(An Introduction to Computer)

Security
J erry den Hartog
Room: MF 6.063
http://www.win.tue.nl/~jhartog/CourseSecurity/
What is Security?
Lets start with some free
association
Network
IT Infrastructures & Security Goals

E
H
R

Privacy
Availability Integrity
Confidentiality
Course Overview
Goal
Challenge
Approach
Course
Schedule
Network
Threats & Countermeasures

E
P
D

Course Overview
Goal
Challenge
Approach
Course
Schedule
Course Overview
Goal
Challenge
Approach
Schedule
Topic Wednesday Topic Friday Lab session
Introduction Cryptography basics Web of Trust
Cryptography Network security basics HTTP basics, Sniffing
and tampering
Malware, web services
security
Hashes, Certificates,
etc.
SQL injection and XSS
Access Control (AC) Digital Rights
Management
AC and session
information stealing
Authentication
(Passwords,
Biometrics)
Authentication
(Hardware tokens)
Authentication Flaws,
Password cracking
Security Protocols Exercises: Security
Protocol and side
channel attack
Session stealing &
phishing
Privacy and Anonymity Exercises & Exam
Preparation
---
See www.win.tue.nl/~jhartog/CourseSecurity
Security What-When-Why-How
What & When
Dependability ~ Security
Security Attributes
Security Policies

Why
attacks & attackers
common security issues
Measuring security
How
Security approaches,
models & tools
Security trade-offs
Security architectures &
engineering

Analysing a scenario
Security requirements

Conclusions
Security : What When Why & How
Content
What
Why
When
How
What
The Why of Security
How
Security: WWW&H
Content
What
Why
When
How
To get Security...
prevent disallowed usage ?



... and enable allowed usage ?

Difference Dependability and Security ?
Other options than prevention
The only truly secure system is one that is
powered off, cast in a block of concrete and
sealed in a lead-lined room with armed guards
E. Spafford
Security: WWW&H
Content
What
Why
When
How
Dependability vs. Security
Dependability Problem ?
program x
only works half of the time
crashes the computer
may cause the computer to explode
no longer works with the firewall installed
can stop the firewall from working
posts all your emails on a public website
tracks all your online activities
changes the data used by program y

Security Problem ?
Security: WWW&H
Content
What
Why
When
How
Dependability
vs.
Security (2)
Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING
The `What of security - Security Attributes
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Privacy
Authenticity
Non-repudiation
Accountability
The `What of security - Security Attributes
C-I-A
Privacy
Authenticity
Non-repudiation
Accountability
Privacy Online
Peter Steiner 1993 Nik Scott 2008
Privacy
EU directives (e.g. 95/46/EC) to protect privacy.

College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (CBP)

What is privacy?





Try to protect: Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)

Users must be able to determine for themselves when, how,
to what extent and for what purpose information about them
is communicated to others (Definition PRIME, European
project on privacy & ID management.)
Alice
The `What of security - Security Attributes
C-I-A
Privacy
Authenticity
Non-repudiation
Accountability
The `What of security - Security
Attributes
C-I-A
Privacy
Authenticity
Non-repudiation
Accountability
EU Data Protection Directive
Personal data usage requirements:
Notice of data being collected
Purpose for data use
Consent for disclosure
Informed who is collecting their data
Kept secure
Right to access & correct data
Accountability of data collectors

Other Security Attributes
Authenticity
users or data are genuine
Prescription is real and issued by a genuine Md.
Non-repudiation
Cannot be denied (action/agreement/...)
Dr. cannot claim not issuing prescription
To achieve (means): (Digital) signatures
Accountability
Ability to hold users accountable for their actions
Dr. can be identified, found and is liable for wrong
prescriptions
The `What of security - Security Attributes
C-I-A
Privacy
Authenticity
Non-repudiation
Accountability
Security Policies & Models
Policy: Specifies allowed / disallowed
Context; applies to ..., approved/imposed by ...
Usage; required enforcement, dealing with breaches

Different notions of `security policy:
from general intention statement
Data shall only be available to those with a `need-to-know
to formal, detailed specification
drwxr-xr-x, access control list, XACML policy, etc.

Security Model
(Formal) Framework to express and interpret policies.
E.g. relations on Users - Objects - Permissions - Groups.
The `When of security - Security policies
Security Policies & Models
Policy: Specifies allowed / disallowed
Context;
applies to ...,
approved/imposed by ...
Etc.
Usage;
required enforcement
dealing with breaches
Different notions of `security policy
Security Model
The `When of security - Security policies
Security Policies & Models
Policy: Specifies allowed / disallowed

Different notions of `security policy:
from general intention statement
Data shall only be available to those with a `need-to-know

to formal, detailed specification
drwxr-xr-x, access control list, XACML policy, etc.


