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Tomcat Vs Super Hornet

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Battle of the Superfighters

F-14D Tomcat vs. F/A-18E/F Super Horet


B!" Bo# $ress a% &ear A%m. 'aul (illcrist )&et.*
+aga,ie" FLIGHT JOURNAL
-ssue Date" JAN/FEB 2002
'oste% ." 8/4/2006
.rigial /&0s"
'A(E 1" http://www.flight!"#$%l.&!'/%#ti&l()/f*4f*8/f*4f*8+*.%)p
'A(E 1" http://www.flight!"#$%l.&!'/%#ti&l()/f*4f*8/f*4f*8+2.%)p
B%ttl( !f th( ,"p(#Fight(#)
F-*4. T!'&%t /). F/A-*8 E/F ,"p(# H!#$(t
Two experts say the Super Hornet isn't so super
B! Bo# $ress a% &ear A%m. 'aul (illcrist2 /.S. 3av! )&et.*
Editors' note: every airplane that goes into service is accompanied by controversy. This is
especially true of the F/A-18E/F Super ornet. !ur t"o e#perts argue that the Super ornet is not
necessarily the airplane the $avy needs for the future% and their bac&grounds lend "eight to their
arguments. 'ear Adm. (aul )illcrist *.S. $avy +'et., spent -- years as a fighter pilot and "ing
commander and "as operations commander of all (acific Fleet fighters. .ob /ress is an
aeronautical engineer and% during his long career at )rumman% he "as directly involved in the
development of a "ide range of fighters. e "as the Engineering 0anager for the original design
and development of the F-11 Tomcat. Their analysis ma&es an interesting statement "hen placed
against the bac&ground of the "ar on terrorism.
The re4uiremets for a practical %eep iter%ictio fighter/#om#er have log #ee the su#5ect of
cotrovers! 6ithi the aval aviatio commuit!2 especiall! 6he it comes to the F-14 Tomcat
versus the F/A-18E/F Super Horet. .fte2 ho6ever2 the %efiitio of 7%eep iter%ictio8 is
chage% to fit the aircraft u%er %iscussio2 rather tha ta9ig ito accout the real-6orl% theater of
operatios for 6hich it is %estie%.
Evets over Afghaista2 ho6ever2 have force% us to formali,e 6hat is reall! ee%e% if a aircraft is
to stri9e a eem! %eep 6ithi its coutr!. To%a!2 6e 9o6 that the politics of surrou%ig
coutries ca %ictate missio %istaces that stretch the a#ilit! of curret aircraft to their limits.

The /.S. relies o 3av! aircraft carriers as #ases. So2 6he puttig fighter/ #om#ers over Afgha
targets2 6hich aircraft le% the charge:;the trie%-a%-true F-14 Tomcat 6ith the F/A-18 Horet 6ell
#ehi%.
This particular coflict motivate% us to a%%ress 6hat 6e see as a serious pro#lem cocerig 3aval
aviatio assets a% the realities of the fiel%s over 6hich 6e 6ill fight.
As sho6 over Afghaista2 there are four #asic re4uiremets of a! carrier stri9e force"
< &each the target.
< Do=t get shot %o6 #! SA+s2 AAA2 or eem! fighters.
< Stri9e the target.
< &etur to the carrier #efore ruig out of gas.
>ithi these four seemigl! simple rules are the ee%s for a airplae to have a log rage 6hile
carr!ig sufficiet muitios to hammer a target a% still #e a#le to fight its 6a! through eem!
aircraft a% AAA threats.

A#'(0 %$0 #(%012 %$ F/A-*83 H!#$(t %))ig$(0 t! th( 45$ighth%w6)42 7#(%6) l(ft %) it &!$0"&t) % p%t#!l 'i))i!$
i$ th( )6i() !/(# Afgh%$i)t%$. 'hoto #! 0t. ?m%r. ?hristopher >. ?hope. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!
A$ Afgh%$i)t%$ )&($%#i!
Because our govermet is=t tellig us all of its secrets2 6e=ll have to ma9e some assumptios
6he usig Afghaista as a e@ample. -t is2 ho6ever2 o#vious that reachig the target presets a
great challege. To avoi% Sil96orm-class missiles2 the carrier #attle group pro#a#l! 6oul% ot 6at
to veture orth of a lie 5oiig +as4at2 .ma a% Ahma%a#a%2 'a9ista. Alog this lie2 the
group 6oul% #e some6hat 6est of $arachi. &eachig $a#ul 6oul% re4uire a oe-6a! flight of
roughl! 81A statute miles. Assumig the use of S-B ta9ers2 a F-14 stri9e2 refuelig some6here
#et6ee Cuetta a% Su99ur2 'a9ista2 6oul%=t have a! trou#le attac9ig targets i the
orthermost parts of Afghaista.
