. The Sayap
Kiri formed the basis of the Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin cabinets and
pursued a policy of negotiating with the Dutch while building up the Re-
public’s armed forces. Under Sjarifuddin, special favor was given to
semiregular forces such as the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo). In
opposition from January 1948, the parties turned sharply against all ne-
gotiations and coalesced in February into the Front Demokrasi Rakyat
(FDR). [0661, 0674, 0865]

SCANDINAVIA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. The Danish East India

Company traded to Java in the 17th century, maintaining posts at
 SEMARANG • 385

Japara and Banten, and in the same period a great many Scandinavians
served as officials and soldiers with the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC). The great Swedish botanist Carl Linné (Linnaeus, 1701–1778)
worked with Indies plants in Leiden in 1735–1737 and was the first to
cultivate a banana tree to fruit in northern Europe. A number of his stu-
dents, notably Pehr Osbeck (1725–1805), Carl Peter Thunberg
(1743–1832), and Clas Fredrick Hornstedt, made important botanical
collections on Java, in some cases with the cooperation of the Swedish
East India Company. See also LANGE, M. J.

SCOUTING. The Nederlandsch-Indische Padvinders Vereeniging (Nether-

lands Indies Scouting Association) was formed in 1917 as a multiracial
nonpolitical organization along the lines of Robert Baden-Powell’s or-
ganization. Later, however, exclusively Indonesian scouting organiza-
tions, the Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia and Persatuan Pandu Islam, were
formed, especially on Sumatra, as an adjunct to the nationalist move-
ment. Many political organizations had affiliated scouting groups, which
numbered 76 by 1960. In 1961, Sukarno forced all scouting groups to
merge into the Pramuka (Praja Muda Karana). In 1978 Pramuka had a
membership of 7 million.

SEINENDAN. Semimilitary youth corps established by the Japanese oc-

cupation authorities on Java on 29 April 1943 to mobilize young men
aged 14–25 for the war effort, especially in urban areas. Its duties in-
cluded patrol and guard duties, and many Seinendan units later became
the basis for badan perjuangan. See also KEIBODAN. [0663, 0674]

SEMAR. One of the clowns (punakawan) of traditional Javanese wayang.

Foolish and ugly, he is also immensely wise and powerful, representing
in some views the strength of the common people. Though he appears in
the Indian-origin Mahabharata, Semar appears to be an indigenous tra-
dition and during the New Order was sometimes identified with Presi-
dent Suharto. See also SUPERSEMAR. [0132, 0159, 0736]

SEMARANG. Town and entrepôt in north-central Java, ceded by Susuhu-

nan Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703) to the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC) in 1678, an agreement confirmed in 1705. During their 1740 up-
rising, the Chinese besieged the VOC’s headquarters at Semarang, sup-
ported by forces of Pakubuwana II. The VOC retook the town the fol-
lowing year, massacring the Chinese. During the second half of the 18th
386 • SENTRAL ORGANISASI BURUH SELURUH INDONESIA

century and the first half of the 19th century, Semarang was the seat of
the governor of Java’s Northeast Coast, becoming economically the most
important town in central Java and its major center for trade. In 1870 the
Dutch dug a canal connecting it to the sea so that large trading ships
could carry their goods directly to the town. In the late colonial period,
as the headquarters of the railway and tram workers’ union, it became an
important center of the left wing of the Sarekat Islam (SI) under Se-
maun, with 20,000 members in 1917.
At the end of the Japanese occupation in October 1945, it was the
site of bitter conflict between Japanese, Republicans, and British for
control of the town, which left perhaps more than 2,000 Japanese and In-
donesians dead. The Dutch occupied Semarang during their first “Police
Action” of July 1947. [0484, 0632, 0643]

SENTRAL ORGANISASI BURUH SELURUH INDONESIA (SOBSI,

All-Indonesia Federation of Labor Organizations). Founded in Novem-
ber 1946, it was for much of the Revolution the only such coordinating
body for labor unions. Though never formally affiliated with the Partai
Komunis Indonesia (PKI), it was influenced by the party from its foun-
dation and was a part of the broad communist front from 1950, when Ny-
ono Prawiro became president. Although a federation of unions that in-
cluded Sarbupri (plantation workers), SBG (sugar industry workers) and
Sarbuksi (forest workers), it regarded members of its constituent unions
as direct SOBSI members. It was estimated to control 50 to 60 percent
of organized labor, but was shadowed in every field by noncommunist
unions such as those affiliated with the Sentral Organisasi Karyawan
Seluruh Indonesia (SOKSI), which made the organization of strike ac-
tivity difficult. SOBSI was banned in 1966. [0436, 0994]

SENTRAL ORGANISASI KARYAWAN SELURUH INDONESIA

(SOKSI, All-Indonesia Federation of Employee Organizations). Labor
union federation that grew out of the Badan Kerja Sama and worked as
a rival to Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI), es-
pecially on army-controlled plantations. By 1963 it had 146 member or-
ganizations, claimed 7.5 million members, and was one of the core or-
ganizations of Golkar. In 1973 it was absorbed into the Federasi Buruh
Seluruh Indonesia (FBSI). See also KARYAWAN. [0436, 0741]

SERAM (Ceram). Island in central Maluku. The original inhabitants, gen-

erally called Alfurs, were slash-and-burn agriculturalists, sago being a
 SEX, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF • 387

major source of food, but from the 17th century were drawn into limited
trade with the Dutch and other Europeans. Coastal communities began
to convert to Christianity and Islam in this period. The island was
drawn into the Dutch sphere of influence by its proximity to Ambon, but
until the 19th century Dutch involvement was limited to periodic hongi
patrols. After independence, the jungles of Seram became a last refuge
for guerrillas of the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS). [0025, 0607]

SERDANG. Sultanate in East Sumatra, purchased by the Dutch from

Siak in 1884. [0818]

SETIABUDI. See INDISCHE PARTIJ.

SEX, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF. Until the arrival of Islam, sex-

ual prowess was commonly an attribute of political power, both because
rulers could seize or otherwise acquire sexual partners (see MAR-
RIAGE, POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF) and because local under-
standing of Tantric doctrines intimately linked intercourse with the re-
lease of energy. The lingga, or phallic monument, was an important
token of rulership. Prolific sexual activity could be both a sign of abun-
dant power and a wasteful dissipation of power, and the downfall of
kingdoms was held to be associated with a rise in licentiousness. Islam
and Christianity regarded sexual promiscuity as morally wrong, rather
than a waste of energy, though the burden of chastity was placed more
heavily on women than on men, encouraging the rise of professional
prostitution on the one hand and varying degrees of seclusion of “re-
spectable” women on the other.
Only in the 20th century, however, did sexual scandal in the contem-
porary sense emerge. Colonial society in Batavia was shaken by revela-
tions of homosexuality in the 1930s, and during Guided Democracy
Sukarno’s sexual activity was widely deplored by strict Christians and
Muslims. Some Western observers argued that Sukarno was simply be-
having as a pre-Muslim ruler and described the tall national monument
(Monas) in central Jakarta as a lingga. False accusations of gross licen-
tiousness among members of the left-wing women’s organization Ger-
akan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani) were used in 1965–1966 to help dis-
credit the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), while under the New
Order rumors of marital infidelity among members of the ruling elite
were taken by some as a sign of moral exhaustion. See also PALAPA.
[0576, 1427, 1430]
388 • SHAHBANDAR

SHAHBANDAR. Senior official, often of foreign descent, in charge of

port and trade affairs in traditional states of the archipelago. [0550]

“SHARED POVERTY.” Term coined by American anthropologist Clif-

ford Geertz to describe what he saw as social arrangements that discour-
aged the formation of capital and the development of commercial elites
in Javanese villages by having the wealthy provide income-earning op-
portunities to the poor. According to Geertz (1963),
Under the pressure of increasing numbers and limited resources, Javanese
village society did not bifurcate, as did that of so many other “underdevel-
oped” nations, into a group of large landlords and a group of oppressed near
serfs. Rather it maintained a comparatively high degree of social and eco-
nomic homogeneity by dividing the economic pie into a steadily increasing
number of minute pieces, a process to which I have referred elsewhere as
“shared poverty.” (p. 97)
A characteristic institution of shared poverty is the open harvest, in
which all can participate and receive a part of what they gather.
Debate on shared poverty, which forms an integral part of Geertz’s
idea of agricultural involution, has focused on the extent and signifi-
cance of social differentiation in rural Java. Extensive landholdings are
absent, but there is a sharp contrast between landed peasants (especially
village officials) and others (see LAND). The practices Geertz identifies
as promoting shared poverty, moreover, seem to be under constant chal-
lenge by wealthier farmers attempting to increase their share of village
wealth. See also CLASS ANALYSIS; DESA. [0328]

SHELL, ROYAL DUTCH. See “KONINKLIJKE”; OIL.

SHIPPING. From early times until the 17th century, there was a large in-
digenous shipping industry in the Indonesian archipelago. Vessels of up
to 500 metric tons were built of teak and sailed the trade routes of the
region. The term “junk,” later used for Chinese vessels, derives from the
Javanese jong. After the 17th century the size of locally built vessels,
generally called prau (perahu), declined to 100 metric tons or less.
In 1825 a steam ship called the van der Capellan was built in
Surabaya to provide a regular government-funded postal service from
Java to other islands, but in 1864–1865 the mail contract was awarded
to a private British-owned firm, the Netherlands Indies Steam Naviga-
tion Co. The NISN had a virtual monopoly of interisland shipping until
 SHIPPING • 389

1890, when it lost the mail contract to the Dutch-owned Koninklijk

Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM). With the opening of the Suez Canal
in 1869, regular steamship services to the Netherlands were provided by
the Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland from 1870.
In the 20th century, interisland shipping was dominated by the KPM,
though there was some scope for small operators (the so-called mosquito
fleet), to run feeder services to the major KPM lines. In 1935 the KPM
founded the Celebes Kustvaart Maatschappij to meet competition from
these feeder services. Under the 1936 Shipping Law, only East Sumatra
was opened to foreign carriers and was serviced primarily by firms from
Singapore and Penang.
Interisland shipping declined dramatically during World War II with
Japanese requisition of ships and destruction of vessels by Allied sub-
marines. From early 1947, the Dutch navy blockaded Republican re-
gions to prevent the export of produce allegedly originating from Dutch-
owned plantations. At independence, control of interisland shipping was
a major item on the Republic’s economic agenda, and plans were laid for
a state shipping enterprise that would exclude the KPM. The Central
Shipowning Authority (Pemilikan Pusat Kapal-Kapal, Pepuska) was
formed on 6 September 1950 to take over government-owned feeder ser-
vices and to purchase vessels for lease to indigenous competitors of the
KPM (see INDONESIANIZATION). On 28 April 1952, Pelayaran Na-
sional Indonesia (Pelni, Indonesian National Shipping) took over the as-
sets of Pepuska and soon began to run vessels in direct competition with
the KPM. By 1956, Pelni carried about 25 percent of total interisland
tonnage, though an important part of this was government cargoes.
The seizure of KPM assets on 3 December 1957, officially ratified on
10 December, removed important competition for Pelni, but commercial
shipping declined on the whole during Guided Democracy as planta-
tion production diminished, infrastructure deteriorated, and trading op-
erations came increasingly into the hands of military business opera-
tions. By March 1963, one third of the commercial interisland fleet was
said to be in the hands of the armed forces, both for military purposes
and for the military trading operations. Rehabilitation of interisland
shipping, especially of ports, was a priority in the New Order’s first
Five-Year Development Plan (see RENCANA PEMBANGUNAN
LIMA TAHUN). In 1984 the government banned ship purchases from
abroad in order to encourage local shipbuilding; the local industry, how-
ever, was unable to meet the demand and the ban was partially lifted in
1988. In 1996 the government allowed 1,000 boats to be imported over
390 • SIAK

four years, but the terms for buying or leasing these boats were so oner-
ous (including the need to be already operating three other vessels) that
few people were able to take advantage of the import relaxation. [0076,
0463, 0464, 0615]

SIAK (Siak Sri Indrapura). Not to be confused with Indrapura, this dynasty
in Sumatra was founded in 1718 by Raja Kecil (or Kecik), a Minangk-
abau who revolted against Sultan Abdul Jalil Riayat Syah of Riau and es-
tablished a polity on Sumatra’s east coast, independent of Johor. In the
18th century Siak became a powerful regional state, controlling the sul-
tanates of Deli, Langkat, and Serdang. Control over timber allowed the
Siak elite to gain benefits from their trading partners in Melaka or Penang
and to persuade the Dutch to allow them direct access to the rice and salt
trade from Java without compensating the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC). The Dutch signed a political contract with the sultan in 1858, on
the strength of which they seized control of these northern dependencies.
The last sultan, Ismail, was forced to abdicate in 1864. [0441, 0778]

SIAM, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Extensive trading contact between

Siam and Indonesia began in the 13th century with the export of Thai ce-
ramics, and for the next four centuries Siam was part of the general trad-
ing world of the archipelago, exporting rice, tin, iron, sugar, and cloth.
In the 17th century, the kingdom of Ayudhya extended its influence far
down the Malay Peninsula and onto the east coast of Sumatra, estab-
lishing a tributary relationship with some local kingdoms that was ex-
pressed in the sending of a bunga mas, or golden flower, to the Thai ruler.
See also SOUTH EAST ASIA LEAGUE; THAILAND.

SILIWANGI. Reputed first king of Pajajaran, his name was later applied
to the West Java division of the Indonesian army, formed in May 1946.
Shaped by its first commander, A. H. Nasution, the Siliwangi was the
most Westernized and conventional division of the army during the Rev-
olution. It was unable to prevent the Dutch from overrunning much of
West Java in the first “Police Action” in 1947, and after the signing of the
Renville Agreement 22,000 Siliwangi troops were ordered to retreat
from guerrilla strongholds in West Java to Republican Central Java.
There, they became a major pillar of the Mohammad Hatta government
and took part in the suppression of the Madiun Affair, with many of their
officers being sent to head units in other parts of Republican territory.
 SINGAPORE • 391

SILK. Produced in Wajo’ in South Sulawesi and northern Sumatra (see

PASAI) from perhaps the 13th century, silk was for a time exported to
India. Production declined, however, in the 17th century with the grow-
ing export of fine silk from China. The Dutch attempted to establish the
cultivation of silk on Java after 1700, but without success. In 1934,
Japanese entrepreneurs established a small industry in Minahasa, ex-
porting cocoons to Japan for processing. After the 1960s, production
was revived in Soppeng (South Sulawesi). [0045]

SINGAPORE. Port city on an island at the southern tip of the Malay

Peninsula, part of the kingdom of Riau until the 19th century. In 1819
Thomas Stamford Raffles founded a British settlement there. Exempt
from customs duties (state revenues came largely from a lucrative opium
monopoly) and protected from piracy by the British navy, Singapore
grew rapidly as a major trade center for the archipelago, facing little
competition from the Dutch, whose attentions were focused on Java and
the Cultivation System. From the 1880s the Dutch, concerned over the
concentration of trade on Singapore, introduced a variety of measures
(e.g., preferential tariffs) to encourage direct shipments to Europe. Sin-
gapore’s influence was reduced, though it remained, along with Penang,
the principal port for Sumatra.
From 1921, the British naval base in Singapore became a central ele-
ment in Dutch defense policy in the Indies, and the fall of Singapore to
Japanese forces in February 1942 made the loss of the Netherlands In-
dies inevitable. During the Indonesian Revolution, trade in plantation
products and opium to Singapore was a major source of finance for the
Republic, especially on Sumatra. From 1950, however, Indonesian gov-
ernments sought once more to direct trade away from Singapore.
From 1989 Singapore began to promote economic relationships with
regions of Indonesia, particularly Batam and Bintan Islands, but also
parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. Through these so-called growth trian-
gles, local governments in Indonesia provided manpower and facilities
while private companies in Singapore put up capital for establishing
labor-intensive industries in these regions. Batam and Bintan provided
Singapore with cheap land and labor and the opportunity to develop a
manufacturing hinterland. Singapore also invested widely in Indone-
sia’s telecommunications industry, purchasing shares in the phone
company Indosat (Indonesia satellite) in December 2002. See also
SHIPPING.
392 • SINGASARI

SINGASARI. Kingdom in eastern Java founded in 1222 by Ken Angrok.

It marked the end of the division of Java that followed the rule of Air-
langga and the start of a period of rich cultural development on Java, es-
pecially the closer blending of Hindu-Buddhism and local folk religion.
The last ruler of Singasari, Kertanegara (r. 1268–1292), annexed Bali
and Madura and sought to expand his rule to parts of Kalimantan and
Sumatra (see JAMBI). After envoys from Kublai Khan demanded that
Singasari accept closer Chinese suzerainty, Kertanegara expelled them
from the kingdom in 1289. In 1292, while the Singasari army was on its
way to Sumatra on a military expedition, Kertanegara was deposed and
killed by prince Jayakatwang of Kediri. See also CHINA, HISTORI-
CAL LINKS WITH; MAJAPAHIT.

SISINGAMANGARAJA. A line of Batak holy kings originating proba-

bly in the 16th century. The first of these was revered as a reincarnation
of Batara Guru, the Batak high god. Usually defined as priest kings, their
special importance lay in maintaining stable relations between the Batak
and outside worlds, expressed in terms of symbolic vassalship to Aceh.
In 1825, however, Muslim Minangkabau overran southern Tapanuli,
and Sisingamangaraja X emerged as a leader of the armed resistance,
though he was killed in the struggle. As Dutch power in the region grew,
along with Christian missionary activity, Sisingamangaraja XI and XII
became foci of anticolonial resistance. Sisingamangaraja XII led a revolt
against the Europeans in 1878 but was defeated and killed in 1883.

SJAFRUDDIN PRAWIRANEGARA (1911–1989). After studying law in

Jakarta, Sjafruddin worked in the colonial, Japanese, and Republican
departments of finance and for a time as Republican finance minister. He
was a prominent member of the modernist wing of the Masjumi and in
December 1948, after the Second “Police Action,” he became prime
minister of the Emergency Government of the Indonesian Republic (Pe-
merintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, PDRI) in Sumatra. He was fi-
nance minister again in the Mohammad Hatta and Mohammad Natsir
governments, and he introduced a system of multiple exchange rates for
the rupiah (see CURRENCY). As governor of the Bank of Indonesia
from 1951 to 1958, he was a strong opponent of the Benteng Policy on
the grounds that most Indonesians were in the agricultural sector and
were not ready for accelerated industrialization.
In December 1957, Sjafruddin fled to Sumatra and joined the regional
rebellion, becoming prime minister of the PRRI/Permesta govern-
 SJAHRIR, SUTAN • 393

ment; he returned to Jakarta under an amnesty in 1961 but was jailed un-
til Suharto came to power. Initially a supporter of the New Order, he
grew unhappy with its policies toward Islam, particularly its attempts to
control the haj, and also with the extent of corruption in the govern-
ment. In 1980 he signed the Petition of Fifty and in 1983 he published
an open letter to Suharto protesting the government order that all or-
ganizations accept the Pancasila as their sole foundation. [0661, 0686,
0695, 1040]

SJAHRIR, SUTAN (1909–1966). Born in West Sumatra, he studied in

the Netherlands where he became a member of the Perhimpunan In-
donesia (PI). He returned to Indonesia in December 1931, preceding
Mohammad Hatta, and acting as his agent he founded the Pendidikan
Nasional Indonesia or PNI-Baru, which aimed at building up a nation-
alist cadre in preparation for a prolonged independence struggle. Ar-
rested in 1934, he was exiled first to Boven Digul and then in 1936 to
Banda. He was returned to Java in January 1942 at the time of the
Japanese invasion.
Sjahrir refused to cooperate with the Japanese, building instead a net-
work of young intellectuals who became the basis for the later Partai
Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). After the declaration of independence in
1945, he campaigned strongly against the preservation of occupation-era
institutions, such as the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta) and the Partai Na-
sional Indonesia—Staatspartij, within the Republic. Operating through
the Working Committee of the Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat
(KNIP), he was able to convert the Republic’s nascent political system
to the principle of parliamentary accountability and on 14 November
1945 became its first prime minister, with Amir Sjarifuddin as his
deputy. His strong espousal of diplomatic means for dealing with the
Dutch, however, soon made Sjahrir unpopular, and he was strongly op-
posed by Tan Malaka and the Persatuan Perjuangan (PP). His cabi-
nets fell three times over the issue, and on 27 June 1946 he was briefly
arrested by opposition troops. Displaced by Amir in June 1947, Sjahrir
went abroad to argue the Republic’s case at the United Nations but re-
turned to be an advisor to Sukarno and was captured by the Dutch in the
second “Police Action.” He led the PSI throughout the 1950s, presiding
over its disastrous performance in the 1955 elections. Sukarno had
Sjahrir arrested in 1962 but permitted him to leave for medical treatment
in Switzerland in 1965, where he died the following year. [0661, 0674,
0865, 0916, 0932, 0933]
394 • SLAVERY

SLAVERY. Although definitions are contentious, most societies of the ar-

chipelago recognized slavery in the form of hereditary transferable own-
ership of human beings. Labor was a scarce commodity and slaves were
both a means to and a store of wealth, though they were used mainly in
domestic and commercial service, other forms of bondage such as corvée
being more important for agriculture and the construction of monu-
ments (see HERENDIENSTEN). “Free” labor, in the sense of indepen-
dent manual workers available for hire for a day or longer, seems to have
been virtually unknown; casual labor was obtained by renting slaves
from their owners. People entered the status of slavery generally as a re-
sult either of indebtedness or of capture in warfare, though servitude
could also be inherited. Tribal people such as those of Nias, Sumba,
Maluku, Papua, and upland Sumatra were most commonly victims of
slave trading, though Java was a major slave exporter in 1500 and Bali
was an important source to the 19th century. Slavery incurred certain ad-
vantages, such as exemption from corveé duties for rulers, and it was not
unknown for people to sell themselves into bondage, though slaves em-
ployed in small-scale manufacture and mining often lived in appalling
conditions. Movement out of slavery was sometimes possible by re-
demption, manumission, or simply gradual assimilation to the status of
free servant.
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) was a major trader in
slaves, which it employed for general laboring tasks and in agriculture.
In 1673 half the population of Batavia was said to be slave, and an elab-
orate set of rules formally governed their working conditions. The colo-
nial government banned trade in slaves on Java in 1818, but did not an-
nounce until 1854 that slavery would be abolished in the directly ruled
territories by 1860, and did not issue an ordinance to this effect until 1
July 1863. A continuing obstacle to effective abolition, however, was the
existence, especially in South Sulawesi, of debt slavery, a blurred form
of servitude difficult to regulate, and full-scale slave trading continued in
parts of eastern Indonesia until at least 1910. See also BUTON; COOLIE
ORDINANCE. [0407, 0413, 0434, 0452, 0576, 0833]

SMALLPOX. A major disease in Indonesia, repeatedly introduced through

the centuries by trading contacts with the Eurasian land mass. Severe
epidemics swept Ternate in 1558, Ambon in 1564, Sumatra in
1780–1783, Savu in 1869, and Java, Kalimantan, and Sumatra in
1918–1924. In 1815, shortly after the development of vaccination, the
Netherlands Indies government sent a surgeon to Martinique in the West
 SOEDJATMOKO MANGOENDININGRAT • 395

Indies with a number of slave children. One of these children was inoc-
ulated there with the vaccine and the surgeon carried out successive in-
oculations of the other children during the voyage, so that the vaccine
reached Java live. A similar technique was initially used to spread the
vaccine through the colony, until the development of air-dried vaccine.
Colonial officials estimated that 25 percent of the population of Java
was vaccinated by 1835. Production of vaccine from cattle began in
1884 at a Parc Vaccinogène, which merged in 1895 with the Pasteur In-
stitute. Although never compulsory, vaccination was a condition of en-
try to lower schools. In 1968, the World Health Organization launched a
mass vaccination program in Indonesia. The last recorded case of the dis-
ease in the archipelago was in 1972. [0576]

SNOUCK HURGRONJE, CHRISTIAAN (1857–1936). From 1891 he

was advisor to the colonial government on Aceh and from 1889 advisor
on Islamic and indigenous affairs. He brought lasting change to colonial
policy on Islam, arguing that the religion was not inherently opposed to
colonial rule and that the bitter opposition of many Muslims to the Dutch
could be assuaged if, instead of opposing all manifestations of Islam, the
colonial government protected and promoted religious observance while
suppressing only Islamic political movements. His advice led to the es-
tablishment of an extended network of state-employed religious officials.
Snouck believed that support for Islam should be paired with a vigorous
introduction of Western secular culture to the Indonesian elite (the Asso-
ciation Principle) in order to create a modern elite that would share with
the Dutch the task of ruling the colony. He also advocated abolition of
the separate European and native hierarchies within the Binnenlandsch
Bestuur. His advice that the colonial authorities should cultivate the tra-
ditional aristocracy (uleëbalang) in the war in Aceh also contributed to
the eventual Dutch victory there. After his departure from Indonesia,
Snouck continued to influence colonial policy as professor of Indology
at Leiden University (1907–1927), where he played a major role in train-
ing colonial civil servants. See also ETHICAL POLICY; RELIGION
AND POLITICS. [0590, 1018, 1261]

SOEDJATMOKO MANGOENDININGRAT (1922–1989). One of in-

dependent Indonesia’s most respected intellectuals, Soedjatmoko was
the eldest son of a Javanese physician. He entered medical school in
Jakarta during the Japanese occupation, but was expelled in 1943
possibly because of his contacts with noncooperating political leaders,
396 • SOLO

including Sutan Sjahrir. After independence he became a member of

the Partai Sosialis (PS), and in British-occupied Jakarta in 1946 he
published a Dutch-language weekly, Het Inzicht. From 1947 to 1950,
he served on the Republic’s observer delegation to the United Na-
tions. He remained close to Sjahrir and was the Partai Sosialis In-
donesia (PSI)’s major intellectual and historian, founding its daily Pe-
doman in 1952 and representing the party in the Constituent
Assembly (1956–1959).
After Sjahrir’s death and the crises of 1965–1966, Soedjatmoko’s in-
terest shifted to foreign affairs, and Suharto appointed him ambassador
to the United States in 1968. In 1980 he was appointed rector of the
United Nations University in Tokyo, where he served until 1987.

SOLO. See SURAKARTA.

SOLOR ARCHIPELAGO. Consists of the islands of Solor, Adonara, and

Lomblen, at the eastern end of Nusatenggara. They were listed in the
Nagarakrtagama as a dependency of Majapahit but by the 16th century
were under the influence of Ternate. The archipelago became a shelter
for European ships en route to Timor for beeswax and sandalwood, and
the Portuguese established a fortress on Solor in 1566. A strong politi-
cal division developed between the Catholic Demonara (Demong) com-
munities, who generally supported the Portuguese, and the Muslim Puji,
who supported the Dutch, though neither group ever formed a single
state in its own right. The Portuguese largely abandoned the islands in
1653 but only in 1859 were they handed definitively to the Dutch as part
of a general tidying of colonial boundaries in the region. Effective Dutch
rule through the rajas of Adonara and Larantuka was established only in
the late 19th century. [0491]

SOUTH EAST ASIA LEAGUE. The first initiative for regional coopera-
tion between the independent states of Southeast Asia, the league was
founded in Bangkok in 1947 and brought together representatives of
Burma, Indonesia, Siam (Thailand), and Vietnam. Its aim was to pro-
mote the decolonization of Southeast Asia (and, in Thailand’s case, to re-
sist British encroachment on its sovereignty). It seems to have been an
initiative especially of the Thai Prime Minister Pridi Panomyong and dis-
appeared after his fall and that of Amir Sjarifuddin. See also FOREIGN
POLICY.
 SOYA BEAN • 397

SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH. Suspicious of Republican lead-

ers’ cooperation with the Japanese and more interested in European af-
fairs, the Soviet Union paid little attention to the Indonesian Republic in
its first years. Only after Amir Sjarifuddin became prime minister did
relations become closer and in January 1948 an Indonesian envoy,
Suripno, negotiated a consular treaty with the USSR that was, however,
repudiated by the incoming Mohammad Hatta government, anxious not
to appear aligned with communists. Relations cooled more sharply when
the USSR endorsed the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in the Ma-
diun Affair, and diplomatic relations were not established until 1953.
The USSR backed Indonesia over the West Irian (Papua) dispute and be-
came a major arms supplier from 1956; after 1960, Indonesia was the
largest noncommunist recipient of Soviet bloc military aid. Relations
cooled again, however, with the Soviet–United States detente and as In-
donesia’s Nekolim doctrine drew it closer to China.
The PKI’s swing toward China and the fact that Indonesia owed circa
US$1 billion (later rescheduled) muted Soviet criticism of the Suharto
government’s suppression of the Left after 1965, while Indonesia culti-
vated ties to preserve the appearance of nonalignment in its foreign pol-
icy. After the establishment of a Soviet naval base in Cam Ranh Bay in
Vietnam in 1975, however, Indonesia criticized the Soviet Union for
bringing great power rivalries into the region, and it was also hostile to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
From the early 1980s, Indonesia shared with the Soviet Union a desire
not to see the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge displace the Vietnamese-
backed Hun Sen government in Cambodia. Steadily improving relations
culminated in an economic protocol between the two countries signed on
29 October 1985, a visit by President Suharto to Moscow in September
1989, and a relaxation of Indonesian restrictions on Soviet trade and vis-
its. On 11 January 1990, a Soviet state enterprise signed an agreement with
Liem Sioe Liong to establish a palm oil processing plant near Moscow.
See also DEBT, INTERNATIONAL; MURBA; RUSSIA. [1113, 1128]

SOYA BEAN (Glycine max Fabaceae, kedele). Seed crop probably from
northeast Asia, which reached Indonesia via India. It is a major polow-
ijo crop and is used to prepare a number of important foods. Tahu (tofu,
bean curd) is made by grinding the beans and heating them in water to
precipitate casein, which is then pressed into cakes; tempe is made by in-
oculating parboiled beans with the fungus Aspergillus oryzae; and kecap
398 • SPAIN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH

(soy sauce) is made by inoculating boiled beans with Aspergillus, sub-

merging the fermented mass in brine, exposing it to sunlight, and adding
flavors such as aren sugar, anise, and ginger. Contamination of soya
beans with aflatoxins (from A. flavus) is a major cause of stomach can-
cer in Indonesia.

SPAIN, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Although Magellan’s fleet sailed

through the Indonesian archipelago in 1521, it was not until after the
union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns in 1580 that the Spanish
began to move south seriously from their base in the Philippines. Be-
tween 1582 and 1603 they sent a series of largely unsuccessful expedi-
tions against Ternate, but in the 17th century Spanish attention soon
shifted back north to the Philippines. Many useful plants of American
origin reached Indonesia on Spanish ships. See AMERICAS, HISTORI-
CAL LINKS WITH.

SPELLING. See INDONESIAN LANGUAGE.

