1

HEGELS EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM

A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegels
Phenomenology of Spirit
Kenneth R. Westphal
Dordrecht & Boston: Kluwer, 1989
Philosophical Studies Series, vol. 43
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
Editors:
WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh
KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona
Board of Consulting Editors:
JONATHAN BENNETT, Syracuse University
ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan
ROBERT STALNAKER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ROBER G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University
Philosophical Studies Series is primarily devoted to books within the tradition of contemporary
analytic philosophy. Books in the series, whether written by a single author or as a collective
work, are intended to manifest the highest levels of clarity and precision. The are intended to
have the purpose of communicating important results to members of the profession and to
be written in such a way as to be intelligible to philosophers whose speciality differs from the
subject of the book. Some books are written on a specific problem, others are on the work
of one philosopher, and still other volumes are unified by method and style rather than subject
matter. What is characteristic of the series is the editorial insistence on the combination of
rigorous exposition with general comprehension. It is the intention of the editors that the
books in the series shall present the issues that are of the greatest current interest.
Table of Contents 2
Preface 3
Introduction 5
Analytical Table of Contents 8
Reviews 12
Corrigenda 12
2
CONTENTS
Preface {See below.} ix
Acknowledgements xi
Note on Citations xii

INTRODUCTION {See below.} 1
1 Problems of Knowledge and Problems with Epistemology 4
2 Descartess Defense of the Metaphysical Certainty of Empirical Knowledge 18
3 Kant on the Objectivity of Empirical Knowledge 35
4 Some Aspects of Empiricism and Empirical Knowledge 47
5 William Alston on Justification and Epistemic Circularity 68
6 Some Basic Methodological Considerations of Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit 91
7 Self-Criticism and Criteria of Truth 100
8 The Self-Critical Activity of Consciousness 115
9 Some Further Methodological Considerations 129
10 Hegels Idealism and Epistemological Realism 140
11 The Structure of Hegels Argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit 149
APPENDICIES
I Translation of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 189
II Paragraphs 1416 of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Parallel German and
English 197
III The Triadic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit 201
IV Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Texts 204
V Analytical Table of Contents {See below.} 207
Notes 213
Bibliography 288
Index of Names 305
Index of Subjects 307
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Preface
The scope of this study is both ambitious and modest. One of its ambitions is to reintegrate Hegels
theory of knowledge into main stream epistemology. Hegels views were formed in consideration of
Classical Skepticism and Modern epistemology, and he frequently presupposes great familiarity with
other views and the difficulties they face. Setting Hegels discussion in the context of both traditional
and contemporary epistemology is therefore necessary for correctly interpreting his issues, arguments,
and views. Accordingly, this is an issues-oriented study. I analyze Hegels problematic and method
by placing them in the context of Sextus Empiricus, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston.
I discuss Carnap, rather than a Modern empiricist such as Locke or Hume, for several reasons.
One is that Hegel himself refutes a fundamental presupposition of Modern empiricism, the doctrine
of knowledge by acquaintance, in the first chapter of the Phenomenology, a chapter that cannot be
reconstructed within the bounds of this study. Second, philosophers still tend to turn positivist when
criticizing Hegel. Thus it is important to show that Carnaps program fails to handle the relevant
problems. Third, I believe that Hegel has much to offer the contemporary philosophical scene. In
this regard it is important to show that Hegel and (e.g.) Carnap are, after all, working within the same
philosophical arena. Finally, Carnap is the last figure in the analytic tradition who addresses the
relevant issues as issues in (or at least about and against) epistemology rather than formulating them
mainly as issues in philosophy of language. Pursuing the issues of this study into contemporary
philosophy of language would exceed manageable bounds.
