What The Nikayas Say About Nibbana

BSRV 26.
1 (2009) 3366
doi: 10.1558/bsrv.v26i1.33
Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897

Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (online) 1747-9681
What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about

Nibbna1
Bhikkhu Brahmli
Bodhinyana Buddhist Monastery, Perth, Australia
ven.brahmali@gmail.com
The only way of moving towards consensus on the controversial subject of

the nature of Nibbna is by appealing to the sole source of authority common to practically all Buddhists: the Nikyas/gamas. In the present paper
I will first give an overview of the usage of the term Nibbna in the Nikyas.
I will then argue that, according to the Nikyas, Nibbna cannot be regarded as a self. Next, I will point out that the Nikyas do not see Nibbna as
a form of consciousness, including such exceptional kinds of consciousness
as anidassana via and appatihita via. Nor can Nibbna be
regarded as equivalent to mind, or any particular state of mind. In the final
section I aim to show that the most reasonable interpretation of the Nikyas
is that final Nibbna is no more than the cessation of the five khandhas.
Introduction
Nibbna is the goal of Buddhist practice. As such it is only natural that there is
great interest in understanding what it might mean to achieve it. At the same
time, Nibbna is the most profound of Buddhist concepts. It is perhaps not surprising then that the concept of Nibbna has given rise to a large number of interpretations, some based on meditative experience and others on scriptural study and
logical deduction, and that many of them are mutually contradictory.2
Given this confusing situation, the purpose of the present paper is to try to pin
down what the Buddha himself meant by Nibbna. The only satisfactory way of
achieving this is to turn to the suttas, for it is the suttas that are the final arbiter
in any Dhamma dispute:
Suppose a monk were to say: ... this is the Dhamma, this is the discipline (vinayo),
1 I have benefited from the kindness of Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi and Prof. Peter Harvey who both
offered their careful comments and invaluable suggestions on a draft version of the present
paper. Despite our disagreement on certain issues, the paper is considerably improved as
a result of their generosity. My thanks are also due to a number of monks at Bodhinyana
Monastery for their proofreading.
2 I will provide references for these interpretations during the course of the paper.
Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009, Unit 6, The Village, 101 Amies Street, London SW11 2JW
34
What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

this is the Masters teaching, then, monks, you should neither approve nor disapprove his words. Then, without approving or disapproving, his words and expressions should be carefully noted and compared with the Suttas and reviewed in light
of the discipline. If they, on such comparison and review, are found not to conform
to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is not the
word of the Buddha, it has been wrongly understood by this monk, and the matter
is to be rejected. But where on such comparison and review they are found to conform to the Suttas or the discipline, the conclusion must be: Assuredly this is the
word of the Buddha, it has been rightly understood by this monk. (DN II 124)3
In the following discussion on the nature of Nibbna I will therefore base my

argument, as far as possible, on the complete contents of the Nikyas.4 More specifically, I will inquire into the relationship between att, via and citta on the
one hand and Nibbna on the other. An understanding of this relationship, as I
intend to show, is critical for a proper understanding of Nibbna. In the final section of this paper, I will discuss Nibbna itself in greater detail. But to prepare the
ground for the ensuing discussion, it is necessary first of all to take a preliminary
look at how the suttas employ the term Nibbna.
An initial investigation into the referents of the term Nibbna

There are three frequently mentioned referents of Nibbna: (1) Nibbna as the
destruction of lust, hatred and delusion upon the attainment of arahant-ship;
(2) Nibbna as the state that occurs after the death of the arahant; and (3) Nibbna
as the object of consciousness in a special kind of samdhi. I will briefly discuss
each one of these in turn.
(1) Whenever Nibbna is defined in the suttas, it is always in the same way: The
destruction of lust, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion: this,
friend, is called Nibbna.5 It is sometimes argued that this destruction only refers
to the actual event of becoming an arahant (Harvey 1995, 182185). However,
since the destruction is permanent it would seem more likely that Nibbna here
refers to the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion as a general and fundamental
characteristic of arahant-ship.6 Moreover, the event of becoming an arahant, that
3. Most of the quotes found in this paper are taken from existing translations (see the
bibliography at the end of this paper). Occasionally, where existing translations did not seem
satisfactory, I have supplied my own. I have indicated all such instances. I have sometimes
supplied Pali words and phrases for clarification.
4. With the exception of most of the Khuddaka-nikya. I use the terms suttas and Nikyas
throughout this paper to refer to the four main Nikyas of the Pali Canon, the Vinaya-piaka
and some of the works of the Khuddaka-nikya, specifically the Udna, the Itivuttaka, the
Dhammapada and the Theragth. I have also occasionally consulted parallel passages in the
Chinese Buddhist Canon.
5. See in particular SN IV 251 and SN IV 261, but cf. also SN IV 362373, SN V 8, SN V 2527 and AN I
158159.
6. This would thus include the actual event of becoming an arahant. As pointed out by Harvey
1995, 183, at SN IV 252 arahant-ship is explicitly defined as the destruction of lust, hatred and
delusion. This shows the close relationship between Nibbna and arahant-ship in general.
Harvey tries to show at some length that Nibbna here refers to the event of attaining arahantship, not an aspect of the general state of arahant-ship. His first argument is that the Pali
terminology points to an event rather than an ongoing reality. Without going into detail, it
seems to me that the terminology is open to either interpretation, but most likely it refers
to both. His second and main argument is based on the fact that Nibbna is the end of dukkha
Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009
Bhikkhu Brahmli
35
is the final destruction of the defilements, is presumably instantaneous: either

