1

CREATION AND ABOLITION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Sec. 6, LGC: Authority to create Local Government Units. A local government unit may be created divided, merged,
abolished or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality or
any other political subdivision of by ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod concerned in
the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

A. Requisites for creation of Local Government Units
1. Income. It must be sufficient based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and
services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the LGU concerned.
2. Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants of the within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU
concerned.
3. Land Area. It must be contiguous unless it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by an LGU independent of the
other properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be arrested by the Department of Finance, the NSO and the Land Management
Bureau of the DENR.

B. Decided cases:
b. 1 Pelaez V. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
Facts: In 1964, President Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 new municipalities, mainly in Northern Luzon and
Mindanao. The President based his power from Sec. 68 of the Revised Penal Code of 1917. Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed
a petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, restraining him from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive order and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Pelaez contends that: 1) Sec 68 of the Revised Administration Code has been impliedly repealed by R.A 2370, the Barrio
Charter Act. 2) Sec. 68 is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and 3) Sec. 68 can allow the president to
interfere in local government affairs.

Held: Pelaez is correct. Reasons:
1. The Barrio Charter Act states that barrios may not be created nor their boundaries altered or their names changed
except by act of Congress of the corresponding municipal board upon petition of the majority of voters in the areas affected and the
recommendation of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated This implies that if the Presi dent
cannot create barrios, what more municipalities? (But I think this is not a very good argument coz its implying way too much).
2. A law must be: a) Complete in itself so that there is nothing left for the delegate to do but to implement the statute and
b) Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable The standard set by Sec. 68 is as the public welfare may require
This standard, in relation to the law in question, is so broad that is virtually unfettered.
3. The creation of Municipal Corporation is essentially legislative in character. If the president can create municipalities,
situations may arise where he can submit local officials to his dictation by creating a new municipality and including therein the
barrio wherein the officials preside, thus said officials positions would suddenly becomes vacant. The power of control by t he
president over local government is denied by the 1935 Constitution

b. 2 Tan v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727
Facts: B.P. No. 885 was passed allowing for the creation of the province of Negros del Norte on the Island of Negros.
Petitioner Patricio Tan claimed that B.P. no 885 violated Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution which states: No province, city,
municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected. Specifically, the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental were not allowed to participate in the
plebiscite for the creation of Negros del Norte. Petitioner also claims the proposed province of Negros del Norte failed to meet the
requirements of Sec. 197 of the LGC of 1983, specially that a future province must have at least an area of 3,500 sq. km. Negros
del Norte, Petitioner avers, is actually only 2,856.56 sq km. Respondent claims the issue was already rendered moot and academic
as the new province of Negros del Norte was already proclaimed. Moreover, the area of Negros del Norte is really 4,019.95 sq km,
since the waters falling under the jurisdiction and control of Negros del Norte must be included in the total area of the province.

Held: Tan is correct. The plebiscite is declared null and void Reasons:
1) The phrase subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected must be
construed to mean that the remaining areas in the province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the
said plebiscite. The reason is that cities belonging to Negros Occidental will be added to Negros del Norte, thus Negros
Occidentals land area will be dismembered. Certainly, the people of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the
plebiscite as they are directly affected by the diminution in land size of their province.
2) A reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC of 1983 says. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that the law refers only to t he land mass
and excludes the waters over which the political unit has control. In other words, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land
area of 3,500 sq. km for it to become a province.

b. 3 Paredes v. Executive Secretary 128 SCRA 6
Facts: By virtue of B.P. Blg 56, certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao held a plebiscite to determine whether
they want to constitute themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Governor Zosimo Paredes et. al. however claimed that
the rest of the barangays on Mayoyao should be allowed to participate in the plebiscite by virtue of Art. XI, Sec of the 1973
Constitution as the other barangays are also affected by the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo.

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Held: Paredes is wrong. Presumption of constitutionality should be applied in this case. B.P. Blg. 56 is a reflection of local
autonomy on the part of the barangay wanting to constituent themselves into a new municipality. Said barangays should be given
leeway in becoming self-reliant communities. Moreover, the people in said barangays are the ones who will constitute the new
municipality of Aguinaldo, not the other barangays of Mayoyao excluded from B.P. Blg. 56

