Constitution
Constitution
Constitution
I
Evolution and Philosophy behind the Indian Constitution
Madabhushi Sridhar
Three important questions bothered the man right from the beginning of the history of
civilization. They are:
1. Is Government necessary?
2. What is the best form of Government?
3. How can we prevent the Government from becoming tyrannical?
Answer to the above three questions is the origin of idea of constitutionalism and then the
Constitutional law. The Constitution refers to that body of doctrines and practices which form basis
for organizing a state.
The human being, according to the great Greek Philosopher Aristotle, is a political and social
animal. Either human being or a family cannot survive in isolation. It became necessary for man to
organize himself into communities and societies. With the growth of population, these societies grew
and multiplied and some form of rules and regulation was needed. Out of this need arose law and
government.
Robert M MacIver, in the Web of Government
2
, says that the same necessities that create the
family create regulation. The existence of family requires the regulation of sex, the regulation of
property, and the regulation of youthhere is government in miniature and already government of a
quite elaborate character.family is everywhere the matrix of the government.
MacIver explained the difference between the state and the government and the organ and
organization in an effective expression: When we speak of the estate we mean the organization of
which government is the administrative organ. Even organization must have a focus of
administration, an agency by which its policies are given specific character and translated into
action. But the organization is greater than the organ. In this sense the state is greater and more
inclusive than its government. A state has a constitution, a code of laws, a way of setting up its
government, a body of citizenswhen we think of this whole structure we think of the state
Under these endlessly varied circumstances the habits pertaining to government, which at first were
centered in the family and kin-circle, found a locus in the inclusive community.
Normative decisions are made at the summit of the state, in a process that itself entails
significant political negotiation between public and private interests. However, once those general
policy directions are determined, the difficult work of negotiation then shifts to the administrative
sphere. The sphere of administrative law is where the rubber meets the road in the modern state. It
is the point of contact between state and society where efforts to implement specific legislative goals
generate the friction of social and political resistance. As part of the effort to reduce or override
that resistance, legislative norms are often redirected in number of ways and the role of
administration in this regard is very significant.
In the England, after an initial attempt at dejudicialisation in the 17th century had failed (due
to the Parliaments successful assertion of supremacy over the crown culminating in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688), it would return over the course of the 19th century, albeit sub silencio in tribute
to the strength of the prevailing Rule-of-Law culture. By the early-20th century, with the dramatic
expansion of the regulatory capabilities of the state, the ordinary English courts became more aware
of the new reality and began to vigorously contest the preclusion of judicial review of administrative
action. Ultimately, in the decade after World War II, English judges were forced to accept the reality
of separate forms of administrative justice, but only after Parliament inscribed in law the general
right of appeal to the judicial courts in administrative disputes. Thus the essence of the old Rule-of-
Law system was seemingly retained.
In French history, the detachment of state administration from judicial oversight was central
to the political effort from the 17th to the 19th centuries to make the state a more effective agent for
the construction of a national market economy and a cohesive national political community (both of
which French elites regarded as essential to the projection of state power on the international level,
particularly in competition with the British and later, the Germans). In English history, the effort to
dejudicialise would only be taken up in earnest with the emergence of the Social State at the end of
the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Although this later quest for dejudicialisation in
England would also reflect a desire to make the state a more effective agent of social intervention,
that intervention would now be aimed at circumventing the judicial courts as regulatory bodies
because they were perceived as excessively attached to traditional prerogatives of private property
and laissez-faire. In other words, the English experience in the late-19th and early-20th centuries
paralleled the French experience in the 17th and 18th centuries in that each reflected the desire to
circumvent the judicial courts in the legal control of administrative action. However, in the earlier
French case, administrative dejudicialisation was ultimately in service of very different policy goals.
In American law, the most famous exposition of the same principle was drafted by John Adams for
the constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in justification of the principle of
The Sovereign, socialist, Secular, Democratic and Republic Government of India is based on
most important tripod of three organs i.e. executive, legislature, and judiciary.
The present write-up aims at clarifying the basic structure of these three organs of Indian
Government.
Before elaborating the structure of these organs, it is important to know about the source and
evolution of the duties, power and scope of each of these organs. The Constitution of India is an
organic document which defines the powers and functions of these organs and their interrelationship.
It has adopted the federal structure with a strong centre; and simultaneously it provides for
Parliamentary democracy with an executive responsible to the legislature, and the judiciary to the
legislature and the judiciary to test the validity of the Parliamentary legislation on the basis of the
Constitutional provision. Following is the detailed analysis of the structure of each of these organs.
I. EXECUTIVE
The Indian executive is two tiers and it constitutes the executive at centre as well as at state
level. Let us first elaborate the Union Executive.
UNION EXECUTIVE
The Union executive constitutes of the President, Vice-President, and the Council of
Ministers.
The President
Election
India being a republic country, there is no hereditary monarch as the head of State,
but is headed by the institution of the President.
Art.52 of the Indian Constitution lays down the provision for creation of the office of the
President, who is elected by an indirect method of election, by an electoral college.
The Electoral College consists of the
- Elected members of both the Houses of Parliament.
.
A. Introduction
The study of CentreState Relations in India assumes significance in the backdrop of the
political developments in India during British regime. India has Geo-Political and historical
characteristics which have few parallels. Its size and population, geographical, linguistic, religious,
racial and other diversities give it the character of a sub-continent. But its natural boundaries
marked by mountains and seas, serve to identify it as a separate geographical entity. This insularity
over the years, led to the evolution of a composite cultural pervasive under current of one-ness.
