Football Tactics Evolution
Football Tactics Evolution
Football Tactics Evolution
In the football matches of the 19th century defensive football was not played, the line-
ups reflected the all-attacking nature of these games.
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Classic formations
Catenaccio
Catenaccio describes a tactical system in football with an emphasis on defence. In Italian catenaccio
means "door-bolt" and it means a highly organized and effective backline defense which is intended to
prevent goals. It was made famous by Argentinean trainer Helenio Herrera of Inter Milan in the 1960s
who used it to grind out 1-0 wins over opponents in their league games.
The system remained popular until the European Cup final in 1967 when it backfired on Inter who had
gone 1-0 up from an 8th minute Mazzola penalty kick. They came under constant pressure from Celtic
F.C, a team admired for their style of attack. Celtic won the game 2-1 with over 40 attempts on goal in
the process. The game exposed the serious weaknesses of the catenaccio system. After the game
Helenio Herrera was forced to admit: "Celtic deserved to win and their win was a victory for the sport".
The Catenaccio was influenced by the verrou or "chain" system invented by Austrian coach Karl
Rappan. As coach of Switzerland, Rappan played a defensive sweeper just ahead of his goalkeeper in
the 1930s and 1940s. Nereo Rocco's Padova, in the 1950s, pioneered the system in Italy where it would
be used again by the AC Milan team of the early 1960s.
Rappan's "verrou" system, proposed in 1932 when coach of Servette, was implemented with 4 fixed
defenders, playing a strict man-to-man marking system, plus a playmaker in the middle of the field who
plays the ball together with two midfield wings.
Rocco's tactic, often referred to as the "real" catenaccio, was shown first in 1947 with Triestina: the
most common mode of operation was a 1-3-3-3 formation with a strictly defensive team approach.
With catenaccio, Triestina finished the Serie A tournament in a surprising second place. Some
variations include 1-4-4-1 and 1-4-3-2 formations.
The key innovation of catenaccio was the introduction of the role of libero or sweeper, a player
positioned behind the line of three defenders. The sweeper's role was to recover loose balls, nullify the
opponent's striker and double mark when necessary. Another important innovation was the counter-
attack, mainly based on long passes from the defence.
In Herrera's version in the 1960s, four man-marking defenders are tightly assigned to each opposing
attacker while an extra sweeper would pick up any loose ball that escaped the coverage of the
defenders.
With the years, the original catenaccio has been slowly abandoned for other, more balanced tactical
approaches; in particular, the increasing popularity gained by an attacking-based approach like Total
Football has contributed to make catenaccio a tactic of the past.
Catenaccio today
Real catenaccio is no longer used in the modern football world. Two major characteristics of this style;
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man-to-man marking and the libero position are no longer in use (the "libero" or "sweeper" having
been made redundant due to the offside rule , rendering pure catenaccio unavailable.) What many
consider catenaccio is rather a very hyper-defensive or retreat style defending from teams, with rare
forward movement. This hyper defensive style is still commonly referred to as catenaccio. Nowadays,
catenaccio is used mainly by weaker teams, in order to reduce any technical gap against stronger ones
by showing a more physical approach to football. The slow disappearance of the role of sweepers in
modern football has also contributed to the decline in its use.
The catenaccio system is often criticized for reducing the quality of football games as a spectacle. In
certain parts of Europe, it became synonymous with negative football since the focus is so much upon
defending.
One frequent mistake is to define catenaccio as any defensive tactical system used by a football team.
This is actually untrue, because catenaccio is just one of the possible defensive tactics to be used.
Nowadays catenaccio is used less and less by top teams, and often limited solely to particular
circumstances, such as numerical inferiority following a sending off, or needing to defend a marginal
scoreline until the end of the match. Thus, today any extremely defensive mental approach to a football
match by a team is frequently, incorrectly, referred to as catenaccio.
