chapter one

Interpassivity: Fleeing from Enjoyment,

and the Objective Illusion
Te problem of illusions without owners becomes apparent through
interpassivity a diferent, equally paradoxical issue. When dealing
with people who display the tendency to delegate their own enjoyment
to other people or to an apparatus, we are here unsuspectingly
confronted with the fact that people enact illusions dramatically, with
great precision, without noticing in the slightest that they are doing so.
It is obvious that they know better, but they behave contrary to this
knowledge in compliance with illusions of which they are not even
aware. Tey produce imaginations without any image. Te method that
interpassive subjects employ in their fight from enjoyment thereby
leads us to the trail of imaginations without owners. In what follows,
my aim is to reconstruct as succinctly as possible the opening that leads
from the method of interpassivity to illusions without subjects, without
delving into the complex and intricate questions posed by the motives
for the interpassive subjects behaviour.
1
I therefore refrain from lending
plausibility to all of the individual theses that further examples might
possibly provide, and, at every tenet of the argument, focus only on the
one key example leading directly to the subsequent theoretical assump-
tion. Tis reconstruction appears useful not only because all cases of
interpassivity are examples of illusions without owners, but also because
the concept of interpassivity contains a useful analytical tool that can be
applied in subsequent chapters with reference to other phenomena.
How to Amuse Oneself Objectively
At the beginning of the 1990s, when the art world was dominated by
a seemingly omnipresent discourse about interactivity, Slavoj iek
made an extremely astute comment that was a signifcant break from
the discourse. He maintained that television sitcoms using canned
1 See also the many contributions concerned with this problem in Pfaller,
Interpassivitt.
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16 on the pleasure principle in culture
laughter are actually laughing at their own jokes and funny situations
on behalf of the viewers. According to iek, viewers can be perfectly
amused without having to follow the content of the sitcoms, and even
without having to laugh:
Why this laughter? Te frst possible answer that it serves to remind
us when to laugh is interesting enough, because it simply implies that
laughter is a matter of duty and not of some spontaneous feeling; but
this answer is not suf cient because we do not usually laugh. Te only
correct answer would be that the Other embodied in the television set
is relieving us even of our duty to laugh is laughing instead of us.
So even if, tired from a hard days stupid work, all evening we did
nothing but gaze drowsily into the television screen, we can say
aferwards that, objectively, through the medium of the other, we
had a really good time.
2
iek here illustrates a Lacanian thesis about the role of the chorus in
Greek tragedy. In a passage that has rarely been treated by commenta-
tors, Lacan developed a unique perspective:
Next then in a tragedy, there is a Chorus. And what is a Chorus? You
will be told that its you yourselves. Or perhaps that it isnt you. But
thats not the point. Means are involved here, emotional means. In
my view, the Chorus is people who are moved.
Terefore, look closely before telling yourself that emotions are
engaged in this purifcation. Tey are engaged, along with others,
when at the end they have to be pacifed by some artifce or other.
But that doesnt mean to say that they are directly engaged . . . Your
emotions are taken charge of by the healthy order displayed on the
stage. Te Chorus takes care of them. Te emotional commentary is
done for you . . . Terefore, you dont have to worry; even if you dont
feel anything, the Chorus will feel in your stead. Why afer all can
one not imagine that the efect on you may be achieved, at least a
small dose of it, even if you didnt tremble that much? To be honest,
Im not sure if the spectator ever trembles that much.
3
2 Slavoj iek, Te Sublime Object of Ideology (London/New York: Verso, 1989), p. 35.
3 Jacques Lacan, Te Ethics of Psychoanalysis 19591960, Seminar VII (New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992), p. 252.
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interpassivity 17
From these seemingly paradoxical examples canned laughter and
the Greek chorus (in Lacans interpretation) iek drew the conclu-
sion that our supposedly most intimate feelings can be transferred or
delegated to others. Our feelings and convictions are therefore not
internal, but rather can lead an external, objective existence: a televi-
sion sitcom can laugh for me; weepers can mourn in my place; a Tibetan
prayer wheel can pray for me;
4
and a mythical being, such as the
renowned ordinary man in the street, can take my place and be
convinced of things that I cannot take seriously.
