An old Flight Journal article from 2002.
Proponents argue to keep the F-14 Tomcat in the US Navy.
They clearly lost as the Tomcat was retired by 2006 and the Super Hornet is in service onboard US aircraft carriers today.
An old Flight Journal article from 2002.
Proponents argue to keep the F-14 Tomcat in the US Navy.
They clearly lost as the Tomcat was retired by 2006 and the Super Hornet is in service onboard US aircraft carriers today.
An old Flight Journal article from 2002.
Proponents argue to keep the F-14 Tomcat in the US Navy.
They clearly lost as the Tomcat was retired by 2006 and the Super Hornet is in service onboard US aircraft carriers today.
An old Flight Journal article from 2002.
Proponents argue to keep the F-14 Tomcat in the US Navy.
They clearly lost as the Tomcat was retired by 2006 and the Super Hornet is in service onboard US aircraft carriers today.
B!" Bo# $ress a% &ear A%m. 'aul (illcrist )&et.* +aga,ie" FLIGHT JOURNAL -ssue Date" JAN/FEB 2002 'oste% ." 8/4/2006 .rigial /&0s" 'A(E 1" http://www.flight!"#$%l.&!'/%#ti&l()/f*4f*8/f*4f*8+*.%)p 'A(E 1" http://www.flight!"#$%l.&!'/%#ti&l()/f*4f*8/f*4f*8+2.%)p B%ttl( !f th( ,"p(#Fight(#) F-*4. T!'&%t /). F/A-*8 E/F ,"p(# H!#$(t Two experts say the Super Hornet isn't so super B! Bo# $ress a% &ear A%m. 'aul (illcrist2 /.S. 3av! )&et.* Editors' note: every airplane that goes into service is accompanied by controversy. This is especially true of the F/A-18E/F Super ornet. !ur t"o e#perts argue that the Super ornet is not necessarily the airplane the $avy needs for the future% and their bac&grounds lend "eight to their arguments. 'ear Adm. (aul )illcrist *.S. $avy +'et., spent -- years as a fighter pilot and "ing commander and "as operations commander of all (acific Fleet fighters. .ob /ress is an aeronautical engineer and% during his long career at )rumman% he "as directly involved in the development of a "ide range of fighters. e "as the Engineering 0anager for the original design and development of the F-11 Tomcat. Their analysis ma&es an interesting statement "hen placed against the bac&ground of the "ar on terrorism. The re4uiremets for a practical %eep iter%ictio fighter/#om#er have log #ee the su#5ect of cotrovers! 6ithi the aval aviatio commuit!2 especiall! 6he it comes to the F-14 Tomcat versus the F/A-18E/F Super Horet. .fte2 ho6ever2 the %efiitio of 7%eep iter%ictio8 is chage% to fit the aircraft u%er %iscussio2 rather tha ta9ig ito accout the real-6orl% theater of operatios for 6hich it is %estie%. Evets over Afghaista2 ho6ever2 have force% us to formali,e 6hat is reall! ee%e% if a aircraft is to stri9e a eem! %eep 6ithi its coutr!. To%a!2 6e 9o6 that the politics of surrou%ig coutries ca %ictate missio %istaces that stretch the a#ilit! of curret aircraft to their limits.
The /.S. relies o 3av! aircraft carriers as #ases. So2 6he puttig fighter/ #om#ers over Afgha targets2 6hich aircraft le% the charge:;the trie%-a%-true F-14 Tomcat 6ith the F/A-18 Horet 6ell #ehi%. This particular coflict motivate% us to a%%ress 6hat 6e see as a serious pro#lem cocerig 3aval aviatio assets a% the realities of the fiel%s over 6hich 6e 6ill fight. As sho6 over Afghaista2 there are four #asic re4uiremets of a! carrier stri9e force" < &each the target. < Do=t get shot %o6 #! SA+s2 AAA2 or eem! fighters. < Stri9e the target. < &etur to the carrier #efore ruig out of gas. >ithi these four seemigl! simple rules are the ee%s for a airplae to have a log rage 6hile carr!ig sufficiet muitios to hammer a target a% still #e a#le to fight its 6a! through eem! aircraft a% AAA threats.