These gave the country the character of a general Indian personality. Its history is replete with brief
periods of political unity and stability followed by spells of dissensions chaos and fragmentation.
The strongest kingdoms, from time to time, became empires, extending their sway, more or less, to
the natural boundaries of the sub-continent, brining under their suzerainty the local principalities and
Kingdoms. But undue centralization often proved counter productive and triggered a chain reaction
of divisive forces. Whenever, due to this or other causes, the central authority became decadent and
weak, the fissiparous forces became strong and led to its disintegration, some times tempting foreign
invaders to conquer the country.
The British also, at the commencement of their regime, tried to centralize all power. But they
soon realised, especially after the traumatic consequences of Dalhousies policies, that it was not
possible to administer so vast and diverse a country like India without progressive devolution of
decentralization of powers to the Provinces and Local Bodies. The British Crown had assumed
power directly in 1858 due to a notable fallout of the conflict in 1857. The British then discovered
that the Princely States in India could be a potential source of strength for establishing and
maintenance of the British power. As a result, they discontinued their policy of further expanding
their direct rule in the sub-continent and preferred indirect rule for these States. But majority of
the 500 and odd Princely States, were autonomous only to a limited extent. In all important matters,
they were no less submissive in practice to the suzerain power than the British Indian Provinces. In
the remote and inaccessible areas, strong local tribal customs and beliefs have to be given due regard
and these areas, with long history of isolation retained varying degrees of autonomy. Too
centralized an administration was found to be incompatible with the size and diversity of the
country. It bred administrative inefficiency and local discontent.
B. PreConstitution Development
Despite the urge for excessive centralization of administration by the British regime, the
prevailing circumstances had forced them to resort to some decentralization. The first small but
The concept of delegated legislation can be traced down to 1539 when Henry VIII was
given wide power to legislate by proclamations. In modern times, with the growth of administrative
process, the administrators have become the fountainhead of law making. All law making which
takes place outside the legislature is expressed as rules, regulations, bye laws, orders, schemes,
directions or notifications etc.
Salmond defines subordinate law as that which proceeds from any authority other than the Sovereign
power and is therefore, dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or
supreme authority.
Art. 13(3) of the Constitution of India defines law and includes within its sphere ordinances, orders,
byelaws, rules, regulations and notifications the have the force of law. In Sikkim v. Surendra Sharma
(1994) 5 SCC 282 the Supreme Court held that All Laws in force mentioned in sub clause (k) of
Art. 371 F of the Constitution of India includes subordinate legislation.
Difference between rules, regulation and byelaws: Generally, the statutes provide for power to make
rules where the general policy has been specified in the statute but the details have been left to be
specified by the rules. Usually, technical or other matters, which do not affect the policy of the
legislation, are included in regulations. Bye laws are usually matter or local importance, and the
power to make byelaws is generally given to the local or self governing authority. All the terms are
usually used interchangeably.
Orders: - Under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 order passed is a general order
as distinguished from executive order which is specific. Order asking a person to evacuate his house
is an executive order whereas an order laying down prices of commodities is a legislative order.
Need for the growth of Delegated Legislation:-
The primary reason for the need for the growth of delegated legislation is the Socio- economic
reforms in developing nations. It is a modern trend as the Parliament passes only a skeletal
legislation.
Eg. : - Import and Export (Central) Act, 1947 which contains only 8 Sections.
Reasons for growth of Delegated Legislation:
There are several legal remedies to protect the rights of the people. The system of law aims at
securing the interests of individuals and resolves the disputes through authoritative adjudication with
binding decision. Remedies provided by law are called legal remedies, of which the writs form an
important component. In fact, the power of higher courts in granting writs to the authorities to
provide relief to the aggrieved citizens is the ultimate method of protection of rights. All personal
rights, contractual rights and constitutional rights are secured through the judicial process. Remedies
are of two kinds- Constitutional which are also called public law remedies, and legal remedies, i.e.,
private law remedies. While constitutional law deals with rights in general against public bodies, the
private law remedies are agitated between individuals.
The Constitution provided for remedies to individuals under Article 226 and 32, and some
more remedial provisions are also made, such as Articles 136, 299, 300. Some remedies are
available for the government servants under articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of India.
A. Legal Remedies
Several other right-duty situations arise between the persons depending on the context and
circumstances of their day to day operations in the dynamic society. They are as follows:
(1) Domestic or matrimonial remedies under personal law
(2) Remedies under Criminal Law
(3) Contractual remedies
(4) Remedies provided by Law of Torts
(5) Remedies and Specific Relief Act
(6) Other Legal Remedies under Statutes
1. Personal Law Remedies
Marriage being a sacred contract, it creates rights and obligations for the spouses and they are
adjudicated whenever the parties approach with a complaint of breach of duty and violation of rights.
Some of the marital remedies are as follows:
(a) Divorce/Nullity of marriage: On grounds of adultery, desertion and cruelty the couple can
seek divorce. There are various other grounds on which spouses can seek matrimonial relief.
