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THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA
(CIVIL DIVISION)
MISCELLANEOUS CAUSE NO 87 OF 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE JUDICATURE (JUDICIAL REVIEW) RULES OF 2009
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

UGANDA COURT REPORTERS ASSOCIATION LTDAPPLICANT
Versus
ATTORNEY GENERAL.....RESPONDENT

BEFORE: THE HON. LADY JUSTICE LYDIA MUGAMBE
RULING
A) Introduction, Background and Context
1. Vide Criminal Case No. 303 of 2014, Poteri Ronald stands charged with wrongful
communication and leaking of information contrary to Section 4 (1) (a) of the Official
Secrets Act before the learned Chief Magistrate - Lillian Bucyana at Buganda Road
Court. At the beginning of the hearing on 25 June 2014, Mr. Lino Anguzo - State
Attorney leading the prosecution, without prior warning to the Defence, applied orally
and briefly to have the hearing of the case in camera. In support of his application, Mr.
Anguzo relying on Articles 28 (2) of the Constitution, Section 40 of the Magistrates
Court Act and Section 14 (2) of the Official Secrets Act, submitted that the Magistrate
could grant the application for reasons of morality, public order, and national security.
Further, the State Attorney submitted in support of his application that the accused was
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charged with disclosure of official secrets; the evidence would include classified
information, secrets of police investigative tactics and calling informants whose identity
should not be revealed. In addition the State submitted that if the evidence is published, it
may cause discourse (sic) between the police and executive leadership. Summing up the
State prayed that the proceedings are restricted to parties to the case, who were the
Prosecution, Defence Counsel and Court.

2. In response, Mr. Mugisha Vincent for the Accused submitted expressing reservations
related to trampling of the rights of the Accused continuously. He argued the application
was not brought in good faith. In sum, Mr. Mugisha prayed for an adjournment to prepare
once again for the new idea that had come up if Court is inclined to accept the
application.

3. The learned Chief Magistrate followed with her ruling here below and I quote verbatim
from the record of proceedings:

The application to hear the case in camera is allowed in public interest
and for protection of witnesses whose identity once revealed may
prejudice the trial process and put their security at risk. This is in line
with Section 40 of the MCA which grants court discretion to order at
any stage of inquiry into or trial of any particular case that the public
generally or any particular person shall not have access to, or be, or
remain in the room or building used by the court.. I disagree with
submissions of defence counsel in opposition to the prosecutions
application for a hearing in camera, reasoning that the information is
already before a public wider than court. Although the information was
allegedly leaked, the channels of the alleged leakage are unknown and
as prosecution submitted the chain of leakage is likely to be adduced in
the course of hearing. The interests of justice will best be served if
whoever is involved in the chain is protected from the public eye until
they have at least been heard. An order is accordingly made that
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journalists or any person with recording equipment vacate court, and
continue to do so for this particular case.

For clarity, the trial of this case is restricted to court and a court
interpreter, the accused person, his defence lawyer and his or her clerk,
the trial State Attorney and the court orderly.

The application for adjournment by defence counsel on grounds of new
idea is rejected for lack of merit. Let the trial begin.

4. On 1 August 2014, the Applicant now before me, through Counsel Isaac Semakadde and
Catherine Anite of Centre for Legal Aid and Peter Kibirango of M/S. R.M Ruhinda and
Co. Advocates, filed the application by Notice of Motion supported by affidavits of
Raymond Wamala - the Chairman and Executive Director of the Applicant and Alex
Bukumunhe - senior court reporter employed by the Red Pepper, for judicial review of
this Decision of the Trial Magistrate. The Applicant prays for:

a) an order of certiorari to be issued to call for and quash the
proceedings, ruling and orders of the Trial Magistrate in which the
press and the general public were excluded and thus prohibited
from publishing, broadcasting or otherwise disseminating any
information relating to all or any part of the trial:

b) an order of certiorari to be issued calling for and quashing any and
all of the proceedings of the trial which have been heard in camera;

c) an order of prohibition restraining the Trial Magistrate or any other
agent of or servant of the Respondent from hearing all or any part of the
trial.