SRIVIJAYA. Buddhist kingdom centered on the modern city of Palem-

bang in southern Sumatra and dominating the Strait of Melaka from the
seventh to early 11th centuries. In its day the most powerful state in the
archipelago, Srivijaya’s position was derived from its role as an entrepôt
for gold and forest products such as benzoin from the region, as a stag-
ing post in trade between China and eastern Indonesia on the one hand
and India and the West on the other, as well as from its naval control of
the Strait. It transformed the haphazard piracy of earlier eras into more
regular taxation of trade, which greatly smoothed commerce in the re-
gion. Relatively little is known of Srivijaya’s internal political structure;
the grandiloquent assertions of divine authority made by its rulers are not
plausible as reflections of reality (see SAILENDRAS). Srivijaya seems
likely to have been a carefully managed system of alliances with coastal
chiefs and upland tribes rather than a centralized bureaucratic state. Al-
though fabulously wealthy by accounts of the time, Srivijaya has left few
material remains: in the absence of easily obtainable building stone, most
of its construction seems to have been in wood and has not survived.
The precise nature of Srivijaya’s relationship with China is also un-
clear. The Chinese regarded it as tributary and its prosperity was closely
tied to that of the ports of southern China, but whether Srivijaya ac-
knowledged the relationship as tributary is unknown. Srivijaya main-
tained important cultural links with India, especially with the Buddhist
 STATE ENTERPRISES • 399

monastery at Nalanda in Bihar, and was itself a major center of Buddhist

learning (see BUDDHISM). Srivijaya’s power was abruptly smashed in
1027 by a raid from the South Indian Chola dynasty. The empire’s capi-
tal moved to Jambi, but it was overshadowed by the rise of independent
kingdoms in northern Sumatra and on the Malay Peninsula (see PA-
SAI). The inability of any state to revive Srivijaya’s hegemony may re-
late to the rise of Chinese “private” as opposed to tributary trade. See
also STATE-FORMATION. [0023, 0514, 0522, 0531, 0542–0545]

STAATSPARTIJ. See PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA.

STATE ENTERPRISES. Since the arrival of the Dutch East Indies

Company (VOC) in the archipelago, there has been an intimate connec-
tion between the state and business enterprise. The company itself was
an enterprise with an attached state, rather than the reverse, while the
early years of Crown rule, especially the Cultivation System, were
largely an example of the direct commercial activity of the colonial state.
Private firms such as the Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij (NHM)
benefited greatly from close cooperation with the colonial government
but were not true state enterprises.
Distinct state enterprises first emerged in the 20th century. In 1921, the
colonial government launched the Nederlandsch-Indische Aardolie
Maatschappij, a joint venture with the BPM to drill for oil in Jambi. The
idea that some separation should be made between the state and its com-
mercial ventures was only given legal expression in 1927 with the Indis-
che Bedrijvenwet (Indies Enterprises Law), which allowed the govern-
ment to separate commercial enterprises from the state budget. This was
then applied to the opium factory; the pawnshops; the government qui-
nine and tea industries; the ports of Belawan, Makassar, and Emma-
haven (Teluk Bayur); the posts and telegraph service (see POSTAL
SERVICE; TELEGRAPH); the Bangka tin industry; the military
grasslands; and the reproduction section of the topographical service.
Under the Japanese occupation, some existing enterprises were
handed over to Japanese commercial interests (see SUGAR CANE), but
many were placed under government departments as a source of direct fi-
nance. This system remained in place in practice during the Indonesian
Revolution, when plantations in particular came under the control of lo-
cal armed units. The Republican government set up a number of central-
ized state corporations, including the Badan Textiel Negara and the Badan
Industri Negara, but these suffered from a critical shortage of capital and
400 • STATE-FORMATION

were often unable to take charge of the factories they nominally con-
trolled as these were in the hands of the workers or of lasykar or army
groups. More successful was the semigovernmental Banking and Trading
Corporation (BTC) of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, which traded produce
to Singapore and the United States.
After 1950, successive governments were determined to establish a
significant publicly owned sector in the economy. Railways and the
Java Bank were nationalized, and the Bank Industri Negara helped fi-
nance new state corporations in the fields of shipping, air services (see
GARUDA), textiles, cement, glass, automobile, and hardboard manu-
facture. In 1956, a state trading corporation, USINDO, was formed to
handle the export of goods from these factories. With the nationaliza-
tion of Dutch enterprises in December 1957, the state sector expanded
dramatically. In April 1958, nationalized Dutch trading firms were reor-
ganized into six new state trading corporations with a joint monopoly on
the import of many commodities, including rice and textiles. Fifty-five
percent of profits from these firms were owed to the state, but proceeds
were generally disappointing due to corruption and deterioration of in-
frastructure. A central authority, the Badan Pimpinan Umum, was placed
in charge of state enterprises in 1960.
Under the New Order, this extensive state presence in the economy
was preserved, despite Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
(IGGI) preferences for private ownership, partly because of a lack of do-
mestic capital to take them over, partly because they were an important
source of income and a useful tool for state intervention in the economy.
The largest state enterprises in the 1980s were Pertamina; the tin firm
PN Timah; PN Aneka Tambang, which conducts general mining opera-
tions; and Perhutani (formerly Inhutani), the state forestry corporation.
Public utilities, of course, are also state enterprises, as are the largest
banks and two major manufacturing firms, PT Krakatau Steel and the
fertilizer producer PT Pusri.
In 1986, influenced by analyses reporting that 92 of the 189 state enter-
prises were economically unsound, President Suharto announced plans
for privatization. From 1989, state enterprises were permitted to sell 20
percent of their shares to the public, but progress was slow and by 1994
only the cement manufacturer P. T. Semen Gresik was listed on the Jakarta
Stock Exchange. See also INDONESIANIZATION. [0311, 0351, 0695]

STATE-FORMATION. The boundary between tribal and other “primi-

tive” political formations on the one hand and states on the other is an ar-
 STOCK EXCHANGE • 401

bitrary one, but most scholars regard true states as having emerged in the
archipelago only as part of the adoption and transformation of Indian,
and later Islamic and Western, political ideas. Thus the earliest states in
the western archipelago (“Ho-lo-tan,” “Kan-t’o-li,” and Kutai) were
culturally Indian in at least some respects and were probably stimulated
at least in part by the emergence of trade between Indonesia and India
around the fifth century.
Information on these early states allows us to say that they consisted
of court bureaucracies that rested on carefully constructed networks of
alliances with regional power holders (see BUPATI), but the relative
strength of court and “feudal” lords is hard to judge, even apart from the
fact that it must have varied significantly over time. The longevity of a
state such as Srivijaya and the internal organization required by the Ja-
vanese states that constructed Borobudur and Prambanan suggest a
significant degree of institutionalization, but other evidence suggests
highly personalized rule and the distinction between king, vassal, and
bandit leader seems to have been a fluid one (see BANDITRY;
PIRACY). In contrast, the strong bureaucratic structure of the Dutch
East Indies Company (VOC) gave it an organizational coherence and
resilience that enabled it ultimately to subdue the entire archipelago. See
also SUCCESSION. [0529, 0716]

STATISTICS. The Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek was established in

1924, and its work was continued after independence by the Biro Pusat
Statistik (BPS, Central Bureau of Statistics). In 1997 a nondepartmental
Indonesian government institution, the Badan Pusat Statistiek (BPS,
Central Statistical Body), was established, directly responsible to the
president, to provide statistical data to the government and the public.
See also CENSUSES.

STOCK EXCHANGE. The Jakarta Stock Exchange was established in

1977 but for its first 10 years of operation was largely used by the gov-
ernment to promote Indonesianization. In late 1988 only 24 companies
were listed on the exchange. This changed dramatically in 1990 when
Suharto approved proposals from the technocrats to let foreigners pur-
chase up to 49 percent of the listed shares of an Indonesian-owned com-
pany. By 1995, the number of firms listed on the stock exchange had in-
creased to 238 while the number of listed shares had risen from 60
million to 46 billion. In early 1996 the exchange was capitalized at $67
billion at the current exchange rate.
402 • STRIKES

The 1997 financial crisis sparked a drastic downturn in the stock mar-
ket as investors sold their stock to buy foreign currencies, a move that
accelerated after the government floated the rupiah on 14 August. In the
subsequent five months, stock market prices shrank at one point to half
their previous value. [0353, 0385]

STRIKES. See LABOR UNIONS.

STUDENTS. Students played a major role in Indonesia’s 20th century his-

tory, alongside other pemuda groups, most notably in the anti-Dutch in-
dependence struggle and in the demonstrations that helped drive
Sukarno from power, the latter in alliance with the army. In 1965–1966
they formed the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI), which
encompassed both Islamic student organizations, such as Himpunan
Mahasiswa Islam (HMI), and a few secular student organizations that
had severed any former ties with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).
Students were early outspoken supporters of the Suharto regime,
which appointed several of the KAMI leaders to government posts. But
by the early 1970s, student dissatisfaction with the New Order led them
to spearhead protests against its growing authoritarianism and the ram-
pant corruption that was beginning to characterize it. The government at-
tempted to co-opt the students by establishing in 1973 the Komite Na-
sional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI, Indonesian Youth National Committee),
led by a former KAMI leader David Napitupulu. Affiliated with Golkar
and close to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
and Ali Murtopo, the KNPI was intended as a youth labor union, with
the sole right to represent Indonesian youth in political and social affairs
so that their energies might be directed exclusively to the benefit of the
New Order. Its success was very limited, and students were prime movers
in the Malari protests in January 1974 calling for price reductions and an
end to corruption. Although several of their leaders were then arrested in
the ensuing crackdown, further student protests developed in 1977–1978,
especially in Bandung and Jakarta, against Suharto’s reelection (see
WHITE BOOK). In response, the government further curbed student ac-
tivity through the 1978 Campus Normalization Law, under which univer-
sity deans were charged with keeping the universities free from politics.
Thus during the 1980s student activity had to be largely restricted to in-
ternal campus issues. In the later 1980s students began to turn their atten-
tion to issues of social justice, particularly with respect to land and its ex-
propriation, and poverty exacerbated by government policies.
 STUW, DE • 403

In 1993 students cooperated with Muslim groups in successfully op-

posing a state-sponsored lottery, and this success led them to expand
their activity again into protests against the regime and the corruption of
the Suharto family. Thereafter the students’ profile was raised once
more as they formed or allied with activist movements including the Per-
satuan Rakyat Demokratik (PRD).
Students were in the forefront of the demonstrations that ultimately
forced Suharto’s resignation in May 1998. Their organized protests be-
gan in Jakarta in the second half of February when they demanded a
return to democracy and initiated a free forum (mimbar bebas) to ex-
press their dissatisfaction with the corruption of the Suharto regime.
These protests were echoed on campuses throughout the country, as a
network of student activists in the universities coordinated their activi-
ties through e-mail and cell phone communication among the campuses.
Thus on 15 April students were able to organize nationwide coordinated
protests that escalated again in early May in opposition to a rise in fuel
and electricity prices. By this time, the student demands included calls
for Suharto to step down. The trigger for the final showdown came on
12 May when Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus) and police
forces shot at students demonstrating at Trisakti University in Jakarta,
killing six of them. In the huge protest demonstrations that followed,
students occupied the parliament building and were a key element in ul-
timately forcing Suharto’s resignation. The student movement splin-
tered immediately after Suharto’s fall over whether or not to support the
new government, headed by B. J. Habibie, and though still active in the
reformasi period, students were unable to regain their earlier influence.
[0748, 0760]

STUW, DE (The Push). Political journal published from 1930 by the Asso-
ciation for the Furtherance of the Social and Political Development of the
Netherlands Indies, usually called the Stuw-group. Most of its members
were government officials or academics, and most had been influenced by
Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje at Leiden University. Their association
was primarily a study and discussion group, though it argued generally for
the creation of an Indies commonwealth (see SUCCESSION). The group
was largely disbanded by 1933, partly because it appeared to be damag-
ing the careers of its younger members in the conservative political cli-
mate of the day. Several of its members, however, gained influential po-
sitions in the postwar colonial administration, notably H. J. van Mook as
lieutenant governor-general and J. H. A. Logemann and J. A. Jonkman as
404 • SUBANDRIO

minister for colonies. They had little success, however, in pushing the
Dutch government toward greater concessions to Indonesian national-
ism, and their often paternalistic ideas on cultural and economic develop-
ment antagonized Indonesian nationalists. [0620, 1146]

SUBANDRIO (1915–). As a young intellectual with medical training,

Subandrio was posted abroad to promote the Republic during the In-
donesian Revolution. After serving in London (1947–1954) and
Moscow (1954–1956), he returned to Indonesia where he joined the Par-
tai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) in 1957 and in the same year became for-
eign minister in Sukarno’s first kabinet karya. He held the post until
1966 and was one of the architects of the foreign policy of Guided De-
mocracy, including Confrontation with Malaysia. On becoming
deputy prime minister in 1959, he resigned from the PNI to project a
more national image. A skilled political manipulator, he was seen by
many as typifying the byzantine politics of Guided Democracy and was
among the first government figures targeted by conservative forces after
1965. Subandrio was arrested in March 1966, tried by the Mahmillub in
October, and convicted of participation in the Gestapu coup. Although
sentenced to death, he remained in detention in Jakarta for nearly 30
years, until 1995 when Suharto decided to release some prominent po-
litical prisoners, including Subandrio and Omar Dhani (a former air
force commander), under pressure from human rights advocates. In
2000 Subandrio published his version of events surrounding the Gestapu.
[0712, 1144]

SUBVERSION. Both colonial and independent governments in Indonesia

have been deeply and constantly concerned about alleged problems of
subversion. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) feared collusion
between inhabitants of Batavia and enemies outside, and periodically
executed those suspected of treason. In 1916 the colonial government
founded the Politiek Inlichtingen Dienst (PID) or Political Intelligence
Service, whose place was taken under the Japanese by the Kenpeitai
and in the Suharto period by the Badan Koordinasi Intelijen (Bakin)
(see also INTELLIGENCE SERVICES).
These police organs have been backed by a series of laws on subver-
sion, beginning with the so-called haatzaai-artikelen of 1914, based on
the penal code of British India, which banned the “sowing of hatred” of
the government or of any group of Indonesian inhabitants; by irony, one
of the first prosecutions under these articles was of the editor of a colo-
 SUCCESSION • 405

nial military journal that published an article critical of the quality of Ja-
vanese soldiers. These haatzaai-artikelen were used in 1984 to convict
the dissident H. R. Dharsono. Lèse-majesté regulations of the colonial
era have also been retained by independent Indonesia (with substitution
of president and vice president for queen and governor-general) and
were used against the authors of the 1978 White Book. Finally, the 1963
Law on Subversion, which bans both the arousing of “hostility, distur-
bances or anxiety among the population or broad sections of society” and
the undermining of Pancasila or the Garis Besar Haluan Negara
(GBHN), was used against Sawito Kartowibowo and against the al-
leged plotters behind the Malari riots. See also MAHKAMAH
MILITER LUAR BIASA. [0635, 0923]

SUCCESSION. The idea that the colony of the Netherlands Indies should
be succeeded by some sort of independent state emerged in the early 20th
century. Proponents initially envisaged gradual decolonization, perhaps
via an increase in the powers of the Volksraad, toward a commonwealth
arrangement along British lines, with Indonesia being essentially self-
governing but deferring to the Netherlands on matters of common inter-
est (see STUW, DE). The idea of full independence became a part of the
platform of the nationalist movement in the 1920s, though the exact
mechanism of succession was not spelled out. Nationalists did not agree
at first on whether the colony should gain independence as a whole or in
a number of ethnically based states (see NATIONALISM). By the
1920s, there was general agreement that the successor state should en-
compass the entire Netherlands Indies.
Succession by Japanese military rule was sanctioned in interna-
tional law by the formal surrender of Dutch forces on 8 March 1942,
but was called into question by the establishment of a Netherlands In-
dies government-in-exile in Australia under H. J. van Mook and the
fact that the Dutch still held the town of Merauke in the southeastern
corner of West New Guinea (see PAPUA).
Japan surrendered on 14 August 1945, and the Indonesian Republic
was declared on 17 August. The Republic based its claim to succession
on the right of national self-determination, on the argument that Dutch
sovereignty had ceased with the Dutch loss of the colony in 1942 and on
the initially slender international recognition it received from other coun-
tries. The Linggajati Agreement of November 1946 and the Renville
Agreement of January 1948 gave the Republic vague “de facto” recog-
nition by the Dutch, but this was withdrawn in the “Police Actions” of
406 • SUDHARMONO

July 1947 and December 1948. The Republic received full recognition
from Egypt and Syria in 1947.
Under van Mook, the postwar Netherlands Indies government recog-
nized the inevitable end of colonialism but sought to push the colony’s suc-
cessor state in the direction of a multiracial paternalistic meritocracy. In the
latter part of the Revolution, this took the form of a federation (see FED-
ERALISM). On 9 March 1948, the colonial government was renamed the
Provisional Federal Government (Voorlopige Federale Regeering) and the
term Netherlands Indies was replaced in the Dutch Constitution by In-
donesië. On 3 November the post of governor-general was replaced with
that of high commissioner of the Crown. On 27 December 1949 sover-
eignty over the Netherlands Indies was transferred to the Republik In-
donesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia, usually translated as Re-
public of the United States of Indonesia). West New Guinea, however, was
retained by the Dutch, partly on grounds of the ethnic dissimilarity be-
tween the Papuans and other Indonesians, partly on the grounds that Dutch
sovereignty over the territory was stronger by virtue of the permanent
Dutch presence in Merauke. West New Guinea (West Irian, Papua) was
handed by the Dutch in 1962 to United Nations administration, which in
turn handed it to Indonesia in 1963. The incorporation of the territory into
Indonesia was ratified by an “Act of Free Choice” in 1968.
The issue of succession dominated the last years of both the Sukarno
and Suharto regimes, as neither president was willing to institute an or-
derly method for the transfer of power after his resignation or death. Al-
though under the Constitution the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
(MPR) was responsible for electing the president, under neither the Old
nor the New Order was it believed that the parliament could act inde-
pendently of the will of the president himself. The bloody initiation of
the Suharto presidency had led to questions as to its legitimacy, and
Suharto was always eager to stress the legality of the handover of power
from Sukarno through the Supersemar. Suharto’s unwillingness to indi-
cate a possible successor led to great uncertainty during the early 1990s
and contributed to the chaos that followed his May 1998 resignation. In
the post-Suharto period, the issue of succession has been clarified
through the measures passed by the MPR whereby a president can only
serve two five-year terms and is now elected by the population as a
whole and not by maneuvering within the parliament. [0751, 0940, 0970]

SUDHARMONO (1927–). After serving in the army from 1945, Sudhar-

mono attended the military law academy in the late 1950s and, at the be-
 SUGAR CANE • 407

ginning of the New Order, Suharto appointed him as his private secre-
tary for general affairs. He then became state secretary in 1973 and
chairman of Golkar in 1983. Sudharmono attempted to make Golkar
into a real political party by lessening its dependence on the executive.
Both as state secretary and head of Golkar, he also weakened the mili-
tary’s influence by helping a group of indigenous businessmen gain
greater access to government projects and state funding, undermining the
army’s financial strength. The army leadership responded by placing
military representatives in some two thirds of Golkar’s provincial chair-
manships and spreading rumors that Sudharmono had communist links.
The army’s campaign against him ensured that he was replaced as leader
of Golkar, but it was unable to prevent Suharto from appointing him as
his vice president in March 1988, where he served until 1993. [0748,
0751]

SUDIRMAN (1915?–1950). Former schoolteacher and Pembela Tanah

Air (Peta) battalion commander, he was elected army commander in
Yogyakarta on 12 November 1945. Sudirman emphasized the valued of
martial and national spirit over hierarchy and formal organization in de-
feating the Dutch, and he was initially sympathetic to the radical nation-
alism of Tan Malaka, though he stopped short of supporting him against
the Sjahrir government. Although his charisma made him a focal point
of army loyalty, he was gradually edged out of direct command by a
group of Western-trained officers including A. H. Nasution. In Decem-
ber 1948, however, after the Republican cabinet was captured in the sec-
ond Dutch “Police Action,” Sudirman, dying of tuberculosis, led Re-
publican forces in a guerrilla struggle against the Dutch in the Javanese
countryside. Along with the Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia
(PDRI) he opposed the Roem–van Roijen Agreement, but in July 1949
he reluctantly submitted to the Republican government that had been re-
stored to Yogyakarta. He died in January of the following year. [0886]

SUGAR CANE (Saccharum officinarum Poaceae). Probably native to In-

donesia and first domesticated there, but improved techniques for culti-
vating and processing it were developed in India. Chinese visitors re-
ported it from Java in 400 A.D., but other sources of sugar (e.g., aren,
honey, and lontar) were more important. Under sponsorship of the
Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), Chinese settlers on Java produced
the first commercial sugar cane in the countryside around Batavia in the
17th century for export to Europe and Japan. Of 150 mills on the island
408 • SUGAR CANE

in 1710, all but four were Chinese-owned, though production declined

later in the18th century because of the loss of external markets, political
disturbances on Java, and lack of firewood.
Sugar production was an important part of the Cultivation System.
Sugar grown under government monopoly was delivered to private sugar
mills, often owned by European entrepreneurs who, though they had to
deliver the processed sugar at fixed prices to the Nederlandsche Handel
Maatschappij (NHM), made enormous profits. In the first half of the
19th century, sugar was by far the dominant export of the colony, ac-
counting for 77.4 percent of the total value of exports in 1840. Private
companies established sugar plantations in the Vorstenlanden in this pe-
riod.
In 1870, the government decided to hand over sugar production to pri-
vate enterprise, though the government monopoly was not formally abol-
ished until 1891. Sugar cane requires much the same kind of agricultural
conditions as rice (and three times the volume of water) as well as a sea-
sonal labor force, and most sugar plantations were therefore established
in areas already under indigenous rice cultivation. Under a variety of ex-
ploitative relationships, the sugar growers generally gained access to
their choice of land and to abundant water while leaving a portion of the
rice economy intact to tide their labor force over seasonal dips in labor
demand. A world crisis in 1883 drove many smaller companies out of
production but set the stage for massive capital investment, especially by
the NHM, which turned the Java sugar industry into the world’s most ef-
ficient. The industry fared badly in the Depression of the 1930s, and its
share of the value of exports sank to around 7 percent by 1938.
During the Japanese occupation, the sugar plantations and mills of
Java were handed over to Japanese sugar firms in proportion to their
share of Japanese production. Since the combined production of Java,
the Philippines, and Taiwan was far more than the needs of the Japanese
empire, production on Java was steadily reduced. During the Indonesian
Revolution, the preferential laws that had given sugar plantations access
to village lands were abolished, and the industry was never able to re-
cover the access to cheap land and labor that had previously underpinned
its success. Postwar policies of keeping sugar prices low contributed to
underinvestment and generally low yields, exacerbated by primitive
technology and use of low-yielding plant varieties. In 1971 the Badan
Urusan Logistik Nasional (Bulog) took over distribution and price sup-
port, and in 1972 the government launched an intensified smallholder
cane program, which included reductions in tax and an improved mar-
 SUHARTO • 409

keting system. In 1975 plans were announced to phase out the renting of
land for large sugar plantations, but despite some progress, the industry
remained inefficient, absorbing 20 percent of total agricultural credits for
only 3 percent of the total value of agricultural output.
In order to boost rice production it was proposed that sugar cane cul-
tivation should be moved from Java, which in 1988 produced 83 percent
of the country’s sugar. No basic change was made in the government’s
policies, however, although there was some expansion outside Java, par-
ticularly to Lampung. [0552, 0603, 0617, 0730, 1249]

SUHARTO (1921–). Second president of Indonesia. Born 8 June 1921, in

a village near Yogyakarta to a peasant family, Suharto joined the
Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL) in 1940 and rose to the
rank of sergeant before the Japanese invasion. After demobilization, he
joined first the police and then the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta) in 1943
and the Republican army in Central Java in 1945. During the Dutch oc-
cupation of Yogyakarta (1948–1949), he commanded a “general attack”
(serangan umum) in which Indonesian forces briefly occupied the city
before being driven back by the Dutch. In 1956 he became commander
of the army’s Diponegoro division but was dismissed in October 1959
for putting illegal levies on commercial activities in Central Java. Posted
to the Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad) in Ban-
dung, he was involved peripherally in the development of the army’s
doctrine of dwifungsi before being appointed in 1961 as commander of
the army’s strategic reserve Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan
Darat (Kostrad). In 1962 Suharto was placed in command of the Man-
dala campaign to recover West Irian (Papua) but was Kostrad com-
mander in Jakarta at the time of the Gestapu coup in 1965 when his
troops were instrumental in suppressing the coup. With his appointment
as commander of Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketert-
iban (Kopkamtib) on 10 October 1965, he set about dismantling
Guided Democracy and installing the regime that soon became known
as the New Order.
The Supersemar order of 11 March 1966 enabled him to suppress the
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and to purge the government bureau-
cracy. Suharto was sworn in as acting president in March 1967, and in
March 1968 he was selected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat
(Sementara) (MPRS) as president. He called general elections for
1971 and was reelected by the new MPR in 1972. Usually with no op-
position, he was reelected every five years from then until 1998.
410 • SUHARTO

Suharto initially appeared to many observers to be a quiet and efficient

military manager, using a consensual style and drawing heavily on the
economic skills of the Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional
(Bappenas) staff (see WIDJOJO NITISASTRO) and on political man-
agers such as Ali Murtopo of the Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies (CSIS). In the mid- and late 1970s, his presence retreated
somewhat from the national stage as rivalry between competing generals
in Suharto’s inner circle not only broke into public view but also was ex-
pressed obliquely in the Malari Affair. An attitude of mumpungisme (“get
what you can while you can”) seemed to be the order of the day, and ob-
servers began to refer to the leadership as a junta and to speculate that
Suharto was no more than a figurehead for concealed and more powerful
figures. With the drop in oil revenues and a more austere economic
regime in the 1980s, however, he seemed much more clearly in control,
removing apparently powerful subordinates, directly determining much
government policy, and promoting Pancasila as the state ideology. By the
late 1980s he had begun to court Islamic groups (see IKATAN CEN-
DEKIAWAN MUSLIM INDONESIA [ICMI]) and made a tentative but
short-lived effort to allow for some dissent within Indonesian society (see
KETERBUKAAN). Several members of his immediate family (see CEN-
DANA GROUP; SUHARTO FAMILY) began to prosper enormously.
During his last decade in power, Suharto seemed to lose his political
touch. This became clear as the Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme (KKN)
within the system intensified, with the first family personifying how far
these excesses had corroded Indonesian society. After a sudden heart at-
tack killed his wife in April 1996, Suharto seemed even less willing to
curb the greed of his children and close associates. He increasingly
leaned on them, rather than the technocrats, for economic advice. When
the Asian financial crisis began to affect Indonesia in mid-1997, there
was a wave of domestic and international criticism that led to the rapid
collapse of his regime.
Suharto was initially defiant, appointing the erratic technocrat, B. J.
Habibie, as his vice president after the March 1998 elections, and his
daughter Tutut (Siti Hardijant Rukmana) and the notorious timber baron
Muhammad “Bob” Hasan to his cabinet. But the public responded with
wide-scale rioting and looting in Jakarta and other major cities. Student
demonstrations calling for reformasi and for Suharto’s resignation
spread throughout the archipelago, intensifying after the military shot to
death several university students at Trisakti University on 12 May.
Suharto returned from a meeting in Cairo on 15 May still determined to
 SUKADANA • 411

serve out his term of office, but the escalating demonstrations and the de-
fection of both his vice president and General Wiranto, chief of the
armed forces, left him with no alternative. He resigned on 21 May,
handing over power to Vice President Habibie. See also CULTURE; IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICES; POLITICAL SUBVERSION; SUMITRO
DJOJOHADIKUSUMO. [0719, 0729, 0845, 0878, 0976]

SUHARTO FAMILY (sometimes referred to by the acronym, PPP [putra,

putri presiden]). Suharto and his wife, Siti Hartinah (Tien) Suharto, had
six children. They had three sons, Sigit Harjojudanto, Bambang Trihat-
modjo (Bamban Tri or simply BT), and Hutomo Mandala Putra
(Tommy); and three daughters, Siti Hardijanti Hastuti Rukmana (Mbak
Tutut), Siti Hediati Harijadi Prabowo (Titiek), and Siti Hutami Endang
Adiningsih (Mamiek). Most of them, together with other of his relatives,
including his brother-in-law Probosutejo and son-in-law Prabowo
Subianto, were deeply involved in exploiting Indonesia’s economy, of-
ten in competition with one another.
Mbak Tutut and Tommy were the best known economically and polit-
ically. Tutut, “the toll-road queen,” headed firms participating in the
building and management of toll roads in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and China, and also the Citra Flour Mills and Citra Trans-
port Nusantara. After 1994 she was sole agent in Indonesia for
Malaysia’s Proton national car. In the mid-1990s she was a chairperson
of the Golkar and member of the Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim In-
donesa (ICMI) advisory council, and she was mentioned in 1997 as a
potential vice president. Suharto appointed her minister of social affairs
in his last cabinet (March–May 1998).
Equally well known was Tommy, who headed the Humpuss (Hutomo
Mandala Putra Soeharto Sumahardjuno) Group and was director of the
Timor national car (see AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY). Megawati
Sukarnoputri’s government finally arrested him in March 2002 for his
alleged involvement in the murder of a Supreme Court judge (who had
sentenced him to 18 months in jail for corruption), and he was con-
victed in July and sentenced to 15 years in jail. See also CENDANA
GROUP.

SUKADANA. Kingdom in southwest Kalimantan, reportedly founded by

exiles from Majapahit. Its economy was based on the export of Kali-
mantan diamonds and of iron from Karimata. It was conquered by
Mataram in 1622.
412 • SUKARNO

SUKARNO (1901–1970). Often affectionately called Bung (Brother)

Karno, he was a nationalist leader and Indonesia’s first president. Born
6 June 1901, Sukarno became involved in the nationalist movement early
as a protégé of H. U. S. Tjokroaminoto, and after studying engineering
at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) he helped to found an Al-
gemene Studieclub (General Study Club) in Bandung in 1926. In 1927
he founded the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), which expanded dra-
matically under the influence of his oratory. He was jailed in December
1929, and on his release he joined the Partai Indonesia (Partindo), to
which he also drew an enthusiastic mass following. Arrested again in
1933, he apparently offered to abstain from politics if he were pardoned,
but he was exiled nonetheless to Flores and then to Bengkulu.
Sukarno returned to Jakarta shortly after the Japanese invasion and
agreed to cooperate with the occupation authorities. In exchange for ex-
horting the Indonesian people to support the war effort, he received ex-
tensive public exposure and an opportunity to broadcast lightly con-
cealed nationalist messages to the public. He was later criticized for his
role in recruiting romusha laborers for the Japanese. His speech formu-
lating the Pancasila was made to a meeting of the independence prepara-
tory body Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indone-
sia (BPUPKI) in June 1945. On 17 August 1945, two days after the
Japanese surrender, he and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesia’s
independence, and the following day the Japanese-sponsored Panitia
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) elected them president and
vice president.
During the Revolution Sukarno played a key role in keeping the rev-
olutionary movement relatively united, although he wielded less actual
governmental power than Hatta. He consistently backed the socialist
governments of Sutan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, and after the fall
of Amir’s government following the Renville Agreement Sukarno ap-
pointed Hatta to head a presidential cabinet. He had planned to flee the
Republican capital of Yogyakarta to head a government in exile, but the
Dutch launched their second “Police Action” on 19 December 1948 be-
fore the evacuation plane arrived, and he was captured, together with
Hatta and his cabinet. He was exiled to the island of Bangka until al-
lowed to return to Yogya in July 1949 after the Roem–van Roijen
Agreement.
In the early 1950s Sukarno became increasing dissatisfied with party
politics, and in 1957 he called for a system of Guided Democracy to re-
place what he saw as the tyranny of the majority in a conventional par-
 SUKARNO • 413

liamentary system. He took an active hand in forming governments after

the fall of the second Ali Sastroamijoyo cabinet in 1957 and in 1959,
with army backing; took over the prime ministership; and instituted his
system of Guided Democracy. Once in power, however, Sukarno proved
to be less than competent at day-to-day administration, concentrating on
symbolic projects such as the recovery of West Irian (Papua), Con-
frontation with Malaysia, and the formulation of a national ideology
called Nasakom to reconcile the conflicting nationalist (NASionalis), re-
ligious (Agama), and communist (KOMunis) political parties.
His self-assurance seemed to increase, and in 1963 Sukarno had him-
self declared president-for-life. Politically, however, he was increasingly
forced to balance the army and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in
an uneasy triangular relationship. His role in the Gestapu coup of Sep-
tember 1965 remains unclear, though it seems improbable that he had
any direct hand in plotting it. In its aftermath, he did his best to protect
the PKI from the subsequent massacres of 1965–1966. Suharto’s crush-
ing of the Gestapu overthrew the balance of power of late Guided De-
mocracy, enabling Suharto gradually to push Sukarno aside until he ob-
tained full executive authority under the Supersemar order of March
1966. Sukarno was stripped of his presidency on 12 March 1967 and was
confined under house arrest until he died on 21 June 1970. (See also
MAHMILLUB; NEKOLIM.)
Scholars continue to argue over the nature of Sukarno’s ideology. He
was strongly influenced by Marxism, and especially the Leninist theory
of imperialism; one of his theoretical coinages was the notion of the
Marhaen, a category of poor Indonesians who were oppressed by capi-
talism and imperialism but were not proletarians since they owned, in the
form of a little land and a few tools, some of the means of production.
But he was also a pious abangan Muslim and a strong nationalist. He ar-
gued that there was no contradiction between these three beliefs, and the
core of his thinking was an attempt to synthesize them for Indonesian
use. Though under the Suharto regime Pancasila and Nasakom came to
have opposing political connotations, they were both attempts at ideo-
logical syncretism. This blending of ideologies makes it difficult to judge
how much social change Sukarno wished to introduce; his rhetoric was
always that of radical change, but his practice was often less so.
Sukarno was buried in the East Java town of Blitar, initially in a humble
grave that has since been made a substantial mausoleum. After his death the
Suharto regime and its apologists made various attempts to downplay
Sukarno’s role in national development; in 1980–1981, in particular, it was
414 • SUKARNOPUTRI, MEGAWATI

alleged that Sukarno was not the author of the Pancasila, while in 1987 de-
tractors circulated false rumors of vast sums he had corruptly secured that
were held in foreign bank accounts. But he remained one of the most potent
symbols in Indonesian politics. His memory was used especially by the
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) that claimed to be his heir in its con-
cern for the less well off, and the continued widespread loyalty to him was
largely responsible for the rise of his daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri,
to lead the PDI and ultimately become president. [0643, 0725, 0844, 0850,
0851, 0859, 0881, 0934–0936]

SUKARNOPUTRI, MEGAWATI. See MEGAWATI SUKARNOPUTRI.

