Nordic Outlook 1408: Continued Recovery - Greater Downside Risks

Continued global recovery,
but greater downside risks

Riksbank will cut key rate in
uncharted political landscape
Nordic Outlook
Economic Research August 2014
Contents
Nordic Outlook August 2014 | 3
International overview 5
Theme: What should central banks aim for? 14
The United States 16
Theme: Is low potential growth in the US here to stay? 20
Japan 21
Asia 22
The euro zone 25
Theme: Public debt problems persist in the euro zone 29
The United Kingdom 30
Eastern Europe 31
The Baltics 33
Sweden 34
Theme: New political landscape after the election 39
Denmark 41
Norway 43
Finland 46
Economic data 48
Boxes
International overview: Permanently higher risk level 7
International overview: Fiscal policy makers seek new mechanisms 10
International overview: How long will the recovery last? 12
USA: Temporary factors have lowered 2014 GDP 16
USA: Fewer households are moving 17
USA: Neutral interest rate is lower today 19
The euro zone: ECB rotation, minutes, fewer meetings 28
Sweden: Low pay hikes a threat to ination target? 36
Denmark: Is Denmark overheating? 42
4 | Nordic Outlook August 2014
Economic Research
This report was published on August 26, 2014.
Cut-o date for calculations and forecasts was August 21, 2014.

Robert Bergqvist
Chief Economist
+ 46 8 506 230 16
Elisabet Kopelman
Head of Economic Research
Japan
+ 46 8 506 230 17
Hkan Frisn
Head of Economic Forecasting
Sweden
+ 46 8 763 80 67
Daniel Bergvall
Economist
The euro zone & Finland
+46 8 763 85 94
Mattias Brur
Economist
US & United Kingdom
+ 46 8 763 85 06
Ann Enshagen Lavebrink
Editorial Assistant
+ 46 8 763 80 77
Mikael Johansson
Economist
The Baltics, Poland & Eastern Europe
+ 46 8 763 80 93
Andreas Johnson
Economist
China, India, Ukraine & Russia
+46 8 763 80 32
Frederik Engholm-Hansen
SEB Copenhagen
Denmark
+45 3328 1469
Thomas Thygesen
SEB Copenhagen
Denmark
+45 3328 1008
Olle Holmgren
Trading Strategy Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 763 80 79
Erica Blomgren
SEB Oslo
Norway
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Stein Bruun
SEB Oslo
Norway
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SEB Economic Research, K-A3, SE-106 40 Stockholm
International overview

Nordic Outlook August 2014 5
Continued recovery, but downside risks have increased

Central bank support and spare resources
will help fuel continued economic recovery
US growth over 3 per cent in 2015 and 2016
Rising EM growth, despite structural flaws
Euro zone: Intensified deflation risks
ECB launching QE in March, Fed hike in April
Slow yield upturn, wider US-German spread
Gradual US dollar appreciation against euro

The world economy continues to be marked by a fragile
recovery of varying strength. In the United States, the trend
became clearer after a slump early in 2014. GDP growth
rebounded sharply in the second quarter and the labour
market is showing gradual improvement. The British economy
has also shown strength. In China, first half growth was higher
than expected despite a real estate market downturn. In
Japan, however, hopes of a clear export upturn have been
dashed. Negative signals are even more predominant in the
euro zone, where GDP stagnated completely in the second
quarter. This weakness also applies to Germany, where
industrial production and optimism have fallen. To a minor
extent, the trade conflict with Russia has probably played a
role, at least psychologically.
We foresee a continued tug-of-war between different forces.
Monetary policy will remain very expansionary. We expect
further stimulus programmes from various central banks,
especially the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of
Japan (BoJ), but also from Swedens Riksbank. The US and UK
central banks will begin normalising key interest rates in the
spring of 2015 but will probably carry out their rate hikes very
cautiously. In general, there is lingering fundamental
uncertainty about the effectiveness of monetary policy, in
an environment where balance sheets remain in great need of
repair. Fiscal policy is now moving into a rather neutral
phase after earlier budget-tightening. Due to high public
debt, there is very limited room for stimulus. Instead, the
focus is on measures that do not weigh down budgets so
much. This applies, for example, to tax reforms that benefit
lower-income households and opportunities to bring about
capital spending by using various methods to initiate
partnerships between public institutions and the business
sector. Geopolitical uncertainty will probably continue
during the foreseeable future, as various regional conflicts
unfold. This is apparently not having a big impact on oil prices,
but trade disruptions and more cautious investment behaviour
are likely to dampen future growth to some extent.
Global GDP growth
Year-on-year percentage change
2013 2014 2015 2016
United States 2.2 2.2 3.4 3.1
Japan 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
Germany 0.1 1.2 1.4 1.8
China 7.7 7.5 7.3 6.9
United Kingdom 1.7 3.1 2.8 2.6
Euro zone -0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5
Nordic countries 0.6 1.5 2.0 2.2
Baltic countries 2.9 2.1 2.7 3.6
OECD 1.4 1.9 2.5 2.4
Emerging markets 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.1
World, PPP* 3.3 3.4 3.9 4.0
Source: OECD, SEB * Purchasing power parities

We arrive at the conclusion that accelerating growth in 2015
is the most probable world economic scenario. In an
environment of low resource utilisation, there is ample room
for continued powerful monetary stimulus. Historically
speaking, it has been very unusual for an economic downturn
to occur before the central bank normalisation process has
even begun. Heightened geopolitical uncertainty and
continued sluggishness due to balance sheet adjustments will
diminish the power of the upturn and delay a clear capital
spending upturn. But given a rising US economy, it is unlikely
that this will end the global recovery. Overall, we expect GDP
growth in the 34 mainly affluent countries of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) to be 2.5 per cent in 2015 and a tenth of a
percentage point lower in 2016. We have thus revised both
our 2014 and 2015 OECD forecasts downward by two tenths.
In emerging market (EM) economies, we also expect
growth to speed up somewhat in 2015 and 2016. Most such
countries have shown resilience amid the prevailing
geopolitical turbulence. We also believe they are generally well
equipped to deal with the impact of the US Federal Reserves
cautious rate hikes. Overall, EM growth will climb from 4.6 per
cent in 2014 to some 5 per cent in 2015 and 2016.
In an environment where major central banks are moving in
different directions and growth is accelerating somewhat, but
where large downside risks persist, financial market trends will
be less clear. Looking ahead, US and UK central bank rate hikes
are likely to lead to a moderate upturn in bond yields. Due

6 Nordic Outlook August 2014
to ever-widening interest rate gaps between the Fed and the
ECB, the spread between US and German 10-year sovereign
yields will increase further from todays already high level.
Bond yields will thus remain historically low in Europe; the
German 10-year yield will not exceed 2 per cent during our
forecast period. Stock market volatility will probably
increase as the Feds rate hikes approach. If our forecast of
continued low interest rates and a degree of acceleration in
global growth proves correct, there is potential for rising share
prices further ahead. Exchange rates will also be largely
influenced by differences in monetary policy. Among other
things, this implies a gradual appreciation of the US dollar. We
expect the EUR/USD rate to continue down to 1.20 by the end
of 2016. Scandinavian currencies will eventually appreciate
against the euro, but cautious central banks will help limit that
potential. This autumn the Swedish krona will also be weighed
down by further Riksbank stimulus measures and by political
uncertainty related to the September parliamentary election.
US: Growth engine of unruly world economy
Most indications are now that the US economic slump early in
2014 was due to temporary factors such as severe winter
weather, de-stocking in the automotive industry and the
temporary effects of economic policy measures (see the box in
the US section of this issue). GDP growth rebounded to an
annualised 4.0 per cent in the second quarter. More and more
factors suggest a continued upturn, with GDP growth above 3
per cent in both 2015 and 2016. Confidence indicators are at
high levels and the labour market has shifted to higher gear.
Rising wealth and good incomes will benefit consumption. At
present, fiscal policy is less strict and less uncertain than for a
long time. Even if the Fed begins hiking its key interest rate
next spring, monetary policy will provide continued support. In
such an environment, we see good prospects for cyclical
sectors to expand from todays depressed levels. By the end of
our forecast period, unemployment will fall below its
equilibrium level, but we do not expect general resource
problems to stop the recovery.

Renewed euro zone weakness
In the euro zone, disappointments have predominated in
recent months. Even the German economy has weakened,
which is partly connected to the direct and indirect
consequences of trade disruption with Russia. The euro zone
economy is generally vulnerable, in a situation where balance
sheet adjustment has a long way to go. In addition, the credit
market is not yet working satisfactorily, though risk premiums
for government securities have greatly decreased. Because of
weak real growth, combined with very low inflation, nominal
GDP is stagnating. This worsens the debt dynamic in many
countries, since the budget-tightening they have implemented
has not been enough to bring down their debt as a percentage
of GDP. We have revised our 2014 and 2015 growth
forecasts rather clearly downward to 0.7 and 1.1 per cent,
respectively (previously 1.0 and 1.6). In 2016, growth will be 1.5
per cent.
This somewhat stronger growth will be largely driven by ECB
stimulus programmes. The measures the bank approved in
early June have not yet begun to have much effect, and also we
expect further stimulus programmes ahead. Other countries
will also provide some help. Several crisis-hit countries,
especially Spain, are entering a more robust growth phase after
their previous deep downturns. France and Italy are showing
worrisome stagnation tendencies, however. The process of
increasing European Union political and economic integration
is moving sluggishly. The election to the European Parliament
last spring was a success for parties that oppose expanded
supranational powers. In the near term, the process of creating
a common EU banking union will continue, but otherwise not
much is likely to happen. The euro zone thus has quite far to go
before it has laid the groundwork for a stable, well-functioning
currency union. The ECBs efforts remain vital in order to keep
the euro zone together.

EM economies are showing resilience
In recent months, emerging market (EM) economies have
shown resilience to increased geopolitical uncertainty. Overall,
we anticipate some acceleration in growth this coming year,
among other things because there is room for continued loose
monetary policies. Although EM countries are struggling with
various types of structural problems, we still believe they are
rather well equipped to meet the challenges that the Feds
coming interest rate hikes will bring. In particular, generally
strong external balances and robust exchange rate systems are

in contrast to the situation in the late 1990s when the Asian
financial crisis broke out.
The Chinese economy seems to be holding up well against
the ongoing downturn in the construction sector. We have
revised our GDP growth forecast a bit upward to 7.5 per cent.
After that we foresee a controlled and cautious slowdown to
6.9 per cent in 2016. There are high hopes for the economic
policies of the new Indian government (BJP). We foresee a
certain risk of disappointments on the reform front but still
believe that growth will accelerate from 5.0 per cent this year
to around 6 per cent in 2015 and 2016. Structural factors have
contributed to the sharp deceleration in Brazilian growth over
the past few years. During 2000-2010, annual growth averaged
3.7 per cent. Our GDP forecast for 2014 is 1 per cent. Far-
reaching structural reforms are needed to get the economy
moving. Capital spending will need to take over from private
consumption as the main driver of growth. The presidential
election in October could serve as a catalyst for change, but
none of the main candidates has shown an impressive reform
agenda. Weak growth will continue during our forecast period,
with GDP rising by 2-2.5 per cent in 2015 and 2016.
Downside risks have increased somewhat
Because of greater geopolitical risks, for example connected to
risks of escalation in the Russia-Ukraine crisis combined with
renewed stagnation tendencies mainly in the euro zone,
downside risks have increased somewhat in recent months.
Looking ahead a bit, we also see a certain risk that US interest
rate hikes may come at such an early stage that they will have
negative international consequences. We have thus raised
the probability of our low-growth scenario to 30 per cent
from 25 per cent in the May 2014 issue of Nordic Outlook.
As in recent issues of Nordic Outlook, we estimate the
probability of a faster-growth scenario at 20 per cent. Our
main scenario implies that secondary effects from the
American economic upturn will be weaker than usual. Yet one
potential upside for our global forecast is that the positive
international impact of the US upturn will be more in line with
historical patterns.

Permanently higher geopolitical risk level
In recent months, geopolitical uncertainty has escalated.
The main focus has been on Russia-Ukraine, the Islamic
State (IS) offensive in Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Apart from these, there are a number of other conflicts in
which no solution is in sight, for example the civil war in
Syria, the ongoing disintegration of Libya and increased
tensions between various groups in other African countries.
Behind the scenes, we are also seeing how Chinas increas-
ing strength and growing long-term power ambitions are
creating tensions in East Asia, especially in relations to
Japan and Vietnam.
The EU has entered the toughest phase (No. 3) of its sanc-
tions plan against the Russian economy. Russia has re-
sponded with trade barriers in the aviation, agriculture and
food sectors. Western sanctions are intensifying the struc-
turally weak trend in the Russian economy, and the conflict
has in itself already pushed Ukraine into a deep recession.
Yet in our assessment, the direct effects on the EU will
be rather small. Hardest hit will be Finland and the Baltic
countries, which are the most dependent on trade with
Russia. Looking ahead, we believe that the EU countries will
not be inclined to escalate trade sanctions further, partly
due to their vulnerable domestic economic situation. How-
ever, the likelihood of a Russian invasion in parts of eastern
Ukraine has recently increased, and thus also the risks of
serious secondary economic effects.
Oil prices have not been driven up by the trouble spots
in the Middle East and North Africa. Instead they have
tended to fall. Perhaps the most important link between
geopolitical turmoil and global economic activity seems to
have been broken, making the impact of such turmoil more
unclear. Greater geopolitical tensions presumably have a
negative psychological effect, primarily on the investment
climate. But sometimes the massive new flow from crisis
flashpoints seems to lead to an initial tendency to exagger-
ate the global economic and financial effects of emerging
crises.
In a long-term perspective, however, we can still foresee the
beginnings of a negative trend. The relaxation of tensions
following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War stimulated the world economy. The shift to-
wards greater democracy and economic liberalisation
helped drive demand and trade for a long time. The US was
able to transfer resources from military to civilian use, but
still maintain its role as an unchallenged superpower that
guaranteed stable international trade conditions.
There are many indications that we are now entering a
phase of weakened US authority, for both political and
economic reasons. The conflict of interests between the
West and Russia is likely to persist, especially in light of the
prevailing political trends in Russia. Meanwhile the rivalry
between China and the US is likely to grow as Southeast
Asia becomes an increasingly important world economic
engine. These developments represent both threats and
opportunities. But the stimulative effect on global trade
created by the relaxation of tensions in previous dec-
ades is unlikely to return. Instead the geopolitical situa-
tion will probably become more uncertain ahead. Regional
conflicts are likely to become more common. This will prob-
ably also mean that the global community must prepare to
deal with larger flows of refugees.


Finland lagging other Nordic countries
The Nordic countries continue to show divergent growth
trends. The Swedish economy is showing decent growth,
primarily due to strong consumption that is benefiting from
rising real incomes and asset prices. Yet industrial production
and exports are not taking off and they will also continue to
show subdued growth. Employment is rising, but because of
the rapidly increasing labour supply the jobless rate is falling
very slowly. Fiscal policy will probably be neutral over the next
couple of years, although there is great uncertainty about the
shape of economic policy after Septembers parliamentary
election. Low inflation and falling inflation expectations
continue to pressure the Riksbank, which will deliver further
monetary stimulus measures this autumn.

The Finnish economy is fighting an uphill battle. Structural
problems in the forest product and information and
communications technology (ICT) sectors have hampered
growth for a long time. Now the country is also being hit
relatively hard by slow Russian growth and Russian import
restrictions. Most parts of the Finnish economy are under
pressure; exports are weak, unemployment is high and
household incomes are growing at a slow pace, while
businesses are hesitant to invest. GDP will fall by 0.6 per cent
in 2014 and then increase weakly in 2015 and 2016. The
Danish economy is showing stronger growth dynamics after
several weak years. Rising employment and home prices as
well as looser fiscal policy will support households. Improved
international economic conditions will benefit the corporate
sector. We believe initial resource utilisation is relatively low,
which will help GDP grow above trend throughout our forecast
period. The Norwegian economy is dominated by forces that
are pulling in different directions. The headwind is coming
from lower capital spending in the oil and gas sector as well as
weak residential investments. But the labour market has
stabilised, along with the housing market, and good real
income increases are providing support to consumption. We
expect Norways GDP growth to accelerate from 1.6 per cent
this year to 1.7 per cent in 2015 and 2.1 per cent in 2016. This is
somewhat below trend.

Nordics and Baltics, GDP growth
2013 2014 2015 2016
Sweden 1.6 2.1 2.9 2.7
Norway 0.6 1.6 1.7 2.1
Denmark 0.4 1.8 2.3 2.5
Finland -1.2 -0.6 0.5 0.9
Estonia 0.8 0.5 1.8 3.0
Latvia 4.1 2.5 2.7 3.4
Lithuania 3.3 2.7 3.2 4.0
Source: OECD, SEB

Baltics weighed down by effects of Russia
The Baltic countries are being hit relatively hard by the Russia-
Ukraine conflict due to their large volume of trade with Russia.
Exports and capital spending are being hampered by Russian
economic stagnation and increased regional uncertainty.
Russian food import restrictions are impacting Lithuania the
hardest, but Estonia is generally the most vulnerable of the
Baltics due to its higher export level relative to GDP and its
strong connections to the shaky Finnish economy.
Meanwhile there are positive growth forces in the Baltics.
Private consumption remains relatively robust, sustained by
continued high real wage increases. Looking at capital
spending, construction is continuing to grow while
infrastructure projects will receive increased support from EU
funds after a decline in recent years. Direct investments in
Lithuania will also receive an extra push when the country joins
the euro zone on January 1, 2015. Overall, we predict some
acceleration in Baltic growth in 2015-2016, although we have
revised our 2015 forecasts for all three countries by about 0.5
percentage points compared to the May Nordic Outlook.
Ever more divergent inflation environments
During the first half of 2014, tax hikes in Japan and rising core
inflation in the US were instrumental in raising Consumer Price
Index (CPI) inflation in the OECD countries from 1.5 to about 2
per cent. Generally, however, inflation pressure in the
developed economies remains low. They share many of the
forces that are driving this trend; for example, low resource
utilisation is continuing to hold back wages and profit
margins. International producer prices for consumer goods are
also continuing to fall. Falling commodity prices, especially for
energy and food, have recently led to further downward
pressure on inflation. Looking ahead, we expect oil prices to
remain rather stable at around USD 100/barrel. Rising oil
production in the US and Saudi Arabia and somewhat lower
international demand, for example because of lower prices for
other types of energy, are offsetting production disruptions in
crisis-hit regions. Oil price risks are on the downside.
The differences between the inflation environments of various
regions are meanwhile becoming increasingly evident. In the
US, CPI inflation climbed from 0.9 per cent in October 2013 to
2.0 per cent in July. So far, unit labour costs have been pushed
somewhat higher by falling productivity growth, but wages and

salaries are likely to take over as a driving force when
unemployment approaches its equilibrium. Inflation
expectations in the US are at fairly comfortable levels from a
central bank perspective, and the Federal Reserve has
consequently toned down deflation risks. Our forecasts
indicate that CPI will increase by 1.9 per cent in 2015 and by
2.2 per cent in 2016. The Feds favourite measure, the personal
consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator, will end up a bit
lower. The risks are on the upside, however.

In the euro zone, the deflation threat nevertheless remains a
focus of attention. Inflation has continued to deliver downside
surprises, and the downturn in inflation expectations has
actually speeded up since the European Central Bank (ECB)
presented its broad stimulus package in early June. Wage and
price adjustments in crisis-hit euro zone countries are
continuing; both Greece and Spain showed falling prices in
July. But even in Germany, inflation is below 1 per cent, which
also makes it harder for crisis-hit countries to solve their
competitiveness problems. We believe that the euro zone as a
whole can avoid deflation, partly because further ECB stimulus
measures will improve the credit market situation and help
weaken the euro. Measured as annual averages, inflation
according to the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
will be 0.5 per cent in 2014, 0.6 per cent in 2015 and 0.9
per cent in 2016. Core inflation in 2015 will be somewhat
below HICP inflation.

