Paulson/Glessner

Coaching the

Pistol Spread
Option Offense

Chris Paulson

Chris Paulson & Jeff Glessner

Jeff Glessner

I coached with Chris Paulson and Jeff Glessner for many years. They have great knowledge about option
football. Coaching the Pistol Spread Option Offense is very technically detailed and covers the history and
theories of the option. The techniques and philosophy of this book will help anybody who wants to run an
option offense.
Jay Freeman
Defensive Line Coach
Auburn (WA) High School

51995

9 781606 792964

$19.95

Coaches Choice

ISBN 978-1-60679-296-4

PISToL SPREAD OPTION OFFENSE

Coach Paulsons teams are always well coached and at or near the top of all offensive statistical categories in
their league. Chris is always working to find ways to keep his offense moving, and the pistol spread option
has become his calling card. When planning my own offense, Coach Paulson was the first call I made and
we were able to implement parts of his scheme into what we do.
Aaron Chantler
Head Football Coach
Gig Harbor (WA) High School

Coaching the

Coaching the Pistol Spread Option Offense is an excellent, comprehensive book on option football. It is a
must read for option coaches, as well as those who have to defend the option.
Gordon Elliott
Head Football Coach
Auburn (WA) High School

Coaching the

Pistol Spread
Option Offense

Coaching the
Pistol Spread
Option Offense

Chris Paulson
Jeff Glessner

2014 Coaches Choice. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States.
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Coaches Choice.
ISBN: 978-1-60679-296-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2013957798
Book layout: Cheery Sugabo
Cover design: Cheery Sugabo
Front cover photo: Tom Jones Photography
Coaches Choice
P.O. Box 1828
Monterey, CA 93942
www.coacheschoice.com

Dedication
To my wife, Amanda, and daughter, Ava. Thank you for all your love and support.
Chris Paulson
To Don Joy: For selling me on the wishbone.
To Stan Clements: For selling me on the triple option.
To Bob Oliver: Whose brilliant school of defensive thought molds how I think of
offensive football.
To Ritchie Saltz: For teaching me the technique aspects of football.
To Emory Bellard and Glenn Tiger Ellison: Two of the most brilliant coaches in football
history, who innovated football to another level.
Ultimately, to my father, Thomas Glessner: My hero and my inspiration for everything I do.
Jeff Glessner

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank:
My parents, Scott and Kristi Paulson, for allowing me to follow my dreams.
Mike Price and Bill Doba, for demonstrating genuine love and care for every player in
their program.
Howie Martin, for leaving a legacy in which I can only hope to aspire.
Gordy Elliott, for being a mentor to not just me, but any coach who asks.
Chris Paulson
I would like to thank my family and friends in Fredericksburg, Virginia. The love and
support I have received from them makes it a very special place to me.
Jeff Glessner

Contents
Dedication
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction

3
4
6
8

Chapter 1: Measuring a Plays Effectiveness

11

Chapter 2: The Triple Option

29

Chapter 3: The Pistol Spread Option Passing Game

79

Chapter 4: Complementary Plays

114

Chapter 5: Game Management

146

Chapter 6: Option-Specific Drills

167

Chapter 7: Option Offense Practice Schedule

180

Conclusion
About the Authors

187
188

Preface
This book wouldnt have been possible to create without specific influences on the
content. As will be soon demonstrated, the principles and theories in this book are
from old school option football coaches. The spread guru movement of the past 10
years has minimal to no influence on the content. Original principles of the option are
the staple of this book.
To be more specific, several coaches deserve recognition for their influence on the
authors. The first three would be Emory Bellard, Don Faurot, and Bud Wilkinson. These
are the three pioneers of option football. Although many people dont know who these
people are and what influence they have had on the game, they set the standard for
principles and the theoretical realm of not only option football but the entire game itself.
The running game is influenced by many sources. The first is the Paul Johnson
school of coaches. These are the coaches who have kept option football alive and
running. Theyve had great success with the weaponry of the spread (flexbone/double
slot) offense. The second influence on the running game are the old-time wishbone
coaches: Barry Switzer, Paul Bear Bryant, Ken Hatfield, and, most especially, Emory
Bellard, Homer Smith, and Franklin Pepper Rodgers. These are the coaches who ran
the option successfully in the day and age where everyone ran the option. Needless to
say, they were some of the most successful in their approaches.
The passing game is influenced by several sources. The first in principle would be
the original wishbone coaches. The first in practicality is Tony DeMeo. DeMeo helped
develop a complementary passing game to the option that hadnt been used before.
Tom Moore, Norm Chow, Glenn Tiger Ellison, June Jones, and Darrel Mouse Davis
have had an impact on the philosophical and technical realms of the passing game.
Although the passing game shown doesnt have these coaches direct ideas, they have
subtly had an influence on the content.
Although many have influenced this offense, most of the ideas and concepts
come from the authors. Although they have been heavily influenced in their thought
processes, the authors have undoubtedly become very opinionated on why and what
they believe in. Although coaches have been acknowledged here for their influences,
the authors still state that some disagreement exists with some thought processes,
techniques, and schematic fine tuning that will be argued for and against in this book.