-f2 ho6ever2 a F/A-18E/F refuels i the same spot2 it 6ill #arel! ma9e it to $a#ul. The u-refuele%
ra%ius of a F-14 carr!ig the ormal stri9e loa% )four 12DDD-pou% 0(Bs2 t6o HA&+ missiles a%
t6o Si%e6i%ers plus EFA rou%s of 1Dmm a% t6o2 18D-gallo e@teral ta9s* is at least ADD
statute miles. Accompa!ig E/F Super Horets have ol! a BAD-statute-mile ra%ius carr!ig a#out
half the #om# loa%. To complete the picture of missio %istaces2 the S-Bs 6oul% have to %ash #ac9
to the ?Gs2 hot-refuel a% meet the rai% comig out of Afghaista2 6hich 6oul% #e much i ee%
of H'-4 coc9tails.
A$ F-*4 T!'&%t (8"ipp(0 with % L!w-Altit"0( N%/ig%ti!$ %$0 T%#g(ti$g I$f#%#(0 f!# Night 9LANTIRN: p!0
p#(p%#() t! ($t(# th( p%tt(#$ i$ p#(p%#%ti!$ !f l%$0i$g %7!%#0 U,, J!h$ F. 5($$(01 93; 6<:. Th( fight(# i)
%tt%&h(0 t! Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ O$( =(#! Tw! 9;F-*02: 4.i%'!$07%&6)24 0(pl!1(0 %7!%#0 th( &%##i(# whi&h i)
p%#ti&ip%ti$g i$ Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$ >%t&h. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!.
>h! are 6e it pic9ig over missio %etails: Eas!I At the #egiig of the stu%ies that le% to this
article2 6e 6ere covice% that the Afgha campaig 6oul% #e a all-/SAF sho62 a% that 6oul%
lea% to 4uestios of carrier-fleet effectiveess. But map stu%ies com#ie% 6ith 9o6le%ge of
geopolitical restrictios sho6e% that carrier assets2 primaril! the F-142 6ere 5ust a#out the /.S.=s
ol! optio. This has clearl! #ee su#statiate% #! evets.
.f course2 the F-14s 6ere ot the first to hit targets i AfghaistaJ B-1 stealth #om#ers each
carrie% 1E2 12DDD-pou% ('S-gui%e% #om#s. The! fle6 from >hitema AFB i +issouri;a BB-
hour rou% trip. Further2 #ig-time /SAF strategic air assets;B-A1s a% B-1s;arrive% shortl!
after6ar%.
-t 6as soo apparet that /SAF tactical aircraft 6ere ot #eig use% i Afghaista. >e fou% that2
eve give ulimite% i-flight ta9er refuelig2 the /SAF F-1A a% F-1E coul% ot #e use% 6ithout
a +i%%le Easter grou% #ase. Tur9ish #ases 6ere simpl! too far a6a! a% 6oul% re4uire refuelig
over hostile areas. .l! the use of tactical air #ases i Tur9meista a%/or /,#e9ista 6oul% 6or92
a% this 6oul% allo6 ol! partial coverage of Afghaista.
The #ig 4uestio #ecomes" %oes the 3av! have the assets to #e a#le to carr! this 9i% of 6ar ito
the future2 a% 6hat 9i% of plaig is i place: To cut to the chase2 the %iscussio oce agai
reverts to 6hether or ot the e6 Super Horet 6ill reall! cut the mustar% or the 3av! has ta9e !et
aother 6rog tur that 6ill cost us %earl! o the #attlefiel%.
A#'(0 with % 2000-p!"$0 ?5-86 J!i$t .(f($)( Att%&6 ?"$iti!$ 9J.A?:2 %$ F/A-*8 H!#$(t f#!' th( 4Bl%&6
5$ight)4 !f ?%#i$( Fight(# Att%&6 ,8"%0#!$ Th#(( O$( F!"# #(&(i/() th( fi$%l )ig$%l f!# l%"$&h %7!%#0 U,,
J!h$ 3. ,t($$i). 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate Br% ?lass Ha!me 'astoric. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!.
A Hi)t!#1 !f N%/%l A/i%ti!$ 0iffi&"lti()
The su#5ect of the erosio of 3aval aviatio has agge% #oth of us ever sice the cacellatio of the
A-11 program #! the Secretar! of Defese i the late =8Ds. -t 6as a 6atershe% for a um#er of
reasos2 ot the least of 6hich 6as a level of #a% maagemet that ha%=t #ee see i the 'etago
for %eca%esI >e ca loo9 #ac9 o that %a! a% clearl! see that the uravelig of the fa#ric of 3aval
aviatio 6oul% #ecome a log-term tre%. 3either of us cote%s that the A-112 as evisioe% #!