SUKIMAN WIRYOSANJOYO (1896–?). Member of the Perhimpunan

Indonesia (PI) and later leader of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia
(PSII) until he left in 1933 to form the Partai Islam Indonesia (PII). He
was one of the modernist leaders who took control of Masjumi in 1945,
and he served as prime minister from April 1951 to February 1952. His
term in office was marked by hostility to the army: pro-army leaders
were excluded, and lasykar captured by the army after the Revolution
were released. Sukiman also attempted to suppress the Partai Komunis
Indonesia (PKI), arresting perhaps 15,000 party members in August
1951. Pro-Western in its foreign policy, his cabinet fell after it signed a
secret aid agreement with the United States committing Indonesia to
help defend the “free world.” [0695]

SULAWESI (Celebes). Island in the Greater Sundas. The origin of the

name is uncertain: Sulawesi may derive from sula besi, “island of iron,”
while Celebes may come from the Portuguese Punta des Celebres, Cape
of the Infamous. The island’s distinctive shape with four arms separated
by broad gulfs has led it to be compared variously to a spider, an orchid,
a giraffe, a starfish, and a drunken letter K. Only the southern arm around
Makassar and the northern arm around Minahasa are volcanic, and
these fertile areas are the most heavily populated parts of the island,
which in the 2000 census had a population of just under 15 million.
Bronze Buddha images dating from the fourth to fifth century have
been found in southern Sulawesi, suggesting first Hindu influences at
about the same time as on Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan, but no ma-
jor early kingdoms developed there. Four ethnic groups dominate this re-
gion: the Makassarese in the far south, the Bugis farther north, the
Luwunese still farther north, and the Mandar to the northwest. The king-
dom of Luwu or La Galigo emerged on the southern peninsula in the
ninth century, and the Bugis kingdoms of Bone, Wajo’, and Soppeng
 SUMATRA • 415

and the Makassarese kingdom of Gowa (Goa) arose in the 13th century
among a scattering of perhaps 50 small states, variously Hindu and ani-
mist. Gowa and its sister port Tallo accepted Islam in 1605 and, now
commonly known as Makassar, soon became influential beyond the
peninsula in Kalimantan and Sumbawa. In 1660, however, Makassar
was captured by the Dutch in alliance with Arung Palakka of Bone.
The rest of the island meanwhile remained largely under small tribes,
most notably the Toraja of the central mountains, though the kingdom
of Bolaäng Mongondouw on the northern peninsula flourished briefly
until it was subjected by the Maluku kingdom of Ternate, which also
dominated the gulf of Tomini (see GORONTALO). The entire island
was claimed by the Dutch in 1846 and was ruled loosely by the gover-
nor of Celebes en Onderhoorigheden (Sulawesi and dependencies), but
Dutch control in the interior was not felt until the late 19th century.
After the Japanese occupation, the island was reoccupied by Aus-
tralian troops, who were instrumental in suppressing the initial attempt
by local nationalists to join the Indonesian republic. Thereafter, Sulawesi
was a linchpin in Dutch plans for federalism in Indonesia and Makassar
was the capital of the short-lived Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT). After
the dissolution of the NIT in 1950, Sulawesi was the site of rebellions
against the central authorities by both the Darul Islam (DI) and the Per-
mesta (Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam). (See PRRI/PERMESTA
REBELLION.) Under the New Order, nickel mining expanded on the
southeastern peninsula, and parts of the island were an important desti-
nation for Balinese transmigration settlements.
After Suharto’s fall, interreligious violence first broke out in Poso,
Central Sulawesi, on 24 December 1998, and flared and subsided over
the subsequent years. Although Christians and Muslims reached a peace
deal in December 2001, surrendering hundreds of weapons to the police,
violence soon resumed. It was estimated that in the district of Poso at
least 500 people were killed, about 80,000 forced to flee, and 10,000
buildings destroyed. The Muslim side was reinforced by about 500
members of Laskar Jihad from Java. Christian refugees fled mostly to
the nearby town of Tentena and Muslims fled to Palu, the provincial cap-
ital. A respite in the sporadic violence occurred between December 2002
and May 2003, but during the last three months of the year shootings and
bombings upsurged, especially in the Poso area. [0161, 0549, 0786,
0787, 0831, 1227, 1254, 1327, 1376, 1396]

SUMATRA (Sumatera, from Samudra, former name of the kingdom of

Pasai). The westernmost and third largest of Indonesia’s main islands, it
416 • SUMATRA

is divided geographically into a mountainous spine, the Bukit Barisan, in

the west and an area of flat lowland, often swampy, in the east. The
rugged terrain of the Bukit Barisan has made overland travel difficult,
and a number of distinct peoples—the Gayo, Batak, Minangkabau, Re-
jang, and Lebang—developed in the relatively isolated valleys of the in-
terior. The coastal regions of the east and south were dominated by
Malays and were tied politically, culturally, and economically to the
Malay Peninsula until the hardening of colonial and national borders. In
the north, the Acehnese came under Muslim influence in early times.
The earliest major kingdoms on Sumatra (Srivijaya and Jambi) arose
initially as river-based controllers of the Strait of Melaka (see also
PIRACY) that were vital to the India–China trade, but they also de-
pended on alliance with peoples and rulers in the interior who supplied
forest and mining products such as camphor, pepper, and gold for
trade. Later kingdoms (Pasai, Pedir, and Aceh), for the most part Mus-
lim, depended more on this entrepôt role, and Aceh was probably the
most successful in bringing regions of the interior under its control.
European domination of the trade routes from the 18th century left
new coastal states (Palembang, Deli, and Riau) relatively weak, but Eu-
ropean powers did not attempt to extend significant control over territory
until the early 19th century. After the return of Java to the Dutch in
1816, Thomas Stamford Raffles attempted to build the British colony
in Bengkulu into a major base, and the Dutch became involved soon af-
ter in the politics of Minangkabau through the Paderi War. The British
ceded Bengkulu and other possessions in Sumatra to the Dutch in the
Treaty of London of 1824 (see ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY). Aceh was
not fully conquered until 1903. The introduction of plantation crops to
East Sumatra by private Dutch companies—tobacco in 1864, rubber
and oil palms in the early 20th century—together with the discovery of
oil dramatically changed the economy of the island, making it the rich-
est export area of the Netherlands Indies and later of Indonesia. The so-
cial character of East Sumatra changed drastically with the introduction
of many Javanese and Chinese indentured laborers.
Sumatrans—Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, Tan Malaka,
Muhammad Yamin, Amir Sjarifuddin, and others—took a major part
in the rise of Indonesian nationalism in the 20th century and although
the island was administratively united with Malaya under the 25th army
during part of the Japanese occupation, local nationalists enthusiasti-
cally declared for the Republic in 1945. Fierce social revolutions broke
out against aristocratic associates of the Dutch in Aceh and East Suma-
 SUMBAWA • 417

tra. In the latter part of the Revolution, the Dutch attempted to establish
federal states in East and South Sumatra, but these were abolished in
1950.
After the transfer of sovereignty, Sumatra was divided into three
provinces: North, Central, and South Sumatra. Resentment in much of
the island grew during the 1950s. A revolt broke out in Aceh from 1953
to 1957, southern Sumatra had become a major destination for settlers
under the transmigration program, while in North Sumatra the govern-
ment insisted on removing squatters from foreign-controlled plantation
lands occupied during the Revolution. Sumatrans also felt that their is-
land was generating most of Indonesia’s wealth while getting little in re-
turn. Dissatisfaction over Jakarta’s allocation of income earned by
Sumatra’s exports was among the reasons for regional movements led by
local military commanders emerging in Padang, Medan, and Palem-
bang. These developed into the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in February
1958, when military and civilian leaders proclaimed a revolutionary gov-
ernment with its center in West Sumatra.
After the rebellion was suppressed in 1961, military forces on the is-
land were largely under Javanese leadership until the closing years of the
New Order. The Suharto government accelerated the transmigration
policy, particularly to the Lampung area of South Sumatra. Also, large
areas of the island were converted from native vegetation to oil palm
plantations, with huge tracts of forest being destroyed. Land clearing
was carried out, often during severe drought conditions, and this was one
of the major causes of the fires that swept across the region in 1997–1978
and during subsequent years. [0077, 0124, 0284, 0291, 0569, 0775,1179,
1187, 1240]

SUMBA. An island in Nusatenggara whose abundant sandalwood trees

attracted European attention in the 17th century; the area was repeatedly
raided for slaves. The Dutch obtained treaty rights in 1756 and instituted
direct rule in 1866, but the island was relatively neglected and few of its
inhabitants converted to Christianity. The raising of horses for export
began in the 1840s, and the island is also known for its production of ikat
cloth. See also SAVU. [0147, 1220, 1395]

SUMBAWA. Mountainous island in Nusatenggara, commonly divided

into two kingdoms, Bima in the east and Sumbawa in the west. The is-
land was a major exporter of sandalwood and later horses but was dev-
astated in 1815 by the eruption of Mt. Tambora, in which 50,000 people
418 • SUMITRO DJOJOHADIKUSUMO

were reportedly killed. After independence it became part of the province

of Nusatenggara and in 1958 of West Nusatenggara.

SUMITRO DJOJOHADIKUSUMO (1917–2001). Son of the founder of

the Bank Negara Indonesia, Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978),
Sumitro was born in Central Java and earned his doctorate in econom-
ics at the Rotterdam School of Commerce. On graduating, he remained
in the Netherlands and participated in the underground struggle during
World War II. He returned to Indonesia in 1946, and during the Revolu-
tion he negotiated a number of trading agreements in the United States
intended to draw American business interests to the side of the Republic.
He was a leading member of the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and an
assistant to Sutan Sjahrir (once unsuccessfully challenging Sjahrir for
the party’s leadership). In 1949 he played an important role in defending
the economic position of the Republic against Dutch demands during the
Round Table Conference in The Hague. He was appointed minister of
trade and industry in the Mohammad Natsir cabinet and was responsi-
ble for launching the Benteng Program, also arguing in favor of foreign
investment as a key to development. Dean of the Economics Faculty at
the University of Indonesia, he cooperated with the Ford Foundation in
training a cadre of economists who became known as the Berkeley
Mafia.
Accused by the army of financial manipulations, Sumitro fled to
Sumatra at the end of 1957 and joined with the PRRI/Permesta rebel-
lion, serving as its foreign minister. After the rebellion was suppressed
he remained in exile in Malaysia until the advent of the New Order,
when he returned to Indonesia and was appointed minister for trade and
commerce in 1968, but he retreated to the portfolio of state research in
1973 after widespread accusations that PSI figures were too influential
in the regime. He remained an important advisor to his former pupils in
Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas). His son,
Prabowo Subianto, married one of Suharto’s daughters (Siti Hediati
Harijadi). [1121]

SUNDA. Though its boundaries are hard to define precisely, Sunda refers
generally to the western third of the island of Java, dominated by the
Sundanese people, though much of the northern coast is now not Sun-
danese. One of the earliest historical states in the archipelago, Taru-
manegara, had its center near modern Bogor, and the region was ap-
parently dominated by Srivijaya in the late seventh century, but little
 SUPREME COURT • 419

else is known of it until the emergence of Hindu Pajajaran in the 14th

century. Islam reached Banten and Cirebon in the 16th century, and the
conversion of the interior began soon after the fall of Pajajaran in 1579.
Less influenced by Hindu-Buddhist traditions than the rest of Java, the
Sundanese became increasingly strongly Muslim, and the region was one
of the centers of the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion. See also PASUNDAN;
PRIANGAN. [0358]

SUNDA KELAPA. See BANTEN; PAJAJARAN.

SUNDA SHELF. A large southern extension of the Asian continental land

mass carrying the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Java. During
20 successive periods of glaciation over the last 2 million years, and
most recently circa 50,000–15,000 years ago, the entire shelf has been
exposed. East Sumatra and West Kalimantan were then drained by the
great Sunda River, flowing into the South China Sea north of Sarawak,
while Java and South Kalimantan were drained by another major river
flowing into what is now the Flores Sea. There were glaciers on
Mt. Leuser in Sumatra at this time, and the climate seems to have been
drier, but it is difficult to reconstruct the region’s prehistory since most
areas of possible human habitation have been flooded. See also CONTI-
NENTAL DRIFT.

SUPERSEMAR (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Executive Order of 11

March 1966). Signed reluctantly by Sukarno, it ordered General
Suharto “to take all necessary steps to guarantee security and calm and
the stability of the running of the government and the course of the Rev-
olution,” thus transferring full executive authority to Suharto. See also
SEMAR. [0727]

SUPREME COURT (Mahkamah Agung). At independence Indonesia in-

herited from the Netherlands East Indies a Supreme Court (now renamed
the Mahkamah Agung) operating in a constitutional system calling for a
separation of government powers. Rejecting a proposal from Muham-
mad Yamin that the newly independent country adopt a balance of pow-
ers doctrine, the meetings of the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan
Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) retained the colonial system of
separation of powers, thus leaving the Court within a system favoring
executive rather than judicial power. This meant that the Court had no
right of judicial review of the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. The
420 • SURABAYA

government strengthened its grip over the judiciary during Guided De-
mocracy, by reducing the judiciary’s salaries and defining its powers
more narrowly.
Under the New Order, the judiciary strove to retain its autonomy,
but the government successfully ensured its institutional loyalty
through the political appointments of Supreme Court leaders and
strengthening the powers of these leaders within the Court. The strug-
gle to change the Supreme Court and the judiciary continued to focus
on the separation of powers doctrine, with the government increasingly
after 1970 replacing the Supreme Court in controlling judiciary per-
sonnel management. Also after 1970, constitutional review was seen as
requiring a special constitutional authority, so the possibilities of judi-
cial review were restricted. In 1985 Law no. 14 categorized the
Supreme Court’s tasks into four functions: judicial, advisory, regula-
tory, and administrative, the principal one being the judicial function,
which refers to dispute settlement (cassation). These functions are pri-
marily directed toward ensuring a uniform application of the law in the
lower courts. At the same time the workload of the Court increased,
and by the early 1990s it faced a backlog of more than 20,000 unde-
cided cases. The burden of this caseload meant that the Court was un-
able to supervise the lower courts effectively, and the lack of control
led to a larger number of irregularities and indirectly to a lowering of
professional standards among the judges.
After the fall of Suharto, President Abdurrachman Wahid at-
tempted to reform the Supreme Court by replacing 17 of its judges with
new figures not touched by corruption. Without a more widespread re-
form of the institution and a correction of the abuses in the legal system,
however, this move seemed unlikely to have a major effect on the
Supreme Court’s effective operation. This was recognized in the amend-
ments to the 1945 Constitution passed in August 2002, when parliament
approved the establishment of a Constitutional Court to be set up by Au-
gust 2003 separate from the Supreme Court to decide a range of disputes
with the authority to try cases at the first and final level, as well as re-
view laws against the Constitution. A Commission of Judiciary was also
established to propose candidates for appointments to the Supreme
Court. [0989, 1095, 1096, 1098]

SURABAYA. Port city at a mouth of the Brantas River in East Java

founded, according to official accounts, in 1293, when Raden Wijaya
drove out the Mongols to become ruler of Majapahit. It became an im-
 SURINAM, JAVANESE IN • 421

portant port in the 15th century under Raden Rahmat or Sunan Ngampel,
but was first subject to Demak, then briefly independent, and finally in
1625 conquered by Mataram. It was seized by the Dutch East Indies
Company (VOC) in 1743. Herman Willem Daendels established a
naval base there. Under Dutch rule it became the major city of East Java,
the principal commercial center for eastern Indonesia, and headquarters
of the Dutch navy in the east. It was heavily bombed by the Allies dur-
ing World War II and was the scene of fierce fighting between Indone-
sian nationalist forces and British Indian troops in November 1945. 11
November is celebrated as Heroes’ Day in its honor. [0652, 0789]

SURAKARTA (Solo). Javanese court city founded in 1743 by Sunan

Pakubuwono II (r. 1726–1749) of Mataram. After the treaty of Giyanti
(1755), which divided Mataram, the rump of the old kingdom became
the Sunanate (Kasunanan) of Surakarta, remaining a relatively prosper-
ous center of trade, agriculture, and batik manufacture. As in Yo-
gyakarta, political impotence generated a cultural florescence, Solo pro-
ducing a style said to be gentler and less martial than Yogyakarta’s. The
Sunanate was abolished by the Indonesian Republic in 1946, after the
sunan had failed to join it unequivocally against the Dutch. See also
MANGKUNEGARAN. [0577, 0632, 1248, 1392]

SURAPATI (?–1706). Former Balinese slave in Batavia who escaped to

the surrounding countryside to lead a bandit gang. In 1683 he surren-
dered to the Dutch and joined the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC)
forces, but in 1684 he attacked the company again and fled to Kartasura,
capital of Mataram, where he successfully ambushed a VOC unit sent
to capture him. He then fled to Pasuruan in East Java and established an
independent kingdom, defeating a Mataram army in 1690 and pushing
his domains east to Madiun in 1694. Surapati was finally killed in joint
campaigns by the VOC, Mataram, and Madura in 1706, but his descen-
dants continued to rule the region until the mid-18th century. See also
BALAMBANGAN. [0567]

SURAU. See MADRASAH; PESANTREN.

SURINAM, JAVANESE IN. Toward the end of the 19th century, Dutch
concern over the growth of population in Java and a desire to limit the
number of contract laborers from British India on plantations in the Dutch
South American colony of Surinam led to the recruitment of Javanese for
422 • SUTARJO PETITION

work there. Between 1891 and 1939, 32,976 Javanese entered the colony,
usually on five-year contracts. Some 7,684 of these were repatriated before
World War II and about 1,000 in 1954, the remainder settling in the colony.
In 1962 the Javanese population was 43,000.

SUTARJO PETITION. Presented to the Volksraad in July 1936 by Su-

tarjo Kartohadikusumo, a career bureaucrat, rather than a member of the
nationalist movement, the petition asked for a conference to prepare do-
minion status for Indonesia after 10 years, along the Philippine Com-
monwealth model. Many nationalists believed the petition asked for too
little, but the colonial authorities’ failure to act on its proposals after it
had been passed by the Volksraad became a symbol of Dutch political in-
transigence. [0587]

SUTOMO, DR. (1888–1938). Physician, founder of several “study clubs”

intended to spread nationalist awareness among young intellectuals,
cofounder of the protonationalist Budi Utomo, and later head of Partai
Indonesia Raya (Parindra), he argued especially that adherence to Is-
lam was incompatible with nationalism. See also ALGEMENE
STUDIECLUB. [0502, 0888]

SUTRISNO, TRY (1935–). Born in Surabaya, Sutrisno graduated from

the Army Technical Academy (Aktedkad) in 1959. He was Suharto’s
adjutant (1974–1978) and served as chief of staff in East Timor and
commander of Kodam IV in South Sumatra before being appointed to
head the Jakarta command (Kodam X) in 1982. He became army chief
of staff in 1986 and replaced Benny Murdani as armed forces com-
mander in February 1988. He had a reputation for being charming but
weak, established good ties with the Muslim community, and was a per-
sonal favorite of Suharto. Sutrisno did not display great ability or good
judgment in his military career, heading the Jakarta command during the
Tanjung Priok riots (see WHITE PAPER) and a period of great law-
lessness in the city, and then being commander of the armed forces dur-
ing the Lampung Affair and the 1991 massacre in East Timor, where
he defended his officers’ performance in the face of the evidence of
widespread abuse. Nevertheless, with military backing he was appointed
vice president in March 1993, serving in the post until 1998. [0751]

SUWARDI SURYANINGRAT, R. M. (1889–1959). Early nationalist and

leader of the Indische Partij. His article “If I were to be a Dutchman”
 TAHANAN POLITIK • 423

(“Als ik eens Nederlander was,” 1913) was a classic turning of the argu-
ments of European liberalism against colonialism. Exiled to Holland
1913–1919, he became interested in educational philosophy and in
1922, taking the name Ki Hajar Dewantoro, founded the Taman Siswa
school system. In 1943 he briefly joined the leadership of the Japanese-
sponsored mass organization Putera, but soon withdrew to concentrate
on educational matters. He remained close to Sukarno, and his ideas on
the governance of Taman Siswa schools were one of the elements con-
tributing to the philosophy of Guided Democracy. See also NATION-
ALISM.

SWEET POTATO (Ipomoea batatas Convolvulaceae). Introduced from

South America by the 17th century, it gradually replaced the yam in
much cultivation, especially in Papua, since it is quicker to grow and
prepare, though it stores much less well.

SYPHILIS. Though this was probably restricted to the Americas until

1492, there is evidence for some sort of venereal disease in Indonesia
early in the 14th century. The fact that syphilis apparently did not cause
an immediate epidemic when it arrived in the 16th century suggests the
earlier presence of some related disease, perhaps yaws. Nonetheless, the
disease was widespread by the early 19th century, and Thomas Stam-
ford Raffles established a hospital for sufferers in Yogyakarta in 1811.
From 1852 regular medical checks for syphilis were required of prosti-
tutes in all parts of Java, but since this proved costly and the connection
with prostitution was unclear, the tests were abandoned in 1911. See
also HEALTH. [0576]

–T –

TAHANAN POLITIK (TAPOL, political prisoners). Term generally ap-

plied to the approximately 700,000 persons detained after October 1965
on suspicion of complicity in the Gestapu coup attempt of 1965, though
the criterion was association with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
rather than activities on the evening in question. “A” category prisoners,
often major figures, were brought to trial; “B” category, generally lesser
figures, were detained without trial, about 10,000 being shipped after
1969 to Buru; and “C” category, about 550,000 persons, were detained
only briefly. Most “B” tapol were released by late 1979. All former
424 • TAMAN SISWA

tapol, however, were noted as such on their identity cards and were
barred from a number of political and social activities. See also
MAHKAMAH MILITER LUAR BIASA.

TAMAN SISWA (Garden of Pupils). School system founded in Yogyakarta

in 1922 by Ki Hajar Dewantoro (Suwardi Suryaningrat), under the in-
fluence of the ideas of Rabindranath Tagore and Maria Montessori.
Though receiving no government subsidy, the system rapidly expanded to
166 schools in 1932, teaching from primary to teachers’ training level.
Taman Siswa schools aimed at sound development of personality and
freedom of the individual within a broad national, rather than interna-
tional, colonial, or Islamic, culture. Although explicitly nonpolitical in
curriculum, the schools played a major role in developing self-confidence
and skills among young Indonesians. See also EDUCATION; NATION-
ALISM. [1279, 1288]

TAMBORA. Volcano on the island of Sumbawa that erupted in April

1815 in the most massive explosion in recent human history, substan-
tially exceeding that of Krakatau. Perhaps 12,000 people were killed on
Sumbawa, and a total of 117,000 died from the effects of the eruption.
The kingdoms of Tambora and Papegat on Sumbawa were destroyed; the
rain of ash caused crop failure and famine on Bali, Lombok, and neigh-
boring islands; and ash in the atmosphere made 1816 a “year without
summer” in Europe. [1176]

TAN MALAKA (Sutan Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka) (1897–1949).

An Indonesian revolutionary and Marxist theorist, he was born in West
Sumatra and educated there and in the Netherlands (1913–1919). On his
return to Indonesia, he was involved in labor union and later Partai Ko-
munis Indonesia (PKI) activity, becoming party chairman in December
1921. After backing a pawnshop workers’ strike, he was exiled in March
1922 to Holland, where he stood for parliament on the Dutch Commu-
nist Party ticket before going to Moscow to join the staff of the Com-
intern. He argued strongly for an alliance of communism with nation-
alism and Pan-Islam, and in 1923 he was appointed Comintern agent for
Southeast Asia, with headquarters in Canton. From exile, he opposed the
PKI’s decision to abandon its alliance with Sarekat Islam and to launch
a premature revolution. After the uprisings of 1926–1927 failed, the
party accused him of sabotage. The inaccurate description of him as
“Trotskyist” dates from this time.
 TANIMBAR • 425

On 1 June 1927 Tan Malaka founded the Partai Republik Indonesia

(PARI) in Bangkok, a secretive underground party that spread over
many parts of Indonesia (particularly Sumatra and Java) during the next
decade, though he himself remained abroad in southern China until 1937
and thereafter mostly in Singapore. In 1942, after the Japanese
takeover, he returned secretly to Indonesia, traveling via Sumatra to
Banten, where he worked mostly as a clerk in a coalmine in southern
Banten.
On the outbreak of the Revolution in 1945, Tan Malaka opposed the
more cautious policies of the Sukarno/Mohammad Hatta leadership
and favored mass mobilization on a platform of revolutionary change.
He became the central figure in the radical Persatuan Perjuangan de-
manding 100 percent independence. Accused of trying to overthrow the
state, he was jailed from March 1946 until September 1948, when the
Hatta government released him in order to strengthen the anti-PKI
forces. He remained, however, an implacable critic of negotiation with
the Dutch and in November 1948 became “promoter” of the new Murba
party. He continued campaigning against the Republican government af-
ter the second “Police Action” and was captured and shot by Republican
troops in February 1949. [0643, 0853, 0866, 0871, 0873]

TANAH BENGKOK (ambtsvelden). Land allocated to officials in lieu of

salary. The allocation of bengkok lands was abolished by Fransen van de
Putte in 1867 except at the village level, where it remained common in
Central and East Java. The strong hold of officials on these lands be-
came a recurrent source of social tension, especially during the late
1940s and early 1960s. See also LAND REFORM.

TANAH MERAH. See BOVEN DIGUL.

TANIMBAR (Timor Laut) ISLANDS. An archipelago of about 70, mostly

low, limestone and coral islands with coastal villages engaged in fishing
and warfare. In 1646 the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) signed a
monopoly treaty with some village chiefs for the trade in slaves,
turtleshell, shark fins, ambergris, beeswax, and sapanwood and briefly
established forts in the archipelago that they had abandoned by the end
of the century. The Dutch showed little interest in the islands in the 18th
or 19th centuries, but in 1912 a military expedition was sent to subdue
them. Extensive conversions to Catholicism and Protestantism then
took place.
426 • TANJUNG PRIOK

TANJUNG PRIOK. See JAKARTA; PORTS; WHITE PAPER.

TAPANULI. See BATAKS.

TARUMANEGARA. Early state in West Java, based in the vicinity of

modern Bogor. Its existence is known only from four Sanskrit inscrip-
tions from around 450 A.D., which record King Purnavarman as presid-
ing over canal construction, one of the earliest records of water manage-
ment in Southeast Asia. See also “HO-LO-TAN”; KUTAI; SUNDA.

TAXATION. An important measure of state power throughout Indonesian

history. Early rulers in the archipelago obtained significant income
through personal trade, plunder (see PIRACY), and direct control of
production by means of control of labor and land, but the development
of a state apparatus for regularized revenue collection was a gradual phe-
nomenon. There appear to have been two key elements in this process.
One was the emergence of an appanage system, under which rulers allo-
cated particular regions or blocks of population to “vassals” in exchange
for a guarantee of military and political support, a broadly feudal system.
The other was the emergence of tax farms (see PACHT). The forced de-
livery system of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in West Java
(see PRIANGAN) was an attempt at the direct taxation of peasants with
indigenous rulers as collection agents. This system was intensified with
the institution of land rent and the Cultivation System. Export and im-
port duties were an important part of state revenue after the abolition of
the VOC, while property tax was introduced in 1890. Company tax was
first levied in 1907 and income tax in 1908 (it was made uniform for all
races in 1920). In 1908 a poll tax (hoofdgeld, capitation) was levied in
North and West Sumatra as substitute for land rent. The poll tax levied
on Java and Madura as a substitute for herendiensten was abolished in
1927.
After independence, export and company taxes remained the central
pillar of state revenues and, in 1980–1981, 60 percent of all government
revenue came from tax on oil companies. Less than 1 percent of the pop-
ulation was subject to income tax. After 1983 a number of tax reform
measures were introduced, aimed in part at making Indonesia a more at-
tractive country for foreign investment and broadening the state’s tax
base. These included lowering the maximum tax rate from 45 to 35 per-
cent, introducing in April 1985 a 10 percent VAT (on many items such as
petroleum and tobacco as well as a number of farm inputs, particularly
 TEAK • 427

fertilizers, but not on farmers’ products), and reforming the income tax
laws. As a result of these reforms, nonoil income tax revenue increased
markedly, with 59 percent of government expenditures being funded by
this revenue in 1996 compared with only 24.7 percent prior to the re-
forms. Government revenue from income tax rose from Rp 12.5 billion
in 1992–1993 to Rp 55 billion in 1999–2000, with revenue from VAT ris-
ing from Rp 10.7 billion to Rp 33 billion in the same period. (This rise,
however, would have been more than offset by the fall in the exchange
rate of the rupiah during the financial crisis.) In effect from 1 January
2001, the finance ministry imposed a new tax structure for individual and
corporate taxpayers, with five different rates, ranging from 5 to 35 per-
cent, the highest rate being applied to those with an annual income of
more than Rp 200 million (US$22,700). See also GAMBLING;
PERDIKAN VILLAGES; TOBACCO. [0053, 0376, 0380, 0386, 0399]

TEA (Camellia sinensis Theaceae). Chinese in origin, tea was first grown
in Indonesia at the instigation of Governor-General Joannes Camphuys
in 1690. Extensive cultivation began in 1825 and was continued under
the Cultivation System, though never with much profit, and the gov-
ernment monopoly on production was lifted in 1865. After 1870 there
was a massive expansion of private tea plantations in mountainous areas
of West Java and later in North Sumatra. The industry suffered badly in
the Depression, especially because of the British Imperial Preference
scheme, but by 1940 a total of 213,000 hectares (ha) was under tea pro-
duction, about one third of it by smallholders, and tea was the Indies’
second export earner after rubber. Extensive clearing of plantations dur-
ing the Japanese occupation greatly reduced the planted areas (now
125,000 ha), and the industry was further hampered by the Darul Islam
(DI) rebellion in West Java. Dutch plantations were nationalized in 1957,
and a combination of disease, lack of investment and replanting, and
poor agricultural practices has meant that Indonesian tea tends to be of
lesser quality than fine teas from India and Sri Lanka, though it has high
production volume and commands about 8 percent of the world market.
In the 1970s, commercially bottled sweet tea (teh botol) gained an im-
portant share of the soft drink market. [0316, 0331, 0332]

TEAK (Tectona grandis Verbenaceae). Introduced from India, probably

about the 10th century, teak forests along the northern coast of Java be-
came a major source of income for the Dutch East Indies Company
(VOC). Prized for its hard wood and resistant to worms and ants, teak was
428 • TELEGRAPH

used for the construction of ships in precolonial times and was extensively
grown by the Netherlands Indies forestry service in Central and East Java.
Under the Suharto regime, these major teak plantations (in Cepu, Kebon-
hardjo, Kendal, Lawu, and Madiun) were managed by the state-owned Pe-
rum Perhutani (State Forestry Corporation). They received certification
from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1998, a certification that
was withdrawn in October 2001 for four of the five plantations because
long-term sustainability of the plantation resources was at serious risk and
Perhutani had failed to crack down on illegal logging. [1148]

TELEGRAPH. The first telegraph lines in Indonesia were laid in 1857 be-
tween Batavia and Buitenzorg (Bogor) and were briefly restricted to gov-
ernment use. An undersea cable between Batavia and Singapore was laid
in 1859 and the first lines on Sumatra in 1866. A link with Australia was
established via Banyuwangi in 1871. In 1905 the German-Dutch Tele-
graph Co. of Cologne completed a cable link to Yap in the German Pacific
territories, linking the colony with Europe via Siberia and the United
States, a line independent of British colonies and British firms. In 1905
the colonial government purchased a cable ship to establish undersea con-
nections throughout the archipelago. See also PALAPA.