The goal of this book is to be theoretical, philosophical, and, most importantly,

open to debate. The problem with football literature in the past 30 years is that most
of it leaves out theories and philosophy. A football book with just diagrams, anecdotes,
and clichs doesnt mean anything. Any coach can put a bunch of diagrams together
and create a book. Showing the different methods and thought processes behind the
option is important to understand the overall structure of the option. This book is aimed
at readers who want a much more in-depth look at the actual option philosophy itself.

Introduction
The Pistol Spread Option: How Did We Get Here?
The option play has had a dynamic history and relationship to the game of football
since the 1940s. The idea of eliminating defenders by reading them rather than
blocking them is as revolutionary now as it was in the 1940s at the University of
Missouri and the University of Oklahoma. Over the course of time, football evolves and
even goes through cycles. One of the reasons why football didnt evolve much until the
1950s was because movies werent widely available. What adds insult to injury about
the evolution of football was that for 30 to 40 years, most of the evolution occurred
because of rule changes. The main point is that the more accessible technology has
become, the faster information and ideas move along in the football world. Now weve
reached a point where football has combined the triple option with the pistol formation.
Its true to say nothing is new about the triple (three-way) option. Or about having
two slotbacks in the spread option formation. Or about a systematic approach to
running the option. And barely anything new with techniques. The idea of reading
two defenders on a play has been around since the 1960s. Whats new is the idea of
marrying the best of the under-center option game with the best of the passing game in
the shotgun. The theory of this attack is to activate all the areas of the field and stretch
the defense horizontally and vertically to get as close to one-on-one match-ups as
possible. Trying to get the best of both worlds is difficult in itself, and if anyone expects
perfection in either area, hes going to be disappointed. But the power of combining
the two, sacrificing a little bit of the passing game and a little bit of the running game,
makes running the triple option out of the pistol a very deadly weapon.

History of the Option

The single wing, the Halas T, and the Shaughnessy T were on top of the world back in
the 1930s and early 1940s. The single wing was prominent in college football and in
the pros. The Halas T proved to be dominating with the Chicago Bears under Coach
George Halas, destroying opponents left and right. Clark Shaughnessy with Stanford
University won the 1941 Rose Bowl, owning the western part of the United States.
These offensive attacks were very effective for their time, but they were rightfully
dethroned once the option hit the scene in college football.
The split-T, designed by Don Faurot, had the idea of faking close to the line of
scrimmage and eliminating defenders. This is where the original option play got its
start. It was originally called the running pitchout. Running the option and eliminating
8

a defenderusually the end man on the line of scrimmagewere aspects that turned
the college football world upside down. Bud Wilkinson at the University Oklahoma took
the idea of the split-T and had the most success with it. The attack was predicated on
maximum speed, deception on the line of scrimmage, and elimination of a defender
by optioning him. With the success of the attack, the single wing offense was soon
eliminated in college football. Several reasons caused this: The point of attack was
predetermined, speed was slow, and the formation failed to attack all the dimensions
of the field. Another reasonwhich football history has shown to be ironicis that the
single wing was considered a poor passing formation because the ball wasnt already
in the passers hand immediately following the snap. The T formation was something
that facilitated the idea of throwing the ball because the ball was in the passers hands
immediately. The past decade of football has shown the opposite trend.
Once the split-T had dominated college football, defensive minds finally caught up
with the offense. Wilkinson, who helped master this offense, devised a defensive game
plan to stop the split-T. The defense he developed was the Oklahoma (Okie) defense.
Using new principles of defensive line play, linebacker play, and secondary rotation put
the effectiveness of the split-T on hold. By the mid-1960s, the split-T had faded quickly
from the scene of college football. One problem that the coaches of that era had was
opening up the passing game. Back then, throwing the football was looked down upon.
Thus, when split-T teams refused to throw the football, the offense went dead.
By 1968, a pioneer named Emory Bellard came to his head coach Darrell Royal
with a new idea. With Royal being in trouble for several mediocre seasons, Bellard
came to him with a new idea: running the T formation with a triple option, moving the
backs closer together, moving the fullback up, and splitting a receiver out. Bellard said
he had experimented with the formation when he was still a high school coach. As
football history has shown, when a coaching staff is desperate, it will try anything to get
back up on its feet. Royal approved of the new offense and they went on to install it at
the University of Texas.
Bellard took his new offense and revolutionized college football. The defense that
had taken the split-T out of college football was now being destroyed. The triple option
play out of the wishbone helped defeat an Oklahoma defense that had hurt many
offenses in the past. The resume for the wishbone speaks for itself: Eight Associated
Press national championships in 17 years shows how effective the offense was and
is. During the 1980s, the flexbone became more popularly used. Many claim to have
been one of the first to install the triple option out of the spread (flexbone/double slot),
but the fact of the matter is that Ellison was the first person to create a triple option play
out of the spread. He called it his cowboy on the run and a three-way option.
At Georgia Southern and the military academies, the spread formation (flexbone)
was becoming more popular. The only fault with the original wishbone offense was the
limitability of the passing game. Believe it or not, using option principles, the passing
game out of the wishbone isnt bad. But if two minutes are left in the game and the