3av! lea%ers2 6as the right airplae to %evelop at that poit i histor!J i fact2 it 6as=tI That2
ho6ever2 is aother stor! for aother time.

>e have put off 6ritig this article simpl! #ecause 6e 9o6 it is li9el! to ruffle ma! feathers i
the 'etago a% o ?apitol Hill2 #ut evets i Afghaista agai #rought our mai argumets ito
focus. -s 6ritig this 9i% of article 6orth it2 6e 6o%ere%J 6e might #e see to #e 7pilig it o8
6he the 3av! is i %ifficult! a% clearl! o a steep2 %o6hill sli%e. >ell2 6e have listee%2 6ith o
small restrait2 to the potificatios that 5ustif! ho6 6ell the 3av! is %oig 6ith its favorite
program2 the F/A-18E/F Super Horet;%espite uimpeacha#le reports to the cotrar! from the
gu!s i the fleetJ commets ma%e to us #! !oug fleet pilots 6ho have flo6 the airplae a%
%escri#e it as 7a %og8 carr! much more 6eight 6ith us tha statemets from seior officers a%
civilias higher i the foo% chai. But certai potificatios i a statemet #! a seior 3aval officer
6ho shoul% have 9o6 #etter serve% as the last stra6.
The prooucemet appeare% alog 6ith a spate of triumphal aoucemets that cele#rate% the
7successful8 completio of the Super Horet=s first operatioal evaluatio ).'EGA0*. - a
pu#licatio calle% 7-si%e >ashigto28 the 3av!=s %irector of operatioal testig is 4uote% as
sa!ig that the Super Horet 6as superior to its earlier mo%els 7K i ever! categor! #ut three"
acceleratio2 ma@imum spee% a% sustaie% turig performace.8 This prooucemet #oggle%
our mi%s #ecause these are the ver! performace capa#ilities that %etermie a tactical airplae=s
survival. The2 as if to 5ustif! this 7ha% grea%e28 the officer is 4uote% as statig that the 3av! has
sacrifice% spee% i the Super Horet for other #eeficial capa#ilities2 a% he asserts2 7#rute spee% is
o loger the %iscrimiator it oce 6as 6he the #echmar9 6as the Soviet threat.8 -t is clear to us
that this 3aval officer %oes=t have a clue a#out aerial com#at a% the importace of total eerg! i
the comple@ e4uatios of eerg! maeuvera#ilit!. 3or %oes he seem to u%ersta% that Thir% >orl%
coutries all arou% the glo#e are purchasig the ver! latest operatioal &ussia-#uilt fighters that
are also licese% for pro%uctio i ?hia. The &ussia aerial threat still e@istsJ 6hat has chage% is
that the pilots are=t &ussias.
As a atio2 6e have al6a!s ha% the meas to protect our o6 glo#al iterests as 6ell as those of
other coutries. Short of uclear 6ar2 the carrier #attle groups have #ee a#le to stri9e o ver! short
otice. A 'resi%et=s first 4uestio i time of crisis is ofte2 7>here are the carriers:8
Th( )"$ p%i$t) %$ F-*4. T!'&%t !f Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ Tw! g!l0 %) it fli() !/(# U,, 3!$)t(ll%ti!$ i$ th( A#%7i%$
G"lf 0"#i$g Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$ >%t&h. 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate Thir% ?lass Timoth! ?. >ar%. 'hoto courtes!
of the /.S. 3av!.
F-*4) &%##1 % '%!# p"$&h
>ith a la!ere% %efese2 iclu%ig air assets2 gui%e%-missile cruisers a% frigates a% u%ersea
#ac9ig2 the carrier #attle groups are prett! 6ell ivulera#le. . the 3imit,-class carrier2 6e see
the F-14;a trul! log-rage fighter/#om#er;plus light6eight F/A-18A fighter/#om#ers. The log-
rage A-E #om#er has goe forever2 #ut its %erivative2 the EA-EB Electroic >ar-fare )E>* aircraft
is i place a% is i much %ema% #! #oth the /S3 a% the /SAF. This coutr!=s Desert Fo@ a%
$osovo e@perieces have2 at last;a% correctl!;shifte% the focus a6a! from stealth a% to6ar%
electroic 6arfare. >e 6ill have more to sa! o this importat topic i a su#se4uet article. -
short2 at the momet2 the %ec9 complemet loo9s a%e4uate. The F-14 ca pic9 up the A-E role
#ecause it 6as %esige% to %o so from scratch. -ts performace i $osovo as a ver! effective stri9e
lea%er has more tha #ore out that fact. >ith 0A3T-&32 ight-visio %evices a% s!thetic
aperture A/( ra%ar2 the F-14 targete% ot ol! its o6 four 12DDD-pou% 6eapos #ut also the
or%ace of the F/A-18s2 6hich %o=t have such capa#le sesors.