I. Introduction
Most nations and large ones at that do not easily alter their international orientation. States
tend to be conservative about foreign policy. Fundamental changes in foreign policy take place only
when there is a revolutionary change either at home or in the world. Much as the ascent of Deng
Xiaoping in the late 1970s produced radical changes in Chinese foreign policy, Indias relations with
the world have seen a fundamental transformation over the last decade and a half. A number of
factors were at work in India. The old political and economic order at home had collapsed and
externally the end of the Cold War removed all the old benchmarks that guided Indias foreign
policy. Many of the core beliefs of the old system had to discarded and consensus generated on new
ones. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the new wave of economic globalization left India
scrambling to find new anchors for its conduct of external relations. This paper is examines the
origin, dynamics and the implications of Indias new foreign policy strategy.
Most Indians agree that its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had defined a unique
foreign policy for India at the very dawn of its independence. Despite many critics of his worldview,
a broad national consensus had emerged around Nehrus ideas on independent foreign policy, non-
alignment, and third world solidarity. Since the 1990s, though, the challenge for the Indian leaders
has been to reinterpret Nehrus ideas to suit the new political context that had confronted it. The new
Indian leaders could neither denounce Nehru nor formally reject Nehrus ideas, for that would have
invited serious political trouble. Yet they had to continually improvise and refashion Indias foreign
policy to suit the new requirements.
This has not been easy. The tension between the imperative of the new and the resistance of
the old ideas on how to conduct foreign policy is real and is unlikely to end in the near future. The
fear of the new and fondness for the old continue to be reflected in all aspects of Indian diplomacy
from engaging the United States to an optimal strategy towards the smallest of the neighbours. The
new foreign policy of India is indeed work in progress. Yet it is not difficult to see that the
direction of Indian diplomacy has changed substantially since the end of the cold war amidst internal
and external impulses.
II. Structural Changes in Indias World View
Underlying Indias current foreign policy strategy are a set of important transitions in Indias
world view. The Indian political leadership articulated not all of these self-consciously or clearly. A
few of those changes stand out and are unlikely to be reversed. The first was the transition from the
national consensus on building a socialist society to building a modern capitalist one. The
The literature on Indias economic development that has emerged over the last 60 years is
very large, covering nearly all its dimensions. On the specifics of regional development patterns, the
existing literature is again substantial, some of the earlier studies dating back to the 1970s or early
1980s (Chattopadhyay et al 1973; Mathur 1983). Simultaneously, there has emerged a parallel and
large literature on political developments in India which, on the one hand, underlines the basic
strength of Indian democracy as evidenced by the resilience of its political system and, on the other,
raises serious questions about how the same system, its federal structure, political parties and
periodic elections have failed to bring about the desired social, economic and political changes (Jalal
1995; Chatterjee 1997; Chadda 2000). With such a wide body of knowledge at hand on post-
independent Indias economic and political developments, one would have expected a third group of
studies where these two inherently correlated developments are analysed within a single framework.
The study of politics, almost by its very definition, encompasses not merely the locus and modus
operandi of power, but nearly all aspects of behaviour, including the creation and distribution of
wealth. Indeed, it is this aspect of social relations, over which power is exercised most extensively,
that makes the two developments economic and political highly correlated. Even when such an
analysis has been attempted in a political economy framework (Bardhan 1984; Kaviraj 1995; Nayyar
2001), the level of aggregation has been the nation or the national economy as a whole, leaving little
scope for analysing the import of widening regional disparity in India. There is a voluminous
literature on the economic and political developments of individual regions or states (and here again
it is largely separated along the boundaries of the two disciplines), but endogenising the concept of
region in a political economy account of the nation state and the national economy has probably not
been attempted.
Against this backdrop, this paper is an attempt to analyse the political implications of
regional disparity in the country in the post-independence period, keeping in view the nature of
federalism and democracy enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Before we enter into a discussion on
the political implications, the paper presents the crucial findings on regional disparity in India since
the 1960s, based on the existing literature. Although a part of this literature is devoted to the
determinants of regional disparity, an issue on which opinions differ considerably, our attention is
restricted to the pattern and trend of regional disparity on which a reasonable agreement exists
among different authors. There are at least two political perspectives from which one could
interrogate the observed trends in regional disparity, the first being the federal aspects of the
Constitution vis--vis both its political and fiscal dimensions and, second, the challenges and limits
to the overall functioning of democracy and its evolution over the last six decades. We investigate
which of these limitations are attributable to the phenomenon of regional disparity in the second and
third sections, one focusing on the contours of federalism in India and the other studying its link with
the functioning of liberal democracy. The last section situates certain changes in the institutional role
Centre for Economic Policy and Public Finance, Asian Development Research Institute, Patna
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of finance commissions over the post-independence period in the light of the observations on the
link between regional disparity, federalism and democracy.