defense knows the offense is going to throw the football, the offense is in trouble. Also,
football coaches are copycats. The average football coach naturally runs what the most
popular offense is at the time. In the 1980s, the modern passing game was being
developed by Bill Walsh, Dennis Erickson, Mike Price, and Darrel Mouse Davis. Selling
these new concepts out of the wishbone is impossible because of the structure of the
formation. As a result of that and how hard recruiting is for the wishbone, by the end
of the 1980s, the wishbone was bleak. The spread (flexbone) was one of the main
tools to run the triple option from, including the I bone at the University of Colorado
and Tom Osborne at the University of Nebraska. But the idea of running a systematic
option offense in college football was gone by the 1990s. Nebraska was still running
the option, but it wasnt part of the wishbone system. Once the year 2000 hit, the
option as a system was a lost cause in major college football.
Although the option seemed to have vanished from major college football, it was
still being run by lower-division programs. While that was going on, spreading the field
and throwing the ball became more and more popular in college football. At the same
time, Paul Johnson at Georgia Southern and the Naval Academy dominated the ground
game with limited talent. The option was then given a chance: Paul Johnson took his
2009 Georgia Tech Yellow Jackets to the Orange Bowl. Georgia Tech, Army, Navy, and
Air Force have dominated the ground game by using the same offensive principles that
the wishbone had established.
The past decade has shown the trend to wide-open football. Thats where the pistol
and the spread connect with each other. The University of Nevada first broke the scene
running the pistol and the University of West Virginia and the University of Texas helped
popularize the zone read out of the shotgun. The idea of running the spread option out
of the pistol (to the authors knowledge) was tried first by the Virginia Military Institute
around 2005 and 2006. This shows this idea has been around for some time now. This
book is meant to be a way to show how the original themes of the option, established by
the split-T and the wishbone, put together with some modern ideas can give an offense
a theoretical, numerical, angular, and space advantage against any defense.
At the core of the option is the wishbone. The wishbone is the gold standard of
option football. Hopefully, this book shows that using old principles established not by
spread gurus of the past 10 years but old school option coaches is the theoretical
gold standard for moving the football.

10

1
Measuring a Plays Effectiveness

Coaches can measure a plays effectiveness in several ways. While the term effective
can be subjective, certain factors need to be considered when evaluating a football play.
Many great football plays can be executed very well in a variety of offensive systems.
However, an effective football play isnt merely about drawing up a play on a chalkboard.
An effective play must be based on sound theory, philosophy, and reasoning for it to be
consistently successful. Thousands of football plays have been run throughout history.
Some have stood the test of time and are still in use today, while others have disappeared
from modern football. The plays that have stood the test of time measure up when
considering the following factors of measuring a plays effectiveness.

Determining a Plays Effectiveness

Attacking the Defense Horizontally
The football field is 53.3 yards wide. To achieve maximum effectiveness, a play should
threaten the field from sideline to sideline. Two significant reasons exist for this. The
first reason is simple spacing. By stretching the defense horizontally, the offense can
create as close to a one-on-one matchup as possible. The most difficult thing to do in
football is to tackle in space. By utilizing the fields entire width, an offense can force
defenders to tackle in space. The role that open space has can be illustrated in the fact

11

that if the football field were 100 yards wide, the offense would have the advantage
over the defense because more room would exist for the defense to cover. But if the
field were 25 yards wide, the defense would have the advantage.
Another dimension to the principle needs to be mentioned. The fewer number of
players involved in a play, the greater the advantage the offense has. If football were
played with five players on each team, the defense would be at a great disadvantage. If
football were played with 17 players on each team, the offense would have a difficult
time moving the ball up and down the field. The best example of this is six, seven, or
eight-man football. The scores of these games are very high because of the limited
number of players on the field. Arena league football also bolsters this.
Creating one-on-one matchups through the use of spacing and limiting the number
of players involved in the play are two strong principles that should be applied when
examining a plays effectiveness. Based on those principles, an effective play is one
that stretches the defense with multiple points of attack. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 provide a
comparison of the triple option to a conventional power play.

Figure 1-1. Triple option

Figure 1-2. I formation power

The two examples clearly show which play attacks the entire width of the field.
The power play out of the I formation can be a great play, but in terms of attacking a
defense horizontally, its not as effective as the triple option. The triple option stretches
the attack from sideline to sideline, which means the defense has multiple points of
attack it must account for.