5. In the alternative but without prejudice, the Applicant prays for:
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a) a declaration that the decision or order of the trial court to
conduct the entire trial in camera is unjustifiable;

b) a declaration that all proceedings in the trial which have been
heard in camera are invalid;

c) an order that the restrictions imposed on press and media
coverage of the trial by the trial court be lifted or varied by this
Court in order to bring those proceedings in conformity with the
great principle of open justice;

d) an injunction restraining the trial Court and any other agent or
servant of the Respondent from enforcing the impugned Decision
and order and from interfering unjustifiably with the operations and
activities of the media.

6. The Applicant contends that the decision of the Trial Magistrate was reached through
irrationality, illegality and procedural impropriety warranting judicial review of the same.

7. The Respondent on the other hand, represented by Mr. Oburu Odoi, and through the
affidavits of Anguzu Lino- Senior State Attorney with the Directorate of Public
Prosecutions and Resident State Attorney at Buganda Road Court and Geoffrey Wangolo
Madete State Attorney in the Chambers of the Attorney General, opposed the application
arguing that this is not a good case for judicial review; the Applicant had a rights of
appeal. Revision and constitutional reference which they failed to exercise and that the
trial Magistrate committed no error when in her discretion, she granted the application to
hear the trial in camera. In sum, that the trial Magistrate acted legally, the Applicant has
not exhausted all available remedies and the application is bad in law, an abuse of court
process and should be dismissed with costs.

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8. I have carefully read all the pleadings of both parties. I must thank Counsel for both the
Applicant and the Defendant for the spirited and exhaustive presentation of their cases.

B) The Law
i) Judicial Review
9. The law on judicial review, certiorari and prohibition is now well settled in Uganda.
Judicial review is the process by which the High Court exercises its supervisory
jurisdiction over the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other
bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions, or who are engaged in the
performance of public acts and duties. Those functions/duties/acts may affect the rights
or liberties of the citizens. Judicial review is a matter within the ambit of Administrative
Law. It is different from the ordinary judicial review of the court of its own decisions,
revision or appeal in the sense that in the case of ordinary review, revision or appeal, the
courts concerns are whether the decisions are right or wrong based on the laws and facts
whereas the remedy of judicial review, as provided in the orders of mandamus, certiorari
and prohibition, the court is not hearing an appeal from the decision itself but a review of
the manner in which the decision was made.
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10. Lord Hailsham of Marylebone LC stated in Chief Constable of North Wales Police v.
Evans (1982)3 ALL ER 141 that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment. A decision reached without observing the rules of
natural justice is no decision at all.
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These principles have been set out in so many cases. See for example Kuluo Joseph Andrew & ors v. Attorney
General & ors Misc. Cause No 106 of 2010, where Justice Bamwine explained that judicial review is concerned
not with the decision per se but the decision making process. It involves an assessment of the manner in which a
decision is made. It is not an appeal and the jurisdiction is exercised in a supervisory manner, not to vindicate rights
as such, but to ensure that public powers are exercised in accordance with basic standards of legality, fairness and
rationality.
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The purpose of judicial review is to assess the manner in which inferior courts or bodies arrive at a
decision and not concerned with the actual decision. Also see Hilary Delany in his book Judicial review of
Administrative action 2001, Sweet and Maxwell, pages 5&6 and Justice Bamwine in Clear Channel Independent
Uganda Ld v. Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority, Misc. Cause 380 of 2008.
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See Marko Matovu & 2 Others Vs Mohammed Sseviri & Uganda Land Commission C.A.C.A No. 7 Of 1987;
General Medical Council Vs Spackman (1943) 2 All ER 337; Re Annbrite Anslund v. Ag H.C.M.C No. 441 Of
2004; Al Hajji Edrisa Mayanja Njuki Vs. The Electoral Commission (2001- 2005) 2 HCB 107.
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11. The remedy of judicial review is discretionary in nature and can only be granted on three
grounds namely: illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety with guiding
principles like common sense and justice; whether the application is meritorious; whether
there is reasonableness; vigilance and not any waiver of rights by the Applicant.
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ii) Certiorari

12. In John Jet Tumwebaze v. Makerere University Council and 3 ors Civil Application
No. 353 of 2005 (unreported), it was held that the orders for declaration, mandamus,
certiorari or prohibition are discretionary in nature. In exercising its discretion with
respect to prerogative orders, the court must act judicially and according to settled
principles. Such principles may include; common sense and justice; whether the
application is meritorious; whether there is reasonableness; vigilance and not any waiver
of rights by the Applicant. Justice Kasule pointed out that prerogative orders look to the
control of the exercise and abuse of power by those in public offices, rather than at
providing final determination of private rights which is done in normal civil suits.