Central banks face widely different choices
The worlds central banks are facing many challenges and
dilemmas. Todays systems assign heavy responsibility to them
for stabilisation policy, but it is not self-evident that the
instruments available to them are sufficiently effective. The
prevailing low interest rate environment both stimulates and
compels greater financial risk-taking, but it is far from certain
that it generates productive investments. Meanwhile the risks
of financial imbalances will increase the longer this
exceptionally low interest rate environment persists. Nor, at
present, is there much agreement on how responsibilities
should be allocated in the future when it comes to
safeguarding financial stability and countering financial
imbalances. The interplay between interest rate policy, tax
policy and macroprudential supervision is especially
complicated and hard to assess in such an environment.

On the whole, monetary policy will remain expansionary during
our forecast period, but the leading central banks in the OECD
countries face different sets of choices. We expect the BoE and
the Fed to take their first cautious steps towards normalisation
during the first half of 2015. Our forecast is that the BoE will be
the first, raising its key interest rate in February, and that the
Fed will follow suit in April. Then they will carry out cautious
rate hiking cycles, with the US federal funds rate reaching 2.5
per cent and the British base rate 1.75 per cent by the end of
2016. In two theme articles (What should central banks aim
for? and Is low potential GDP growth in the US here to stay?)
we discuss the reasons why we believe that rate hikes will
occur at a slower pace than has been historically normal and
why we believe that a neutral key interest rate is now around 3
per cent: far lower than previously. No active changes in US
and British central bank securities portfolios will probably be
carried out during our forecast period.
Meanwhile we expect the ECB and the BoJ to expand their
stimulus programmes. The BoJ will enlarge its balance sheet
this autumn beyond the level announced so far. Because of
sluggish economic growth and falling inflation expectations,
during the spring of 2015 the ECB will initiate a traditional
quantitative easing (QE) policy, including weighted purchases
of government bonds. The ECB and BoJ will leave their key
interest rates at close to zero throughout our forecast period.

Due to low inflation and falling inflation expectations,
Swedens Riksbank will lower its key interest rate further to
0.15 per cent this autumn. We also expect the central banks
Governing Council to reach consensus on guidance based on
the conditions that must be met before raising the repo rate.
Decisions on new tightening measures will probably also be
made this autumn within the macroprudential supervisory
system, thereby increasing monetary policy manoeuvring
room. The Riksbank will not begin its rate hikes until early
2016, and by year-end the repo rate will stand at 1.0 per cent.
Fiscal policy makers seek new mechanisms
After the budget-tightening of recent years, fiscal policy
looks set to provide a relatively neutral growth impulse over
the next couple of years. Deficits have fallen to a level that is
stabilising government debt, although GDP stagnation is
making debt problems more difficult in the crisis-hit coun-
tries of the euro zone. Debt levels are nevertheless so high
in most developed economies that unfunded projects are
difficult to implement.
Fiscal policy makers still have an important role to play.
There are lingering risks of long-term (secular) stagnation
connected to the weakened effectiveness of interest rate
policy in the prevailing environment of balance sheet ad-
justment, which the recent period of economic weakening in
the euro zone has further accentuated. In the last Nordic
Outlook, we discussed the potential for tax policy in a box
entitled Tax policy a key that can unlock growth? The
main argument, for example in International Monetary Fund
(IMF) analyses and proposals, is that tax reforms with a
favourable redistribution profile will provide an injection of
economic stimulus. This is because they supply lower-
income households with resources, and these house-
holds normally have a higher marginal inclination to
consume.
The international economic policy discourse is now begin-
ning to focus increasingly on the potential for setting private
investments in motion more rapidly. There may be various
reasons for sluggishness in investment activity, for example
global overcapacity or increased political uncertainty at
national and global levels. Another explanation is that return
requirements are still too high, creating financial

short-termism and hampering investments aimed at in-
creasing production capacity. There are many justifications
for large infrastructure investments in such sectors as
transport, energy, water and communications. Aside from
their cyclical growth stimulus, they can also improve long-
term growth potential. For developing countries, infrastruc-
ture investments help boost growth, reduce poverty and
promote environmental and climate-related efforts.
Right now the use of government resources to try to kick-
start private investments is a consistent theme in such
debate forums as the G20, the EU and the BRICS group of
countries. To avoid increased public debt, one strategy is for
such bodies as the European Investment Bank, the World
Bank, the IMF or the BRICS countries new development
bank to mobilise resources for concrete investments.
Through partnerships, long-term investors such as pension
funds will also find attractive investment alternatives.
The exact mechanisms for this kind of collaboration are
being worked out. But if infrastructure projects partially
based on private funding are to become possible, this will
require a long-term approach and broad parliamentary
support. Partnerships also require a high degree of certainty
in the wording of legal contracts that regulate allocation of
responsibilities among the parties involved. The ambition is
that the G20 countries will take the first concrete steps at
their summit in Brisbane later this year. This will put pres-
sure on all 19 countries plus the EU to deliver decisions: the
G20s target is for these measures to help boost global
growth by 2 per cent over the next five years.

Continued decoupling of bond yields
After a temporary US-driven upturn last autumn, this year
long-term yields have been in a downward trend. Since January
1, yields on 10-year US Treasuries have fallen by 60 basis
points, while yields on German 10-year bonds have nearly
halved to record lows of less than 1 per cent. This downturn in
yields has been driven by several factors. The economy has
repeatedly shown signs of weakness, and inflation has shown
downside surprises, especially in the euro zone. New monetary
easing by the ECB is also expected, and the Fed has sent
soothing signals regarding the pace of its interest rate hikes.
Geopolitical worries have also contributed to a greater appetite
for liquid American and German government securities.
The trend of international bond yields will continue to be dom-
inated by historically expansionary monetary policies. In the
US, long-term yields are rising in anticipation of the start of key
interest rate hikes next spring. Looking ahead, however, the
upturn may be limited because the Fed may be expected to
proceed substantially more slowly than during previous rate
hiking cycles, although we see an upside risk in relation to
cautious market pricing. Yields on 10-year US Treasuries will be
3.20 per cent at the end of next year and 3.60 per cent at the
end of 2016.
Falling inflation expectations, and expectations of further
easing by the ECB, will exert downward pressure on long-term
German yields this autumn. But if the ECB succeeds in stabilis-
ing and raising inflation expectations, we believe that long-
term German yields may begin moving upward in line with the
American pattern during the QE programme. At the end of
2015, German 10-year government bond yields will be 1.50 per
cent, and at the end of 2016 they will be 1.90 per cent. This
means that the US-German yield spread will widen further from
todays 140 points to 170. The US-German spread has not been
this wide since the 1980s. The decoupling between US and
euro zone economic cycles and inflation will also show up
in the fixed income market.


In Sweden, the spread against German long-term yields has
narrowed since the Riksbank cut its key interest rate by 50
basis points in July. New Riksbank actions in the form of a rate
cut during the fourth quarter plus clearer guidance on what will
be required before the Riksbank will again begin to hike the
repo rate will narrow the spread to a low of 40 points,
compared to 60 points today. As rate hikes approach again in
2016, the spread will widen to around 60 points by the end of
2016, which is close to the peak levels of the past 20 years.
Because of low international yields, the yield on a 10-year
Swedish government bond will still remain at low levels,
around 2.60 per cent at the end of 2016.
Due to rising activity during the summer and inflation that is
stuck at high levels, Norwegian bond yields have not been
pulled down by the German yield decline. This autumn we also
believe that better liquidity in the Norwegian fixed income
market will also help narrow the spread. The 10-year spread
against Germany will thus shrink from todays record
levels at 130-140 basis points to 120 points at the end of
this year and 90 points at the end of 2015.
Higher stock market volatility on the way
During the past six months, stock markets have faced a num-
ber of challenges. Macroeconomic signals have not been per-
suasive and geopolitical trouble spots have flared up in rapid
succession. SEBs index of global risk appetite has also gradu-
ally fallen. But despite macro disappointments in several major
markets, a majority of corporate interim reports for the second
quarter ended up close to or above earnings and sales expecta-
tions. We also believe that the need for downward revisions in
the earnings outlook has decreased or even ended. The pro-
spect of further monetary stimulation -- - for example, by the
ECB and Bo J has also confirmed the picture of persistently
low interest rates and bond yields. Low interest rates serve
as a shock absorber in an uncertain situation where share
valuations are beginning to reach higher levels.
Looking ahead, we foresee various forces that will influence
the stock market climate. Monetary policy impulses will be
mixed, but as the US and British central banks move closer to
interest rate hikes, we expect volatility to increase. Persistent
geopolitical uncertainty also suggests volatile stock market
performance during the next six months. At the same time, our
forecast of continued low interest rates means that current
valuations imply a rather high risk premium on equities. If the
global economy performs in line with our forecasts, equities
appear to be an increasingly attractive alternative to
investments in government securities and corporate bonds.

Interest rate policy will dominate FX market
The foreign exchange (FX) market continues to show high
volatility and range trading. So far in 2014, high interest rate
currencies often commodity currencies have performed
best. Looking ahead, the driving forces that have characterised
the past year are likely to persist. Speculative market players
are acting mainly in response to signals from central banks
about monetary policy changes, with moves towards tighter
policies unavoidably seeming to lead to a stronger currency.

Given this dominant driving force, it is natural to stick to our
forecast that the US dollar will trend higher, since the Fed will
be raising its key interest rate long before the ECB. Over the
past year, the euro has remained firm because investors have
had a great inclination to increase their European portfolio
holdings as the ECB has successfully stabilised the euro zone.
This factor is now fading in strength, which will later lead to a
continued weakening of the euro against the USD. We expect a
EUR/USD exchange rate of 1.30 at the end of 2014; then the
rate will move towards 1.20 at the end of our forecast period.

How long will the recovery last?
The economic recovery has now been under way for a rather
long period. Share prices, industrial production and GDP
generally bottomed out in 2009 and have trended upward
since then in most countries. Now that we are extending our
forecast horizon to the end of 2016 eight years after the
Lehman Brothers crash there is reason to ask how long the
recovery can last. There are several conceivable approaches
for assessing this:
Historical patterns. For decades after the Second World
War, a certain regularity was discernible in economic cycles,
which lasted about 5 years (including both upturn and
downturn). These cycles were often driven by labour mar-
ket, investment and inventory cycles. Given this mechanical
way of thinking, a new cyclical downturn might come soon.
But after financial markets were deregulated in the early
1980s, the pattern seems to have changed. Upturn phases
have become longer. Normally, various forms of bubble-like
imbalances have gradually built up. When these have be-
come unsustainable, relatively deep downturns have fol-
lowed. Our conclusion is that at present, it is hardly mean-
ingful to estimate the duration of the recovery by citing
historical regularity.

Output and labour market gaps. Resource gap analysis is
a natural tool for trying to estimate the duration of an ex-
pansion. Growing international economic integration, espe-
cially via greater labour mobility, means that output gaps
are increasingly becoming a global matter. However, coun-
try-by-country gap analyses are important in shaping eco-
nomic policy, since it presumably provides guidance about
future inflation and overheating risks. During our forecast
period, there will be clear differences between regions. In
the US, we expect unemployment to fall below its equilibri-
um level during 2016, yet depressed productivity and labour
supply levels still suggest there is some spare capacity in the
economy. A similar situation applies in the UK. Low German
unemployment indicates that the economy is close to nor-
mal capacity utilisation, whereas there is plenty of spare
capacity elsewhere in the euro zone. To summarise, we
believe that we will be rather close to equilibrium at the end
of 2016, but that even then there will be some spare capaci-
ty in the OECD countries as a whole. Our gap calculations
Thus suggest that the upturn may continue for another
while.
Output gaps in selected countries
Per cent of GDP *
Q2 2014 Q4 2016
United States 3.5 1.0
Japan 1.5 0.5
Euro zone 4.0 2.0
Germany 1.5 0.5
United Kingdom 2.0 0.5
Sweden 3.0 1.0
OECD 3.2 1.0
* Positive figures mean spare capacity
Source: OECD, SEB

Imbalances and financial bubbles. Gap analysis has,
however, been insufficient in recent years to predict the
major shifts in financial and economic performance. For a
long period (the Great Moderation), inflation was almost
improbably low and stable in many countries. Central banks
with inflation targets thus had both legitimacy problems and
analytical difficulties in deciding when to impose monetary
tightening in order to prevent imbalances from growing to
unsustainable size. The dramatic financial and economic
crisis thus led to a discussion of the need to change the
economic policy framework. The development of new
macroprudential supervision policies is precisely intended to
relieve central banks of the dual tasks of simultaneously
meeting inflation targets and preserving financial stability.
How effectively the various branches of the political system
can work together to avoid the build-up of unsustainable
financial imbalances in the future is nevertheless uncertain.
To summarise, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions
on the length of the current recovery based on histori-
cal patterns or regularities. However, developments over
the past five years have confirmed experiences from earlier
balance sheet crises; the recovery will be lacklustre and
lengthy, among other things because balance sheet adjust-
ment weakens the effects of interest rate stimulus
measures. This has contributed to speculation that growth
has been damaged in the long term (secular stagnation).
Although such uncertainty makes the task of central banks
more difficult, it is still unlikely that resource shortages
will halt the upturn during our forecast period. The
duration of the recovery will instead probably be deter-
mined by the shape of economic policies. The big challenge
will be to formulate an exit strategy that avoids both an
abrupt cyclical downturn and new financial bubbles. Accord-
ing to our forecasts, this question will not come to a head in
the next couple of years. Our conclusion is that the cautious
upturn can continue for another while.


The Japanese yen has stabilised following the earlier BoJ-
induced depreciation. We believe that a bit further ahead the
JPY will continue to weaken, among other things due to new
central bank stimulus measures. The USD/JPY rate will move to
around 115 by the end of 2015.
Because of the Riksbanks key rate cuts from 1.0 per cent in
December to its current level of 0.25 per cent, the SEK has
showed the weakest performance among G10 currencies. In
the recent calmer environment the krona has nevertheless
regained some ground, supported by krona-positive flows.
Uncertainty about the parliamentary election, combined with
further stimulus measures by the Riksbank, will probably weigh
down the krona in the short term. The downside for the krona
is limited, though. Towards year-end the EUR/SEK exchange
rate will be 9.25. During 2015 and 2016, we will then see a
gradual krona appreciation as stronger Swedish growth
persuades the Riksbank to begin rate hikes long before the
ECB. At the end of 2015, the EUR/SEK rate will be 8.90. At the
end of 2016 it will be 8.70. Our forecast of gradual US dollar
appreciation against the euro will lead to a slow upturn in the
USD/SEK rate to 7.25 at the end of our forecast period.
Given our forecast that Norges Bank will not deliver the key
rate cut that the market has partly discounted, the outlook for
the Norwegian krone is cautiously positive. Yet an excessively
strong currency runs a risk of triggering a rate cut. We believe
that Norges Bank will again warn the market if the NOK moves
too high. A EUR/NOK exchange rate of around 8.00 thus seems
to be a benchmark, looking ahead a year or so.

Theme: What should central banks aim for?


Central banks at an important crossroads
Bond portfolios in standby mode
automatic adjustment most likely
New normal key rate around 3 per cent
Greater financial volatility after rate hikes

Global monetary policy has now been exceptionally
expansionary for six years. Both nominal and real key
interest rates have been close to zero or negative. Meanwhile
central banks have expanded their balance sheets by USD
14.65 trillion: up 83 per cent to USD 22.65 trillion by our
calculation. This increase is equivalent to 20 per cent of both
global GDP and stock market capitalisation (July 2014). The
economic outlook indicates a continued need for monetary
policy support, but various countries are approaching the date
when they will begin a normalisation process, including
slimmed balance sheets and higher key interest rates.

Central bank assurances that exceptional policies will last until
the recovery is on firm ground have helped to keep volatility in
financial markets very low in recent years. The normalisation
process is thus likely to result in greater financial volatility.
For example, the economic recovery may well suffer temporary
setbacks ahead, creating uncertainty about the sustainability
of normalisation policies. The need to adjust large financial
global portfolios to a new risk environment will also have an
impact.
No rapid slimming of balance sheets
We believe that upward adjustments in key interest rates
will be the next step in normalisation policy and that active
changes in bond portfolios will be delayed. By raising interest
rates, central banks probably want to create manoeuvring
room that will enable them to deal with any new setbacks. In
case there are new periods of economic weakness, a reduction
in central bank portfolios in a situation where recovery is not
completely ensured may create communication challenges
and renewed monetary policy uncertainty. A reduction of
bond portfolios at the beginning of normalisation also risks
being interpreted by the market as meaning that rate hikes
may be accelerated, which on the whole would result in an
excessively large monetary tightening.
Our main scenario is thus that central bank bond holdings
will be adjusted gradually by not reinvesting loans as they
mature. If the quantity of liquidity in the system is considered
too large, there are alternative instruments that can reduce its
impact on the economy. New IMF estimates indicate that the
Federal Reserve, by not reinvesting the proceeds of maturing
bond loans, will achieve a portfolio that may be regarded as
optimal from the standpoint of promoting efficient markets in
about eight years. For the Bank of England (BoE), the situation
is different: not until 2060 will the expanded government
securities portfolio reach its equilibrium level after the GBP 375
billion expansion that has occurred in recent years.

Interest rate hikes in small steps
Our main forecast (see International overview) is that interest
rate hikes will be carried out cautiously and that key
interest rates will remain historically low. This is also
consistent with what the BoE and the Fed are communicating.
For example, BoE Governor Mark Carney has emphasised that
2.5 per cent, not 5 per cent, is the new normal for the
British base rate and that this level can be achieved by early
2017. In itself, it is worth noting that central banks are often
inclined to signal a cautious strategy at the beginning of a
hiking cycle, when they are not yet sure that the recovery is
firmly established. In the current situation, however, we see
several reasons why the low interest rate scenario will stick:
1. Sluggish cyclical growth. Healing processes following the
global recession/financial crisis are continuing, but debt levels
Theme: What should central banks aim for?

remain dangerously high in some countries. This will impede
growth for years to come, due to deleveraging, higher
emergency saving and more cautious capital spending. A
lengthy period of lower average growth is compatible with
lower real interest rates.
2. Slower long-term growth. An ageing population and in all
likelihood slower productivity growth point in the direction of
slower real potential growth, compared to recent decades.
Credit-driven growth before the crisis broke out in 2008
probably helped mask an underlying trend towards falling
productivity growth in developed economies. This signals a
new environment of lower real equilibrium interest rates.
3. Continued downward pressure on inflation. Expanded
production resources in the commodity, energy and food
industries as well as more efficient resource utilisation are
expected to push down their prices in the future. Meanwhile
globalisation implies further integration of production capacity
in Asia/Africa and downward pressure on wages and
salaries. Today inflation is, in many respects, a global
phenomenon with national output gaps gradually
diminishing in monetary policy importance.
4. The new role of macroprudential supervision policies.
The development and launching of new tools that regulate
credit volumes will ease the burden on monetary policy makers
and thereby make lower key interest rates possible.
Not too quickly
The economic recovery of recent years has been generally
lacklustre in most large industrialised countries. Debt
deleveraging needs have weakened the effectiveness of
monetary policy and made their economies less interest rate-
sensitive. But this is not symmetric. Because private debt
remains at record-high levels, future rate hikes after a long
period of low interest rates may have a powerful impact on
the economy despite continued low interest rates.
Global private debt and interest rate trend
USD trillion and per cent

Sourcer: BIS
A number of factors will play a role in how future interest rate
hikes are planned and implemented:
1. Aggregate financial conditions increasingly important.
Recent communications from central banks indicate a greater
interest in the aggregate effect of monetary policy on currency
rates, credit spreads and stock markets. If interest rate hikes
result in unexpectedly tight financial conditions due to falling
share prices, rising long-term yields and appreciating currency,
it is thus likely that central bank actions will be more cautious.
2. Political pressure on central banks. Due to a lack of fiscal
policy manoeuvring room, central banks will remain under
pressure to help sustain economic growth. An increased focus
by economic policy makers on capital spending as the most
important growth force will also accentuate the need for
continued low interest rates.
3. Target symmetry will lead to increased acceptance for
rising inflation. In recent years inflation has been well below
central bank targets, while resource utilisation has been low.
For reasons of symmetry, central banks will thus probably be
less sensitive to inflation and inflation expectations being
above their targets for a time. Lingering risks of setbacks and
stagnation also point to such increased acceptance.
4. Global considerations will have a certain influence.
During the crisis, monetary policy cooperation was easier
because countries faced similar economic and financial
challenges. Now that we are moving towards greater inflation
and growth divergence, the tensions in global monetary policy
cooperation will probably increase. Taking global factors into
account is not part of central bank mandates. Yet it is likely
that the Fed, the BoE and others will be subjected to pressure
to take into account the effects on global capital streams and
exchange rates when they shape their normalisation strategies.
and not too slowly
Acting too slowly also entails risks. Low interest rates and
generous access to money boost risk-taking, but it is far from
certain that this leads to productive investments. In an
environment where investors are searching for returns, there
are obvious risks of financial imbalances and poor real
investments. Although macroprudential supervision policies
are gaining in importance, there is not yet a broad consensus
on what role interest rates should play in regulating credit
growth or countering asset price bubbles. Delaying interest
rate hikes for too long also decreases pressure on political
systems to implement structural reforms, while postponing
necessary balance sheet adjustments in the private sector.
We arrive at the following overall conclusions:
Weak demographic and productivity trends indicate that
potential future GDP growth will be lower than in recent
decades.
Structural reasons point to a lower real equilibium interest
rate. Central banks will regard a level of around 3 per cent
as the new benchmark for a neutral key interest rate.
High debt levels and a long period of exceptionally low
interest rates will imply high interest rate sensitivity in
many economies. This will probably make central banks
extra cautious in the medium term.
A lower neutral key interest rate will mean that asset prices
will generally be at a higher level than before the crisis.
The United States