5
Te respective attitude
or conviction is realized through these external agents. As iek states,
the wheel itself is praying for me, instead of me or, more precisely,
I myself am praying through the medium of the wheel. Te beauty of
it is that in my psychological interior I can think about whatever I
want, I can yield to the most dirty and obscene fantasies, and it does
not matter because to use a good old Stalinist expression what-
ever I am thinking, objectively I am praying.
6
Interpassivity: Do-It-All Artworks that
Even Include Their Own Reception
ieks contemplations on canned laughter and the Greek chorus
make it possible to derive another conclusion relevant for art theory:
apparently, there are artworks that already contain their own viewing
and reception. And there are viewers who want it that way. It seems
that they would prefer to be replaced than to feel their own laughter,
their own fear, or their own sympathy. Tese are thus artworks and
viewers who present us with exactly the opposite of what the theory of
interactivity so persistently preaches. Whereas interactivity entails
shifing a part of the artistic production (activity) from the artwork
to the viewer, here the opposite occurs: the viewing (passivity) is
shifed from the viewer to the artwork. I have decided to call this type
of displacement interpassivity.
Interactive art attempts to activate its viewers: in interactive art,
viewers are not only required to view the artwork, but also to
4 For more on these examples, see iek, Sublime Object of Ideology, pp. 335.
5 See iek, Die Substitution, p. 14.
6 iek, Sublime Object of Ideology, p. 34.
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18 on the pleasure principle in culture
participate in its production. For interpassive artworks, however, the
opposite seems to be the case: viewers are not required to participate;
moreover, they are not even required to view. Te work is there,
completely fnished not only completely produced, but completely
consumed as well. Contained within such works is not simply the
necessary activity, but also the requisite passivity. Interpassive art
absolves viewers of any necessary activity whatsoever, and also of
their passivity. Tey can now be even more passive than passive.
Deprived even of their passivity, they end up in the uncanny hereafer
of their couch-potato existence.
From Arts Self-Viewing to Delegated
Enjoyment in General
Te discovery that the sitcoms canned laughter and the Greek trage-
dys chorus present examples of self-viewing artworks, and can
therefore be understood as cases of interpassivity, allows us to draw a
further conclusion. Here, what is delegated is the reception of art
including the enjoyment of art. Interpassivity comprises delegated
enjoyment. Not only can laughing at a sitcom be lef to others, but also
the act of watching television: rather than watching our favourite
shows, we can record them and never watch the recording. It is as
though the recorder has already watched for us. Tis opens up an
entire series of everyday interpassive phenomena: Is it mere coinci-
dence that travellers immediately hold a camera up to their eyes for
protection when looking at a monument? Might it even be possible to
say that they go so far as to place their friends, to whom they will later
show the snapshots of their vacation, between themselves and the
pictures that the camera takes? Isnt the utterly common statement
How interesting! a downright negation in the Freudian sense?
Doesnt it really mean: Tat doesnt interest me in the slightest! And
isnt there an entire genre of interesting books (with titles such as
Te Etruscans) that show up in shops just before Christmas: books
that no one ever reads, but everyone gets as gifs? And in electronic
media, isnt there a steady stream of new forms of actors and avatars
constantly turning up in place of people for example, in chat rooms,
on Facebook, Twitter, and other second lives?
7
7 See Mathias Fuchs, Disembodied Online in Pfaller, Interpassivitt, pp. 338.
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interpassivity 19
In addition to the artistic aspect of the matter delegated view-
ing there is also a more general, economic aspect namely, delegated
consumption. Interpassivity can be understood as every movement
that shifs the consumption of a product from the consumer to a dele-
gated consumption agency. Tis type of consumption agency can be
either already contained in the product (such as the canned laughter
in the sitcom) or added to the product (such as a recording device in
a television set). Te role of this agency is embodied by persons,
machines, animals, plants, and so on (which then function as inter-
passive media). Consumers who tend towards this delegation of their
pleasure are identifed as interpassive subjects.