TELEVISION. The national broadcaster Televisi Republik Indonesia

(TVRI) began operations in 1964. During the 1980s, under an Informa-
tion Ministry program called televisi masuk desa (television enters the
village), sets were provided to virtually all villages throughout the coun-
try, creating a major information conduit from the central government.
Commercial advertisements were banned from television in 1981. In
1987 there were an estimated 6 million television sets throughout the
country. The state-owned TVRI was a monopoly until 1989 when the
government licensed five private television channels to compete with it,
allowing them to make a profit by advertising but requiring that a por-
tion of their revenues go to the state network. Licenses for four of these
new channels went to Suharto’s friends and family. In 1999 President
B. J. Habibie doubled the number of commercial TV licenses. See also
MEDIA; PALAPA; RADIO. [0154, 1294, 1299, 1302]

TENGGER. See ASLI; HINDUISM.

TERNATE. Kingdom in northern Maluku that rose in the 13th century on

the basis of trade in cloves. It converted to Islam in the 15th century and
 TIGA A • 429

under the warlike Sultan Baabullah (r. 1570–1583) dominated much of

the surrounding region, including northern and eastern Sulawesi, Banda,
and the coasts of Papua. The Portuguese, who established a fort there
in 1522, were expelled in 1574, but the island was conquered by Span-
ish forces in 1606. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) competed
with Ternate for control of the clove trade, fighting a fierce war
(1652–1658) before Ternate finally accepted VOC suzerainty in 1667.
See also TIDORE. [0026]

THAILAND, RELATIONS WITH. After the tentative efforts toward re-

gional cooperation promoted by Thai leaders in the period immediately
following World War II (see SOUTH EAST ASIA LEAGUE), there were
few ties between the two countries until the establishment of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the late 1960s. During the
Sukarno era, Indonesian foreign policy leaders tended to view Thailand as
a feudal military regime, and during the Vietnam war, its membership in
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the presence of
American bases on its territory led Indonesians to see Thailand as a satel-
lite of the United States. Despite economic and some military cooperation
between the two countries within ASEAN during the 1970s and 1980s,
they differed in their approach to China and Vietnam, with Thailand re-
garding Vietnam as the most immediate threat and Indonesia instead view-
ing China as more minatory. As a result they favored competing strategies
in resolving the conflicts in Indochina, though ASEAN formally adopted
the Thai position. Indonesia’s closest economic ties have been with the
other members of ASEAN, but southern Thailand participates in a growth
triangle encompassing parts of Sumatra and Malaysia. See also CAM-
BODIA; SIAM, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. [1103, 1144]

TIDORE. A kingdom in northern Maluku, geographically close and rival

to Ternate, and like it based on the clove trade. It had major trading and
raiding links with Halmahera and Papua (and for this reason was cho-
sen in 1956 as provisional capital of the province of Irian Barat, then still
held by the Dutch). The Portuguese established a fort there in 1578, and
the Spanish, then united with the Portuguese, made it a center of their
operations in the region in the early 17th century. The island was cap-
tured by the Dutch in 1654. [0026, 1251]

TIGA A (Triple A) MOVEMENT. Initially a slogan “Japan the Light of

Asia, Japan the Leader of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia” sponsored by
430 • TIGA DAERAH

the Japanese on their arrival in Java in March 1942 and drawing on

widespread enthusiasm for Japan’s role in ending Dutch colonialism. By
April 1942 the slogan had ostensibly become an organization, apparently
for the mobilization of Indonesians in the war effort. It appears, however,
that the organization had little substance and certainly little participation
from senior Indonesian or Japanese figures. It was superseded by Putera
in March 1943 but had long been of no significance. [0663]

TIGA DAERAH (Three Regions) AFFAIR. From October to December

1945, a social revolution broke out in Brebes, Tegal, and Pemalang, the
so-called three regions of Pekalongan residency, in which the local elite
were killed or driven out and a coalition of local Partai Komunis In-
donesia (PKI) members, radical Muslims, and gangsters (lenggaong)
established a revolutionary government. The revolutionaries were nomi-
nally loyal to the Indonesian Republic, but the Republic’s leaders saw
them as dangerous and embarrassing, and the army suppressed the
movement in December 1945. [0660, 0665]

TIGER (Panthera tigris). The largest predatory animal in western Indone-

sia, preying mainly on pig and deer. As pig numbers increased with the
spread of cultivation, so apparently did those of the tiger, becoming a
major danger to human and animal life until the 19th century when for-
est clearing began to remove its habitat. A bounty was offered on car-
casses in many regions until 1897. Separate subspecies occurred on
Sumatra, Java, and Bali, the latter two of which are now extinct. The
Balinese subspecies probably disappeared before World War II; the Ja-
vanese was reduced to perhaps four individuals in 1989 and has since be-
come extinct. Leopards (sometimes called panthers), also found on Java,
appear to account for many reported tiger sightings. Only about 500 wild
Sumatran tigers remain, 75 percent of them inhabiting the island’s six na-
tional parks. See also WALLACE’S LINE. [1149, 1154, 1179, 1187]

TIMOR. Island at the eastern end of Nusatenggara, mountainous, arid,

and now seriously deforested. The indigenous population was of mixed
Austronesian-Melanesian ancestry and included the Atoni in the west
and the Belu in the center. Traders visited the island for sandalwood
from the seventh century, and Portuguese arrived for the same reason in
1520. Portugal’s regional center was on Solor, but coastal Timor came to
be dominated by the Topasses, or “black Portuguese,” mestizo descen-
dants of Dutch and Portuguese settlers and Solorese who also dominated
 TITLES • 431

eastern Flores. In the 17th century, Makassarese influence led to the

conversion of some regions to Islam. A Dutch settlement was founded at
Kupang in 1653 and a Portuguese post at Dili in 1769, but it was not un-
til 1839 that negotiations began to sort out a colonial division of territory
on the island. A treaty was signed in 1859, but only in 1914 was the bor-
der finally fixed and colonial rule firmly established in the interior on ei-
ther side of the border. See also EAST TIMOR; ROTI. [0029, 0953,
1220, 1255, 1266]

TIMOR GAP. See ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT.

TIMOR LAUT. See TANIMBAR.

TIN. Rich alluvial tin (cassiterite) deposits are found in Indonesia on the is-
lands of Bangka and Belitung, geologically an extension of the Malay
Peninsula, which was a major early source of tin for the production of
bronze (see COPPER). Small amounts of tin were exported to China
from the 13th century. Large-scale extraction was begun on Bangka in
1710 by the Sultan of Palembang. Mining was undertaken by Chinese,
organized in kongsi, who contracted with the sultan to pay for the right
to extract tin from defined areas. This system was taken over by the
Dutch in 1823, the government supplying advances of rice, oil, and
money and contracting to buy tin at a price fixed in advance according
to the expected productivity of the soil.
Mechanization of the mining began in the early 20th century, and in
1927 the so-called Bangka Tinwinning was established as a state enter-
prise of the colonial government; after World War II, operations were
taken over by a private firm, the Gemeenschappelijke Mijnbouw Billi-
ton, which was nationalized in 1953. Mining began on Belitung in 1850
and by 1860 was in the hands of a private company, the Billiton-
Maatschappij. Actual extraction of the tin, however, was done by Chi-
nese kongsi. Large-scale offshore mining using dredges began in 1966.
In the early 1990s many of the mines began to be closed, and mining
phased out as world prices made it unprofitable to mine the tin reserves.
The state-owned company PT Tambang Timah began producing low-
lead tin in 1992 to meet the more stringent import requirements of the
United States and Europe. [0411, 0801]

TITLES. A wide variety of titles, hereditary and conferred, were used by

the traditional aristocracies of the archipelago, and many of these were
432 • TJIK DI TIRO, TEUNGKU

preserved by the Dutch as part of their policy of retaining native rulers

as agents of colonial rule. During and immediately after the Revolution,
many titles fell out of use, but they seem now to be being revived. The
Javanese lower aristocratic title Raden (abbreviated R.) and its female
equivalent Raden Ajeng (R.A.) are commonly used today as are the Mi-
nangkabau Sutan (St.), the Malay Datuk and Pangeran, and the Bugis
Karaëng and Arung.
Many elite Indonesians have academic titles obtained from the Dutch
or Netherlands Indies education system. Mr. (meester in de rechten) was
the primary law degree but has now been replaced by SH (sarjana
hukum), placed after the holder’s name. Drs. (doctorandus, now SS or
sarjana sastra) is sometimes misleadingly described as denoting com-
pletion of all requirements for a doctorate but the dissertation. It was in
fact the standard undergraduate course in arts and economics, but since
it included a short thesis (scriptie) it is perhaps most closely equivalent
to a master’s degree. Ir. (ingenieur) was the primary degree for graduates
in engineering, agriculture, and similar technical fields. Dr. was the
standard title of the holder of a medical degree, but was commonly
spelled dokter or dr. to distinguish it from the thesis-based higher doc-
torates. See also NAMES.

TJIK DI TIRO, TEUNGKU (1836–1891). An Acehnese ulama (religious

teacher), he joined guerrilla resistance to the Dutch in Aceh in 1878 and
soon emerged as principal leader of the ulama, touring the countryside to
preach holy war. His example helped to establish the ulama firmly as the
symbols of opposition to colonialism, unlike secular war leaders
(uleëbalang) such as Teuku Umar. [0818]

TJIPTO MANGOENKOESOEMO (1886–1943). Physician and one of

the founders of Budi Utomo in May 1908. Unlike his colleagues, he was
strongly critical of the feudalism and conservatism of traditional Ja-
vanese culture, and he tried to move Budi Utomo away from exclusively
focusing on Java and on the priyayi. He advocated especially the elimi-
nation of the Javanese language whose levels of address, he argued, pre-
served social inequalities. Dissatisfied with Budi Utomo, he left in Oc-
tober 1909 and in 1911 helped to found the radical multiracial Indische
Partij. He was expelled from the Indies 1913–1914 but on his return was
appointed to the first Volksraad as a representative of Insulinde. He was
exiled to Banda in 1928–1941, accused of complicity in the 1926–1927
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) uprisings.
 TORAJA • 433

TJOKROAMINOTO, HAJI UMAR SAID (1882–1934). Although

trained as a government official, he left to work in various jobs before
becoming Surabaya leader of the Sarekat Dagang Islam. A charismatic
figure, he soon emerged as a national leader and was chosen to head
Sarekat Islam (SI) when it took its new shortened name in September
1912. Many peasants believed him to be the ratu adil, or just prince, of
Javanese mythology, and he was reputed (incorrectly) to have been born
as Krakatau erupted. Under his leadership, SI won a huge following,
claiming about 2 million members, but it became increasingly divided
between Marxists of the Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging
(ISDV) and radical Muslim scholars, whom Tjokroaminoto tried to bal-
ance in an uneasy compromise. He also sought to avoid provoking Dutch
repression and accepted appointment to the first Volksraad. He became
less sympathetic to the Marxists after they criticized him in 1920, but
was in jail for alleged perjury over the Afdeling B Affair when they were
expelled. In February 1923 he formed the remains of SI into the Partai
Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), but this too lost much support with the
founding of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926.

TOBACCO (Nicotiana tabacum Solanaceae). One of the first New World

plants to reach the archipelago, being reported from the court of
Mataram on Java in 1601. The chewing of betel and the smoking of
opium and probably cannabis were then already known in the archipel-
ago, and tobacco spread only gradually as a drug of addiction, often be-
ing used in conjunction with betel, opium, or both. From 1830 to 1864 to-
bacco was grown widely on Java under the Cultivation System. Later in
the century, the Vorstenlanden and West Kalimantan became major ar-
eas of Western-owned plantation tobacco, while there was extensive
smallholder cultivation on Java, especially in Kedu and Banyumas. The
main area of production, however, was East Sumatra, where J. Nienhuys
established the first plantation in 1863–1864. Indonesian cigarette con-
sumption today is dominated by kretek, cigarettes in which the tobacco is
mixed with cloves. The importance of tobacco excise to state income and
of cigarettes as penghibur rakyat (comforters of the people) led the gov-
ernment to discourage the emergence of an antismoking campaign.

TONARIGUMI. See RUKUN TETANGGA.

TORAJA. Ethnic group in the mountains of central Sulawesi. The region

was divided into numerous small communities subject to periodic slaving
434 • TOTOK

and plundering raids by coastal kingdoms such as Luwu, though in the

17th century most joined a temporary alliance against Bugis invasion.
Coffee was introduced as a major crop in the 1870s, and increased rev-
enue from coffee exports seems to have enabled a few chiefs, such as
Pong Tiku of Pangala, to establish themselves as regional warlords in the
final decades of the 19th century. The Dutch conquered the region in
1905–1906 as part of their general consolidation of power in the archi-
pelago, but their administrative reorganization and demands for taxes and
corvée labor sparked a major rebellion in 1917. Christianity has since
spread to 80 percent of the population, Islam to 10 percent. In the 1980s
traditional Toraja religion was recognized, under the name Aluk, as a sect
of Hinduism. [0130, 1269, 1270, 1272]

TOTOK. Colonial-era term for anyone recently arrived in the Indies or,
more generally and in contrast to peranakan, to unacculturated immi-
grant communities. See also CHINESE IN INDONESIA.

TOURISM. Organized tourism, with fixed timetables and itineraries and

prepayment for services, began only after travel permit requirements
were abolished for Europeans on Java and Madura in 1902, detailed
tourist guides being published soon after and ever since. In general, pre-
war tourism showed visitors natural phenomena (including landscapes),
antiquities, and colonial architecture; postwar tourism emphasized in-
digenous culture and food. In 1987, 1.05 million foreign tourists visited
Indonesia, Bali being the favored destination.
Despite the unrest plaguing Indonesia in the post-Suharto years, more
than 5 million foreigners visited the country in 2001, bringing in more
than $5 billion in foreign exchange. Tourism was the biggest foreign ex-
change earner after oil and gas. The number of tourists visiting Indone-
sia, however, plummeted after the rise in terrorism, especially after the
12 October 2002 bombing of the nightclub in Bali. [0088–0090, 0093,
0095, 0130]

TOWNS. See CITIES.

TRADE. The exchange of goods between individuals and groups is as old

in the Indonesian archipelago as anywhere in the world, but it was not
until improvements in shipping technology around the beginning of the
Christian era that the region became part of the great maritime trade
route that extended from southern China to the eastern Mediterranean.
 TRADE • 435

The route was in fact a complex of trade routes in which most com-
modities traveled only part of the total distance and typically passed re-
peatedly from one trader to another at the entrepôt ports that dotted the
coastline. Until the 10th century, commerce in Indonesian waters was
primarily in Indonesian hands, and Southeast Asians controlled most of
the shipping north to China. Indian merchants, on the other hand, domi-
nated trade in the Bay of Bengal, though the absence of Indian vocabu-
lary derived from trade in Indonesian languages suggests that they did
not penetrate far. The rhythm of this trade was seasonal, following the
changing pattern of the monsoons.
The principal goods of this trade are fairly well known. Cotton cloth
from India and silk and porcelain from China were major imports, while
the archipelago exported a more varied range of spices, minerals, and
forest products. The organization of the trade is less well understood. It
has commonly been suggested that most traders were “peddlers” operat-
ing as individuals with small capital and carrying small quantities of rel-
atively high-value goods between entrepôts. There is a good deal of evi-
dence, however, that local rulers were involved not only in taxing and
plundering trade (see PIRACY) but also in large-scale commercial en-
terprises.
It is fairly clear that the arrival of the Portuguese in Indonesia in the
16th century brought little change to the pattern of trade. The Portuguese
strength lay primarily in their naval power and their consequent ability
to seize ports such as Melaka and to extract customs duties from pass-
ing merchants. The European trading companies, however, have gener-
ally been seen as a major organizational innovation, partly because their
capital reserves enabled them to outlast local competitors in difficult
markets, partly because their bureaucratic structures made them less de-
pendent on the will and ability of single individuals. The Dutch East In-
dies Company (VOC), however, also relied to a considerable extent on
armed force to hold its dominant position in the trade of the archipelago.
The rise of the European trading companies changed the balance of po-
litical power in the archipelago, impoverishing the former merchant
princes of the coastal states and strengthening the hand of the feudal
elites of the interior.
In the early years of independence, the Republic attempted to counter
Dutch domination of the import-export trade by establishing the Central
Trading Company in 1948 to export agricultural products, and in 1956 it
established the USINDO to export factory products and import raw mate-
rials. Until the 1960s Indonesia’s primary exports were rubber, oil, tin,
436 • TRADE

copra, coffee, sugar, tobacco, and coffee (in that order), with rubber pro-
viding nearly 50 percent of export earnings in the early 1950s. Oil in-
creasingly assumed the primary role, and in 1965 oil and rubber con-
tributed almost 70 percent of Indonesia’s export earnings. During the early
years of the New Order, the volume of exports grew rapidly with oil and
associated products making up more than 80 percent of Indonesia’s export
earnings at the peak of the oil boom. This changed with the collapse of oil
prices in the mid-1980s, after which the government attempted to diversify
Indonesia’s exports (see ECONOMY). Oil and liquefied natural gas,
which had constituted 73 percent of the total value of Indonesian exports
in 1984, formed only 51.7 percent in January–September 1987, with agri-
cultural, industrial, and mining exports making up the remaining 48.3 per-
cent. By 1993 nonenergy exports—notably plywood, textiles, garments,
and shoes—had risen to 76 percent of total export earnings. Between 1987
and 1996, there was a surge in low-skill, labor-intensive manufactured ex-
ports.
The late 1960s was a time of economic liberalism in the field of trade
policy, but import bans began to appear again in the early 1970s acceler-
ating after the Malari demonstrations of 1974. Trade restrictions were
expanded in the late 1970s and further tightened through the early 1980s,
when increasing numbers of nontariff barriers were imposed in the form
of restrictive import licensing bans and quotas. Under pressure from the
technocrats and international lending institutions, however, in 1986 im-
port liberalization measures were instituted, including an across-the-
board tariff reduction, and in October of that year the first reform pack-
age was introduced, followed by others in 1988, 1990, and 1991 that
transformed Indonesian industry, making it internationally competitive.
The government initiated further tariff reductions in 1995, and this series
of trade liberalization measures culminated in June 1996 when it was an-
nounced that tariffs would be cut on 1,497 items, simplifying trade pro-
cedures and offering more flexibility for foreign manufacturers. This
brought the average tariffs in Indonesia down to around 15 percent. But
the growing cronyism of the regime meant that many businesses owned
by those close to Suharto were unaffected by these reforms. Between
1970 and 1997, Indonesia’s trade as a percentage of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) rose from 28 percent to 56 percent.
Between 1966 and the 1990s, there was a major shift in Indonesia’s
trading relationships from North America and Europe toward Japan and
other East Asian nations, with a growing volume of trade among the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the peak of the oil
 TRANSMIGRATION • 437

boom, Japan/East Asia absorbed about 70 percent of Indonesia’s exports,

with the United States receiving around 15–30 percent.
In the 2–3 months immediately following Suharto’s resignation, ex-
ports continued to increase because the collapse in the value of the ru-
piah meant that Indonesian products were competitively priced, but in
the closing months of 1998 exports plunged as oil prices declined and
East Asian economies failed to recover from the financial crisis. The de-
cline continued in subsequent years, with total exports falling from
US$62.1 billion in 2000 to US$57 billion in 2002. [0290, 0301, 0303,
0313, 0438–0459, 0516, 0521, 0540, 0542, 0558, 0571, 0769]

TRADE UNIONS. See LABOR UNIONS.

TRANSMIGRATION. The government policy of shifting people from

the heavily populated Inner Islands of Indonesia (Java, Madura, Bali,
and Lombok) to the ostensibly underpopulated Outer Islands began in
1902 as part of the Ethical Policy. By 1931, 36,000 people were living
in the first transmigration settlement in Lampung. After independence,
transmigration was often seen as a panacea for the problems of rural
Java, and extravagant plans were drafted in 1952 for using it to reduce
the population of Java (then over 50 million) to 31 million by 1987.
Sukarno announced an annual resettlement target of 1.5 million in
1964, and Suharto raised this to 2 million in 1966. In fact, however, no
more than 340,000 people were shifted from Java to Sumatra in the
years 1950 to 1965. Between 1969 and 1982 about 1 million people
were moved, during which time the population of Java-Madura rose by
about 17 million.
The program became a major undertaking of the New Order and was
given legislative basis in the 1972 Law on Transmigration. It received fi-
nancial and technical support from the World Bank but has proven very
expensive, at its peak in the mid-1980s costing $7,000 per family moved
and consuming 6 percent of the national budget. Officially people are
not compelled to take part, but those displaced by development projects
or natural disasters are often heavily pressured to join. Until 1985 former
political prisoners (see TAHANAN POLITIK) were encouraged to take
part, but they have since been banned.
The initial rationale for transmigration was the relief of population
pressure on Java, but government statements later emphasized that the
benefits of transmigration would fall to those who took part rather than
those who stayed behind. A further goal, less publicly stated, was the
438 • TRAVEL

transmission of Javanese agricultural techniques and culture to other re-

gions both for economic development and for national integration. The
Suharto regime saw settlements of Javanese and Balinese in outer re-
gions as a useful obstacle to potential local secessionist movements.
Transmigration, however, in some cases increased local tensions, espe-
cially where transmigrants were settled on land that local people be-
lieved to be theirs; the national government was generally unwilling, for
instance, to recognize the land rights of shifting cultivators and hunting
communities. There was some killing of transmigrants in Sulawesi dur-
ing the PRRI/Permesta rebellion and later of transmigrants in Papua.
In the 1980s, criticism of the environmental consequences of transmi-
gration also increased. After the fall of Suharto, the transmigration poli-
cies of his regime were frequently blamed for the interethnic violence
that broke out in Kalimantan, Maluku, and Papua. See also JAVA-
NIZATION; POPULATION. [0955, 0977, 1322, 1378]

TRAVEL. To protect its trading monopoly, the Dutch East Indies Com-
pany (VOC) banned from its possessions all Europeans not in its ser-
vice. After the fall of the company, various more liberal regulations were
introduced, but under the Cultivation System the old restrictions were
largely restored before being lifted in stages between 1861 and 1911 (on
Java and Madura; 1916 in the Outer Islands) when Europeans became
free to trade and reside anywhere in the archipelago, subject only to the
exorbitante rechten of the governors-general. Formal restrictions on the
travel of Indonesians began only in 1816, with the introduction of a pass
system intended to keep the labor force in place. Passes were abolished
in 1863 and liberalization of travel regulations continued, a pace or two
behind that for Europeans, until 1914 (on Java; 1918 in the Outer Is-
lands), when travel and residence throughout the archipelago was virtu-
ally unrestricted. Chinese and other “foreign orientals” (see RACE)
were regulated separately but in a similar way to Indonesians, being sub-
ject to pass laws from 1816 to 1863 and being required from 1835 to
1919 to live in so-called wijken (districts) or Chinatowns. Current regu-
lations require Indonesians to obtain a surat jalan for long or inter-
provincial journeys. In November 1982, a so-called fiscal fee was intro-
duced to discourage overseas travel by Indonesians. In 1989 Indonesia
announced it would abolish the requirement that citizens leaving the
country obtain exit permits. See also LINSCHOTEN, J. H. VAN;
MARCO POLO; PIRES, TOMÉ; ROADS; SHIPPING; TOURISM.
[1078, 1100]
 TURTLE • 439

TREKKERS. Dutch residents of the Indies intending to return to the

Netherlands at the end of their term of service, in contrast to the blijvers
who intended to remain in the colony on retirement. See also DUTCH IN
INDONESIA

TRIBUTE SYSTEM. See CHINA, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH.

TRUNOJOYO, RADEN (c. 1649–1680). A prince of Madura who con-

spired with the crown prince of Mataram against King Amangkurat I,
who had had Trunojoyo’s father killed. After seizing Madura in 1671 he
attacked Java, declaring himself king in 1675. He defeated Mataram in
1677, capturing the court and sending the king into exile. His former co-
conspirator the crown prince, however, as Amangkurat II, obtained help
from the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) and defeated the rebels in
1679. Trunojoyo was executed in 1680. [0484, 0560]

TURKEY, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. After the capture of Constan-

tinople in 1453, the Ottoman Turkish Empire was the preeminent mili-
tary power and cultural center in the Islamic world and a natural focus of
attention among the newly Islamizing peoples in the Indonesian archi-
pelago, especially as a potential ally against the Portuguese. A Turkish
diplomat, Seh Ibrahim, helped to mediate the Treaty of Giyanti in 1755.
Aceh is said to have accepted Ottoman suzerainty in the 16th century,
and Sultan Ibrahim renewed the submission in 1850; his successors ap-
pealed to the Ottomans for help in 1869, just prior to the Aceh War.
Turkey’s abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 helped to crystallize division
within the Sarekat Islam (SI) over the place of Islam: many modernists
saw the reforms of Kemal Atatürk as a model for what might be achieved
in an independent Indonesia, but traditionalists saw them as an example
of dangerous secularism, and this concern contributed to the founding of
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. [1363]

TURMERIC. Spice prepared from the ends of the root fibers of Curcuma
domestica (Zingiberaceae), valued both for its bright yellow color and its
flavor. Originally exported from Southeast Asia to China and India, it
soon came to be cultivated in both places. [0527]

TURTLE. The shell of the hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) has been
exported from Indonesia to China for at least two millennia. Turtle eggs are
a source of food for some communities in eastern Indonesia. [1154]
440 • UJUNG KULON

–U–

UJUNG KULON. Peninsula on the southwestern corner of Java, the sole

remaining habitat of Javan rhinoceros. A nature reserve was declared in
1921, a game reserve in 1937, and a national park, including the volcanic
island of Krakatau, in 1980. See also CONSERVATION. [1154]

UJUNG PANDANG. See MAKASSAR.

ULAMA. Muslim teachers and religious leaders. See ISLAM; NAHDLATUL

ULAMA.

UMAR, TEUKU (1854–1899). Acehnese war leader (uleëbalang) and op-

portunist. In the prolonged Aceh War, he sided alternately with the Dutch
(1883–1884 and 1893–1896) and the Acehnese (1873–1883, 1884–1893,
and 1896–1899). While Umar’s own motives seem to have been mainly
personal ambition, his career typified the ambivalence of the uleëbalang
toward the colonial authorities on the one hand and the ulama (religious
teachers) on the other, and was a forerunner of the uleëbalang-Dutch coali-
tion that uneasily ruled Aceh in the first part of the 20th century. [0818]

UNIÃO DEMOCRÁTICA TIMORENSE (UDT, Timorese Democratic

Union). Founded on 11 May 1974 as the party of the East Timor estab-
lishment and the first party after the Lisbon coup. It was dominated by
mixed-race Portuguese-Timorese from the small commercial, adminis-
trative, and agricultural elites, as well as traditional chiefs (liurai), and it
more or less inherited the membership of the Acção Nacional Populár.
Its program called for general political liberalization and movement to
self-government under Portuguese tutelage. From January to May 1975
it was in coalition with Fretilin, but after staging an unsuccessful coup
on 11 August it joined Associação Popular Democrática Timorese
(Apodeti) in seeking integration with Indonesia. After incorporation, the
UDT leader Francisco Lopez da Cruz became deputy governor, but the
party ceased to exist in early 1976. [0806]

UNIÃO NACIONAL. See ACÇÃO NACIONAL POPULÁR.