A#'(0 %$0 #(%012 %$ F/A-*83 H!#$(t %))ig$(0 t! th( 45$ighth%w6)42 7#(%6) l(ft %) it &!$0"&t) % p%t#!l 'i))i!$ i$ th( )6i() !/(# Afgh%$i)t%$. 'hoto #! 0t. ?m%r. ?hristopher >. ?hope. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av! A$ Afgh%$i)t%$ )&($%#i! Because our govermet is=t tellig us all of its secrets2 6e=ll have to ma9e some assumptios 6he usig Afghaista as a e@ample. -t is2 ho6ever2 o#vious that reachig the target presets a great challege. To avoi% Sil96orm-class missiles2 the carrier #attle group pro#a#l! 6oul% ot 6at to veture orth of a lie 5oiig +as4at2 .ma a% Ahma%a#a%2 'a9ista. Alog this lie2 the group 6oul% #e some6hat 6est of $arachi. &eachig $a#ul 6oul% re4uire a oe-6a! flight of roughl! 81A statute miles. Assumig the use of S-B ta9ers2 a F-14 stri9e2 refuelig some6here #et6ee Cuetta a% Su99ur2 'a9ista2 6oul%=t have a! trou#le attac9ig targets i the orthermost parts of Afghaista. -f2 ho6ever2 a F/A-18E/F refuels i the same spot2 it 6ill #arel! ma9e it to $a#ul. The u-refuele% ra%ius of a F-14 carr!ig the ormal stri9e loa% )four 12DDD-pou% 0(Bs2 t6o HA&+ missiles a% t6o Si%e6i%ers plus EFA rou%s of 1Dmm a% t6o2 18D-gallo e@teral ta9s* is at least ADD statute miles. Accompa!ig E/F Super Horets have ol! a BAD-statute-mile ra%ius carr!ig a#out half the #om# loa%. To complete the picture of missio %istaces2 the S-Bs 6oul% have to %ash #ac9 to the ?Gs2 hot-refuel a% meet the rai% comig out of Afghaista2 6hich 6oul% #e much i ee% of H'-4 coc9tails. A$ F-*4 T!'&%t (8"ipp(0 with % L!w-Altit"0( N%/ig%ti!$ %$0 T%#g(ti$g I$f#%#(0 f!# Night 9LANTIRN: p!0 p#(p%#() t! ($t(# th( p%tt(#$ i$ p#(p%#%ti!$ !f l%$0i$g %7!%#0 U,, J!h$ F. 5($$(01 93; 6<:. Th( fight(# i) %tt%&h(0 t! Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ O$( =(#! Tw! 9;F-*02: 4.i%'!$07%&6)24 0(pl!1(0 %7!%#0 th( &%##i(# whi&h i) p%#ti&ip%ti$g i$ Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$ >%t&h. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. >h! are 6e it pic9ig over missio %etails: Eas!I At the #egiig of the stu%ies that le% to this article2 6e 6ere covice% that the Afgha campaig 6oul% #e a all-/SAF sho62 a% that 6oul% lea% to 4uestios of carrier-fleet effectiveess. But map stu%ies com#ie% 6ith 9o6le%ge of geopolitical restrictios sho6e% that carrier assets2 primaril! the F-142 6ere 5ust a#out the /.S.=s ol! optio. This has clearl! #ee su#statiate% #! evets. .f course2 the F-14s 6ere ot the first to hit targets i AfghaistaJ B-1 stealth #om#ers each carrie% 1E2 12DDD-pou% ('S-gui%e% #om#s. The! fle6 from >hitema AFB i +issouri;a BB- hour rou% trip. Further2 #ig-time /SAF strategic air assets;B-A1s a% B-1s;arrive% shortl! after6ar%. -t 6as soo apparet that /SAF tactical aircraft 6ere ot #eig use% i Afghaista. >e fou% that2 eve give ulimite% i-flight ta9er refuelig2 the /SAF F-1A a% F-1E coul% ot #e use% 6ithout a +i%%le Easter grou% #ase. Tur9ish #ases 6ere simpl! too far a6a! a% 6oul% re4uire refuelig over hostile areas. .l! the use of tactical air #ases i Tur9meista a%/or /,#e9ista 6oul% 6or92 a% this 6oul% allo6 ol! partial coverage of Afghaista. The #ig 4uestio #ecomes" %oes the 3av! have the assets to #e a#le to carr! this 9i% of 6ar ito the future2 a% 6hat 9i% of plaig is i place: To cut to the chase2 the %iscussio oce agai reverts to 6hether or ot the e6 Super Horet 6ill reall! cut the mustar% or the 3av! has ta9e !et aother 6rog tur that 6ill cost us %earl! o the #attlefiel%. A#'(0 with % 2000-p!"$0 ?5-86 J!i$t .(f($)( Att%&6 ?"$iti!$ 9J.A?:2 %$ F/A-*8 H!#$(t f#!' th( 4Bl%&6 5$ight)4 !f ?%#i$( Fight(# Att%&6 ,8"%0#!$ Th#(( O$( F!"# #(&(i/() th( fi$%l )ig$%l f!# l%"$&h %7!%#0 U,, J!h$ 3. ,t($$i). 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate Br% ?lass Ha!me 'astoric. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. A Hi)t!#1 !f N%/%l A/i%ti!$ 0iffi&"lti() The su#5ect of the erosio of 3aval aviatio has agge% #oth of us ever sice the cacellatio of the A-11 program #! the Secretar! of Defese i the late =8Ds. -t 6as a 6atershe% for a um#er of reasos2 ot the least of 6hich 6as a level of #a% maagemet that ha%=t #ee see i the 'etago for %eca%esI >e ca loo9 #ac9 o that %a! a% clearl! see that the uravelig of the fa#ric of 3aval aviatio 6oul% #ecome a log-term tre%. 3either of us cote%s that the A-112 as evisioe% #! 3av! lea%ers2 6as the right airplae to %evelop at that poit i histor!J i fact2 it 6as=tI That2 ho6ever2 is aother stor! for aother time.