Security Model
The `When of security - Security policies
Security Policies & Models
Policy: Specifies allowed / disallowed

Different notions of `security policy:

Security Model
(Formal) Framework to express and interpret policies.
E.g. relations on Users - Objects - Permissions - Groups
The `When of security - Security policies
Summerizing the What & When
Security attributes what to achieve
Security Policies When to achieve them
Security Model Setting to interpret
policies
What
The Why of Security
How
A days worth of security news (2012)
Android-malware verstopt zich via steganografie
Microsoft: hang op als we bellen
Google mailt gebruikers over nieuw privacybeleid
OpenDNS laat Mac-gebruiker onzichtbaar internetten
"Google Chrome ruimt andermans rotzooi op
Cybercriminelen vluchten naar Sovjet-Unie
FBI zet 15.000 euro op hoofd internetoplichter
Microsoft en Google samen tegen phishing
Leerlingen opgepakt wegens hacken schoolcijfers
DigiD offline wegens hash collision-lek
Rootkit infecteert pc via Windows Media Player
Android-malware besmet miljoenen gebruikers

Source: Security.nl
A days worth of security news (28-1-13)
58.000 toezichtcamera's open voor hackers
CBP: overheid weet veel te veel van ons
'WhatsApp schendt privacy gebruikers'
Autorun-worm houdt huis in Pakistan
200MB groot virus verrast onderzoekers
Pornosites veroorzaken piek in politievirussen
5 beveiligingstips voor WordPress-gebruikers
Afmeldlink e-mail blijft grootste bron van ergernis
Pentagon vervijfvoudigt aantal cybersoldaten
'Brussel moet privacy burgers beter beschermen'
Veel gemeenten lek door verouderde software
'Apple laat verwijderde iPhone sms'jes staan'
Oracle gaat veiligheid J ava verbeteren

Source: Security.nl
Attackers & Attacks
(WHAT) Break Security goals (Attributes)
(WHY) Reach Attacker goals
(WHO) IBM Attacker classification
I: Clever outsiders
II: Knowledgeable insiders
III: Funded Organisations
(WHO) CPA - CCA - etc.
Formalization attack context
Attacker goals and capabilities
Some common security issues
Security as an after thought
Needs to be addressed from the start

Forgetting security depends on the whole system
Focusing where the risk isn't (...more below)

Single point of failure
Breach of a security feature causes complete
breakdown of system

Security by obscurity
Obscurity may help but it is dangerous to have the
security design depend on it (Kerckhoffs principle)
Some common security issues (2)
Lack of Security policies

Lack of Preventative management
Keep systems up to date (e.g. patching)
Practice failure situations

Lack of Use of security features
E.g. Windows XP included firewall but not active (pre SP2)
Only need to check single checkbox

Relying on users for security
expertise, awareness, priorities
AliceBob
Weakest Link Different
aspects of security
``A chain is as strong as its weakest link
Security needs to be addressed in its whole;
Looking at a single aspect is like looking at a
single link.
system design (security not addressed)
quality of software (bugs in code)
strength of encryption (bad algorithm, bad
`randomness, length/chose of key)
system usage (bad passwords, not using security
features)
A program is only as strong as its design
The WMF problem provides a prime example of a software security flaw. At its
heart, the WMF problem is caused by a software feature being used in
an unintended way. WMF files, designed in the late 1980s, allow image
files to contain code that can be executed as the image decodes. Microsoft put
this "feature" in on purpose. The problem is, nobody put on their black hat and
thought through what an attacker might be able to do with such an inherently
dangerous feature. Malicious hackers use WMF information to install rootkits,
spyware, and other malicious code on their victims' machines. Some security
experts estimate that at least a million computers have been compromised this
way.
Source: Gary McGraw at itarchitect.com
Even though Microsoft has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on software
security, company representatives still expressed great surprise when the
Windows Metafile (WMF) vulnerability surfaced. There's a simple reason for
this. Microsoft's approach, commendable in many ways, involves an
overemphasis on code-level bugs and is thus subject to a major blind spot:
overlooking architectural flaws such as the WMF problem.
Weakest Link
``A chain is as strong as its weakest link
Security needs to be addressed in its whole;
Looking at a single aspect is like looking at a
single link.
system design (holes in security perimeter)
quality software (bugs in code)
strength of encryption (bad algorithm, bad
`randomness, length/chose of key)
system usage (bad passwords, not using security
features)
Programming flaws can lead to security holes
Buffer overloads: the big security hole
Last month, Microsoft reissued its buffer-overflow vulnerability announcement for
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), ... buffer-overflow vulnerabilities in
ISAPI ... buffer-overflow vulnerability in Oracle's supposedly unbreakable Oracle 8i
and Oracle 9i servers. ...
Source: ZDNet News
Another zero-day vulnerability reported in Windows 7
...This issue is caused by a buffer overflow error ... which could be exploited by
malicious users to crash an affected system or potentially execute arbitrary code
with kernel privileges.
Critical flaws in Windows, Internet Explorer
As part of this months Patch Tuesday schedule, Microsoft plans to ship a
dozen bulletins with fixes for 22 vulnerabilities, some serious enough to allow
hackers complete access to a vulnerable Windows machine. (J an 2011)
Basic idea buffer overflow
call routine CheckPin