b. 4 Mun. of Candijay, Bohol v. Ca 251 SCRA 182
Facts: The municipality of Candijay petitioned the RTC of Tagbilaran, Bohol, claiming that its boundary line actually covered
barrio Pagahat, since the municipality of Alicia claims to have current territorial jurisdiction over said barrio. The RTC awarded
Pagahat to Candijay Alicia appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of Alicia on the grounds that 1) applying the rule
of equiponderance of evidence (a principle in Civil Procedure) with Candijay as plaintiff and Alicia as defendant in the lower court,
the court must rule in favor of the defendant. The equiponderance of evidence rule states: Where the scale shall stand upon
equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of defendants claim. Even if
the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his side i f such
evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action. In this case, both municipalities failed to satisfactorily back their
claims that they owned barrio Pagahat: and 2) if Candijays boundary line claim was true, then not only would they claim Pagahat
but also other certain barrios as well, which would as a result, certainly expand Candijays territory far beyond than what the l aw
allows her, Candijay petitioned is review on certiorari with the SC, claiming that 1) the CA misapplied the equiponderance of
evidence rule and 2) the municipality of Alicia had no juridical personality, having been created under avoid E.O. ( E.O. No. 265)
since Sec. 68 of the RAC of 1917 from which the said E.O. derived its authority, was declared unconstitutional in Pelaez v. Audition
General (See III-b 1).

Held: The Municipality of Candijay is incorrect Reasons:
1. The SC sees no need in reviewing the equiponderance rule as it was not arrived whimsically or capriciously by the CA
2. The Municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of E.O. 265 in 1949. 16 years late when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
promulgated. And yet even after, various government acts, most notably the recognition by the 1987 Constitution of Alicia as one of
the 20 municipalities of the Third District of Bohol, indicate the States recognition and acknowledgement of the existence thereof.
Alicia therefore, can claim the benefits of Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC of 1991 which states Municipal District organized pursuant to
presidential issuances and E.O. and which have their respective set of municipal officials holding officials holding office at the time
of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sec. 442 (d) is therefore a curative law in
favor of Alicia. The objection against it being a municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted in 1991.

b. 5 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr. 265 SCRA 182
NOTE: Dates in this case are important because essentially Jimenez lost on account of the slow wheels of justice
Facts: In 1949, President Quirino issued E.O. 258, creating the municipality of Sinacaban in the Province of Misamis
Occidental. In 1988 by virtue of said E.O. Sinacaban filed a claim with the provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
municipality of Jimenez territorial possession of about 5 barrios. Jimenez in its reply with the provincial Board that same year and
later on with the RTC in 1990, said that Sinacaban had no juridical personality to file a suit because it was created under a void
E.O. as promulgated in Pelaez Auditor General and 2) the disputed barrios belong to Jimenez since in 1950 the municipalities
entered into an agreement duly approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental back then which recognized Jimenezs
jurisdiction over the disputed barrio in 1992, the RTC ruled in favor of Sinacaban using as its basis the curative benefits of Sec. 2 of
the LGC of 1991. Angrily, Jimenez added in its petition with the Supreme Court the RTCs decision was null and void because it
failed to decide the case within one year mandated by the LGC of 1983 and the Constitution.

Held: Jimenez is incorrect Reasons:
1. Sinacaban can claim the benefits of Sec.442 (d) of the LGC of 1991, since various government acts through the years
after the Pelaez case of 1965 indicate the recognition by the years after the Pelaez case 1965 indicate the recognition by the state
of the municipality of Sinacaban, most notably when the 1987 Constitution recognized Sinacaban as part of the 2
nd
District of
Misamis Occidental.
2. Whatever agreement Sinacaban and Jimenez entered into 1950 must still conform with the territorial metes and bounds
set forth in E.O. 258, otherwise the agreement in void (A relocation survey was ordered but the results of the survey was not stated
in the case)
3. Even granting that the RTC was deliberately slow, its decision is not rendered void. The only remedy left would be to file
administrative sanctions against it.

b. 7 Mathay v. CA 320 SCRA 703
NOTE: Dont confuse CSU with CSC
Facts: During his term, Mayor Brigido Simon appointed 16 people to positions in the Civil Service Unit (CSU) of the local
government of Quezon City. Simons authority to appoint was based upon P.D. 51. The Secretary of Justice rendered an Opinion,
stating that P.D. 51 was never published in the Gazette, therefore, conformably with the Tanada v. Tuvera ruling P.D. 51 never
became law at all. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) thus ordered the revocation of all appointments in the CSU. However, the
effects of such revocation were temporarily cushioned when the city council issued an ordinance creating the Department of Public
Order and Safety (DPOS). All present personnel of the CSU, the said ordinance stated are to be absorbed into the DPOS.
However, the regular positions in the DPOS never got filled due to insufficient number of said positions and lack of funds.
Simon and later on his successor, Mayor Ismael Mathay, remedied the situation by offering the CSU personnel
contractual appointment. When Mathay refused to renew their appointments, the CSU personnel complained to the CSC. The CSC
replied by issuing resolutions ordering the CSU personnel reinstated. Mathay now asserts that the CSC cannot order him to
reinstate the said personnel as it is. In effect, giving the appointing power he possesses, as city Mayor to the CSC.