13. In the case of John Jet Tumwebaze v. Makerere University Council and ors (Civil
Application No. 78 of 2005), Ag. Justice Remmy Kasule (as he then was) gave the
definition of Certiorari as a prerogative writ issued to quash a decision which is ultra
vires or vitiated by an error on the face of the record. Certiorari is a prerogative order
designed to control inferior courts, tribunals, administrative and statutory authorities.

14. In John Jet Tumwebaze v. Makerere University Council and 3 ors, Civil Application
No. 353 OF 2005; Re: Mustafa Ramathan (1996) KALR 86 at p.87; Owor Arthur &
8 ors v. Gulu University H.C.M.A No. 0018 of 2007, it was explained that no order of
certiorari can issue unless it is premised on a decision of a body that was mandated to
determine a dispute.


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See: Aggrey Bwire v. Judicial Service Commission & AG CACA NO. 9 OF 2009; John Jet Tumwebaze v.
Makerere University Council & Ors H.C Civil Application No. 353 OF 2005.
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15. In Stream Aviation Ltd v. The Civil Aviation Authority Misc. Application No. 377 of
2008 (Arising from Misc. Cause No. 175 of 2008) Justice V. F. Musoke Kibuuka held
that the prerogative order of certiorari is designed to prevent the access of or the outright
abuse of power by public authorities. The primary object of this prerogative order is to
make the machinery of Government operate properly, according to law and in the public
interest.

16. In Re - An Application by Bukoba Gymkhana Club, it was explained that certiorari
issues to quash decisions which are ultra vires or which are vitiated by error on the face
of the record or are arbitrary and oppressive. Thus certiorari looks at the past as a
corrective remedy.
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iii) Illegality, Irrationality and Procedural impropriety

17. Illegality is when the decision making authority commits an error of law in the process
of taking the decision or making the act, the subject of the complaint. Acting without
jurisdiction or ultra vires or contrary to the provisions of the law or its principles are
instances of illegality.

18. In the locus clascus case of Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service [1985] AC 375 (cited with approval in Mugabi Edward v. Kampala District
Land Board & Wilson Kashaya Misc. Cause No 18 of 2012), Lord Diplock had this to
say on illegality:
Illegality as a ground for judicial review means that the decision maker
must understand correctly the law that regulated his decision-making power
and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a
justifiable question to be decided in the event of dispute by those persons
the judge, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercised

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Re - An Application by Bukoba Gymkhana Club (1963) E.A. 473.
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19. Micheal Allen, Braun Thompson and Bernadette Walsh in their book Cases and
Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law also explain what amounts to
illegality as hereunder:
(a) An authority must not exceed its jurisdiction by purporting to exercise
powers which it does not possess.
(b) An authority must direct itself properly on the law
(c) An authority must not use its powers for an improper purpose
(d) An authority must take into account all relevant considerations and
disregard all irrelevant considerations.
(e) An authority must not act in bad faith.
(f) An authority acts unlawfully if it fails to fulfill a statutory duty.
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20. Irrationality is when there is such gross unreasonableness in the decision taken or act done,
that no reasonable authority, addressing itself to the facts and the law before it, would have made
such a decision, such a decision is usually in defiance of logic and acceptable moral standards.
21. On procedural impropriety, in Twinomuhangi v. Kabale District & ors (2006) HCB Vol 1
page 130, Justice Remmy Kasule (as he then was) stated at page 131 that:
Procedural impropriety is when there is failure to act fairly on the part of
the decision making authority in the process of taking a decision. The
unfairness may be in the non-observance of the rules of natural justice or
to act with procedural unfairness towards one to be affected by the
decision. It may also involve failure to adhere and observe procedural
rules expressly laid down in a statute or legislative instrument by which
such authority exercises jurisdiction to make a decision.
C) The Evidence
i) Is this a proper case for judicial review

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See also the case of Council of Civil Service Unions Vs Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 375 (cited with
approval in Mugabi Edward Vs Kampala District Land Board & Wilson Kashaya Misc. Cause No 18 of 2012.
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22. The Respondent argues that this is not a good case for judicial review as the Applicant
had the remedies of appeal, revision or constitutional interpretation. In my view, Section
204 (1) (a) and (7) of the Magistrates Court Act reserves the right of appeal in criminal
cases only to the convicted person and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. So appeal
is not an available remedy for the Applicant before me who was not party to the
proceedings before the Trial Court.