routine CheckPin
{ char pin[ 4 ];


pin <= userInput;
User enters: 1234<AddressY>
...

return;
}

Put return address on stack:
<addressX> (return address)

Local variables on stack:
? ? ? ? (four empty bytes)
<addressX> (return address)

User input copied to stack
1 2 3 4 (user entry)
<addressY> (return address)

Remove local vars, return to:
<addressY>
Weakest Link
``A chain is as strong as its weakest link
Security needs to be addressed in its whole;
Looking at a single aspect is like looking at a
single link.
system design (holes in security perimeter)
quality software (bugs in code)
strength of encryption (bad algorithm, bad
`randomness, length/chose of key)
system usage (bad passwords, not using security
features)
Choose your crypto well...
IT: Mafia Boss Using Crook Crypto Captured
Posted by Zonk on Tuesday April 18, @11:13AM
from the never-heard-of-pgp-and-email dept.

boggis writes "Discovery is running a story on Bernardo
Provenzano, the recently arrested 'boss of bosses' of the
Sicilian Mafia. He apparently wrote notes to his henchmen
using a modified form of the Caesar Cipher, which was
easily cracked by the police and resulted in further arrests
of collaborators. Discovery's cryptography expert describes
it as a code that 'will keep your kid sister out'."
Source: Slashdot.org / Discovery channel
Weakest Link
``A chain is as strong as its weakest link
Security needs to be addressed in its whole;
Looking at a single aspect is like looking at a
single link.
system design (holes in security perimeter)
quality software (bugs in code)
strength of encryption (bad algorithm, bad
`randomness, length/chose of key)
system usage (bad passwords, not using security
features)
Memorystick, computer & diskettes

Het is de zoveelste keer dat vertrouwelijke informatie op straat is
terechtgekomen. ... landmachtkapitein een memorystick met geheime
militaire informatie in een huurauto had laten liggen. Op het
geheugenkaartje stonden onder meer instructies voor militairen in
Afghanistan. ... een memorystick was kwijtgeraakt met daarop
vertrouwelijke informatie van de Militaire Inlichtingen- en
Veiligheidsdienst (MIVD).
... officier van justitie ... computer op straat, zonder de inhoud te wissen...
belandde het apparaat bij misdaadverslaggever Peter R. de Vries ...
medewerker van de veiligheidsdienst AIVD eind vorig jaar diskettes in
een leaseauto liggen met daarop vertrouwelijke informatie over Pim
Fortuyn.
Source: Elsevier website
Store your secrete data securely
(Dutch examples of loss of unencrypted data carriers with confidential information.)
What
The Why of Security
How
prevention
detection
correction
repression
deterrence
The How of Security
Techniques to address specific threats
Cryptography
Identity Management, Access control
Security Protocols, Firewalls, Virus scanners
Physical security, Tamper resistant devices
Intrusion detection, auditing

Identify risk & threats, combine defenses
into complete security architecture:
Security Engineering
How secure is it?
Quantifying dependability:
Define tests, test coverage
If covers `common cases reasonable test dependability
not really suitable for security
Measuring security:
Attackers typically using unexpected behaviour
Is 1 bug better than 5 bugs ?
1 exploitable error better that 5 ?
Which goal (attribute) is more important
How to reflect trade-offs in score
As much security as possible ?
...truly secure system
is powered off...
Measuring security?
Security of system ~ Cost of breaking
Cost - Effort, Money, Expertise, ...
Violate security goal / Reach attacker goal
Hard to measure in general
40
CCWAPSS: Security Scoring
1. Authentication
2. Authorization
3. Input check
4. Error handling
5. Password Quality
6. Privacy
7. Sessions
8. Patching
9. Admin access
10. Encryption
11. Third parties
8.3/10
Criteria Checklist
(source: ccwapss 1.1 whitepaper)
Security trade-offs
No absolute security
There will always be vulnerabilities in the system
design / implementation / usage / etc.
May not be desirable; allow for the unforeseen
no access to `secure area ...
unless only exit during fire?