UNITED KINGDOM, RELATIONS WITH. See BRITAIN, RELATIONS

WITH.
 UNITED NATIONS • 441

UNITED NATIONS (UN). From its inception in 1945, the United Nations
took an active interest in decolonization and was drawn into the Indonesian-
Dutch dispute in July 1947, when India and Australia raised the Dutch
first “Police Action” in the Security Council. The UN responded in Octo-
ber 1947 by appointing a so-called Good Offices Commission, consisting
of Australia, Belgium, and the United States, to facilitate a settlement. This
commission presided over the Renville Agreement of January 1948. At the
beginning of 1949, after the second “Police Action,” the Security Council
demanded the full transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia by mid-1950.
Indonesia joined the UN on 26–29 September 1950 and was able to
use UN good offices again in the early 1960s in the transfer of West Irian
(Papua) from Dutch rule, when the UN acted as intermediary in receiv-
ing the territory from the Dutch in 1962 and handing it to Indonesia on 1
May 1963. Although thereafter a UN Temporary Executive Authority
(UNTEA) was still acting as the overseer for the Act of Free Choice that
was to be held in five years’ time to determine the wishes of the Papuan
people, on 2 January 1965 Sukarno indignantly pulled Indonesia out of
the international body. This was when Malaysia became a temporary
member of the Security Council (see CONFRONTATION). Indonesia
then tried to organize an alternative UN in the form of a Conference of
the New Emerging Forces (Conefo), but this had made little headway by
the time Sukarno lost power. Indonesia rejoined the UN in September
1966.
In November 1975, Portugal formally requested UN help in solving its
East Timor problem, and on 12 December the General Assembly passed
a motion calling on Indonesia to withdraw. On 22 December 1975 and
22 April 1976, the Security Council condemned the Indonesian invasion
of East Timor and again instructed it to withdraw; Indonesia ignored this
instruction, as well as annual motions of condemnation passed by the
General Assembly from 1975 to 1982.
After Suharto’s resignation, Jakarta finally proposed granting a spe-
cial status to East Timor, and UN-brokered talks began in late 1998 be-
tween Portuguese and Indonesian representatives, focusing on a plan for
“autonomy with special status” for East Timor. The UN supervised a ref-
erendum on independence on 31 August 1999, but it left security in the
hands of the Indonesians rather than introducing a UN peacekeeping
force. When it became clear that a vast majority of the voters had opted
for independence, Indonesia-supported militias went on a rampage,
killing hundreds of civilians (including UN staff members). Indonesia
declared martial law and tried to retain control, but finally yielded to
442 • UNITED STATES, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH

threats from the international community and financial institutions, and

permitted a 7,500-soldier UN-backed International Force for East Timor
headed by Australia to land on 20 September to restore order.
The UN set up a transitional government in the territory, but an esti-
mated 120,000 East Timorese remained in refugee camps in West Timor
and the continuing tension broke into open violence with the murder of
three UN workers on 6 September 2000 on the West Timor side of the
border. After general elections through which Jose Alexandre
“Xanana” Gusmão was elected president, the UN secretary-general
ceded governing authority on 20 May 2002 to the newly independent
Democratic Republic of East Timor. [0661, 0744, 0855, 0959, 1123,
1141]

UNITED STATES, HISTORICAL LINKS WITH. Traders from

Britain’s American colonies were present in Indonesian ports well be-
fore the Revolution of 1776, and the American scientist Thomas Hors-
field (1773–1859) conducted important research on Java in the early
19th century, but U.S. interest in Indonesia did not become substantial
until the middle of the 19th century, when U.S. missionary groups began
conversion in Sumatra and growing U.S. industrialization stimulated
trade. In the 1860s, the United States exported oil to Indonesia, but from
1871 American companies, especially Socony, took an important role in
oil exploration in the archipelago. U.S. investment in East Sumatra’s
rubber was important, and the United States became a major market for
Indies spices, coffee, tobacco, and, after 1905, oil. The Acehnese unsuc-
cessfully requested U.S. help against the Dutch in 1873. [1118]

UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH. Indonesian nationalists were

aware from at least 1944 that the United States was a major power in the
Western Pacific, and the first actions of the Indonesian Republic were de-
signed in part to win U.S. support for the independence struggle. Repub-
lican leaders explicitly compared their declaration of independence to
that of the United States and further guaranteed the position of U.S. com-
mercial interests in the archipelago. During the Revolution, Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo on behalf of the Indonesian government made exten-
sive efforts to involve the United States on the side of Indonesia by mak-
ing commercial agreements with U.S. firms more generous than the
Dutch were ever likely to concede. The United States, however, re-
mained generally lukewarm toward the Republic, particularly since it
needed to keep the Netherlands amenable to participation in the North
 UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH • 443

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and it aimed primarily but unsuc-

cessfully at a settlement acceptable to both sides. After the suppression
of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) at Madiun in 1948, however,
U.S. official opinion swung strongly behind the Mohammad Hatta gov-
ernment as a likely bastion against communism in Southeast Asia, and
after the Second “Police Action,” U.S. pressure was one of the factors
forcing the Dutch to make a rapid transfer of sovereignty to the Repub-
lic (see also UNITED NATIONS).
The United States cultivated Indonesian governments in the 1950s as
potential noncommunist allies in Asia, but the idea of direct alliance with
the United States was unpopular in Indonesia and in 1952 the Sukiman
government fell over its acceptance of U.S. military aid. The United
States’ unease with Indonesia’s leftward swing under Ali Sastroamijoyo
and then under Guided Democracy led it to give clandestine military
support to the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 1958, which was exposed
with the shooting down of an American B-25 pilot, Alan Pope, over Am-
bon on 18 May. Relations improved in the early 1960s, when the United
States pressed the Netherlands to abandon its claim to West Irian (see
Papua), but they deteriorated rapidly from 1962. An economic stabiliza-
tion program offered by the United States under International Monetary
Fund (IMF) supervision was rejected by Sukarno because of Con-
frontation with Malaysia. But the United States maintained continuing
contact with the Indonesian army via training and supplies (by 1965,
half the officers corps had received some U.S. training).
The United States was delighted with the accession to power of General
Suharto in 1965–1966, though the extent to which it played a role in his
success is unclear; Suharto certainly knew that the United States would
support the removal of Sukarno and the banning of the PKI, and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) clearly played a propaganda role in ensur-
ing that the ambiguous Gestapu coup of 30 September 1965 was seen un-
equivocally by the general public in Indonesia as a communist plot. After
the consolidation of the New Order, relations between the United States
and the Suharto regime were stable. Indonesia remained officially non-
aligned and committed to the removal of great power influence from the
region, but in practice it aligned itself fairly closely with the United States.
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in December 1975 was carried out
only after it was clear that the action had been approved by President Ger-
ald Ford. The subsequent U.S. unwillingness to accept Indonesia’s annex-
ation of the territory without demur strained relations, and from this time
U.S. concern over Indonesia’s human rights record and the question of
444 • UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

copyright protection caused further difficulties. President Suharto an-

noyed Washington in 1988 with calls for a nuclear weapons–free zone in
Southeast Asia. In May 1989 a visit by Vice President Dan Quayle was
greeted with demonstrations against the role of U.S.-based transnational
corporations in environmental destruction, especially in Papua.
In 1991 the U.S. Congress suspended Indonesia’s participation in the
International Military Education and Training program (IMET) because
of the Dili massacre in East Timor, and in 1999 after the army was im-
plicated in the killing and destruction surrounding the plebiscite there,
Congress banned all military sales to Indonesia. Military ties began to be
resumed after Indonesia agreed to East Timor’s independence, and, in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington on
11 September 2001, Congress set aside $21 million for regional coun-
terterrorism training programs in Indonesia, signifying U.S. hopes for
stronger ties with the Indonesian military.
President Megawati Sukarnoputri was one of the first foreign lead-
ers to visit the United States after 11 September, and she pledged that she
would participate in the global fight on terrorism. But her government re-
fused to endorse military strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan and
declined to grant the U.S. military permission to fly through Indonesian
air space. In addition, in the U.S. Congress the Leahy amendment still re-
tained the condition that human rights abusers had to be brought to jus-
tice. Resumption of military ties was thus impeded in Congress by the
Indonesian military’s refusal both to accept responsibility for bloodshed
in East Timor and to extradite those indicted, as well as by its reluctance
to move against Islamic radicals allegedly linked to Jemaah Islamiah
(see ISLAM IN INDONESIA).
Nevertheless, the U.S. State Department sought approval from Con-
gress for $16 million in aid to Jakarta for peacekeeping and counterter-
rorism, and the Pentagon pushed ahead with plans to give Indonesia $8
million for training and equipping a domestic peacekeeping force to
combat communal, sectarian, and ethnic violence. Another $8 million
was earmarked for training civilian-led Indonesian counterterrorism
units. Despite the Indonesian government’s foot-dragging on human
rights, in mid-2002 the U.S. administration pressured Congress to pro-
vide financing for a new “command and control” unit for the Indonesian
army to carry out peacekeeping tasks in places like Maluku and to allow
Indonesian officers to receive training in the United States. At the begin-
ning of August 2002, the secretary of state announced that the United
States would resume direct military training aid to Indonesia, and in late
September the first three officers arrived in the United States to partici-
 URBANIZATION • 445

pate in an antiterrorism program. The State Department also urged a U.S.

federal court to dismiss a lawsuit brought by human rights groups against
ExxonMobil in behalf of Acehnese villagers complaining of the oil com-
panies’ complicity in the human rights violations by Indonesian soldiers.
When the foreign aid bill was passed in mid-February 2003, the Sen-
ate made the aid conditional on certification that military officers were
being prosecuted for alleged involvement in “gross violations of human
rights,” which included not only the massacre in East Timor but also the
killings in Papua and Aceh. Unaffected was the money provided for
counterterrorism programs, most of which went to civilian and police
training, and $400,000 allocated for officer training.
After the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, the Indonesian govern-
ment became more cooperative in hunting for terrorists and soon arrested
and brought to trial several suspects in the Bali bombing and other vio-
lence. But the U.S. refusal to share intelligence information obtained from
Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), the alleged head of Jemaah Islamiyah, after
his arrest in Thailand in August 2003 angered the Indonesians. U.S.–In-
donesian relations were also strained over measures passed in early 2003
ordering all Indonesian men in the United States to show that they had
valid documents, a measure that applied to people of no other Southeast
Asian country. Tension further increased after an FBI investigation found
that Indonesian soldiers, not members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka
(OPM), were responsible for the August 2002 killings of two Americans
near the Freeport mine in Papua. Nevertheless, leaders in the Pentagon
continued to press Congress for increased aid to the Indonesian army and
support for Indonesia in the fight against terrorism, pressure that gained
strength with Jakarta’s hiring of former senate majority leader Robert
Dole as a lobbyist to represent Indonesia’s interests in Washington. See
also ISLAMIC STATE. [0973, 1109, 1117, 1121, 1126, 1127, 1144]

UPAS (Antiaris toxicaria Urticaceae, ipoh). Tree that produces a highly poi-
sonous sap, formerly smeared, sometimes in conjunction with locally pro-
duced strychnine, on darts and arrows for hunting and on swords and dag-
gers for warfare. It was extensively used in the defense of Melaka against
the Portuguese in 1511. The tree became the subject of a widespread sci-
entific myth initiated by Rumphius, which held that its fumes would rap-
idly kill any living thing, plant or animal, within a radius of several meters
or more. The legend probably derived originally from efforts by producers
of the poison to discourage closer investigation of its origins. [1148, 1189]

URBANIZATION. See CITIES.

446 • VADERLANDSE CLUB

–V –

VADERLANDSE CLUB. Conservative association of Europeans in the

Netherlands Indies founded in 1929 to promote Dutch interests in the
colony and to resist Indonesian nationalism and the expansion of in-
digenous education. It had 9,000 members in 1930. Though sometimes
vocal, it had little influence on government policy. [0602]

VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE COMPAGNIE. See DUTCH EAST

INDIES COMPANY (VOC).

VICE PRESIDENT. The post of vice president has no formal responsibil-

ities except to support and, if necessary, to replace the president. Mo-
hammad Hatta, elected vice president in 1945 under the first constitu-
tion, was prime minister 1948–1950 by virtue of his national standing
rather than his vice presidency. He was reappointed vice president by
Sukarno in October 1950 under the provisional constitution, but resigned
in 1956, after which the post remained vacant until 1973. In the New Or-
der, Hamengkubuwono IX was vice president from 1973 to 1978;
Adam Malik (1917–1984) from 1978 to 1983; Umar Wira-
hadikusumah from 1983 to 1988; Sudharmono from 1988 to 1993; Try
Sutrisno from 1993 to 1998; and B. J. Habibie from March to May 1998.
After the first post-Suharto elections, Megawati Sukarnoputri became
Abdurrachman Wahid’s vice president from 1999 to 2001; and Hamzah
Haz, chairman of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), was ap-
pointed vice president when Megawati became president in 2001. As vice
president Megawati was given major responsibility for the problems of
eastern Indonesia, and when she replaced Wahid as president, she chose
Hamzah Haz as her vice president largely to provide a balance between
her nationalist-oriented Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan
(PDI-P) and Muslim groups. [0970, 1100]

VIETNAM HISTORICAL LINKS AND RELATIONS WITH. Strong

Chinese influence in Vietnam tended to limit its role in Southeast Asia in
early times, though it was a major exporter of ceramics to Indonesia in the
15th century. Thereafter the rise of European power in the region strength-
ened the mutual isolation. In 1947 Vietnam and Indonesia cooperated
briefly in the South East Asia League but made little attempt otherwise
to coordinate their national struggles. Sukarno recognized the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and accepted a National Liberation
 VOLCANOES • 447

Front (NLF) mission in Jakarta. At the request of the United States, In-
donesian troops were posted in South Vietnam as part of the International
Commission of Control and Supervision under the Paris Accord of 1972.
Following Vietnam’s reunification in 1975, refugees from Vietnam
began to arrive in large numbers in Indonesia’s Natuna archipelago, and
between 1977 and 1981 the Indonesian camp on Pulau Galang received
over 65,000 refugees for processing and transit to third countries. There
was domestic concern over the high proportion of Vietnamese Chinese
among the refugees, and none were accepted for permanent settlement.
Indonesia joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
condemnation of Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of Cambodia, upholding the
“Democratic Kampuchea” seat in the United Nations, but it consistently
sought compromise over the issue. It believed that Vietnam had no hege-
monic ambitions beyond Indochina and that its isolation dangerously in-
creased the scope for great power (especially Chinese) intervention in the
region. ASEAN appointed Jakarta to act as mediator in Vietnam’s con-
flict with Cambodia, and Indonesia played a major role in reaching an
acceptable solution. In March 1989 an Indonesian private bank, Summa
Bank, announced plans to join the Saigon Industrial and Commercial
Bank in the Indochina Bank, Vietnam’s first banking joint venture. Af-
ter Vietnam became the seventh member of ASEAN in July 1995 politi-
cal relations further eased, but Vietnam remained a major economic
competitor to Indonesia in the low-income segment of the export market.
See also SOVIET UNION, RELATIONS WITH. [1125, 1144]

VILLAGES. See DESA.

VOLCANOES. Located at the junction of three tectonic plates (see CON-

TINENTAL DRIFT), Indonesia is volcanically active, 829 active vol-
canoes being found widely scattered in eastern Indonesia and along the
spines of Sumatra and Java. Ejecta of low pH are responsible in Java,
Bali, and other places for exceptionally fertile soil; ejecta of high pH in
Sumatra and elsewhere are less productive. An eruption 75,000 years ago
in North Sumatra created the valley now partly filled by Lake Toba,
when an estimated 1,500–2,000 km of material was ejected, leaving a
caldera 100 km long. The greatest eruption in recent history was that of
Tambora on Sumbawa in 1815, which claimed at least 117,000 lives
and destroyed the vegetation of entire regions, leading to widespread
famine in Sumbawa, Lombok, and Bali. The eruption of Krakatau in
the Sunda Strait in 1883 is better known and recorded, though a much
448 • VOLKSLECTUUR, COMITE OR KANTOOR VOOR DE

smaller quantity of volcanic material was released than in Tambora and

fewer people were killed (approximately 36,000). Kelud in East Java has
also been particularly destructive, less because of the force of its periodic
eruptions (1752, 1771, 1811, 1848, 1864, 1901, 1919) than because wa-
ter trapped in its crater is flung out to create dangerous mud avalanches.
In 1963 Gunung Agung on Bali erupted with much devastation and loss
of life. Sulphur collection has been an important local industry on sev-
eral volcanoes, and a number of volcanoes have been harnessed for
steam power (Kamojan, near Garut, since 1926, Salak more recently). A
Vulkanologisch Dienst (Vulcanological Service) was established by the
colonial government in 1920. [1165, 1174, 1176, 1178]

VOLKSLECTUUR, COMITE OR KANTOOR VOOR DE. See BALAI

PUSTAKA.

VOLKSRAAD (People’s Council). Representative body of the Netherlands

Indies, established in 1918 with 39 members, approximately half elected
and half appointed. Membership was on an ethnic basis, with initially 15
indigenes and 23 Europeans and “foreign orientals” (see RACE). In 1931
membership was expanded to 60, with 30 indigenes, of whom 20 were
elected, 25 Europeans (15 elected), and five others (three elected). Elected
indigenous representatives were chosen for a four-year term by indige-
nous members of the local and kabupaten councils as a single electorate.
Initially the Volksraad had only advisory power, though as its members
had parliamentary immunity it provided a platform for those nationalists
who accepted election (see NATIONALISM). From 1931 the Volksraad
approved the annual budget of the Netherlands Indies and appointed a
College van Gedelegeerden (Chamber of Delegates) to examine and ap-
prove ordinances of the colonial government. While all government ordi-
nances required its approval, rejected ordinances could come into force in
any case as general government regulations (algemene maatregelen van
bestuur). See also CHUO SANGI-IN. [0638, 0661]

VOLLENHOVEN, CORNELIS VAN (1874–1933). Professor of law at

Leiden University from 1901 to 1933 and foremost proponent of adat or
traditional Indonesian law. He strongly resisted moves for a single set of
legal codes for the colony and was mainly responsible for the codifica-
tion of adat in successive Adatrechtbundels. [1083]

VOORLOPIGE FEDERALE REGEERING. See SUCCESSION.

 WALLACE’S LINE • 449

VORSTENLANDEN. The princely states of Central Java, that is, the Sul-
tanate of Yogyakarta, the Kasunanan (Sunanate) of Surakarta, and the
lesser Pakualaman and Mangkunegaran. Descendants of the divided
kingdom of Mataram, these were the only indirectly ruled part of the is-
land in the latter colonial period and were thus exempt from many of the
colonial regulations applied to other areas. The Cultivation System, for
instance, was not introduced in the Vorstenlanden, and large privately
owned plantations developed there rather earlier than elsewhere. The au-
thority of the Vorstenland rulers was limited to Javanese within their do-
mains. Europeans and others were the administrative and legal responsi-
bility of Dutch residents.

VREEMDE OOSTERLINGEN. See RACE.

–W–

WAHID, ABDURRACHMAN (GUS DUR). See ABDURRACHMAN

WAHID.

WAJO’. Bugis state in southwestern Sulawesi, founded in 1471 by exiles

from Luwu. Its ruler, called the Arung Mataa, was elected by a council
of 40 princes. In 1737 under Arung Singkang (La Ma’dukelleng,
1700?–1765) Wajo’ attacked Bone, and in 1739 it headed a federation of
southern Sulawesi states in a series of unsuccessful attacks on the Dutch
in Makassar. A Dutch protectorate was established in 1860–1861.

WALI SONGO (Nine Saints). Said to have converted Java to Islam in the
16th century, their individual careers, which were not especially con-
nected, are shrouded in legend, but several appear to have been non-
Javanese and to have studied in Melaka. The first Muslim state on Java,
Demak, is said to have been founded by Sunan Gunungjati (?–1570).

WALLACE’S LINE. This was named for Alfred Russell Wallace

(1823–1913), a British scientist who collaborated with Charles Darwin,
author of the theory of evolution. Previous scientific opinion had held that
animal and plant forms were a direct response to environmental condi-
tions, such as climate. During research in Indonesia from 1854 to 1862,
however, Wallace noted that, although the Indonesian islands were climat-
ically similar and geographically close, there was a dramatic difference in
450 • WARFARE

fauna and flora between the west, where typical Eurasiatic species such as
tigers, rhinoceros, monkeys, and oaks were found, and the east of the ar-
chipelago, where marsupials, megapodes (mound-building birds), and eu-
calypts were common. It is now known that the former were characteristic
of the old northern supercontinent of Laurasia, while the latter derive from
the southern supercontinent of Gondwana, though present biological dis-
tribution does not exactly reflect the geological origin of the islands (see
CONTINENTAL DRIFT). The line that Wallace drew between Bali and
Lombok and between Sulawesi and Kalimantan separating these two
zones has been called Wallace’s line. Wallace himself, however, recog-
nized the existence of a transition zone, and it is now more common to re-
fer to this distinct zone, covering roughly Sulawesi, Maluku, and
Nusatenggara, as Wallacea. See also PREHISTORY; SUNDA SHELF.
[0100, 1186, 1192]

WARFARE. The ferocity of traditional battle in the archipelago seems to

have been limited by a number of factors. First, warfare was largely
aimed at capturing people, who represented a valuable labor resource,
and obtaining allegiance of their rulers rather than winning territory,
which was relatively abundant, and so combatants tended to be some-
what sparing of life. Second, prolonged defense of cities in a tropical cli-
mate was difficult and so retreat, which avoided confrontation, seems to
have been a common strategy. Third, trickery, deception, and bluff on the
part of commanders seem to have been prized, and surrogate battle by
champions in single combat was a common strategy (see KERBAU).
When conflict actually came to battle, running amuk seems to have
played a major role, though the main reason for this furious charge into
enemy ranks in disregard for one’s own safety seems to have been to
cause terror rather than destruction. And fourth, combatants seem to have
attributed the outcome of warfare at least in part to supernatural factors,
keeping for instance jimat or charms for their own personal protection
and taking account of portents of the final result.
Against this somewhat optimistic picture must be set the accounts of
warfare described by Europeans in the 16th century and after, in which
massacres and other military brutality are common. Some authors have
indeed suggested that the Europeans brought an increased ruthlessness to
warfare, but this is hard to specify or document. It does seem clear, how-
ever, that the initial military advantage of Europeans was slender and that
it derived from their use of a standing army of professional soldiers
rather than from technological superiority of weapons. Mercenary troops
 WAYANG • 451

became common in the archipelago from the 17th century, but whether
they were an older phenomenon is hard to tell. A major consequence of
the Dutch presence was the gradual disarming of the indigenous popu-
lation, so that Java, for instance, once known as a land of warriors,
gained a reputation for exceptional peace.
During the Revolution there was relatively little battlefield combat
between Republican and Dutch forces in view of the overwhelming
Dutch superiority in weaponry. The Republic’s greatest successes were
in guerrilla warfare (see GERILYA) carried out by both regular and ir-
regular troops. After independence this pattern continued. Government
troops could overwhelm any dissident forces through their superior
weaponry, and rebel opposition (whether by forces of the PRRI/Perme-
sta rebellion, Darul Islam, or antigovernment movements in Aceh, East
Timor, or Papua) was generally conducted only through small-scale
guerrilla operations. See also DEFENSE POLICY; KONINKLIJK NED-
ERLANDSCH INDISCH LEGER; WEAPONS. [0576]

WATER. The first public purification of water took place in Batavia in

1923. Since the 1980s, bottled water has become a common drink. See
also TEA.

WAWASAN NUSANTARA. See ARCHIPELAGIC CONCEPT.

WAYANG. Literally “shadow,” this term is now applied to a wide range of

Javanese dramatic forms: wayang kulit (shadow puppets), wayang golek
(solid wooden puppets), wayang beber (painted screens), wayang klitik
(flat wooden or rod puppets), wayang topeng (masks), and wayang wong
(dance dramas). Although now named as if variants of a single art, these
forms probably have different origins, wayang beber deriving perhaps
from traditional storytelling and wayang wong from traditional dance,
though it took its present form only in Yogyakarta in the 19th century.
Wayang golek is said to have been invented by one of the Wali Songo,
Sunan Kalijaga, near Yogyakarta in 1586, but it was reported by Tomé
Pires in 1515. Wayang kulit may be derived ultimately from South In-
dian shadow puppetry, though authorities are not in agreement on this.
Wayang kulit employs flat leather shadow puppets manipulated by a
dalang (puppeteer), who simultaneously provides all voices and cues the
gamelan. Its earliest recorded use was in the ninth century. In former times,
the audience watched the shadows of the puppets cast on a white cloth
screen by an oil lamp above the dalang’s head; more recently, audiences
452 • WEAPONS

have tended also to shift around behind the dalang and gamelan to watch
the finely painted puppets themselves.
Wayang golek is also performed by a dalang with a gamelan orches-
tra, and there are currently three major variants: Wayang golek papak
(flat wayang golek), which recount local legends of West Java and are
usually performed in the central plains of West Java; wayang golek
purwa, whose stories are usually derived from those of wayang kulit and
are usually performed in the Sundanese highlands; and wayang golek
Menak, now rarely performed, which are connected with the Kebumen
area and recount Islamic history and legend.
Wayang kulit generally presents episodes from the Mahabharata and
Ramayana, but within this framework the dalang has enormous scope
for improvisation. The so-called Nine Walis used wayang kulit to spread
Islam on Java (it is said that the distorted shape of the characters was
adopted to satisfy the Islamic prohibition on the representation of hu-
mans), and prewar nationalists, communists, and postindependence gov-
ernments have all seen it as a tool for spreading information and ideas
rapidly to the rural population of Java. Suharto used it in legitimizing
his rule and popularizing its objectives, but especially in the closing
years of his regime his opponents also chose to express their opposition
through wayang plays. [0008, 0017, 0132, 0140, 0153, 0163, 0169,
0170, 0181, 0182]

WEAPONS. A number of traditional weapons have been in use in the ar-

chipelago, namely, the kris on Java, Bali, and Lombok; the klewang, a
long, generally straight-bladed knife (Aceh); and darts among the
Dayaks and Bataks. Bows and arrows have also been common. Can-
nons were introduced by the Chinese, Gujeratis, and Turks in the 15th
century. [0143, 0576]

WERENG. General name for various flying insects of the families Ci-
cadelidae and Delphacidae (Order Hemiptera) occurring in plague pro-
portions in Java since 1969 and transmitting major viral diseases of rice.
Their spread is closely related to the Green Revolution, under which
more susceptible rice varieties were introduced, overuse of pesticides di-
minished the bird and other predator populations, and the number of
crops per year was increased so that the life cycle of the wereng was
never disrupted by lack of food. The plague was checked briefly after
1976 by the introduction of new resistant rice varieties, but within a
decade the wereng had adapted and by 1986 wereng were said to be re-
 WHITE BOOK • 453

sponsible for an annual loss of 200,000–300,000 potential tons of agri-

cultural produce. In November 1986, however, with dramatic success In-
donesia introduced a program of integrated pest management for rice, in-
volving bans on the use of many pesticides and a start with rotation of
crops between different rice varieties.

WEST NEW GUINEA, WEST IRIAN. See PAPUA.

WESTERLING, RAYMOND PAUL PIERRE (1919–1987). A Dutch

commando and counterguerrilla specialist, Westerling was born in Istan-
bul and thus known as “The Turk” though he was reportedly of mixed
Turkish, Dutch, and Greek descent. After being parachuted into Suma-
tra in late 1945, he was posted with his Korps Speciale Troepen to South
Sulawesi in 1946 and used particularly brutal techniques in suppressing
local Indonesian nationalists. The official Indonesian figure of 40,000
dead is probably inflated, but his victims certainly numbered several
thousands. After resigning from the Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch
Leger (KNIL) in July 1949, he mobilized appoximately 8,000 troops
and launched an unsuccessful coup in Bandung and Jakarta in an effort
to topple Mohammad Hatta’s government. In doing so he brought
about the fall of the Pasundan government, further discredited federal-
ism, and hastened the movement toward a unitary state. [0674]

WHALES AND WHALING. Both the blue whale (Balaenoptera muscu-

lus) and Rudolphi’s whale (B. borealis) occur in Indonesian waters, the
former very sporadically. B. borealis is hunted using traditional means
by the villagers of Lamakera (Solor) and Lamararap (Lomblen). [1387]

WHITE BOOK (Buku Putih). 1. A systematic critique of New Order poli-

cies issued on 14 January 1978 by students at the Bandung Institute of
Technology (ITB) opposed to President Suharto’s reelection. The book
was banned and about 30 student leaders arrested and tried, including
Heri Akhmadi, who was convicted on charges of insulting the head of
state.
2. Prepared in 1978 by Nugroho Notosusanto, head of the army’s Mil-
itary History division, this White Book is the government’s account of
the events surrounding the 1965 Gestapu coup. It was never published
but was distributed among a limited circle of government officials.
3. Written by a government team headed by Moerdiono (minister
of the State Secretaritat, Mensecneg) in 1994, this book was entitled
454 • WHITE PAPER

G-30-S: Pembrontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia—Latar Belakang,

Aksi dan Penumpasannya (The 30th of September Movement: The Re-
bellion of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Its Background, Action
and Annihilation). It unsuccessfully aimed at ending the controversy
surrounding the events of 1965. See also SUBVERSION. [0725,
0923]

WHITE PAPER (Lembaran Putih). On 12 September 1984, army units in

the Jakarta port of Tanjung Priok shot dead between nine and several
hundred members of a crowd that, after having heard speeches from
Muslim preachers, had marched on an army post to demand release of
two men detained for allegedly assaulting two security officers who had
reportedly defiled a prayer house. The White Paper, drafted by Ali
Sadikin, retired Siliwangi division commander H. R. Dharsono, and
others, was one of several pamphlets that questioned the official version
of the event. Following bomb explosions in Jakarta banks on 4 October,
Dharsono was arrested and later tried under the colonial era haatzaai-
artikelen and on charges of undermining government authority (see
SUBVERSION). He was sentenced to 10 years in jail (later reduced to
seven).

WHITE RAJAS. The flexibility of allegiances and alliances that enabled

the rapid rise and fall of petty states in many coastal regions of the ar-
chipelago, especially on Kalimantan, also allowed a number of Euro-
pean adventurers to establish themselves as local rulers with local and
traditional power bases. The Brookes of Sarawak were the best known of
these, but others included Raja Wilson of Bengkalis, Baron van Over-
beek of Sabah, Clunies Ross of Cocos, and Joseph Torry, Raja of Am-
bon. Lord Jim by Joseph Conrad is a fictionalized account of one such
ruler. Governors-general of the Netherlands Indies took the indigenous
title Sri Paduka yang Dipertuan Besar. See also KUTAI. [0243, 0629]

WIDJOJO NITISASTRO (1927–). Educated at the University of Indone-

sia’s Department of Economics and at the University of California,
Berkeley, Widjojo became head of President Suharto’s team of eco-
nomic advisors in 1966. He is credited with fashioning the successful
economic policies of the early years of the New Order and with enjoy-
ing the complete trust of Suharto, whom he tutored and guided in eco-
nomic matters. He left the government in the 1980s, and Suharto’s
cronies and family largely replaced the so-called Berkeley Mafia in shap-
 WOMEN AND MEN • 455

ing Indonesia’s economic priorities. When B. J. Habibie became presi-

dent, he gave Widjojo an enhanced advisory role in the government in an
effort to reassure the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Indonesia’s
business community.

“WILD SCHOOLS.” See EDUCATION, PRIVATE AND ISLAMIC.