When Italy was reduced to 10 men in the fiftieth minute of the 2006 FIFA World Cup round of 16
match against Australia, coach Marcello Lippi changed the Azzurri's formation to a defensive
orientation which caused the British newspaper The Guardian to note that "the timidity of Italy's
approach had made it seem that Helenio Herrera, the high priest of catenaccio, had taken possession of
the soul of Marcello Lippi".[1] Note, however, that the 10 men team was playing with a 4-3-2 scheme,
just a midfielder away from the regular 4-4-2, another stereotypical viewing of a defensive italian
formation as "Catenaccio".Italy won their next match against Ukraine (3-0), and proved they have
excellent football to offer. In their following match, the Azzurri secured a historic semi-final win over
Germany in Dortmund by defying common expectations of negative, safety-first play, with their two
late goals scored by Fabio Grosso and Alessandro Del Piero in the 119th and 120th minute that sank
the host country. In this match, the Azzurri surprised many, including their opponents, by their "un-
catenaccio" display which saw both teams having an equal 18 shots, of which the Germans had only six
shots on target, while the Italians had an impressive 11, forced 10 saves from German keeper Jens
Lehmann, and scored two goals.
However, after the 2006 FIFA World Cup, the media picked up the fact that modern football, which
should heavily rely on attacking, is not to be and feared that defensive style of playing will come back.
The amount of goals scored in that World Cup was only 147 (an average of 2.297 per match), and the
Golden Boot Winner Miroslav Klose only scored 5 goals as opposed to the amount the previous winner
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Ronaldo scored, 8. Not only that, this World Cup was the first to feature its official top three "Best
Players" to be all non-forwards.
A new breed of cattanacio has been utilised in 2007 in Scotland by Walter Smith's Rangers, where they
have played 4-5-1 in almost every game. This Wattenacio tactic has proved to be deeply flawed after
Smith used it in both home and away games even against smaller teams. It came spectacularly outdone
at home against Lyon in December 2007 when they were soundly thrashed 3-0 to put them out of the
Champions League. Walter remained loyal to the Wattenacio till the end, finishing the game with his
standard 4-5-1 formation.
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of attacking football have come to an end with results being more important than attractive
football.
• Brazil, under coach Dunga have fielded all-out defensive formations, most notably fielding 3
defensive midfielders throughout Copa America 2007 and making use of tactical fouls, 37 in the
final match alone.
• Rangers, under coach Walter Smith. This Scottish brand of 'Wattenacio' has seen Rangers play
4-5-1 against all opponents regardless of quality and has seen them struggle in the league and in
Europe
Totall football
In football (soccer) Total Football is a system where a player who moves out of his position is
replaced by another from his team, thus retaining their intended organizational structure. In this fluid
system no footballer is fixed in his or her intended outfield role; anyone can be successively an
attacker, a midfielder and a defender.
Total Football depends largely on the adaptability of each footballer within the team to succeed. It
consists of footballers being extremely tactically aware, allowing them to change positions at high
speed—in its simplest terms, every player is comfortable in any other position. It also puts high
technical and physical demands on the players.
History
The foundations for Total Football were laid by Jack Reynolds, who was the manager of Ajax
Amsterdam from 1915-1925, 1928-1940 and 1945-1947.
Rinus Michels, who played under Reynolds, later went on to become manager of Ajax himself and
refined the concept into what is known today as "Total Football" (Totaalvoetbal in Dutch), using it in
his training for the Ajax squad and the Netherlands national team in the 1970s. It was further refined by
Stefan Kovacs after Michels left for FC Barcelona. Dutch forward Johan Cruyff was the system's most
famous exponent.
Although Cruyff was fielded as centre forward, he wandered all over the pitch, popping up wherever he
could do most damage to the opposing team. This resulted in a need for such a dynamic system like
Total Football. His teammates adapted themselves flexibly around his movements regularly switching
positions, so that the tactical roles in the team were always filled, although not always by the same
person.
Space and the creation of it were vital for the tactic of Total Football to be played into fruition, Ajax
defender Barry Hulshoff explained how the team that won the European Cup in 1971, 1972 and 1973
worked it to their advantage. 'We discussed space the whole time. Johan Cruyff always talked about
where people should run and where they should stand, and when they should not move.'
The constant switching of positions that became known as Total Football only came about because of
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this spatial awareness. 'It was about making space, coming into space, and organising space-like
architecture on the football pitch,' said Hulshoff. The system developed organically and
collaboratively: it was not down to coach Rinus Michels, his successor Stefan Kovacs or Cruyff alone.
Cruyff summed up his (Total Football) philosophy: 'Simple football is the most beautiful. But playing
simple football is the hardest thing.' [1]
The 1972 European Cup final proved to be Total Football's finest hour and which placed it on the map.