>e have put off 6ritig this article simpl! #ecause 6e 9o6 it is li9el! to ruffle ma! feathers i the 'etago a% o ?apitol Hill2 #ut evets i Afghaista agai #rought our mai argumets ito focus. -s 6ritig this 9i% of article 6orth it2 6e 6o%ere%J 6e might #e see to #e 7pilig it o8 6he the 3av! is i %ifficult! a% clearl! o a steep2 %o6hill sli%e. >ell2 6e have listee%2 6ith o small restrait2 to the potificatios that 5ustif! ho6 6ell the 3av! is %oig 6ith its favorite program2 the F/A-18E/F Super Horet;%espite uimpeacha#le reports to the cotrar! from the gu!s i the fleetJ commets ma%e to us #! !oug fleet pilots 6ho have flo6 the airplae a% %escri#e it as 7a %og8 carr! much more 6eight 6ith us tha statemets from seior officers a% civilias higher i the foo% chai. But certai potificatios i a statemet #! a seior 3aval officer 6ho shoul% have 9o6 #etter serve% as the last stra6. The prooucemet appeare% alog 6ith a spate of triumphal aoucemets that cele#rate% the 7successful8 completio of the Super Horet=s first operatioal evaluatio ).'EGA0*. - a pu#licatio calle% 7-si%e >ashigto28 the 3av!=s %irector of operatioal testig is 4uote% as sa!ig that the Super Horet 6as superior to its earlier mo%els 7K i ever! categor! #ut three" acceleratio2 ma@imum spee% a% sustaie% turig performace.8 This prooucemet #oggle% our mi%s #ecause these are the ver! performace capa#ilities that %etermie a tactical airplae=s survival. The2 as if to 5ustif! this 7ha% grea%e28 the officer is 4uote% as statig that the 3av! has sacrifice% spee% i the Super Horet for other #eeficial capa#ilities2 a% he asserts2 7#rute spee% is o loger the %iscrimiator it oce 6as 6he the #echmar9 6as the Soviet threat.8 -t is clear to us that this 3aval officer %oes=t have a clue a#out aerial com#at a% the importace of total eerg! i the comple@ e4uatios of eerg! maeuvera#ilit!. 3or %oes he seem to u%ersta% that Thir% >orl% coutries all arou% the glo#e are purchasig the ver! latest operatioal &ussia-#uilt fighters that are also licese% for pro%uctio i ?hia. The &ussia aerial threat still e@istsJ 6hat has chage% is that the pilots are=t &ussias. As a atio2 6e have al6a!s ha% the meas to protect our o6 glo#al iterests as 6ell as those of other coutries. Short of uclear 6ar2 the carrier #attle groups have #ee a#le to stri9e o ver! short otice. A 'resi%et=s first 4uestio i time of crisis is ofte2 7>here are the carriers:8 Th( )"$ p%i$t) %$ F-*4. T!'&%t !f Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ Tw! g!l0 %) it fli() !/(# U,, 3!$)t(ll%ti!$ i$ th( A#%7i%$ G"lf 0"#i$g Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$ >%t&h. 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate Thir% ?lass Timoth! ?. >ar%. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. F-*4) &%##1 % '%!# p"$&h >ith a la!ere% %efese2 iclu%ig air assets2 gui%e%-missile cruisers a% frigates a% u%ersea #ac9ig2 the carrier #attle groups are prett! 6ell ivulera#le. . the 3imit,-class carrier2 6e see the F-14;a trul! log-rage fighter/#om#er;plus light6eight F/A-18A fighter/#om#ers. The log- rage A-E #om#er has goe forever2 #ut its %erivative2 the EA-EB Electroic >ar-fare )E>* aircraft is i place a% is i much %ema% #! #oth the /S3 a% the /SAF. This coutr!