Held: Mathay is correct. Reasons:
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1) First of all, the law applicable is B.P. 337 or the old LGC and not the LGC of 1991 since the material events of the case
took place during the time of the old LGC.
2) Under B.P. 337, the power to appoint rests in the local chief executive in the case the Mayor. When the city council
issued the ordinance allowing for the absorption of CSU personnel into the DPOS, it specifically made use of the wordings Present
Personnel and not positions, thus the city council arrogated upon itself the appointing power by dictating who shall occupy the
DPOS positions. Even in the local government level, the separation of powers must be respected.
3) The reasoning in no. 2 also applies to the CSC. The CSC claims that by virtue of the ordinance enacted by the city
council, the CSU personnel became regular employees and such they have gained the protection of the Civi l Service Law. Such
reasoning is wrong because in the first place the CSU never existed at all, thus they were never part of the Civil Service to begin
with. Thus when Simon and later on Mathay offered them contractual appointments, they were at the mercy of the appointing power
of the said mayors, as they have the option not to renew their appointments

b. 8 Samson v. Aguirre, 315 SCRA 53
Facts: R.A. 8535 was signed into law creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays in Quezon City. Quezon City
councilor Moises Samson questioned the constitutionality of said R.A. claiming that 1) certifications as to income, land area and
population of Novaliches were not presented during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. 8535 2) a certification attesting
to the fact that the mother LGU, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of Novaliches city in terms of income,
land area and population, was also not presented 3) a copy of the petition of concerned barangays calling or the creation of City of
Novaliches was not presented to the Quezon City Council, as mandated by the Implementing Rules of the LGC, 1991 and 4) R.A.
8535 failed to specify the seat of government of the proposed City of Novaliches as mandated by Sec. 11 (a) of the LGC, 1991.

Held: Samson is wrong. Reasons:
1. The presumption of constitutionally of laws shall be applied in this case, meaning that Samson has burden of proof to
show that R.A. 8535 was unconstitutional. Samson did not present any proof that no certifications were presented during the
deliberations. And even granting that no certifications were indeed presented, the representatives of the DOF, NSO, DENR and
even Quezon City mayor Ismael Mathay were present during the deliberations. The official statements attesting to the income, land
area and population of Novaliches could serve the certifications contemplated by law
2. Mathay was present during the deliberation. If Quezon City would object to the creation of the City of Novaliches, he
would be the first representative to do so. But he didnt.
3. The failure to provide the QC council a petition of concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of
Novaliches is not fatal as such petition is meant only to inform the QC council of such creation. With the mass media publicizing the
creation of the city of Novaliches, Samson could not claim he was not informed of the proposed creation
4. The failure of R.A.8535 to provide a seat of government for Novaliches is not fatal. Sec. 12 of the LGC provides that a
government center shall be established by the LGU as far as practicable. Government centers can also serve as seats of
government.
5. The fact that the City of Novaliches was not included among the 17 cities and municipalities listed in the ordinance
attached to the 1987 constitution does not mean that a constitutional amendment is necessary in order for Novaliches to become a
city. The ordinance attached to the Constitution merely apportions the seat of the House of Representatives to the diff erent
legislative districts in the country. Nowhere, does it provide that Metro Manila shall be forever composed of 17 cities and
municipalities.
NOTE: the proposed City of Novaliches was later voted down in a plebiscite held for that purpose