one is an arahant or one is not. But the narrow focus on momentary events, usually known as mind moments, is a characteristic of the Abhidhamma and later Pali
literature, not the suttas. The suttas normally refer to realities that are extended
in time. That this is the case also for the Nibbna attained at arahant-ship is clear
from the following passages:
When lust is abandoned (rge pahne) when hatred is abandoned when delusion is abandoned one does not intend for ones own affliction, for the affliction of
others, or for the affliction of both and one does not experience mental pain and
dejection. It is in this way, brahmin, that Nibbna is visible in this very life.
(AN I 159, my translation)
Not intending for ones own or others affliction, and not experiencing mental pain and dejection, cannot be momentary. Nor can Nibbna be momentary in
the following description:
And what, monks, is the Nibbna element with residue remaining? Here, a monk is
an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the holy life, done what
had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed the
fetters of existence, one completely liberated through final knowledge. However, his
five senses remain unimpaired, by which he still experiences what is agreeable and
disagreeable, still feels pleasure and pain. It is the destruction of lust, hatred, and
delusion in him that is called the Nibbna element with residue remaining. (It 38)
Thus I take Nibbna in the above definition to refer to that unchanging and
permanent aspect of the general state of arahant-ship which is the destruction
of lust, hatred and delusion.7 In this sense Nibbna is an ever-present reality for
the arahant.8 Moreover, since the destruction of the three root defilements is the
standard Nikya explanation of Nibbna, it seems reasonable to assume that whenever Nibbna is used without further qualification it refers to this aspect of the
state of arahant-ship. This will be my assumption throughout this paper.
whereas the arahant still has some dukkha remaining and thus the general state of arahantship cannot be called Nibbna. But Nibbna at arahant-ship is called Nibbna with residue
remaining (It 38), the residue being the experience of what is agreeable and disagreeable
pleasure and pain (dukkha). It seems clear enough, therefore, that the presence of a residue of
suffering does not bar the absence of lust, hatred and delusion in an arahant from being called
Nibbna.
7. The literal meaning of Nibbna is extinguishment. (Alternatively, Nibbna could perhaps be
translated as extinction. However, extinction has such negative connotations in English
connotations that obviously do not pertain to Nibbna that extinguishment seems more
appropriate). Nibbna as the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion is therefore simply the
permanent extinguishing of these three defilements. In fact, Nibbna is a relative term in
the suttas, its precise connotation depending on what is being extinguished. At AN IV 454
each jhna and each immaterial attainment is said to be provisional Nibbna (nibbna
pariyyena). Non-provisional Nibbna is reached at arahant-ship, and final Nibbna at the
death of the arahant (see below). In each case something is extinguished (either temporarily
or permanently): in first jhna the five hindrances and the five senses are temporarily
extinguished, in the second jhna vitakka-vicra etc.. At final Nibbna all five aggregates are
permanently extinguished.
8. The arahants destruction of lust, hatred and delusion is unconditioned, since it is permanent.
For this reason Nibbna is also known as asakhata, not conditioned.
36
(2) Occasionally Nibbna is used to describe the state that occurs after the
death of an arahant:
And what, monks, is the Nibbna element without residue remaining? Here a monk
is an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, who has lived the holy life, done
what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached his own goal, utterly destroyed
the fetters of existence, one completely liberated through final knowledge. For
him, here in this very life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool
right here [i.e. at death]. That, monks, is called the Nibbna element without residue remaining. (It 38)
In the following I will refer to this as final Nibbna.9 In the suttas, only very
rarely does the word Nibbna unambiguously refer to final Nibbna.10
(3) In a few places the suttas mention a type of samdhi that is attainable only
by ariyas:11
Just as, friend, in a burning wood-fire, one flame arises and another flame ceases,
so too the cessation of existence is Nibbna, the cessation of existence is Nibbna
(bhavanirodho nibbna, bhavanirodho nibbnan ti), one perception (sa) arose in
me, friend, and another perception ceased, the cessation of existence is Nibbna;
and yet, on that occasion I was percipient (sa). (AN V 910, my translation)
This samdhi is sometimes said to take Nibbna as its object,12 i.e. taking the
equivalent of final Nibbna as its object. However, I cannot see how this explanation can be correct. Final Nibbna by definition is other than sasra, which
means it is other than the six sense bases and their six corresponding classes
of objects. In the Nikyas, consciousness is always defined by the object it takes
9. Note that my emphasis in this paper is not on final Nibbna as the event of the death of the
arahant but on that which happens beyond the arahants death.
10. In fact, it seems difficult to find any unambiguous references apart from the one quoted
here.
11. That it is attainable by all ariyas is the commentarial interpretation. In contrast to this, a
verse at AN I 133 seems to say that this samdhi the perception in this samdhi is given as
This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is Nibbna, but it seems to be equivalent to the one
quoted above is attainable only by arahants, i.e. one who has crossed over birth and old
age, atri so jtijaran ti. Whatever the correct interpretation, the broader argument remains