12

Holding Off Defensive Pursuit

The next factor to consider when measuring a plays effectiveness is how well the
play holds off defensive pursuit. Pursuit is the enemy of offense in the sense that
defensive pursuit allows a defense to gain numbers at the point of attack. For defense,
its simple: Pursuit equals numbersand numbers equal a defensive advantage. The
pursuit principle goes hand in hand with the first principle of having multiple points of
attack. If a defense is stressed at multiple points, an offense can hold defenders and
slow down defensive pursuit. The triple option is a play that holds off defensive pursuit
by attacking the entire width of the field.
When the option first came to being in the early 1940s, the single wing was the
dominant offense in college football. One of the issues that single wing offenses ran
into was holding defensive pursuit. Defenses could immediately run to the point of
attackwhether it be the spinner series, the buck lateral series, or the trap series. In
contrast, early option offenses were able to hold off pursuit. Defensive pursuit caused
the single wing to fall out of favor and put the split-T option in charge of college football
for a decade.
Because the early double option play had two points of attack, it was impractical
for the defense to simply run to just one point of attack. When the option play was first
introduced into college football by Don Faurot, collegiate coaches were stunned by
how much they could hold pursuit on a defense. When Bill Yeoman added the triple
option, more parts of the defense were frozen for two reasons. The first is the natural
freeze of certain members of the defense when theyre being read. The second is
that the offense added another point of attack to the offense to combat the defense.
Combating the principle of pursuit is key in measuring a plays effectiveness. Eliminating
pursuit means fewer defenders at the point of attack. The fewer number of defenders
at the point of attack for the offense, the greater advantage the offense has on that
particular play.
Can Smaller, Below-Average Offensive Linemen Succeed?
Championships are won and lost on the offensive and defensive lines. In measuring
a plays effectiveness, the level of difficulty of each players responsibility should be
considered. Because its practical to assume that championships are won and lost at
the line of scrimmage, its also practical to first consider the difficulty of an offensive
linemans responsibility. Figures 1-3 through 1-6 show comparisons of the triple option
with common power, iso, and inside zone plays.
Power, iso, and inside zone are predicated on creating movement and winning oneon-one blocks along the line of scrimmage. The power play requires the playside guard
and tackle to double-team the 3 technique all the way to the backside linebacker. This
is a difficult skill to accomplish with average linemen. The splits are very tight, so the

13

Figure 1-3. Power

Figure 1-4. Iso

Figure 1-5. Inside zone

Figure 1-6. Triple option

14

entire play hinges on the idea that offensive linemen will move the defenders off the
ball. While the power play is one of the most utilized plays in football today, it requires
a high level of ability on the offensive line.
The isolation play requires a very similar skill set to the one needed to run the power
play. The isolation play out of the I formation depends on everybody on the line of
scrimmage to win one-on-one blocks. While the isolation play is one that has stood the test
of time, it also heavily depends on offensive linemen being superior to their counterparts.
The inside zone play is different. Inside zone has more leeway when it comes to
dominating defenders at the point of attack. Its a physical play. However, it can be
successful with linemen who simply stay engaged with defenders. Quicker linemen
will have a better chance at succeeding with the inside zone scheme than power and
iso. While the inside zone doesnt require the same level of physicality as the power or
iso play, it does require that linemen be able to maintain contact with defenders for a
significant amount of time.
The triple option is designed to allow inferior offensive linemen to succeed. Many
of the blocks required for the offensive line are technique blocks. Even so, for the sake
of argument, unlike power, iso, and inside zone, the triple option only needs to win
one block on the line of scrimmage. If the offense cant block that one defender, an
answer within the option system requires that the defender be read instead of blocked.
When running any other running game, at some point, the offense has to win blocks
at the point of attack. If a 3 technique is used, the offensive line cant move, meaning
the offense cant run the ball inside. The service academies have shown that inferior
offensive linemen can be successful within the spread offense.
The Difficulty of the Play for the Skill Positions
If the triple option gives the offensive line an advantage, it also shifts the burden to
the skill positions. While more is required from the skill positions than from offensive
linemen in this system, the triple option requires very few techniques from these
players relative to other offensive systems.
Many critics of the option offense claim that to run the triple option, the offense
must have superior athletes. This statement is far from the truth. Is it true it can
enhance the threat to the defense? Absolutely, but it doesnt hinder the offense to a
status of useless. Many offenses require tailbacks that are 4.5 runners and under with
receivers that range from 61 to 64 and tight ends who can block, stretch a defense
vertically, and make tough catches over the middle. It also requires a quarterback who
can make all the throws and has above-average height and a cannon arm. The triple
option requires none of these traits. As already stated, would these characteristics help
the option? Of course, but does the offensive system being run depend on having a
stud quarterback year in and year out and big, strong, lengthy receivers who can beat
any secondary? Does the offensive system require a tight end who can do everything?

15

Does it require a broad range of personnel traits needed by five to seven competent
skill positions? Its fantastic if a school can fill these requirements, but the reality of the
situation is that a majority of football programs arent blessed with these characteristic
traits. The option is open to many different body types. For example, what value in a
pro-style offense does a 56 player have? Absolutely none to that offense. Within the
scope of the option offense, if hes a hard worker with speed, he could be a valuable
asset to the offense.
Illustrating the difficulty of base plays within other systems will show the difficulty
thats placed on the quarterback and other skill positions compared with the triple
option. For the sake of argument, the triple option will be compared with other offensive
base pass plays. The reason is that other offensive base run plays, the quarterback
does nothing but hand the ball off and boot away from the play.
Many West Coast offenses feature the stick concept as a core play in their
playbook (Figure 1-7). The quarterback must come up to the line and determine
whether its man or zone. The primary side hes looking at is the stick route to the tight
end side if its zone. He has the freedom to go to the double slants side if its man. He
can also stick to the tight end side if its man. The quarterback will take a three-step
drop with no hitch and read the flat defender and the ball will be gone by his third step.
Many moving parts exist in this play. The tight end will run a stick route. Versus zone,
hell sit in the hole. If its man or if hes attached, hell stick his foot in the ground and
turn out. In many West Coast teams philosophy, this is an efficient play designed to get
four to seven yards. Countless techniques are taught in every facet of this play to gain
only four to seven yards. A coach must teach the quarterback where to go depending
on whether its man, cover 2, 3, 4, 6, or 10, or press. Thats a lot on the quarterbacks
plate to gain only four to seven yards. This is also but one play of an infinite amount in
the West Coast offense.