23. I also do not see any serious question warranting constitutional interpretation as
suggested by the Respondent.

24. Instead I take the view that the Applicant had the remedy of revision under S. 50 (5) of
the Criminal Procedure Code Act Cap 116 of the Laws of Uganda which is not
exhausted. On this basis alone this ground as argued by the Respondent makes the
application unsustainable. To this end, I am also mindful of the exceptional nature of the
supervisory remedy of judicial review.

25. Be that as it may, taking all the circumstances before me in to account, considering that
referring the case for revision will only result in delayed justice, I have exceptionally
allowed to entertain this application, purely to avoid delays and in the interest of
delivering substantive justice and not have technicalities stand in its way, as required
under Article 126(2) (e) of the 1995 Constitution.

26. For purposes of judicial review, Rule 5 (1) of the Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules of
2009 requires that an application for judicial review be brought promptly and within three
months always from the date when the grounds of the application first arose and the court
may only extend the time if good cause is demonstrated. In the circumstances before me,
the ruling of the Magistrate was on 25 June 2014 and the application was filed on1
August 2014. This was within time.

27. In addition there is a clear ruling of the Magistrate in a lower Court and the challenge
here is of the process reaching this ruling or decision.
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ii) Judicial review analysis of the Decision of the Learned Trial Magistrate
28. Both the Applicant and Respondent went to great lengths demonstrating the correctness
or incorrect nature of the Trial Magistrate decision/ruling. I will, however, not concern
myself with any evidence or submissions on this because it is irrelevant to judicial
review. Rather, Ill strictly evaluate the decision-making process of the Trial Magistrate
in reaching her decision, which is the concern of judicial review as explained in the
jurisprudence above.

29. From the construction of the application for the in-camera hearing by the State Attorney
and the ruling of the Trial Magistrate, the ruling concerned the right to proceed in-
camera, excluding journalists and the public on the one hand and the right of access to
information by the press and the public. The exclusion rights are contained in Article 28
(2) of the Constitution and Section 14 (2) of the Official Secrets Act, Cap. 302, while
access to information is embodied in Article 41 (1), and by virtue of Article 41 (2), the
Access to Information Act of 2005. Article 28(1) provides for a fair, speedy and public
hearing of criminal cases. Article 43(1) prohibits limitations on enjoyment of rights and
freedoms or the public interest. Under Article 43 (2) public interest shall not permit,
among others, any limitation of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by
this Chapter beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and
democratic society or what is provided in this Constitution. So both sets of rights/interests
are legally protected and the Trial Magistrate was dealing with competing rights and/or
interests.

30. In the South African case of Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v. Minister for
Intelligence Services (2008) ZACC 6, the issues there were largely similar to the case at
bar. They concerned consideration of in-camera proceedings on the basis of national
security and access to court proceedings/information by the press and public. I am
persuaded by it as well as the other foreign authorities I cite below and Ill refer to them
for relevant guidance.

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31. The different judges discuss thoroughly the importance of open justice through hearings
in open court and the role of media access to legal proceedings as well as the process to
be adopted in such applications. Justice Masenke DCJ at page 39 explains that although
the right to open justice is not absolute, in each case where derogation is sought the court
will have to weigh the competing rights or interests carefully with a view to ensuring that
the limitation it places on open justice is properly tailored and proportionate to the end it
seeks to attain. The Court is obliged to have regard to all factual matters and factors
before it in order to decide whether a limitation on the right to open court rooms passes
constitutional muster. In evaluating the competing constitutional claims premised on
open justice on one hand and national state security on the other, the starting point is to
recognize the vital significance of openness of court proceedings and court records.
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32. Justices Mosenke and Yacoob explain that the mere fact that documents in a court
record carry a classification does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court to decide whether
they should be protected from disclosure from the media and public.
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33. Justice Sachs emphasized that open justice is an integral part of the constitutional vision
of an open and democratic society.
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34. In Biffo s/o Mandirire v. R (1960) EA 965 at pages 967H-968C, it was held that justice
should be done openly save in special circumstances for which statutory provision to the
contrary is made, and save in certain other very unusual circumstances It is better that a
man should not be brought to justice at all than that justice should be done to him
without the public being given the opportunity of seeing it done.