unaffected.
12. For instance in the Paramatthadpan-k: eva suatdinma nibbna rammaa katv
pavattni maggaphalnipi rammaavasenapi suatdinma labhati, Thus having made
Nibbna, which is called emptiness etc., the object, the resulting path and fruit obtain the
name emptiness etc. on account of the object. It is noteworthy that this statement is found
in a modern (19th century) commentarial work. In his translation and explanation of the
Abhidhammattha Sagaha, in which he refers extensively to the above mentioned k, Bodhi
(1993, 363) states that: the attainment of fruition (phalasampatti) is a meditative attainment
by which a noble disciple enters into supramundane absorption with Nibbna as object.
It is difficult to ascertain with any precision when the idea of Nibbna as an object of
consciousness first appears in Pali literature. It might be claimed that it appears already in
the Canonical Abhidhamma where the asakhatadhtu is included in the dhammyatana (Vibh
72). However, the asakhatadhtu is then defined in exactly the same way as in the suttas,
namely, as the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion (Vibh 73). There is no indication that
Nibbna is an existing entity which is taken as a direct object of consciousness. Exactly how
the commentaries understand Nibbna is also a moot point. I am not able to discuss this here,
since it would be a major study in itself to trace the historical development of how Nibbna is
understood in Pali literature.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
37
and consequently there are precisely six classes of consciousness. For Nibbna to
be an object of consciousness, an entirely new class of consciousness would be
required, going beyond the established Nikya taxonomy.13
Indeed, the above quote contains sufficient pointers to make it unlikely that
this is a direct reference to Nibbna. Firstly, perception is specifically said to be
present. As in the case of consciousness, perception in the suttas is restricted to six
classes, all of which are bound up with sasra (SN III 63). There is no room for a
direct perception of Nibbna in this system of classification. Secondly, the perceptions are said to arise and cease, one after the other. Arising and ceasing is a characteristic of sasra, not Nibbna: Nibbna is specifically said to be stable (dhuva; SN
IV 370). One would expect a samdhi that takes Nibbna as its object to be stable,
much like the stability of perception found in other deep states of samdhi.14
I would therefore propose an alternative interpretation of this passage. It is
not Nibbna as such, but a perception that is based on the ariyas direct knowledge
of the nature of Nibbna. That is, it is not a perception of Nibbna but a perception about Nibbna.15 For convenience I will refer to this samdhi as ariya-samdhi
in the remainder of this paper.16
Of these three referents of the term Nibbna, the first one is relatively straightforward: it refers to the arahants state of having extinguished all defilements.17
In Nikya usage this is the usual meaning of Nibbna. The third referent, ariyasamdhi, does not seem to be a direct reference to Nibbna at all, but a particular
13. Nibbna cannot simply be classified as a mind object with the corresponding consciousness
being mind-consciousness since all mind objects and their corresponding objects are said
to be impermanent and suffering; see eg. SN IV 25. Indeed, the Salyatana-sayutta contains
a large number of suttas that directly state that mental phenomena (dhammas) are suffering.
These statements often have an almost equational quality. And there is no clear statement
anywhere in the suttas that there are any exceptions to this. In fact the six senses together
with their six objects are called the all (SN IV 15), clearly indicating that there are no further
senses or sense objects apart from these. These statements taken together make it impossible,
to my mind, to accept the idea of Nibbna as a mind object cognized by mind-consciousness.
(The post-canonical literature, however, sometimes seems to take a different position, see
e.g. the Milindapaha, p.270).
14. Deep states of samdhi, in particular the jhnas, consist of completely stable and uninterrupted
perceptions, until one emerges.
15. This interpretation hinges on understanding bhavanirodho nibbna to be an equational
sentence: the cessation of existence is Nibbna. On this reading, the expression is clearly an
idea about Nibbna, not a direct reference to it. If instead one were to translate this phrase as two
words in apposition, the cessation of existence, Nibbna, then this would be a direct reference to
Nibbna and one would have to conclude that the phrase concerns a direct perception of Nibbna.
There are other suttas (AN I 132-33, AN V 7-8 and three suttas at AN V 318-22), however, that
speak of the same sort of samdhi but whose interpretation is unambiguous. In these suttas
the relevant perception is given as this is peaceful, this is sublime, that is Nibbna (eta
santa, eta pata, yad ida nibbnan ti). Here the wording is such i.e. the verb to be
is required that there can be no doubt that we are dealing with a sentence not just words
in apposition. It seems quite clear, therefore, that this concerns a perception of an idea, an
idea about Nibbna i.e. this is peaceful, this is sublime not a direct experience of Nibbna.
From this it is necessary to conclude that the expression bhavanirodho nibbna should also
be understood as a sentence, not just two words in apposition.
16. This is equivalent to what the commentaries call phalasampatti/phalasampatti-samdhi; see
Mp V 2, 23 and Mp V 80, 14.
17. Extinguishment being the literal meaning of Nibbna (see footnote 7 above).
38
perception based on the full understanding of what Nibbna is. It is the second
referent that which supervenes at the death of an arahant which is the most
profound and most often misunderstood. It is Nibbna in this sense, final Nibbna,
which will be the main focus of this paper.
Is final Nibbna a permanent self?

