This document is a court decision regarding a land dispute between Pedro Lee Hong Hok and others ("petitioners") and Aniano David ("respondent"). The Court of Appeals and lower court had ruled in favor of respondent, upholding the validity of the Torrens Title for the disputed land issued to respondent. The Supreme Court affirms this decision, finding that petitioners provided no evidence to support their claim to ownership of the land through accretion. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument that only the government can grant land, noting this principle has been established since a 1972 case. As petitioners had no ownership rights, they could not challenge respondent's legally issued land title.
This document is a court decision regarding a land dispute between Pedro Lee Hong Hok and others ("petitioners") and Aniano David ("respondent"). The Court of Appeals and lower court had ruled in favor of respondent, upholding the validity of the Torrens Title for the disputed land issued to respondent. The Supreme Court affirms this decision, finding that petitioners provided no evidence to support their claim to ownership of the land through accretion. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument that only the government can grant land, noting this principle has been established since a 1972 case. As petitioners had no ownership rights, they could not challenge respondent's legally issued land title.
This document is a court decision regarding a land dispute between Pedro Lee Hong Hok and others ("petitioners") and Aniano David ("respondent"). The Court of Appeals and lower court had ruled in favor of respondent, upholding the validity of the Torrens Title for the disputed land issued to respondent. The Supreme Court affirms this decision, finding that petitioners provided no evidence to support their claim to ownership of the land through accretion. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument that only the government can grant land, noting this principle has been established since a 1972 case. As petitioners had no ownership rights, they could not challenge respondent's legally issued land title.
This document is a court decision regarding a land dispute between Pedro Lee Hong Hok and others ("petitioners") and Aniano David ("respondent"). The Court of Appeals and lower court had ruled in favor of respondent, upholding the validity of the Torrens Title for the disputed land issued to respondent. The Supreme Court affirms this decision, finding that petitioners provided no evidence to support their claim to ownership of the land through accretion. The Court also rejects petitioners' argument that only the government can grant land, noting this principle has been established since a 1972 case. As petitioners had no ownership rights, they could not challenge respondent's legally issued land title.
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G.R. No.
L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSIT LEE HONG HOK !"# LEON$IO LEE HONG HOK,petitioners, vs. NINO D%ID, THE HON. SE$RETR& O' GRI$(LT(RE ND NT(RL RESO(R$ES, THE DIRE$TOR O' LNDS !"# $O(RT O' PPELS, respondents. Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners. Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David. Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
'ERNNDO, J.:p Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What maes the tas for petitioners !uite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodo"y and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the government through the appropriate public officials 3 e"ercising the competence duly vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, une"pressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. #uch an assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. $t cannot receive our assent. We affirm. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court maes clear that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he %ac!uired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of &ands on 'une (), (*+), covering &ot ,)*, containing an area of ,,- s!uare meters, which is a portion of &ot ,)-. of the /aga Cadastre. 0n the basis of the order of award of the Director of &ands the 1ndersecretary of Agriculture and /atural 2esources issued on August ,-, (*+*, 3iscellaneous #ales Patent /o. 45(,6* pursuant to which 0CT /o. +(6 was issued by the 2egister of Deeds of /aga City to defendant5appellee Aniano David on 0ctober ,(, (*+*. According to the #tipulation of 7acts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs5appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of 2epublic Act 8*- subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... 1nder #ection .) of Act 8*- any !uestion concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... $n this case the land in !uestion is not a private property as the Director of &ands and the #ecretary of Agriculture and /atural 2esources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. $n this case we do not see any fraud committed by defendant5appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land involved through his 3iscellaneous #ales Application /o. 3#A545,-989, entered in the records of the :ureau of &ands ;3iscellaneous #ales< =ntry /o. 45*6.., because everything was done in the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the >overnment. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife?s application, and the said deceased occupied the land since (*.).% ) 0n such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is liely to be attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taen place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would see to disregard what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. $t does not therefore call for any further consideration. /either of the other two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Conse!uently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal. (. 3ore specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition set forth in the e"haustive opinion of then 'ustice #alvador =sguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a member of this Court@ %There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. 0nly the >overnment, represented by the Director of &ands, or the #ecretary of Agriculture and /atural 2esources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent A&ucas vs. Durian, (6, Phil. ((+9B Director of &ands vs. Ceirs of Ciriaco Carlo, >.2. /o. &5(,8)+, 'uly .(, (*+*D. This was not done by said officers but by private parties lie the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of /aga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been ac!uired but notwithstanding such fact the &and Department subse!uently granted patents to public land applicants.