CAWALING,JR. VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada
signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "ActCreati ng The Ci t y Of Sorsogon By Mergi ng The Muni ci pal i ti es Of Bacon And
Sorsogon In The Provi nce Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities
of Bacon andSorsogon and submi tted the matter for rati fi cati on procl ai med the creati on of the Ci ty of Sorsogon
as havi ngbeen ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.Invoking his right as a resident and
taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorariseeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:A.
The December 16, 2000 pl ebi sci te was conducted beyond the requi red 120-day peri od from the approval
of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; andB. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty
(20) day extensive informationcampaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.Petitioner
instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional ,contending, inessence, that:1. The creati on
of Sorsogon Ci ty by mergi ng t wo muni ci pal i ti es vi ol ates Secti on 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in
relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipalityor a cluster of
barangays
may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of
Sorsogon and the (b) abolitionof the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule
prescribed bySection 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Peti ti oner contends that under Secti on 450(a) of the Code,
a component ci ty may be created onl y byconverting "a municipality or a cluster of
barangays
," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806has done.
Issue:
(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order tocreate the City of Sorsogon(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one
bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of theConstitution(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "Amunicipality or a cluster of
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Barangays may beconvert ed into a component city" is not a criterion but simplyone of the mo des by which a city may be
created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the
merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay i n accordance wi th the
cri teri aestablished by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a di vi si onor a mer ger
of existing local government units is recogni zed
under the Consti tuti on, provi ded that such merger or di vi si onshal l compl y wi t h the requi rements prescri bed by
the Code.

F. Settlement of boundary disputes( Sec. 118, LGC, Sec 15-19, IRR)
* Section 118. Judicial Responsibility for settlement of Boundary Dispute. Boundary dispute between and among LGUs
shall, as much as possible. Be settled amicably. To this end:
a. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod Sangguniang Bayan concerned.
b. Boundary disputes involving 2 or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned.
c. Boundary dispute involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the Sangguniang of the province concerned.
d. Boundary dispute involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other or
2 or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective Sangguniang of the parties
e. In the event the Sangguniang fails to present an amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the dispute was
referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sangguniang
concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of the certification referred to above.

*Sec. 15 definition and policy. There is a boundary dispute when a portion or a whole of the territorial area of an LGU is
claimed by 2 or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.

* Sec.16 Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes shall be referred for settlement to the following:
a. Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang for those involving 2 or more barangays in the same city or municipality as
the case may be.
b. Sangguniang Panlalawigan for those involving 2 or more municipalities with in the same province.
c. Jointly, to the Sanggunian of provinces concerned, for those involving component cities or municipalities of different
provinces.
d. Jointly, to the respective Sangguniang for those involving a component city or municipality and highly urbanized city of 2
or more highly urbanized cities.

* Sec. 17 Procedures for settling Boundary Disputes they are 1) filing of petition 2) contents of petition 3) documents
attached to petition (e.g. provincial, city or barangay map as the case may be technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs
concerned 4) Joint hearing 5) failure to settle amicably (a certification shall be submitted to the effect 6) Decision 7) Appeal (To the
proper RTC)

*Sec 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending final resolution of the dispute, the status of the affected area prior to the
dispute shall be maintained and continued for all purposes.

* Sec 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the official custodian of all documents on boundary disputes of LGUs.

f 1. City of Pasig v. COMELEC et.al. 314 SCRA 179
Facts: 2 petitions were raised by the City of Pasig and the municipality of Cainta respectively. Both Questioned the priority
of the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites for the proposed creation of Barangay Karangalan and barangay Napico (pursuant
to 2 ordinances passed by both cities) Cainta had contended that the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary
dispute between her and Pasig; hence the suspension of the scheduled plebiscites is justified. Pasig however contends otherwise.
Despite this, the COMELEC ruled against Cainta and the plebiscite for the creation of barangay Napico pushed through. The core
issues now are 1) whether or not the said barangay dispute is a prejudicial question which must be resolved before any plebiscite
can be held and 2) Whether the plebiscite already conducted ratifying the creation of Barangay Napico has rendered the issue as to
it moot and academic.

Held: Cainta is correct. Reasons
1. Pasig cannot deny that there is a pending boundary dispute between her and Cainta Surely, whether the area in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of the Pasig has material
bearing to the proposed barangay Karangalan and Napico. The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of an LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond
these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of government powers which will ultimately the peoples welfare.
2. As was done before in Tan v. COMELEC, the plebiscite already conducted for the creation of Barangay Napico can be
annulled and set aside.
Held: SC held that the plebiscite should be held in abeyance.

f. 2 DILG Opinion No. 161-1994 (still to search)



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C. How are existing sub-provinces converted to provinces?

* Sec. 10 LGC: Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
LGUs shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the voted cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, unless the law or ordinance fixes another date.

