1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA,
accused.
AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J .:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac City, finding appellant Agpanga
Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga guilty of violating Article II, Section
4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
1

For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos.
Appellant and her co-accused were charged under the following Information:
"That on or about October 20, 1996 at around 1:00 oclock dawn, in
the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping with one another, without
being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make delivery/transport with intent to sell marijuana
leaves wrapped in a transparent plastic weighing approximately
eight (8) kilos, which is in violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
2

During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of
1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a
certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were
transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks.
On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector
Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip
which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would
be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed
a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness
SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino
were assigned to man the checkpoint.
At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea
and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female
passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.
3
In front of them was a
black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when
asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the
black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy
Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two
women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3
Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was
opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of
the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags
and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio
interrogated the two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned by the
appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed this allegation. Thereafter, they were
made to sign a confiscation receipt without the assistance of any counsel, as
they were not informed of their right to have one. During the course of the
investigation, not even close relatives of theirs were present.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San
Fernando, Pampanga on October 23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P.
2

Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that the
articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos.
4

For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita
Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy
medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial
Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal
pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay
Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was
flagged down by a policeman at a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She
was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was
there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight
bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its
contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers
seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger
behind the driver.
Remarkably, appellant did not appear in court and was only represented by
her lawyer. The latter marked and submitted in evidence an affidavit
executed by one Efren Gannod, a security guard of Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines in Tarlac, Tarlac. The sworn statement declared that at about 0220H
on October 20, 1996, SPO2 Antonio arrived at their terminal and arrested a
certain woman who boarded their Bus No. 983. The incident was recorded in
the companys logbook. Gannod, however, was not presented in court to
attest that the woman referred in his affidavit was the appellant.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga,
thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425 in
relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million
pesos.
SO ORDERED."
5

Aggrieved by the verdict, appellant interposed the present appeal. In her
brief, she assigned the following errors:
"1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court failed to appreciate the
contention of the defense that the right of accused against illegal
and unwarranted arrest and search was violated by the police
officers who arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate the contention of the
defense that the right of the accused to custodial investigation was
deliberately violated by the peace officers who apprehended and
investigated the accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to evaluate the material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses
which inconsistencies cast doubt and make incredible the contention
and version of the prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion when it
appreciated and considered the documentary and object evidence of
the prosecution not formally offered amounting to ignorance of the
law."
6

We are not persuaded by these contentions; hence, the appeal must be
dismissed.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful, appellant capitalizes on the absence
of a warrant for her arrest. She contends that at the time she was
apprehended by the police officers, she was not committing any offense but
was merely riding a tricycle. In the same manner, she impugns the search
made on her belongings as illegal as it was done without a valid warrant or
under circumstances when warrantless search is permissible. Consequently,
any evidence obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly
issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
7

3

The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches
and seizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless
authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a
magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants
and warrants of arrest.
8

Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained
prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are
certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of
moving vehicles.
9
Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said
circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
10
Peace officers in such
cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
11
When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible
only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction.
12

In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following
instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the
plastic bag carried by the accused;
13
(b) where an informer positively
identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously;
14
(c)
where the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused
would transport a quantity of marijuana;
15
(d) where Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain
Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge
in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification
papers when requested to do so;
16
(f) where the moving vehicle was stopped
and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the
drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong --
that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;
17
(g)
where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the
accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous
test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably
carrying shabu with him;
18
(h) where police officers received an information
that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag,
would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;
19
and (i) where the
appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted
the description given by a civilian asset.
20

The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable
cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded
the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita
Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the
police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a
tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle
and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the
drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content
was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless
search and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs
in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of
Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a
warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto, thus:
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or
a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."
21
(emphasis supplied)
4

Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer
when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly
informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her
choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein
should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any
confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the
appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated
marijuana. We quote the relevant portion of its decision:
"Earlier in the course of the proceedings, the court then presided by
Judge Angel Parazo, granted bail to accused Agpanga Libnao,
ruling that the confiscation receipt signed by both accused (Exhibit
"C") is inadmissible because they were not assisted by a counsel.
Confronted with this same issue, this court finds the postulate to rest
on good authority and will therefore reiterate its inadmissibility.
Since the prosecution had not presented any extrajudicial
confession extracted from both accused as evidence of their guilt,
the court finds it needless to discuss any answer given by both
accused as a result of the police interrogation while in their custody.
By force of necessity, therefore, the only issue to be resolved
by the court is whether or not, based on the prosecutions
evidence, both accused can be convicted."
22
(emphasis supplied)
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account
the object and documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latters
failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she argues that they
again must be deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be
considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case.
23
All the documentary and object evidence in this case
were properly identified, presented and marked as exhibits in court, including
the bricks of marijuana.
24
Even without their formal offer, therefore, the
prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified
those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded.
25
Furthermore, appellants
counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the
exhibits.
26

Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. She first cites the inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1
Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who opened the black
bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that
the bag was already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then
focuses on the police officers failure to remember the family name of the
driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she
mentions refer only to minor details and not to material points regarding the
basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not affect
the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that
appellant and her co-accused were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant
details concerning the principal occurrence.
27
The identity of the person who
opened the bag is clearly immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it
is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding the same
incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons
may have different recollections of the same incident.
28

Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to
note and remember the name of the tricycle driver for the reason that it was
unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in
complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the
crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold
this presumption.
29
In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest
any improper motive on the part of the police enforcers in arresting the
appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
appellants defense of denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of denial
and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just
as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most
cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
30
It has to be
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
31
The sole proof presented
in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi
5

was a sworn statement, which was not even affirmed on the witness stand
by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial
court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A. No. 7659,
and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of two million pesos is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.