Need to make trade-offs
Conflicting requirements
easy to use secure
Conflicting security requirements
availability confidentiality
Conflicting goals of stakeholders
more usage information privacy user
...truly secure system
is powered off...
Examples Security Trade-offs
Security - Performance:
Increase key length in a public key crypto system
+ Increases protection against brute-force attack
- En/Decryption require more computation

Security Usability
Have a user enter their password for every access
+ Password does not have to be stored in memory
+ User away from machine
- Inconvenient for user
- Maybe less secure in the end;
eavesdropping,
enter password in wrong place,
legit user may try to circumvent
Examples Security Trade-offs (cont)
Security Cost
Higher development time to achieve better security
Use of extra hardware, e.g. smartcard in credit/debit
card

Integrity Privacy:
Gathering more information (e.g. logging)
may help prevent or detect misuse
decreases the privacy of the users
Access to a building:
Open building privacy but low security
Check at entrance: Medium security but some privacy lost
Track users in the building: High security but no privacy

Etc..., etc...
Security Requirements
Security Requirement Engineering Methodology
structured approach to finding security requirements
integration into system design

Integral part requirements elicitation process
E.g. SecureUML
Consider `misuse cases (in addition to use cases)
KOAS, NFR, i*Tropos
Goal oriented (security goals as explicitly functionality)
Security Problem Frames
Problem patterns based (related to security goals)
Requirements
Design
Concepts
Process
Attackers
i*/Tropos concepts
Actor
Entity with intent: role, position, agent (human/software)

Goal (Soft goal)
Strategic interest of an actor

Task
course of action to satisfy a goal

Resource
Physical or informational entity (without intent/goal)

Social dependency (between two actors)
depends to reach goal, execute task, deliver resource
Agreement between two actors
Requirements
Design
Concepts
Process
Attackers
Development Process
Identify stakeholders and their goals

For each actor & goal:
adopt it (this actor will achieve it; elaborate to tasks)
delegate it to an existing or new actor
decompose it into new subgoals

Finish when all goals have been adopted.
Requirements
Design
Concepts
Process
Attackers
Attacker Analysis
Any actors can be a potential attacker

Assumed guilty until proven innocent

Attacker inherits the
intention, capabilities, relations
of legitimate actor

External attackers
Not necessarily linked to system actor
Requirements
Design
Concepts
Process
Attackers
Requirements Elicitation
[Liu et al. 2003] Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis within a Social Setting.
Requirements
Design
Concepts
Process
Attackers
http://www.win.tue.nl/~jhartog/CourseSecurity
(reading material, slides, exercises, assignments)

Preparation for Fridays lecture/Lab section
look at 5
th
chapter of Security Engineering
Nice introduction to the topic of cryptography
(For all lab section); bring your laptop
Create a public key-private key pair (e.g. gpg4win)
Install Firefox and Tamper data plug in

Follow up on this lecture: reading material:
Check website for links, exercises, etc.
Article on security requirement engineering
1
st
chapter of Security Engineering by Anderson.

Exercise: Analyze security related news article.
Literature: Listed on course page
Articles & book chapters - available online
Several chapters from Security Engineering
Interesting read but light on the (technical) details
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Useful information but very technical, limited to crypto.
Articles on selected subjects
Experiments, Exercises and notes
Still under development; feedback appreciated.
Links will be posted on course server
Conclusions
Main Messages to take away from today
Security is not an `add-on feature
Needs to be taken into account from the start
Security requires looking at the `complete picture
Consider whole system not just isolated parts

Try to place treated security techniques in
context
What is their role in an security architecture
What goals can they achieve
What trade-off need to be made
Nieuws Item Analysis
Find a security related news article and analyze it
what is the security issue in this article
related to availability, confidentiality, integrity, etc.
Collect some background information when needed.
For a security incident
What was the failure, why did it occur
How could it have been prevented how should it be solved
For a solution/technology
What problem is solved, how can it be used, will it work
For an opinion/analysis/...
Do you agree, what are possible other/counter arguments
For a more general article
What is the issue you have identified
Did the article address this issue?
How well was the issue described
does the article get the key points correct, did it miss any issues.
Is the article biased? Do you agree with the article?