* Sec. 462 LGC: Existing Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces upon approval
of the voters cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The plebiscite shall
be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of this code.
The new legislative district created as a result of such conversion shall continue to be represented in Congress by the duly
elected representatives of the original districts out of which said new province or districts were created unit their own representative
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections and qualified
The incumbent elected officials of the said sub-provinces converted into regular provinces shall continue to hold office until
June 30, 1992. Any vacancy occurring in the offices occupied by said incumbent elected officials, or resulting from expiration of
resulting from expiration of their terms of office in case of negative votes in the plebiscite results, shall be filled by appointment by
the President. The appointees shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected in the regular local elections following
the plebiscite mentioned herein and qualified. After effectivity of such conversion, the President shall fill up the position of governor
of the newly created province through appointment if none has yet been appointed to the same as hereinbefore provided, and shall
also appoint a vice governor and other members of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan, all of whom shall likewise hold office unit their
successors shall have been elected in the next local election and qualified.
All qualified appointive officials and employees in the career service of the said sub-provinces at the time of their
conversion into regular provinces shall continue in accordance with civil service law, rules and regulation.

C 1. Grino v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672
Facts: Pursuant to Sec. 462, LGC, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its mother province was
Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously with the May 11, 1992 elections. The participants in the said
plebiscite were the residents of Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras. Surprisingly, the ballots issued in the
said 3 municipalities did not provided any space for the election of governor, vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo. LDP Iloilo governor-candidate Simplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing
the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, since at the time of the plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-
province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for regular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at al l to
vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo. But what if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should special election be held for
the 3 municipalities so that they can vote for the provincial official of Iloilo?

Held: Obviously, Grinos petition was rendered moot and academic when Guimaras voted to become regular province. Besides
its too late to undo what COMELEC has done. If Guimaras did vote to remain as a sub province, Grinos petition would have been
meritorious.



PADILLA VS. COMELEC
D. Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city and reclassification (implementing Rules and regulations,
LGC).

* Art 12 Conversion of a component city into a highly urbanized city
a) Requisites for conversion. A component city shall not be converted into a highly urbanized city unless the following
requirements are present:
1. Income latest annual income of not less than P50M based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasure. The
annual income shall included the income accruing to the general fund exclusive of special funds, transfers and non-recurring
income and
2. Population, which shall not be less than 200,000 inhabitants as certified by NSO.

b) Procedure for conversion:
1. Resolution. The interested component city shall submit to the office of the President a resolution of its Sanggunian
adopted by a majority of all its members in a meeting duly called for the purpose, and approved and endorsed by the city mayor.
Said resolution shall be accompanied by certifications as to income and population
2. Declaration of conversion. Within 30 days from receipt of such resolution, the President shall, after verifying that the
income and population requirements have been met, declare the component city as highly urbanized
3. Plebiscite. Within 120 days from the declaration of the President or as specified in the declaration, the COMELEC shall
conduct a plebiscite in the city proposed to the converted such plebiscite shall be preceded by a comprehensive information
campaign to be conducted by the COMELEC with the assistance of national and local government officials, media, NGOs and
other interested parties.

c) Effect of conversion
The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is
geographically located
Miranda v. Aguirre 314 SCRA 603
Facts: On May 5, 1994 R.A. 7720 was passed converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabel into an independent
component city. On Feb 14, 1998 R.A. 8528 was passed amending R.A. 7720 on 2 points: 1 Sec. 2 of R.A. 7720 is hereby
amended by deleting the words, an independent so that the municipality of Santiago will be converted into a component city only
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and 2) the voters of Santiago could now vote again for the provincial officials of the province of Isabela. Jose Miranda, the mayor of
Santiago and other petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 8528. He says that said law lacks the provision requiring that
the plebiscite be held for its ratification. Alexander Aguirre, the Executive Secretary and other respondents on the other hand
countered that (1) Miranda et. al. had no standing to file their petition 2) the issue is a political question and 3) R.A. 8528 did not
created divide, etc or after any boundaries of Santiago it merely reclassified Santiago from an independent component city into a
component city.

Held: Aguirre and his cohorts are gravely mistaken. Reasons:
1. Miranda had standing, he field the petition in his capacity as mayor of Santiago.
2. The issue is justiciable, Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8528, since it runs contrary to article X, Sec 10 of
the 1987 Constitution. The court has the power to decide the constitutionality of any law.
3. The reclassification will downgrade Santiagos status from an independent component city into a component city. Far
reaching changes will then take place. Its political independence will diminish. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. Ordinance and resolution passed by the city council of Santiago will have to
be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabel. Taxes collected by the city would then be shared with the province. All these
changes merit the need of a plebiscite so that the people at Santiago can air their side on the issue. Moreover, if a plebiscite can be
held for the upgrading of an LGU, should not a plebiscite be held for its downgrading as well?
NOTE: Mendozas strong dissent was anchored on Art. X Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Said section refers to
alteration of boundaries of Santiago were substantially altered nor any of its income, population or land area been radically changes
Santiago was neither recreated into another LGU nor abolished, much less its boundaries alter. (This good justice is implying the
reclassification was administrative in nature.