Vs. man

QB: 3-step drop

Figure 1-7. West Coast stick route

The bench route (Figure 1-8) has many facets to it. The quarterback drop varies
from coach to coach, but it would be a five-step drop and the hitches to the drop would
vary from coach to coach. The split end will run a curl route, unless its cover 2, in which
case he converts it to a fade. The flanker will run an 8- to 12-yard speed out depending
16

on the cushion the corner gives him. The tight end will read the middle of the field. If
the middle of the field is open, hell run a short post, splitting the safeties. If the middle
of the field is closed, hell run a seam route about two yards outside of the hash. Both
running backs will check-release off the outside linebackers. If the linebackers come on
a blitz, the running backs have to pick them up. If the linebackers drop in coverage, the
running backs run swing routes. This play presents the same predicament as the stick
route: It has a lot of moving parts. This play can become an efficient and explosive play
depending on how the defense reacts. However, this is one of many plays in the West
Coast offense that skill players and quarterbacks have to master for the offense to work.
This route is one of many for which the quarterback, receivers, and running backs have
to be on the same page for it to work.
Convert vs. cover 2

M.o.f.o.

M.o.f.c.

Figure 1-8. Bench route

Compared with West Coast plays, the base 4 vertical play (Figure 1-9) is much
more explosive and is used more for teams who run a 2x2 spread. Most teams who
run a 2x2 spread have this as a staple play, which is theoretically better than the West
Coast philosophy. However, this is being compared with the difficulties of all skill
positions compared with the triple option.

Vs. man

Vs. man
Vs. zone

Soft zone

Figure 1-9. Base 4 vertical

The plays details vary greatly from coach to coach. However, the way it was
originally invented is shown. The quarterback will look at the right slot receiver first and
hell throw the football on his third step if the receiver is open. If not, the quarterback
then shifts his eyes to the left slot receiver. The slot receiver will read the coverage and
17

react accordingly. If the quarterback is uncomfortable or if he has a cloudy read, hell

pay attention to the left slot receiver and see how he reads coverage. Again, compared
with West Coast plays, this play in theory is much better to hang the offenses hat
onassuming its a huge part of a teams game plan every week. The point is that the
skill positions in these other offenses have a lot more to work on than triple option skill
positions, especially more technical and specific aspects to the entire realm of those
offenses than a team that specializes in the option.
Critics will say that the triple option has a lot of moving parts to it for the skill
positions. Theyre correct in their assertion. However, the triple option play will always
consist of 40 to 60 percent of a teams game plan every week regardless of what kind
of defense the opposition runs. The triple option is covered in more detail in Chapter
2. However, theory, history, and results have proven that the triple option quarterback
doesnt need a rocket arm, infinite knowledge about every coverage, stunt, and front
the defense will show, and doesnt need to be an all-world athlete. Its also understood
that once the quarterback masters the triple option, everything else in the offense is
very easy to pick up because everything flows together.
Are All Defenders Accounted For?
Many base run plays are predicated on dominating the line of scrimmage. However,
another downfall of many run plays is the inability to account for every defender on
the field. The triple option almost never has this predicament, whereas many other run
plays do. For example, in a power play vs. 4-3 cover 4 (Figure 1-10), the safeties are
unaccounted for. Whats the answer for wanting to run the ball if the defense is playing
cover 4 where the safeties are primary run support? Theoretically, none.

Unaccounted for

Figure 1-10. Power vs. 4-3 cover 4

Against cover 3 (Figure 1-11), again, in theory, no answer exists in the run game for
this unaccounted-for defender. Not only does the power and isolation play require big,
strong linemen, but it doesnt even account for everybody on the field. The offensive
line could theoretically dominate the line of scrimmage and the play could still go for
no gain. The normal depth for an I formation running back is usually seven yards deep.
Its not difficult to grasp the concept that safeties at seven or nine yards deep can come
up and make a tackle for no gain or a three- to four-yard gain.

18

Unaccounted for

Figure 1-11. Power vs. 4-3 cover 3

The inside zone (Figure 1-12) and outside zone (Figure 1-13) are better answers
than power and isolation. Because the running back has the freedom to bang, bend, or
bounce or read the alphabet, he has more leeway to get away from unaccounted-for
players. Because the running backs path isnt necessarily pre-determined, safeties who
have a wrong run fit can be giving the offense an automatic six points. However, the
point remains the same: The safeties still arent accounted for. In a cover 4 situation,
the safeties could be free to be run stoppers. Or if the defense is in a cover 2 shell and
correctly spills the play to the unblocked corners, the play will go nowhere.

Figure 1-12. Inside zone

Figure 1-13. Outside zone

Theoretically, in running zone, the tight end and tackle should be able to combo
the 5 technique to the corner. But practically, when has that ever happened on inside
zone? Even if they correctly combo the 5 technique to the corner, the safety is still
19

unaccounted for in the box. Again, unlike power and iso, this play has more leeway and
is stronger in theory because its blocking gaps. But the reality of the play is different.
At some point, the running back is going to have to run somebody over or make
somebody miss for the play to be successful.
Against a sound defense, the triple option will almost always account for everybody
in the defensive picture. Figure 1-14 illustrates the triple option vs. the 4-3. (More
frontswill be discussed later.) Compared with the other run plays that have been
reviewed, the triple option accounts for everybody in the picture.