Hegels expositors face a difficult dilemma. Hegels corpus is so vast that it is well neigh
impossible to cover all the texts relevant to the issues of any particular investigation or to any one
Hegelian text, so that an expositor risks omitting something crucial. On the other hand, attempting
to treat Hegels views synoptically inevitably leads to a superficial treatment of his particular
statements and arguments, thus leaving an expositor at risk of misconstruction. It is my firm
conviction that Hegel has suffered far too much from this second shortcoming. Attempts to treat his
philosophy, or even one of its major components, synoptically has led expositors to misconstrue
Hegels views, sometimes drastically. Hegel insists that there is no way to understand the very
pungent and suggestive (and sometimes absurd) statements he makes in the latter parts of his
expositions without understanding how the meaning of his terms and the justification of his
statements have been developed from the beginning of his discussion. Im convinced that Hegel
needs to be taken at his word about this point. To do this, however, requires understanding how he
proposes to develop his poi nts from the beginning to the end of any one of his expositions. To
follow his development of his views thus requires what has seemed most difficult of all: to follow the
development of his arguments from one statement to the next, and from one paragraph to the next.
This study provides a complete, detailed analysis and reconstruction of an important portion of
one of Hegels most important texts. The portion I consider, principally the Introduction to the
Phenomenology of Spirit, concerns Hegels philosophical aims and method in the Phenomenology. Thus the
purpose of this study is to provide a detailed understanding of his procedure in the Phenomenology of
Spirit, an interpretation intended to facilitate an exacting and philosophically sensitive readi ng of
Hegels very interesting book. The modesty of the present study lies in its subtitle: It is a study of the
aim and method of Hegels Phenomenology, and not an exhaustive treatment of his whole book.
What many may find surprising is my contention that the absolute idealist Hegel defends the
view that there is a way the world is that does not depend on our cognitive or linguistic activity and
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that we can know the way the world is. Hegels idealism is an ontological holism that is, and is
intended to be, consistent with what I call epistemological realism. This view is obviously a realism.
I call it epistemological realism in order to draw attention to the fact that this view involves both
an ontological thesisthere is a way the world is which does not depend on our cognitive or
linguistic activity; and an epistemological thesiswe can know the way the world is. Providing this
label distinguishes this view, as an issue in epistemology, from what is called scientific realism, the
view that the theoretical entities posited by scientific theories exist. Hegel has views which bear on
the issue of scientific realism, but they cannot be discussed at length in this study. Hegels issue is the
Modern issue of the external world, the existence of which is typically granted in debates about
scientific realism. This is also to say, Hegels issues are prior to those concerning scientific realism.
It is thus important to note that Hegels criterion of truth analyzed in this study concerns the truth
of epistemological theories of knowledge, and neither does nor is designed to apply to problems of
theory selection or the underdetermination of theory by observation.
1
Those who find incredible my contention that Hegel is an epistemological realist might first read
G. W. Cunninghams essay, The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge.
2
Cunningham valiantly attacks numbers of mistaken impressions of Hegels philosophy, many of
which still have unwarranted currency today. Henry Harris, Hegels most dedicated and sensitive
expositor, remarks:
The balance of social influence has shifted so drastically between Hegels time and ours ... from the
religious to the scientific establishment, that Hegels own contribution to this shift has itself become
an obstacle to the right understanding of what he said. He wanted to swing religious consciousness
into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life .... His own choice of language was
conditioned by the Christian teaching, but also by the knowledge that the Christian doctrine of spirit
was derived from Stoic sources.
3
The Stoics were, of course, thoroughgoing materialists and naturalists. Strong evidence of Hegels
epistemological realism is interlaced throughout Harriss magnificent reconstruction of Hegels early
metaphysics, logic, and philosophy of nature. The present study aims to establish a proper
understanding of Hegels mature approach to defending epistemological realism in the Phenomenology
of Spirit, and so to provide access to Hegels very interesting views about empirical knowledge and its
philosophical analysis.
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Introduction
Is there a way the world is regardless of how we think about it? If so, can we know the way the world
is? Is knowledge a socio-historical phenomenon? Various philosophers in various periods have
answered these questions differently, but rarely has it been thought that all three questions could be
answered affirmatively. Hegel holds the controversial position that all three questions can be
answered affirmatively. In so doing, Hegel rejects both skepticismthere may be a way the world
is, but we cant know itand what I call subjectivismwe can know the way the world is, but its
structure or characteristics depend upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. I argue that Hegel
defends what I call epistemological realism: we can know the way the world is, even though it is
not dependent upon our cognitive or linguistic activity. Many may find my contention surprising, but
what is interesting is that he defends this realism by grounding it in a social and historical account
of empirical knowledge.
