EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002]

RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly
impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?
This purely legal issue was posed in connection with a dispute over the mayoralty
seat of San Vicente, Palawan. Considering that the term of the contested office expired
on June 30, 2001,
[1]
the present case may be dismissed for having become moot and
academic.
[2]
Nonetheless, we resolved to pass upon the above-stated issue concerning
the application of certain provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On August 5, 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A.
Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable
violation of the Constitution.
[3]
Complainants alleged that respondent, on behalf of the
municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the consultancy
agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited
one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he
merely hired him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice
dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one
year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a
government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
On February 1, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent
guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
service.
[4]
Respondent appealed to the Office of the President which, on May 29, 2000,
affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.
[5]

Pending respondents motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the
President, or on June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Consequently,
respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order,
docketed as SPL Proc. No. 3462.
[6]
The petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath
administered to petitioner. The Executive Judge granted a Temporary Restraining
Order effective for 72 hours, as a result of which petitioner ceased from discharging the
functions of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was raffled to Branch 95 which, on June 23,
2000, denied respondents motion for extension of the 72-hour temporary restraining
order.
[7]
Hence, petitioner resumed his assumption of the functions of Mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan.
On July 4, 2000, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of Appeals seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office of the
President; (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan; and (3) the June 23, 2000 order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan,
Branch 95.
On March 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals
[8]
declared void the assailed decisions of
the Office of the President and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered
petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
[9]
A motion for
reconsideration was denied on April 23, 2001.
[10]
Hence, the instant petition for review.
The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of
dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a
court of law. Thus, inSalalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al.,
[11]
we held that [t]he Office of
the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of
the aforequoted Section 60.
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds
enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority referred to pertains to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
[12]

As held in Salalima,
[13]
this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or
contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing
rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which
operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991,
expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing
rules.
[14]

Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial
prerogative is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue
of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can
suspend or remove an elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may
I just add the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only
the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that
in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or
may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like
to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase PROPER REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OR THE SANDIGANBAYAN simply by COURTS. Kasi po,
maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. OR THE PROPER COURT.
Senator Saguisag. OR THE PROPER COURT.
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr.
President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to
capture the other ideas that have been elevated.
x x x x x x x x x.
[15]

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials
from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it
vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local
officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public
officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by
the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority
is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
[16]
As explained by the
Court in Lacson v. Roque:
[17]

the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not
without its own justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the
lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or
remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the
public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained
discretionary power to suspend and remove.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.



[1]
See Rollo, p. 422.
[2]
Malaluan v. Commission on Elections, et al., 254 SCRA 397, 403-404 [1996],citing Atienza v.
Commission on Elections, 239 SCRA 298 [1994]; Abeja v. Taada, 236 SCRA 60 [1994]; Yorac v.
Magalona, 3 SCRA 76 [1961].
[3]
Rollo, p. 74.
[4]
Rollo, p. 135.
[5]
Rollo, p. 208.
[6]
Rollo, p. 212.
[7]
CA Rollo, p. 94.
[8]
Third Division, composed of Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino (ponente); Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
(member); and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (chairman).
[9]
Rollo, p. 32 .
[10]
Rollo, p. 55.
[11]
257 SCRA 55, 100 [1996].
[12]
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. --- A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent
component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
[13]
Supra, citing Regidor v. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507 [1989]; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of
Administrators, PVA, 33 SCRA 585 [1970]; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660 [1971].
[14]
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991, The Key to National Development, 171
[1993 ed.].
[15]
Deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code of 1991, August 1, 1990, pp. 39-40.
[16]
Salalima v. Guingona, supra.
[17]
92 Phil. 456, 464 [1953].