WILOPO (1909–1981). A leader of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)

and prime minister from April 1952 to June 1953 after the fall of Suki-
man. His cabinet fell over the use of police to remove peasant squatters
from foreign-owned plantations in East Sumatra. [0695]

WIRANTO (1947–). Born in Yogyakarta, Wiranto graduated from the

Military Academy in 1968. After serving from 1989 to 1993 as Suharto’s
military adjutant and from 1993 to 1996 as military commander of
Jakarta, he was appointed army chief of staff in 1997 and armed forces
commander in February 1998. After Suharto’s fall, B. J. Habibie also
appointed him minister of defense, and in his strengthened position
Wiranto was able to remove his major military rival, Suharto’s son-in-law
Prabowo Subianto, from his position as head of Komando Pasukan
Khusus (Kopassus). Wiranto was also largely responsible for separating
the police from control of the armed forces in April 1999, and for steps
to lessen military involvement in civilian affairs under dwifungsi.
Although disappointed in his hope to become vice president, Wiranto
was appointed coordinating minister for defense and security in Abdur-
rachman Wahid’s cabinet on 27 October 1999. But his tenure was short-
lived, especially because after the widespread massacres carried out by
military-supported militias following the referendum in East Timor, the
national Human Rights Commission recommended that the Attorney
General’s office investigate Wiranto’s responsibility for the military’s ac-
tions there. The president suspended him as coordinating minister in Feb-
ruary 2000, and he formally resigned three months later on 16 May. In
February 2003 the United Nations indicted him for crimes against hu-
manity for his responsibility in the massacres during the vote for East
Timor’s independence in 1999, an indictment that the Indonesian gov-
ernment ignored. In October 2003 Wiranto emerged as a strong con-
tender for Golkar’s nomination for the presidency in 2004. [0731, 0972]

WOMEN AND MEN. As elsewhere in the world, a social division of la-

bor between men and women has been the rule throughout most of the
456 • WOMEN AND MEN

archipelago, derived partly from religious notions of a distinction be-

tween active and productive energy. Thus, men were traditionally re-
sponsible for tasks such as metalworking, raising animals, plowing
fields, felling trees, hunting, and building, while women were assigned
transplanting, harvesting, pottery, weaving, food preparation, and mar-
keting. There seems also to have been a widespread tradition of bilateral
and matrilineal kinship, seen most strongly today in Minangkabau so-
ciety, where ownership of land passes exclusively through the female
line and men are frequently absent from the community on merantau.
This combination of conceptual dualism and female economic power
seems to have led to societies in which the access of women to power,
position, and education was not dramatically less than that of men, or at
least was considerably greater than in Chinese, Indian, or Islamic soci-
eties. Thus, female literacy was high (see WRITING SYSTEMS), there
were many important women traders and diplomats (women were tradi-
tionally regarded as more adept in financial matters and in negotiation
than men, partly because they were not bound by rigid male codes of
honor), and the courts of Aceh and Mataram had a tradition of women
bodyguards. Women took part in the Java War as generals. South Su-
lawesi in the 14th to 19th centuries and Aceh in the 17th century were
ruled by a succession of queens.
Hindu, Muslim, and perhaps Chinese influences all helped to diminish
the access of women to education and to positions of power and influ-
ence. All accepted polygamy and preferred some degree of seclusion of
women, though their influence was felt at first most strongly in elite cir-
cles. In rural areas in particular, the role of women in market trade and
in harvesting assured their continuing social significance, though
changes in both areas in recent years have damaged their position (see
GREEN REVOLUTION). In other sectors of the economy, women are
most numerous as unskilled and semiskilled factory workers and as do-
mestic help, and they face the common problems of low wages and sex-
ual harassment.
Participation by women in modern politics was unknown until the late
19th century, when the growing presence of educated European women
as wives of government officials increased the social pressure on the
wives of indigenous elite men to be conversant with public affairs. This
consideration led, for instance, to the Western education given to R. A.
Kartini. Indonesian women first graduated in law in 1921 and in medi-
cine in 1922, and a number of women were prominent in the nationalist
movement. While often members and leaders of women’s groups, the
 WOMEN’S MOVEMENT • 457

most prominent of these worked alongside men in nationalist organiza-

tions. One of the most outstanding was Rasuna Said (1910–1965), who
taught in the Diniyah Putri school in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra,
and then was a leader of the Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Permi) and
subsequently close to Sukarno in the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI).
Another was Maria Ulfah Santoso (1911–1988), who was the first In-
donesian woman to receive a law degree in the Netherlands (Leiden
1933), and the first woman cabinet minister when she served as minister
of social affairs in Sutan Sjahrir’s second cabinet (1946–1947).
The 1945 Constitution specified legal equality for men and women,
but most political parties maintained affiliated women’s organizations
rather than integrating women fully into their structures (see, e.g., GER-
AKAN WANITA INDONESIA). Official policy in the late Suharto pe-
riod stressed the role of women as wives and mothers, but women con-
tinued to hold a number of senior administrative posts. While Suharto’s
wife held no official position, with her influence dependent largely on
her relationship with her husband and her commercial activities, his eld-
est daughter, Siti Hardijanti Hastuti Rukmana (Tutut), was prominent not
only in the commercial field but also as a leader of Golkar. Megawati
Sukarnoputri was elected to lead the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
(PDI) in 1993 and ultimately became Indonesia’s first woman president
in 2001. See also DHARMA WANITA; MARRIAGE, POLITICAL SIG-
NIFICANCE OF; RACE. [0552, 0566, 0576, 0584, 1400, 1409, 1412,
1416, 1417, 1419, 1421, 1424, 1425, 1427, 1430, 1432]

WOMEN’S MOVEMENT. R. A. Kartini is generally credited with found-

ing the women’s movement in Indonesia by identifying and promoting the
specific interests of women. The earliest women’s organizations were
concerned mainly with the spreading of information on matters of inter-
est to women. The first women’s journal, Poetri Hindia, began publica-
tion in Bogor in 1908. In 1912 Soenting Melajoe published its first issue
in West Sumatra. One of its founders was Rohana Kudus (1884–1974),
often viewed as the Minangkabau Kartini. The early movements stressed
women’s education, both Islamic and western. One of the most success-
ful and influential of the women’s schools was the Diniyah Putri founded
in Padang Panjang in 1923 by Rahmah El Yunusiyah (1900–1969), which
had as many as 500 female students drawn from throughout the archipel-
ago and Malaya. From 1914 the journal Poetri Merdeka began to argue
that women’s problems had a political solution, and four Indonesian
women’s conferences were held 1928–1932, at the first of which a
458 • WORLD BANK

number of generally nationalist women’s associations federated to form

an organization that in 1932 took the name Perikatan Perhimpunan Istri
Indonesia (PPII, Federation of Indonesian Women’s Associations). The
federation established scholarships for girls; opposed polygamy, prosti-
tution, and child marriage; and promoted scouting and hygiene. The or-
ganization Istri Sedar (The Conscious Woman), founded in Bandung in
1930, was particularly active in these areas and came frequently into con-
flict with the Muslim Aisyiyah. In 1932 Istri Sedar merged with other
women’s groups to become Isteri Indonesia (Indonesian Women).
During the Revolution women’s organizations regrouped to form the
Badan Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Kowani, Congressional Body of In-
donesian Women) committed to an independent Indonesia, which dis-
solved in 1950 and was replaced by an organization of the same name
(Kowani), which, however, played only a coordinating role among its
many affiliates. See also DUTCH IN INDONESIA; GERAKAN
WANITA INDONESIA (GEKWANI). [0627, 1282, 1287, 1422, 1428,
1430, 1432]

WORLD BANK (International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-

ment, IBRD). Indonesia joined the World Bank in April 1954, left on 17
August 1965 without having contracted loans with it, and rejoined in
April 1967. Experts from the bank, as well as from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), helped devise the Suharto regime’s new eco-
nomic stabilization policies. The first IBRD credit to Indonesia, in Sep-
tember 1968, was for US$5 million. Credits have continued to be prima-
rily in the area of agriculture and communications. The IBRD is a
member of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). The
bank has been a major funder of Indonesia’s transmigration program,
but in October 1986 it issued a report strongly critical of aspects of the
program’s management, including lack of provision of facilities for
transmigrants and lack of attention to the program’s environmental con-
sequences. Subsequently, as Suharto increasingly began to ignore the
advice of the technocrats in favor of the personal circle surrounding him
(see CENDANA GROUP; SUHARTO FAMILY), the bank became
more critical of the government’s policies and by mid-1997 was pressing
for policy changes, including measures against corruption. It also
warned against the growth in external debt and the decline in the growth
of nonoil exports. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the World
Bank cut its lending to Indonesia to an average of $400 million per year
from about $1.5 billion annually before. In late 2002 it stated that it
 YAM • 459

would consider raising this to $1 billion if Jakarta continued to reform its

economy, reduce the budget deficit, and restore economic stability.
[0378, 0395]

WRITING SYSTEMS. The fifth-century inscriptions of Kutai and Taru-

manegara, which are the earliest written documents from the archipel-
ago, are in southern Indian Grantha script, but by the eighth century an
indigenous adaptation of that script, usually called Kawi, was in use on
Java for writing both Sanskrit and old Javanese. Writings, from left to
right, were commonly etched onto lontar leaves. Kawi was the basis for
several other scripts in the archipelago, notably Balinese, Sundanese, Re-
jang, Batak, Lampung, and Madurese. Of the indigenous scripts in the
archipelago, only that of Bugis is not based on Javanese but developed
directly from Sanskrit. From the 14th century, Malay commonly used
Jawi script, an adaptation of Arabic script for Persian.
Evidence is sparse on the level of literacy in precolonial times; Rijklof
van Goens in 1648–1654 believed that a majority of Javanese were liter-
ate, and the same was said to be true of Bali in the 19th century. The 1920
census showed a literacy rate of 6.83 percent among Javanese men and
0.26 percent among women, and many observers have suggested that pre-
colonial levels could not have been much higher. Anthony Reid, however,
suggests that this reflects a decline in literacy from earlier times, pointing
out that literacy in the otherwise neglected region of Lampung was
recorded at 45 percent and 34 percent for men and women respectively in
the 1930 census as a result of the survival of the Lampung script for use
in manjau, “a courting game whereby young men and women would
gather in the evenings and the youths would fling suggestive quatrains
(pantun) written in the old script to the young women they fancied.” The
Lampung script had about 14 characters and a few vowel markers and
would have been easy to learn. Such literacy would have had immensely
strong social incentive and was probably taught at home rather than in
school. See also EDUCATION; PAPER; WOMEN AND MEN. [0576]

–Y –

YAM (Dioscorea spp. Dioscoreaceae). A food plant with large starchy

roots, it can grow to two meters in length. An important food crop of
slash-and-burn peoples in Kalimantan and Papua, it is now being dis-
placed by the sweet potato, which is much easier to prepare.
460 • YAMIN, MUHAMMAD

YAMIN, MUHAMMAD (1903–1962). Writer and politician from West

Sumatra. He helped to formulate the Youth Oath in 1928, and in the
late 1920s he wrote some of the first patriotic poems in Indonesian, es-
pecially the collection Indonesia tumpah darahku (Indonesia, land of my
birth, 1929). He later prepared a biography of Gajah Mada, prime min-
ister of Majapahit, which marks the start of a nationalist historiography.
He graduated in law in Batavia in 1932, joined the Sukarnoist Partai In-
donesia (Partindo) in the same year, and in 1937 became one of the
founders of the antifascist Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo). He
left the party in 1939, when he entered the Volksraad as representative
of West Sumatra, participating in it until 1942. As a member of the inde-
pendence preparation investigation committee (Badan Penyelidik Us-
aha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [BPUPKI]), in 1945 Yamin
argued for the inclusion of the Malay Peninsula, northern Borneo, and
East Timor in a Greater Indonesia. During the Revolution he supported
Tan Malaka’s ideas of a vigorous program of struggle and was arrested
in June 1946, being released finally in August 1948. He was close to the
Murba but did not join it and served in several cabinets in the 1950s. In
1959 Sukarno chose him as head of the National Planning Council (De-
wan Perancang Nasional), and he became one of the leading ideologists
of Guided Democracy. [0502]

YANI, AHMAD (1922–1965). Career army officer. He commanded gov-

ernment troops in the suppression of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion on
Sumatra in 1958 and was chief of staff of Komando Operasi Tertinggi
(Koti), the command for the liberation of West Irian (see PAPUA) in
1961. In 1962 Sukarno appointed him army chief of staff in a move to
limit the influence of A. H. Nasution; both officers were anticommunist,
but Yani was less puritanical and closer in outlook to Sukarno, coining,
for instance, the term Nekolim (Neo-Kolonialis, Kolonialis, dan Impe-
rialis). Yani strongly opposed plans to arm workers and peasants as a
“Fifth Force” and in 1965 was accused of joining a Council of Gener-
als planning a coup to forestall a Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)
takeover. He was killed in the Gestapu coup attempt of September–Oc-
tober 1965. [0714, 0889]

YAP THIAM HIEN (1913–1989). A lawyer and human rights activist,

Yap was born in Aceh and educated first in Java, then in the law school
in Leiden. A founding member of the Badan Permusyawaratan Ke-
warga-Negaraan Indonesia (Baperki), he was a major proponent of the
 YOUTH PLEDGE • 461

strengthening of the rule of law in Indonesia. By the time of the 1965

coup, Yap was a notable defender of the rights of all Indonesia’s citizens.
He defended Subandrio in the Mahmillub trials. His own arrest in 1968
was turned into a test of the New Order’s commitment to due legal
process, and he was released after five days. He was a firm advocate of
the full legal equality of Chinese Indonesians and fiercely opposed the
adoption of ethnic Indonesian names, seeing this as essentially coercive
and prejudicial. He remained closely involved with the Lembaga Ban-
tuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute), founded by Buyung Nasution in 1971,
and was involved in nearly every major national project of legal reform
or defense of human rights. [0860]

YOGYAKARTA (Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat). City and sultanate in Cen-

tral Java, founded after the splitting of Mataram in 1755. Formed after
Dutch supremacy on Java was well established, Yogyakarta was never
militarily powerful and was weakened by the creation of a minor court,
the Pakualaman, within its territory in 1812; by territorial losses fol-
lowing the Java War of 1825–1830; and by economic decline in the
19th century. Perhaps in compensation for this weakness, successive sul-
tans (all called Hamengkubuwono) became patrons of Javanese culture,
encouraging tradition and innovation to varying degrees.
As a princely territory (Vorstenland), Yogyakarta, like Surakarta, was
administratively distinct from the rest of Dutch Java. Nonetheless, its peo-
ple participated generally in the emergence of Indonesian nationalism in
the 20th century. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX was a strong adherent of
the Republic, and Yogyakarta became the seat of its government from
shortly after the declaration of independence until the end of the Revo-
lution in 1949, with a brief period of Dutch occupation from 18 Decem-
ber 1948 to 6 July 1949. Since 1946 Yogyakarta (including the Pakuala-
man) has been a special territory (daerah istimewa) of the Republic, with
the Yogyakarta sultan as governor and the Pakualam as his deputy. [1390]

YOUTH. See KOMITÉ NASIONAL PEMUDA INDONESIA; PEMUDA;

STUDENTS.

YOUTH PLEDGE (Sumpah Pemuda). At the second national Youth Con-

gress, held in Batavia in 1928, delegates formally adopted Indonesia as the
framework for the struggle against the Dutch, affirming that they were one
people (bangsa Indonesia), with one language, Indonesian, and one home-
land, Indonesia. See also “INDONESIA RAYA”; NATIONALISM.
462 • ZELFBESTUREN

–Z–

ZELFBESTUREN (“self-governing regions”). Official name for the native

states within the Netherlands Indies, which numbered 282 in 1942. All
were originally independent or semi-independent states with which the
Dutch had concluded political contracts, either the so-called lange poli-
tieke contracten, long political contracts that set out in detail an allied or
subordinate relationship, or the Korte Verklaring, or short declaration,
which simply acknowledged Dutch suzerainty (see NETHERLANDS
INDIES, EXPANSION OF). Within all states, the colonial government
had extensive powers to intervene, including the free use of land, control
of mining, and the right to appoint a ruler’s successor. Until the 20th cen-
tury the general trend had been for the Dutch to abolish such states as it be-
came convenient. The Zelfbestuursregelen (Self-governing territories reg-
ulations) of 1919 and 1927, however, set the notionally “indirect” form of
rule on a legal basis within the colonial administrative structure; and under
the ontvoogding (detutelization) measures of 1929, a number of states that
had been abolished, such as the kingdoms on Bali, were restored. The Re-
public’s Law no. 22 of 1948 and the Negara Indonesia Timor (NIT) Law
no. 44 of 1950 retained the zelfbesturen as a level of government under the
name swapraja or daerah swatantra, but in 1960 these were abolished. See
also DECENTRALIZATION. [0472, 0591, 0948]

ZEVEN PROVINCIËN, MUTINY ON THE. On 5 February 1933, Indone-

sian and Dutch sailors on the Dutch naval vessel De Zeven Provinciën mu-
tinied off Aceh over a 17 percent wage cut introduced by the government
to reduce expenditure during the Depression. Dutch aircraft bombed the
ship to suppress the mutiny. Though the mutineers protested their political
loyalty, the colonial government saw the rising as a product of nationalist
agitation and used it to justify greater political restrictions soon after.

ZHENG HE (Cheng Ho) (1371–1435). Chinese eunuch raised as a Muslim.

In 1405, after a successful military career in northern China, he was sent by
the Yongle Emperor of the Ming dynasty as leader of a major maritime ex-
pedition to Southeast Asia. The expedition consisted of 27,000 crew in over
300 vessels; its purposes remain unclear, but they probably included a de-
sire to suppress piracy and to establish Chinese hegemony in the region.
Zheng He successfully destroyed the fleet of a Chinese pirate based on the
Sumatra coast of the Melaka Strait, near Palembang; seems to have de-
veloped close relations with Melaka; and followed the 1405 expedition with
six others, but the expeditions seem to have had no long-term significance.
 Appendix A
Governors-General of the Netherlands Indies

GOVERNORS-GENERAL

1609–1614 Pieter Both (?–1615)

1614–1615 Gerard Reynst (?–1615)
1616–1619 Laurens Reael (1583–1637)
1619–1623 Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629)
1623–1627 Pieter de Carpentier (1588–1659)
1627–1629 Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1630)
1629–1632 Jacques Specx (1588–?)
1632–1636 Hendrik Brouwer (1581–1643)
1636–1645 Anthony van Diemen (1593–1645)
1645–1650 Cornelis van der Lijn (1608?–?)
1650–1653 Carel Reyniersz (1604–1653)
1653–1678 Joan Maetsuycker (1606–1678)
1678–1681 Rijkloff van Goens (1619–1682)
1681–1684 Cornelis Janszoon Speelman (1628–1684)
1684–1691 Joannes Camphuys (1634–1695)
1691–1704 Willem van Outhoorn (1635–1720)
1704–1709 Joan van Hoorn (1653–1713)
1709–1713 Abraham van Riebeeck (1653–1713)
1713–1718 Christoffel van Swoll (1663–1718)
1718–1725 Hendrick Zwaardecroon (1667–1728)
1725–1729 Mattheus de Haan (1663–1729)
1729–1732 Diederik Durven (1676–1740)
1732–1735 Dirck van Cloon (1684–1735)
1735–1737 Abraham Patras (1671–1737)
1737–1741 Adriaen Valckenier (1695–1751)
1741–1743 Johannes Thedens (1680–1748)
1743–1750 Gustaaf Willem, baron van Imhoff (1705–1750)

463
464 • APPENDIX A

1750–1761 Jacob Mossel (1704–1761)

1761–1775 Petrus Albertus van der Parra (1714–1775)
1775–1777 Jeremias van Riemsdijk (1712–1777)
1777–1780 Reynier de Klerk (1710–1780)
1780–1796 Willem Arnold Alting (1724–1800)
1796–1801 Petrus Gerardus van Overstraten (1755–1801)
1801–1805 Johannes Siberg (1740–1817)
1805–1808 Albertus Henricus Wiese (1761–1810)
1808–1811 Herman Willem Daendels (1762–1818)
1811 Jan Willem Janssens (1762–1838)

ENGLISH INTERREGNUM

1811–1816 Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826)

1816 John Fendall (1762–1825)

COMMISSIONERS-GENERAL

1814–1816 C. Th. Elout (1767–1841) and A. A. Buyskes (1771–?)

GOVERNORS-GENERAL

1816–1826 Godert Alexander Gerard Philip, baron van der Capellen

(1778–1848)
1826–1830 Leonard Pierre Joseph, Burggraaf du Bus de Gisignies
(1780–1849)
1830–1834 Johannes van den Bosch (1780–1839)
1834–1836 Jean Chretien Baud (1789–1859)
1836–1840 Dominique Jacques (de) Eerens (1781–1840)
1841–1844 Pieter Merkus (1787–1844)
1845–1851 Jan Jacob Rochussen (1797–1871)
1851–1856 Albertus Jacobus Duymaer van Twist (1809–1887)
1856–1861 Charles Ferdinand Pahud (1803–1873)
1861–1866 Ludolf Anne Jan Wilt, baron Sloet van de Beele
(1806–1890)
1866–1872 Pieter Mijer (1812–1881)
1872–1875 James Loudon (1824–1884)
 GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES • 465

1875–1881 Johan Wilhelm van Lansberge (1830–1905)

1881–1884 Frederik s’Jacob (1822–1901)
1884–1888 Otto van Rees (1823–1892)
1888–1893 Cornelis Pijnacker Hordijk (1847–1908)
1893–1899 Jhr Carel Herman Aart van der Wijck (1840–1914)
1899–1905 Willem Rooseboom (1843–1920)
1905–1909 Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz (1851–1924)
1909–1916 Alexander Willem Frederik Idenburg (1861–1935)
1916–1921 Jean Paul, Graaf van Limburg Stirum (1873–1948)
1921–1926 Dirk Fock (1858–1941)
1926–1931 Jhr Andries Cornelis Dirk de Graeff (1872–1957)
1931–1936 Jhr Bonifacius Cornelis de Jonge (1875–1958)
1936–1945 Alidius Warmoldus Lambertus Tjarda van Starkenborgh Sta-
chouwer (in Japanese detention, 1942–1945) (1888–1978)

LIEUTENANT GOVERNORS-GENERAL

1941–1942 Hubertus Johannes van Mook (1894–1965)

1944–1948 Hubertus Johannes van Mook (1894–1965)

JAPANESE MILITARY GOVERNORS OF JAVA

March–November 1942 Imamura Hitoshi

November 1942–November 1944 Harada Kumakichi
November 1944–August 1945 Yamamoto Moichiro

HOGE VERTEGENWOORDIGER VAN DE KROON

1948–1949 Louis Joseph Maria Beel (1902–1977)

1949 Antonius Hermanus Johannes Lovink (1902–1995)

GOVERNORS OF WEST NEW GUINEA

1950–1953 Simon L. van Waardenburg

1953–1958 Jan van Baal
1958–1962 Pieter J. Plateel (1911–1978)
 Appendix B
Netherlands Ministers of the Colonies

(Note: Keys to abbreviations follow.)

ZAKEN VAN INDIË EN VAN DEN KOOPHANDEL

(THE INDIES AND TRADE)

Paulus van der Helm (dir. gen.) 29 July 1806–10 December 1807
Jacob Jan Cambier 10 December 1807–8 January 1808

MARINE EN KOLONIËN (NAVY AND COLONIES)

Paulus van der Helm 8 January 1808–1811

FRENCH OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS

No minister

ZAKEN VAN KOOPHANDEL EN KOLONIËN

(TRADE AND COLONIES)

G. A. G. Ph. baron van der 6 April 1814–29 July 1814

Capellen (sec. v. staat)
J. C. van der Hoop 29 July 1814–14 September 1814
(sec. v. staat, w.)
Jhr J. Goldberg (w.) 14 September 1814–16 September 1815
Jhr J. Goldberg (dir. gen.) 16 September 1815–19 September 1818

467
468 • APPENDIX B

PUBLIEK ONDERWIJS, DE NATIONALE NIJVERHEID

EN DE KOLONIËN (PUBLIC EDUCATION,
NATIONAL INDUSTRY, AND THE COLONIES)

A. R. Falck 19 March 1818–30 March 1824

NATIONALE NIJVERHEID EN KOLONIËN (NATIONAL INDUSTRY

AND COLONIES)

C. Th. Elout 30 March 1824–5 April 1825

MARINE EN KOLONIËN (NAVY AND COLONIES)

C. Th. Elout 5 April 1825–6 September 1829

J. J. Quarles van Ufford 6 September 1829–29 December 1829
(sec. gen., w.)

WATERSTAAT, DE NATIONALE NIJVERHEID EN KOLONIËN

(WATER CONTROL, NATIONAL INDUSTRY, AND COLONIES)

P. L. J. Servais van 29 December 1829–4 October 1830

Gobbelschroij
G. G. Clufford (a.i.) 4 October 1830–1 January 1832

NATIONALE NIJVERHEID EN KOLONIËN (NATIONAL INDUSTRY

AND COLONIES)

G. G. Clufford (a.i.) 1 January 1832–1 January 1834

KOLONIËN (COLONIES)

A. Brocx (sec. gen., w.) 1 January 1834–30 May 1834

J. G. van den Bosch 30 May 1834–25 December 1839
J. Chr. Baud (a.i.) 25 December 1839–21 July 1840
 NETHERLANDS MINISTERS OF THE COLONIES • 469

MARINE EN KOLONIËN (NAVY AND COLONIES)

J. Chr. Baud 21 July 1840–15 March 1848

KOLONIËN (COLONIES)

J. Chr. Baud 1 January 1842–15 March 1848

J. C. Rijk (a.i.) 25 March 1848–21 November 1848
G. L. Baud 21 November 1848–18 June 1849
E. B. van den Bosch 18 June 1849–1 November 1849
C. F. Pahud 1 November 1849–19 April 1853
C. F. Pahud 19 April 1853–31 December 1855
P. Mijer 1 January 1856–1 July 1856
P. Mijer 1 July 1856–18 March 1858
J. J. Rochussen 18 March 1858–23 February 1860
J. J. Rochussen 23 February 1860–31 December 1860
J. S. Lotsy 1 January 1861–9 January 1861
J. P. Cornets de Groot van 9 January 1861–14 March 1861
Kraaijenburg
J. Loudon 14 March 1861–31 January 1862
G. H. Uhlenbeck 31 January 1862–3 January 1863
G. H. Betz (a.i.) 3 January 1863–2 February 1863
I. D. Fransen van de Putte 2 February 1863–10 February 1866
I. D. Fransen van de Putte 10 February 1866–30 May 1866
P. Mijer 30 May 1866–15 September 1866
N. Trakranen 15 September 1866–20 July 1867
J. J. Hasselman 20 July 1867–4 June 1868
E. de Waal 4 June 1868–16 November 1870
L. G. Brocx (a.i.) 16 November 1870–4 January 1871
P. P. van Bosse 4 January 1871–6 July 1872
I. D. Fransen van de Putte 6 July 1872–27 August 1874
Willem baron van Goltstein 27 August 1874–11 September 1876
F. A. Mees 11 September 1876–3 November 1877
P. P. van Bosse 3 November 1877–21 February 1879
H. O. Wichers (a.i.) 21 February 1879–12 March 1879
O. van Rees 12 March 1879–20 August 1879
Willem baron van Goltstein 20 August 1879–1 September 1882
W. M. de Brauw 1 September 1882–23 February 1883
470 • APPENDIX B

W. F. van Erp Taalman Kip (a.i.) 23 February 1883–23 April 1883

F. G. van Bloemen Waanders 23 April 1883–25 November 1883
A. W. Ph. Weitzel (a.i.) 25 November 1883–27 February 1884
J. P. Sprenger van Eijk 27 February 1884–21 April 1888
L. W. C. Keuchenius 21 April 1888–24 February 1890
Aeneas baron Mackay 24 February 1890–21 August 1891
W. K. baron van Dedem 21 August 1891–9 May 1894
J. H. Bergsma 9 May 1894–27 July 1897
J. Th. Cremer 27 July 1897–1 August 1901
T. A J. van Asch van Wijck 1 August 1901–9 September 1902
J. W. Bergansius (a.i.) 9 September 1902–25 September 1902
A.W.F. Idenburg 25 September 1902–17 August 1905
D. Fock 17 August 1905–12 February 1908
Th. Heemskerk 12 February 1908–20 May 1908
A. W. F. Idenburg 20 May 1908–16 August 1909
J. H. de Waal Malefijt 16 August 1909–29 August 1913
Th. B. Pleijte 29 August 1913–8 December 1915
J. J. Rambonnet (w.) 8 December 1915–9 September 1918
A. W.F. Idenburg (ARP) 9 September 1918–13 November 1919
Ch. J. M. Ruys de 13 August 1919–13 November 1919
Beerenbrouck (w.) (RKSP)
S. de Graaf (ARP) 13 November 1919–18 September 1922
S. de Graaf (ARP) 18 September 1922–4 August 1925
H. Colijn (a.i.) (ARP) 4 August 1925–26 September 1925
Ch. J. I. M. Welter (RKSP) 26 September 1925–8 March 1926
J. C. Koningsberger (Lib.) 8 March 1926–10 August 1929
S. de Graaf (ARP) 10 August 1929–26 May 1933
H. Colijn (ARP) 25 May 1933–31 July 1935
H. Colijn (ARP) 31 July 1935–24 June 1937
Ch. J. I. M. Welter (RKSP) 24 June 1937–25 July 1939
C. van den Bussche (Lib.) 25 July 1939–10 August 1939
Ch. J. I. M. Welter (RKSP) 10 August 1939–3 September 1940
Ch. J. I. M. Welter (RKSP) 3 September 1940–27 July 1941
Ch. J. I. M. Welter (RKSP) 27 July 1941–17 November 1941
P. S. Gerbrandy (a.i.) (ARP) 17 November 1941–21 February 1942
P. S. Gerbrandy (ARP) 21 February 1942–21 May 1942
H. J. van Mook 21 May 1942–23 February 1945
 NETHERLANDS MINISTERS OF THE COLONIES • 471

OVERZEESE GEBIEDSDELEN (OVERSEAS TERRITORIES; CREATED

23 FEBRUARY 1945)

J. I. J. M. Schmutzer (RKSP) 23 February 1945–24 June 1945

J. H. A. Logemann 24 June 1945–3 July 1946
(became PvdA)
J. A. Jonkman (PvdA) 3 July 1946–7 August 1948
E. M. J. A. Sassen (KVP) 7 August 1948–14 February 1949
J. H. van Maarseveen (a.i.), 14 February 1949–15 June 1949
(KVP)
J. H. van Maarseveen (KVP) 15 June 1949–24 December 1949

UNIEZAKEN EN OVERZEESE RIJKSDELEN (UNION AFFAIRS AND

OVERSEAS TERRITORIES; CREATED 24 DECEMBER 1949)

J. H. van Maarseveen (KVP) 24 December 1949–15 March 1951

W. Drees (a.i.) (PvdA) 15 March 1951–30 March 1951
L. A. H. Peters (KVP) 30 March 1951–2 September 1952

OVERZEESE RIJKSDELEN (OVERSEAS TERRITORIES;

CREATED 7 NOVEMBER 1952)

W. J. A. Kernkamp (CHU) 2 September 1952–18 July 1956

C. Staf (a.i.) (CHU) 18 July 1956–13 October 1956

ZAKEN OVERZEE (AFFAIRS OVERSEAS; CREATED 14 FEBRUARY

1957, ABOLISHED 19 AUGUST 1959)

C. Staf (a.i.) (CHU) 13 October 1956–16 February 1957

G. Ph. Helders (CHU) 16 February 1957–22 December 1958
G. Ph. Helders (CHU) 22 December 1958–19 May 1959
H. A. Korthals (VVD) 19 May 1959–18 August 1959
472 • APPENDIX B

KEY TO PARTIES

ARP Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Antirevolutionary Party)

CHU Christelijk-Historische Unie (Christian Historical Union)
KVP Katholieke Volkspartij (Catholic People’s Party)
Lib. Liberalen (Liberals)
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labor Party)
RKSP Rooms-Katholieke Staatspartij (Roman Catholic State Party)
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democracy (People’s Party
for Freedom and Democracy)

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

a.i. ad interim (provisional)

dir. gen. director-general
sec. v. staat secretaris van staat (secretary of state)
w. waarnemend (acting)

NOTE

Based on G. F. E. Gonggryp, Geillustreerde encyclopedie van Nederlandsch-Indie

(Leiden: Leidsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1934); and H. Daalder and C. J. M.
Schuyt, eds., Compendium voor politiek en samenleving in Nederland (Alphen aan
den Rijn, The Netherlands: Samsom, 1986; fifth supplement, 1988), section A 0500.
 Appendix C
Rulers of the Early States

ACEH

1496 Ali Mughayat Syah

1528 Salah ud-din ibn Ali
1537 Ala’ad-din al Kahar ibn Ali
1568 Husain
1575 Sultan Muda (a few days)
1575 Sultan Sri Alam
1576 Zainil Abidin
1577 Ala’ad-din of Perak (Mansur Syah)
1589? Sultan Boyong
1596 Ala’ad-din Riayat Syah
1604 Ali Riayat Syah
1607 Iskandar Muda
1636 Iskandar Thani
1641 Safiyat ud-din Taj al-Alam bint Iskandar Muda (widow of
Iskandar Thani)
1675 Naqiyat ud-din Nur al-Alam
1678 Zaqiyat ud-din Inayat Syah
1688 Kamalat Syah Zinat ud-din
1699 Badr al-Alam Syarif Hasyim Jamal ud-din
1702 Perkara Alam Syarif Lamtui
1703 Jamal al Alam Badr al-Munir
1726 Jamal al-Alam Amin ud-din (a few days)
1726 Shams al-Alam (a few days)