Hegel recognizes that his position is controversial, and he recognizes that any position on these
issues makes claims to know what empirical knowledge is. For these reasons, Hegel addresses a
question that no one else has faced so directly: How can a theory of empirical knowledge be shown
to be true, and so end the controversy within epistemology, without begging the question? One aim
of Hegels Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit is to pose this question in the course of
enumerating some desiderata of any successful theory of empirical knowledge. The chief aim of his
Introduction is to sketch a method for answering this question while providing an account of
empirical knowledge that meets the desiderata he establishes. The main aim of the present study is
to elucidate the desiderata Hegel establishes for the adequacy of any theory of empirical knowledge
and to reconstruct the method Hegel proposes for meeting those desiderata.
Reconciling epistemological realism with a socially grounded theory of knowledge is a large
project. It is a project that Hegel carries out not only through the whole of the Phenomenology, but also
in his philosophy of mind and social philosophy. The full sweep of Hegels project cannot be
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adequately recounted within the bounds of a single study. However, three important steps towards
reconstructing Hegels theory of empirical knowledge are made here. The first of these is to show
that Hegels project is to reconcile realism and a socio-historically grounded theory of knowledge.
The second is to note several theses about knowledge and theories of knowledge, implied by Hegels
methodo-logical considerations in the Introduction, which are important for reconciling realism with
a socially grounded theory of knowledge. The third is to set out the structure of Hegels argument
in the Phenomenology for a socio-historically grounded realist theory of knowledge.
Hegels approach to these issues can best be understood by examining them in relation to three
familiar, classic theories of knowledge: Rationalist Foundationalism, Critical Philosophy, and
Empiricism. Hegel derives his epistemological desiderata from reflection on earlier theories of
knowledge and on the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus. After summarizing Sextuss skeptical
challenges to empirical knowledge and to epistemological claims about empirical knowledge, I show
that, consciously or not, Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and William Alston each respond to the skeptical
problems Sextus poses. Demonstrating that these skeptical challenges are common concerns among
Hegel and these other epistemologists helps reintegrate Hegels views with the main stream of theory
of knowledge. I further emphasize the importance of Sextuss challenges by showing that Descartes,
Kant, and Carnap each failed to handle them. I argue further that William Alstons view of the
justification of epistemological claims about empirical knowledge fails to rebut Sextuss challenges
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to the justification of such claims and that his view supplies insufficient answers to some important
questions. I then show that Hegels method for analyzing empirical knowledge can handle both
Sextuss challenges to empirical knowledge and his challenges to the justification of epistemological
claims about empirical knowledge, and that it supplies more thorough answers to the questions left
unresolved in Alstons view of the justification of epistemological claims.
Two more benefits are offered by examining these other theories of knowledge here. I argue that
in their failures to answer Sextuss challenges, Descartes, Kant, and Carnap violate one or another of
the desiderata Hegel establishes for epistemology. This shows that Hegels desiderata carry important
philosophical weight. One charge Hegel makes against traditional epistemology is that
epistemologists have answered Sextus at the first-order level of concerns about empirical knowledge
only to fall prey to Sextuss charges of circularity, dogmatism, or question-begging at the
second-order level of concerns about the status of philosophical theories of knowledge. I show that
Descartes, Kant, and Carnap are guilty of Hegels charge. Part of Hegels response to this is to hold
that philosophical theories of knowledge must be knowable in accordance with their own principles.
5
I show that Hegels requirement of reflexive self-consistency undoes both Kants and Carnaps
rejections of realism.
A key tenet in Hegels program for overcoming subjectivism (the view that the way the world
is depends upon our cognitive or linguistic activity) is to reject the common tendency within
epistemology to hold empirical knowledge claims answerable to philosophical theories about what
empirical knowledge is. This tendency is due to granting epistemology priority over ontology. I show
that Descartes, Kant, and Carnap did grant epistemology priority over ontology, and that this priority
generates subjectivist accounts of knowledge in each of these cases.