Interest rate hikes looming ahead

Incomes and consumption growing faster
Home price increases decelerating
Vigorous labour market
Wage inflation rebounding from low level

After a very weak first quarter, the American economy has
regained its energy. GDP growth in the second quarter was 4.0
per cent on an annualised basis, and indicators are exuding
optimism. The recovery is thus continuing as planned, with
households as the growth engine. Business investments are
also gaining momentum, while residential investments are
falling short of our earlier forecasts. Overall, we predict that
GDP growth will reach 2.2 per cent this year, 3.4 per cent
in 2015 and 3.1 per cent in 2016 above potential and
consensus in all three years. Cyclical sectors remain depressed,
an indication that the recovery will continue for several more
years, especially since the Federal Reserve is proceeding
cautiously with interest rate normalisation. The first key
interest rate hike will come in April 2015, and by the end of
our forecast period, the key rate will stand at 2.50 per cent: in
line with the Feds estimate, but well above futures pricing.
During the past six months, employment growth has been the
strongest in 17 years. Unemployment, which will amount to
5.9 per cent at the end of 2014, will continue falling to 5.0
per cent at the end of 2016 according to our forecasts:
somewhat below the Feds latest estimate. Inflation curves are
pointing upward, and the deflation threat feels distant, but
our main scenario is that inflation will remain low during the
next couple of years. Food and commodity prices will be
restrained in the short term, but the resource situation points
to a normalisation of wage-driven inflation.
Temporary factors have lowered 2014 GDP
American GDP fell by 2.1 per cent during the first three
months of this year. This is of great importance to full-
year 2014 growth, and we have sharply lowered our
forecast to 2.2 per cent. Various temporary factors
severe winter weather, the phase-out of a programme for
the chronically unemployed, de-stocking in the
automotive industry, tougher new lending requirements
and regulations introduced on January 1 plus acceleration
of business investments for accounting reasons explain
the downturn.
GDP growth bounced back vigorously in the second
quarter, and despite the dip early in 2014, GDP growth
has averaged 2.5 per cent viewed over the past four
quarters. The strong outlook is likely to persist: business
and consumer surveys point to continued good
underlying economic dynamism.

Incomes are driving consumption higher
We see several reasons for consumer optimism.
Household debt has decreased by about USD 1 trillion since its
peak, and the credit bubble that built up in 2003-2007 has
definitely been punctured. The debt service ratio (interest
and principal costs as a percentage of income) is at record
lows. Credit quality has also greatly improved, while the
percentage of borrowers who are delinquent and in danger of
default has also fallen to low levels. Loans to businesses and
for commercial construction are already growing rapidly, but in
the past six months various forms of consumer credit have also
expanded. One indication that confidence has returned to
The United States

the household sector is the strong light vehicle sales earlier
this summer.
Lagging wealth effects from rising share and home prices also
indicate that consumption growth is now accelerating.
Incomes are already showing robust rates of increase and
the latest six-month period has been the strongest in eight
years. Real disposable incomes rose at a 3.5 per cent rate in the
first quarter and 3.8 per cent in the second, driving up the
household savings ratio to 5.3 per cent. The conditions are
thus in place for stronger consumption growth. Private
consumption will increase by an average of 2.7 per cent in
2014-2016, compared to 2.1 per cent in 2010-2013.
Business investments gaining momentum
We see several reasons for stronger capital spending growth
after last years dip. The average age of factories and
machinery is 22 years: the highest figure since the 1950s.
Capacity utilisation has normalised to levels that have
historically been compatible with capital spending growth of 7-
10 per cent. Meanwhile fiscal policy uncertainty has
diminished, due to the two-year federal budget now in place. A
combination of easier bank lending terms and strong corporate
earnings and cash reserves also means that financing will not
be an obstacle. Optimistic companies our composite ISM
purchasing managers index is compatible with real GDP
growth of 5 per cent also point to growth-promoting
investments. Such a robust GDP increase is not in our forecast,
but stronger demand still justifies a capital spending
upswing averaging 7.5 per cent in 2014-2016.

Downshift in home price increases
Since residential construction bottomed out in 2009, its
recovery has been relatively weak in a historical perspective;
for example, housing starts are still at a level consistent with
the lows in previous economic cycles. Lingering crisis effects,
combined with a major decline in labour mobility, are two
reasons behind the sluggish recovery. Early in the year,
residential investments and construction sector confidence
were also hampered by severe winter weather and by the
introduction of tougher regulations and credit standards
banks are still considerably more restrictive with home
loans compared to other types of consumer credits.
As earlier, we believe that residential investments and housing
starts will continue to climb, but the upturn will be more
lacklustre than we previously forecasted. The stronger labour
market is continuing to improve conditions for first-time home
buyers, an important group. Over the past year, employment
among people aged 25-34 has increased by 700,000 jobs.
Meanwhile residential construction has fallen about one million
units per year short of demographic demand since 2008. There
is thus a pent-up need for housing, and we predict 1.8 million
housing starts annually by the end of our forecast period.

Fewer households are moving
The percentage of the population who move each year
has trended downward from just below 20 per cent in the
early 1990s to less than 12 per cent today. Several factors
explain the downturn. Until the middle of the last decade,
US home ownership increased at the expense of renting,
causing a lock-in effect and resulting in fewer moves. In
the wake of the economic crisis, home prices then fell
steeply; selling and moving in that situation would have
resulted in capital losses for many households. Additional
factors that slow housing market mobility are an ageing
population and the fact that more and more households
now have two breadwinners. Falling mobility is one
reason why the housing market recovery has been
weak so far by historical standards.
Looking ahead, however, the prospects are brighter. The
percentage of households who own their homes has
fallen sharply in recent years, and more people are
renting instead. This is highly important, because renters
have four-five times higher mobility than home
owners. Home prices are also approaching their earlier
peaks. This means that fewer people are trapped in their
homes by negative equity. But demographics will
continue to hamper mobility, since older people are less
likely to move house than younger people.

After a 12 per cent increase last year, home prices according to
the Case-Shiller 20-City Index are currently rising at a year-on-
year rate of 9 per cent. This deceleration is in line with our
forecasts of slower price increases of 8 per cent in 2014
The United States

and 6 per cent in 2015. In 2016, home prices will increase by 3
per cent.
Unemployment will continue to fall
The American labour market is enjoying a tailwind. For the
first time since 1997, job growth has exceeded 200,000 for six
months in a row. Current levels of newly registered job seekers
indicate that this favourable trend will continue. The four-week
average was recently below 300,000 for the first time since
February 2006 a level historically compatible with at least
4 per cent real GDP growth. So far in 2014, employment has
increased by an average of 230,000 jobs per month, which
means that our earlier job growth forecasts were on the
cautious side. We are now predicting that employment will
climb by an average of 220,000 per month in 2014-2016.
Most indications are that unemployment will continue to
fall. Job growth is considerably faster than the long-term trend.
The Chicago Fed estimates a trend level of 80,000 new jobs
per month, while other analyses end up a bit higher.
Businesses are also beginning to have difficulty recruiting new
employees; even now, 33 per cent of small businesses believe
they cannot find qualified workers, and these problems are
likely to increase over time. The trend of labour market
participation will be a key issue ahead. For example, the IMF
estimates that one third of the downturn in recent years is
cyclical. We also expect a slight recovery in participation over
the next couple of years, although for demographic reasons
the long-term trend is downward. Overall, we predict that
unemployment will gradually fall to 5.0 per cent by the
end of 2016. This is a bit below non-accelerating inflation rate
unemployment (NAIRU) or equilibrium unemployment
which is 5.6 per cent according to the Congressional Budget
Office and 5.4 per cent according to the Fed. The level is also
relatively low in a historical perspective; unemployment
bottomed out at 3.8 and 4.4 per cent, respectively during the
two previous economic cycles.
Pay hikes will boost inflation somewhat
The resource situation points to somewhat higher
inflation during the next couple of years. Capacity
utilisation in manufacturing is approaching its historical
average, while labour market gaps are closing: an estimated 50
million people are already working in sectors that have full
employment. In light of this, the Fed toned down deflation risk
when announcing its latest key interest rate decision.
In some respects, todays wage formation is following the
pattern from the three previous economic cycles. Wage
inflation did not bottom out until five years into the recovery
both in the 1980s and the 1990s. During the latest economic
upturn, wage increases bottomed out in 2005 three years
after the recovery began. This time around, average hourly
wage increases bottomed out at 1.3 per cent in October 2012
and have risen by about one percentage point since then.
Wage inflation remains low but is trending upward, and
small business planning for wage increases is consistent with
continued upturns. Average hourly wages will increase at a
3.5 per cent rate by the end of 2015 according to our
forecasts. The rate of increase in average weekly pay has
already reached the 3 per cent mark.
Inflation increased from 0.9 per cent in October 2013 to 2.0 per
cent in July. Prices are rising faster in the service sector, while
the inflation trend in the goods sector is pointing downward.
CPI inflation will be 1.9 per cent both this year and next:
unchanged from our earlier forecasts. In 2016, prices will
increase by 2.2 per cent. The risk picture is nicely balanced:
food and energy prices may lead to lower inflation figures,
while inflation may also end up higher if wages and salaries
accelerate faster. Core inflation, which has climbed since the
turn of the year, will continue its weak upward trend, especially
since the upturn in housing costs appears likely to persist.
The United States

Budget deficit is shrinking steadily
Federal revenue is increasing twice as fast as expenditures, and
the budget deficit is continuing to decrease. According to the
latest figures, the cumulative deficit was USD 460 billion a
major improvement compared to July 2013, when the
corresponding figure was USD 607 billion, not to mention July
2009 when the deficit was three times as large. Since this
improvement is taking place concurrently with the tapering
process, this means that the Fed is still buying about an equally
large share of government bonds. In July, the central bank
purchased 44 per cent of all Treasury securities issued. The
Fed thus still dominates the sovereign bond market, which
has probably helped keep long-term yields down.
The budget deficit, estimated at 6.4 per cent of GDP this year,
will fall to 5.5 per cent next year. Fiscal consolidation will
continue and in 2016 the deficit will be just below 5 per cent
of GDP.
Fed will hike its key rate in April 2015
When the Fed ends its stimulative bond purchases in October
this year, its balance sheet will be equivalent to 25 per cent of
GDP, around USD 4.5 trillion nearly six times larger than
before the crisis. The markets focus will thus soon shift to
when the central bank will again raise its key interest rate. It
has been a long time; the last rate hike occurred in June 2006.
In practice, it looks as if the Fed has a wage target for
its monetary policy. The bank explicitly wishes to see average
hourly wages increasing by 3-4 per cent year-on-year before
beginning its rate hikes. Because wages are lagging behind
unemployment, which in turn is lagging behind the real
economy, the central bank has room and arguments to
continue pursuing its zero interest rate policy for another while.
To ensure that interest rate hikes do not derail the recovery
prematurely, it is important that households are sustained
by rising income curves; otherwise high interest on debt will
threaten to sink the recovery. After the debt deleveraging of
recent years, household balance sheets are also in good shape,
which banks have already taken advantage of. Apart from
home mortgage loans, lending is increasing on a broad
front.
Pay increases in line with the Feds target interval will occur in
mid-2015, according to our forecasts. Our forecast that
unemployment will continue to fall relatively fast nevertheless
indicates that the first rate hike may occur a bit earlier.
One important question is whether a continued zero interest
rate will create credibility problems for monetary policy as
unemployment creeps closer to 6 per cent and eventually
lower. Viewed over the last five rate hiking cycles from 1988
onward, unemployment has averaged 5.8 per cent when
Fed rate hikes began. Average capacity utilisation in
manufacturing has been 81 when interest rate hikes began,
compared to 79 per cent today.
Our forecast is that the first rate hike to 0.25-0.50 will
occur in April 2015. At the end of next year, the key rate will
stand at 1.25 per cent and at the end of 2016 at 2.5 per cent
according to our forecasts, which also closely match the Feds
forecasts. The market still believes that rate hikes will be
substantially slower. The futures market is pricing in a key
rate of 0.67 per cent at the end of 2015 and 1.62 per cent at
the end of 2016.
Neutral interest rate is lower today
A neutral or equilibrium interest rate is a key interest rate
that will keep GDP growth at its potential level, while
maintaining full employment and a trend of inflation in
line with central bank targets. A neutral interest rate is
often analysed in real terms, that is, key interest rate
corrected for inflation.
According to the Feds forecasts, the real neutral
interest rate is 1.75 per cent today. Before the financial
crisis, it was often generally assumed that the real neutral
interest rate was around 2 per cent which is a bit
remarkable since the average from 1990 to 2006 was 1.4
per cent. Since there are many indications that potential
GDP growth and expected real return on assets have
fallen since the crisis, the real interest rate should also be
lower today. Since capital adequacy requirements are
also stricter, this means in practice that for any given key
interest rate, the long-term interest rates at which banks
lend to households and businesses will be higher. The
Feds quantitative easing has flattened the yield curve,
though, which has the opposite effect. Our overall
assessment is that the real neutral interest rate is
closer to 1 per cent, clearly below the Feds official view.
If inflation ends up close to the Feds 2 per cent target,
this will result in a nominal neutral key interest rate of 3
per cent, rather than 3.75 per cent as the Feds own
forecasts show. This, in turn, indicates that the central
bank will proceed cautiously with its key rate hikes, and
that the peak key interest rate once it occurs will be
well below earlier levels. Not until the end of 2016 will the
real key interest rate exceed zero, according to our
forecasts.

Theme: Is low potential growth in the US here to stay?


Okuns law: Potential GDP growth has been
close to zero since 2009
Our estimate: Around 2 per cent
New technology will determine whether the
slowdown will be temporary
Neutral interest rates are lower today

In recent years, the relationship between GDP growth and
labour market developments has diverged greatly from the
historical pattern. Since the recovery began in 2009, GDP
growth has averaged 2.2 per cent very low in historical terms.
Yet unemployment has fallen sharply from its peak of 10 per
cent in October 2009 to 6.2 per cent today. Okuns law can
illustrate how exceptional this development is. According to
this law, unemployment falls by half a percentage point for
each percentage point that GDP growth exceeds the potential
rate. Okuns law indicates that potential GDP growth has
been as low as 0.3 per cent so far during the recovery.
Such a negative view of potential growth seems greatly
exaggerated, however. Changes in labour supply and
productivity have probably been exceptional during the
recovery. It is also possible that actual GDP growth will be
adjusted upward later. Still, this development is worrisome and
the question of whether lower potential GDP growth will be
temporary or lasting will be very important in the future.

According to the textbooks, long-term GDP growth is created
by labour (more hours worked), capital (investments in
infrastructure, machinery and factories) and new technology.
Since the economic recovery began, US population growth has
been the weakest since the days of the 1930s depression.
Meanwhile the population is ageing and the upward trend in
womens labour force participation has probably levelled out
permanently. Our estimate of the long-term annual growth
trend in labour supply is thus around 0.5 per cent, but it is
difficult to estimate the effect of migration flows on the labour
supply. By all indications, the US labour market will remain
internationally attractive; in a stronger economic situation, this
may potentially mean somewhat faster labour supply growth.
Labour productivity growth has slowed in the past decade.
Both in a five- and ten-year perspective, average yearly growth
is around 1.5 per cent: far lower than in the 1980s and 90s. In
the past three years, however, the average has dropped to 1.0
per cent. Low capital spending has also greatly undermined
US capital stock. In recent years, the growth in capital stock
has been the weakest since measurements began. This has
presumably had an impact in the form of lower productivity.
In the long term, future technology will determine the growth
outlook. The pessimistic way of viewing this matter is that
technological progress will continue but new discoveries will
weigh more lightly than earlier giant leaps such as the
combustion engine and the light bulb. Although computers
are becoming more powerful, this does not deliver a higher
living standard to most people. The IT boom of the 1990s led
to higher productivity, but the effect was rather short-term.
Optimists, on the other hand, look ahead at how
computerisation will change the playing field even in such
knowledge-based sectors as economics, law and health care.
Freeing up a large quantity of labour even in typical
knowledge-based sectors will greatly boost productivity
figures. Robot technology is also still in its infancy, from an
optimists point of view.
To summarise, our estimate of potential real GDP growth
today is around 2 per cent annually. While the impact of
new technology is hard to judge, we know with great certainty
that the population structure will continue to push down
potential GDP growth. Even if the dip in potential growth is
temporary and the post-war trend of 3 per cent resumes at
some point, this is not likely to occur any time soon. As a result,
the neutral key interest rate will probably be lower in this
cycle and, consequently, the Feds coming peak interest
rate as well.
Japan

Further stimulus needed while waiting for reforms
Disappointing exports and industrial output
Structural reforms key to higher wages

Aprils consumption tax hike has resulted in choppy growth so
far this year. GDP surged in the first quarter due to accelerated
consumption and capital spending, followed by a setback in
the second quarter. The recovery will regain momentum this
autumn and the economy will continue to grow above
trend: by 1.1 per cent in 2014 and 1.2 per cent in 2015,
followed by a deceleration to 0.8 per cent in 2016.
This summers developments are raising questions about the
underlying strength of the economy, thus providing support for
our relatively cautious forecast. Yen depreciation has not yet
boosted exports. One interpretation is that relocating
production elsewhere in Asia has weakened the currency rate
sensitivity of Japans foreign trade. But it is also likely that the
economic slowdown in the US and China early in 2014 spilled
over into the rest of Asia. We thus foresee an export rebound,
sustained by growing international demand, during our
forecast period. The positive effects on the trade balance will
be limited by continued large energy imports while awaiting
the gradual restarting of domestic nuclear power plants.
Industrial production has trended downward all year, and
machinery orders have dropped sharply but sentiment
indicators paint a brighter picture of the situation in both
manufacturing and the business sector as a whole. The
quarterly Bank of Japan (BoJ) Tankan survey shows sentiment
at historically high levels, and companies have again raised
their capital spending outlook. The most expansionary
investment plans as well as the greatest optimism are found in
the construction industry, which will enjoy an added surge
ahead of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games.
Consumer confidence has recovered after dipping in April,
sustained by the labour market. Unemployment has now fallen
to levels that the BoJ and others believe will push up wages
and salaries. According to Tankan, the labour market has not
been tighter since the early 1990s. Pay is now rising year-on-
year, but far from enough to keep up with the inflation upturn.
Household purchasing power is thus being squeezed.
CPI inflation rose to 3.6 per cent in June, but excluding the
effects of the tax hike, inflation remains below 2 per cent. The
BoJs target variable (CPI excluding fresh food) is at about 1.25
per cent excluding tax effects. The inflation impulse from the
earlier yen depreciation is now gradually fading an indication
that the BoJ will find it difficult to achieve its target of
stabilising inflation at around 2 per cent. This is reflected in
the pricing of expected inflation in 10-year CPI swaps, which
has levelled out at a bit above 1 per cent. Our forecast is that
inflation will rise from 0.4 per cent in 2013 year to 2.7 per cent
this year, then 1.7 per cent in 2015 and 2.0 per cent in 2016,
including the effects of 2014 and 2015 consumption tax hikes.
Excluding the tax hike, inflation will remain around todays
levels of somewhat above 1 percent and the upturn expected
by the BoJ from the end of 2014 will fail to materialise.