A iterestig compariso ca #e ma%e to 4uatif! the F-14=s stri9e effectiveess. ?ompare oe F-
14 a% oe B-1 #om#er %urig a t6o-ight )BB-hour* missio i $osovo. - reactive situatios )o
foreig #ase*2 the B-1 operates from the /.S. )lac9 of overseas B-1 #asig is a serious costrait
a% there are ol! a limite% um#er of B-1s to #egi 6ith*. The chart sho6s the 6eapos %elivere%
;/.S. to $osovo a% #ac9;for the B-1 a% the F-14D.
@@-h!"#-'i))i!$ )t#i6( (ff(&ti/($())
B-2 F-*4
3o. of 12DDD l#. #om#s 1E 4
+issio time )hours* BB< BL
3o. of missios 1 A<<
3o. of #om#s %elivere% 1E 1D
First #om#s o target )hours* 1E.A 1
3otes"
< From >hitema AFB2 +issouri
<< All-ight missios
The F-14 iformatio is from Desert Fo@ operatios.
A$ F-*4A T!'&%t %tt%&h(0 t! Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ F!"# O$( %w%it) it) t"#$2 %l!$g with tw! F/A-*8)2 t! #(f"(l
0"#i$g flight !p(#%ti!$) f#!' th( %i#&#%ft &%##i(# U,, E$t(#p#i)(. ?(%$whil(2 !$( F/A-*8 H!#$(t i) #(f"(li$g
f#!' th( Ai# F!#&( 53-*0A EAt($0(# %0/%$&(0 t%$6(#. 'hoto #! ?m%r. Bria (. (a6e. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S.
3av!.
3%##i(# (ff(&ti/($()) i) th( i))"(
The simple chart o the previous page sa!s a great %eal a#out a carrier #attle group=s effectiveess.
&emem#er that there are;or there ca #e;14 F-14s o a ship such as the Hoh ?. Steis )?G3-
F1*. T6et! four F-14s ca %eliver more 6eapos tha the etire 1E aircraft B-1 fleet.
/fortuatel!2 the um#ers of F-14s are %6i%lig2 a% the! 6ill #e almost goe i aother 1D
!ears. >hat 6ill #e the replacemet:
The F-14 6ill #e replace% #! the F/A-18E Super Horet2 6hich attempts %eep-iter%ictio missios.
Though it=s a 6hi,,! little airsho6 performer 6ith a ice2 mo%er coc9pit2 it has ol! BE percet of
the F-14=s pa!loa%/rage capa#ilit!. The F/A-18E Super Horet has #ee improve% #ut still has2 at
#est2 AD percet of the F-14=s capa#ilit! to %eliver a fi@e% um#er of #om#s )i pou%s* o target.
This aturall! meas that the carrier ra%ius of ifluece %rops to AD percet of 6hat it 6oul% have
#ee 6ith the same um#er of F-14s. As a result2 the area of ifluece )ot ra%ius* %rops to 1B
percetI 3o 6o%er the /S3 is 6or9ig o 7#u%%! ta9er8 versios of the Super Horet.
B! the 6a!2 o6 that the A-E ta9er has goe2 ho6 6ill the Horets get to %eep-iter%ictio targets:
?otrar! to 6hat 6e=re officiall! tol%2 a ta9er variat of the Horet is simpl! ot the as6er. - a
attempt to ma9e it supersoic2 the F-18E has #ee give a lo6 aspect ratio2 ra,or #la%e of a 6ig.
This hurts su#soic %rag a% carrier ta9eoff pa!loa% 6he compare% 6ith a $A-E ta9er2 6hich is
a aero%!amicall! efficiet solutio. E4uall! sill! is the proposal for a E> versio of the F-18E.