Examining the failure of each of these theories of knowledge also provides an occasion for
explaining and defending some important substantive points in Hegels own theory of knowledge.
Discussing the failure of Descartess foundationalism allows me to show Hegels rejection of the
Modern Way of Ideas, and it allows me to show that Hegels theory of knowledge is a deliberate
alternative to foundationalism, in part because he rejects the ideal of incorrigibi lity and adopts
fallibilism. Discussing Kant allows me to show that Hegel rejects transcendental idealism, an
important point for understanding Hegels own brand of idealism, and also to suggest that
transcendental arguments might be made independently of transcendental idealism, which is what Hegel
proposes to do. Discussing Carnap allows me to show that there has been considerable confusion
concerning correspondence as a criterion of truth and as an analysis of truth. Rejecting the former
does not entail rejecting the latter. More importantly, I show that Hegel was well aware of the issues
in philosophy of mind that engendered this non sequitur, namely, the recognition that were incapable
of knowledge by acquaintance and so are incapable of using correspondence as a criterion of truth.
It is an explicit aim of Hegels argument to reconcile a correspondence analysis of truth with a
complex social philosophy of mind, a philosophy of mind incompatible with knowledge by
acquaintance. A final important point, implied by Hegels analysis of self-criticism, is the rejection
of descriptionalist theories of reference, that is, of the linguistic heirs to the Fregean slogan that
sense determines reference. Such theories of reference figure prominently in many current
arguments against realism. Hegel holds that this is only part of the story concerning reference, and
that because it is only part of the story, were in a position to critically revise the descriptionalist
senses of our terminology.
The third step towards reconstructing Hegels theory of empirical knowledge made in this study
7
is to outline the structure of his argument for epistemological realism and its social bases as he
propounds it in the Phenomenology. On Hegels view, knowledge as a social phenomenon is possible
because it is an activity engaged in a naturally structured world. By explicating this natural basis, Hegel
avoids subjectivism in the course of developing his social account of empirical knowledge.
Hegels Introduction divides into three parts. The first part sets out the problems Hegel address
in the Phenomenology and his desiderata for their successful solution. A second part sketches the
structure of Hegels phenomenological program answering these problems and meeting these
desiderata. A final part concerns the course and results of Hegels argument as it is carried out.
Hegels Introduction is as brief as it is wide-ranging, so that considerable stage-setting and
reconstruction is required in order to understand it. This study attempts to provide that
reconstruction, and thus to provide access to Hegels very interesting views about empirical
knowledge and its philosophical analysis presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
The problems Hegel addresses and his desiderata for their solution are set out in Chapter One.
This chapter analyzes the first part of Hegels Introduction in connection with some general features
of Modern epistemology and in close consideration of Sextus Empiricus. The character and
significance of Hegels issues are elaborated in Chapters Two through Five, which examine his
problems and desiderata by analyzing their bearing on Descartes, Kant, Carnap, and Alston. The
second and third parts of Hegels Introduction, concerning the structure of his phenomenological
program and the course of the argument he presents in the Phenomenology, are analyzed and
reconstructed in Chapters Six through Nine. Chapter Ten sketches Hegels basic ontology, showing
that Hegels idealism is an ontological holism that is, and is intended to be, fully consistent with
epistemological realism. Chapter Eleven analyzes the structure of Hegels argument presented in the
Phenomenology for epistemological realism and the social and historical bases of empirical knowledge.