=s Desert Fo@ a% $osovo e@perieces have2 at last;a% correctl!;shifte% the focus a6a! from stealth a% to6ar% electroic 6arfare. >e 6ill have more to sa! o this importat topic i a su#se4uet article. - short2 at the momet2 the %ec9 complemet loo9s a%e4uate. The F-14 ca pic9 up the A-E role #ecause it 6as %esige% to %o so from scratch. -ts performace i $osovo as a ver! effective stri9e lea%er has more tha #ore out that fact. >ith 0A3T-&32 ight-visio %evices a% s!thetic aperture A/( ra%ar2 the F-14 targete% ot ol! its o6 four 12DDD-pou% 6eapos #ut also the or%ace of the F/A-18s2 6hich %o=t have such capa#le sesors. A iterestig compariso ca #e ma%e to 4uatif! the F-14=s stri9e effectiveess. ?ompare oe F- 14 a% oe B-1 #om#er %urig a t6o-ight )BB-hour* missio i $osovo. - reactive situatios )o foreig #ase*2 the B-1 operates from the /.S. )lac9 of overseas B-1 #asig is a serious costrait a% there are ol! a limite% um#er of B-1s to #egi 6ith*. The chart sho6s the 6eapos %elivere% ;/.S. to $osovo a% #ac9;for the B-1 a% the F-14D. @@-h!"#-'i))i!$ )t#i6( (ff(&ti/($()) B-2 F-*4 3o. of 12DDD l#. #om#s 1E 4 +issio time )hours* BB< BL 3o. of missios 1 A<< 3o. of #om#s %elivere% 1E 1D First #om#s o target )hours* 1E.A 1 3otes" < From >hitema AFB2 +issouri << All-ight missios The F-14 iformatio is from Desert Fo@ operatios. A$ F-*4A T!'&%t %tt%&h(0 t! Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ F!"# O$( %w%it) it) t"#$2 %l!$g with tw! F/A-*8)2 t! #(f"(l 0"#i$g flight !p(#%ti!$) f#!' th( %i#&#%ft &%##i(# U,, E$t(#p#i)(. ?(%$whil(2 !$( F/A-*8 H!#$(t i) #(f"(li$g f#!' th( Ai# F!#&( 53-*0A EAt($0(# %0/%$&(0 t%$6(#. 'hoto #! ?m%r. Bria (. (a6e. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. 3%##i(# (ff(&ti/($()) i) th( i))"( The simple chart o the previous page sa!s a great %eal a#out a carrier #attle group=s effectiveess. &emem#er that there are;or there ca #e;14 F-14s o a ship such as the Hoh ?. Steis )?G3- F1*. T6et! four F-14s ca %eliver more 6eapos tha the etire 1E aircraft B-1 fleet. /fortuatel!2 the um#ers of F-14s are %6i%lig2 a% the! 6ill #e almost goe i aother 1D !ears. >hat 6ill #e the replacemet: The F-14 6ill #e replace% #! the F/A-18E Super Horet2 6hich attempts %eep-iter%ictio missios. Though it=s a 6hi,,! little airsho6 performer 6ith a ice2 mo%er coc9pit2 it has ol! BE percet of the F-14=s pa!loa%/rage capa#ilit!. The F/A-18E Super Horet has #ee improve% #ut still has2 at #est2 AD percet of the F-14=s capa#ilit! to %eliver a fi@e% um#er of #om#s )i pou%s* o target. This aturall! meas that the carrier ra%ius of ifluece %rops to AD percet of 6hat it 6oul% have #ee 6ith the same um#er of F-14s. As a result2 the area of ifluece )ot ra%ius* %rops to 1B percetI 3o 6o%er the /S3 is 6or9ig o 7#u%%! ta9er8 versios of the Super Horet. B! the 6a!2 o6 that the A-E ta9er has goe2 ho6 6ill the Horets get to %eep-iter%ictio targets: ?otrar! to 6hat 6e=re officiall! tol%2 a ta9er variat of the Horet is simpl! ot the as6er. - a attempt to ma9e it supersoic2 the F-18E has #ee give a lo6 aspect ratio2 ra,or #la%e of a 6ig. This hurts su#soic %rag a% carrier ta9eoff pa!loa% 6he compare% 6ith a $A-E ta9er2 6hich is a aero%!amicall! efficiet solutio. E4uall! sill! is the proposal for a E> versio of the F-18E. The same aero%!amic reasos appl! for this airplae2 plus it has a e@teral stores %ilemma. To get sufficiet rage to support a %eep-iter%ictio missio2 the EF-18E 6oul% have to use up precious e@teral store statios 6ith fuel ta9s rather tha E?+ po%s as carrie% o the EA-EB. 