1 Trends in Regional Disparity
At independence, the Indian economy was characterised by not only economic stagnation,
but also wide regional disparity. The reasons for this have been well documented by a growing
corpus of work by historians and are beyond the scope of this paper. But to set out the context, it is
worth observing that colonial economic policies in different periods between 1757 and 1947, in the
content of trade policy itself, the differential land tenure systems and personal laws or the selective
role of public investment, were entirely guided by the countrys change in strategic importance in the
British Empire. The regions that had undergone significant economic transformation at the time of
independence were all around the three seats of colonial economic power Calcutta, Bombay and
Madras. Outside these, there were only a few regions where because of reasons other than trade (for
example, location of military establishments) or some highly specific conditions leading to the
development of a local capitalist class (for example, the textile industry in Ahmedabad), some
significant economic transformation had taken place. The British administrative machinery had on
the one hand limited economic development of India by separating the link between economic and
political power. This meant that at the turn of the century, emerging Indian capital could only
develop in and around the capitalist enclaves in a society where non-capitalist social relations still
dominated. On the other hand, the Indian commercial classes were protected from the wrath and
struggles of the exploited and the oppressed through the rule of law enforced uniformly by an
elaborate police force and judicial structure. The same administrative-judicial institutions later
combined with a discriminatory electoral franchise provided a convenient means of depriving the
peasantry of their crops, resources, customary security and personal protection. That the existing
regional disparities like social inequalities and sectoral disparities at the time of independence were
the consequences of economic policies and were almost wholly unrelated to the resource
endowments of different regions is apparent from the fact that the central Indian plateau where the
mineral resources of the country are concentrated was one of the poorest regions of the country. So
was the Gangetic plain which is endowed with extremely fertile agricultural land along with rich
biodiversity (except certain parts of Bengal the seat of the colonial establishment till 1912 and
colonial enterprise till the First World War).
It was, therefore, not surprising that within the realm of economic policy, right from the First
Five-Year Plan, the goal of a balanced regional growth was considered politically as important as
the goal of aggregate growth (Kumari 2006). Up to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, three basic strategies
that mentioned balanced economic growth as one of the aims were undertaken
(a) According priority to agriculture, irrigation, and community development, which all related to the
rural sector where development deficits were most stark, (b) providing equitable infrastructural
facilities (power, roads, communications, educational and health institutions) in all regions, and (c)
locating new enterprises, whether public or private, based on the need to address regional disparity.
It must be noted that these strategies did yield results, but they evolved over a period of time and as
such the reduction of regional disparities in the early period of planning, observed later in the paper,
cannot be causally ascribed to the basket of policies.
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However, the long-term trend in regional disparity in India has been one of widening. Taking
the period from the 1950s to the 1980s and using a weighted coefficient of variation, Mathur (1994)
concluded that regional disparity in India had lessened during the 1950s and up to the mid-1960s,
but had thereafter widened steadily. Because of the reorganisation of the states in 1956, other studies
on long-run trends in regional disparity refer to periods, starting from 1960-61 or a year later. In one
such study (Chaudhuri 2000), regional disparity is measured as the coefficient of variation (CV) of
per capita state domestic product (PCSDP) indices, taking the all-India per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) as 100. Starting with 1961-62, the CVs of PCSDP indices are computed at five-year
intervals, again showing that it steadily increased from 18.2 in 1961-62 to 35.4 in 1997-98. In
another exhaustive study (Dasgupta et al 2000), covering the period 1970-71 to 1995-96 and using
the CV of PCSDP as the measure of interstate disparity, it was concluded that Indian states have
diverged in terms of per capita real state domestic product (SDP) over the 25 years under
consideration. Apart from establishing the widening of regional disparity, the study also showed
that it is the low-income states that have exhibited lower growth rates in SDP, another important
aspect of the dynamics of regional disparity in India. Since liberalisation has meant a major
paradigm shift in the source of economic growth, some authors have compared the growth
performance of different state economies during the 1980s and 1990s, that is, in the immediate pre-
and post-reform decades. Based on the coefficient of variation of growth rates of SDP, it is observed
that regional disparities were wider in the 1990s than in the 1980s; these disparities are even wider in
terms of growth rates of per capita SDP, since low-income states are also at the lower end of the
demographic transition (Bhattacharya et al 2004). That the process of liberalisation has accentuated
the trend in widening of regional disparity in India is also corroborated by two other studies (Nagraj
et al 1998; Ahluwalia 2002), which taken together show that the Gini coefficient of per capita SDP
was 0.152 in the beginning of the 1980s, rose to 0.171 in the beginning of the 1990s, and increased
faster thereafter to reach 0.239 in 2003-04. The existing literature thus brings out the following
conclusions about the pattern and trend of regional inequalities in India.
(a) Independent India inherited an economy which had wide regional disparities because of colonial
interests; its few relatively developed regions consisted of industrial and trading enclaves mainly
around the port cities. Removal of regional disparity has been constantly underlined in all plan
documents. But, except during the early years of planning, inter-state disparity in India has steadily
widened. One should emphasise here that this is the only aspect of Indias development experience
where actual progress has been in the opposite direction. For other socio economic development
objectives like income, employment, education or health status, progress might have been slower
than desired, or reversals apparent in the recent period as in the case of poverty, hunger and
nutrition, but no other indicator has shown such a secular regressive trend in the entire post-
independence period.
(b) The phenomenon of widening regional disparity has been a feature of the Indian economy since
the 1960s, but the process of economic liberalisation has certainly accentuated it. This intensification
of regional disparity is also accompanied by wider sectoral disparities, particularly between
agriculture and non-agriculture, in different regions, along with wider rural-urban disparities
(Krishna 2004).
(c) Apart from widening over the years, regional disparity in India also shows that the relative ranks
of different states in terms of their per capita income levels have remained practically unchanged in
the last three decades, with very moderate changes in the ranks of middle- or high-income states
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within their respective groups. In other words, the regions that were poor (rich) earlier are the ones
that continue to be poor (rich) now. Such a secular homogeneity among the poorer and richer regions
of India probably signifies a close relation between the overall national growth strategy in the pre-
and post-liberalisation periods and its regional outcomes.