473
474 • APPENDIX C

Bugis Dynasty
1727 Ala’ad-din Ahmad Syah
1735 Ala’ad-din Johan Syah
1764 Badr ad-din Johan Syah
1765 Mahmud Syah (restored)
1769 Mahmud Syah
1773 Sulaiman Syah (Udahna Lela)
1773 Mahmud Syah (restored)
1781 Ala’ad-din Jauhar al-Alam
1795 Ala’ad-din Jauhar al-Alam
1823 Muhammad Syah
1838 Sulaiman
1857 Ali Ala’ad-din Mansur Syah (Ibrahim)
1870 Mahmud Syah
1874 Muhammad Daud Syah

SINGASARI AND MAJAPAHIT

1. 1222 Rajasa (Ken Angrok)

2. 1227 Anusapati, stepson of 1
3. 1248 Tohjaya, son of 1
4. 1248 Wisnuwardhana, son of 2
5. 1268 Kertanegara, son of 4
6. 1292 Jayakatwang of Kediri (usurper)
7. 1293 Kertarajasa Jayawardhana (Wijaya), nephew and son-in-
law of 5
8. 1309 Jayanegara, son of 7
9. 1329 Tribuwana, daughter of 7
10. 1350 Rajasanegara (Hayam Wuruk), son of 9
11. 1389 Wikramawardhana, nephew and son-in-law of 10
12. 1429 Suhita, daughter of 11
13. 1447–1441 Kertawijaya, son of 11

MATARAM

1582 Sutawijaya Senopati

1601 Mas Jolang
 RULERS OF THE EARLY STATES • 475

1613 Cakrakusuma Ngabdurrahman, Sultan Agung

1645 Prabu Amangkurat I, Sunan Tegalwangi
1677 Amangkurat II
1703 Amangkurat III, Sunan Mas
1705 Pakubuwono Sunan Puger
1719 Amangkurat IV
1725 Pakubuwono II
1749 Pakubuwono III

SURAKARTA

? Pakubuwono III (of Mataram)

1788 Pakubuwono IV
1820 Pakubuwono V
1823 Pakubuwono VI
1830 Pakubuwono VII
1858 Pakubuwono VIII
1861 Pakubuwono IX
1893 Pakubuwono X
1939 Pakubuwono XI
1944–1946 Pakubuwono XII

YOGYAKARTA

1749 Hamengkubuwono I, Mangkubumi

1792 Hamengkubuwono II, Sultan Sepuh
1810 Hamengkubuwono III, Raja
1814 Hamengkubuwono IV, Seda Pesijar
1822 Hamengkubuwono V, Menol
1855 Hamengkubuwono VI, Mangkubumi
1877 Hamengkubuwono VII
1921 Hamengkubuwono VIII
1939 Hamengkubuwono IX
1989–present Hamengkubuwono X
 Appendix D
Cabinets of the Republic of Indonesia

Presidential Cabinet 31 August 1945–14 November 1945

Sjahrir I 14 November 1945–12 March 1946
Sjahrir II 12 March 1946–2 October 1946
Sjahrir III 2 October 1946–27 June 1947
Amir Sjarifuddin I 3 July 1947–11 November 1947
Amir Sjarifuddin II 11 November 1947–29 January 1948
Mohammad Hatta I 29 January 1948–4 August 1949
(presidential cabinet)
Emergency Cabinet 19 December 1948–13 July 1949
Mohammad Hatta II 4 August 1949–20 December 1949
(presidential cabinet)
Susanto Tirtoprojo 20 December 1949–21 January 1950
(Republic of Indonesia,
Yogyakarta)
Abdul Halim 21 January 1950–6 September 1950
(Republic of Indonesia,
Yogyakarta)
Mohammad Hatta III (RISi) 20 December 1949–6 September 1950
Mohammad Natsir 6 September 1950–27 April 1951
Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo 27 April 1951–3 April 1952
Wilopo 3 April 1952–1 August 1953
Ali Sastroamijoyo I 1 August 1953–12 August 1955
Burhanuddin Harahap 12 August 1955–26 March 1956
Ali Sastroamijoyo II 26 March 1956–9 April 1957
Juanda I (Kabinet Karya) 9 April 1957–25 June 1958
Juanda II 25 June 1958–9 July 1959
Kabinet Kerja I (Sukarno) 9 July 1959–18 February 1960
Kabinet Kerja II (Sukarno) 18 February 1960–6 March 1962
Kabinet Kerja III (Sukarno) 6 March 1962–13 November 1963

477
478 • APPENDIX D

Kabinet Kerja IV 13 November 1963–2 September 1964

(Sukarno)
Kabinet Dwikora I 2 September 1964–24 February 1966
(Sukarno)
Kabinet Dwikora II 24 February 1966–30 March 1966
“Cabinet of 100 Ministers”
Kabinet Dwikora III 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
Kabinet Ampera 28 July 1966–10 June 1968
Kabinet Pembangunan I 10 June 1968–27 March 1973
(Suharto) (Development
Cabinet)
Kabinet Pembangunan II 27 March 1973–29 March 1978
Kabinet Pembangunan III 29 March 1978–19 March 1983
Kabinet Pembangunan IV 19 March 1983–22 March 1988
Kabinet Pembangunan V 21 March 1988–17 March 1993
Kabinet Pembangunan VI 17 March 1993–14 March 1998
Kabinet Pembangunan VII 14 March 1998–23 May 1998
Kabinet Reformasi 23 May 1998–26 October 1999
Pembangunan (Habibie)
Kabinet Kesatuan Nasional 26 October 1999–23 August 2000
(Abdurrachman Wahid)
2nd Abdurrachman Cabinet 23 August 2000–1 June 2001
3rd Abdurrachman Cabinet 1 June 2001–9 August 2001
Kabinet Gotong Royong 9 August 2001–present
(Megawati)

NOTE

Sukarnoerg cabinets based principally on Susan Finch and Daniel S. Lev, comps.,
Republic of Indonesia Cabinets 1945–1965 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Mod-
ern Indonesia Project, 1965).
1. Republik Indonesia Serikat (Republic of the United States of Indonesia).
 Appendix E
Republic of Indonesia Officeholders

PRESIDENTS

Sukarno 18 August 1945–12 March 1967

Suharto (acting) 12 March 1967–27 March 1968
Suharto 27 March 1968–19 May 1998
B. J. Habibie 19 May 1998–26 October 1999
Abdurrachman Wahid 26 October 1999–23 July 2001
Megawati Sukarnoputri 23 July 2001–present

Vice Presidents
Mohammad Hatta 18 August 1945–1 December 1956
Hamengkubuwono IX 27 March 1968–23 March 1978
Adam Malik 23 March 1978–12 March 1983
Umar Wirahadikusumah 12 March 1983–11 March 1988
Sudharmono 11 March 1988–17 March 1993
Try Sutrisno 17 March 1993–14 March 1998
B. J. Habibie 14 March 1998–19 May 1998
Megawati Sukarnoputri 26 October 1999–23 July 2001
Hamzah Haz 23 July 2001–present

PRIME MINISTERS

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, declared independent

17 August 1945)
Sutan Sjahrir (PS) 14 November 1945–13 March 1946
Sutan Sjahrir (PS) 13 March 1946–2 October 1946

479
480 • APPENDIX E

Sutan Sjahrir (PS) 2 October 1946–27 June 1947

Amir Sjarifuddin (PS) 3 July 1947–11 November 1947
Amir Sjarifuddin (PS) 11 November 1947–29 January 1948
Mohammad Hatta 29 January 1948–4 August 1949
Mohammad Hatta 4 August 1949–20 December 1949

Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia

(Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Sumatra)
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 19 December 1948–13 July 1949
(Masjumi)

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, Constituent State

of the Republik Indonesia Serikat)
Susanto Tirtoprojo (PNI) 20 December 1949–21 January 1950
Abdul Halim 21 January 1950–6 September 1950

Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia)

Mohammad Hatta 20 December 1949–6 September 1950

Republik Indonesia
Mohammad Natsir (Masjumi) 6 September 1950–27 April 1951
Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo 27 April 1951–3 April 1952
(Masjumi)
Wilopo (PNI) 3 April 1952–1 August 1953
Ali Sastroamijoyo (PNI) 1 August 1953–12 August 1955
Burhanuddin Harahap 12 August 1955–26 March 1956
(Masjumi)
Ali Sastroamijoyo (PNI) 26 March 1956–9 April 1957
Juanda Kartawijaya 9 April 1957–9 July 1959
Juanda Kartawijaya1 9 July 1959–7 November 1963
Sukarno 9 July 1959–12 March 1967
Subandrio (1st deputy 13 November 1963–18 March 1966
prime minister)
Johannes Leimena 13 November 1963–30 March 1966
(2nd deputy PM)
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OFFICEHOLDERS • 481

Khaerul Saleh ) 13 November 1963–18 March 1966

(3rd deputy PM)
K. H. Idham Khalid 24 February 1966–30 March 1966
(4th deputy PM)
Johannes Leimena 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
(1st deputy PM)
K. H. Idham Khalid 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
(2nd deputy PM)
Ruslan Abdulgani 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
(3rd deputy PM)
Hamengkubuwono IX 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
(4th deputy PM)
Suharto (5th deputy PM) 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
Adam Malik (6th deputy PM) 30 March 1966–28 July 1966

FOREIGN MINISTERS

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, 17 August 1945–

20 December 1949)
Ahmad Subarjo 31 August 1945–14 November 1945
Sutan Sjahrir (PS) 14 November 1945–27 June 1947
Haji Agus Salim (Masjumi) 3 July 1947–20 December 1949

Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia

(Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Sumatra)
A. A. Maramis (PNI) 19 December 1948–13 July 1949

Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia)

Mohammad Hatta 20 December 1949–6 September 1950

Republik Indonesia
Mohammad Roem (Masjumi) 6 September 1950–27 April 1951
Ahmad Subarjo (Masjumi) 27 April 1951–3 April 1952
Wilopo (PNI, ad interim) 3 April 1952–29 April 1952
482 • APPENDIX E

Mukarto Notowidagdo (PNI) 29 April 1952–1 August 1953

Sunario (PNI) 1 August 1955–26 March 1956
Ruslan Abdulgani (PNI) 26 March 1956–9 April 1957
(nonactive) 28 January 1957–14 March 1957
Subandrio 9 April 1957–30 March 1966
Adam Malik (ad interim) 30 March 1966–28 July 1966
Adam Malik 28 July 1966–29 March 1978
Mochtar Kusumaatmaja 28 March 1983–21 March 1988
Ali Alatas 21 March 1988–26 October 1999
Alwi Shihab 26 October 1999–9 August 2001
Hassan Wirayuda 9 August 2001–present

MINISTERS OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, 17 August 1945–

20 December 1949)
R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah 31 August 1945–14 November 1945
Sutan Sjahrir (PS) 14 November 1945–12 March 1946
Sudarsono (PS) 12 March 1946–2 October 1946
Mohammad Roem (Masjumi) 2 October 1946–27 June 1947
Wondoamiseno (PSII) 3 July 1947–11 November 1947
Mohamad Roem (Masjumi) 11 November 1947–22 January 1948
Sukiman Wiryosanjoyo 29 January 1948–4 August 1949
(Masjumi, ad interim)
Wongsonegoro (PIR) 4 August 1949–20 December 1949

Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia

(Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Sumatra)
Teuku Mohammad Hasan 19 December 1948–13 July 1949

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, Constituent State

of the Republik Indonesia Serikat)
Susanto Tirtoprojo (PNI) 20 December 1949–21 January 1950
Susanto Tirtoprojo (PNI) 21 January 1950–6 September 1950
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OFFICEHOLDERS • 483

Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia)

Anak Agung Gde Agung 20 December 1949–6 September 1950

Republik Indonesia
Assaat 6 September 1950–27 April 1951
Iskaq Cokroadisuryo (PNI) 27 April 1951–3 April 1952
Mohamad Roem (Masjumi) 3 April 1952–1 August 1953
Hazairin (PIR) 1 August 1953–23 October 1954
Haji Zainul Arifin (NU) 23 October 1954–19 November 1954
Sunaryo (NU) 19 November 1954–12 August 1955
Sunaryo (NU) 12 August 1955–19 January 1956
R. P. Suroso (Parindra) 19 January 1956–26 March 1956
Sunaryo (NU) 26 March 1956–9 April 1957
Sanusi Harjadinata (PNI) 9 April 1957–9 July 1959
Ipik Gandamana 9 July 1959–6 March 1962
Saharjo 6 March 1962–13 November 1963
Ipik Gandamana 13 November 1963–2 September 1964
Sumarno 2 September 1964–18 March 1966
Basuki Rahmat 30 March 1966–9 January 1969
Amir Machmud 23 January 1969–28 March 1973
Suparjo Rustam 28 March 1973–21 March 1988
Rudini 21 March 1988–17 March 1993
M. Yogie Memet 17 March 1993–22 May 1998
Syarwan Hamid 22 May 1998–26 October 1999
Surjadi Soedirdja 29 October 1999–9 August 2001
Hari Sabarno 9 August 2001–present

MINISTERS OF DEFENSE

Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia, 17 August 1945–

20 December 1949)
Supriyadi (deceased) 6 October 1945–14 November 1945
Sulyoadikusumo (ad interim) 20 October 1945–14 November 1945
Mustopo (self-appointed) November 1945
484 • APPENDIX E

Hamengku Buwono IX (chosen by army but never took office)

Amir Sjarifuddin (PS) 14 November 1945–29 January 1948
Mohammad Hatta (ad interim) 29 January 1948–15 July 1948
Hamengku Buwono IX 15 July 1948–20 December 1949

Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia

(Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Sumatra)
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 19 December 1948–13 July 1949
(Masjumi)

Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia)

Hamengku Buwono IX 20 December 1949–6 September 1950

Republik Indonesia
Abdul Halim (ad interim) 6 September 1950–17 August 1950
Mohammad Natsir 17 December 1950–27 April 1951
(Masjumi, ad interim)
Sewaka (PIR) 9 May 1951–3 April 1952
Hamengku Buwono IX 3 April 1952–2 June 1953
Wilopo (PNI) 2 June 1953–1 August 1953
Iwa Kusumasumantri 1 August 1953–13 July 1955
(Persatuan Progresif)
Burhanuddin Harahap 12 August 1955–26 March 1956
(Masjumi)
Ali Sastroamijoyo 26 March 1956–9 April 1957
(PNI, ad interim)
Juanda Kartawijaya 9 April 1957–9 July 1959
Abdul Haris Nasution 9 July 1959–24 February 1966
M. Sarbini 24 February 1966–29 March 1973
Maraden Panggabean 28 March 1973–17 April 1978
Andi Mohammad Yusuf 17 April 1978–28 March 1983
S. Poniman 28 March 1983–21 March 1988
L. B. (Benny) Murdani 21 March 1988–21 March 1993
Edi Sudrajat 21 March 1993–14 March 1998
Wiranto 22 March 1998–26 October 1999
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OFFICEHOLDERS • 485

Juwono Sudarsono 26 October 1999–23 August 2000

Mohammad Mahfud 23 August 2000–9 August 2001
Matori Abdul Djalil 9 August 2001–present

COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY

The formal title of the army’s most senior commanding officer was pan-
glima (1945–1949), Kepala staf (chief of staff, 1949–1960), menteri/Kepala
staf (minister/chief of staff, 1960–1963), menteripanglima (1963–1967), pan-
glima (1967–1969), and Kepala staf (1969–present).

Supriyadi (deceased) 6 October 1945–14 November 1945

Urip Sumoharjo 6 October 1945–18 December 1945
(acting chief of HQ)
Sudirman (elected) 12 December 1945–18 December 1945
Sudirman (appointed) 18 December 1945–19 January 1950
A. H. Nasution 19 January 1950–15 December 1952
Bambang Sugeng 16 December 1952–2 May 1955
Zulkifi Lubis (acting) 12 May 1955–27 June 1955
Bambang Utoyo 10 June 1955–24 July 1955
Zulkifli Lubis (acting) 24 July 1955–7 November 1955
A. H. Nasution 7 November 1955–25 June 1962
Ahmad Yani 25 June 1962–1 October 1965
Pranoto (acting) 1 October 1965–16 October 1965
Suharto 16 October 1965–29 May 1967
Maraden Panggabean (acting) 29 May 1967–17 May 1968
Maraden Panggabean 17 May 1968–4 December 1969
Umar Wirahadikusumah 4 December 1969–2 April 1973
Surono Reksodimejo 2 April 1973–10 April 1974
Makmun Murod 10 April 1974–26 January 1978
Widodo 26 January 1978–15 April 1980
S. Poniman 15 April 1980–7 March 1983
Rudini 7 March 1983–24 June 1986
Try Sutrisno 24 June 1986–27 February 1988
Edi Sudrajat 27 February 1988–6 April 1993
Wismoyo Arismunandar 6 April 1993–11 February 1995
R. Hartono 11 February 1995–13 June 1997
486 • APPENDIX E

Wiranto 13 June 1997–23 February 1998

Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo 23 February 1998–? December 1999
Tyasno Sudarto 7 December 1999–9 October 2000
Endriartono Sutarto 9 October 2000–3 June 2002
Ryamizard Ryacudu 3 June 2002–present

COMMANDERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

T. B. Simatupang (chief of staff) 19 January 1950–c. August 1953

(post abolished)
Abdul Haris Nasution 25 June 1962–12 March 1967
Suharto 12 March 1967–28 March 1973?
Maraden Panggabean 28 March 1967–17 April 1978
Andi Muhammad Yusuf 17 April 1978–28 March 1983
L. B. (Benny) Murdani 28 March 1983–27 February 1988
Try Sutrisno 27 February 1988–19 February 1993
Edi Sudrajat 19 February 1993–21 May 1993
Feisal Etno Tanjung 21 May 1993–20 February 1998
Wiranto 20 February 1998–5 November 1999
Widodo Adi Sucipto 5 November 1999–7 June 2002
Edriartono Sutarto 7 June 2002–present

KOPKAMTIB COMMANDERS

Suharto 10 October 1965–19 November 1969

Maraden Panggabean 19 November 1969–27 March 1973
Sumitro 27 March 1973–28 January 1974
Suharto 28 January 1974–17 April 1978

(Day-to-day command exercised by KOPKAMTIB Chief of Staff Sudomo.)

Sudomo 17 April 1974–29 March 1983

L. B. (Benny) Murdani 29 March 1983–22 September 1988

KOPKAMTIB was abolished in September 1988 and replaced by BAKO-

RSTANAS, which was abolished in March 2000.
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OFFICEHOLDERS • 487

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

Masjumi Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia

(Consultative Council of Indonesian
Muslims)
NU Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the
Religious Scholars)
Parindra Partia Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia
Party)
PIR Persatuan Indonesia Raya (Greater
Indonesian Association)
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian
Nationalist Party)
PS Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party)
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian
Socialist Party)
PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Party
of the Indonesian Islamic Union)

NOTE

1. Although Juanda’s formal position from 9 July 1959 was that of first minister
(Menteri Pertama), rather than prime minister (Perdana Menteri), with Sukarno
holding the posts of president and prime minister concurrently, he was effectively
prime minister, that is, head of the cabinet, until his death on 7 November 1963.
 Appendix F
Parliamentary Strengths and Electoral
Performance of the Parties, 1945–1999

KOMITÉ NASIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT, FOUNDED 16–17

OCTOBER 1945 (200 SEATS)1

Party Seats (%)

PNI 45 (22.5%)
Masjumi 35 (17.5%)
Partai Sosialis 35 (17.5%)
Partai Buruh 6 (3.0%)
PKI 2 (1.0%)
PARKINDO 4 (2.0%)
Partai Katolik 2 (1.0%)
Sumatra 1 (0.5%)
Borneo 4 (2.0%)
Sulawesi 5 (2.5%)
Maluku 2 (1.0%)
Sunda Kecil 2 (1.0%)
Chinese 5 (2.5%)
Arabs 2 (1.0%)
Europeans 1 (0.5%)

KOMITÉ NASIONAL INDONESIA PUSAT, EXPANDED 2 MARCH

1947 (514 SEATS)2

Party Seats
PNI 45
Masjumi 60
Partai Sosialis 35

489
490 • APPENDIX F

Partai Buruh 35
PKI 35
PARKINDO 8
Partai Katolik 4
Workers* 40
Peasants* 40
Sumatra 50
Borneo 8
Sulawesi 10
Maluku 5
Sunda Kecil 5
Chinese 7
Arabs 3
Europeans 3

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT OF THE UNITARY REPUBLIC OF

INDONESIA (FORMED 17 AUGUST 1950, 236 SEATS)3

Origins
1. Members of RIS Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
A. Representing the Republic of Indonesia 50
B. Representing states and territories of the RIS
other than the Republic of Indonesia and
Pasundan 79
C. Representatives for Pasundan appointed
by the Republic of Indonesia 19
2. Members of the RIS Senate 29
3. Members of the Working Committee of the
Republic of Indonesia KNIP 46
4. Members of the Dewan Pertimbangan
Agung of the Republic of Indonesia 13

Affiliation
Party Seats (% of DPR, total 232)
Masjumi 49 (21%)
PNI 36 (16%)
 PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHS AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE • 491

PSI 17 (7.3%)
PIR 17
PKI 13 (5.6%)
Fraksi Demokrasi 13
PRN 10
Partai Katolik 9 (3.9%)
PARINDRA 8
Partai Buruh 7
PARKINDO 5 (2.2%)
PSII 5
Murba 4 (1.7%)
Front Buruh 4
Fraksi Kedaulatan Rakyat 4
Serikat Kerakyatan Indonesia 3
Golongan Tani (peasants) 2
No formal affiliation 26

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT, ELECTED

29 SEPTEMBER 19554

Party No. of Valid Votes % of vote Seats

PNI 8,434,653 22.3 57
Masjumi 7,902,886 20.9 57
Nahdatul Ulama 6,955,141 18.4 45
PKI 6,176,914 16.4 39
PSII 1,019,160 2.9 8
PARKINDO 1,003,325 2.6 8
Partai Katolik 770,740 2.0 6
PSI 753,191 2.0 5
IPKI 541,306 1.4 4
Perti 483,014 1.3 4
PRN 242,125 0.6 2
Partai Buruh 224,167 0.6 2
GPPS (Gerakan 219,985 0.6 2
Pembela Pancasila)
PRI 206,261 0.5 2
PPPRI 200,419 0.5 2
492 • APPENDIX F

Murba 199,588 0.5 2

Baperki 178,887 0.5 1
PIR-Wongsonegoro 178,481 0.5 1
Gerinda (Gerakan 154,792 0.4 1
Indonesia)
Permai 149,287 0.4 1
Partai Persatuan 146,054 0.4 1
Daya
PIR-Hazairin 114,644 0.3 1
PPTI 85,131 0.2 1
AKUI 81,454 0.2 1
PRD 77,919 0.2 1
PRIM (Partai Rakyat 72,523 0.2 1
Indonesia Merdeka)
Acoma (Angkatan 64,514 0.2 1
Comunis Muda)
R. Soejono 53,305 0.1 1
Prawirosudarso &
Associates
Others 1,022,433 2.7 —
Total 37,785,299 100.0 257

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, 15 DECEMBER 19555

PNI 9,070,218
Masjumi 7,789,619
NU 6,989,333
PKI 6,232,512
PSII 1,059,922
PARKINDO 988,810
Partai Katolik 748,591
PSI 695,932
IPKI 544,803
PERTI 465,359
PRN 220,652
Partai Buruh 332,047
Murba 248,633
 PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHS AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE • 493

PIR (Wongsonegoro) 162,420

PIR (Hazairin) 101,509
Permai 164,386
Baperki 160,456
Gerinda 157,976
Partai Persatuan Daya 169,222
PRIM 143,907
AKUI 84,862
Acoma 55,844
PPTI 74,913
PRD 39,278
R. Soedjono 38,356
Prawirosoedarso &
Associates

JAVA PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS, JUNE-AUGUST 1957 (RESULTS IN

1955 ELECTIONS IN SAME REGIONS IN BRACKETS)6

Jakarta West Java Central Java East Java

Masjumi 153,709 1,841,030 833,707 977,443
(200,460) (1,844,442) (902,387) (1,109,742)
PNI 124,955 1,055,801 2,400,282 1,899,782
(152,031) (1,541,927) (3,019,568) (2,257,069)
NU 104,892 597,356 1,865,568 2,999,785
(120,667) (673,552) (1,772,306) (3,370,554)
PKI 137,305 1,087,269 3,005,150) 2,704,523
96,363) (755,634) (2,326,108) (2,299,785)

DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT—GOTONG ROYONG

(DPR-GR), JULY 19607

PNI 44
PKI 30
Partai Katolik 5
PSII 5
PARKINDO 6
494 • APPENDIX F

Murba 1
NU 36
PERTI 2
Army (functional group) 15
Navy 7
Air force 7
Police 5
Workers 26
Peasants 25
Islamic teachers 24
Youth 9
Women 8
Intellectuals and teachers 5
Total 283

SECOND GENERAL ELECTIONS, 3 JULY 1971

Party Votes (%) Seats in DPR

Golkar 34,348,673 (62.80) 227
Nahdatul Ulama 10,213,650 (18.67) 58
PNI 3,793,266 (6.94) 20
PARMUSI 2,930,746 (5.36) 24
PSII 1,308,237 (2.39) 10
PARKINDO 733,359 (1.34) 7
Partai Katolik 603,740 (1.10) 3
PERTI 381,309 (0.70) 2
IPKI 338,403 (0.62) —
Murba 48,126 (0.09) —
Total 54,699,509 351

THIRD GENERAL ELECTIONS, 2 MAY 19778

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 18,743,491 27.78 99
Golkar 34,348,673 64.33 232
PDI 5,516,894 7.87 29
 PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHS AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE • 495

FOURTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 19829

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 20,871,880 27.78 94
Golkar 48,334,724 64.34 246
PDI 5,919,702 7.88 24

FIFTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 23 APRIL 198710

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 13,730,456 16.04 61
Golkar 62,433,161 72.94 299
PDI 9,434,667 11.02 40

SIXTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 9 JUNE 199211

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 16,624,647 17 62
Golkar 66,559,331 68 282
PDI 14,565,556 16 56

SEVENTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 29 MAY 199712

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 25,340,028 22.4 89
Golkar 684,187,907 74.5 325
PDI 3,565,556 2.6 11

EIGHTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 199913

Party Votes % Seats

PDI-P 35,689,073 33.76 153
Golkar 23.741,749 22.46 120
PKB 13,336,982 12.62 51
496 • APPENDIX F

Party Votes % Seats

PPP 11,329,905 10.72 58
PAN 7,528,956 7.12 34
PBB 2,049,708 1.94 13
PK 1,436,565 1.36 7
PKP 1,065,686 1.01 4
PNU 679,179 0.64 5
PDKB 550,846 0.52 5
PP 551,028 0.52 1
PPIIM 56,718 0.43 1
PDR 427,854 0.40 1
PSII 152,82014 0.14 1
PNI-FM 365,176 0.35 1
PBI 364,290 0.34 1
PNI-MM 345,720 0.33 1
IPKI 328,564 0.31 1
PKU 300,064 0.28 1
PKD 216,675 0.20 1
None of the other 27 parties that contested the elections received a seat
in parliament.