'erhaps the 3av! shoul% cosi%er puttig the EA-EB #ac9 ito upgra%e% a% mo%eri,e% pro%uctio a% #uil% some of them as ta9ers: .r more Super A-Es: As this is #eig 6ritte2 it is too earl! to commet i a iforme% maer o the 6ar o terrorism i Afghaista. The /SAF heav! #om#er rai%s are full! pu#lic. Ho6ever2 it is evi%et that /S3 carrier stri9e groups that cosist of F-14s a% F-18s are co%uctig the tactical rai%s. A stu%! of maps sho6s that ?G3 air#ore S-B ta9ers facilitate the co%uct of these rai%s #! refuelig2 pro#a#l! over 'a9ista. At this time2 /SAF tactical air assets %o ot have #ases close eough to Afghaista to allo6 air#ore refuelig over frie%l! atios. B! the time this fi%s its 6a! i-to prit2 that ma! have chage%. R(p!#t(0 ,"p(# H!#$(t p#!7l(') Although the 3av! has #ee 6or9ig ver! har% to correct F/A-18E/F .'EGA0 pro#lems2 it is 6orth summig them up" the pro%uctio F/A-18E/F is sigificatl! over6eight 6ith respect to its specificatios )B2DDD pou%s over*. This is far i e@cess of 6hat oe 6oul% e@pect for a variat of a e@istig F/A-18A2 B2 ?2 or D. Aircraft 6eight estimatio metho%s coul%2 a% shoul%2 have #ee much #etterJ i fact2 6he 6e loo9 o#5ectivel! at the F/A-18E/F2 6e see a airplae 6ith a #ra%- e6 6ig2 e6 fuselage a% e6 empeage;i other 6or%s2 a e6 airplae. This is2 therefore2 6hat ?ogress 6oul% call a 7e6 start.8 Both ?ogress a% the Dept. of Defese )DoD* ha% to #e loo9ig the other 6a! 6he the 3av! 6as permitte% to slip this airplae #! as a simple mo%ificatio of a e@istig airplae. - com#at-maeuverig flight2 the aircraft ha% severe 76ig-%rop8 pro#lems that %efie% resolutio2 %espite the use of ever! aero%!amic aal!tical tool availa#le. Evetuall!2 oe test pilot came up 6ith a 7lea9!-fol%-5oit8 fi@ that opee% chor%6ise air slots to aspirate the 6ig=s upper surface flo6 a% there#! prevet the sharp stallig of oe 6ig #efore the other. The! stalle% more or less together2 #ut much earlier a% more severel! tha #efore. This e6 fi@ is 6hat the aero%!amicists call a 7#a% ai%.8 -t causes aircraft #uffetig2 6hich is geerall! a source of 6ig %rag. But a 7fi@8 that com#ie% 7accepta#le8 6ig %rop 6ith 7accepta#le8 #uffetig ha% #ee achieve%. .e test pilot commete% %r!l!2 7-=% li9e the #uffetig levels to #e a little lo6er so - coul% rea% the hea%s-up %ispla!I8 ;%p!# )t#(%6) %&#!)) th( wi$g) !f %$ F/A-*8 H!#$(t f#!' th( 4Bl"( Bl%)t(#)4 !f Fight(# Att%&6 ,8"%0#!$ Th#(( F!"# %) it 0i/() 0"#i$g %$ %i# p!w(# 0('!$)t#%ti!$ $(%# th( %i#&#%ft &%##i(# U,, G(!#g( >%)hi$gt!$. 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate 1% ?lass Shae +c?o!. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. .6ig to its high %rag a% 6eight )a% pro#a#l! other factors*2 the F/A-18E is sigificatl! poorer i acceleratio tha the F/A-18A. Also2 its com#at ceilig is su#statiall! lo6er2 a% its trasoic %rag rise is ver! high. >e have sta!e% i touch 6ith some pilots at the 3av!=s test ceter a% have gathere% some mi%-#ogglig aec%otal iformatio. Here are some e@amples" M A F/A-18A 6as use% to 7chase8 a F-14D test flight. The F-14D 6as carr!ig four 12DDD-pou% #om#s2 t6o 18D-gallo %rop ta9s2 t6o HA&+ missiles a% t6o Si%e6i%er air-to-air missiles. The chase airplae 6as i a relativel! 7clea8 cofiguratio 6ith ol! a ceterlie fuel ta9. At the e% of each test flight2 the chase airplae 6as several miles #ehi% the test airplae 6he the chase airplae reache% 7#igo8 fuel a% ha% to retur to #ase. M A F/A-18E Super Horet is teste% usig the same chase airplae2 a earlier mo%el Horet2 i the same cofiguratio. The chase airplae %oes ot ee% full thrust to sta! 6ith the test airplae. M A F/A-18E/F i ma@imum after#urer thrust caot e@cee% +ach 1.D i level flight #elo6 1D2DDD feet eve 6he it is i the clea cofiguratio )o e@teral stores*. At 1D2DDD feet2 the F-14D ca e@cee% +ach 1.E. M A 4uote from a Horet pilot is %evastatigl! fra9" 7The aircraft is slo6er tha most fighters fiel%e% sice the earl! 1NEDs.8 M The most %evastatig commet came from a Horet pilot 6ho fle6 umerous si%e-#!