(d) The division of the major states in India into the three broad groups of high- middle- and low-
income states since the 1970s interestingly generates three almost contiguous zones. At the top, one
finds four states (Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat and Maharashtra) which, but for the location of
Rajasthan, would mean a contiguous zone of relative prosperity, all in the western half of the
country. The middle-income states (Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and West
Bengal) again form a contiguous zone in the southern part of the peninsula, except for West Bengal.
That leaves four Hindi heartland states (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar) to
form a contiguous zone of poor states, with one of its remaining members (Orissa) just bordering the
Hindi heartland and another (Assam) located at a distance. This geographical pattern of prosperity
has no association with the natural endowment of the different states.
(e) The increase in regional disparity and social disparity has been significantly correlated with
marked patterns in the post-liberalisation period. The coefficient of variation in rural poverty ratios
across states increased from 42% in 1993-94 to 56% in 1999-2000 while it rose from 44% to 63%
for urban areas during the same period (Mahendra Dev and Babu 2008). The composition of the
poor has also been changing. Rural poverty is becoming concentrated in agricultural labour
households and artisan households and urban poverty in casual labour households. In high-income
states, poverty is concentrated in agricultural labour disparities households, while in low-income
states it extends to other occupational groups (Radhakrishna and Ray 2005). Poverty is also
concentrated among dalits and adivasis. The poor among those classified as scheduled castes in rural
areas are concentrated in Uttar Pradesh (58%), Bihar, and West Bengal while the poor among dalits
in urban areas are concentrated in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (41%). Although official
poverty is relatively low in Punjab, around 80% of the rural poor in this state are dalits
Intensification
Before we move to the next section on the implications of ever-widening regional disparities
on political developments in India, the first argument can be set out: regional disparities have
intensified not in spite of the countrys development strategy, but largely because of it.
Notwithstanding federal constitutional provisions that allocate different social and economic sectors
between the central and state governments and elaborate guidelines regarding their fiscal
dimensions, the core of economic development strategies in India has always been decided at the
centre, mainly through the sectoral allocation of resources, regional allocation being only a by-
product of this exercise. Consequently, regional disparities are largely a consequence of sectoral
disparities. Taking the two major sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture, one may note that their
long-term growth rates (1950-2000) have been 2.6% and 5.8% respectively (Sivasubramonian 2004).
For both these sectors, the core of the development strategy was substantial state intervention, either
through public investment or administered prices, both of which contributed to creating the regional,
sectoral and social epicentres of economic growth, at least up to the 1980s.
For the non-agricultural sector, the most important component of state intervention was
public investment in infrastructure and basic industries. Starting with a share of around one-fourth
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during the early 1950s, the contribution of the public sector in total gross capital formation in India
had risen to nearly half by the middle of the 1980s; thereafter, it started decreasing because of the
reversal entailed in the reform paradigm (Chaudhuri 2000). With the huge investments that
infrastructure and basic industries entailed, the strategy of public investment under planning was to
crowd in private investment in the non-agricultural economy. Together with this investment
support, the state also followed a policy of administered prices, which amounted to subsidising many
of the industrial inputs like steel and energy. Thus, along with some regulatory measures restricting
the free play of private capital in sectors of its choice, the state provided the private capitalist sector
with considerable patronage and incentive through huge public investment.
In parallel, the core element of the states development strategy for the agricultural sector
was the Green Revolution policy introduced after the food crisis of the 1960s. Unlike the strategy of
industrialisation which remain unaltered through the period of planning (except for the Patent Act of
1970 which changed the nature of technology acquisition and development), the state had to change
its policy of non-intervention in agriculture during the mid-1960s after a serious food shortage in the
urban areas (commonly interpreted as a wage goods bottleneck) started unsettling its growing
industrial sector. At this point, the agricultural development strategy changed to concentrate only on
those areas where, because of earlier investment in agriculture, irrigation facilities were of an
assured nature and landholding patterns were not frozen through the zamindari system. This covered
barely one-fifth of the cultivated areas in the country, mostly in northern India. And the outcome of
the water-seed-fertiliser technology, all of them subsidised, was the Green Revolution enabling the
Indian economy to attain self-sufficiency in foodgrains (Sen 1974). This self-sufficiency was,
however, a limited phenomenon because the aim of the policy was itself narrow. It did not imply
adequate food for all; instead, it only meant adequate food for those who had the purchasing power
to buy it, leaving a large majority of hungry households without purchasing power (Patnaik 2007).
Thereafter, agricultural production levels in India have been sufficient to meet the entire urban food
demand and also create a large food stock, the two together ensuring that the industrial sector does
not suffer from any food supply constraint even in the face of serious crop failures and agrarian
distress. Thus the narrow aim of sector-specific intervention within an overall policy of non-
intervention was instrumental in reinforcing social, sectoral and regional bias.