Figure 1-14. Triple option vs. 4-3

In What Situations Can a Play Be Run?

Most offensive plays are usually good only in certain situations. The triple option play is
good anywhere on the field and on almost any down. Many plays are situational plays.
The triple option is as good on third-and-10 as it is on first-and-10. Once perfected,
this play can be run from goal line to goal line. This is a key measurement of a plays
effectiveness. The more situations and field position markers the play can be successful
in, the more practical it is to run. The triple option can score a touchdown on any part
of the field if executed 100 percent.
Is the Play Based in a System?
A great wishbone coach once said 90 percent of offenses dont run an offensethey
just run plays. That statement is one of the sad truths of football. Most teams dont
run an offense with core plays. They just run random plays that dont fit in the realm
of a well-oiled offensive machine. A lot of offenses have no answer for what a defense
does with its base play. Running the triple option as the base play of a system gives a
clearer picture to the coaches and players. Everything begins and ends with the triple
option. Whatever the defense does, the system has an answer. Whether its another
running play, a tweak in the blocking scheme, or a pass, the triple option as a system
has concrete answers to all defenses. Other systems may have answers, but at the end
of the day, if the offense cant move a 3 technique from point A to point B, it really
doesnt matter what the supposed answer is. Its pretty simple: When a play is part of a
system, the effectiveness of the play can only improve.
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Does the Offense Have the Chalk Last?

Running the triple option will always give coaches and players on offense the chalk last.
The concept of the offense having the chalk last comes from the great Darrel Mouse
Davis, the co-inventor of the run-and-shoot offense. Many core similarities exist
between a run-and-shoot offense and an option offense, but the most common theme
is that both systems will always have the chalk last. Running the triple option always
gives the offense strategic moves during the play (which is the same with the run-andshoot offense). When West Coast teams run power or iso or when wing-T teams run
belly or bucksweep, the second the quarterback receives the snap, the play is already
pre-determined. The revolutionary idea of the option offense is that nobody on the
field knows wholl get the ball. It all depends on the defenders reactions. This principle
also unintentionally gives offensive players a lot of confidence and power. Knowing
and understanding that no matter what the defense does the offense is right and the
defense is wrong are revolutionary and empowering concepts to football players.

Measuring the Effectiveness of a Formation

Measuring the possibilities of a formation is important when trying to come up with
sound fundamental football. A formation should be measured by many key aspects.
Balance
A balanced formation forces a defense to be balanced. An unbalanced formation
naturally forces a defense to be unbalanced. A strong suit that the offense can use is
balance because being balanced will give the offense its greatest advantage. Tendencies
are highly exposed in unbalanced formations. But if an offense is simply balanced, it
can kill whatever tendencies a defense can key on. Balance makes the spread and
wishbone hard to defend. Proper formation balance will make the defense play 5.5
defenders on each side (Figure 1-15).

5 defenders

5 defenders

Figure 1-15. 5.5 defenders on each side

This makes the counting system within the option much simpler. An unbalance in
numbers will many times lead the offense to miscount the defenders. If the defense is

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overloaded to one side, the offense should run the triple option to the other side. With
quick motion, the offense can automatically outnumber the defense. However, if the
defense shifts with motion, that makes it vulnerable to the backside option game
Stretching the Defense Horizontally
As stated before, the football field is 53.3 yards wide. Stretching a defense to defend
every inch of the field is important in moving the football. The principle that will be
restated in this book multiple times is that the fewer number of players in a football
play, the greater the advantage is to the offense. The more players, the more the
advantage is to the defense.
What gets lost in attacking the defense horizontally is how many gaps the defense
has to defend (Figure 1-16). The more gaps, the greater the advantage the offense
has. If a defender misses an assignment with his gap responsibility, a big play will
occur. The spread option formation offers a unique challenge for a defense to prepare
for within the structure of gaps.
1

Figure 1-16. Spread gaps

The gap structure begins to weaken the defense by stretching it throughout the
width of the field. Technically speaking, eight gaps require eight defenders to play gap
responsibility before either slotback goes in motion. Figure 1-17 compares this with the
wing-T formation.
1

Figure 1-17. Wing-T gaps

Both formations require eight gaps to be covered efficiently by the defense.

However, a key difference exists in defending these formations. The base wing-T
formation is a compressed formation with relatively small splits. This doesnt necessarily
stretch the defense horizontally. Attacking the width of the field is key in having an
explosive offense. With crowding an area, the defense has the advantage in numbers.
Pursuit is numbersand numbers is defense. The fewer one-on-one match-ups the
offense has, the greater the advantage to the offense.

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Why are the spread option gap responsibilities more effective than a base 4 wide
receiver spread? Do they have the same number of gaps the defense has to cover?
Yes, but the spread option is superior for one reason: The slot receivers in a base 4
wide receiver spread formation are spread out too wide to control their gap to the
inside (Figure 1-18).