35. The same principle was enunciated in Scott v. Scott (1913) AC 417, at pages 438, 439
& 445 where it was explained that the inveterate rule is that justice shall be administered
in open court unless it be strictly necessary for the attainment of justice, there can be no

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Independent Newspapers (Pty) Ltd v. Minister for Intelligence Services (2008) ZACC 6,
paras.39-42, 44-46&54.
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Ibid. paras 53 and 89.
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Ibid. paras 151 & 153.
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power in the court to hear in camera either a matrimonial cause or any other where there
is contest between parties. To justify an order for hearing in camera it must be shown that
the paramount object of securing that justice is done would really be rendered doubtful of
attainment if the order were not made.

36. In Maj. General David Tinyefuza v. Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 1
of 1996, the Justices of the Court of Appeal relying on Fields Law of Evidence at p.
5290, explained that it is not enough for the officer at the head of the Department or
Counsel for the State to claim privilege. The Court has a duty to establish that privilege
applies. It is possible for the court to find that the privilege does not apply depending on
the facts of the case.

37. Quoting Fields Law on Evidence, the court explained that an invocation of a supposed
inherent secrecy in all official acts and records can lend itself to mere sham and evasion
and applied in such a spirit, it tends to become merely a technical advantage on the side
of the party who happens to be interested as an official and to be in possession of
important proof. There is a long catena of decisions in which warnings have been given
by courts of the menace which the supposed privilege implies to individual liberty and
private right, and to the potency of its abuse. The highest courts consider the privilege is a
narrow one and most sparingly to be exercised.

38. If the State objects to the release of the information, it must show that the release of that
information is likely to prejudice the security of the State. This can only be established by
evidence to show the prejudice the security of the State would suffer. It is not enough to
raise state security without more.. It is for the Court to determine whether a matter falls
within the exception of Article 41 or not. And to do this, the State must produce evidence
upon which the court can act.
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Maj. General David Tinyefuza v. Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 1996,
pp.6,7,12 & 14.
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39. In Raichura Ltd v. Sondhi (1967) EA 624, at p. 629, it was held that when a claim of
priviledge is made by a police officer, it becomes the duty of the court to inquire in to the
circumstances of the claim and decide whether, in those circumstances, it is justifiable for
the police officer to make the claim.

40. In Re- Officer L (2007) UKHL 36 paras 19-29, Lord Carswell explained that any and
all claims of public interest immunity must be objectively verified and justified. It is
dangerous for a court of law to grant any public interest immunity privilege on the basis
of subjective fears alone.

41. In R v. Mentuck (2001) 3 SCR 442 at p.459 and 463 paras 26 and 34 respectively, and
page 465 paras 38-39, it was explained that the burden of displacing the general rule of
openness of judicial proceedings lies on the party making the application and that there
must be a sufficient evidentially basis from which the trial Court must assess the
application and upon which it may exercise its discretion judicially. A sufficient
evidentially basis permits a reviewing court to determine whether the evidence is capable
of supporting the decision of the trial court.

42. The import of having both the Applicant and the Respondent before the Trial Magistrate
with constitutional protection of their rights/interests was a high duty on the Trial
Magistrate to conduct a weighing or balancing of the two sets of rights or interests in
reaching her decision. The Trial Magistrate in reaching her decision was duty bound to
inquire into the evidence concerning the alleged secrecy of the audio recordings and
communications that were the subject of the application, in order to satisfy herself that
indeed the limitation requested by the State was objectively verified, justified and
necessary.

