HAZARD IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL

In order to reduce the risk of injury and ill health within an organisation, hazards need to be
controlled. To do this, there are essentially three hazard management stages that need to
be taken into account.

Hazard identification - ensures the recognition of specific hazards through regular

monitoring of the workplace.

Risk assessment - involves the assessment of the seriousness of the identified

hazards. Once the hazards in a workplace have been identified and the risks
assessed, priorities can be set for action to control the risks.

Risk control takes a variety of forms depending on the nature of the hazard, and
should be based on a hierarchy of control options emphasising the elimination of
the hazard at its source.
The three-step hazard and risk management system needs to be integrated into all
operations of an organisation to ensure that hazards are not overlooked. For
example, with respect to items of equipment, all procedures and specifications for
design, purchase, installation and maintenance of the equipment would take into
account any foreseeable hazards.

1.

Requirements under the OSH Act for reporting accidents, injuries and dangerous
occurrences and for identifying hazards and assessing and controlling risks have
been complied with as per the relevant regulation(s), approved codes of practice
and legislated Standards. The organisation maintains a register/list of legislation,
approved codes of practice and Standards relevant to its operations. The
organisation ensures senior managers are aware of their responsibilities in respect
of hazards and risk management.

2.

All accidents, including near miss, property damage and those resulting in injury
including first aid and minor injury are reviewed by the safety and health committee
on a regular basis to determine trends and prevention strategies.

3.

A documented procedure exists for reporting and investigating all accidents

including near miss, property damage and those resulting in injury. The procedure
ensures appropriate corrective action is implemented. Training sessions have been
provided for line managers, supervisors and safety and health committee members
in the accident investigation procedure and techniques.

4.

OSH considerations are incorporated into design specification and the purchase,
hire, lease and supply of equipment, materials, products and substances used in
the workplace.

5.

Regular workplace inspections occur and managers, supervisors and safety and
health committee members are involved and actions are completed in the required
timeframes. A written procedure has been developed for undertaking OSH
inspections in the workplace. Training sessions in inspection procedure and
techniques have been provided for those employees involved in inspections.

6.

The organisation has identified hazards in the workplace and has implemented
plans to assess and control risks in consultation with employees. Controls
implemented have been based on the hierarchy of control which emphasises the
elimination of the hazard at the source.

7.

The organisations confidential records contain specific employee data that will
assist in protecting employees from injury at work. Employee information includes
details of employees OSH-related:

skills;

experience;

training;

health factors that may put them at risk; and

exposures to potentially hazardous activities/substances.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION, RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL

IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
HAZARD

A hazard is anything that can cause harm (e.g. chemicals, electricity,

working from ladders etc.).

RISK

Risk is the chance or probability (big or small) of harm actually being

done. (It can also be expressed as a frequency - the number of
events in unit time).
As an example, think about a can of solvent on a shelf. There is a
hazard is the solvent is toxic or flammable, but very little risk. The
risk increases when it is taken down and poured into a bucket.
Harmful vapour is given off and there is a possibility of spillage.
Things are made much worse if a mop is then used to spread it over
the floor for cleaning. The chance of harm, i.e. the risk, is then high.

DANGER

Danger is the relative exposure to a hazard. A hazard may be

present but there may be little danger because of the control
precautions taken.

THE CONCEPT

Three basic steps should be taken to ensure a safe and healthy

workplace. They are based on the concept that the workplace should
be modified to suit people, not vice versa. The three steps are:

identifying the hazards - involves recognising things which may

cause injury or harm to the health of a person, for instance
flammable material, ignition sources or unguarded machinery;

assessing the risk - involves looking at the possibility of injury or

harm occurring to a person if exposed to a hazard; and

controlling the risk - by introducing measures which will

eliminate or reduce the risk of a person being exposed to a
hazard.

It is important to regularly review the steps, especially if there

are changes in the work environment, new technology is
introduced, or standards are changed.

IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
The identification of hazards should involve a critical appraisal of all activities to take
account of hazards to employees, others affected by activities (e.g. members of the public
and contractors) and to those using products and services. Adequate hazard identification
requires a complete understanding of the working situation.
In the simplest cases hazards can be identified by observation, comparing the
circumstances with the relevant information. In more complex cases measurements such
as air sampling or examining the methods of machine operation may be necessary to
identify the presence of hazards presented by chemicals or machinery. In the most
complex or high risk cases (for example, in the chemical or nuclear industry) special
techniques and systems may be required such as hazard and operability studies
(HAZOPS). Specialist advice may be necessary in choosing and applying the most
appropriate techniques.
A combination of the following methods may be the most effective way to identify hazards.
Methods of identifying workplace hazards include

previewing legislation and supporting codes of practice and guidance;

NIOSH/DOSH published information;

reviewing relevant Malaysian and international standards;

reviewing industry or trade association guidance;

reviewing other published information;

developing a hazard checklist;

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conducting walk-through surveys (audits) and inspections;

reviewing information from designers or manufacturers;

assessing the adequacy of training or knowledge required to work safely;

analysing unsafe incident, accident and injury data;

analysing work processes;

job safety analysis;

consulting with employees;

observation;

examining and considering material safety data sheets and product labels; and

seeking advice from specialists.

Some hazards are inherent in the work process, such as mechanical hazards, noise, or the
toxic properties of substances. Other hazards result from equipment or machine failures
and misuse, control or power system failures, chemical spills and structural failures.
The conclusion of hazard identification should result in a list of hazard sources, the
particular form in which that hazard occurs, the areas of the workplace or work process
where it occurs, and the persons exposed to that hazard.

THE RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Gather information about each hazard identified. Think about how many people are
exposed to each hazard and for how long. Use the information to assess the likelihood
and consequence of each hazard and produce a qualitative risk table.
How likely is it that a hazardous event or situation will occur?

Very likely - could happen frequently

Likely - could happen occasionally
Unlikely - could happen, but only rarely
Highly unlikely - could happen, but probably never will

What might be the consequences of a hazardous event or situation?

Fatality
Major injuries (normally irreversible injury or damage to health)
Minor injuries (normally reversible injury or damage to health requiring days off
work)
Negligible injuries (first aid)

Once youve decided on the likelihood and consequence of each hazardous event or
situation, you need to rate them according to how serious the risk is. This risk table is
one way of doing this. You can use it to translate your assessments of likelihood and
consequence into levels of risk.
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QUALITATIVE RISK TABLE

Consequence

Likelihood
Very likely

Likely

Unlikely

Highly
unlikely

Fatality

High

High

High

Medium

Major injuries

High

High

Medium

Medium

Minor injuries

High

Medium

Medium

Low

Negligible injuries

Medium

Medium

Low

Low

Events or situations assessed as very likely with fatal consequences are the most serious
(HIGH risk); those assessed as highly unlikely with negligible injuries are the least serious
(LOW risk).
Note the risk rating for each hazard on a worksheet. When youre developing risk control
strategies, you should tackle anything with a HIGH rating first.

RISK CONTROL
Information or ideas on control measures can come from:

codes of practice;

industry or trade associations;

specialists;

MSDSs; and

other publications including those by manufacturers and suppliers.

The following hierarchy should be used when considering control measures.

Most Effective
elimination - removing the hazard or hazardous work practice from the workplace. This is
the most effective control measure;
Fairly Effective
substitution - substituting or replacing a hazard or hazardous work practice with a less
hazardous one;

isolation - isolating or separating the hazard or hazardous work practice from people not
involved in the work or the general work areas. This can be done by marking off
hazardous areas, installing screens or barriers;
engineering control - if the hazard cannot be eliminated, substituted or isolated, an
engineering control is the next preferred measure. This may include modifications to tools
or equipment, providing guarding to machinery or equipment;
Least Effective (Back Up Controls) - Safe work practices essential
administrative control - includes introducing work practices that reduce the risk. This
could include limiting the amount of time a person is exposed to a particular hazard; and
personal protective equipment - should be considered only when other control measures
are not practicable or to increase protection. A last resort measure.
Control measures are not mutually exclusive. That is, there may be circumstances
where more than one control measure should be used to reduce exposure to
hazards.
Risk control measures must also be maintained - for example, interlocking guards have to
be kept in working order, work procedures have to be monitored to ensure they are being
followed, and hearing protectors have to be kept clean and checked for damage. In order
to keep accurate records, a recording or reporting system should be developed,
implemented and maintained. The control of high risk activities may require procedures
which need to be strictly followed, for example, a permit-to-work system which ensures
close supervision during implementation. Maintaining risk control measures requires
adequate inspection, maintenance and monitoring procedures to secure continued
operation.