Both these core elements of Indias development strategy were sector-specific and hence
apparently region-neutral, more so the strategy of industrialisation. But, much to the disadvantage of
low-income states, this strategy was region-specific as well. Both the strategies of industrialisation
and agricultural growth entailed asymmetric geographical distribution of resources in favour of
states that were already better off because of historical reasons. Considering the strategy of directed
investment in industry through licensing first, one may note that at least initially it implied
favourable private investment patterns in some low-income states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and
Orissa because of their rich mineral resources. But this possibility was more than offset by the policy
of freight equalisation which ensured availability of basic industrial inputs like coal and steel at the
same prices throughout India. This promoted the growth of industries in those regions where the
industrial economy was already relatively large (to take advantage of external economies) and
deprived the remaining regions of India, including even those states which arguably had a natural
comparative advantage for industrialisation. In the case of the Green Revolution strategy, the
economic rationale was not an increase in agrarian productivity-led growth as such, which would
have entailed extensive institutional change (Rao 1999), but only ensuring that the supply of
foodgrains was adequate to meet the food demand of the urban market. A failure to do so would
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have caused wages to rise, threatening the profit levels of the industrial capitalist. For this limited
objective to be met it was not at all necessary to promote growth in agricultural productivity
throughout India through institutional and technical change; covering barely one-fifth of the
cultivated area in the country under the Green Revolution was sufficient to attain the goal.
Apparently, it could be argued that once a region (initially uncovered by the new technology)
managed to set up an adequate irrigation infrastructure, the benefits of the substantially subsidised
new technology were as much within its access as the areas already covered. But once the limited
objectives of the industrial sector had been served, public investment in agriculture started declining
even in absolute size in the late 1970s (Rao C H 2006), Consequently, the spread of Green
Revolution after its initial success in selected areas thinned out elsewhere in the country. One can,
thus, conclude that within the clear sector-specificity of the state-led long-term development strategy
of the Indian economy, namely, the modality of industrial development and the narrow aim of
agrarian policy goals, was hidden a region-specificity, a result of which was the widening of regional
disparities in India.
An analysis of long-term trends in inter-state disparity in per capita income shows that it has
been widening all along since the 1960s; but during the 1990s, the process has been faster
(Ahluwalia 2002). This is apparently paradoxical for, if the argument of those who called for
narrowing down the role of the state in the economy was to hold, and if the earlier regional
disparities were caused by the development strategies of the state, its much smaller role during the
1990s should have at least arrested the trend of widening regional disparities if not reversed it. That
did not happen because low-income states, when exposed to the unfettered forces of the market,
were inherently more disadvantaged than during the period of directed development. By the end of
the 1990s, the low-income states in India were not only poor vis--vis their income levels, they also
had accumulated deficits in infrastructure, suffered a weakening of the institutional structures of
social transformation from above, and their governments were incapacitated because of their steadily
weakening financial base.
2. Federalism and Regional Disparity
The Indian Constitution does not easily lend itself to the standard binary classification of unitary and
federal (Rao and Singh 2006). On the one hand, the provision of legislative bodies in different states
makes it a federal constitution; on the other, through a number of legislative and executive powers
that the Constitution bestows on the central government, relating to both command over resources
and exercise of political power, its unitary character is too prominent. The Indian Constitution is
generally characterised as a federal constitution with unitary bias, a description that is far from
definitive and only underlines its dual character. As a consequence, over the last 60 years, federalism
in India has had to face not only the challenge of an evolving modus operandi, but also a parallel one
of holding its own space, often threatened by the elements of unitarism. At the root of this
contestation lies the political structure that the British bequeathed to the colonial administration,
finding it advantageous to promote sub-national political entities to forestall the emergence of a
strong national identity, starting with the partition of Bengal in 1905, which had to be reversed but
was pursued in other ways after the Government of India Act of 1912 (Rao and Singh 2006). When
the Constitution was drafted, its authors felt that, after independence, what could possibly hold
together a large nation like India was a strong central government, even when the contradictions due
157
to such a centralising state were apparent in the debates in the Constituent Assembly and the
National Planning Committee (Chibber 2003).
The problems with this political arrangement were clear after the use of Article 356 in Kerala
in 1959. But it was only by the end of the 1960s, when the diverging trends of regional disparity
started that the pressing questions about the functioning of the state and economy, including the
issue of federalism, came to the political foreground. The most important liberal rationale for
federalism is its efficacy as a mechanism of managing diversity, a phenomenon more likely in
large countries marked by plurality. But that is not the only task of federalism. Besides a liberal
answer to the question of identity, federalism also incorporates the constitutional arrangement of
sharing of power, outlining the domain of political federalism, and a parallel arrangement for the
sharing of resources, not the whole of which is defined constitutionally, to delineate the space for
fiscal federalism. Admittedly, these two subsystems, political and fiscal federalism, may influence
each other, but their trajectories are not necessarily parallel.
The working of Indian federalism since independence appears to be a telling example of a
divergence. To take the case of political federalism first, the democratic and political process has
triggered a gradual but significant dispersion of power to state-level political parties, and regional
parties have become a more important, often critical, part of coalitions at the centre in the period of
economic reform (Jayal et al 2007). This is not an isolated view. Another summative judgment on
the working of federalism in India notes that it would be an exaggeration to maintain that federalism
has withered away in the actual working of the Constitution. The most conclusive evidence of the
survival of the federal system is the coexistence of state governments with sharply divergent
ideological complexions. A more assured space for the federal components of overall political power
is also apparent now, as the arbitrary use of Article 356 of the Constitution has been tempered after a
series of political and judicial contestations, though the constitutional provision has not been
amended.
However, the weak basis of fiscal federalism has been eroded further in the same period.