The key to sustainably higher inflation is wages and salaries,
but the low rate of pay increases is only partly due to
cyclical factors. In recent decades, real wages have steadily
lagged behind productivity improvements. Meanwhile the
Japanese labour market has become increasingly divided, with
a sizeable increase in the share of part-timers and employees
not covered by centralised pay agreements, who have a harder
time negotiating higher wages. In order to speed up the rate of
pay hikes, a reform of the labour market will thus be required.
This summer, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched the third
arrow of his economic plan: a list of reforms to improve wage
formation and to sustainably boost both productivity and the
labour supply, thereby raising potential GDP growth from
todays 0.5 per cent or so. But concrete details are still
missing in several key areas. Meanwhile it will take time before
such reforms affect the economy. At the same time, the
government remains under pressure to bring down its deficits
for example by making a decision this autumn on the next
consumption tax hike to 10 per cent in October 2015
especially if it carries out the planned corporate tax cut.
Low inflation and another consumption tax hike means the BoJ
must stimulate the economy further. During fall, we expect the
BoJ to increase its bond purchase programme to JPY 100 trn
annually from todays JPY 60-70 trn. This will also contribute to
a renewed depreciation in the yen to 125 per USD late in 2016.
Asia

Modest growth acceleration, but China will slow down

Gradual GDP acceleration, followed by
levelling out in 2016
China: External demand and targeted
stimuli offsetting weak real estate sector
India: Election outcome will benefit growth

We expect growth to strengthen gradually in Asias emerging
economies during the next few quarters. Exports to OECD
countries will gain strength as the recovery progresses and will
be the main driver of growth. Meanwhile continued soft
monetary policies and strong labour markets will help to
sustain domestic demand in most economies.
Yet due in part to other forces, GDP acceleration in the
region as a whole will be moderate, levelling out in 2016.
Chinas expected slowdown will restrain economic activity in
the region over the next few years. Credit growth is also
unsustainably high in some economies. So far this discussion
has focused on China, but countries like Thailand and
Singapore also have a very high credit growth. When lending
must be slowed in the future, the impact on domestic demand
may be significant in individual countries. However, there is
little likelihood of a broad, deep downturn similar to the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s, among other things because
of todays more robust system of floating exchange rates as
well as improved external balances. Beyond our forecast
horizon, various economies including China and South Korea
will also be hampered by worsening demographics. Escalating
geopolitical tensions in the region, driven by Chinas increasing
influence, also risk hampering long-term investment appetite.
Inflation pressure generally remains low in the region,
although India and Indonesia are major exceptions. Yet even in
these countries, inflation has begun to ease. There is thus
room for continued soft monetary policies in the region for a
while longer; we expect a more general tightening only during
2015. One upside inflation risk is a scenario of rising oil prices.
Most Asian economies are net oil importers. Indonesia, for
example, is especially sensitive due to its sizeable current
account deficit.
Asian stock markets, and to some extent currencies, have
continued to strengthen in recent months. Worries related to
the Ukraine conflict have not had an impact. Hopes of
increased reform measures in India and Indonesia following
the recent elections have helped sustain their local stock
markets, but financial developments have also been positive in
most other economies. The impact of the US Federal Reserves
coming monetary policy tightening remains a source of
uncertainty, however, although financial market turbulence
similar to that of summer 2013 is not expected to recur.
China: Growth target within reach
Chinese economic growth during the first half of 2014 was
somewhat better than expected. In the second quarter, GDP
growth accelerated marginally to 7.5 per cent year-on-year,
compared to 7.4 per cent in Q1. The quarter ended strongly.
Most final statistics from recent months, both indicators and
hard data, have shown improvements or stabilisation. Both
Chinas official purchasing managers index and the Markit PMI
have risen in recent months, and other leading indicators have
risen cautiously.

The performance of the real estate sector remains very weak
and is the most serious downside risk today. The main
problem is that construction has expanded much faster than
demand. There has been a sharp cutback in construction
Asia

volume although there are some indications of recovery. The
construction sector will be a restraining factor for economic
growth for a long time ahead. Home prices have fallen month-
on-month for three consecutive months, but in itself this is not
necessarily anything negative since a downward price
adjustment improves the situation of households in the
residential market and reduces the risk of price bubbles.
So far in 2014, construction sector weakness has been offset
by improved external demand as well as by the targeted
measures the authorities carried out in the spring and
summer. Measures to counter weakness in the real estate
sector have nevertheless consisted of fine-tuning rather than
large-scale stimulus. Just as in 2012, increased infrastructure
investments have also been used in order to speed up activity.

Exports have gained strength in recent months. The
picture has also become clearer, since over-invoicing for tax
reasons -- - which previously made trade statistics difficult to
interpret -- - has now vanished from monthly figures. The recent
export upturn is due to stronger US and EU demand. There is,
moreover, good potential for continued decent performance,
since economic growth will gradually speed up in 2014 and
2015. Imports are far more sluggish than exports and declined
year-on-year in July. One important reason is lower demand for
commodities, in turn driven by the weak performance of the
real estate sector. The trade surplus is again at record highs,
pushing the yuan higher and causing Chinas foreign currency
reserve to reach new record levels. Industrial production has
accelerated cautiously in recent months, yet the rate of
increase is still well below that of early 2014.
Overall conditions are favourable for the Chinese economy to
achieve or come close to the official 2014 growth target of 7.5
per cent. Based on somewhat faster first half expansion than
expected, we are raising our GDP forecast somewhat, but we
believe that the deceleration trend will continue during our
forecast period, driven by a slowdown in credit growth and
capital spending. We expect GDP to increase by 7.5 per
cent in 2014, followed by a slowing in the growth rate to
7.3 per cent in 2015 and 6.9 per cent in 2016.
The weak real estate market will remain a key issue for
economic policy. Tight housing market regulations have been
cautiously eased, and banks have been ordered to increase
their lending for home purchases. There are also efforts to
improve borrowing opportunities for small and medium-sized
businesses. Last spring, authorities eased reserve requirements
at certain banks. These policy measures have recently helped
to slow the deceleration in total lending. But looking ahead, the
authorities must keep limiting credit growth to mitigate the
imbalances in the economy caused by inefficient lending.
If Chinas economy should weaken more severely, there is
plenty of room for both monetary and fiscal stimulus. Although
monetary policy has already been softened, borrowing costs
especially for small and medium-sized businesses remain
high. Yet we believe that no extensive stimulus measures will
be needed. As long as the growth target is not perceived as
being in danger, we instead expect a focus on structural
reforms. China has also undertaken further reform measures in
recent months. For example, local authorities in some
provinces will be allowed to issue their own bonds. This reform
is a step in the right direction and will increase transparency.
The inflation rate was 2.3 per cent in July. Although we expect
inflation to accelerate a bit during the rest of 2014 driven by
rising food prices it will remain below 3 per cent. Producer
prices are still falling year-on-year, but a rebound has begun.
These price declines mainly reflect weak commodity price
trends rather than businesses being forced to cut prices. Core
inflation remains below 2 per cent. The overall picture is one of
low inflation pressure; the risk of rising prices is thus no
constraint on policy makers. We expect full-year 2014
inflation of 2.5 per cent and foresee inflation of 2.7 per
cent in 2015 and 3.0 per cent in 2016.

In recent months, the yuan has begun to appreciate against the
USD, after weakening sharply in February and March because
Chinas central bank wanted to counter capital inflows. Yuan
depreciation attracted great attention. The central bank is
probably pleased about having shown financial markets that
the currency can also weaken for long periods. But the
fundamental factors driving appreciation remain in place.
Record-sized trade surpluses are creating clear upward
pressure and large-scale capital inflows are also contributing to
this. We thus believe that long-term yuan appreciation will
continue, but this process will move at a leisurely pace. We
expect volatility to increase as China continues its move
Asia

towards a freely floating currency. We expect a USD/CNY
exchange rate of 5.90 at the end of 2014, 5.80 at the end
of 2015 and 5.70 at the end of 2016.
India: New government raises reform hopes
The victory of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in
last Mays parliamentary election was anticipated, but the party
unexpectedly won its own majority in the Lok Sabha (lower
house): 282 out of 543 seats. Led by Narendra Modi, the BJP
campaigned on a business-friendly programme including
extensive reforms. Its majority will create far better potential
to push through reforms than if the election outcome had
been a coalition government. Key elements of these reforms
will be to speed up capital spending and infrastructure projects
and try to loosen restrictive labour market laws. Despite its
lower house majority, the BJP still faces obstacles to its
reforms. The BJP and its allies have no upper house majority,
and the party will also be forced to work together with local
parties in Indias states, which often oppose reforms.
So far, the government has not released very many details
about how it will meet reform expectations. Although the
budget unveiled in July was tighter than predicted, with an
ambitious target of reducing the deficit to 4.1 per cent of GDP
this fiscal year, it included no large-scale reform package as
many had hoped. Nor were there any indications of how the
government will be able to reduce large subsidy expenses. The
budget presented only minor reforms: deregulation of foreign
investments in the defence and insurance sectors and a pledge
to review tax disputes. There is a risk that high expectations
of the Modi government will be disappointed unless it
soon presents more concrete reform proposals, thereby
showing in what ways it differs from the previous government.
There will be a time lag before reforms are implemented and
have positive growth effects. During the next few quarters,
there is little chance of a clear GDP acceleration. First quarter
GDP grew by 4.6 per cent year-on-year, and we do not believe
that second quarter growth was much faster. There are some
bright spots, however. Purchasing managers indices in both
the manufacturing and service sector have improved, although
levels remain low. Industrial production has recovered
somewhat in recent months, but it is too early to say whether
there will be a sustained recovery. Accelerating exports have
helped to push down the trade deficit, which during the first
quarter of 2014 was the smallest since early 2009.

One key factor hampering vigorous growth recovery is heavy
debt among Indian companies. Combined with continued tight
monetary policy, this is holding back capital spending. Overall,
we are thus making a relatively cautious upward revision of
our May growth forecast in Nordic Outlook, based on the
improved potential for economic reforms, but if reform efforts
begin in earnest there is good chance of even higher growth. In
2014 we expect GDP to increase by 5.0 per cent,
accelerating to 5.8 per cent in 2015 and 6.2 per cent in
2016.
Inflation has decelerated somewhat since the beginning of the
year but CPI inflation accelerated to 8.0 per cent in July and is
thus at the target that the Reserve Bank of India has set for the
beginning of 2015. The RBIs long-term target is inflation of 4
per cent, but the large role of food in the CPI basket creates
sensitivity to food price fluctuations. For example, a weak
monsoon risks leading to rising vegetables prices an upside
risk for inflation. The RBI has nevertheless shown a clear desire
to bring down inflation, despite potentially negative growth
consequences. We believe that inflation pressure will ease
during our forecast period. In 2014 we expect CPI inflation
to end up at 8.0 per cent, and in 2015 at 7.3 per cent. In
2016, inflation will slow further to 6.7 per cent.
Because of the recent inflation slowdown and the RBIs belief
that it will achieve its inflation target for early 2015, the key
interest rate can remain at todays 8.0 per cent during the rest
of 2014. In 2015 we expect that the RBI can begin easing
monetary policy as inflation pressure softens.
The rupee has weakened against the USD since last spring, but
the currency remains well above its September 2013 lows. At
the end of 2014 we expect the rupee to stand at 57.0.
However, with the Fed expected to start hiking interest
rates the rupee will likely weaken in 2015 to 60.0 by year
end. In 2016 the rupee will strengthen again to 55.0 by
year-end.

The euro zone

Weak growth with deflationary tendencies

Italy and France losing ground
Trade sanctions increasing downside risks
Falling inflation expectations creating
sustained deflation risks
More ECB support coming, no QE until 2015

The economic situation remains weak, and the second
quarter brought new disappointments. Indicators point to
somewhat faster expansion ahead, and stimulus measures
from the European Central Bank (ECB) will provide support.
Fiscal policies will be largely neutral in 2015 and 2016 after
earlier austerity; if anything, lacklustre growth may lead to
acceptance of weakly expansionary fiscal policies despite high
debt levels. Consumption and capital spending are slowly
rebounding from depressed levels, and a weaker euro is
helping exports a bit. Our forecast is that GDP growth will
gradually rise from 0.7 per cent in 2014 to 1.1 per cent in
2015 and 1.5 per cent in 2016. Partly because of continued
balance sheet adjustments, growth will be fragile and uneven.
Competitiveness has not been completely restored in some
countries, and unemployment levels remain very high.

Risks to economic growth are on the downside. Since
Mays Nordic Outlook, relations with Russia have worsened and
sanctions have intensified in both directions. We believe the
current sanctions will have a certain impact on the euro zone
as a whole, partly via psychological channels. The direct effect
on exports will be relatively marginal for the overall region, but
noticeable in some countries especially Finland and the
Baltics. Sanctions create a downside risk for our forecast.
Renewed financial market turmoil, for example when the
results of the ECBs stress tests and asset quality review (AQR)
of euro zone bank assets are published in October, may
contribute to weaker economic performance, though we
regard these risks as small. First half 2014 growth was weaker
than expected, also accentuating the issue of whether balance
sheet adjustment will be a bigger obstacle to underlying
growth than we assume.
The ECBs broad action package in June including interest
rate cuts, conditional loans to banks and preparations to buy
asset-backed securities (ABSs) was well received, leading to
lower long-term bond yields and a weaker euro. Yet inflation
and especially inflation expectations have continued to fall.
The risk of a damaging deflation process has actually risen.
The ECB will leave interest rates unchanged but launch a
broad bond purchasing programme (quantitative easing or
QE, including weighted purchases of government bonds). We
believe that the central bank wants more time to evaluate the
measures presented/implemented in June and will
consequently not launch its new QE package until the first
quarter of 2015.

Euro zone economic and political integration remains sluggish.
In the European Parliament election, parties opposed to
expanded supranational powers gained ground. The new
European Commission is not yet in place. Among more EU-
friendly forces, there is meanwhile a tug-of-war between more
enthusiastic supporters of greater integration and pragmatists
who wish to hurry slowly. The EU election shows the need to
seek more public support and to explain why more centralised
power is needed, in order to avoid further fuelling the
popularity of anti-EU parties. What will probably happen is that
processes that have already started, such as the banking
union, will continue but the economic and political integration
roadmap unveiled in the summer of 2012 will largely be
shelved. Looking ahead, there is a risk that the slow integration
process may lead to a new crisis of confidence in the euro.
The euro zone

Economic indicators are diverging again
After converging last spring, indicators in major euro zone
countries have again begun diverging. Purchasing managers
indices (PMIs) in Germany, Italy and Spain are at around 55,
while in the past three months France has slipped below the
growth threshold of 50. In the euro zone as a whole, composite
PMI stood at 52.8 in August, roughly the same as in January.
Readings for manufacturing are slightly below the composite
index, indicating that exports are performing more weakly than
domestically oriented sectors. There are also divergences
among crisis-hit countries. PMIs in Greece (just below 50) and
Italy (just above 50) look worse than in Spain and Ireland. The
overall euro zone manufacturing PMI points to quarter-on-
quarter growth of 0.2-0.3 per cent in the near term.

As for short-term GDP trends, Germany despite some second
quarter weakness and Spain are performing more strongly
while France and Italy lag behind. This diverges from the
pattern in the first post-crisis years, when France was the
country that most successfully latched on to the German
recovery. We believe major euro zone countries will continue to
follow different paths in terms of 2015-2016 growth. German
and Spanish GDP will increase by about 1.5-2.0 per cent
annually, while France and Italy will end up with growth below
1 per cent.
Exports will take off slowly
So far this year export growth has cooled, failing to provide the
push that the euro zone needs in order to break out of its crisis.
In addition, industrial production weakened early in the
summer, falling in such countries as France and Italy in May
(year-on-year). Improved international economic conditions
and stronger competitiveness due to pay cuts and a weaker
euro will eventually help drive growth. Our calculations indicate
that a 10 per cent weakening of the euro against the US dollar
will raise aggregate GDP by one per cent in the space of a few
years. Overall, exports will increase by 2.5 per cent in 2014,
3.3 per cent in 2015 and 4.2 per cent in 2016.
The current account has improved in recent years, showing a
surplus of 1.5 per cent of GDP in 2013. In most cases, crisis-hit
countries have moved from deficit to balance or surplus,
largely due to falling domestic demand. We expect the surplus
to remain at the same level. Exports will improve, while imports
will climb as consumption and capital spending grow.
GDP
2013 2014 2015 2016
Germany 0.1 1.2 1.4 1.8
France 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.1
Italy -1.9 -0.2 0.5 0.8
Spain -0.1 1.3 1.9 2.1
Greece -3.9 0.1 1.5 2.2
Portugal -1.4 1.2 1.2 1.7
Ireland 0.2 1.7 2.3 2.3
GIPS countries -0.7 1.2 1.8 2.1
Euro zone -0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5
Source: Eurostat, SEB

Capital spending is slowly reviving
The level of capital spending has fallen sharply in recent years,
especially in crisis countries, but now seems to have bottomed
out. Capacity utilisation, which is low, has remained largely
unchanged in the past three years. Problems in the banking
sector are another restraint; lending to both households and
businesses continues to shrink. We believe that the credit
situation will ease late in 2014 once ECB stress test and AQR
results are published and shortcomings have started to be
dealt with.

Due to a certain increase in capacity utilisation, combined with
a better-functioning credit market, capital spending will slowly
rebound from todays depressed levels. Lingering uncertainty
about the underlying strength of the economy and the effects
of disruptions in trade with Russia will hamper capital
spending, but we expect a shift in economic policy priorities
towards fixed investments in order to provide some help. This
will occur because of both EU-level projects and targeted loans
that the ECB will provide to banks that boost their lending.
Although the economy is now growing again, partly because of
continued low capacity utilisation, capital spending will rise
very slowly. Capital spending will increase by 1.2 per cent
in 2014, 1.6 per cent in 2015 and 2.3 per cent in 2016.
The euro zone

Consumers not yet ready to spend
Consumer confidence is showing an upward trend, although it
lost some ground in June and July. Households generally view
the economic situation more positively, but still indicate that
they will be saving more. Despite cautious households, several
factors point to rising consumption in 2015 and 2016.
Unemployment will fall somewhat, while looser fiscal policies
and low interest rates will provide stimulus. Low inflation will
also contribute to purchasing power, which will increase by
about 1 per cent in 2015, although continued cost adjustment
needs in southern Europe will push down wages. Overall, we
anticipate that consumption will climb by 0.5 per cent in
2014, 0.8 per cent in 2015 and 1.2 per cent in 2016.

Slowly falling unemployment
Unemployment is slowly creeping lower. In May 2014 it
stood at 11.5 per cent. Jobless rates now seem to have peaked
in most countries but remain alarmingly high (Spain 24.5 per
cent, Portugal 14.1 per cent, Greece 27.3 per cent). In France
and Italy, too, unemployment is historically high. In Germany it
has fallen towards 5 per cent, the lowest since reunification.

One reason why euro zone unemployment is now falling is
lower labour force participation, but there has also been a
positive employment trend in 2014. The upturn is the first
since the third quarter of 2011. Job creation continues to rise,
but at such a weak rate that the downturn in unemployment
will be very moderate over the next couple of years. Much of
the upturn in joblessness can be viewed as cyclical, but it risks
becoming permanent if growth fails to take off. We estimate
that equilibrium unemployment is now around 9 per cent. The
IMF believes that economic weakness affects the jobless rate
for young people twice as much as that of people over age 25.
This underlines the importance of focusing policy on measures
that prevent exclusion of the young from the labour market.
Lower inflation and inflation expectations
Inflation continues to fall on a broad front in the euro
zone. The July preliminary figure according to the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) was 0.4 per cent well below
the ECBs target. Wage and price adjustments in crisis-hit
countries are holding down the average: both Greece and
Spain showed falling prices in July. But inflation in Germany
and France is also below 1 per cent. Falling food and energy
prices will push down inflation further this autumn. Generally
low inflation in the euro zone deepens the debt problems of
crisis countries and makes it harder to solve competitiveness
problems with the help of internal devaluations.