-si%e compariso flights 6ith F/A-18E/F Super Horets a% sa!s" 7>e outra them2 6e out-fle6 them a% 6e ra them out of gas. - 6as em#arrasse% for them.8 Up0%ti$g th( F-*4 - the Hauar! 1NN1 issue of 3aval Aviatio2 a article remi%e% us of some histor!" 7After the %ive/#om#er #ecame a aval aircraft t!pe i the mi%-1NBDs2 fighters 6ere %esige% primaril! as gu platforms. Ho6ever2 the stregth a% po6er that characteri,e% the F4/ a% FEF ea#le% them to #e rea%il! mo%ifie% to fighter/ #om#ers. Each coul% carr! for6ar%-firig roc9ets2 t6o 12DDD-pou% #om#s or a %roppa#le fuel ta9. The proportio of fighters assige% to fast carriers icrease% stea%il! from 1A percet of complemet i 1N41 to AD percet i 1N44 to FD percet i 1N4A. The %ual role ma%e this great icrease i air-to-air com#at po6er possi#le 6ith little loss i carrier air- to-surface capa#ilit!.8 Ho6 a#out a Hellcat --2 a9a Tomcat --: The first or%er of #usiess 6oul% #e to resurrect as ma! retire% F-14s )of a! cofiguratio* as 6e ca. Seco%2 com#ie these 6ith fleet F-14As2 the remaiig F-14As a% eve the -raia F-14 assets that might #e o#taia#le )-ra too9 %eliver! of appro@imatel! 8D F-14s u%er the ShahJ a#out BD are still air6orth!*. Thir%2 %esig a program to upgra%e all of these aircraft to F-14Ds. This ma! sou% 6il%2 #ut (rumma e@periece i restorig +ala!sia A4D #as9et cases to mit co%itio i the =8Ds 6as ver! successful2 a% the! 6ere ot eve (rumma airplaesI Similar success i restorig fleet A-Es at (rumma=s St. Augustie2 Flori%a2 facilit! 6as achieve%. -t 6oul% #e appropriate for the 3av! or DoD to lauch a stu%! #! a #lue ri##o team u%er the aegis of 3AGA-&. >e estimate that a#out 1DD a%%itioal F-14s coul% #e #rought #ac9 ito the fleet. The titaium #o@ #eams a% #ul9hea%s are earl! i%estructi#le as 6ell as repaira#le usig electro-#eam 6el%igJ #ut this is ot !et a Tomcat --. Bu!ig time 6ith these programs 6oul% allo6 the coveig of a %esig team;agai le% #! 3AGA-&;of cotractor persoel2 +-T scietists a% other uiversit! help to stu%! the cost of #uil%ig e6 F-14s. >e thi9 the follo6ig %esig chages to the F-14 are achieva#le for a e6 #aselie airplae a% later for #loc9 chage improvemets" 1. -crease high-value-6eapo #rig-#ac9 capa#ilit!J this 6oul% mea that the F-142 carr!ig heav! stores2 6oul% hit the arrestig gear too fast. >e coul% coclu%e that a #igger 6ig 6ith more po6erful high-lift flaps a% slats is re4uire%2 #ut fl!-#!-6ire s!stems allo6 a more elegat solutio. 1. >ith flaps %o62 the #asic F-14 ee%s a %o6 tail loa% to trim out the flap ose-%o6 pitchig momet. Allo6ig the aircraft to fl! slightl! usta#le i pitch2 o6 ea#le% #! fl!-#!-6ire techolog!2 suggests the use of a caar% or a elarge%2 fi@e% glove vae as o the F-14A/B2 6hich 6oul% pro%uce uploa%s a% relieve the %o6 tail loa%s. B. The et result of these chages is that a icrease of 42ADD pou%s i #rig-#ac9 store 6eight coul% #e allo6e%J this is e4uivalet to a %ecrease i approach spee% of 11 9ots. The relief of %o6 tail loa%s also solves a aft fuselage maeuverig fatigue pro#lem a% #rigs a air com#at maeuverig lift icrease of 1N percet. Turig )lift to %rag* is also improve% #! relievig %o6 tail loa%s. This chage coul% #e rea%il! achieve% #ecause o primar! structure is ivolve%. A further plus of this %esig chage 6oul% #e that the aircraft=s iteral fuel capacit! coul% #e icrease%. 