The same aero%!amic reasos appl! for this airplae2 plus it has a e@teral stores %ilemma. To get
sufficiet rage to support a %eep-iter%ictio missio2 the EF-18E 6oul% have to use up precious
e@teral store statios 6ith fuel ta9s rather tha E?+ po%s as carrie% o the EA-EB. 'erhaps the
3av! shoul% cosi%er puttig the EA-EB #ac9 ito upgra%e% a% mo%eri,e% pro%uctio a% #uil%
some of them as ta9ers: .r more Super A-Es:
As this is #eig 6ritte2 it is too earl! to commet i a iforme% maer o the 6ar o terrorism i
Afghaista. The /SAF heav! #om#er rai%s are full! pu#lic. Ho6ever2 it is evi%et that /S3
carrier stri9e groups that cosist of F-14s a% F-18s are co%uctig the tactical rai%s. A stu%! of
maps sho6s that ?G3 air#ore S-B ta9ers facilitate the co%uct of these rai%s #! refuelig2
pro#a#l! over 'a9ista. At this time2 /SAF tactical air assets %o ot have #ases close eough to
Afghaista to allo6 air#ore refuelig over frie%l! atios. B! the time this fi%s its 6a! i-to
prit2 that ma! have chage%.
R(p!#t(0 ,"p(# H!#$(t p#!7l(')
Although the 3av! has #ee 6or9ig ver! har% to correct F/A-18E/F .'EGA0 pro#lems2 it is
6orth summig them up" the pro%uctio F/A-18E/F is sigificatl! over6eight 6ith respect to its
specificatios )B2DDD pou%s over*. This is far i e@cess of 6hat oe 6oul% e@pect for a variat of
a e@istig F/A-18A2 B2 ?2 or D. Aircraft 6eight estimatio metho%s coul%2 a% shoul%2 have #ee
much #etterJ i fact2 6he 6e loo9 o#5ectivel! at the F/A-18E/F2 6e see a airplae 6ith a #ra%-
e6 6ig2 e6 fuselage a% e6 empeage;i other 6or%s2 a e6 airplae. This is2 therefore2
6hat ?ogress 6oul% call a 7e6 start.8 Both ?ogress a% the Dept. of Defese )DoD* ha% to #e
loo9ig the other 6a! 6he the 3av! 6as permitte% to slip this airplae #! as a simple mo%ificatio
of a e@istig airplae.
- com#at-maeuverig flight2 the aircraft ha% severe 76ig-%rop8 pro#lems that %efie% resolutio2
%espite the use of ever! aero%!amic aal!tical tool availa#le. Evetuall!2 oe test pilot came up
6ith a 7lea9!-fol%-5oit8 fi@ that opee% chor%6ise air slots to aspirate the 6ig=s upper surface
flo6 a% there#! prevet the sharp stallig of oe 6ig #efore the other. The! stalle% more or less
together2 #ut much earlier a% more severel! tha #efore. This e6 fi@ is 6hat the aero%!amicists
call a 7#a% ai%.8 -t causes aircraft #uffetig2 6hich is geerall! a source of 6ig %rag. But a 7fi@8
that com#ie% 7accepta#le8 6ig %rop 6ith 7accepta#le8 #uffetig ha% #ee achieve%. .e test
pilot commete% %r!l!2 7-=% li9e the #uffetig levels to #e a little lo6er so - coul% rea% the hea%s-up
%ispla!I8
;%p!# )t#(%6) %&#!)) th( wi$g) !f %$ F/A-*8 H!#$(t f#!' th( 4Bl"( Bl%)t(#)4 !f Fight(# Att%&6 ,8"%0#!$ Th#((
F!"# %) it 0i/() 0"#i$g %$ %i# p!w(# 0('!$)t#%ti!$ $(%# th( %i#&#%ft &%##i(# U,, G(!#g( >%)hi$gt!$. 'hoto #!
'hotographer=s +ate 1% ?lass Shae +c?o!. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!.
.6ig to its high %rag a% 6eight )a% pro#a#l! other factors*2 the F/A-18E is sigificatl! poorer
i acceleratio tha the F/A-18A. Also2 its com#at ceilig is su#statiall! lo6er2 a% its trasoic
%rag rise is ver! high. >e have sta!e% i touch 6ith some pilots at the 3av!=s test ceter a% have
gathere% some mi%-#ogglig aec%otal iformatio. Here are some e@amples"
M A F/A-18A 6as use% to 7chase8 a F-14D test flight. The F-14D 6as carr!ig four 12DDD-pou%
#om#s2 t6o 18D-gallo %rop ta9s2 t6o HA&+ missiles a% t6o Si%e6i%er air-to-air missiles. The
chase airplae 6as i a relativel! 7clea8 cofiguratio 6ith ol! a ceterlie fuel ta9. At the e%
of each test flight2 the chase airplae 6as several miles #ehi% the test airplae 6he the chase
airplae reache% 7#igo8 fuel a% ha% to retur to #ase.
M A F/A-18E Super Horet is teste% usig the same chase airplae2 a earlier mo%el Horet2 i the
same cofiguratio. The chase airplae %oes ot ee% full thrust to sta! 6ith the test airplae.