NINTH GENERAL ELECTIONS, 5 APRIL 200415

A total of 24 political parties qualified to contest the 2004 elections, in-

cluding only six that had participated in the 1999 general elections.16 These
six were: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDIP); Golkar; Partai
Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP); Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB); Partai
Amanat Nasional (PAN); and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB).
The other qualifying parties were: Partai Nasional Indonesia
Marhaenisme (PNIM), Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (PBSD), Partai
Merdeka (PM), Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PPDK), Partai
Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (PIB), Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan
(PNKB), Partai Demokrat (PD), Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia
(PKPI), Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (PPDI), Partai Persatuan
Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (PPNUI), Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (PKPB),
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR), Partai
Damai Sejahtera (PDS), Partai Patriot Pancasila (PPPan), Partai Serikat In-
donesia (PSI), Partai Persatuan Daerah (PPD), and Partai Pelopor (PP).17
 PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHS AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE • 497

NOTES

1. George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 201.
2. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, 201.
3. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), 94–95.
4. Feith, The Decline, 434–35.
5. Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), 65.
6. Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), 93–96.
7. Herbert Feith, “The Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” in Indonesia, ed.
Ruth T. McVey (New Haven, Conn.: HRAF, 1963), 345.
8. Kees van Dijk, “The Indonesian Elections,” RIMA 11, no. 2 (1977): 42–43.
9. Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesia’s Political System: Continuity and Change,”
Comtemporary Southeast Asia 9, no. 4 (March 1988): 272.
10. Jakarta Post, 27 April 1987.
11. Aloysius Arena Ariwibowo et al., Pemilu 1997 (Jakarta: Penakencana, 1997):
327.
12. Ariwibowo et al, Pemilu, 327.
13. Kompas online, 27 July 1999; Pompe, Sebastiaan, De Indonesische Al-
gemene Verkiezingen 1999 (Leiden, KITLV, 1999), pp. 39–40.
14. According to Pompe, PSII received 375,920 votes.
15. Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections (Jakarta/Brussels:
International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 71, 18 December 2003) and Forum
Keadilan, 4 January 2004
16. The 1999 election law had provided that only parties that won 2 percent of
the seats in the DPR (or 3 percent in the local representative councils in half the
provinces and half the districts) could participate in the 2004 election. If they did
not qualify, they could reform or merge to meet the criteria in the new election law.
17. Forum Keadilan, 8. In order to qualify parties needed to demonstrate “full
leadership” in at least two thirds of the provinces and two thirds of the districts
within those provinces. Indonesia Backgrounder, 5.
 Bibliography

This bibliography is a classified collection of articles, monographs, and

books on Indonesia up to the present day selected from a very much larger
body of writings. Works have been included for various reasons. Some are
classics in their fields, perhaps out-of-date now but nonetheless influential
and worthy of continuing attention. Others are substantial monographs that
are important, reliable, and likely to withstand the test of time. Many of the
more recent items are less substantial but offer the most up-to-date analy-
sis or statement of a problem and are included because they usefully sum-
marize the state of the art in their field, provide an introduction to other
works, or offer current information. A few works have been included be-
cause they are the only available source on a particular topic, even if they
are out-of-date. And some have been included because they are favorites of
the compilers or because they round out the picture of writing on Indone-
sia. Because of the rapid flow of events in Indonesia over the past decade,
and especially since the resignation of Suharto, the bibliography now con-
tains a number of articles and a few collections detailing the political and
economic events of these years and the different personalities and political
forces that have emerged in the new era.
As this dictionary is targeted at a mainly English-speaking readership,
priority has been given to works in English and to English translations of
works in other languages. But recognizing that the vast majority of schol-
arship on the Netherlands Indies prior to World War II was written by
Dutch scholars and administrators, much of which has never been sur-
passed, it includes a considerable number of entries in Dutch especially
for the colonial period and in the fields of anthropology, language, and
science. It also includes many recent monographs and articles in both En-
glish and Dutch that have appeared in publications of the Koninklijk In-
stituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV) as well as other Dutch
institutions that have been in the forefront of more recent scholarship on

499
500 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Indonesia. There is also a selection from the growing body of scholarship

on Indonesia in French (especially from the journal Archipel), Japanese,
and Indonesian, although the Japanese works are all in English transla-
tion.
The general section that opens the bibliography provides a good guide to
the main categories of scholarship on Indonesia, and it includes some useful
recent bibliographies of archival collections on Java [0005, 0009, 0010].
The Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam has completed its series on the
Changing Economy in Indonesia [0052–0068], which is an invaluable guide
to the colonial economy. In the subsequent section on culture, Astri Wright’s
treament of contemporary Indonesian painters, Soul, Spirit, and Mountain
[0202], joins Claire Holt’s classic Art in Indonesia [0159] to provide an ex-
cellent introductory overview of Indonesian art up to the present day.
Many works in the economic section overlap different categories, and for
this reason the reader would probably find it useful to check the biblio-
graphical references in the relevant dictionary entries.
Subdivisions in the history section differ somewhat from those in the
first edition. In particular, there is a single section covering the Dutch colo-
nial period (History, 1800–1942) rather than the previous two. Similarly,
the Japanese and revolutionary periods have been fused into a single sec-
tion (History, 1942–1949). Indonesia’s postindependence history has been
divided into the Sukarno, Suharto, and post-Suharto periods. (These subdi-
visions correspond to the breakdowns now followed in the chronology.) A
new section has been added on regional history, which should help those
wishing to trace the roots of the recent ethnic and religious unrest in the his-
tories of the regions where it occurred.
The remaining sections—Politics, Science, and Society—follow the
lines of the original dictionary, with a subsection on media and the press
now added to the society section.
Following current Indonesian developments from outside the country
has never been easy. But in the past decade, the Internet has provided an in-
valuable means of gaining a wide perspective of viewpoints regarding
events of the day. For a listing of useful websites on general issues, the en-
vironment, and human rights, see the Internet resources section at the end
of this bibliography.
All the major Jakarta newspapers and some provincial ones have web
pages, and the easiest way of accessing these is through a search engine—
Google.com seems to have the widest and most accessible database. In ad-
dition, a number of Indonesian newspapers and journals, notably Tempo
and Kompas, now have both Indonesian and English-language editions, in
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 501

print and online. The weekly Far Eastern Economic Review carries brief
mentions of most major events in Indonesia, but it increasingly emphasizes
economic news over that in the political sphere and emphasizes East over
Southeast Asia. The Asian Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tri-
bune, New York Times, Washington Post, Sydney Morning Herald, and the
Dutch-language NRC Handelsblad occasionally publish accounts of In-
donesian developments when they affect the interests of the United States,
Australia, or the Netherlands.
At the end of the bibliography, there is a list of journals that frequently
carry articles concerning recent developments in Indonesia as well as the
most recent scholarship on all fields of study. On economic matters, the
Bulletin of Indoensian Economic Studies (BIES) is the most useful and it
also publishes a quarterly economic survey. The journal Indonesia pub-
lishes frequent updates on officeholders in the military, Inside Indonesia
focuses on contemporary issues, and Asian Survey publishes an annual
roundup of political events in its January or February issue.
Both Excerpta Indonesica (EI) and the Bibliography of Asian Studies (BAS)
are essential tools for keeping in touch with recent academic research. EI ap-
pears twice a year and provides abstracts of recent articles on Indonesia in the
social sciences and humanities. Its e-mail address is kitlvpress@kitlv.nl. BAS
now appears online. Details for accessing the database (which covers
1971–present) for organizations subscribing to BAS Online can be obtained
from www.hti.umich.edu/b/bas/. Inquiries for individual subscriptions can be
sent to abeard@aasianst.org.
As already indicated in the reader’s note, all bibliographical entries are
numbered, and these numbers appear at the end of entries in the dictionary
to guide readers to the relevant sources.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANU, Australian National University

BCAS, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (now Critical Asian Studies)
BEFEO, Bulletin de l’Ecole Française d’Extrème Orient
BIES, Bulletin tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik
ISEAS, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
JAS, Journal of Asian Studies
JMBRAS, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSEAH, Journal of Southeast Asian History
502 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

JSEAS, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

KITLV, Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
MAS, Modern Asian Studies
OUP, Oxford University Press
RIMA, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs

CONTENTS

GENERAL
Bibliographies 504
Reference Works 505
Statistical Abstracts 506
Travel and Tourism 507
Guidebooks 508

CULTURE
Archeology 509
Architecture 510
Arts 510
Literary Studies 514
Works of Literature 515
Language and Linguistics 516

ECONOMY
General 518
Agriculture 519
Development 521
Finance 523
Industry 524
Labor 525
Trade 526
Transport and Communications 528

HISTORY
General Histories 528
Historiography 529
To 1400 530
1400–1800 532
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 503

1800–1942 534
1942–1949 537
1950–1966 540
Suharto Era (1967–1998) 541
Post-Suharto Era (1998–2003) 543
Regional 544
Biography and Autobiography 547

POLITICS
General 550
Political Thought 551
Political Writings 552
Policy Issues 552
Government Institutions 554
Political Parties 555
Elections 556
Islam and Politics 557
Racial and Minority Issues 558
Law 560
International Relations 561

SCIENCE
Biology 564
Geography, Geology, and Ecology 565
History of Science 566
Public Health and Medicine 567

SOCIETY
Anthropology 567
Education 571
Media and the Press 572
Population 573
Religion 573
Sociology 576
Women 577

CURRENT MEDIA
Journals 580
Internet Resources 582
504 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

GENERAL

Bibliographies
[0001] ASEAN: A Bibliography. Singapore: ISEAS, 1984.
[0002] Avé, Jan B., Victor T. King, and Joke G. W. de Wit. West-Kalimantan: A Bib-
liography. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1983.
[0003] Baal, J. van, K. W. Galis, and R. M. Koentjaraningrat. West-Irian: A Bibli-
ography. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris, 1984.
[0004] Boland, B. J., and I. Farjon. Islam in Indonesia: A Bibliographic Survey.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris, 1983.
[0005] Carey, Peter, and Mason C. Hoadley. The Archive of Yogyakarta, Vol. II:
Documents Relating to Economic and Agrarian Affairs. New York: OUP, 2000.
[0006] Char Lan Hiang. Southeast Asian Research Tools: Indonesia. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawai’i Southeast Asian Studies Program, 1979.
[0007] Coolhaas, W. Ph. A Critical Survey of Studies on Dutch Colonial History,
2nd. ed. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980.
[0008] Farjon, I. Madura and Surrounding Islands: An Annotated Bibliography
1860–1942. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1980.
[0009] Florida, Nancy. Javanese Literature in Surakarta Manuscripts, Volume 1: In-
troduction and Manuscripts of the Karaton Surakarta. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Southeast Asia Program, 1993.
[0010] ———. Javanese Literature in Surakarta Manuscripts, Volume 2: Manu-
scripts of the Mangkunagaran Palace. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Pro-
gram, 2000.
[0011] Groenendael, Victoria M. Clara van. Wayang Theatre in Indonesia: An An-
notated bibliography. Leiden, the Netherlands: KITLV, 1987.
[0012] Hicks, George L., and Geoffrey McNicoll. The Indonesian Economy
1950–1965: A Bibliography. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast
Asian Studies, 1967.
[0013] Jacobs, M., and T. J. J. de Boo. Conservation Literature on Indonesia: Se-
lected Annotated Bibliography. Leiden, the Netherlands: Rijksherbarium, 1982.
[0014] Jaquet, F. G. P. Sources for the History of Asian and Oceania in the Nether-
lands, 2 vols. Munich: K. G. Saur, 1982–1983.
[0015] Johnson, Donald Clay. Index to Southeast Asian Journals: A Guide to Arti-
cles, Book Reviews and Composite Works, 2 vols. Boston: Hall, 1977–1982.
[0016] Kemp, H. C. Annotated Bibliography of Bibliographies on Indonesia. Lei-
den, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1990.
[0017] Kennedy, Raymond. Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures, 2nd
ed. New Haven Conn: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1962.
[0018] Klooster, H. A. J. Bibliography of the Indonesian Revolution: Publications
from 1942 to 1994. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1997.
[0019] Koentjaraningrat. Anthropology in Indonesia: A Bibliographical Review.
Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1975.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 505

[0020] Kratz, Ernst Ulrich. A Bibliography of Indonesian Literature in Journals.

Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada Press, 1988.
[0021] Lan Hiang Char. Southeast Asian Research Tools: Indonesia. Honolulu: Uni-
versity of Hawai’i, 1979.
[0022] Langenberg, Michael van, ed. Bibliography of Indonesian Politics and the
Economy since 1965. Sydney: Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific, 1988.
[0023] Manguin, Pierre-Yves. A Bibliography for Sriwijayan Studies. Jakarta: l’E-
tude Française d’Extreme-Orient, 1989.
[0024] Nagelkerke, Gerard A. The Chinese in Indonesia: A Bibliography, 18th cen-
tury—1981. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1982.
[0025] Polman, Katrien. The Central Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography. Lei-
den, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1983.
[0026] ———. The North Moluccas: An Annotated Bibliography. Leiden, The
Netherlands: KITLV, 1981.
[0027] Pompe, Sebastiaan. Indonesian Law 1949–1989: A Bibliography of Foreign-
Language Materials with Brief Commentaries on the Law. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992.
[0028] Schouten, Mieke. Minahasa and Bolaangmongondouw: An Annotated Bib-
liography, 1800–1942. Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV, 1981.
[0029] Sherlock, Kevin. A Bibliography of the Island of Timor, Including East (For-
merly Portuguese) Timor, West (formerly Dutch) Timor and the Island of Roti.
Canberra: Australian National University, 1980.
[0030] Volkman, Toby Alice. Film on Indonesia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Southeast Asia Studies, 1985.

Reference Works
[0031] Apa dan Siapa: sejumlah orang Indonesia, 1981–1982; 1983–1984;
1985–1986. Jakarta: Grafiti, 1981, 1983, 1986.
[0032] Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië, 4 vols. and 4 suppls. The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1917–1939.
[0033] Ensiklopedi Indonesia, 7 vols. Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru-van Hoeve, 1980–1984.
[0034] Ensiklopedi Indonesia supplemen, vols. 1 and 2. Jakarta: Ichtiar Baru-van
Hoeve, 1986–1990.
[0035] Orang Indonesia jang terkemoeka di Djawa. [Jakarta]: Gunseikanbu, 2604
(i.e., 1944).
[0036] The Indonesian Military Leaders: Biographical and Other Background
Data, 2nd ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief, 1978.
[0037] Who’s Who in the Indonesian Military. Jakarta: Sritua Arief, 1977.
[0038] Boomgard, P., ed. The Colonial Past: Dutch Sources on Indonesian History.
Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991.
[0039] Bruinessen, Martin van. Kitab kuning, pesantren dan tarekat: tradisi-tradisi
Islam di Indonesia. Bandung, Indonesia: Mizan, 1995.
506 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

[0040] Crawfurd, John. A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent
Countries. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: OUP, 1971.
[0041] Cribb, Robert. Historical Atlas of Indonesia. Honolulu: University of
Hawai’i Press, 2000.
[0042] Day, Tony, and Will Derks, eds. Encompassing Knowledge: Indigenous En-
cyclopedias from Ninth-Century Java to Twentieth-Century Riau. BKI, special is-
sue, 155, no. 3 (1999).
[0043] Drooglever, P. J., M. J. B. Schouten, and Mona Lohanda. Guide to the
Archives on Relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, 1945–1963. The
Hague: Institute of Netherlands History, 1999.
[0044] Gibb, H. A. R., and J. H. Kramers. Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953
[0045] Gonggryp, G. F. E. Geillustreerde encyclopedie van Nederlandsch-Indie.
Leiden, The Netherlands: Leidsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1934.
[0046] Ikhwan, Abdul Halim, et al. Ensiklopedi Haji and umrah. Jakarta: PT Raja
Grafindo Persada, 2002.
[0047] Parsidi, Agata. Kamus akronim, inisialisme dan singkatan. Jakarta: Grafiti
Pers, 1992.
[0048] Pompe, S. “A Short Review of Doctoral Theses on the Netherlands-Indies
Accepted at the Faculty of Law of Leiden University in the Period 1850–1940.”
Indonesia 56 (October 1993): 67–98.
[0049] Roeder, O. G. Who’s Who in Indonesia, 2nd ed. Jakarta: Gunung Agung,
1971, 1980.
[0050] Suryadinata, Leo. Eminent Indonesian Chinese: Biographical Sketches. Sin-
gapore: ISEAS, 1978.
[0051] The Liang Gie, and Andrian The. Ensiklopedi ilmu-ilmu. Yogyakarta, In-
donesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2001.

Statistical Abstracts
Changing Economy in Indonesia, published by the Royal Tropical Institute, Ams-
terdam
[0052] 1. Creutzberg, Piet. Indonesia’s Export Crops, 1816–1940. 1975.
[0053] 2. ———. Public Finance, 1816–1939. 1976.
[0054] 3. ———. Expenditure on Fixed Assets. 1977.
[0055] 4. ———. Rice Prices. 1978.
[0056] 5. ———. National Income. 1979.
[0057] 6. Van Laanen, J. Th. M. Money and Banking, 1816–1940. 1980.
[0058] 7. Altes, W. Korthals. Balance of Payments, 1822–1939. 1987.
[0059] 8. Segers, W. I. A. M. Manufacturing Industry, 1870–1942. 1987.
[0060] 9. Knaap, Gerrit J. Transport, 1819–1940. 1989.
[0061] 10. Boomgaard, P., and J. L.van Zanden. Food Crops and Arable Lands, Java
1815–1942. 1990.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 507

[0062] 11. Boomgaard, P. Population Trends, 1795–1942. 1991.

[0063] 12a. Korthals, W. L. General Trade Statistics 1822–1940. 1991.
[0064] 12b. Clemens, Adrian, J. Thomas Lindblad, and Jereon Touwen. Regional
Patterns in Foreign Trade 1911–1940. 1992.
[0065] 13. Dros, Nico. Wages 1820–1940. 1992.
[0066] 14. Van Baardewijk, Frans. The Cultivation System, Java 1834–1880.
1993.
[0067] 15. Altes, W. L. Korthals. Prices (Non-Rice), 1814–1940. 1994.
[0068] 16. Boomgaard, P. Forests and Forestry, 1823–1941. [1996].
[0069] Berita Resmi Statistik. “Hasil sensus penduduk 2000.” Berita Resmi Statis-
tik 26, no. 5 (3 June 2002).
[0070] Indisch Verslag 1939, II: Statistisch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indiê
over het jaar 1938. Batavia (Jakarta): Landsdrukkerij, 1939.
[0071] Penduduk Indonesia: hasil sensus penduduk 1990. Jakarta: BPS, 1992.
[0072] Penduduk Indonesia: hasil survei penduduk antar sensus 1995. Jakarta:
BPS, 1996.
[0073] Statistik Indonesia 1996. Jakarta: BPS, 1996.
[0074] Statistik Indonesia. Jakarta: BPS, 2000.
[0075] Netherlands Indies Departement van Economische Zaken. Volkstelling 1930,
8 vols. Batavia (Jakarta): Landsdrukkerij, 1933–1936.
[0076] Touwen, Jeroen. Shipping and Trade in the Java Sea Region 1870–1940: A
Collection of Statistics on the Major Java Sea Ports. Leiden, The Netherlands:
KITL, 2001.

Travel and Tourism

[0077] Anderson, John. Mission to the East Coast of Sumatra in 1823. Edinburgh:
Blackwood, 1826. Reprint, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: OUP, 1971.
[0078] Attenborough, David. Zoo Quest for a Dragon [Komodo]. London: Lutter-
worth, 1957.
[0079] Bickmore, Albert S. Travels in the East Indian Archipelago. London: Mur-
ray, 1868.
[0080] Bonneff, Marcel. Pérégrinations javanaises: les voyages de R.M.A. Purwa
Lelana: une visie de Java au XIXe siècle (c. 1860–1875). Paris: Editions de la
Maison des Recherche Scientifique, 1986.
[0081] Burnell, A. C., and P. A. Tiek, eds. The Voyage of J. H. van Linschoten to the
East Indies, 2 vols. London: Hakluyt Society, 1885.
[0082] Cortesåo, Armando, trans. and ed. The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires, 2 vols.
London: Hakluyt Society, 1944.
[0083] Foster, Sir William, ed. The Voyage of Sir Henry Middleton to the Moluccas,
1604–1606. London: Hakluyt Society, 1943.
[0084] Gibb, H. A. R., ed. and trans. Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa,
1325–54. London: Routledge, 1953.
508 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

[0085] Jack-Hinton, Colin. “Marco Polo in South-East Asia.” JSEAH 5, no. 2

(1964): 43–103.
[0086] Kayam, Umar, and Harri Peccinottiq. The Soul of Indonesia: A Cultural
Journey. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985.
[0087] Kenji, Tsuchiya, and James Siegel. “Invincible Kitsch or as Tourists in the
Age of Des Alwi.” Indonesia 50 (October 1990): 61–76.
[0088] Macnaught, T. J. “Mass Tourism and the Dilemmas of Modernization in Pa-
cific Island Communities.” Annals of Tourism Research 9, no. 3 (1982).
[0089] Maurer, Jean-Luc. Tourism and Development in a Socio-Cultural Perspec-
tive: Indonesia as a Case Study. Geneva: Institut universitaire d’études du
développement, 1979.
[0090] McCarthy, John. Are Sweet Dreams Made of This? Tourism in Bali and East-
ern Indonesia. Northcote, Australia: Indonesian Resources and Information Pro-
gram, 1994.
[0091] McPhee, Colin. A House in Bali. New York: John Day, 1944.
[0092] Milton, Giles. Nathaniel’s Nutmeg: Or, The True and Incredible Adventures
of the Spice Trader Who Changed the Course of History. New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1999.
[0093] Noronha, R. “Paradise Reviewed: Tourism in Bali.” In Tourism: Passport to
Development? edited by E. de Kadt. New York: OUP, 1979.
[0094] Picard, Michel. Bali: Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture. Singapore:
Archipelago Press, 1996.
[0095] ———. “‘Cultural Tourism’ in Bali: Cultural Performances as Tourist At-
traction.” Indonesia 49 (April 1990): 37–74.
[0096] Pollmann, Tessel, Juan Seleky, and Bert Nienhuis. Terug op de Molukken.
Amsterdam: De arbeiderspers, 1982.
[0097] Powell, Hickman. The Last Paradise. Oxford: OUP, 1982 [orig.1930].
[0098] Severin, Tim. The Spice Islands Voyage: In Search of Wallace. London: Lit-
tle, Brown, 1998.
[0099] Valentijn, François. Oud en nieuw Oost-Indiên, 5 vols. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Van Braam, 1724–1726.
[0100] Wallace, Alfred. The Malay Archipelago, 2 vols. London: Macmillan, 1869.
[0101] Wright, Arnold, and Oliver T. Breakspear, eds. Twentieth Century Impres-
sions of Netherlands India: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Re-
sources. London: Lloyd’s Greater Britain Publishing, 1909.
[0102] Yoety, Oka A. Perencanaan dan pengembangan pariwisata. Jakarta: Pra-
dyna Paramita, 1997.

Guidebooks
[0103] Cochrane, Janet. The National Parks and Other Wild Places of Indonesia.
London: New Holland, 2000.
[0104] Cockell, Charles. The Expeditions to Indonesia Handbook. Hailsham, East
Sussex, UK: CSC Expeditionary Publications, 1994.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 509

[0105] Dalton, Bill. Indonesia. New York: Odyssey Publications, 1999.

[0106] Destination Indonesia. Jakarta: Directorate General of Tourism, 1992–1993.
[0107] Eliot, Joshua, Jane Bickersteth, and Liz Capaldi. Indonesia Handbook. Bath,
UK: Footprint Handbooks, 1998.
[0108] Henley, David E. F., et al. Indonesia: Sumatra, Java, Bali, Lombok, Su-
lawesi: An Up-to-Date Travel Guide. Edison, N.J.: Hunter, 2000.
[0109] Indonesia: Travel Atlas. Singapore: Periplus, 1998.
[0110] Jepson, Paul. Fielding’s In-Depth Guide to Birding on the World’s Largest
Archipelago. Hong Kong: Periplus, [1997].
[0111] Smith, Holly S. Adventuring in Indonesia: Exploring the Natural Areas of
the Pacific’s Ring of Fire. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, [1997].

CULTURE

Archeology
[0112] Dumarçay, Jacques. “Le Candi Badut.” Archipel 63 (2002): 7–14.
[0113] Gomez, Luis O., and Hiram W. Woodward. Barabudur: History and Signif-
icance of a Buddhist Monument. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, 1981.
[0114] Harkantiningsih, Naniek. “Le site de Léran à Gresik, Java-Est: étude
archéologique préliminaire.” Archipel 63 (2002): 17–26.
[0115] Kalus, Ludvik, and Claude Guillot. “La Jérusalem javanaise et sa mosqué al-
Aqsâ: texte de fondation de la mosquée de Kudus datée 956/1549.” Archipel 63
(2002): 27–56.
[0116] Krom, N. J. Barabadur: Archaeological Description, 2 vols. The Hague: Ni-
jhoff, 1927.
[0117] Manguin, Pierre-Yves. “Etude Sumatranaises 1. Palembang et Sriwijaya: an-
ciennes hypotheses, recherches nouvelles (Palembang ouest).” BEFEO 76 (1987).
[0118] McKinnon, E. Edwards. “Buddhism and the pre-Islamic archaeology of
Kutei in the Mahakam Valley of East Kalimantan.” In Studies in Southeast Asian
Art: Essays in Honor of Stanley J. O’Connor, edited by Nora Taylor, 217–40.
[0196]
[0119] ———. “Ceramic Recoveries (Surface Finds) at Lambara, Aceh.” Journal of
East-West Maritime Relations 2 (1992).
[0120] ———. “The Sambas Hoard: Bronze Drums and Gold Ornaments Found in
Kalimantan in 1991.” JMBRAS 67, no. 1 (1994): 9–28.
[0121] Miksic, John N. “Evolving Archaeological Perspectives on Southeast Asia,
1970–95.” JSEAS 26, no. 1 (March 1995): 46–62.
[0122] Simangjuntak, Truman. “New Light on the Prehistory of the Southern
Mountains of Java.” In Indo-Pacific Prehistory, ed. Peter Bellwood et al. Can-
berra: Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association, ANU, 2001.
[0123] Stutterheim, W. F. Studies in Indonesian Archaeology. The Hague: Nijhoff,
1956.
510 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

[0124] Suleiman, Satyawati, Sculptures of Ancient Sumatra. Jakarta: Proyek

Penelitian Purbakala, 1981.

Architecture
[0125] Dumarçay, Jacques. The House in South-East Asia. Singapore: OUP, 1987.
[0126] Keeler, Ward. Symbolic Dimensions of the Javanese House. Clayton, Victo-
ria, Australia: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983.
[0127] Kusno, Abidin. Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space, and Po-
litical Cultures in Indonesia. London: Routledge, 2000.
[0128] Macrae, Graeme, and Samuel Parker. “Would the Real Undagi Please Stand
Up? On the Social Location of Balinese Architectural Knowledge.” BKI 158, no.
2 (2002): 253–81.
[0129] Prijotomo, Josef. Ideas and Forms of Javanese Architecture. Yogyakarta, In-
donesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1984.
[0130] Volkman, Toby Alice, and Charles Zerner. “Tourism and Architectural De-
sign in the Toraja Highlands.” Mimar 25 (September 1987): 20–25.
[0131] Wijaya, Made. Architecture of Bali: A Source Book of Traditional and Mod-
ern Forms. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002.

Arts
[0132] Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965.
[0133] Barbier, Jean Paul. Indonesian Primitive Art: Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines. Dallas, Tex.: Dallas Museum of Art, 1984.
[0134] Barendregt, Bart. “The Sound of ‘Longing for Home’: Redefining a Sense
of Community through Minang Popular Music.” BKI 158, no. 3 (2002):
411–50.
[0135] Becker, Judith. Traditional Music in Modern Java: Gamelan in a Changing
Society. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1980.
[0136] Bernet Kempers. Ancient Indonesian Art. Amsterdam: van der Peet, 1959.
[0137] Bodrogi, Tibor. Art of Indonesia. London: Academy Editions, 1973.
[0138] Brakel-Papenhuyzen. “Javanese Talèdhèk and Chinese Tayuban.” BKI 151,
no. 4 (1995): 545–69.
[0139] Brakel-Papenhuyzen, and Wim van Zan, eds. “Performing Arts in Southeast
Asia.” BKI, special issue, 151, no. 4 (1995).
[0140] Brandon, James R. On Thrones of Gold: Three Javanese Shadow Plays.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. Press, 1970.
[0141] Causey, Andrew. “The Folder in the Drawer of the Sky Blue Lemari: A Toba
Batak Carver’s Secrets.” Crossroads 14, no. 1 (2000): 1–34.
[0142] Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. History of Indian and Indonesian Art. New
York: Dover, 1965.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 511

[0143] Draeger, Donn. Weapons and Fighting Arts of the Indonesian Archipelago.
Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1972.
[0144] Elliott, Inger McCabe. Batik: Fabled Cloth of Java. Harmondsworth, UK:
Viking, 1985.
[0145] Feinstein, Alan. “Modern Javanese Theatre and the Politics of Culture: A
Case Study of Teater Gapit.” BKI 151, no. 4 (1995): 617–38.
[0146] Fontein, Jan. The Sculpture of Indonesia. Washington, D.C.: National
Gallery of Art, 1990.
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Law
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580 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

CURRENT MEDIA

Journals
Antropologi Indonesia, Jurusan Antropologi, FISIP, Universitas Indonesia, Depok,
Java Barat, Indonesia.
Archipel, Bureau 732, EHESS, 54 Bd Raspail, 75006 Paris, France.
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Economic Re-
search Unit), Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614.
Asian Affairs, Royal Society for Asian Affairs, 2 Belgrave Square, London SW1X
8PJ, United Kingdom.
Asian Perspectives (archeology), University of Hawai’i Press, 2840 Kolowalu St.,
Honolulu, HI 96822, USA.
Asian Survey, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA.
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Australian Institute of International Af-
fairs, Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia.
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, KITLV, Postbus 9515, 2300 RA Lei-
den, Netherlands.
Borneo Research Bulletin, IEAS, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, 94300 Kota Sama-
rahan, Sarawak, Malaysia.
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Research School of Pacific Studies, Aus-
tralian National University, GPO Box 4 Canberra Act 2601, Australia.
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Heng Mui Keng
Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614.
Critical Asian Studies [formerly Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars], c/o BCAS,
3693 South Bay Bluffs Drive, Cedar, MI 49621-9434, USA.
Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Center for
Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA.
Cultural Survival Quarterly, Cultural Survival Inc., Cambridge, MA, USA.
Developing Economies, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan.
Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan
Masyarakat, Fakultas Ekonomi, Universitas Indonesia, Kotak Pos 295, Jakarta
10001, Indonesia.
Far Eastern Economic Review, GPO Box 160, Hong Kong.
Flora Malesiana Bulletin, Rijksherbarium, Postbus 9514, 2300 RA Leiden, Nether-
lands.
Gatra, Gedung Gatra, Jl. Kalibata Timur IV, No. 15, Jakarta 12740, Indonesia.
Indische Letteren, c/o Reggie Baay, Praam 27, 2377 BW Oude Wetering, Nether-
lands.
Indonesia, Southeast Asia Program Publications, 640 Stewart Avenue, Ithaca, NY
14850, USA.
Indonesia: An Analysis of Economic and Political Trends, Economist Intelligence
Unit, 40 Duke Street, London, W1A 1DW, United Kingdom.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY • 581

Indonesia and the Malay World [successor to Indonesia Circle], School of Oriental
& African Studies, Univ. of London, Thornhaugh St., Russell Square, London
WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom.
Indonesia: Feiten en Meningen, Postbus 4098, 1009 AB Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Indonesian Quarterly, CSIS, Yayasan Proklamasi, Jl Tanah Abang III/27, Jakarta
Pusat, Indonesia.
Inside Indonesia, PO Box 1326, Collingwood, Victoria, Australia.
Itinerario, Centre for the History of European Expansion, Faculty of the School of
Humanities, University of Leiden, Postbus 9515, 2300 RA Leiden, Netherlands.
Journal of Asian History, Otto Harrassowitz, Postfach 2929, D-6200 Wiesbaden 1,
West Germany; Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA.
Journal of Asian Studies, AAS, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
48109, USA.
Journal of Contemporary Asia, PO Box 592, Manila, Philippines 1099.
Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 130M Jalan Thamby
Abdullah, Brickfields, 50470 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (succeeded Journal of Southeast Asian History),
c/o Department of History, National University of Singapore, 11 Arts Link, Sin-
gapore 117570.
Kyoto Review [online]: http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyoto-u.ac.jp.
Masyarakat Indonesia, Biro Pemasyarakatan IPTEK, LIPI, Widya Graha, Jl Jend.
Gatot Subroto 10, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Modern Asian Studies, Cambridge University Press, Edinburgh Building, Shafts-
bury Rd, Cambridge CB2 2RU, United Kingdom.
Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1W5, Canada.
Panji, Jalan Kemang Selatan Raya, No. 111H, Jakarta 12730, Indonesia.
Populasi: bulletin penelitian dan kebijaksaan kependudukan, Pusat Penelitian
Kependuduukan Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Department of Southeast Asian Studies,
University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia.
Sojourn, Journal on Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614.
Southeast Asia Research (SOAS), Turpin Distr. Services, Blackhorse Road, Letch-
worth, Herts SG6 1HN, United Kingdom.
Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Heng Mui Keng Ter-
race. Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614.
Southeast Asian Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto Univ., 46 Shi-
moadachi-cho, Yoshida, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, Japan.
Studia Islamika, IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Tapol: The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 111 Northwood Rd., Thornton
Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, United Kingdom.
Tempo, Gedung Tempo, Jalan Proklamasi No. 72, Jakarta 10320, Indonesia.
Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, Van Gorcum, Groningen, The Netherlands.
582 • BIBLIOGRAPHY

Internet Resources
General
Biro Pusat Statistik: www.bps.go.id. The most useful website for recent statistical
data.
International Crisis Group: www.crisisweb.org. The International Crisis Group pub-
lishes occasional briefings on Indonesia that are both reliable and informative.
www.Laksamana.net. The best source for up-to-date English digests of current po-
litical and economic events in Indonesia.
www.gtzsfdm.or.id. A useful website that gives the most recent news on the course
of decentralization.
www.store.eiu.com. The Economic Intelligence Unit’s regular economic updates
and country profiles.

Environment
The following two websites cover environmental developments in the region and
are perhaps the most useful websites on this subject.
Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI): www.lei.or.id
Down to Earth: http://dte.gn.apc.org

Human Rights
Amnesty International (AI): www.amnesty.org. AI provides frequent reports on a
variety of issues affecting human rights in Indonesia. A list of these publications
and their e-mail releases can be accessed via their website.
 About the Authors

Robert Cribb is senior fellow at the Australian National University in Can-

berra and has previously worked in Australia, the Netherlands, and Den-
mark. His research interests focus on Indonesia and cover political vio-
lence, national identity, environmental politics, and historical geography.
He is the author of Gangsters and Revolutionaries (1991) and the Histori-
cal Atlas of Indonesia (2000), as well as editor of The Indonesian Killings
of 1965–1966 (1990), The Late Colonial State in Indonesia (1994), and
(with Li Narangoa) Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia,
1895–1945 (2003).

Audrey Kahin received her Ph.D. in Southeast Asian History from Cornell
University in 1979. From 1978 to 1995 she was managing editor of South-
east Asia publications at Cornell and coeditor, then editor, of the journal In-
donesia. She is editor and contributor of Regional Dynamics of the Indone-
sian Revolution (1985), author of Rebellion to Integration (1999) and (with
George McT. Kahin) Subversion as Foreign Policy (1995). Most recently
she edited, with James T. Siegel, Southeast Asia over Three Generations
(2003). She is currently working on problems of integration in Indonesia
and a biography of the former Islamic political leader Mohammad Natsir.

583