After Ajax's 2:0 victory over Internazionale, newspapers around Europe reported the "death of
Catenaccio and triumph of Total Football". The Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad declared: ‘The
Inter system undermined. Defensive football is destroyed.’[2]
Michels was appointed for the 1974 FIFA World Cup campaign by the KNVB. Most of the 1974 team
were made up of players from Ajax and Feyenoord. However, Rob Rensenbrink was an outsider,
having played for clubs in neighboring Belgium, and was unfamiliar with Total Football, although he
was selected and adapted well. During the tournament, the Netherlands coasted through their first and
second round matches, defeating Argentina (4-0), East Germany (2-0) and Brazil (2-0) to setup a
meeting with hosts West Germany.[3]
The 1974 Finals, Cruyff kicked off and the ball was passed around the Oranje thirteen times before
returning to Cruyff, who then went on a rush that eluded Berti Vogts and ended when he was fouled by
Uli Hoeness inside the box. Teammate Johan Neeskens scored from the spot kick to give the
Netherlands a 1-0 lead with 80 seconds of play elapsed, and the Germans had not even touched the ball.
Cruyff's playmaking influence was stifled in the second half of the match by the effective marking of
Berti Vogts, while Franz Beckenbauer, Uli Hoeness and Wolfgang Overath dominated midfield,
enabling West Germany to win 2-1.[4]
The ill-fated Austrian "Wunderteam" of the 1930s is also credited in some circles as being the first
national team to play Total Football. It is no coincidence that Ernst Happel, a talented Austrian player
in the 1940s and 1950s, was coach in the Netherlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He introduced
a tougher style of play at ADO and Feyenoord. Happel managed the Netherlands national team in the
1978 World Cup, where they again finished as runners-up.
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2-3-5 (The Pyramid)
In 1884, Preston North End (England) introduced what would become the first long-
term successful formation — the 2-3-5; this was originally known as the Pyramid
with the numerical formation being referenced retrospectively. By the 1890s it was
the standard formation in Britain and had spread all over the world. With some
variations it was used by most top level teams up to the 1940s.For the first time a
balance between attacking and defending was reached. When defending, the two
defenders (fullbacks) would watch out for the opponent's insides (the second and
fourth players in the attacking line); while the midfielders (halfbacks) would watch
for the other three forwards.The center halfback had a key role in both helping to
organize the team's attack and marking the opponent's center forward, supposedly one
of their most dangerous players.It was this formation which gave rise to the
convention of shirt numbers which is still used today[citation needed] but can appear
confused when applied to the classic 4-4-2 line up, i.e.:
• 01 – Goalkeeper
• 02 – Right back
• 03 – Left back
• 04 – Center back/Defensive Midfielder
• 05 – Center back
• 06 – Defensive midfielder
• 07 – Right winger
• 08 – Center midfield/Center Midfielder
• 09 – Center Forward
• 10 – Offensive midfielder(play maker/Center Forward
11 – Left winger
•
•
Austria, 4th at the 1934 World Cup: Team: Platzer; Cisar and Sesta; Wagner, Smistik
and Urbanek; Zischek, Bican, Sindelar, Schall and Viertl. Coaches: Hugo Meisl and
Franz Hansl.
Metodo
The Metodo was devised by Vittorio Pozzo, coach of the Italian national team in the
1930s [1]. It was a derivation of the Danubian School. The system was based on the
2-3-5 formation, Pozzo realized that his halfbacks would need some more support in
order to be superior to the opponents' midfield, so he pulled 2 of the forwards to just
in-front of midfield, creating a 2-3-2-3 formation. This created a stronger defense than
previous systems, as well as allowing effective counterattacks. The Italian national
team won back-to-back World Cups in 1934 and 1938 using this system.
The WM
3-3-4
The 3-3-4 formation was similar to the WW with the notable exception of having an
inside-forward (as opposed to centre-forward) deployed as a midfield schemer
alongside the two wing-halves. This formation would be commonplace during the
1950s and early 1960s. One of the best exponents of the system was the Tottenham
Hotspur double-winning side of 1961, which deployed a midfield of Danny
Blanchflower, John White and David Mackay. FC Porto won the 2005-06 Portuguese
national championship using this unusual formation (coach: Co Adriaanse).