M A F/A-18E/F i ma@imum after#urer thrust caot e@cee% +ach 1.D i level flight #elo6
1D2DDD feet eve 6he it is i the clea cofiguratio )o e@teral stores*. At 1D2DDD feet2 the F-14D
ca e@cee% +ach 1.E.
M A 4uote from a Horet pilot is %evastatigl! fra9" 7The aircraft is slo6er tha most fighters
fiel%e% sice the earl! 1NEDs.8
M The most %evastatig commet came from a Horet pilot 6ho fle6 umerous si%e-#!-si%e
compariso flights 6ith F/A-18E/F Super Horets a% sa!s" 7>e outra them2 6e out-fle6 them
a% 6e ra them out of gas. - 6as em#arrasse% for them.8
Up0%ti$g th( F-*4
- the Hauar! 1NN1 issue of 3aval Aviatio2 a article remi%e% us of some histor!" 7After the
%ive/#om#er #ecame a aval aircraft t!pe i the mi%-1NBDs2 fighters 6ere %esige% primaril! as gu
platforms. Ho6ever2 the stregth a% po6er that characteri,e% the F4/ a% FEF ea#le% them to #e
rea%il! mo%ifie% to fighter/ #om#ers. Each coul% carr! for6ar%-firig roc9ets2 t6o 12DDD-pou%
#om#s or a %roppa#le fuel ta9. The proportio of fighters assige% to fast carriers icrease%
stea%il! from 1A percet of complemet i 1N41 to AD percet i 1N44 to FD percet i 1N4A. The
%ual role ma%e this great icrease i air-to-air com#at po6er possi#le 6ith little loss i carrier air-
to-surface capa#ilit!.8
Ho6 a#out a Hellcat --2 a9a Tomcat --: The first or%er of #usiess 6oul% #e to resurrect as ma!
retire% F-14s )of a! cofiguratio* as 6e ca. Seco%2 com#ie these 6ith fleet F-14As2 the
remaiig F-14As a% eve the -raia F-14 assets that might #e o#taia#le )-ra too9 %eliver! of
appro@imatel! 8D F-14s u%er the ShahJ a#out BD are still air6orth!*. Thir%2 %esig a program to
upgra%e all of these aircraft to F-14Ds. This ma! sou% 6il%2 #ut (rumma e@periece i restorig
+ala!sia A4D #as9et cases to mit co%itio i the =8Ds 6as ver! successful2 a% the! 6ere ot
eve (rumma airplaesI Similar success i restorig fleet A-Es at (rumma=s St. Augustie2
Flori%a2 facilit! 6as achieve%. -t 6oul% #e appropriate for the 3av! or DoD to lauch a stu%! #! a
#lue ri##o team u%er the aegis of 3AGA-&. >e estimate that a#out 1DD a%%itioal F-14s coul% #e
#rought #ac9 ito the fleet. The titaium #o@ #eams a% #ul9hea%s are earl! i%estructi#le as 6ell
as repaira#le usig electro-#eam 6el%igJ #ut this is ot !et a Tomcat --.
Bu!ig time 6ith these programs 6oul% allo6 the coveig of a %esig team;agai le% #!
3AGA-&;of cotractor persoel2 +-T scietists a% other uiversit! help to stu%! the cost of
#uil%ig e6 F-14s. >e thi9 the follo6ig %esig chages to the F-14 are achieva#le for a e6
#aselie airplae a% later for #loc9 chage improvemets"
1. -crease high-value-6eapo #rig-#ac9 capa#ilit!J this 6oul% mea that the F-142 carr!ig heav!
stores2 6oul% hit the arrestig gear too fast. >e coul% coclu%e that a #igger 6ig 6ith more
po6erful high-lift flaps a% slats is re4uire%2 #ut fl!-#!-6ire s!stems allo6 a more elegat solutio.
1. >ith flaps %o62 the #asic F-14 ee%s a %o6 tail loa% to trim out the flap ose-%o6 pitchig
momet. Allo6ig the aircraft to fl! slightl! usta#le i pitch2 o6 ea#le% #! fl!-#!-6ire
techolog!2 suggests the use of a caar% or a elarge%2 fi@e% glove vae as o the F-14A/B2 6hich
6oul% pro%uce uploa%s a% relieve the %o6 tail loa%s.
B. The et result of these chages is that a icrease of 42ADD pou%s i #rig-#ac9 store 6eight
coul% #e allo6e%J this is e4uivalet to a %ecrease i approach spee% of 11 9ots. The relief of %o6
tail loa%s also solves a aft fuselage maeuverig fatigue pro#lem a% #rigs a air com#at
maeuverig lift icrease of 1N percet. Turig )lift to %rag* is also improve% #! relievig %o6
tail loa%s. This chage coul% #e rea%il! achieve% #ecause o primar! structure is ivolve%. A further
plus of this %esig chage 6oul% #e that the aircraft=s iteral fuel capacit! coul% #e icrease%.