The ECBs June action programme has eased deflation pressure
somewhat, for example via a weaker euro, but exchange rates
will probably have rather little impact on inflation. Due to the
continued need to restore competitiveness in crisis-hit
countries, as well as high unemployment and moderate
growth, deflation risks remain. If anything, they have increased
in recent months. Inflation expectations continue to fall,
making the situation even more serious. We believe the region
as a whole will avoid deflation, but the margins are not wide.
Annual average HICP inflation will be 0.5 per cent in 2014,
rising to 0.6 per cent in 2015 and 0.9 per cent in 2016. Core
inflation in 2015-2016 will be somewhat below HICP.
ECB will wait and see, but more to come
Weak economic performance, low inflation and falling inflation
expectations prompted the ECB to act late last spring. On June
5, it approved various measures to increase monetary policy
stimulus and improve lending:
1) It cut the refi rate by 10 basis points to 0.15 per cent.
2) It cut the deposit rate equally much to -0.10 per cent.
3) It discontinued sterilisation in the Securities Markets
Programme (SMP), thus adding about EUR 156 billion in new
The euro zone

liquidity to the banking system.
4) It is offering banks up to four-year targeted long-term
refinancing operation (TLTRO) loans for onward lending to
the corporate sector. The offer applies on eight occasions
starting in September at the prevailing refi rate. The loans may
not exceed 7 per cent of total lending (excluding home loans)
and fall due in September 2018.
5) It is keeping main refinancing operations (MROs) as fixed
rate tender procedures with full allotment as long as there
is a need and at least until December 2016.
6) It is prolonging its expansion of the range of instruments
that may serve as collateral for loans in the ECB system until
September 2018.
7) It will intensify preparations to begin direct purchases of
Asset-Backed Securities (ABSs).

This package is powerful and has considerable signalling
value. It has already had an impact by helping create more
expansionary financial conditions, mainly due to the weaker
euro. Ten-year government bond yields have generally fallen
compared to the days before the ECB policy meeting, although
the spread against German bond yields which hit record lows
has widened. This has decreased the need for further interest
rate cuts and/or government bond purchases (QE) in the near
term. The ECB needs time to evaluate the effects of the
measures it has implemented. In addition, two measures
(TLTRO and ABS purchases) have not yet been launched.
Yet lingering deflation risks and falling inflation expectations
will put continued pressure on the ECB to act. We believe that
the ECB will leave its key rate untouched since negative
rates risk causing unnecessary uncertainty and worsening the
functionality of the interbank market. The ECB is more likely to
try strengthening its guidance on refi rate developments, for
example by linking future changes to inflation variables. Early
in 2015, once its latest actions have been evaluated, the ECB
will probably carry out large-scale asset purchases. Using
only ABS purchases will hardly be sufficient; instead it will
probably also implement government bond purchases.
One factor weighing down euro zone economic performance is
that households and businesses have not yet sufficiently
decreased their balance sheets. A study by the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) shows that lingering pressure
to correct balance sheets (to reduce debt levels) makes
economies less interest rate-sensitive and that only when
balance sheets have been adjusted can low key interest rates
support a recovery. At present, there is a clear divergence
between the US and the euro zone. In the US, households and
businesses have carried out sizeable deleveraging, while in the
euro zone the same process has just begun. This further
strengthens the arguments for unconventional ECB measures
as a complement to low interest rates.

ECB rotation, minutes, fewer meetings
Various ECB rules and procedures will soon change.
Some changes are governed by treaties; others are the
ECBs own reforms in its methods and communication.
When Lithuania joins the euro zone on January 1,
2015, the number of member countries will reach 19.
According to treaty, voting rights in the Governing
Council will begin to rotate. Thus one country, one
vote will not apply at all meetings. The 21 votes in the
Council will be allocated as follows: 1) The six
Executive Board members have permanent voting
rights. 2) The five largest countries (weighted 5/6 for
GDP and 1/6 for size of financial sector) get 4 votes. 3)
Other countries must share 11 votes, with a monthly
rotation. Overall, this change means that the
Executive Board and the five largest countries enjoy
more power due to higher voting frequency. This is
likely to result in a tougher battle for seats on the
Executive Council, even though its members do not
formally represent their home countries.
Starting on January 1, 2015, the ECB will also publish
minutes of monetary policy meetings. Published
minutes mean greater openness and transparency,
but there is also a risk that it will lead members to
become more cautious during their discussions.
The frequency of monetary policy meetings will
change to every six weeks, also starting on January
1, 2015. The ECB Governing Council will also have
more general meetings at least once a month.

Theme: Public debt problems persist in the euro zone


Smaller deficits and neutral fiscal policy
Higher interest expenses despite low rates
Tax relief may be considered once again if
stagnation tendencies persist

The era of major budget-tightening is over. Euro zone public
finances are moving in the right direction. Measured as change
in structural saving, fiscal policy will be largely neutral in
2014-2016. This may be regarded as a well-balanced policy,
given both the continued need for saving and the need to
avoid sabotaging the recovery. Public sector deficits will
shrink to 2.3 per cent of GDP in 2016, and public debt is
expected to peak at 96.3 per cent of GDP that year. Future
economic policies will largely focus on stimulating growth, for
example through tax cuts and infrastructure investments, but
we believe these measures will generally be funded, since
many countries still have sizeable deficits.
Net lending and gross debt
Public sector, per cent of GDP
Debt
2013 2014 2015 2016 2016
France -4.3 -3.9 -3.5 -3.5 96.0
Ireland -7.0 -4.8 -4.0 -4.0 119.0
Portugal -5.0 -4.0 -2.5 -2.5 125.0
Italy -2.8 -2.6 -2.5 -2.4 133.0
Spain -7.1 -6.2 -5.3 -5.0 103.0
Euro zone -3.0 -2.7 -2.3 -2.3 96.3
Source: Eurostat, SEB

Hard to reduce debt levels without growth
This summer, bond yields on government debt in a number of
euro zone countries reached record lows. It is clear that at the
moment, the market fully trusts the ECB to continue sustaining
the region. But even though budget deficits are now falling, the
long-term problems of high debt levels will persist.
Low bond yields make funding easier for euro zone countries,
but their impact on interest outlays occurs gradually since only
a small proportion of their debt is refinanced each year. In
crisis-hit countries, public sector interest outlays account for a
substantially higher proportion of GDP today than before the
crisis. The biggest difference is in Ireland, where these outlays
have quadrupled to the equivalent of 4.5 per cent of GDP in
2013. In Spain and Portugal they have doubled to 3.4 and 4.5
per cent of GDP, respectively. In France and Germany, interest
outlays as a percentage of GDP have instead decreased.

Because of low real economic growth and low inflation (or
deflation), nominal GDP is growing very slowly. This is one
reason why public debt, as a percentage of GDP, continues to
increase at an almost unchanged pace despite falling budget
deficits. Italy is a clear example of this problem. Although its
deficit is low by southern European standards, about 3 per cent
of GDP in 2013, its debt is climbing as a percentage of GDP.
Nominal GDP growth was just above zero, and the debt level
early in 2014 was clearly higher than in 2012 and 2013.

It is quite possible to get by with a high level of debt, but this
entails disadvantages and risks. It reduces fiscal manoeuvring
room and increases the likelihood of adverse effects on
confidence in troubled times. Todays low bond yield spreads
are highly dependent on ECB support. In the short and medium
term, there is no indication that this support will decrease, but
in the long term there is still a risk that yield spreads may
widen. Nor given continued tendencies towards stagnation
of nominal growth can we rule out the potential for further
debt write-offs or renegotiation of bail-out loans for the most
indebted countries in the euro zone.
The United Kingdom

Unemployment will fall below equilibrium level

Households and companies exude optimism
Low inflation will slow interest rate hikes
Scotland will stay in the United Kingdom

The British economy has wind in its sails. GDP has now
regained its entire loss during the financial crisis. The UK will
report the highest 2014 growth among G7 countries. The
economy will continue upward, with GDP growth at a robust
2.8 per cent in 2015 and 2.6 per cent in 2016: a bit above
consensus. The labour market is strong but is not causing pay
increases to speed up. At the end of 2016, unemployment
will be at 5 per cent, somewhat below equilibrium. Meanwhile
we predict that inflation will fall below target throughout
our forecast period. This indicates that the Bank of England
(BoE) will hike its key interest rate slowly, starting in the first
quarter of 2015. By the end of 2015 the key rate will be at 1.25
per cent, and by the end of 2016 at 1.75 per cent.
Job creation is rapid today. Employment is at its highest level in
23 years. Meanwhile unemployment is falling. Yet wage and
salary growth remains subdued, a sign that there is still spare
capacity in the British labour market. The BoE also lowered its
estimate of equilibrium unemployment to 5.5 per cent in its
recent inflation report. Structural factors may also explain the
pressure on pay: job growth has been especially strong among
the self-employed, who are often under-employed, which is
another reason why productivity growth is so weak.

The strong labour and housing markets have lifted consumer
confidence above historical averages, and household
consumption is showing high growth figures. The future
outlook also seems bright, and households will remain the
engine of the recovery, especially as wages and salaries
accelerate in 2015. Pay indicators as well as the planned
minimum wage hike this autumn point in the same direction.
The risk of overheating in the housing market seems to
have decreased a bit: macroprudential supervisory measures
such as linking the maximum size of a mortgage loan to
income have already had a certain cooling effect. The housing
supply is also increasing, which also indicates that the price
upturn will soon decelerate. Overall, household consumption
will grow by an annual average of 2.5 per cent in 2015-
2016, in line with this years rate of increase.
Business sector indicators are also exuding optimism.
Service, manufacturing and construction PMIs are at robust
levels in the 55 to 62 range. Capital spending will grow by 7
per cent this year and by an average of 4 per cent in 2015
and 2016. The upside risks in our forecast are the biggest in
capital spending: overall indicators are compatible with
quarterly GDP growth of 6 per cent on an annualised basis. Yet
hopes of export-driven growth continue to fall short. For the
third year in a row, foreign trade will contribute negatively to
GDP in 2014. Sentiment indicators for export orders are
nevertheless at high levels. Combined with gradually stronger
demand in important export markets, this suggests a positive
net contribution to GDP from foreign trade in 2015-2016.
Having exceeded the BoEs 2 per cent target in 2005-2013,
inflation will be low in the next couple of years. Energy and
food prices have recently fallen, and the CPI upturn of 1.9 per
cent in June is temporary; early next year, 12-month figures will
bottom out at 1.0 per cent. As annual averages, inflation will
be 1.5 per cent in 2014, 1.3 per cent in 2015 and 1.7 per
cent in 2016. Lagging effects of the past years pound
appreciation more than 10 per cent in effective terms -- - will
hold down imported inflation. Primarily driven by expected
interest rate spreads, the pound will appreciate somewhat
against the euro, while weakening against the US dollar. At the
end of 2015, the GBP/USD rate will be at 1.63 and the
EUR/GBP rate at 0.76 according to our forecasts.
Despite good momentum in the real economy, the wage and
inflation picture justifies a cautious normalisation of
monetary policy. The first key interest rate hike, to 0.75 per
cent, will occur in February 2015. Rate hikes will continue at a
slow pace to 1.25 per cent at the end of 2015 and 1.75 per cent
at the end of 2016. As for the September 18 referendum on
Scottish independence, the No side currently has a clear
lead. There is every indication that Scotland will remain in the
union. The UKs future relations with the EU will probably
dominate the next parliamentary election. Voters choices will
be important and will affect, not least, the Nordic countries.
Eastern Europe

Tougher sanctions are having little direct impact on growth

Structurally weak Russia will stagnate
Central Europe: Continued gradual recovery
High inflation in Russia and Ukraine

The downing of a Malaysian passenger plane over Ukraine in
mid-July led to a rekindling of the Ukraine crisis, following a
trend in May and June towards easing military and diplomatic
tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and
Western powers. This event underscores our May forecast in
Nordic Outlook that the geopolitical conflict in eastern
Ukraine, including domestic discord, will last a long time.
The US and EU have responded with tougher sanctions to
pressure Russia to work towards demilitarising the conflict
region. The US quickly seized the initiative, banning some
major Russian companies and banks from long-term USD
loans. One reason why the US was a step ahead of the EU is
probably that it has far smaller trade with Russia and that
major EU countries are divided for selfish national reasons.
Italy is the only large EU country with marginal foreign trade
links to Russia. Other interests are in the background. Germany
imports a lot of Russian natural gas. France is selling two
warships to Russia. Not until late July did the EU reach accord
on an expanded three-part sanctions package: Russian state-
owned banks and some large non-financial companies will be
denied access to long-term financing in EU capital markets;
there will be embargoes on arms trade and certain energy
sector technology exports to Russia. The US imposed similar
embargoes. Japan and Switzerland followed up with financial
sanctions to block possible evasion of US and EU sanctions.
By expanding its sanctions, the EU entered the toughest phase
(No. 3) of the action plan it launched last spring after Russias
annexation of Crimea, aimed at hurting the Russian finance,
energy and defence sectors. Yet the sanctions imposed so
far have had fairly little direct effect, at least in the short
term. Russian banks have a modest need to refinance foreign
loans in the next nine months. The central bank has a strong
currency reserve, and the government is in a strong financial
position if funding must be provided. Russias arms exports are
also small in relation to total production. The freeze on
Western technology input to the energy sector will affect
performance and production only long-term. But escalated
sanctions are expected to cause greater uncertainty about
general developments in Russia and lead to speculation that
sanctions will be further tightened or broadened, making
foreign companies more restrictive about investing in
Russia and also hampering short-term growth.
Russia responded in August by imposing trade barriers in the
aviation, agriculture and food sectors. About 10 per cent of
food imports are being halted for one year, but the effect
of this ban is mostly symbolic. It will have little economic
impact on any affected countries, except Lithuania, which has
relatively large food exports to Russia. Instead, one effect of
these measures may be to drive up Russian inflation. Further
targeted sanction measures by the Russians are rather likely.
But in that case they will be relatively cautious. Note the words
of President Vladimir Putin in his decree to the authorities
concerning agricultural and food products: with the goal of
guaranteeing the security of the Russian Federation.
We are sticking to the fundamental economic
assumptions we have maintained since the Russia-Ukraine
conflict broke out in February-March: There will be no large-
scale trade sanctions and no serious disruptions in
Russian energy deliveries to Europe. Western powers and
Russia are both highly reluctant to start a full-scale trade war,
since the early recovery of the euro zone is fragile and Russias
economy is both cyclically and structurally weak. There is also a
sizeable mutual dependence on Russian natural gas exports,
which cover 30 per cent of Europes natural gas needs.
The consequences of the conflict -- - especially via accentuated
weakness in Russian and Ukrainian growth -- - caused modest
downward adjustments in our general growth forecasts for
Eastern (including Central) Europe last spring. Our latest
downgrade of the 2015 Russian outlook and the 2014-
2015 German outlook and any new sanctions justify only a
small further lowering of GDP forecasts for the region.
Given the limited impact of sanctions, we are maintaining our
forecast that the gradual recovery which began in the second
half of 2013, mainly in the central portion of Eastern
Europe but also further south in the region, will continue
over the next couple of years. Growing private consumption in
Germany/Western Europe will offset lost exports to Russia and
short-term investment downturns in countries near the conflict
area. It is worth noting that the larger countries of Central
Europe send a relatively small share of their exports to Russia.
During the second quarter, GDP year-on-year growth in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia was largely
unchanged at decent levels compared to the development in
the first quarter. Retail sales remained good. Although
manufacturing indicators have lost some ground generally, a
similar pattern is also apparent in Western Europe. We view
this as a temporary correction.
Private consumption will remain a key driver of economic
growth in many countries. Households are benefiting from
Eastern Europe

good real income increases via labour market stabilisation
and especially via low inflation. Purchasing power has
strengthened further in recent few months, because weak
price pressures in countries like Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
have turned into deflation. Downward pressure on inflation in
Central Europe will continue during the coming year, since
there are sizeable idle economic resources. In the near future,
inflation will remain low due to falling food prices, partly a
global trend. This may open the way for further cuts in already
low key interest rates, thereby boosting household demand for
loans and helping lead to higher consumption.
Stagflation problems in Russia
There is little risk of Russian economic collapse over the
next couple of years. Stable energy prices and a strong labour
market will help sustain the economy. The country also shows
financial strength in the form of low sovereign debt (11 per
cent of GDP), a balanced federal budget and a strong currency
reserve. Note that extra 2014 expenditures for Crimea and
Sevastopol are covered by funds, not the budget. The
governments forecast that its 2014 surplus will be 0.5 per cent
of GDP this year (after a 0.5 per cent deficit in 2013) is also
based on a realistic +0.5 per cent growth assumption. But
years of anaemic growth lie ahead, as well as high short-
term inflation. These problems are not only due to the Russia-
Ukraine conflict but largely stem from structural problems.

Russias GDP will increase by 0.5 per cent this year. The
economy will almost stagnate in 2015 and then expand by
1.5 per cent in 2016 below potential growth of 2-3 per
cent. We have raised our 2014 forecast from zero in Mays
Nordic Outlook, following unexpectedly good second quarter
growth (+0.8 per cent year-on-year, compared to +0.9 in Q1).
Industrial production was surprising, and the manufacturing
sector purchasing managers index has gradually risen since
spring; it reached 51 in July above the expansion threshold of
50. Sustained by unchanged oil prices of USD 105-110/barrel
for the rest of 2014 and decent net exports, Russia can avoid
recession despite a rapid fall in domestic demand. We have
cut our 2015 GDP growth forecast from 1.2 per cent to 0.3
per cent due to lower household purchasing power (via
higher-than-expected inflation), new regional extra sale taxes
of up to 3 per cent and weaker capital spending because of the
Ukraine conflict and the impact of new sanctions. A sharp
upturn in long-term bond yields will help push down capital
spending, but this summers government grants for
infrastructure investments will have the opposite effect. The
government will possibly also try to offset economic weakness
by means of higher wages and pensions in 2015.
The economy is being squeezed on other fronts as well.
Demographic trends are unfavourable; despite weaker growth
in recent years there are supply-side restrictions in the
labour market. Unemployment has fallen from 5.5 per cent
early in 2014 to just under 5 per cent (lowest since the mid-
1990s) and has been below its equilibrium level of 6-7 per cent
since 2011. Capital spending has also lagged for many years;
the investment ratio is low compared to other EM economies.
Inflation has surged from 6 per cent early in 2014 to 7.5 per
cent, well above the central banks year-end target of 6.5 per
cent (raised since the spring) and the medium-term target of 4
per cent. The upturn has been driven by several periods of
rouble depreciation. But inflation is also largely due to the tight
labour market. The central bank raised its key interest rate in
late July in order to slow inflation and try to halt the renewed
trend towards accelerating capital outflows. We expect new
interest rate hikes, but inflation will remain high due to
further weakening of the rouble, driven by geopolitical turmoil
and economic weakness. The rouble will weaken from todays
36 per USD to 38.5 a year from now. Food import restrictions
will also help drive up inflation despite a government directive
ordering a price freeze. The new sales tax will also have an
impact next year. We predict 6.5 per cent inflation in 2015.
A long way back for Ukraine
Ukraine entered a deep recession after the severe domestic
political unrest that began late in 2013 and has gradually
worsened. The current state of war has severely hurt
production and consumption and nearly paralysed capital
spending activity. The plunging value of the hryvnia after
Ukraine abandoned its USD peg in February helped drive
inflation from close to zero early in 2014 to 12.5 per cent in
July. There have also been major price increases for natural gas
because of cuts in subsidies, partly due to IMF/EU bail-out loan
requirements. This has further hampered consumption. As
earlier, we believe that the international bail-out loans (which
began to be disbursed in May) eliminate the default risk and
stabilise the currency reserve and the hryvnia. But Ukraine still
has a long way back. The positive effect of the currency
depreciation on exports will occur only after a delay.
Meanwhile the government must implement budget-
tightening in order to keep receiving its bail-out loan
payments. The pace of GDP decline accelerated from 1.1 per
cent year-on-year during the first quarter to 4.7 per cent in Q2.
We expect GDP to fall by 6 per cent this year, followed by
zero growth in 2015. Only in 2016 will Ukraine again see
weak growth of 3 per cent. Inflation will remain high but will
fall within 1-2 years as the effects of this years currency rate
depreciation fade.
The Baltics

Russian weakness/sanctions are slowing recovery

Estonia hardest hit by Russian weakness
Resilience because of strong real incomes
Unexpectedly low inflation bottoming soon