Figure 1-18. Base 4 wide receiver set

Yes, the defense has to defend eight gaps, but two of them are difficult to control.
In essence, the defense isnt scared to be threatened within these gaps. Slotbacks are
close enough to the line of scrimmage to be able to theoretically control the gap inside
of them and the gap outside of them. The advantage of the spread is that eight gaps
are created horizontally and the formation is stretched out far enough to threaten the
entire width of the field, but its also compressed enough to control all eight gaps.
Does the Formation Attack the Field Vertically?
The importance of attacking the field horizontally has already been talked about.
But a vertical threat will completely threaten all 11 defenders on the football field.
Its impractical to say that a formation needs to threaten the field vertically for 100
yards or even 60 yards. However, the vertical stretch of a defense for 30 to 40 yards
is very practical for an offense to get the proper stretch on a defense. The question
then becomes How many immediate vertical threats does the offense present to the
defense? The I formation has only three vertical threats (Figure 1-19).

Figure 1-19. I formation vertical threats

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In theory, this only stresses the defense vertically in three areas, which means
the defense only has to worry about three vertical threats. Pre-motion in the spread
threatens the field with four vertical threats (Figure 1-20).

Figure 1-20. Spread option vertical threats

This is what sets the spread apart from the wishbone. Running the triple option with
a lead blocker is the reason for the wishbone formation. Running the triple option with
eight horizontal gaps and four vertical threats is the reason for the spread formation.
Both approaches have costs and benefits, but the following theoretical reasons for the
triple option and the spread formation need to be understood: to create gap conflict, to
have balance, and to have four vertical threats. For those reasons, the triple option with
the spread formation is a deadly weapon.

The Marriage Between a Formation and a Play

The theories stated are only good if a play and a formation can fit together. Given the
theoretical arguments shown, it makes sense that the spread and the triple option
go together better than any other play with any other formation. The success of this
marriage has proven itself on the football field. Making the defense defend eight gaps
and four verticals and also having to defend the best play in football put a defense in a
bind. On short motion, the defense must defend all these areas that are based on the
pistol spread option attack (Figure 1-21).
Vertical threat

Flash

Counter speed

Slot iso

Midline

Triple

Figure 1-21. Pistol spread option points of attack

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Triple

Deep third

Triple

With quick motion, these are all the immediate places the defense must defend
against. If a defense shies away from one of these points of attack, it will be burned. This
is in contrast to the original points of attack with the wishbone formation (Figure 1-22).
Deep third
Counter option

Counter dive

Triple

Triple

Triple

Figure 1-22. Wishbone points of attack

Comparing the two shows what a bind the defense is in. Both are using the triple
option to create horizontal and vertical stretches on a defensea technique thats
seldom talked about.

The Truth About the Spread Formation

An unsaid truth about the spread formation is almost never talked about. Maybe its not
talked about because in todays football world, people cant fathom the triple option
being run from any other formation. However, if the passing game through the spread
isnt consistently attacking the defense vertically and the offense doesnt consistently
attack the defense at all areas of the line of scrimmage, the spread is a very keyable
offense. The same goes with the wishboneexcept in the opposite direction. Without
the triple option, its a poor formation because of principles of a formation and its plays.
If a team doesnt spend half its time perfecting its passing game with the spread, the
team is running the wrong formation. The advantages of the spread are lost when
its only merely a running formation. If the offense consistently shows the defense
a vertical passing game, the defense will defend those areas of the field. If not, the
wishbone formation is the best at triple optioning.
Along the same lines, if a strict adherence to maintain attacking all areas of the line
of scrimmage doesnt occur, the spread is a keyable formation. The reason is because
of its use of quick motion. Motion is a good that can turn evil. Thats a huge key
defenses can and will use against the offense. Keeping the defense honest will make
the offense sound. If the defense is unsound in its linebacker or defensive line play or
is playing with unsound secondary rotation, a play will be open. However, not restricting
the defense to these plays will make running the spread suicide against teams that
are only out to stop the triple option. Even though the wishbone requires the same
adherence to attacking all areas of the line of scrimmage because of stagnant backfield
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play, its a better formation. The spread formation can magnify the wishbones original
principles, but straying away from these principles will make it an easy offense to figure
out during the course of a game.