4. >e appreciate the value of sta!ig 6ith a varia#le-s6eep %esig;especiall! for the po%%e%2
t6i-egie F-14. First2 6e coul% have a carrier aircraft 6ith la%ig spee%s i the or%er of 1BD
9ots versus the F-4 'hatom at 14A 9ots. At the other e%2 the missio pa!loa%/rage is greatl!
icrease% #! fl!ig us6ept2 as is air com#at maeuverig. >h! the latter: Because %e%icate% air
com#at occurs at #elo6 a#out +ach D.8 #ecause of high turig %rag;a area i 6hich the F-14=s
1D-%egree s6eep is optimal. A%2 of course2 the F-14 has #ee to +ach 1.A1 6ith four Sparro6s
loa%e% at E8 %egrees of 6ig s6eep. The F-14B/D have #ee flo6 to +ach 1.BA at A2DDD feet )81B
9ots -AS*2 at 6hich poit the throttle ha% to #e retar%e% to avoi% over-spee%.
A. The F-14 logitu%ial flight-cotrol s!stem 6ill have to #e re%esige% to cope 6ith the level of
ista#ilit! i%uce% #! the larger glove2 6hich is mius five percet i clea flight a% mius 1B
percet flaps %o6 at the most aft ?(. This is o #ig %eal a%2 i fact2 it ma! #e 6ithi the
capa#ilit! of the e@istig F-14 #o#6eight s!stem that tolerates some logitu%ial ista#ilit!. For
referece2 the (rumma O-1N 6as 4A percet usta#leI
E. The F-14 shoul% have some reasoa#le stealth-ehacig a%%itios;7sesi#le stealth8 as 6e
use% to call it;6hich 6oul% have practicall! o impact o 6eight or performaceI A lot of 6or9
6as %oe to this e% i arou% 1NNDJ it iclu%e% full-scale tests o real F-14s. Some ra%ar-sigature
e@perts 9o6 e@actl! 6hat shoul% #e %oe. ?omparig the #asic ra%ar sigatures2 the F-14 has a
slight fu%ametal %isa%vatage" it is larger. -ts tuel-moute% attac9 stores ma9e2 ho6ever2
virtuall! o cotri#utio to its sigature2 a% it %oes ot carr! a forest of 6ig ta9s a% 6eapos
o log-rage stri9e missios )this also 9eeps its sigature %o6*.
The #aselie F-14D pro%uctio aircraft %efie% a#ove 6oul% allo6 these carefull! cosi%ere%
mo%ificatios"
1. The istallatio of the F-11N or the F-11D egies. The F-11N has alrea%! #ee chec9e% for fit.
/pgra%es of the (E F-11D might also #e via#le. The o#5ective 6oul% #e a 4D2DDD-pou% class
tur#ofa.
1. The istallatio of t6o-a@is2 vectora#le2 a@iall! s!mmetric egie o,,les for super augmete%
pitch2 roll a% !a6 cotrol.
B. The istallatio of /HF ateas that 6oul% #e em#e%%e% i the icrease%-chor% lea%ig-e%ge
slats to allo6 the o#oar% %etectio a% trac9ig of stealth! a%versaries. 0o6-fre4uec! ra%ar
6or9s 6ell agaist lo6-ra%ar-cross-sectio o#5ects. Arra!s li9e this 6ere teste% at (rumma arou%
1NND.
- 1NND2 (rumma %efie% ma! versios of 6hat it thought the F-14D coul% #e. -t 6as some6hat
over%oe i the stealth area2 #ut it icorporates most of the aforemetioe% i%eas 6ith ver! little
%esig chage or com#at pealt!. All of the chages are cosmetic 7ti8 a% ot #asic to the
structure.
A$ F-*4. T!'&%t f#!' th( 4T!'&%tt(#)4 !f Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ Th#(( O$( 9;F-@*: fli() !/(# th( L%$0i$g ,ig$%l
Offi&(# 9L,O: pl%tf!#' !f U,, A7#%h%' Li$&!l$ %ft(# #(t"#$i$g f#!' % )"&&())f"l p#!fi&i($&1 flight. Li$&!l$ i)
!$ h(# fi$%l )(g'($t !f % )&h(0"l(0 )iA-'!$th 0(pl!1'($t t! th( A#%7i%$ G"lf i$ )"pp!#t !f Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$
>%t&h. 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate 1% ?lass Daiel >olse!. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!.