Unlike most countries in Europe, the Baltics are being relatively
hard hit by the Russia-Ukraine conflict via accentuated Russian
economic weakness, expanded sanctions and increased
regional uncertainty. The main reason is that a large share of
their exports go to Russia (in 2013, 12-20 per cent), partly
due to sizeable transit trade. The transport sector is thus also
affected by falling Russian foreign trade, although the effects
on this sector are not entirely negative; to date, Latvia has
benefited from extra transit business that used to go through
Ukraine. Capital spending is also hampered by greater political
uncertainty in the surrounding region. Tourism, which is
relatively important to the Baltic economies, is expected to fall
only a bit due to the conflict. Statistic available so far from last
spring showed that total tourist flows increased somewhat in
those months compared to the corresponding period of 2013,
although the number of Russian visitors fell significantly.
Estonia which already entered a major slowdown last year
will be squeezed the most as Russia moves towards
stagnation. This is because exports make up a larger share of
the economy (equivalent to 80 per cent of GDP, compared to
65 per cent in Lithuania and 45 per cent in Latvia) and that it
also has large exports to recession-plagued Finland. Lithuania
will weather the Russia-Ukraine conflict best of the Baltics.
Negative effects on GDP will be offset by domestic demand,
which is entering a more robust recovery; the domestic
recovery in Lithuania, in particular the property market, has
lagged behind the other Baltic states. Lithuania can also
benefit from a new gas terminal next year, markedly reducing
its 100 per cent dependence on Russian natural gas. However,
Lithuania will be clearly harder hit than Estonia and Latvia by
Russias food import restrictions; the effect of the one-year
sanctions is equivalent to nearly 1 per cent of GDP.
Meanwhile positive growth dynamics in the Baltics will partly
offset the negative impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Private consumption will remain the most important
driver in 2015, mainly due to continued high real wage
increases. Consumer confidence is historically high; in Estonia
and Latvia, optimism has climbed since the Crimea crisis last
March, while it has fallen somewhat in Lithuania. Good
economic fundamentals in the three countries are probably
contributing to household confidence; public sector finances
are in good shape and current account balances are showing
only small deficits. Looking at capital spending, construction
continues to grow and infrastructure projects will receive larger
support from EU funds, following a decrease in recent years.
Direct investments in Lithuania will get an extra push when the
country joins the euro zone on January 1, 2015. During 2015-
2016, Baltics exports will also gradually recover.
Overall Baltic growth will accelerate somewhat after a
slump in all three countries in 2013-2014. Estonias GDP will
grow 0.5 per cent this year, 1.8 per cent in 2015 and 3.0 per
cent in 2016. Latvias growth will be 2.5 per cent this year, 2.7
per cent in 2015 and 3.4 per cent in 2016. Lithuanias GDP will
increase by 2.7, 3.2 and 4.0 per cent, respectively. These
forecasts are still well below consensus. Our GDP
forecasts for 2014 are unchanged from Nordic Outlook in
May, since second quarter figures were in line with our
expectations. We have lowered our 2015 forecasts by about
0.5 percentage points in each case, mainly due to Russias
poorer growth outlook and food sanctions, and marginally due
to lower growth in Western Europe.

Inflation is now extremely low in the Baltics. Even in the
once high-inflation Estonian economy, the rate has slowed
significantly; year-on-year HICP inflation was zero in July, after
an almost uninterrupted slide from 3.9 per cent in July 2013.
Inflation has provided downside surprises in the Baltics for
years, mainly because of subdued energy prices and lower food
price increases. We have now sharply lowered both our 2014
and 2015 inflation forecasts. Meanwhile the bottom is near. We
expect a gradual upturn to the 1.0-2.5 per cent range in
2015-2016. The fundamental reason is rising wage costs due
to increasingly scarce labour market resources. There have
already been localised labour shortages for a couple of years.
In Estonia, unemployment fell to 7 per cent in the second
quarter, which is below its equilibrium of about 8 per cent.
Sweden

Decent growth, but the election will create political risks

Recovery but no real economic dynamism
Slowly falling unemployment
Inflation will continue to pressure Riksbank
Election outcome will push down krona

The Swedish economy continues to show higher growth than
most European countries, but the data have again turned
weaker than expected and we have adjusted our forecasts for
both 2014 and 2015 downward. We now believe that GDP
will increase by 2.1 per cent this year and by 2.9 per cent
in 2015. Growth will slow to 2.7 per cent in 2016. GDP will
exceed its long-term trend throughout our forecast period,
leading to a gradual decline in unemployment. Yet resource
utilisation will remain below normal. Growth is being driven by
strong consumption, which is benefiting from rising real
incomes and asset prices. Accelerating home prices and
household lending are increasing the risk of a downward
correction further ahead. We are thus expecting new
macroprudential supervision measures, including a decision on
stricter mortgage principal repayment requirements, during
autumn 2014. This will help increase the chances of a soft
landing in the housing market.
In the run-up to the general election on September 14, a
coalition between the Social Democrats and the Green Party is
our main scenario. The unclear parliamentary situation creates
uncertainty about economic policy and the political system
faces major challenges over the next few years. Taken together
the result is heightened political uncertainty. But the
likelihood of an irresponsibly expansionary fiscal policy or
major changes in the economic policy framework is small.
The Riksbank will remain under pressure due to worryingly low
inflation. We expect the central bank to cut its repo rate to
0.15 per cent, probably this October, and leave the rate
unchanged throughout 2015. We also believe that the
Riksbank wants to achieve further stimulus effects by
signalling more cautious rate hikes a bit further ahead. It will
probably also strengthen its monetary stimulus by means of
guidance: for example, by having the entire Governing Board
support a requirement that inflation must reach 1.5 per cent
before any interest rate hike is considered. Only in 2016, once
the US and British central banks have made some headway in
their hiking cycles, do we expect cautious Riksbank key rate
hikes. By the end of 2016, the repo rate will stand at 1.0 per
cent.
Slow upturn in exports, industrial output
During the first half of 2014, industrial production was weaker
than expected. Merchandise exports were also sluggish,
showing a weak and uneven upturn. Forward-looking
sentiment indicators rose early in the year but then fell
somewhat. Their levels are low compared to earlier recoveries
but point towards decent growth. We should, however, bear in
mind that actual export and production figures in recent years
have been lower than the indicators have signalled.
Shaky world market demand is reflected in falling Swedish
manufacturing sector investments, and companies are
signalling that they will also cut back their capital spending
during the second half of 2014. The weakening of the krona
over this past year has helped improve profitability but has
thus not been enough to maintain the capital spending level.

Despite their disappointing first half performance, there is
reason to believe that merchandise exports will now gradually
recover. One is the relatively good economic conditions in key
export markets: 35 per cent of all exports go to Norway,
Germany, the United Kingdom and the US, for example.
Exports will also benefit from the krona depreciation of the
past year. According to our estimates, the 5 per cent
weakening of the currency in the past year will push up exports
by a total of 2 percentage points. A continued steady upward
trend for service exports will also help boost total export
growth. Because of low final figures and weaker international
growth, we have nevertheless lowered our forecast somewhat
compared to May. We believe that exports will increase by 2.4
per cent this year and climb by 5.2 per cent in 2015 and 2016: a
slow upturn viewed in a historical perspective.
Sweden

Potential for higher residential construction
Total capital spending rose by nearly five per cent during the
first half of 2014, mainly because residential construction
increased by more than 20 per cent year-on-year. The overall
investment ratio in Sweden is somewhat above the euro zone
average, but the level of residential investments is still low in
an international perspective. In Sweden such investments are
equivalent to around 4 per cent of GDP, which remains lower
than the euro zone average and well below the 5-6 per cent
historical average in most countries. We thus believe there is
sizeable potential for a continued increase in residential
investments. Rapidly rising population also points to large
demand for housing. So far, economic policy makers have not
been so successful in their ambition to initiate broad-based
new residential construction. But we expect these efforts to
intensify this autumn, regardless of the governing
constellation. We expect the increase in overall residential
construction to a total of 70 per cent in the period 2014-2016.

On the whole, business investments will benefit somewhat
from low interest rates, but these investments are primarily
dependent on the demand situation and capacity utilisation.
The cyclical pattern indicates that the service sectors will lead
the recovery, but manufacturing sector investments will also
rebound with a certain lag. After a 1.3 per cent downturn in
2013, total capital spending will increase by 3.0 per cent in
2014. After that the recovery will continue, with an increase of
4.5 per cent in 2015 and 5.5 per cent in 2016. As in the case of
exports, this is a slow rate of increase in historical terms.
Household incomes and consumption
2013 2014 2015 2016
Consumption 2.0 2.7 3.0 2.5
Incomes 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.3
Savings ratio, % of 13.0 13.3 12.5 12.3
disposable income
Source: Statistics Sweden, SEB
Cautious households start opening wallets
Household consumption has held up well during the economic
slumps of recent years, but it has increased at a slower pace
than incomes. This has meant that households have continued
to increase their saving from an already high level. We are now
seeing clear signs that the rate of consumption is about to
accelerate. We expect consumption growth of about 3 per cent
next year, mainly driven by wealth effects from rising asset
prices. While tax hikes and somewhat higher inflation will
probably contribute to slower income growth, this will be partly
offset by higher benefit levels in social insurance systems:
measures that will also help households with a relatively high
marginal inclination to consume.
Neutral fiscal policy after the election
During 2014, fiscal policy is having an expansionary effect on
the economy equivalent to 0.5 per cent of GDP, or about the
same magnitude as in 2013. This will help increase the public
sector deficit to 1.8 per cent of GDP. To some extent, reforms
that worsen the fiscal balance will be offset by improved
economic conditions, but at the same time they will be kept up
by such items as higher refugee reception costs. Because of
pre-election uncertainty, we are cautious about our fiscal
policy assumptions. A red-green government, which we regard
as the most likely outcome (see New political landscape after
the election in this issue of Nordic Outlook), is expected to
pursue a more demand-oriented fiscal policy, implying higher
levels of both expenditures and revenue. We believe
government measures will be largely financed from revenue
and that fiscal stimulus will be largely neutral.
Given a neutral fiscal policy stance over the next couple of
years, stronger economic conditions in 2015-2016 will
gradually improve the public financial balance. The deficit
will decrease to 0.4 per cent of GDP in 2016, when general
government debt will again fall below 40 per cent of GDP. Our
overall assessment is that public finances are in good shape.
The deficit is under control and public debt is low, both in a
historical and international perspective. In our judgement,
further stimulus would be possible given low interest rates,
good confidence levels and a large quantity of idle resources.
Public finances
Per cent of GDP
2013 2014 2015 2016
Net lending -1.2 -1.8 -1.0 -0.4
Gen. govt gross debt 40.6 41.5 41.0 39.8
Central govt debt
(unconsolidated)
35.3 36.0 35.5 35.0
Borrowing req., SEK bn 131 60 30 20
Source: Statistics Sweden, SEB

Slow decline in unemployment
Employment has continued to climb. Forward-looking
indicators, such as lay-off figures and hiring plans according to
the Business Tendency Survey of the National Institute of
Sweden

Economic Research (NIER), signal that the upturn will intensify.
Despite faster job creation, unemployment according to the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) has continued to increase due to an
expanding labour supply. The downturn in the number of
people on long-term sick leave and disability pensions now
seems to have levelled out. This will help slow the increase in
labour supply.

We thus expect the jobless rate to start falling soon, which is
also being signalled by declining unemployment according to
Public Employment Service statistics. We believe that
joblessness will continue its gradual decline in 2015 and
2016, but because of a strong increase in the working-age
population due to increased immigration in the next couple of
years, the downturn is likely to be slow. By the end of 2016,
unemployment will remain a bit above 7 per cent. The
employment ratio will increase but at a slow pace.
A growing percentage of the unemployed are people with little
formal education and/or poor language skills and weak ties to
Swedish society. This increases uncertainty about how far
unemployment can fall without leading to wage-driving
bottlenecks. Resource utilisation indicators are rising (though

Low pay hikes a threat to inflation target?
The three-year collective pay agreements signed early in
2013 are now in their second year, and it still appears as if
wage and salary increases will end up well below the
average for the past 20 years. The next wage round will
not begin until early 2016, when lower unemployment is
likely to trigger higher contractual pay increases than the
2+ per cent that the previous wage round resulted in.
The relationship between the Riksbank and the two sides
in the labour market faces new challenges ahead. Last
spring, representatives of both trade unions and
employers expressed displeasure with low inflation and
the Riksbanks poor record in meeting its inflation target.
If union and employer inflation expectations continue to
fall below the 2 per cent target, we may end up in a
downward spiral where low wage agreements make
it more difficult to meet the inflation target. As one
element of its efforts to restore the credibility of its
inflation target, we expect the Riksbank to abstain from
warnings that excessively high pay increases may lead to
interest rate hikes.
Such a development already appears to be on its way, but
the question is whether the Riksbank wants to go so far
as to explicitly advise the two sides to sign high pay
agreements that make it easier to meet the inflation
target. Germanys Bundesbank has changed its signals
and has urged the parties to conclude higher pay
agreements in Germany as a way of pushing up inflation
in the euro zone, which shows that such actions are not
unreasonable. Such a signal may, however, challenge the
conceptual framework that connects inflation to resource
utilisation. Riksbank Deputy Governor Martin Flodns
speech on May 14 indicates that he is willing to reduce
the banks ties to this conceptual framework. In his
speech, Flodn emphasises that monetary policy
transmission channels such as exchange rates and
expectations may influence inflation without necessarily
having such a big impact on real variables such as GDP
and unemployment. Although it is too early to draw major
conclusions from this, it seems reasonable that the
Riksbank may need to use new, unconventional methods
to reverse the trend towards falling inflation
expectations.

Sweden

the Riksbank measure showed a slight downturn in the second
quarter) but remain at low levels. Today there are also few
signs that companies are having problems finding suitable
labour. NIER surveys indicate that recruitment problems are
bigger in the public sector than in the business sector. In a
number of public sector areas, this probably reflects
uncompetitive wages and salaries. Meanwhile there is little
risk of wage-driving bottlenecks arising during our
forecast period.

Higher inflation, but far below target
Inflation pressure will remain low throughout our forecast
period. In the short term, however, there are many indications
that CPIF inflation bottomed out at zero in March and that the
year-on-year rate will be higher ahead. The most important
short-term factor is the weakening of the krona during the past
year. Other factors contributing to somewhat higher inflation
will be higher energy prices and food prices once the effects of
the current downturn disappear from the 12-month figures.
During 2016 there will also be a faster rate of pay increases.
With international prices of both commodities and more
processed goods trending flat, Swedish CPIF will still have a
hard time reaching 2 per cent during our forecast years.
International food prices, partly driven by the Russian import
restrictions, are again starting to fall. This is a downside
inflation risk to our forecast during the coming year.
During 2016, when the Riksbank begins to raise its repo rate,
we expect CPI to climb above 2 per cent due to higher
interest expenses for home owners.
Upside inflation risks will come mainly from the indirect
taxes proposed by the red-green parties. Due to the uncertain
political situation and the lack of clarity about the exact shape
of government tax policy, we are making a cautious forecast of
tax effects on CPI. The table below shows tax hikes discussed
by various parties in the current red-green opposition (Social
Democrats, Greens and Left Party) and a rough estimate of
their CPI effect. In our forecast, we have assumed that indirect
taxes will boost inflation by 0.2 percentage points per year in
2015 and 2016. Even a continued Alliance government would
be quite likely to raise certain indirect taxes, for example on
energy, alcoholic beverages and tobacco.

Indirect taxes that may be raised
by a new government
CPI effect*
Restoring 25% restaurant VAT 0.2-0.3
Reduced home care/repair deduction 0.1-0.2
Air travel tax 0.1-0.2
Energy taxes (per year) 0.1-0.2
Property tax 0.1-0.2
* Percentage points. Source: SEB
Home prices increases have accelerated
Home prices have continued to rise. Continued low interest
rates and growing imbalances in the housing market indicate
that home prices will continue to rise by 5-10 per cent by
the end of 2015. A renewed acceleration in home prices from
already high levels will increase the risk of a sizeable future
correction. The tone of discourse has become more urgent,
and further measures will be introduced as part of
macroprudential supervision when the Financial Stability
Council holds its next meeting in November. We are mainly
expecting the Financial Supervisory Authority to introduce new
principal payment requirements on home mortgages before
the end of 2014. Other measures may also be considered, for
example restrictions on the ability of households to borrow at
floating interest rates and restrictions on bank funding in
foreign currencies. Our forecast is that these measures will
help bring about a soft landing in the housing market and that
prices will fall somewhat during 2016.
Further monetary policy stimulus
The minutes of the July monetary policy meeting of the
Riksbank shows that inflation is again back in focus in interest
rate policy. By cutting its repo rate by a full 50 basis points, the
bank is also clearly signalling that macroprudential supervision
and not interest rate policy bears the main responsibility for
financial risks connected to imbalances in the housing market
and household borrowing.
During the summer, inflation figures came in somewhat higher
than expected. Our inflation path is now in line with the
Riksbanks for the next six months. The pressure for further
immediate actions thus appears to have eased somewhat. This
Sweden

is why we believe that the Riksbank will make no changes in
September but will then lower the repo rate to 0.15 per cent
when it publishes its Monetary Policy Report in October. Not
much will be needed to persuade the Riksbank to carry out a
further rate cut. Even today, the Riksbank needs to lower its
GDP forecasts. A CPIF figure a few tenths of a per cent lower
than expected or a continued decline in long-term inflation
expectations will probably be enough to trigger an interest
rate cut of 10 basis points. The built-in signalling at three
points in the rate path published in July also shows a clear
readiness to act in this direction. Low inflation during much of
next year, a weak recovery in historical terms and a continued
zero interest rate policy by the ECB indicate that the Riksbank
will not raise its repo rate in 2015. During 2016 we expect
three rate hikes to 1.00 per cent.
Further stimulus will come primarily via stronger monetary
policy guidance. During the autumn, the rate path will probably
signal more cautious rate hikes in a slightly longer perspective.
Governing Board members also seem prepared to offer future
guidance with the help of economic variables in line with what
the Fed and BoE have previously done. Among the members,
Per Jansson has made the clearest promise not to vote for a
repo rate hike before CPIF reaches 1.5 per cent. The Governing
Board will probably reach a consensus during the autumn on
conditions for deciding when to consider rate hikes, for
example a requirement that CPIF inflation must reach at least
1.5 per cent. Governor Stefan Ingves has also pointed out that
the Riksbank should hold off on any rate hikes until the Fed
and BoE have made some headway in their rate hiking cycles.
Although German 10-year government bond yields are now at
record lows, the Riksbanks rate cut has helped narrow the
spread between Germany and Sweden in recent weeks. Our
estimates indicate that the margin may shrink somewhat
further in the near future, partly depending on new measures
by the Riksbank. We also expect German bond yields to rise
somewhat when the ECB begins buying government bonds
next year. The mechanism goes via rising inflation expectations
and capital flows to other euro countries. The spread between
Germany and Sweden will then bottom out at 40 basis points.
As rate hikes move closer in 2016, however, the spread will
widen again and approach its peak level of the past 20 years,
around 70 basis points. Given continued low international
bond yields, this still means that the yield on a 10-year
government bond will be 2.60 per cent at the end of 2016.
Krona will remain weak in the near future
The key interest rate cut in July helped weaken the trade-
weighted krona to its lowest level in two years. Despite the
depreciation of the past year, todays exchange rate is higher
than the average during the period 2004-2008 (before the
financial crisis broke out). On the other hand, todays exchange
rate is lower than we and other observers (for example the IMF)
view as a reasonable long-term equilibrium rate.

But although the krona is undervalued at present, it is difficult
to find forces that will drive a rapid reversal of the past years
depreciation. The foreign exchange market today is largely
based on relative monetary policies. This autumn, the
Riksbanks monetary policy easing including a further key
interest rate cut is expected to be more prominent than the
actions of the ECB. Also likely to hold down the krona is
uncertainty about the formation of a government after the
September parliamentary election, especially if neither the red-
green opposition nor the Alliance wins a majority of seats.
Our conclusion is that the krona will continue to weaken in the
near term, and the EUR/SEK exchange rate will peak at
around 9.40 this autumn. Towards year-end the rate will be
9.25. During 2015 and 2016 we will then see a gradual
appreciation of the krona as stronger Swedish growth helps
persuade the Riksbank to begin rate hikes well before the ECB.
However, we have adjusted our long-term forecasts towards a
less vigorous krona, among other things because we foresee
very cautious interest rate hikes by the Riksbank. In addition,
the krona usually has difficulty holding its own in periods when
the USD is appreciating against other major currencies. At the
end of 2015, the EUR/SEK rate will be 8.90 and at the end
of 2016 it will stand at 8.70. Our forecast of a gradual
strengthening of the US dollar will lead to a slow upturn in the
USD/SEK exchange rate to a level of 7.25 at the end of our
forecast period.