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APPENDIX V
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents vii
Preface ix
Acknowledgements xi
Note on Citations xii

INTRODUCTION 1
ONE Problems of Knowledge and Problems with Epistemology 4
I. Knowledge as an Instrument or a Medium 4
II. Four Assumptions of Epistemology 6
III. The Problem of Adjudicating Between Fundamentally Different Conceptual Schemes 10
IV. Some Principles of Pyrrhonian Skepticism 11
A. Some Distinctions Between Appearance and Reality 11
B. Skepticism and Representational Theories of Perception 12
C. The Problem of Regress and Circularity 13
D. The Dilemma of the Criterion 14
E. Contraposition Arguments 15
F. Knowledge, Truth, and Suspension of Judgment 15
V. Summary and Prospects 16
TWO Descartess Defense of the Metaphysical Certainty of Empirical Knowledge 18
I. Descartess Problematic 18
A. Introduction 18
B. Descartess Dilemma 19
C. Descartess Argument for the Truth of Clear and Distinct Ideas 20
D. The Problem of Circularity 21
E. Four Cartesian Doctrines 21
1. Representationalism 21
2. The Divine Creation of Eternal Truths 22
3. Denotative and Connotative Aspects of Ideas 22
4. Logical Voluntarism 22
II. Five Circularities in Descartess Argument 23
A. Circularity and Logical Voluntarism 23
B. Circularity and the Denotation of Ideas 25
C. Circularity and Descartess Inability to Disbelieve What is Clear and Distinct 26
D. Circularity and the Transparency of Descartess Self-Knowledge 26
E. Circularity and the Self-Verification of Descartess Thinking Nature 27
9
III. Some Defenses of Descartes 28
A. Doubt, Circularity, and Memory 28
B. The Didactic Aim of the Meditations 29
C. The Absurdity of Questioning Ones Highest Cognitive Faculty 29
IV. Some Inherent Limits of the Cartesian Program 30
A. Representationalism and Skepticism 30
B. The Paucity of Self-Evident Foundations 31
C. The Untenability of Self-Evidence 32
D. Subjectivism and the Priority of Epistemology 34
THREE Kant on the Objectivity of Empirical Knowledge 35
I. Introduction 35
II. Kants Copernican Response to Skepticism 35
III. Kants Subjectivism 38
IV. Kants Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism 39
V. Criticism of Kants Direct Argument for Transcendental Idealism 41
VI. Reflexive Difficulties with Kants First Critique 43
VII. Coda: Hegels Debt to Kant 46
FOUR Some Aspects of Empiricism and Empirical Knowledge 47
I. Introduction 47
II. Empiricism and Non-Conceptual Apprehension of Objects 48
III. Some Principles of Empiricism 48
IV. Carnaps Empiricism 50
A. Summary of Carnaps Attempt to Undo the Issue of Epistemological Realism 50
B. Carnaps Mature Views on Criteria of Meaningfulness and on Realism 51
V. Criticism of Carnaps Program 56
A. Syntactical Analysis Must be Supplemented by Semantic Analysis 56
B. The Inadequacy of Carnaps Psychology of Observation Sentences 57
C. Carnaps Relapse To Non-Conceptual Apprehension of Objects 59
D. Carnaps Implicit Criteria of Truth: Truth within a Specified Formally (Re)Con-
structed Language 60
E. Carnaps Subjectivism 60
F. Carnaps Failure to Diagnose the Source of Difficulties with Epistemological Realism 62
G. Carnaps Failure to Undo the Issue of Epistemological Realism 64
H. Reflexive Difficulties Facing Carnaps Program 66
VI. Coda: Hegels Sensitivity to the Source of Difficulties with Epistemological Realism 67
FIVE William Alston on Justification and Epistemic Circularity 68
I. Introduction 68
II. Alstons Rejection of Perspectival Internalism 69
III. Alstons Defense of an Epistemic Conception of Justification 70
IV. Alston on the Internality of Justification 71
V. Alston on the Justificatory Regress Argument 72
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VI. Alston on the Justification of Epistemic Principles 74
VII. Rebuttal of Alstons Objection Concerning Doxastic Voluntarism 76
VIII. Rebuttal of Alstons Objections to the Dilemma of the Criterion 78
IX. The Problem of Epistemic and Logical Circularity 83
X. Alstons Rejection of Fully Reflective Justification 85
XI. Alstons Criteria for Evaluating Epistemic Principles 86
XII. Some Strategic Suggestions for Justifying Epistemic Principles 87
SIX Some Basic Methodological Considerations of Hegels Ph e n o m e n o l o g y o f