A w!#0 !$ %i#&#%ft 0()ig$
Hust as commercial airliers are reachig their %esig limitatios as fighter %esigs have mature%2
the!2 too2 have ecoutere% the limits impose% #! the la6s of ph!sics. Fighters a% airliers are i
the same situatio2 #ut fighters iclu%e a couple of e@tra %imesios. For istace2 a choice has to
#e ma%e #et6ee supersoic flight a% su#soic com#at maeuverig a% cruise efficiec!. The
same is true of stealth versus electroic 6arfare. 'ic9 oe a% %esig to6ar% it. -f !ou 6at a
G/ST.02 %esig oe2 #ut %o=t tr! to ma9e it ito a tri-service fighter/#om#er.
-f !ou 6at a log-lastig2 log-rage fighter/#om#er2 %esig it from scratch for the missio as a
e6 or upgra%e% %esig;prefera#l! the latter. The e4uip it 6ith mo%er 6eapos2 sesors2
surveillace2 commuicatios a% E>. 0et the sesors a% computers;o #oar% a% remote;give
the cre6 complete 9o6le%ge of the situatio i the volume of air the! are tr!ig to %omiate a%
also suggest the #est pla!s.
The electroics 6ill cotiue to a%vace rapi%l! to provi%e capa#ilities that are o6 ol! %iml!
perceive%2 #ut the #asic airplae2 regar%less of 6ho %esigs it2 is 4uic9l! approachig the #est that it
ca #e. - the meatime2 remem#er to give the cre6 -& missiles a% a (atlig gu for those times at
6hich +urph! itervees a% high-tech 6arfare oce agai %eteriorates to the usual grovelig
%ogfight.
The #ottom lie is that2 uless aircraft li9e the F-14 cotiue to #e o #oar%2 /.S. 3av! aircraft
carriers 6ill #e %eplo!e% 6ith lo6 capa#ilit! aircraft o their flight %ec9s2 most of those #eig
versios of the Horet a% the Super Horet. Despite all protests to the cotrar!2 6ith regar% to
sta%off muitios a% precisio gui%e% 6eapos2 our carrier #attle forces 6ill ot have the
pulveri,ig po6er of their 1N8Ds couterparts. >he that time arrives2 it 6ill #e the #egiig of
the e% for carrier forces as 6e 9o6 them to%a!;a% the e% of their rapi% availa#ilit! to the
'resi%et i times of ee%.
Th( f"t"#( !f NA;AIR
- 1NFA2 a A-F ?orsair -- 6as moute% o a pe%estal outsi%e the o6 close% 3av! +aster Het Base2
?ecil Fiel%2 Flori%a. . the #ase of the pe%estal 6as a large #ro,e pla4ue #earig the iscriptio"
7The mai #atter! of the fleet.8 The #attle groups i those %a!s;e4uippe% 6ith ?orsair --s a% A-E
-tru%ers;coul% trul! 79ic9 ass a% ta9e ames.8 Those %a!s ma! #e over;pro#a#l! forever;
uless strog /S3 actio is ta9e. >e ca lear ma5or lessos from our past. 0et=s hope the 3av!
a% the politicias remem#er to appl! these lessos to the future.
So +r. 'resi%et2 as9 ot 6hat !our carriers ca %o for !ou #ut 6hat !ou ca %o for !our carriers.
Th( A"th!#)
In 1951, Bob Kress joined Grumman, where he worked on the F9F-6, XF10F-1 and F11F-1, the
proposed !"# $% &'(in) boats and the $rm( *ohawk "bser+ation $ir,ra&t- he a'so he'ped
to desi)n !"# and .!"# air,ra&t and the !FX/ 0e mana)ed #* (stems imu'ation &or the
'unar modu'e and was proje,t en)ineer &or #* Guidan,e 1a+i)ation and 2ontro'/ From the
F-13$4s in,eption unti' 1951, he was the pro)ram4s en)ineerin) mana)er, a&ter whi,h he
was appointed F-13 deput( de+e'opment pro)ram mana)er/
$dm/ 6au' Gi'',rist ser+ed 77 (ears as a 1a+( ,arrier pi'ot and retired in 1985 as a
rear admira'/ 0is ,ruise bo9 ,ontains a pi'ot4s 'o)book that 'ists more than 6,000
&'i)ht hours in 55 di&&erent t(pes o& airp'ane, 96: arrested 'andin)s on 16 air,ra&t
,arriers and 165 ,ombat missions &'own in an F-8 2rusader in the !onkin Gu'& ;&or whi,h
he earned 15 ,ombat awards</ 0e has ,ommanded a &i)hter s=uadron and a ,arrier win), and
at one time, he was in operationa' ,ontro' o& a'' 6a,i&i, F'eet &i)hter s=uadrons/

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