Theme: New political landscape after the election


S-MP minority coalition is most likely
Gradually increased difficulties in governing
unless there is cross-bloc cooperation
Higher tax and fee levels
Changes in existing economic policy
framework are unlikely

Over the past 15 years, political changes in Sweden have not
been a big issue for financial markets. Immunity to political
uncertainty has gradually strengthened, due to stable inflation,
strong government finances and sizeable current account
surpluses. Broad support for todays official economic policy
framework including an independent Riksbank, expenditure
ceilings and budget surplus targets has been a guarantee
against imprudent policies. By most indications this stability
will persist, but the political system will be sorely tested
in the coming year. As the parliamentary election approaches,
many changes are conceivable: a new government, untested
governing coalitions, new party leaders, blurred lines between
the two political blocs, parties leaving or entering Parliament
and a kingmaker party that no one else wants to work with.
With only a few weeks left before the election, the government
formation process is a major focus. Opinion polls show a clear
lead for the red-green opposition Social Democrats (S),
Greens (MP) and Left (V) against the governing Alliance bloc
of Moderates (M), Liberals (FP), Centre (C) and Christian
Democrats (KD). According to some polls, the red-green bloc
will win its own majority, while other polls indicate that the
populist anti-immigrant Sweden Democrats (SD) will achieve a
kingmaker role in Parliament. One key question affecting the
majority situation is whether C and/or KD will attract the 4 per
cent needed to stay in Parliament, but parties teetering on this
threshold often attract sympathy votes. Historical experience
also indicates that wide gaps between blocs tend to shrink as
elections draw closer, though we have not yet seen any such
trend. Today we still believe that a more likely outcome is
that the red-green bloc will fail to win its own majority.
Proven leadership skills were a decisive trump card for the
Alliance in the 2010 election, especially after the S, MP and V
finally formed a three-party governing alternative. In the 2014
campaign, the Social Democrats have changed strategy and
avoided showing their cards on the government formation
issue. In recent weeks, the Alliance has tried to raise this issue
and show what difficulties a red-green government may face.
Yet after lively debate, the Alliance seems willing to let an S-led
government take over in a situation where the red-green
parties have more seats than the Alliance but lack their own
majority. Instead the Alliance is focusing on the difficulties that
may arise during this autumns budget process.
Because the parliamentary situation seems unclear, the formal
timetable for the formation of a government may be of
interest. The key innovation this time around is that Parliament
must choose a prime minister (PM) no later than 14 days after
opening. This means that all parties will be explicitly forced to
show their cards on the government formation issue. However,
a majority that actively votes No is still required in order to
reject a PM candidate. It thus remains possible for parties to
passively allow a government to take office by abstaining.
Important dates in the political process
Sep 14: Incumbent PM has the option to choose resignation
Sep 29: New Speaker of Parliament appointed a no-
confidence vote may be proposed
Sep 29-Oct 13: Speaker may ask a PM candidate to form a
government
Sep 30: Parliament opens; a PM may be proposed
Oct 3: Statement of Government Policy if Alliance stays in office
Oct 3: Possible Statement of Government Policy from a new PM
(but no later than three weeks after the PM is chosen)
Oct 10: Deadline for choosing a PM; an extra parliamentary
election will be held if the Speaker fails after four attempts
Oct 14: Deadline to submit Budget Bill if Alliance stays in office
Oct 24: Earliest date for a new government to submit Budget Bill
Nov 17: Deadline for a new government to submit Budget Bill
Dec 30: A formal decision on the 2015 budget must be made

We now believe that the most probable outcome is a Social
Democratic-Greens minority government. The Left Party
(ex-Communist) likely to vote with an S-MP government,
whether the red-green bloc wins its own majority or not. The
Left will agree to stay out of government, among other things
because it can thereby avoid major compromises that some of
its party factions would have a hard time accepting.
The ability of the next government to actually push through its
political programme will largely depend on how much voter
support it has attracted. To enable an S-MP government to be
formed relatively painlessly and act with sufficient authority, it
is important that the red-green parties receive a clear voter
mandate. If the gap between the blocs shrinks towards 5
percentage points, we believe that forming a government may
be complicated. For the Social Democrats, it will be of great
value to exceed the 30.7 per cent of votes they received in
2010, which was viewed as almost disastrous. If their 2014
election outcome is the worst in modern times, it will weaken
the partys authority and self-confidence. In such a situation,
the leaderships more pragmatic economic policy strategy
might be challenged by V and MP as well as the partys own left
wing. The Social Democrats are also very unaccustomed to
sharing power; their most recent experience is a coalition
government with the Center (then Farmers) Party in the 1950s.
Theme: New political landscape after the election

If the red-green parties have only a small lead in Parliament
and/or the Social Democrats are weakened, other governing
constellations besides S+MP may be considered. We foresee
the following alternatives, in descending order of probability:
a) a three-party S+MP+V government; b) a minority S+MP+FP
government; c) a pure S government; d) a minority of non-
socialist parties (Alliance); e) formation of an S+M grand
coalition with a parliamentary majority; f) a majority
government of MP plus the non-socialist (Alliance) parties.
But political uncertainty is not limited to the formation of a
government. At least equally important is how effective
any minority government will be. During the past four years,
the Alliance has governed as a minority without any organised
cooperation with the opposition. Several factors have made
this possible: 1) the government has nearly commanded its
own majority (with 173 seats out of 175 needed), which has
strengthened its authority; 2) the Sweden Democrats have
mainly voted with the government; 3) the leftist (red-green)
opposition has been unwilling to team up with SD to defeat
government bills; 4) the government has squeezed as many
proposals as possible into its Budget Bills, making it easier to
win since the opposition must join forces and submit a single
bill to defeat a Budget Bill. The price of this parliamentary
situation has been that the government has pursued
substantially more passive policies than during its 2006-
2010 majority period. The lack of cross-bloc cooperation has
also led to passivity on various policy issues, such as private
contractors in social services and health care, taxes, housing,
integration of immigrants, schools, defence and energy supply.
The question is how big the problems will be for a leftist
minority government with no organised cross-bloc
cooperation. The Alliance has declared that it intends to submit
a joint budget bill, regardless of the election outcome. This
would reinforce SDs kingmaker role and force the government
to compromise in different directions. But we can also raise
more fundamental questions about the practices employed in
2010-2014. The Alliances way of using Budget Bills, for
example, seems dubious in principle. The idea behind the
Budget Act is to make the budget process more transparent
and reduce the risk of uncontrolled spending expansion in
various fields, not to make it easier for a minority government
to rule. We believe that the difficulties facing a minority
government will grow as the parliamentary term
progresses, increasing the pressure for cross-bloc
cooperation. A cross-bloc government may be formed during
the coming term, but a government crisis and snap election
might be required before the parties are ready for this.
Leadership changes in Alliance parties may eventually ease the
way for new coalition alternatives.
One crucial question is what differences in economic policy the
various governing constellations represent. Right now it is very
difficult to see the big picture, since new proposals are
continuously being unveiled. Below we are thus presenting
some overall conclusions in key areas. We generally believe
that the fiscal policy will be rather neutral or weakly
expansionary, regardless of government. It may be tempting
for a government to try to make a flying start in the labour
market by increasing fiscal stimulus programmes, especially in
light of the shaky economic situation. But this is difficult
because the Social Democrats have long criticised the Alliance
government for being fiscally irresponsible. Instead the likely
outcome is that a red-green government will raise certain
taxes, such as income and excise taxes, and remove the rebate
on employer-financed social insurance fees for young
employees. Meanwhile a red-green government will raise fees
to a greater extent, for example by boosting unemployment
insurance benefits. This implies a policy mix that provides an
extra short-term dose of stimulus, while a higher tax
burden will risk worsening long-term growth potential.
During the next governments four-year term, tax reforms will
be considered. The table below presents our view regarding
the probability of changes in various tax areas.
Tax area Higher/lower Proba-
bility
Direct taxes on labour High
(incomes, home care/repair)
Indirect taxes on labour High
Capital incomes Medium
(interest/deductions/dividends)
Assets (real estate, High
wealth, inheritance, gift)
Corporate tax Medium
VAT, indirect taxes/fees High
There has been lively debate, especially within the red-green
opposition, on reforming the economic policy framework.
This includes giving the Riksbank greater responsibility for the
labour market and resource utilisation. But when the dust
settles, we do not believe there will be any changes in the
central banks mandate. The government and other political
leaders have little long-term interest in further expanding or
complicating the task of the Riksbank. Also under discussion is
adding unemployment and capital spending targets to the
current public surplus target. We do not believe there will be
any changes in this area either. The government may very well
formulate visions and goals related to economic variables, for
example in line with the Social Democrats unemployment
target in the 1990s. But we believe that political leaders will
preserve the distinction between such visions and the actual
framework, whose purpose is to clarify overall fiscal policy
rules of the game. In light of Swedens low central government
debt, a minor reform transforming the surplus target for
general government finances (1 per cent of GDP over an
economic cycle) into a zero balance target is not unlikely.
Generally speaking, the Swedish political system faces major
challenges over the next few years. In the short term we see
risks that the formation of a government may be
complicated, resulting in heightened political uncertainty.
There is also some uncertainty about how economic policy will
be formulated, especially if a red-green government is headed
by a greatly weakened Social Democratic Party. But the
likelihood of an irresponsibly expansionary fiscal policy or
major changes in the economic policy framework is small.
Denmark

Room for above-trend growth

Lower growth forecast for 2014-2015 due to
foreign weakness
2016 growth will be 2.5 per cent
Labour market slack under-estimated

Weak GDP numbers in the fourth quarter of 2013 led to worries
about the recovery. As noted earlier, however, technical and
temporary factors drove much of this Q4 weakness (see Nordic
Outlook, May 2014), and the Q1 number released at the end of
May seemed to confirm this notion. Most domestic indicators
still look solid, but lower growth expectations for Denmarks
key trading partners in the euro zone and for Sweden have led
us to trim Danish GDP growth in 2014 and 2015 by a quar-
ter of a per cent to 1.8 and 2.3, respectively. A slightly high-
er sequential growth rate should put 2016 growth at 2.5 per-
cent. In 2016, we foresee tighter fiscal policy countering im-
provements in private demand.

Recovering consumers face a more dynamic labour market as
well as improving balance sheets; housing prices are rising
despite high household debt levels. Along with fading cau-
tiousness among firms, a loosening fiscal stance, the ongoing
global recovery and super-easy monetary policy, this will feed
into the Danish upturn. One major current risk to this outlook
stems from a more significant escalation of the Russia-Ukraine
conflict, which would affect European forecasts more material-
ly. A small open economy like Denmark is highly dependent on
the external environment.
Little has changed in the outlook for the consumer. Employ-
ment is still picking up nicely, growing at an annual rate of
close to 1 per cent. Wage growth is sluggish but is expected to
slowly speed up as the recovery matures and unemployment
continues its downward trend (more on this below). Unem-
ployment is expected to be 4.1 per cent in 2014 and to average
3.5 per cent in 2016. We expect wages and salaries to acceler-
ate by slightly below 2 per cent in 2015 and slightly above 2 per
cent in 2016.
The recovery in the housing market continues, supported
by mortgage rates that have stayed at historical lows. Single-
family houses are only seeing slight price increases, whereas
flats are appreciating by close to 10 per cent annually, and
even more in Copenhagen. The ongoing improvement in
household fundamentals is visible in consumer sentiment,
which during the summer reached levels only seen at the peak
of the 1990s and 2000s expansions. The volatility of consumer
spending in recent GDP releases makes it hard to track the
underlying strength, so our consumption growth forecast is
based more on the fundamental backdrop outlined above than
on an extrapolation of the current trend.
On the business side, things are more mixed. The tendency
survey for the manufacturing sector has declined throughout
the late spring and summer and is now at a lower level than in
the past couple of years. This is somewhat disturbing, but also
confusing. We see little to suggest such a dramatic change of
the situation among manufacturers. Other business indicators
do not signal the same dramatic change. Fear of an escalation
of the Russia-Ukraine conflict might be part of the reason for
the summer blues. Concerns among business leaders could
lead to postponement of capital spending, leading to a down-
side risk to our investment forecasts and thereby also to our
GDP forecast.
The external balance is still looking very healthy. On a 12-
month rolling basis, the goods and services balance of the
current account has come off the peak reached early in the
year, but it is still looking very solid at around 4-5 per cent of
GDP. The total current account surplus is running at around 6
per cent of GDP. We still see this as an indication of solid com-
petitiveness among the parts of the economy that compete
internationally. An expected weakening of the euro implies that
the Danish krone will also weaken in real effective terms.
Danish inflation to outpace euro zone
Inflation dynamics are still extremely weak, with domestic
demand still far from pre-crisis levels, held back by sluggish
income growth. However, accelerating growth and employ-
ment combined with moderately faster wage increases and a
firming residential property market should feed into gradually
increasing inflation. Specifically, we expect Danish inflation
to run ahead of euro zone inflation during our forecast period.
Denmark

This is due to a more advanced position in the expansion
curve, slightly higher growth expectations and significantly
milder deflationary pressure from structural adjustment and
depressed labour markets than in southern Europe. This means
that Danish HICP inflation should outpace that of the euro
zone in the next couple of years. We expect inflation of 0.6
per cent in 2014. In 2015, inflation will accelerate to 1.1
percent and in 2016 to 1.5 per cent. Nonetheless, we see
little need for monetary policy action in our main scenario. The
key interest rate hike by Danmarks Nationalbank in May and
the banks passiveness when the ECB lowered rates in June
have reinstated a positive spread to Germany and strength-
ened the krone just as intended. Although we expect the ECB
to do more, this will not change the conditions for Danmarks
Nationalbank.
Is Denmark overheating?
In June, Nationalbank Governor Lars Rohde publicly advised
a tightening of economic policy in 2015 due to fear of bot-
tlenecks and overheating. The government seems to agree.
Earlier this summer, the prime minister raised similar con-
cerns and the government has repeatedly warned about the
risk that Denmark may lose competitiveness.
We find little to support this case right now. The labour
market seems to have plenty of slack if the proper measure
is used. Official Danish publications have historically re-
ferred to Net Unemployment, excluding people in public
employment programmes, or since 2010 Gross Unemploy-
ment, which includes this group of people. But both figures
are register-based, i.e. includes only people listed in public
files as receivers of state unemployment benefits or social
transfers. People who are not eligible for such benefits are
not registered as being part of the labour force and thus not
counted as unemployed.

With recent changes to Danish unemployment insurance
rules reducing the maximum benefit period from four to two
years, going forward it is likely that more people will be
unemployed but ineligible for public support.
We believe slack is better analysed using survey-based
unemployment rates, such the one the OECD uses in its
harmonised measures. As indicated in the chart above this
number (black curve) points to plenty of slack, with the
survey- based unemployment rate remaining above the
levels seen from late 1990s through the start of the financial
crisis. The latest figure of 6.5 per cent still stands 3.5 per-
centage points above the low point of the previous cycle,
which admittedly looks somewhat extreme.

Are there other indications of overheating? Bottlenecks can
lead to overheating even at elevated unemployment rates if
skill-matching between firms and jobseekers is insufficient.
This would lead to wage pressures. But as indicated by the
chart below, wage growth does not seem worrisome from
that perspective and neither does growth in unit labour cost.
We believe the risk that wage and inflation expectations will
settle at inappropriately low levels is bigger than the risk of
overheating at present.

This also relates to the discussion on competitiveness. Is the
Danish economy at a stage where it is appropriate to warn
about lost competitiveness and a need for restraint in wage
negotiations? Sluggish ULC is not only the result of moder-
ate wage dynamics but also of solid productivity. Productivi-
ty for the total economy in a boom-bust period with a big
correction in the construction sector is hard to measure
accurately. But manufacturing productivity can more mean-
ingfully be measured and it has shown a much stronger
improvement than most observers acknowledge, reaching
the highest growth level in the past 20 years (when current
records started).
Measuring problems aside, if this was such a pressing issue
how could Denmark maintain such strong external surplus-
es? Going forward, we expect wage growth to pick up as the
labour market tightens, but given plentiful slack we see this
as a gradual process. It is difficult to forecast wages and
salaries because they seem less responsive to the drop in
unemployment than normally. The current unemployment
rate has historically led to wage growth of above 2 per cent,
but today it is close to 1. This downward shift is hard to
explain, but the downshift in overall inflation expectations
could be part of the reason.

Norway

Weathering the storm

Growth picking up to trend-like pace
Drag from stalling oil-sector investment,
but firm consumption and non-oil exports
Surprisingly persistent core inflation
Norges Bank on hold until higher key rates
abroad ease appreciation pressure on NOK

Economic momentum has risen markedly over the past year.
Mid-2013 saw signs of stagnation, and declining prices of
existing homes raised fears that consumption was about to
falter. However, 2014 has so far been stronger, fuelled by
revitalised private consumption on reviving home prices, high
employment and still-healthy income despite higher inflation.
Moreover, exports of non-petroleum goods have recovered on
robust foreign orders, in part helped by previous NOK
weakness. In fact, mainland GDP excluding oil/gas and
shipping jumped 1.2 per cent from the first to the second
quarter and by an above-trend 2.8 per cent year-on-year. While
declining capital spending in the petroleum sector will be a
drag, it is very hard (to say the least) for Norges Bank to argue
that the economic outlook has undergone further weakening,
which it in June saw as a potential trigger for lower key rates.

Mainland GDP should gain 2.4 per cent in 2014 and 2.5 per
cent in 2015. Growth in overall GDP will be 1.6 and 1.7 per
cent in 2014 and 2015, respectively, slightly less than assumed
in the May Nordic Outlook due to weaker investment.
Headwinds from capital spending
The capital spending cycle within oil and gas extraction is
downshifting sharply. Such investments gained an average of
more than 14 per cent in volume terms in 2011-13, providing
the rest of the economy with important demand impulses,
though its average direct contribution of 0.9 percentage points
to annual GDP growth during this period exaggerates the net
effect (for example, due to high import content).
Statistics Norways oil-sector investment survey in June
suggested a much steeper-than-expected downshift.
Projections by operators on the Norwegian continental shelf
put nominal investment in oil and gas extraction and pipeline
transportation at record-high levels in 2014, but the first
estimate for 2015 was 16 per cent lower than assumed for
2014 a year earlier and fully 22 per cent below the current
prediction for 2014.
Planned investment for any year, as measured in the survey,
has historically tended to be revised upward over time,
especially because the survey only covers projects approved by
authorities: the vast Johan Sverdrup field will thus not be
included until mid-2015. Moreover, some details in the June
survey looked too dire. In particular, operators expected
purchases of goods and services at fields on stream (roughly
half the total) to drop by almost a third in 2015, which is very
hard to square with the general notion of broadly stable
production.
Part of the downshift is due to companies trying to rebuild
profits/margins, with a renewed focus on cost-cutting
measures and improving efficiency after years of runaway cost
inflation. Hence, the looming decline should be more
accentuated in nominal terms than measured in real activity,
which is what counts towards GDP. While such investments
will probably be up only marginally in 2014, they will
probably decline by 9 per cent in 2015, slicing percentage
point from overall GDP. The next oil-sector investment survey,
due September 3, will be very important to watch.
Norway

The investment cycle in the petroleum sector has already
turned markedly weaker. Measured in volume terms, capital
spending in oil and gas extraction was 3 per cent lower in the
first half of 2014 compared to the second half of 2013, when it
was up 19.0 per cent year-on-year. In other words, so far the
relative shift in such investment and related demand impulses
is as large as expected for 2015.
Weathering the storm so far
Yet developments suggest that the economy has weathered
the headwind, at least so far. Other demand components
should take up at least part of the slack. There are
prospects for improving exports of non-petroleum goods,
which in the second quarter were up more than 3 per cent from
the previous quarter and year-on-year. The recent
manufacturing Business Tendency Survey suggests more is in
store, since respondents reported growth in foreign orders for
the fourth consecutive quarter in Q2 (the survey was compiled
in late June/early July). Part of the improvement over the past
year reflects the weaker NOK exchange rate, but we believe the
upturn will be sustained. We expect exports of non-
petroleum goods to be up 3.2 per cent in 2014 and a
further 4.0 per cent in 2015.