Tobias v. Abalos 239 SCRA 106
Facts: Robert Tobias, et. al. invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong City, assailed the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675, known as An act Converting the City of Mandaluyong into a Highly urbanized city known as the
City of Mandaluyong. They cited, among others, Art. VIll, Sec. 49 of R.A. 7675, which provides that As a highly urbanized city, the
City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same region Said provision Tobias claims is not
germane to the title of R.A. 7675 thus being contrary to the one title-one subject rule since it creates a legislative district whereas
the title expressly provides only for the conversion of Mandaluyong into highly urbanized city. Also, Tobias, et. al. contend that the
people of san Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite as the same involves a change in their legislative district.

Held: Tobias, et.al. are grossly erroneous Reasons:
1. The creation of a new legislative district is a natural logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
2. The contention that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. 7675 as the
same involved a change in their legislative district is benefit of merit. The reason is that the principle subject involved I the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only anci llary
thereto. Thus the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they have nothing to do with the
changed in status of neighboring Mandaluyong. (This argument is rather strange for me).

Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763
Facts: on Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for local elections on Jan 30,
1980. Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:
xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance with standard established in
the LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution. Any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from
infrastructure and general funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall be classified as a highly urbanized
city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located. xxx The registered
voters may be entitled to voter in the election of the official of the province of which that city is a component. If its charter so
provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall no participate nor vote in the election of the
official of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographical located.

Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of Cebu ad Mandaue assailing Sec. 3
Specially, they questioned the use of annual income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a
highly urbanized city whose voters may no participate in the election of provincial officials of the province in which the ci ty is
geographically located. Ceniza and his fellow goons claim Sec.3 regulates the exercise of freedom of suffrage and violates the
equal protection of the law. Moreover, they attacked R.A. 5519 the law creating the City of Mandaue, which went to effect wit hout
the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in the plebiscite or referendum. They particularly cited the charters provision
denying Mandaue the right to participate in provincial elections.

Held: Ceniza et. at. is mistaken. Reasons:
1. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of LGUs Corollary to independence however, is the
concomitant loss of right to participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial offici als since these
provincial officials have ceased to exercise any government jurisdiction and authority over said city.
2. Regular annual income of a given city is substantial distinction for classification. The revenue of a city would show
whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent economic, social and political unit. Thus, the
equal protection of the laws in not violated.
3. Freedom of suffrage is not imperiled since the Constitution does not give the city voter the right to participate in
provincial elections for territorial reasons
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4. The city of Mandaue came into existence. In 1969, the constitutional requirement that the creation, alteration, etc. of a
city, province, etc. is subject to a plebiscite only came into being when the 1973 Constitution was enacted and therefore cannot be
applied retroactively.

BAI SEMA VS. COMELEC
Municipal Corporation Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) Population Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM
because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The
1
st
legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities
and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act
201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1
st
district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1
st
district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of
MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the
first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1
st
district). Later, Sema was
contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the
Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and si nce S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legisl ative
district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantiall y
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create
Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should
have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k
(population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other
hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are
barangays not cities and provinces.

NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP
FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of the republic of
the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is
scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) to
which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and
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jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is
constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution
thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus
for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented
unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.
Article X. (Local Government)
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituents
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favourably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
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Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.
ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force
upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework. The presidents
authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments
will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
NAVARRO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA
Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050, April 12, 2011), the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that Republic Act No.
9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials
thereof are declared VALID.
The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991
stating, The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands, is
declared VALID.
According to the SC, with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However,
with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected
capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from
the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
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xxx There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to
provinces.In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that i slands or
group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore,
logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for
component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the
exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight
in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
xxxConsistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to
achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an intended province that consists of several municipalities and
component cities which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and municipalities which consist of islands are
exempt from the minimum land area requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province
would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several
islands. fellester.blogspot.com This would mean that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province
with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the greater imperative of development of self-reliant
communities, rural progress, and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option would prove more
difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by
bodies of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
xxx What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in
showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time
fellester.blogspot.com of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the
minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait
accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. (Navarro vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. no. 180050,
April 12, 2011)