43. The State Attorney should have assisted the Trial Magistrate by providing this evidence
but he did not. This, however, does not excuse the Trial Magistrate; she had a duty to ask
for this evidence in order to make an informed and evidence-based analysis in
determining the application to proceed in-camera, but she did not.
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44. As part of the weighing and balancing the Trial Magistrate was also duty bound to
evaluate the nature of the right; the nature, extent and importance of the limitation sought
by the State and the relationship between the limitation and its intended purpose,
especially whether the purpose could be achieved through less restrictive means. There is
no evidence in her ruling or the record that this was done.

45. As part of the weighing and balancing, the Trial Magistrate under Article 28 of the
Constitution was duty bound to caution herself of the importance of open hearings and in
some way warn herself of the dangers of in-camera proceedings before proceeding to
allow the limitation. Unfortunately, she did not.

46. By virtue of Article 41 and 43, the Trial Magistrate was duty bound to evaluate whether
the limitation being sought by the State was sufficient in a free and democratic society.
Unfortunately, there is no scintilla of such considerations by the Trial Magistrate.

47. The cumulative effect of the Trial Magistrates failures above, was that she reached her
decision without taking in to account several relevant considerations. The trial Magistrate
therefore acted unreasonably and unfairly in the process of making her ruling. For this
she committed an illegality, was irrational and her decision is clothed in procedural
impropriety.

48. In so doing, the Trial Magistrate indulged in procedural unfairness to the Applicant when
she reached a decision concerning the rights and core modus operendi of members of the
Applicant without hearing from any member of the Applicant. This fettered the cardinal
right to a fair hearing under Article 44 (c) of the Constitution. The Trial Magistrate
condemned the Applicant members unheard. This clearly, is an error on the face of the
record warranting the judicial review remedy of certiorari.

49. This is compounded by evidence in paragraph 3 and 8 of Mr. Raymond Wamalas
affidavit and paragraph 3 of Mr. Alex Bukumunhes affidavit that members of the
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Applicant were present in Court on 25 June 2014. To the extent that the wording of the
ruling specifically targeted the Applicant in words like An order is accordingly made
that journalists or any person with recording equipment vacate court, and continue to do
so for this particular case the Trial Magistrate should have been mindful to hear from
these members of the Applicant present before reaching her decision/ruling targeting
them.

50. Without the said balancing and weighing of the competing rights/interests in her ruling, it
is not demonstrably clear to me if the Trial Magistrate properly took the public interest in
to account when making her decision as required by Article 43 (1) of the Constitution.

51. I am mindful that the application before me is not by Mr. Poteri Ronald. Nonetheless, I
have something concerning judicial review in his regard. It is not clear in her ruling what
the Trial Magistrate based on to find that the Defence prayer for an adjournment to
respond to the issues of the in-camera application was unmeritorious. In the end the Trial
Magistrate appears to have reached her decision only on the submissions on the substance
from the State Attorney alone. This is not in line with the right to a fair hearing for the
accused. It gives the impression Mr. Poteri was also condemned unheard.

52. Moreover by giving such a blanket cover of in-camera proceedings for the entire trial, the
Trial Magistrate sucked in the Defence case proceedings. Such in-camera proceedings for
the Defence case should have been only at the request of the Defence if they felt it
necessary. This, in my view, also keeps the Trial Magistrates decision/ruling marred in
procedural impropriety.

iii) Remedies.

53. Based on the above findings, I hereby quash the ruling/decision of the Learned Trial
Magistrate of 25 June 2014, ordering in-camera proceedings in Criminal Case No. 303 of
2014 against Poteri Ronald.

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54. Any proceedings carried out under this ruling/order are also accordingly quashed.

55. With these remedies, the other remedies prayed for by the Applicant are catered for and it
is not necessary to address them.

56. I also hereby, under Rule 10 (4) of the Judicature (Judicial Review) Rules, order and
remit the matter to the Trial Magistrate with the direction to reconsider it and reach a
decision in accordance with the above findings of this Court. The Trial Magistrate, in
particular, is directed to weigh and balance the competing rights and interests in issue by
hearing all the parties concerned, have a critical analysis of relevant evidence, and taking
all relevant considerations enumerated above in to account.

57. Costs for the Applicant.

I so order.





LYDIA MUGAMBE
JUDGE
17 SEPTEMBER 2014