4-2-4
The 4-2-4 formation attempts to combine a strong attack with a strong defense, and
was conceived as a reaction to WM's stiffness. It could also be considered a further
development of the WW. The 4-2-4 was the first formation to be described using
numbers.
While the initial developments leading to the 4-2-4 were devised by Márton Bukovi,
the credit for creating the 4-2-4 lies with two different people: Flávio Costa, the
Brazilian national coach in the early 1950s, as well as another Hungarian Béla
Guttman. These tactics seemed to be developed independently, with the Brazilians
discussing these ideas while the Hungarians seemed to be putting them into motion
[3] [2] [4]. However the fully developed 4-2-4 was only 'perfected' in Brazil in the
late 1950s.
Costa published his ideas, the "diagonal system", in the Brazilian newspaper O
Cruzeiro, using schematics as the ones used here and, for the first time ever, the
formation description by numbers as used in this article [3]. The "diagonal system"
was another precursor of the 4-2-4 and was created to spur improvisation in players.
Guttman himself moved to Brazil later in the 1950s to help develop these tactical
ideas using the experience of Hungarian coaches.
The 4-2-4 formation made use of the increasing players skills and fitness, aiming to
effectively use 6 defenders and 6 forwards, with the midfielders performing both
tasks. The 4th defender increased the number of defensive players but mostly allowed
them to be closer together, thus enabling effective cooperation among them, the point
being that a stronger defense would allow an even stronger attack.
The relatively empty midfield relied on defenders that should now be able not only to
steal the ball, but also hold it, pass it or even run with it and start an attack. So this
formation required that all players, including defenders, are somehow skillful and
with initiative, making it a perfect fit for the Brazilian player's mind. The 4-2-4
needed a high level of tactical awareness as having only 2 midfielders could lead to
defensive problems. The system was also fluid enough to allow the formation to
change throughout play.
4-2-4 was first used with success at club level in Brazil by Palmeiras and Santos, and
was used by Brazil in their wins at 1958 World Cup and 1970 World Cup, both
featuring Pelé, and Zagallo who played in the first and coached the second. The
formation was quickly adopted throughout the world after the Brazilian success.
4-3-3
The 4-3-3 was a development of the 4-2-4, and was played by the Brazilian national
team in the 1962 World Cup. The extra player in midfield allowed a stronger defence,
and the midfield could be staggered for different effects. The three midfielders
normally play closely together to protect the defence, and move laterally across the
field as a coordinated unit. The three forwards split across the field to spread the
attack, and are expected to "tackle back". When used from the start of a game, this
formation is widely regarded as encouraging defensive play, and should not be
confused with the practice of modifying a 4-4-2 by bringing on an extra forward to
replace a midfield player when behind in the latter stages of a game.
In club football, the team that brought this formation to the forefront was the famous
Ajax Amsterdam team of the early 1970s, which won three European Cups with
Johan Cruyff. Chelsea have used this formation to great effect under José Mourinho in
the time he has been at the club. While getting his team to constantly press the
opposition when defending, he also likes the two wingers to come back to create a 4-
5-1 formation.
At the 2006 FIFA World Cup Spain and The Netherlands played both a variation of 4-
3-3 without wingers. The three strikers would interchange positions and run the
channels like a regular striker would.
This adaptable formation is the most common in football today, so well known that it
has even inspired a magazine title, FourFourTwo. The midfielders are required to
work hard to support both the defense and the attack: one of the central midfielders is
expected to go upfield as often as possible to support the forward pair, while the other
will play a "holding role", shielding the defence; the two wide midfield players must
move up the flanks to the goal line in attacks and yet also protect the fullback wide
defenders. It is a very popular formation in Britain especially where it is sometimes
called a 'flat-back 4'.
• Brazilian National Team during 1994, winners of the 1994 World Cup (Coach:
Carlos Alberto Parreira)
• Manchester United F.C., Treble Winners 1998-99
• Team: Schmeichel; Gary Neville, Irwin, Stam, Johnsen; Giggs,
Beckham, Scholes, Keane; Cole, Yorke. Coach: Sir Alex Ferguson.