There are several economic trends, stemming from the dominant policy paradigm, that have severely
weakened the space for fiscal federalism since the economic reforms of 1991 because of the
increasing shift to rule-based fiscal control (Isaac and Chakraborty 2008). The erosion of fiscal
federalism has led to competition between state governments in several economic fields. The recent
scenario vis--vis the location of private investment in industry, either domestic or foreign, where
the different states engage in fierce competition in terms of the incentives they offer prospective
investors is one example. As a consequence, industrial units are now located not where the cost
advantage lies as advocated by pure marketists, but on the lure of a range of incentives which, for
historical reasons, are larger in high-income states. The states competed with each other even before
the economic reforms when public investment played a larger role in industrial development, and the
centre, by virtue of its constitutional position decided the nations industrial policy, and through its
economic policy paradigm had some regulatory authority to influence the destination of private
investment. But such vertical competition, where the states at the regional level were vying for the
attention of the centre, has now been replaced by horizontal competition where state governments
vie for the attention of private investors. The winners and losers in this competition form two
separate groups, the former ascribing their success to their efficiency and quality of governance and
the latter underlining the historical burden of post-independence neglect and the race to the
bottom. The above transformation of Indian federalism to a stage where the competitive elements
158
shaping the constituent regions are involved in a contest was a gradual process initially, but since the
early 1990s, has been a very pronounced phenomenon. The allocative role through policy tools like
freight equalisation and industrial licensing had already reinforced regional economic divergence
(Banerjee and Ghosh 1988; Singh 2008). This horizontal competition between regions and states has
been concomitant with the intensification of the horizontal contradictions within the dominant
classes in the different regions during the decade after liberalisation.
The tension between industrial capitalists and agrarian capital was aggravated in Punjab,
Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh in the aftermath of the Green Revolution and underlined the
politics of center-state relationships in the 1970s (Sathyamurthy 1997). But by the beginning of the
1980s, agrarian change outside the classic Green Revolution belts laid the foundations for capitalist
development in the non-farm sector (Kapadia and Lerche 1999). In Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat,
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, regional accumulation processes led to
the emergence of first-generation business houses mainly drawing from the agrarian economy unlike
the old business houses that emerged from trade, commerce and money lending (Baru 2000). The
changing political basis of federalism has emerged from this section of the dominant classes and
their relationship with successive state and central governments and regional political parties (Gupta
2007). Thus, the very basis of the potential for growth in the liberalised economy has also been the
basis of increasing regional disparity. The political tensions inherent in this paradox have been
reflected in demands for fiscal federalism, as is evident from the increasing collaboration among
states in representations to the centre, as well as the political articulation of diverging interests
between rich and poor states, sometimes cutting across party-political divides. These pushes and
pulls have had considerable impact on Indian democracy.
3 Democracy And Regional Disparity
The question of the relationship between regional disparity and democracy has been treated
as a subsidiary one in much of the literature. However, economic development (Lipset 1959), inter-
elite relations (Rustow 1973), relationship between social classes (Moore 1967), and political
institutions to channel and contain conflict (Heper 1991) have been put forth as the determining
basis of the advance of liberal democracy (Pinkney 2004), where it is conceived as a specific
governmental form (Kaviraj 2000). While much of the recent literature on democracy in India has
focused on the question of coalition politics (Yadav 2000, Hasan 2000, Arora 2000), by the mid-
1960s, while the paradigm of economic growth and social redistribution under the Nehruvian
consensus broke down, the political debate revealed an underlying lack of agreement on the form of
strong state and, among some groups, resistance to the goal of creating a nation state in the absence
of a dominant culture. The tension between centralising and decentralising tendencies culminated in
the Emergency. Since then, this tension heightened to reach recognisable patterns by the mid-1980s
(Frankel 2005).
The nomenclature of national and regional parties obfuscates the fact that even the Congress
has been unable to preserve its national character through regional representation in party structures
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is struggling to break from regional confinement. This leads us
to the next significant question about the relationship between democracy and power. The tension
around centralisation has been attributed to size, diversity and fragmentation, but the sources of
fragmentation have not been unchanging. Since the Green Revolution in agriculture, renewed efforts
to enforce land ceiling legislation in the 1970s, the increasing political assertiveness of the emerging
159
elites in state-level politics, the increased prominence of social issues concerning dalits, adivasis,
women, the poor and the landless, the question of status and safety of minorities and the salience of
issues of law and order have intensified in recent decades (Brass 1997). While there is no one-to-one
mapping between regional disparity and the tensions around centralisation and thus the question of
extent of diffusion of power in the democratic polity both show the same pattern over time the
decisive factors in the political arena over democratic power can be traced to the mid-1960s and
have only intensified in the last two decades.
It is in addressing the question of left-wing extremism that a consensus around issues that
connect our earlier observations about the trends in regional disparity and the concentrated
dimensions of the social and the sectoral by region can be seen. This literature raises three
interconnected dimensions of disparity and exclusion regional, social and sectoral (Kujur 2008)
and concludes that the institutions of liberal democracy in India have not been conducive to ensuring
political participation in the mainstream of the polity of groups in the interstices of these three forms
of exclusion and disparity. Inter-elite relations have been another domain but the literature is highly
contested. However, two dimensions of the question can be addressed. One set of questions relate to
elite anxieties about more equitable sharing of economic and political power through affirmative
action.