Te theory of interactivity has assumed a highly questionable
conceptual classifcation, with artistic production and activity on the
one hand, and art reception and passivity on the other. Yet, from the
more general, economic perspective, it is now possible to speak on
frmer ground of activity and passivity: production is activity;
consumption, however, is passivity. Whether a process is active or
passive depends on whether something consumable is produced or
consumed.
If we regard interpassivity as delegated enjoyment, then it is
necessary to change the questions that are posed along ieks path
of investigation the inquiry into the possibility of delegating convic-
tions, feelings, and so on. Tis change also enables a consideration of
ieks examples from a new perspective: the delegation of convic-
tions and feelings creates special cases of the general principle of
delegated enjoyment that we have now been able to identify. Te fact
that Tibetan belief can be delegated to a prayer wheel, for example, is
just as much an example of delegated or substituted consumption as
the delegation of Christian belief to a burning candle representing a
Catholic. Te so-called comforts of religion are the consumable
elements. Worshippers consume them on a regular basis, thus the
producers of religion must constantly produce them. Te producers
of Christian belief, for example, also conceive of this belief as just
such a consumer item, and charge for its consumption in the form of
a church tax or tithes. In the interpassive case, the prayer wheel and
the candle consume the commodity of religion in place of the
worshippers. What we are dealing with here is not merely substituted
belief, feeling or thought, but, rather, substituted consumption or
enjoyment.
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20 on the pleasure principle in culture
Whereas ieks thesis states: feelings and convictions can exist
externally, our double thesis states: 1. Tere are artworks that view
themselves; and 2. there are consumers who want to be replaced by
something that consumes in their place. Fortunately, there is strong
support in the art world for these apparently utterly paradoxical
considerations. Not only in philosophy, but also in art, people have
begun to discover the varieties of delegated consumption. A series of
contemporary artistic works thematize common interpassive
phenomena: artists engaged in so-called service art, for example, ofer
to take the viewers place at a rendezvous, or trash their cars, or corre-
spond with their acquaintances.
8

Numerous artworks also include in their form the possibility of
whether to avoid or engage with interpassive reception. Jenny Holz-
ers text installations, for example, seem to repeat the methods of the
Tibetan prayer wheel. Holzers aesthetic principle comprises creating
such a strong presence for texts in a public space that it has become
seemingly unnecessary to read them. Te texts themselves, their
truisms, also seem to correspond with that principle they appear to
be no ones truths, meant for no one in particular. For an audience
that has grown weary of reading, they bring a pleasant moment of
relief. Interpassivity thus builds a formal principle of contemporary
art. It is the cause of its specifc aesthetic efects.
From this perspective, it becomes possible to gain a general
understanding of the massive emergence of texts within the fne
arts in recent decades. Why are theoretical texts presented on the
walls of exhibitions, in videos, installations or performances, and
not in books?
9
Do the fne arts, with their love of theory, serve as
the last aid for a culture that as Marshall McLuhan concluded
has reached the fnal stages of its reading ability? (Similar to the
way in which the prayer wheel stood at the beginning stages of
literacy?)
8 See the artworks by Ruth Kaaserer, Astrid Benzer, Ronald Eckelt, Martin
Kerschbaumsteiner, and San Keller; cf. for example, Kunstaktion Arbeit Teil1
ausgraben , documentary of an artistic action in 1998, posted on YouTube by
interpassiv on Jan. 22, 2009, and Kunstaktion Arbeit Teil2 zuschuetten ,
documentary of an artistic action in 1998, posted on YouTube by interpassiv on Jan.
22, 2009; see also Pfaller, Interpassivitt, pp. 534.