• Arsenal F.C., Unbeaten Season 2003/04
Team: Lehmann; Lauren, Campbell, Toure, Cole; Pires, Vieira, Gilberto, Ljungberg;
Bergkamp, Henry. Coach: Arsene Wenger
4-4-2 diamond or 4-3-1-2
The 4-4-2 diamond (also described as 4-1-2-1-2 or 4-3-1-2) staggers the midfield. The
width in the team has to come from the full-backs pushing forwards.
• Argentina; probably the team that uses it more often, although in the 2006
FIFA World Cup coach José Pekerman alternated between 4-3-1-2 and 4-2-2-
2. Carlos Bilardo's team is a clear example with Diego Maradona being the
offensive midfielder. This position is known as enganche and is a key position
for Argentine football. This player often has more freedom than the rest and is
considered the creative player, the playmaker, which can 'break' the formation
and move freely along the offensive field. Other examples are Ronaldinho,
Juan Román Riquelme, Rivaldo, Gheorghe Hagi, Zidane, Kaká, and Totti. The
defensive midfielder is key for getting the ball back and covering the spaces
left by the fullbacks or other players, being some sort of "midfield sweeper".
This position is key for the 4-3-1-2 formation because of the recuperation of
possession and several times this player distributes the ball to the teammates.
Some examples include Dunga, Torsten Frings, Fernando Redondo, and
Makelele.
• Germany - with the speciality of two Full Backs who are also capable of
playing like good wingbacks, which is more offensive (Phillip Lahm, Marcell
Jansen) - if there is a "Konter" then, the defensive midfielder is helping the
two centre backs.
• England National Team; the so-called "Wingless Wonders"; winners of the
1966 World Cup
• AC Milan winner of the Champions League 2003, 2007 and the 2004 Scudetto
(coached by Carlo Ancelotti)
• FC Porto winner of the Champions League 2004 (managed by José Mourinho)
• Galatasaray SK winner of the UEFA Cup 2000 (managed by Fatih Terim)
Real Madrid 2001-2002 champions league winners in final
• Boca Juniors winner of the Copa Libertadores 2000 and 2001 (managed by
Carlos Bianchi), and 2007 (managed by Miguel Angel Russo)
4-4-1-1
A variation of 4-4-2 with one of the strikers playing 'in the hole', or as a 'second
striker', slightly behind their partner. The second striker is generally a more creative
player, the playmaker.
This is another variation of the 4-4-2, commonly described as the 'Christmas Tree'
formation. Another forward is brought on for a midfielder to play 'in the hole'. so
leaving two forwards slightly behind the most forward striker. Terry Venables, first
brought in this system throughout England's Euro 96 campaign. Glenn Hoddle then
used this formation poorly during his time in charge of the England national football
team and since then the formation has lost its popularity in England.
5-3-2
This formation has three central defenders (possibly with one acting as a sweeper.)
This system is heavily reliant on the wing-backs providing width for the team. The
two wide full-backs act as wing-backs. It is their job to work their flank along the full
length of the pitch, supporting both the defence and the attack.
• Germany adopted this formation between 1990 and 1994, winning the 1990
World Cup
Celtic FC under Martin O'Neill employed this formation during their 2001 treble
winning season and run to the UEFA Cup Final in 2003
A variant of the above, this involves a more withdrawn sweeper, who may join the
midfield, and more advanced full-backs.
Real Madrid, as 2000 Champions League winner, with Iván Helguera playing as
sweeper
3-4-3
Using a 3-4-3 the midfielders expected to split their time between attacking and
defending. Having only three dedicated defenders means that if the opposing team
breaks through the midfield, they will have a greater chance to score than with a more
conventional defensive configuration, such as 4-5-1 or 4-4-2. However, the three
forwards allow for a greater concentration on offense. This formation is used by more
offensive-minded teams. To use this effectively a team must have 3 defenders which
can hold their own and a keeper who is not afraid to leave the box.
• FC Barcelona during the early 1990s, with Johan Cruijff as coach (four La
Liga titles in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994, and a Champions League in 1992)
• AC Milan during the end of the 1990s, with Alberto Zaccheroni as coach (one
scudetto in 1999)
• FC Barcelona during the a portion of the 2006-2007 La Liga season, with
Frank Rijkaard as coach. This formation was a result of Frank Rijkaard's
insistence on playing Deco, Andres Iniesta, Xavi and a defensive midfielder as
well. With this formation, he most commonly utilized Ronaldinho, Lionel
Messi and Samuel Eto'o as forwards.