Sp i ri t 91
I. Review and Summary 91
II. Forms of Consciousness 92
III. Natural Ideas 94
IV. Apparent Knowledge 95
V. Criticism, Empirical Knowledge, and Transcendental Knowledge 96
A. Criticism and the Analysis of Empirical Knowledge 96
B. Intellectual History and the A Priori Character of the Phenomenology of Spirit 97
VI. Three Points of View 98
VII. Forms of Consciousness and Observed Consciousness 98
VIII. The Dilemma of the Criterion Revisited 99
SEVEN Self-Criticism and Criteria of Truth 100
I. Introduction 100
II. The Self-Critical Structure of Consciousness 100
A. Common Sense and Knowledge as a Relation 100
B. Knowledge as a Relation and the Circle of Appearances 102
C. The In-itself as the Standard of Knowledge 103
D. The Eight Aspects of Knowledge as a Relation 103
1. Two Senses of In-itself 104
2. Some Grammatical Distinctions of Case 105
3. Consciousness as Reflexive; The List Doubled 106
III. Hegels Criterial Inference 108
IV. The Aim of Knowledge 111
A. The Goal of the Self-Critical Process 111
B. Hegels Avowal of the Correspondence Conception of Truth 112
C. Correspondence and Value Judgments 113
V. Criteria of Knowledge and Metaphysical Distinctions Between Appearance and Reality 114
EIGHT The Self-Critical Activity of Consciousness 115
I. Introduction 115
II. Hegels First Discussion of Consciousness Self-Critical Activity 115
A. Self-Criticism and the Circle of Appearances 115
B. Some Interpretive Difficulties Concerning the Distinction Between the Object To
Consciousness and the Object For Consciousness 116
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C. The Alteration of the Object 118
D. Revision of the Standard of Knowledge 119
III. Hegels Second Discussion of Consciousness Self-Critical Activity 119
A. The Structure of the Transition from one Form of Consciousness to the Next 120
B. Inversion and Determinate Negation 125
C. The Necessity of the Transitions 126
NINE Some Further Methodological Considerations 129
I. Introduction 129
II. Hegels Conception of Experience 129
III. Dialectic, Principles, and Practices 131
IV. Hegelian Phenomenology and the Meno Paradox 132
V. Consciousness Cognitive Motivations 133
VI. Phenomenology as a Methodological Skepticism 134
VII. Phenomenology as a Science 135
VIII. Hegelian Phenomenology and Our Observation 136
IX. Question-Begging and Hegels Claims in the Introduction 137
X. The Problem of Completeness 138
TEN Hegels Idealism and Epistemological Realism 140
I. Introduction 140
II. Hegels Rejection of Subjective Idealism 140
III. Hegels Idealism as Ontological Holism 141
IV. The Role of Hegels Idealism in Defending Epistemological Realism 145
V. Objections to Epistemological Realism in Philosophy of Science 145
A. Induction and Skepticism 146
B. Theory Change and Change of Referents 146
C. The Underdetermination of Scientific Theory by Observation 148
ELEVEN The Structure of Hegels Argument in the Ph e n o m e n o l o g y o f Sp irit 149
I. Introduction 149
II. The Unity of the Phenomenology 149
III. The Lineage of German Idealism; Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel 150
IV. The Structure of Hegels Argument for Epistemological Realism 154
V. Summary of Hegels Epistemological Argument in the Phenomenology of Spirit 155
APPENDIX I Translation of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 189
APPENDIX II Paragraphs 1416 of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit in Parallel
German and English 197
APPENDIX III The Triadic Structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit 201
APPENDIX IV Abbreviations of Frequently Cited Texts 204
APPENDIX V Analytical Table of Contents 207
12
Notes 213
Bibliography 288
Index of Names 305
Index of Subjects 307
* * *
REVIEWS:
Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 27/28 (1993):5658 (R. Stern).
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 22.4 (1992):51234 (H. S. Harris).
The Review of Metaphysics 45.1 (1991):15758 (D. Berthold-Bond).
Aquinas 33.3 (1990):68586 (P. Marrone).
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 22.1 (1991):9495 (D. Lamb).
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52.1 (1992):177202 (Recent Work on Hegel, K. Ameriks).
The Owl of Minerva 26.1 (1994):8086 (W. Ludwig).