Improving foreign demand helped lift the manufacturing
sentiment indicator from 6.6 in the first quarter to 7.5 in the
second, slightly above the long-term trend. Meanwhile,
stagnating domestic orders reflect downshifting investment in
the oil sector. It is thus unsurprising that expectations are the
weakest within the investment goods sector, but the Business
Tendency Survey nonetheless suggests that manufacturing is
coping well with these waning demand impulses. Hence,
production in the sector excluding energy and mining was
up a solid 1.3 per cent from the first to the second quarter,
although the year-on-year rate slowed to 2.4 per cent.
Firm consumption
We have long been relatively optimistic regarding the outlook
for private consumption: our May forecast of 2.5 per cent
growth in 2014 was thus more than percentage point above
consensus at the time. In fact, the monthly indicator for
household domestic consumption of goods non-auto retail
sales plus spending on electricity and autos has been even
stronger than expected. The sequential gain of 0.9 per cent in
the second quarter almost matched growth in the first quarter.
While annual growth remains modest, momentum has
rebounded markedly from the weakness of summer and
autumn 2013. In all, private consumption should grow by
2.6 per cent in 2014 and a further 3.2 per cent in 2015.

The underlying trend is thus quite strong. This is despite the
fact that higher inflation is dampening household purchasing
power, which nonetheless shows healthy year-on-year growth.
One reason is the resilient labour market. The Labour Force
Survey (LFS) employment figure rose by a surprising 0.7 per
cent from the first to second quarter. The 0.4 per cent average
sequential growth rate in the first two quarters of 2014 is more
representative of the trend, which still signifies a healthy pace.

Meanwhile, although registered unemployment is up
marginally on net so far in 2014, a marked decline in the
number on people in labour market programmes has left the
overall level lower and reversed half the 2013 increase.
Meanwhile, the LFS unemployment rate declined to a
seasonally adjusted 3.2 per cent in the second quarter, after
staying at 3.5 per cent for six consecutive quarters. Here, the
drop looks a bit too deep due to inflated employment growth,
and unemployment should average 3.4 per cent in 2014
and 3.6 per cent in 2015.
An upturn in existing home prices has probably helped fuel
private consumption through its effect on consumer
sentiment. A year ago, falling home prices created fears of a
Norway

deep slump, but demand has held up and prices have risen in
seasonally adjusted terms in each of the first seven months of
2014. While they are up a modest 0.7 per cent year-to-date
from the full-year average, the six-month annualised change
was running at a strong 7.2 per cent as of July. We expect a
stabilisation going forward, but the low number of building
permits and housing completions and still-low interest rate
puts a floor under the market.
Still waiting for core inflation to move lower
In the May issue of Nordic Outlook, we noted the marked
pickup in core inflation since mid-2013 but expected a slowing
in the near term. Although year-on-year rate CPI-ATE inflation
(CPI excluding taxes and energy) initially eased slightly, July
saw a surprising re-acceleration to 2.6 per cent, matching the
near five-year high in March. Meanwhile, the annual rate of
increase in overall consumer prices picked up to 2.2 per cent.
Core CPI inflation has averaged 2.5 per cent so far in 2014,
bang in line with the medium-term target and a material
upward shift from the 1.3 per cent average rate over the first
seven months of 2013. Slightly less than half the acceleration is
due to food prices, while the rest has been more diverse,
including a marked upturn for imported goods generally. At
least part of this reflects earlier NOK depreciation, which filters
through with a certain lag, an effect that is about to moderate.
In addition, rent inflation (affecting almost one fifth of the core
CPI basket), which initiated the surge in domestic inflation, has
slowed quite a bit.
Part of the recent upside surprise is probably explained by
shifts in seasonal patterns, suggesting a reversal in the very
near term (strong base effects will also be at work). However,
the relatively high core inflation rate also seems to be more
persistent than expected, although it is hard to identify a
general cost-push in prices (other than the currency effect).
Despite recent upside surprises, we have nudged our forecasts
only slightly higher. Core CPI inflation should average 2.4
per cent in 2014 and 2.1 per cent in 2015.
Norges Bank constrained by peers
At its June monetary policy meeting, Norges Bank revised its
rate path markedly lower and re-opened the door to a possible
rate cut. The extent of the downward revision was
questionable, since the growth and inflation outlook was
broadly unchanged. However, it underscores the banks dovish
bias. Furthermore, the bank has downplayed the relatively
more hawkish rate path in favour of a more dovish statement,
also proving that it is favouring a more gut feeling approach,
factoring in more input from exchange rate movements and
monetary policy abroad.
The rate path from June pencilled in a 30 per cent likelihood of
a rate cut, conditional on a further deterioration in the
domestic growth outlook. Considering surprisingly strong data
since the June Monetary Policy Report, uncertainty about the
growth outlook has if anything receded. A rate cut is thus off
the table, and we expect a more balanced statement at Norges
Banks upcoming September 18 rate announcement.
Improved growth momentum, marked rebound in existing
home prices and surprisingly persistent high inflation suggest
that a rate hike may come earlier than we have previously
assumed. However, the banks subjective approach to setting
interest rates suggest it will remain on hold until higher key
rates abroad ease the otherwise large appreciation pressure on
the NOK from higher Norwegian rates. Our expectations that
the BoE and Fed will hike their rates next year thus opens the
way for Norges Bank to start lifting its key rate in late 2015.
However, still-low key rates in the euro zone and in Sweden will
constrain the pace of rate hikes in Norway. We expect a key
interest rate of 1.75 per cent by end-2015 and 2.50 per
cent by end-2016.

Following surprisingly strong economic data, the market has
re-priced its expectations about Norges Bank, which has
strengthened the NOK. Speculative accounts are thus likely to
increase their NOK exposure, supporting the krone in the near-
term. The long-term positive flow outlook and our expectations
about Norges Bank imply a gradual appreciation of the NOK.
We forecast a EUR/NOK exchange rate of 8.00 by mid-2015
and 7.90 by end-2015. Ten-year government bond yields are
likely to receive support from the continued low key rate and
the improved NOK outlook, since foreigners currently hold a
historically low share of outstanding sovereign debt. We
expect a 10-year yield spread vs. Germany of 90 bps by
end-2015.
Finland

The recession is continuing

Weakness in Russia and trade sanctions put
further pressure on economic growth
Unemployment will stabilise at a high level
Continued contractionary fiscal policy

The Finnish economy has shown falling GDP during half of all
quarters since 2008. The economy entered a recession in the
first quarter (two consecutive quarters of negative growth) for
the fourth time since the financial crisis started. This negative
trend is continuing. On top of the structural and cyclical
problems the country has grappled with, there are also trade
sanctions with Russia. From a Western European standpoint,
Finland is hard hit by these sanctions. Most parts of the Finnish
economy are under pressure. Exports are weak and households
are squeezed by high unemployment, while low capacity
utilisation and weak business optimism are holding down
capital spending. The recession will end only late this year. As
an annual average, GDP will fall by 0.6 per cent in 2014. A
weaker euro will provide help to exports, but in 2015 and 2016
growth will be modest: 0.5 and 0.9 per cent, respectively.
Short-term risks are on the downside and mainly related to
whether Russian import restrictions have a larger impact than
we have assumed.

No turnaround in sight
Indicators are not signalling any quick turnaround. Last
autumns improved sentiment has vanished and all sectors
view the situation negatively, according to the European
Commissions indicator. The service sector is the least
negative, although the indicator level is weak here as well.
For years, structural problems in the forest products and
information and communications technology (ICT) sectors
have hampered the economy, contributing to weak or falling
growth. In the short term, Russian import restrictions have now
effectively sabotaged export-driven growth. Finlands exports
total less than 40 per cent of GDP. Russia is the countrys third
largest trade partner (after Sweden and Germany). Nearly 10
per cent of exports go to Russia. EU-Russian trade sanctions
thus have a relatively big impact on the Finnish economy; for
example, Russia buys nearly 20 per cent of Finnish food
exports. Also hurting this trade is the fact that for some time,
the Russian economy has shown structural weaknesses.

It is hard to quantify the impact of Russias import restrictions,
but a 25 per cent downturn in total exports would lower GDP
by more than 1 per cent. In addition there are negative spill-
over effects, but in practice these are usually offset as exports
find new markets. The Bank of Finland has estimated the final
effect of such a scenario to 0.5-1.0 per cent lower GDP.

Finland

Prime Minister Alexander Stubb has declared that Finland may
seek compensation from the EU, since EU-wide sanction
decisions have a relatively large impact on Finland. So far the
EUs response has been cautious. Compensation will depend
on the extent to which new markets can replace exports to
Russia. Even if the EU should pay compensation, its help to the
Finnish economy would be marginal. Overall, we forecast
unchanged Finnish exports in 2014, followed by a weak
increase of 1.5 per cent in 2015 and 3.7 per cent in 2016.
Capital spending will keep falling in 2014
Idle manufacturing capacity suggests a continued decline in
business investments. Falling home prices will also help keep
construction activity weak, although the number of building
permits has increased. Borrowing statistics also show that
households and businesses are being cautious. Lending to
households is rising by less than 2 per cent and to businesses
by 5 per cent year-on-year. For households, borrowing is at its
lowest level in at least two decades. Total capital spending will
fall by 1.7 per cent in 2014, followed by a certain improvement.

Continued high unemployment
Despite continued recession, unemployment has levelled out
and has remained stable at 8.6 per cent so far this year a high
level that is still relatively close to the average in recent
decades. We estimate equilibrium unemployment at around
7.5 per cent. Demographics and prolonged economic
weakness are contributing to a decline in labour force
participation, which is holding back an upturn in joblessness.
Despite weak economic growth and high unemployment, the
number of job vacancies is surprisingly high. This may be a
signal of mismatching and may indicate that economic
restructuring will require a redoubling of labour market
training, for example. Unemployment will remain at its
current level for the rest of 2014 and then fall slowly to 8.4
per cent in 2015 and 8.2 per cent in 2016.
Due to low pay increases, along with high unemployment that
will fall only slowly in 2015-2016, household incomes will show
weak growth during our forecast period. Listless retail sales
show that households are being cautious. Consumption
will fall by 0.4 per cent this year. In 2015-2016, it will again
increase, but slowly (by 0.4 and 0.5 per cent, respectively).

The rate of pay increases has slowed and is now in line with
inflation. Competitiveness has worsened, due to a long period
of relatively high pay hikes, but that trend has now ended.
Along with a falling euro, this will weaken the real effective
exchange rate and benefit exports. Households are squeezed,
although thanks to low inflation they are receiving unchanged
or marginally rising real wages. Inflation slowed to 1.0 per cent
in July and will remain low in 2015-2016, in line with euro zone
price trends. Due to weak domestic and international demand,
it is difficult for companies to raise prices. HICP inflation will
be 1.2 per cent in 2014 and 1.0 per cent in 2015 and 2016.

Continued consolidation policy
Finland continues to pursue a cost-cutting fiscal policy, but due
to weak growth there is still a public sector deficit. Decisions in
March 2014 will place limitations on central government
outlays. Meanwhile the government is creating some room for
growth stimulus, using proceeds of asset sales. Fiscal policy
will be contractionary in 2014-2016. The deficit will fall from
2.7 per cent of GDP in 2014 to less than 2 per cent in 2016.
Public sector debt will continue to rise, reaching 62 per cent of
GDP in 2016. The sovereign bond yield spread to Germany is
very narrow and public finances are in decent shape in a euro
zone perspective, which might suggest a somewhat looser
fiscal policy. Yet it is unlikely that the government will
implement any policy shift, having investing a lot of political
prestige in bringing down the deficit and stabilising debt.
Economic data
GLOBAL KEY INDICATORS
Yearly change in per cent
2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP OECD 1.4 1.9 2.5 2.4
GDP world (PPP) 3.3 3.4 3.9 4.0
CPI OECD 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.9
Export market OECD 2.7 3.6 5.4 4.8
Oil price, Brent (USD/barrel) 108.7 108.0 100.0 100.0
US
2013 level,
USD bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross domestic product 17,078 2.2 2.2 3.4 3.1
Private consumption 11,653 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.6
Public consumption 3,143 -2.0 -0.7 -0.1 0.0
Gross xed investment 2,395 4.7 5.3 8.9 8.5
Stock building (change as % of GDP) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Exports 2,325 3.0 3.1 6.2 6.1
Imports 2,788 1.1 4.6 6.1 5.7
Unemployment (%) 7.4 6.2 5.6 5.2
Consumer prices 1.5 1.9 1.9 2.2
Household savings ratio (%) 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.4
EURO ZONE
2013 level,
EUR bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross domestic product 9,579 -0.4 0.7 1.1 1.5
Private consumption 5,482 -0.7 0.5 0.8 1.2
Public consumption 2,066 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5
Gross xed investment 1,694 -2.9 1.2 1.6 2.3
Stock building (change as % of GDP) -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exports 4,396 1.4 2.5 3.3 4.2
Imports 4,065 0.4 2.5 3.0 4.0
Unemployment (%) 12.0 11.5 11.2 11.0
Consumer prices 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.9
Economic data
LARGE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES
2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP
Japan 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.8
Germany 0.1 1.2 1.4 1.8
France 0.4 0.1 0.7 1.1
Italy -1.9 -0.2 0.5 0.8
China 7.7 7.5 7.3 6.9
India 4.7 5.0 5.8 6.2
Ination
Japan 0.4 2.7 1.7 2.0
Germany 1.2 0.9 1.5 2.2
France 0.8 0.7 0.2 0.2
Italy 1.3 0.2 0.0 0.2
China 2.6 2.5 2.7 3.0
India 10.1 8.0 7.3 6.7
Unemployment (%)
Japan 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4
Germany 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.4
France 10.2 10.5 11.0 10.9
Italy 12.2 12.5 12.4 12.2
EASTERN EUROPE
2013 2014 2015 2016
GDP, yearly change in per cent
Estonia 0.8 0.5 1.8 3.0
Latvia 4.1 2.5 2.7 3.4
Lithuania 3.3 2.7 3.2 4.0
Poland 1.6 2.7 3.0 3.5
Russia 1.3 0.5 0.3 1.5
Ukraine 0.0 -6.0 0.0 3.0
Ination, yearly change in per cent
Estonia 3.2 0.1 1.6 1.9
Latvia 0,0 0.8 2.2 2.6
Lithuania 1.2 0.1 0.7 1.0
Poland 0.8 0.3 1.6 2.2
Russia 6.7 7.3 6.5 5.5
Ukraine -0.3 10.0 7.5 6.0
Economic data
FINANCIAL FORECASTS
Aug 21st Dec-14 Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16
Ocial interest rates
US Fed funds 0.25 0.25 0.50 1.25 1.75 2.50
Japan Call money rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Euro zone Re rate 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
United Kingdom Repo rate 0.50 0.50 0.75 1.25 1.50 1.75
Bond yields
US 10 years 2.39 2.50 2.80 3.20 3.40 3.60
Japan 10 years 0.53 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
Germany 10 years 0.99 1.10 1.40 1.50 1.70 1.90
United Kingdom 10 years 2.51 2.60 2.90 3.20 3.50 3.80
Exchange rates
USD/JPY 104 105 110 115 120 125
EUR/USD 1.33 1.30 1.27 1.24 1.22 1.20
EUR/JPY 138 137 140 143 146 150
GBP/USD 1.66 1.69 1.67 1.63 1.63 1.62
EUR/GBP 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.74
SWEDEN
2013 level,
SEK bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross domestic product, working day adjustment 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.5
Public consumption 998 2.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
Gross xed investment 668 -1.3 3.0 4.5 5.5
Stock building (change as % of GDP) 2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1
Exports 1,668 -0.9 2.4 5.2 5.2
Imports 1,461 -1.2 3.5 4.9 5.2
Unemployment (%) 8.0 7.9 7.5 7.2
Employment 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0
Industrial production -4.0 0.5 3.5 4.0
CPI 0.0 -0.1 0.8 1.7
CPIF 0.9 0.6 1.3 1.5
Hourly wage increases 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.5
Real disposable income 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.3
Trade balance, % of GDP 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.4
Current account, % av GDP 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.8
Central government borrowing, SEK bn 131 60 30 20
Public sector nancial balance, % of GDP -1.2 -1.8 -1.0 -0.4
Public sector debt, % of GDP 40.6 41.5 41.0 39.8
FINANCIAL FORECASTS Aug 21st Dec-14 Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16
Repo rate 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.50 1.00
3-month interest rate, STIBOR 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.85 1.35
10-year bond yield 1.56 1.55 1.80 2.00 2.30 2.60
10-year spread to Germany, bp 57 45 40 50 60 70
USD/SEK 6.89 7.12 7.17 7.18 7.21 7.25
EUR/SEK 9.16 9.25 9.10 8.90 8.80 8.70
TCW 124.3 126.4 124.9 122.5 121.4 120.2
KIX 108.1 110.0 108.7 106.6 105.6 104.6
Economic data
NORWAY
2013 level,
NOK bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross domestic product (Mainland) 2,188 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.6
Gross xed investment 635 8.4 -0.3 -0.5 2.9
Exports 1,121 -3.3 0.7 2.8 1.8
Imports 816 2.9 1.2 3.9 3.6
Unemployment (%) 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.6
CPI 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.3
CPI-ATE 1.6 2.4 2.1 2.3
Annual wage increases 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.8
Deposit rate 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 2.00 2.50
10-year bond yield 2.37 2.30 2.40 2.40 2.65 2.85
USD/NOK 6.15 6.27 6.30 6.37 6.48 6.67
EUR/NOK 8.17 8.15 8.00 7.90 7.90 8.00
DENMARK
2013 level
DKK bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Private consumption 905 0.0 1.6 2.2 2.4
Gross xed investment 322 0.7 2.1 2.1 3.2
Stock building (change as % of GDP) 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Exports 1,021 1.2 3.8 4.0 4.6
Imports 916 1.7 3.8 3.0 3.6
Unemployment (%) 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.5
Unemployment, OECD harmonised (%) 7.0 6.5 5.7 5.0
CPI, harmonised 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.5
Current account, % of GDP 6.8 6.8 6.5 6.0
Public sector nancial balance, % av GDP -0.8 0.0 -0.5 0.5
Public sector debt, % av GDP 44.5 43.5 42.0 40.0
Lending rate 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
10-year bond yield 1.04 1.15 1.45 1.55 1.75 1.95
USD/DKK 5.61 5.73 5.87 6.01 6.11 6.21
EUR/DKK 7.46 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45 7.45
Economic data
FINLAND
2013 level,
EUR bn 2013 2014 2015 2016
Gross domestic product 201 -1.2 -0.6 0.5 0.9
Private consumption 111 -0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.5
Gross xed investment 37 -4.9 -1.7 0.6 2.0
Exports 77 -1.7 0.0 1.5 3.7
Imports 79 -2.5 0.2 1.3 3.5
Unemployment (%) 8.5 8.6 8.4 8.2
CPI, harmonised 2.2 1.2 1.0 1.0
Current account, % of GDP -1.0 -1.4 -1.2 -1.0
Public sector nancial balance, % av GDP -2.3 -2.7 -2.0 -1.8
Public sector debt, % av GDP 57.0 60.0 61.5 62.0
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Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) is incorporated in Sweden, as a Limited Liability Company. It is regulated by Finansinspektionen, and by the local
nancial regulators in each of the jurisdictions in which it has branches or subsidiaries, including in the UK, by the Financial Services Authority; Denmark by
Finanstilsynet; Finland by Finanssivalvonta; and Germany by Bundesanstalt fr Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. In Norway, SEB Enskilda AS (ESO) is regulated
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world as well as Europe and Sweden. Another publication is Eastern European
Outlook, which deals with the Baltics, Poland, Russia and Ukraine and appears
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Nordic Outlook 1408: Continued Recovery - Greater Downside Risks

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Nordic Outlook 1408: Continued Recovery - Greater Downside Risks

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Continued global recovery,

but greater downside risks

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