AFC Ajax won the Champions League in 1995 when Louis van Gaal was manager.
Ajax also won the Eredivisie three times - 1994, 1995 and 1996. The first eleven was:
Edwin Van der Sar, Michael Reiziger, Danny Blind, Frank de Boer, Frank Rijkaard,
Edgar Davids, Clarence Seedorf, Jari Litmanen, Marc Overmars, Finidi George,
Patrick Kluivert.
3-5-2
This formation is similar to 5-3-2 except that the two wingmen are oriented more
towards the attack. Because of this, the central midfielder tends to remain further back
in order to help prevent counter-attacks. It differs from the classical 3-5-2 of the WW
by having a non-staggered midfield. It was used for the first time at international level
by the Argentinian coach Carlos Salvador Bilardo in the FIFA World Cup Mexico
1986[citation needed]. Many teams also use a central attacking midfielder and two
defensive midfielders, so the midfielders form a W formation.
This uncommon but modern formation obviously focuses in the ball possession in the
midfield. In fact, it is very rare to see it as an initial formation, as it is better used to
keep results. Its more common variant is 3-4-2-1, which uses two wingbacks and a
square of two centre midfielder and two playmakers. The latter ones can switch for
the free roles, performing as a second striker or helping the centre midfielders in order
to keep the ball under their control. When there are no spaces in the centre, the
wingbacks must provide crosses from deep-line to the forward, as well as protection
from the forward runs from the opposition wingers/fullbacks. The lone forward must
be tactically gifted, because he is not only focused in scoring, but to play back to the
goal to assist with back passes to his teammates. Once the team is leading the game,
the tactics focuses even more in ball control, short passes and time wasting. On the
other hand, when the team is losing, at least one of the playmakers will play more
often in the edge of the area to add depth to the attack. Guus Hiddink is one of the few
coaches who has used this formation.
4-5-1 could be seen as a defensive formation, however if the two midfield wingers
play a more attacking role it can be likened to 4-3-3. The formation can be used to
grind out 0-0 draws or preserve a lead, as the packing of the centre midfield makes it
difficult for the opposition to build-up play. Because of the 'closeness' of the midfield,
the opposing team's forwards will often be starved of possession. However, due to the
lone striker, the centre of the midfield does have the responsibility of pushing forward
as well. The defensive midfielder will often control the pace of the game.
A modification of this formation is also used by José Mourinho's Chelsea F.C. side.
This modified version is the 4-1-4-1 where only one striker is used and the wingers
are given the responsibility of moving the ball forward and attacking. A holding
midfielder is also positioned in front of the back four. This provides freedom for the
rest of the team to move forward and attack as the defense will be "protected" by the
holding midfielder.
Recently Big Sam Allardyce audaciously claimed to have invented this formation.
[citation needed]
4-2-3-1
This formation is widely used by Spanish and French sides: it is a defensive formation
which is quite flexible, as both the side midfielders and the fullbacks may join the
attack, usually on the counter. In defense, this formation is similar to the 4-5-1. It is
used to maintain possession of the ball and stopping opponent attacks by controlling
the midfield area of the field. The lone striker may be very tall and strong to hold the
ball up as his midfielders and fullbacks join him in attack. The striker could also be
very fast. In these cases, the opponent's defense will be forced to fall back early,
thereby leaving space for the offensive central midfielder. This formation is used
especially when a playmaker is to be highlighted.
5-4-1
When a player is sent-off (after being shown a red card), the teams generally fall back
to defensive formations such as 4-4-1 or 5-3-1. Only when defeat is not an option (e.g.
in a playoff or knockout match) will a team with ten players play in a risky attacking
formation such as 4-3-2 or even 4-2-3. When more than one player is missing from
the team the common formations are generally disbanded in favor of either maximum
concentration on defense, or maximum concentration on attack
Future formations
Many leading football experts have said[citation needed] that, with the increase in
fitness of players, the normal, symmetrical formation is out of date. Variety is needed
in teams; so a pacy, direct winger might be deployed with a slower, more creative
player on the other flank. An example can be seen with the Argentina national team
playing "one armed" with Juan Riquelme attacking from the left.