4. >e appreciate the value of sta!ig 6ith a varia#le-s6eep %esig;especiall! for the po%%e%2 t6i-egie F-14. First2 6e coul% have a carrier aircraft 6ith la%ig spee%s i the or%er of 1BD 9ots versus the F-4 'hatom at 14A 9ots. At the other e%2 the missio pa!loa%/rage is greatl! icrease% #! fl!ig us6ept2 as is air com#at maeuverig. >h! the latter: Because %e%icate% air com#at occurs at #elo6 a#out +ach D.8 #ecause of high turig %rag;a area i 6hich the F-14=s 1D-%egree s6eep is optimal. A%2 of course2 the F-14 has #ee to +ach 1.A1 6ith four Sparro6s loa%e% at E8 %egrees of 6ig s6eep. The F-14B/D have #ee flo6 to +ach 1.BA at A2DDD feet )81B 9ots -AS*2 at 6hich poit the throttle ha% to #e retar%e% to avoi% over-spee%. A. The F-14 logitu%ial flight-cotrol s!stem 6ill have to #e re%esige% to cope 6ith the level of ista#ilit! i%uce% #! the larger glove2 6hich is mius five percet i clea flight a% mius 1B percet flaps %o6 at the most aft ?(. This is o #ig %eal a%2 i fact2 it ma! #e 6ithi the capa#ilit! of the e@istig F-14 #o#6eight s!stem that tolerates some logitu%ial ista#ilit!. For referece2 the (rumma O-1N 6as 4A percet usta#leI E. The F-14 shoul% have some reasoa#le stealth-ehacig a%%itios;7sesi#le stealth8 as 6e use% to call it;6hich 6oul% have practicall! o impact o 6eight or performaceI A lot of 6or9 6as %oe to this e% i arou% 1NNDJ it iclu%e% full-scale tests o real F-14s. Some ra%ar-sigature e@perts 9o6 e@actl! 6hat shoul% #e %oe. ?omparig the #asic ra%ar sigatures2 the F-14 has a slight fu%ametal %isa%vatage" it is larger. -ts tuel-moute% attac9 stores ma9e2 ho6ever2 virtuall! o cotri#utio to its sigature2 a% it %oes ot carr! a forest of 6ig ta9s a% 6eapos o log-rage stri9e missios )this also 9eeps its sigature %o6*. The #aselie F-14D pro%uctio aircraft %efie% a#ove 6oul% allo6 these carefull! cosi%ere% mo%ificatios" 1. The istallatio of the F-11N or the F-11D egies. The F-11N has alrea%! #ee chec9e% for fit. /pgra%es of the (E F-11D might also #e via#le. The o#5ective 6oul% #e a 4D2DDD-pou% class tur#ofa. 1. The istallatio of t6o-a@is2 vectora#le2 a@iall! s!mmetric egie o,,les for super augmete% pitch2 roll a% !a6 cotrol. B. The istallatio of /HF ateas that 6oul% #e em#e%%e% i the icrease%-chor% lea%ig-e%ge slats to allo6 the o#oar% %etectio a% trac9ig of stealth! a%versaries. 0o6-fre4uec! ra%ar 6or9s 6ell agaist lo6-ra%ar-cross-sectio o#5ects. Arra!s li9e this 6ere teste% at (rumma arou% 1NND. - 1NND2 (rumma %efie% ma! versios of 6hat it thought the F-14D coul% #e. -t 6as some6hat over%oe i the stealth area2 #ut it icorporates most of the aforemetioe% i%eas 6ith ver! little %esig chage or com#at pealt!. All of the chages are cosmetic 7ti8 a% ot #asic to the structure. A$ F-*4. T!'&%t f#!' th( 4T!'&%tt(#)4 !f Fight(# ,8"%0#!$ Th#(( O$( 9;F-@*: fli() !/(# th( L%$0i$g ,ig$%l Offi&(# 9L,O: pl%tf!#' !f U,, A7#%h%' Li$&!l$ %ft(# #(t"#$i$g f#!' % )"&&())f"l p#!fi&i($&1 flight. Li$&!l$ i) !$ h(# fi$%l )(g'($t !f % )&h(0"l(0 )iA-'!$th 0(pl!1'($t t! th( A#%7i%$ G"lf i$ )"pp!#t !f Op(#%ti!$ ,!"th(#$ >%t&h. 'hoto #! 'hotographer=s +ate 1% ?lass Daiel >olse!. 'hoto courtes! of the /.S. 3av!. A w!#0 !