Here, the political experience of the last two decades since the implementation of the Mandal
Commission report in 1989 provides a clear indication that the contest between the traditional and
emerging elite was concentrated in the social milieu of widening regional disparity in the Hindi
heartland states (Shah 2004). The other set relates to the question of the limits of coalition politics as
a power-sharing arrangement to address regional disparity. First, coalition politics while setting
regional questions on the national agenda has not in itself been able to reverse the centralising aspect
of the economic reforms paradigm of the union government. Second, coalition politics has not in
itself meant a move towards policies to reverse the trend of widening regional disparity though the
question has come to the fore because of the increasing importance of regional aspirations in the
national polity.
4 Implications for the Finance Commissions
In this paper, we have tried to trace the political issues around federalism and democracy that
stem from the widening of interstate and regional disparity in India. The finance commission has the
status of a constitutionally mandated neutral arbiter in the process of financial devolution in a
context where the structure of Indian federalism and democracy in the post-reform period entails the
concentration of fiscal and financial resources in the hands of the central government. As we noted
earlier, the post-liberalisation period has seen a significant increase in interstate disparity, contrary to
the expectation that removing the policy barriers that had been the cause of widening regional
disparity would entail a reversal of the process. Successive finance commissions, through their
assessments of the states own revenue capacity and the structural constraints on these, have
historically accepted and acted on this question while deciding on horizontal devolution. The
emergence of the per capita income gap as the most important index in the devolution formula
reflects this fact. But the per capita income gap, while it reflects the trends in regional disparity, does
not in itself address the causal factors of regional disparity and the pressing question of widening
regional disparity, which is a product of the reigning policy paradigm.
160
On the question of vertical devolution, central political priorities on economic policy matters
have played a far greater decisive role, reducing the question of vertical devolution to a residual
matter through the mandates in the Terms of Reference. This has been a marked development since
the Tenth Finance Commission. In the post-liberalisation period, the onus has fallen on the states
which have fallen behind to find ways in which they can find resources to fulfil their committed
expenditure requirements, leave alone the question of expenditure to reverse trends in disparity. The
latter is difficult due to a constrained fiscal space where revenue mobilising powers are constrained
by the socio economic structure and borrowing powers are curbed by central decisions, conditions
and directives. This has accentuated the institutional gap between the states that have fallen behind
and those that have forged ahead. The corpus of vertical devolution, though increasing, has fallen far
short of the need for public expenditure and investment necessary in laggard regions to reverse the
process of divergence.
If widening interstate disparity in its three intersecting dimensions regional, sectoral and
social has to be addressed within the institutional space provided by democratic and federal
structures to the finance commission operating within permanent rules set by the Constitution, while
it responds to the political implications of such disparity, two broad conclusions can be drawn.
Central policy goals that accentuate competition between states and impose rule-based constraints on
the policy flexibility of states should not be institutionalised through finance commission
recommendations. If widening interstate disparity has to be addressed both by the own action of
states and broader central policies, then very high levels of public expenditure are needed not just in
social sector, but also in vital economic sectors by states constrained by resource gaps. The broad
principles of the formula for fiscal disparity have led to a move towards democratisation of the
political-devolution have to be based on an economics that is not compared to the 1950s. But
concomitant economic policies to strained by an anathema to public investment. bridge this disparity
have been few and far between. Thus the political contests between the new and old elites over
debate on the means and ends of economic policy in India are far federalism and democracy
stemming from interstate economic from over.
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IX
Human Rights Movement in India:
A Historical Perspective
Aswini K Ray
The historical narrative of the origin and evaluation of the human rights movements in
India has been contextualized within the analytical framework of a post-colonial democracy.
This is different from the mainstream discourse on Indian politics, which is rooted within the
axiomatic framework of a liberal democracy because of its institutional underpinning of
western liberal vintage. For the same reason, Marxists refer to it as a bourgeois democracy,
often derisively. But there are serious empirical, logical, and analytical problems with such an
axiomatic assumption, howsoever widespread it may be, as I have argued elsewhere [Ray
1989].
Many historically inherited structural asymmetries between the post-colonial Indian
state, and the western nation states, as well as their respective interface with the political
economy and civil society, have shaped the origin, evolution and content of political
democracy differently. These divergences may better explain the manifest operational
asymmetries of comparable liberal institutions of western vintage in the Indian context. These
differences pertains particularly of the rights of citizens, which constitutes the core concern of
the liberal democratic agenda. Some of the structural asymmetries of he Indian state and its
interface with the civil society, historically inherited from the colonial era, operationally
impinging on the rights of he citizens would be spelled out at the outset.
The first asymmetry is the disjunction between the relatively modern post-colonial
Indian state and its predominantly traditional social fabric, disparately segmented and stratified
around multiple ascriptive identities of religion, race, language, tribe, caste, spatial location,
along with gender. Universal adult franchise of the republican constitution linked this inherited
duality within Indias political democracy at its origin, creating continuing tension between
tradition and modernity in India politics, which one political leader described as the India vs
Bharat syndrome [Joshi 1989].
The second asymmetry is the inherited duality within Indians post-colonial state
apparatus, between its relatively developed coercive component, like the police, intelligence,
paramilitary institutions, and the penal code on the one hand and the weak democratic
instruments of conflict-resolution on the other. The republican constitution by including them
both within their respective institutional moorings, provided them some contrived democratic
legitimacy.
The other important asymmetry has been the relatively narrow social base of
democratic consciousness around citizens rights because of the specific historical trajectory of