MORE SOPHISTICATED RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT (SYSTEMS

ENGINEERING) The consideration of health and safety aspects at the design and planning stages of new
plant and processes is vitally important in order to ensure that health and safety are built
in, rather than bolted on.
Many formal techniques have been developed for the systematic analysis of complex
systems. They attempt to consider all reasonable possibilities and all suffer from the
drawback that the probability of future events can only be guessed.

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
1.

HAZOP
Hazard and operability studies are useful as a hazard identification technique,
especially in connection with new designs/processes.
The technique was
developed in the chemical process industries, and essentially it is a structured,
multi-disciplinary brainstorming session involving chemists, engineers, production
management, safety advisers, designers etc., critically examining each stage of the
design/process by asking a series of what if? questions. The prime aim is to
design out risk at the early stages of a new project, rather than have to enter into
costly modifications once the process is up and running.
The brainstorming technique can be applied to any new project, to identify hazards.
At one time HAZOPs were mainly focused on fire and explosion endpoints, while
now the scope usually includes toxic release, offensive odor, and environmental
end-points. The initial establishment of purpose, objectives, and scope is very
important and should be precisely set down so that it will be clear, now and in the
future, what was and was not included in the study. These decisions need to be
made by an appropriate level of responsible management.
The end objective of a HAZOP survey is hazard identification; solutions to problems
are a separate effort.
The HAZOP studies are time consuming and expensive. Still, for processes with
significant risk, they are cost effective when balanced against the potential loss of
life, property, business, and even the future of the enterprise that may result from a
major release.

2.

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)

The kinds of failures that could happen are examined, and their effects - in terms of
maximum potential loss - are evaluated. This analysis would form part of an overall
Hazop study.
System
Scrubber

Component
Water pump

Failure Mode
Inadequate water flow

Failure Effect
Increased environmental
pollution

FMEAs are performed at the component level to determine possible ways that
equipment can fail and to determine the effect of such failures on the system. The
FMEA is used to assure that component failure modes and their effects have been
considered and either eliminated or controlled; that information for maintenance and
operational manuals has been provided; and that input to other safety analyses has
been generated.

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

Quantitative analysis uses numerical values (rather than the descriptive scales used in
qualitative analysis) for both likelihood and consequences using data from a variety of
sources.
Application of quantitative methods is usually restricted to sensitive components of a major
hazard installation.
How much analysis is worthwhile is a function of the consequence of the adverse event
and the difficulty in preventing it.
1.

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Fault tree analysis is a logical method of analysing how and why a disaster could
occur. It is a graphical technique that starts with the end event which is the accident
or disaster (e.g. nuclear fuel melt-down) and works backward to find the initiating
event or combination of events that would lead to the final event. If the probabilities
of each potential initiating event is known or can be estimated, the probability of the
end or top event can be calculated.
The fault-tree is a logic diagram based on the principle of multi-causality that traces
all the branches of events that could contribute to an accident or failure.
Data on individual components may be obtained from manufacturers reliability
statistics or quality assurance information. Specific failure rate data for individual
items can also be obtained from reliability data banks such as that operated by the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authoritys (UKAEA) System Reliability Service.
Aspects such as maintenance schedules, condition monitoring, replacement criteria
and human reliability/failure should also be taken into account.
It is a good technique for summating individual probabilities to obtain the overall
probability of the event occurring.

2.

HAZAN
Hazard analysis (HAZAN) is undertaken to ascertain the magnitude of the potential
problem and its potential for harm to the people, plant, process and the public.
A subsequent analysis will then go on to examine the actual consequences - worst
possible case considerations - and express them in quantifiable terms.
To analyse the safety of a major hazard installation as well as its potential hazards,
a hazard analysis should be carried out covering the following areas:
(a)

which toxic, reactive, explosive or flammable substances in the installation

constitute a major hazard;
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(b)

which failures or errors could cause abnormal conditions leading to a major

accident;

(c)

the consequences of a major accident for the workers, people living or

working outside the installation, or the environment;

(d)

prevention measures for accidents;

(e)

mitigation of the consequences of an accident.

The analysis should indicate:

3.

(a)

the worst events considered;

(b)

the route to those worst events;

(c)

the time-scale to lesser events which might lead to the worst events;

(d)

the size of lesser events if their development is halted;

(e)

the relative likelihood of events;

(f)

the consequences of each event.

HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS

At Three Mile Island, the operators misunderstanding of the cooling water status
led to several actions or inactions which helped result in the accident.
Human error analysis adds considerations of human performance to the hazard
evaluation process. Human behavior must be factored into reliability analysis for it
to be accurate in the increasing number of systems where errors in man-machine
interaction can be an initiating event in a disaster.
The most commonly used quantitative method for the measurement and
assessment of personnel-induced errors is the Technique for Human Error
Prediction (THERP). This procedure involves the following steps:

Identification of human activities which create a hazard

Estimation of failure rates

Effect of human failures on the system

The output of THERP is an input to fault tree or other methods of hazard analysis.
While THERP can estimate failure rates for the routine performance of tasks, it
cannot cope with error in human decisions and has difficulty with task error rates
altered by stress, as in an emergency.

SAFE SYSTEMS OF WORK

A safe system of work is a formal procedure which results from a systematic examination
of a task in order to identify all the hazards and assess the risks, and which identifies safe
methods of work to ensure that the hazards are eliminated or the remaining risks are
minimised.
Some examples where safe system will be required as part of the controls are:

Cleaning and maintenance operations

Changes to normal procedures, including layout, materials and methods

Working alone or away from the workplace and its facilities

Breakdowns and emergencies

Control of the activities of contractors in the workplace

Vehicle loading, unloading and movements

A formal analysis can be used to develop a safe system of work. Sometimes these may
be carried out as a matter of policy, with the task broken down into stages and the
precautions associated with each written into the final document. This can be used for
training new workers in the required method of work. The technique is known as job
safety analysis.
For all safety systems, there are five basic steps necessary in producing them:

Assessment of the task

Hazard identification and risk assessment and risk control (explained previously)

Identification of safe methods

Implementing the system

Monitoring the system

TASK ASSESSMENT
All aspects of the task must be looked at, and should be put in writing to ensure nothing is
overlooked. this should be done by supervisors in conjunction with workers involved, to
ensure that assumptions of supervisors about methods of work are not confounded by
reality. Account must be taken of what is used - the plant and substances, potential
failures of machinery, substances used, electrical needs of the task - sources of errors possible human failures, short cuts, emergency work - where the task is carried out -

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the working environment and its demands for protection, and how the task is carried out procedures, potential failures in work methods, frequency of the task, training needs.
SAFE METHODS
Simple written methods can be established, or a more formal method known as a permitto-work system. All of these involve setting up the task and any authorisation necessary;
planning of job sequences; specification of the approved safe working methods including
the means of getting to and from the task area if appropriate; conditions which must be
verified before work starts - atmospheric tests, machinery lockout; and
dismantling/disposal of equipment or waste at the end of the task.
IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEM
There must be adequate communication if the safe system of work is to be successful.
The details should be understood by everyone who has to work with it, and it must be
carried out on each occasion. it is important that everyone appreciates the need for the
system and its place in the accident prevention programme.
Supervisors must know that their duties include devising and maintaining safe systems of
work, and making sure they are put into operation, and revised where necessary to take
account of changed conditions or accident experience. Training is required for all
concerned, to include the necessary skills, awareness of the system and the hazards
which it is aimed to eliminate by the use of safe procedures. Part of every safe system
should be the requirement to stop work when a problem appears which is not covered by
the system, and not to resume until a safe solution has been found.
MONITORING THE SYSTEM
Effective monitoring requires that regular checks are made to make sure that the system is
still appropriate for the needs of the task, and that it is being fully complied with. Checking
only after accidents is not an acceptable form of monitoring. Simple questions are
required - do workers continue to find the system workable? Are procedures laid down
being carried out? Are the procedures still effective? Have there been any changes which
require a revision of the system? A system devised but not followed is not a safe system
of work - the reasons must be found and rectified. Safe systems of work are associates of,
not substitutes for, the stronger prevention techniques of design, guarding and other
methods which aim to eliminate the possibility of human failure.
Examples:
Safety systems of work would ensure that
workers are relocated elsewhere in an excavation while a crane lifts materials over
their work area;
a workplace is designed with a one-way circuit to avoid industrial lift trucks reversing
towards workers on site; and
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data entry operators are given other clerical duties to limit the time spent at
keyboards and to reduce the risk of occupational overuse injuries. Any relevant
regulations must be complied with. Regulations may only address part of the work,
so compliance with a regulation does not necessarily ensure a safe system of work
as required by the employers general duties.
PERMIT TO WORK
A permit to work is a formal, written authority to a tradesperson to carry out maintenance
on an item of equipment, plant or building.
It is issued by a person who is very familiar with the equipment, who knows the hazards
that may be involved in carrying out the work, who has been trained in the permit to work
system and who is authorised to issue the permit.
It is a statement by that person that the job has been assessed, that regular safety
precautions have been taken and that any special safety precautions to be taken by the
tradesperson have been clearly defined and that it is therefore safe, in the authorising
persons opinion, for the tradesperson to carry out the job.
The safe operation of equipment and plant is usually a major consideration during design
and construction. Detailed procedures are written for its operation and people are
thoroughly trained to operate the plant on a routine basis. However, maintenance,
especially breakdown maintenance, is fare from routine and is usually carried out under
pressure to get the equipment back on line.
A permit to work system is a permanent record of precautions taken for maintenance work.
Regular audits of the system will help to identify, before the event, if the people authorising
maintenance are discharging their responsibilities satisfactorily or whether they need
further training. These precautions, which require careful thought by an experienced
person before a job is authorised, give the best possible protection to a tradesperson
asked to carry out a job. Experience has shown that a permit to work system that is
effectively applied will reduce to a minimum the incidence of injuries and unusual or
dangerous occurrences during maintenance.
Finally, the system requires that a permit to work is signed off - by the tradesperson who
has completed his/her job and the person who accepts the plant back into operation after
inspecting the completed work. This much reduces the chances that plant will be restarted
with equipment that is in an unsafe condition.
To prepare plant for safety during maintenance is a serious responsibility. People given
the authority to issue permits to work need to be chosen carefully. Each person must:

have an intimate knowledge of the plant and the hazards likely to be encountered,
be they mechanical, electrical, chemical or other;

have demonstrated a responsible attitude to safety;

be a person who is prepared to admit ignorance and consult if in doubt;

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be mature and senior enough to be able to resolve the conflicts arising between the
pressure to produce and the need for safety;

be a person who can obtain the tradespersons confidence;

ideally, be drawn from the operating plant or production staff (and rarely from
maintenance staff).

A permit to work system should authorise sufficient people to ensure that production is not
adversely affected by the unavailability of people to issue permits.
At the same time, it is unlikely that most factories will have a large number of people who
will have the experience to issue the most critical of permits, e.g. permits for confined
space entry.
It is therefore logical to set up a series of levels of authorisation, with the most complex
tasks restricted to a few highly experienced staff. A suggested set of levels is:
Standard - all ordinary permits to work. No authority for hot work. Usually people at first
line supervisory level.
Standard and hot work (An activity involving a source of ignition such as welding, brazing
or spark-producing operations) - All ordinary permits to work, hot work but not entry to
confined spaces. Usually at very experienced first line supervisory level or more senior.
Full authorisation - All permits to work including entry to confined spaces. Usually at
experienced superintendent level or higher.
Regular maintenance - in some establishments there is a need for a lot of regular
maintenance much of which is recurrent. In such cases, it is possible to define in writing
the procedures needed to prepare the plant item for maintenance. Leading hands or
senior operators can be trained in the procedures and authorised to issue permit to work
for those jobs only.
It is self evident that people to be authorised to issue permits require training, preferably by
someone who has had a lot of practical experience in applying the system.
As with any safety system, it is necessary to measure and audit the permit to work system.
The auditing must

Determine that permits are issued for all maintenance jobs and that the
tradespeople are following the permit requirements 100% of the time. If permits are
selectively issued, the situation is similar to running red traffic lights late at night.
You can get away with it for some time but not for long!

Ensure the high standard of permits. Substandard permits to work are worse than
no permits at all because tradespeople will rely on them as an assurance that their
safety has been carefully considered.
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LOCKING OUT
Where the risk is not so high, but a serious injury could result if the plant were started or
valve opened, the employer could opt for a simpler procedure whereby the power to the
plant in question, or the operating handles of valves, can be locked off by the workman
doing the work and the key retained by him during the time he is doing the work. Again
special training is required to ensure that all those involved know the proper procedure. A
check may be necessary to ensure that the taught procedures are in fact followed.
INSPECTIONS
One method of identifying hazards which can be implemented quickly and effectively is a
workplace inspection.
Not everyone is an expert at inspections and the inspection team conducting a formal
hazard inspection will need guidance. Before the inspection procedures can be
implemented, a checklist is advisable.
Front line supervisors are key participants in all workplace inspections. They manage and
control the risks at the workplace interface and have a good knowledge of the equipment,
procedures, materials and people involved in the activities. They are also in the best
position to identify hazards and suggest and implement remedial actions.
However, there are benefits in having team inspections in which managers and workplace
employees participate. Management inspections demonstrate commitment to safety and
health management and focus on the broader aspects of safety and health issues,
including standard setting. The joint involvement of employees and managers helps to
build up the team spirit in problem-solving, establishing ownership of safety and health
matters in the workplace.
There are a number of types of inspections:

statutory - for compliance with safety and health legislation;

safety and health officer inspections;

executive - senior management tours;

scheduled - planned at appropriate intervals, by supervisors;
For any inspection, knowledge of the plant or facility is required, also knowledge of
applicable regulations, standards and codes of practice.
The outcome of the inspection procedure should be a list of actions clearly identifying who
is responsible in the organisation for that proposed action. Reasonable timeframes should
be agreed upon for actions required.
When preventive actions are put in place, these actions should be recorded to complete
the cycle of the inspection procedure and to allow for subsequent follow-up. Follow up is
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essential to ensure that suggested controls have been put in place and to assess the
effectiveness of those controls.
CHECKLISTS
Whether the activity is called workplace inspection or safety audit, when required to
critically assess the workplace from the health and safety viewpoint, many people feel
more secure if they can use a checklist.
The advantages of using well designed checklists are that they can:

provide an aid to memory to ensure that important items of equipment or machinery,

or aspects of work processes, are not overlooked;

enable a standardised approach to workplace inspection; and

underpin a system of accountability for safety and health management by providing

some of the records necessary for performance assessment.

Before any checklist is first used, some thought needs to be given to: (1) how the checklist
is to be applied; and (2) the checklists content. Its trial use will further contribute to
ensuring a good result.
The inspection checklist should be tailored to the specific needs of the organisation and
designed in such a way as to allow for a systematic walkthrough from one work area to the
next.
The checklist should not limit the inspection procedure to a tick-the-box exercise. Indeed
it is advisable to have an additional inspection worksheet to note details of specific
hazards, as the following example shows.

ITEM

HAZARD AND SOURCE

COMMENTS

Pizza oven

Possible burns when taking food

out

Has happened frequently.

Should use gloves

Such details then can be considered in terms of likelihood and consequences and entered
into a Qualitative Risk Table.
AUDITS
An audit is a full examination and report of the status of some aspect of an organisation.
Like inspections, audits are a proactive system to provide indicators that the risks within
the organisation are being effectively controlled and that the Safety and Health Policy is
achieving its objectives.
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You can structure a safety audit in various ways depending on the objective - from a full
scale audit of an operations safety management systems (using the WorkSafe Plan), to a
mini-audit of a specific unit or work area. Alternatively, it can be used to check on
particular aspects of workplace hazard control such as fire protection, electrical safety.
Workplace Audits
Which workplace features are reviewed during the audit will vary with the type of location.
The following examples cover some aspects which are common to most locations and
which feature frequently in audits.

Fire-fighting facilities

Slip and trip hazards and surface finishes

Ladders and stairways

Safety apparatus

Design of workplaces used by different groups of people

Manual handling activities

use of hand tools

Adequacy of lighting

Warning notices

Emergency arrangements

Incorporation of ergonomic principles

Accessibility of areas for

Management of chemicals, flammables and similar hazardous substances.

operating activities
maintenance work
emergency activities

Procedures Audit
The major activities in a workplace safety procedures audit are:
1.

Identification of what procedures exist (or should exist);

2.

Evaluation of those procedures

-

are they in place?

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are people aware of them?

are they being complied with?
are they adequate?

These audit activities can be used to examine:

(a)
(b)
(c)

general operating procedures.

maintenance procedures.
emergency procedures.

The WHAT IF ...? technique is useful for assessing maintenance and emergency
procedures.
Checklists are the time-honoured method of safety auditing. They may be
invaluable when carrying out special audits of items such as electrical equipment,
fire fighting equipment and machinery. They are part of normal maintenance
systems safety checks. However, checklists can be a barrier to an effective safety
audit if they are used without the WHAT IF ... technique.
The areas covered in your safety procedures audit can include the following:

Operating procedures - correctness, up-to-dateness, application and

operators understanding.

Safety equipment - checks, performance, identification, application and

operators understanding.

Permit systems - procedures, application and checks.

Housekeeping and orderliness.

Contingency plans - procedures, equipment, preparedness, operators

knowledge of and understanding, checks and practices.

Training - content, methods, extent, levels, comprehension testing and

reinforcement.

Incident investigation - systems, findings, follow-up.

Contractors - training, procedures, checks and performance

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