9 See also Arthur C. Danto, Te Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. ixf.
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interpassivity 21
Te steady growth in the ranks of art curators also seems to be an
example of interpassivity. Dont they in fact view the curated art,
replacing traditional viewers who have recently become scarce (for
example, because they have been re-educated by the interactive instal-
lations to become active artists)? And the numerous video installations
in major exhibitions, whose length regularly surpasses (many times
over) the time spent by even the most patient viewers arent they
also self-viewing apparatuses, which in an interpassive way mediate
to exhibition visitors the feeling of having seen something (and to
non-visitors, the feeling of not having to see)?
10
Isnt there a peculiar
conformity here, such that the viewers (who actually see only very
little) perceive the situation that there is a lot to see, in such a way that
it seems as though they have seen a lot?
The Flight from Pleasure
Te next question, then, is the following: Is it possible that interpassive
subjects dont want their enjoyment? Tere is evidence for this assump-
tion. ieks text, for example, reveals a mischievous pleasure derived
from escaping, via canned laughter, the experience of being amused by
television comedy.
11
Te remark by Klaus Heinrich that art collectors
would most like to banish their collection to a safe, where they dont
have to look at it also points in this direction.
12
And doesnt the popu-
larity of interactive art prove that the art viewer only wants to create
art, but does not want to view any or at least not anyone elses?
An initial sof-core explanation of interpassivity hereby proves
insuf cient: the delegation of enjoyment is applied not only in
10 See also Wolfgang Kemp, Echtmensch im Kosmodrom, in Die Zeit, 31 May
2000, p. 46.
11 Te Lacanian study of interpassivity repeatedly asks what happens to
jouissance enjoyment, in Lacans sense in cases of represented pleasure. ieks
mischievous pleasure at the success of his delegated laughter seems to ofer an answer
to this question: the interpassive subjects joy at escaping enjoyment is jouissance. And
is the expression mischievous pleasure not a precise counterpart to the likewise slightly
devious connotations of the French term jouissance? See also Bruce Fink, A Clinical
Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Teory and Technique (Cambridge, MA/
London: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 9: Te term jouissance nicely captures
the notion of getting of by any means necessary, however clean or dirty.
12 See Klaus Heinrich, anfangen mit freud (Basel/Frankfurt am Main:
Stroemfeld [Roter Stern], 1997), p. 55.
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22 on the pleasure principle in culture
situations where direct and personal enjoyment is impossible. Inter-
passivity is not just a method of extended, indirect consumption
that increases ones (necessarily limited) direct consumerist capaci-
ties. Instead, we have to tackle a hard-core explanation straight on:
interpassive subjects are actually feeing from their enjoyment. Tey
even avoid it in those situations where personally experiencing it
would be easy. Owners of recording devices, for example, watch less
television once they have the recorder than they did when they
owned only the television set.
13
And travellers, who are certainly
capable of viewing scenic attractions themselves, hold a camera to
their eyes as if by refex.
Tis poses two fundamental questions. First, the reason for inter-
passivity: Why dont people want to enjoy? And why do they choose
the most complicated form of substitution instead of just leaving
things be? Why are they so intent on someone else taking over the
enjoyment that they dont want? Why do they undertake measures
that work simultaneously for and against enjoyment?
And second, how does this delegation work? What method do
interpassive subjects use? What gives the represented subjects the
feeling (or, more precisely, the ofen unconscious certainty) of being
represented? How is it possible that they treat the televisions mechan-
ical laughter as equivalent to their own laughter? What is the
connection between that which is replaced and its replacement or
delegate? Why dont we perceive the laughter of others as simply their
laughter? And why is ones own not-laughing in no way understood as
not-laughing, but instead as an efect of the successful delegation of
laughter? It appears that these two fundamental issues are interde-
pendent. Te issue of methods seems to provide a key for
understanding the reasons for interpassivity.