Corrigenda:
TEXT: 21.02.2013
p. 14 D Originally misprinted, the quotation reads in full:
[I]n order to decide the dispute which has arisen about the criterion [of truth], we must
possess an accepted criterion by which we shall be able to judge the dispute; and in order to
possess an accepted criterion, the dispute about the criterion must first be decided. And
when the argument thus reduces itself to a form of circular reasoning the discovery of the
criterion becomes impracticable, since we do not allow [those who make knowledge claims]
to adopt a criterion by assumption, while if they offer to judge the criterion by a criterion we
force them to a regress ad infinitum. And furthermore, since demonstration requires a demon-
strated criterion, while the criterion requires an approved demonstration, they are forced into
circular reasoning. (PH 2:20; cf. 1:1167)
p. 59 C Re: 2 quotations, add:
It has become common to distinguish between acceptance and belief, whereby only
belief but not acceptance affirms the truth of whatever is believed. Using this distinction to
interpret Carnaps statements, however, is entirely anachronistic; Carnap (1963a, 57; 1967, v)
himself confirms that the passages quoted here do concern knowledge by acquaintance.
p. 64 G 1 (The answer to the internal question about whether any kind of entity exists is not so
simple as here claimed. It is supposed to be a matter of empirical research to determine
whether entities of any particular kind specified by a linguistic framework exist.
The problem is that such empirical explorations presuppose the framework which
specifies such an entity, whilst adopting that framework cannot, on Carnap's account of
such choices, make use of any empirical information about such entities, because such
information would be framework-independent claims about the entites in question.)
p. 98 VII. Three Points of View should read: VI. Three points ...
13
p. 153 1 Add: Twice in later works Hegel does say that the idea is rightly called a subject-object, but
he insists on each occasion on the mediated character of this identity (Enz. 162, WL
II [Werke 6] 466/SL 758).
p. 156 In the Chart under B.IVB, Freedom of Consciousness should read: Freedom of Self-
Consciousness.
NOTES:
p. 219 n54 Add: Hegel does mention skepticism about the criterion of truth in passing (ibid., p. 212
line 9).
p. 245 n118 Following the quotation from Schlick, add:
Schlick then rejects this coherence theory of truth (ibid., 215) and relies on a version of
knowledge by acquaintance for experiential confirmations which occasion the basic
synthetic statements in terms of which alone we can ultimately formulate our knowledge.
This is to accept the basic inference Will criticizes.
p. 246 n121 Replace Ayer with: Schlick; replace 214 with: 21315.
p. 251 n70 The volume containing Alstons article, A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemol-
ogy (DPAE), appeared in 1989; it appears on pp. 129; the reference is to p. 3. Fur-
ther references to this published article are as follows:
n71. DPAE p. 3 n72. DPAE p. 18 n79. DPAE p. 21
n80. DPAE pp. 57 n81. DPAE pp. 78 n82. DPAE p. 12
n83. DPAE pp. 1214 n84. DPAE p. 23 n85. DPAE p. 30
n86. DPAE pp. 1718 n87. DPAE p. 17 n88. DPAE p. 16
n89. DPAE pp. 1819 n90. DPAE pp. 1920 n91. DPAE pp. 1314
n92. cf. DPAE p. 25 n97. DPAE p. 17
p. 261 n35 Add: Cf. Skepticizmus (op. cit.), p. 222.511.
p. 265 n24 In This simple infinity, of the absolute concept ..., replace of by: or.
p. 266 n31 Add:
Compare Hegels remark that the methods of realism and idealism overlap one another
(VGP III [Werke 13] 145/LHP III 164) and the following statement: This idealism of
recognizing the idea in the whole of nature is just as much [zugleich] realism, since the con-
cept of the living individual is the idea as reality, even if the individuals only correspond to a
moment of the concept (Enz. 353z).
INDEX: Skepticism, methodological, Hegels, 134f.
substantive, 127
Van Cleave: 231 should read 221.
14





BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Carnap, 1963a. Intellectual Autobiography. In: Schilpp (1963), 383.
, Logical Structure of the World; original press: Weltkreis; date of publication of the
translation: 1967; rpt.: Chicago: Open Court, 2003.
NOTE: A revised, second edition is planned. Comments, questions and criticism are welcome.