The Truth About the Pistol Formation

Fads come and go, and in todays football world, the fad is the pistol formation. Its the
hip new thing everybodys excited about. However, most of that excitement is just the
fact its something new, not something thats theoretically sound. The reason for the
pistol and the triple option being married together is to boost the effectiveness of the
passing game. Pass protection has always been a problem for teams who are under
center, especially double slot spread teams who have wide splits that the defense
will take advantage of. The main reason for the pistol and the spread being married
is pass protection. Too many coaches want to run the pistol because its whats new,
but if thats the reason they line up in the pistol, then theyll fail. Theyre not doing
something with philosophy or theory on their side. Theyre doing something because
theyve been talked into being modern in todays football world.
A subject in football thats rarely talked about is the importance of pass protection.
Its pretty simple: A coach can draw up all the cool-looking pass plays in the world.
At the end of the day, if the quarterback has no protection, the play wont work. A
vast majority of football coaches neglect pass protection because its a dry subject to
talk about. Most offensive coaches coach offense because they love the intricacies of
offense. Most offensive line coaches love pounding defenses into submission, so its
understandable why most coaches neglect pass protection. But it must be understood
that pass protection is the number one priority whenever the offense is throwing the
football and that pass protection is everyones responsibility. The pistol spread option
activates the entire field. Its true that if a team wants to fully utilize the advantages of
the gun, the pistol spread isnt the best option. Its easier to protect the quarterback
when hes at five yards instead of three. But thats the sacrifice of running this particular
offense. The triple and midline are much more effective under center and an all-out
passing game is better with the quarterback five yards behind the center.
However, three yards is the happy medium where the quarterback can effectively
run the triple and midline while having better pass protection than under center. Its
true that critics can say this offense is sacrificing too much to marry two ideas. But
the success of this offense speaks for itself. Sacrifice a little bit of the running game
by starting the quarterback three yards behind the center with the tailback in a twopoint stance at five and sacrifice a small portion of the passing game by having the
triggerman line up two yards closer than he normally would. The point being is that
the marriage starts with the importance of pass protection. Lining up in the pistol isnt a
perfect answer nor is it the best theoretical answer for pass protection, but combining
the best of the under-center option game with the benefits of good pass protection is
the goal of this offense. Sound pass protection must be preached from day one.

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The truth is, if the passing game is used as something to completely attack the
defenseespecially out of the pistol spreadits the wrong thing for the offense to do.
The reason for the spread formation is to attack the defense vertically and keep it honest
theoretically and philosophicallyagainst the option game. However, operating out of the
pistol gives a small extension of that attack. Being able to throw quick passes along with
a dropback passing game can amplify an offense as long as its not long or extensive in a
West Coaststyle manner and is strictly used as a constraint on a defense.
If a small extension of the passing game through better pass protection isnt a
priority for an offense, then the pistol spread isnt for that particular team because the
advantages in the option game are lost going to the pistol. The speed of the read is
affected. The read can be cloudy because of where the mesh is taking place. It can be
argued that the counter game out of the pistol is better because of depth from the line
of scrimmage. But the advantages of the triple and midline option plays will be lost to
the wind if the reasons for fully going to this offense arent utilized.
The pessimism isnt shown for the sake of being pessimistic and the theories
espoused here arent simply theories for the sake of theory. This theory of the undercenter game compared with the shotgun isnt backed up by theory but also by football
history. As already discussed, one of the reasons why the single wing folded to the
T formation was because of pursuit. Pursuit helped defenses defeat the single wing.
Another reason for the extinction of the single wing is the shotgun snap. Because the
single wing and the split-T formation were predicated on misdirection, the immediate
placement of the ball was important within the mechanics of these offenses (Figures
1-23 and 1-24).

Figure 1-23. Single wing

Figure 1-24. Split-T

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When deciphering these two diagrams, the split-T fakes are operating closer to the
line of scrimmage. The staple of the split-T offense is to have good fakes close to the line
of scrimmage because deception would be better hidden from its closeness to the line
of scrimmage and the attack would hit the perimeter faster because its faking would be
on the line of scrimmage. The single wing faking takes place five yards beyond the line of
scrimmage, which gives defenses time to recover from the initial fake.
There are specific reasons for going 60 to 70 years back in football history. The
pistol, operating under the assumption of trying to be sexy rather than being theoretically
sound, isnt a good offensive choice. However, without a clear explanation of theory,
this is only snappy clinic talk. The offense is only out to please the man running the
offense for being sexy and cool and cutting edge, when the truth of the matter
is that very little is ever invented in football. New coaches come up with new ideas.
However, the principles of new ideas have been around forever. The pistol spread
option is no exception. This offense is a direct descendent of Don Faurot and Bud
Wilkinsons split-T, Emory Bellards wishbone, and Glenn Tiger Ellisons double slot
formation. The pistol is added to acknowledge that the principles are still the exact
same but that pass protection is better.
To summarize, the reasons for running certain option offenses are these: If an
offense wants to run the ball the majority of the time, the wishbone triple option is
second to none. It controls the perimeter of the defense by using the run off technique
to attack the deep third of the field. The lead back principle makes perimeter blocking
and variations of triple option blocking deadly. If the offense wants to run the ball
but also wants to catch the defense off-guard from time to time, then the spread
under center is the best option. This system has eight gaps and four vertical threats
pre-motion. If the offense wants an extension to the spread option, its out of the
pistol while keeping the same spacing of the under-center option game. The extension
consists of better pass protection, easier quarterback footwork in the passing game, and
a small extension of the dropback, play-action, and screen systems. As already stated,
the goal is to marry the best of the under-center option game with the best of the short
shotgun. The key phrase is small extension. The option offense is a repetition offense
and the practice time required to perfect these techniques is scarce. If the offensive
coordinator wants to run footballs best 100 plays out of footballs best 20 formations,
this offense isnt for him.
Anyone whos interested in this offense is in for a steep change in offensive thinking,
play calling, game planning, and attacking defenses. However, once this offense is
utilized to its maximum potential, coaches wont want to go back to traditional football.
The option principles started by Don Faurot, amplified by Emory Bellard, Franklin
Pepper Rodgers, Paul Bear Bryant, and Barry Switzer, and enhanced by Glenn
Tiger Ellisons double slot formation added to the short shotgun will give offenses
principled and theoretical advantages over every defense they see.

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