The Objective Illusion
In order to track down the riddle of why interpassive people do not
want their own enjoyment, frst we will investigate the methods they
use for representation: What constitutes the interpassive subjects
certainty that they are represented by something or someone else? In
ieks examples the Tibetan prayer wheel, canned laughter, the
13 See also iek, Die Substitution, p. 21.
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interpassivity 23
Greek chorus, mourners, and so on it soon becomes clear that one
obvious answer can be eliminated: the certainty of delegation in no
way has to do with a subjective illusion held by the person who
delegates.
Both the efect and that way it is achieved are usually not
conscious acts on the part of the actors. As a rule, actors dont believe
in the possibility of delegation, and they are not aware or, if so, only
in a distorted way of the relief efect achieved through delegation.
When Tibetan prayer-wheel users imagine something, then it is the
opposite: namely, not being perfectly represented by the rotating
prayer wheel. Teir illusion to remain with ieks example is that
they were merely clinging to their obscene fantasies rather than pray-
ing. In truth, however, as iek remarks, they have prayed objectively.
Excessive video-recorder users, too, deceive themselves by falling
back on general explanations about the actual benefts they gain
from the recording. Tey really believe that they will watch the
programmes at a later date, and dont even notice that they have
already objectively seen them (and have already experienced
complete relief at having done so).
Interpassive subjects neither imagine the possibility of having a
vicarious experience of their enjoyment, nor entertain the illusion of
the success of their actions through a delegate even when such
success is actually present. Te illusion is not theirs; instead, the
interpassive subjects seem to not get it in a double sense: in full
knowledge of the alleged unsuitability of an interpassive process,
the actors nonetheless carry it out, and then actually obtain success-
ful results from it yet once again conceal these results from
themselves.
Tus, it is not the interpassive subjects who imagine the possibil-
ity of having a delegate they ofen dont even think of it. Tis
representation is, instead, something that can only be described by
the paradoxical-seeming concept of an objective illusion. Te illusion
is objective for two reasons: (1) someone other than the practising
actor has to believe in this illusion. Teory must therefore reconstruct
this illusion and prove its efectiveness in the completed action against
the ignorance and even amazed objection of the actors; and (2) this
illusion of realized substitution for example, of a person by a record-
ing device is not entirely untrue. In fact, video afcionados can
realize a nearly television-free life on the basis of their recording
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24 on the pleasure principle in culture
activities. Even when they maintain the illusion of watching all of the
recordings someday, this can easily be revealed as a subjective illu-
sion. Ultimately, the recorder is permanently busy; the interpassive
subjects, who in some cases have dedicated up to four machines per
night to recording, never have a free machine available to watch what
they have recorded. If they did watch, then they would be in danger of
missing something in the current television schedule.
We therefore have a phenomenon similar to Spinozas realization
that we love something more when we hated it before. However, we
cant intentionally increase our love by frst hating something, because
then we would never be able to emerge from our hatred.
14
Te video
afcionados seem to increase their love of television by having pre-
recorded it. But now they never emerge from the recording process.
For both of these reasons because of the non-subjective bearer of an
illusion and the truth-content of that illusion it seems appropriate to
speak of an objective illusion.
From Objective Laughing to Television in Effigy
Who, then, is the subject of this objectivity? Who believes in what
the actors themselves dont even think about and, if confronted
with, would consider senseless? A frst, obvious answer equates the
interpassive subjects and their actions with the audience at hand. If,
for example, I pay mourners to weep at a memorial ceremony, which
I also attend, then the other participants in the ceremony can view
this as my wailing. My own (albeit non-wailing) presence at the wail-
ing makes this wailing my own. In a similar situation, when person A
is present while person B makes a statement and person A accepts it
without protest, person A is also considered by the others present as
party to the opinion expressed by person B. In this case, the audience
at hand would be the subject that is able to establish the objectivity
of my interpassive wailing, my praying with the help of a prayer wheel,
or my amusement attained with the aid of canned laughter.
However, the example of the video recorder raises some pertinent
issues related to this initial answer. Television viewers are apparently
14 See Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics III, in On the Improvement of the
Understanding, Te Ethics, Correspondence (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp.
15960.
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