% * Petitioner ought to have nown better. The above e"cerpt is invulnerable to attac. $t is a restatement of a principle that dates bac to Maninang v. Consolacion, + a (*6) decision. As was there categorically stated@ %The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a !uestion which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not !uestion it. The legality of the grant is a !uestion between the grantee and the government.% 7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis veris inSala!ar v. Court of Appeals. 8 :ereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of "e#es v. "odrigue!, 9 %!uestion the ;title< legally issued.%10 The second assignment of error is thus disposed of. ,. As there are overtones indicative of septicism, if not of outright rejection, of the well5nown distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or ac!uire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. $n such capacity, it may provide for the e"ploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, e"cept as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did spea of the confusion that e"isted during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note the e"istence of res pulicae as a corollary to dominium.% 11 As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by 'ustice Colmes in Cari$o v. %nsular Government, 12 a case of Philippine origin, that %#pain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown....% 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of &ura regalia, 1) which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Colmes served to confirm a much more e"tensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of 'alenton v. Murciano, 1* decided in (*68. 0ne of the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the 2ecopilacion de &eyes de las $ndias 1+ in these words@ %We having ac!uired full sovereignty over the $ndies and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public s!uares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taing into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.% 17 $t could therefore be affirmed in 3ontano v. $nsular >overnment% 18 that %as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, ...% 19 They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categoriEed as public land is undeniable. 21 What was held in Ceirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds application. Thus@ %There being no evidence whatever that the property in !uestion was ever ac!uired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the #panish >overnment or by possessory information title or by any other means for the ac!uisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain.% 23 7or it is well5settled %that no public land can be ac!uired by private persons without any grant, e"press or implied, from the government.% 2) $t is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of ac!uisition recogniEed by law. 2* The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of 'ustice '.:.&. 2eyes, follows@ 2+ %The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of &ot /o. 8-. involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been ac!uired by any private person from the >overnment, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain.% 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit. .. The last error assigned would tae issue with this portion of the opinion of 'ustice =sguerra@ %According to the #tipulation of 7acts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs5appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of 2epublic Act 8*- subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... 1nder #ection .) of Act 8*- any !uestion concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ...% 28 Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David?s title is impressed with the !uality of indefeasibility. $n thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord deference to controlling precedents. As far bac as (*(*, in A(uino v. Director of Lands, 29 'ustice 3alcolm, speaing for the Court, stated@ %The proceedings under the &and 2egistration &aw and under the provisions of Chapter 4$ of the Public &and &aw are the same in that both are against the whole world, both tae the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final.%30 #uch a view has been followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is Caacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing e"cerpt appearing in that decision@ %$t is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land ac!uired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. /ot only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has liewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.% 33 $t is !uite apparent, therefore, that petitioners? stand is legally indefensible. WC=2=702=, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 'anuary .(, (*-* and its resolution of 3arch (8, (*-* are affirmed. With costs against petitioners5appellants. Lee Ho", Ko- ./. D!.0# G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972 Distinction between $3P=2$13 and D03$/$13 0nly the government can !uestion a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a government grant. '$TS1 This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David ac!uired lawful title thereto, pursuant to his miscellaneous salesapplication. After approval of his application, the Director of &ands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the 1ndersecretary of Agriculture and /atural 2esources issued a 3iscellaneous #ales Patent. The 2egister of Deeds then issued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, &ee Cong Fo did not oppose nor file any adverse claim. ISS(E1 Whether or not &ee Cong Fo may !uestion the government grant HELD1 0nly the >overnment, represented by the Director of &ands or the #ecretary of Agriculture and /atural 2esources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. This was not done by said officers but by private parties lie the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it as their private property. The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a !uestion which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendantcannot !uestion it. The legality of the grant is a !uestion between the grantee and the government. $3P=2$13 vs. D03$/$13@ The government authority possessed by the #tate which is appropriately embraced int eh concept of sovereignty comes under the heading of imperiumB its capacity to own or ac!uire property under dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands held by the #tate in its proprietary character. $n such capacity, it may provide for the e"ploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, e"cept as limited by the Constitution.