$ %i#&#%ft 0()ig$ Hust as commercial airliers are reachig their %esig limitatios as fighter %esigs have mature%2 the!2 too2 have ecoutere% the limits impose% #! the la6s of ph!sics. Fighters a% airliers are i the same situatio2 #ut fighters iclu%e a couple of e@tra %imesios. For istace2 a choice has to #e ma%e #et6ee supersoic flight a% su#soic com#at maeuverig a% cruise efficiec!. The same is true of stealth versus electroic 6arfare. 'ic9 oe a% %esig to6ar% it. -f !ou 6at a G/ST.02 %esig oe2 #ut %o=t tr! to ma9e it ito a tri-service fighter/#om#er. -f !ou 6at a log-lastig2 log-rage fighter/#om#er2 %esig it from scratch for the missio as a e6 or upgra%e% %esig;prefera#l! the latter. The e4uip it 6ith mo%er 6eapos2 sesors2 surveillace2 commuicatios a% E>. 0et the sesors a% computers;o #oar% a% remote;give the cre6 complete 9o6le%ge of the situatio i the volume of air the! are tr!ig to %omiate a% also suggest the #est pla!s. The electroics 6ill cotiue to a%vace rapi%l! to provi%e capa#ilities that are o6 ol! %iml! perceive%2 #ut the #asic airplae2 regar%less of 6ho %esigs it2 is 4uic9l! approachig the #est that it ca #e. - the meatime2 remem#er to give the cre6 -& missiles a% a (atlig gu for those times at 6hich +urph! itervees a% high-tech 6arfare oce agai %eteriorates to the usual grovelig %ogfight. The #ottom lie is that2 uless aircraft li9e the F-14 cotiue to #e o #oar%2 /.S. 3av! aircraft carriers 6ill #e %eplo!e% 6ith lo6 capa#ilit! aircraft o their flight %ec9s2 most of those #eig versios of the Horet a% the Super Horet. Despite all protests to the cotrar!2 6ith regar% to sta%off muitios a% precisio gui%e% 6eapos2 our carrier #attle forces 6ill ot have the pulveri,ig po6er of their 1N8Ds couterparts. >he that time arrives2 it 6ill #e the #egiig of the e% for carrier forces as 6e 9o6 them to%a!;a% the e% of their rapi% availa#ilit! to the 'resi%et i times of ee%. Th( f"t"#( !f NA;AIR - 1NFA2 a A-F ?orsair -- 6as moute% o a pe%estal outsi%e the o6 close% 3av! +aster Het Base2 ?ecil Fiel%2 Flori%a. . the #ase of the pe%estal 6as a large #ro,e pla4ue #earig the iscriptio" 7The mai #atter! of the fleet.8 The #attle groups i those %a!s;e4uippe% 6ith ?orsair --s a% A-E -tru%ers;coul% trul! 79ic9 ass a% ta9e ames.8 Those %a!s ma! #e over;pro#a#l! forever; uless strog /S3 actio is ta9e. >e ca lear ma5or lessos from our past. 0et=s hope the 3av! a% the politicias remem#er to appl! these lessos to the future. So +r. 'resi%et2 as9 ot 6hat !our carriers ca %o for !ou #ut 6hat !ou ca %o for !our carriers. Th( A"th!#) In 1951, Bob Kress joined Grumman, where he worked on the F9F-6, XF10F-1 and F11F-1, the proposed !"# $% &'(in) boats and the $rm( *ohawk "bser+ation $ir,ra&t- he a'so he'ped to desi)n !"# and .!"# air,ra&t and the !FX/ 0e mana)ed #* (stems imu'ation &or the 'unar modu'e and was proje,t en)ineer &or #* Guidan,e 1a+i)ation and 2ontro'/ From the F-13$4s in,eption unti' 1951, he was the pro)ram4s en)ineerin) mana)er, a&ter whi,h he was appointed F-13 deput( de+e'opment pro)ram mana)er/ $dm/ 6au' Gi'',rist ser+ed 77 (ears as a 1a+( ,arrier pi'ot and retired in 1985 as a rear admira'/ 0is ,ruise bo9 ,ontains a pi'ot4s 'o)book that 'ists more than 6,000 &'i)ht hours in 55 di&&erent t(pes o& airp'ane, 96: arrested 'andin)s on 16 air,ra&t ,arriers and 165 ,ombat missions &'own in an F-8 2rusader in the !onkin Gu'& ;&or whi,h he earned 15 ,ombat awards</ 0e has ,ommanded a &i)hter s=uadron and a ,arrier win), and at one time, he was in operationa' ,ontro' o& a'' 6a,i&i, F'eet &i)hter s=uadrons/