It is not uncommon to come across attempts to justify the existence of an att (in
the sense of a permanent self) using the Buddhas teachings and the claim that
the end of the Buddhist path is the freeing of this att from suffering.18 But the
evidence quoted to support such claims is often weak, and it frequently relies on
sutta quotes whose interpretation is difficult.
So let us go through some of the Buddhas more straightforward statements
concerning att:
Whether there is an arising of Tathgatas or no arising of Tathgatas, that element
still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, that
all formations (sakhr) are impermanent ... that all formations are suffering ...
that all things (dhamm) are non-self. (AN I 286)19
I would suggest that the Buddha uses dhamm in the last phrase to counter any
misunderstanding that there might be an att outside of conditioned phenomena
(sakhr). In this context consider the following:
Monks, as far as there are things (dhamm) conditioned (sakhat) or not conditioned (asakhat), dispassion (virgo) is reckoned best of those things, that is to
say ... Nibbna. (AN II 34, my translation)
Dhamma is thus a wider term than sakhra. It includes anything that might fall
outside of conditioned phenomena, in particular Nibbna.20
Another way of making the same point is as follows:
Bhikkhus, you may well cling to that doctrine of self (attavdupdna updiyetha)
that would not arouse sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who
clings to it. But do you see any such doctrine of self, bhikkhus? No, venerable
sir. Good, bhikkhus. I too do not see any doctrine of self that would not arouse
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who clings to it. (MN I 137)
Clinging causes suffering because the object of clinging sooner or later changes.
If there were such a thing as a permanent self, clinging to it would not give rise to
suffering, and the Buddha would not have seen any problem with such clinging.21
18. See Harvey 1995, 1719 for a short survey of such attempts, followed by a critique of them.
Other than Harveys references, there has also been the suggestion that the anatt doctrine
is a strategy of spiritual development that is not meant as a metaphysical position on the
existence of an att (hnissaro, 1993).
19. The translation is based on Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhis translation of a similar passage at SN II 25.
20 See also Norman 1991, 207.
21 This does not mean that one may cling to Nibbna. The puthujjana by definition knows nothing
but the five khandhas. Since he does not know what Nibbna is he cannot possibly cling to it.
(He could perhaps cling to some idea of Nibbna, but such an idea would still be included
within the five khandhas.) Once one becomes a stream-enterer, i.e. once one understands the
Dhamma, one knows that the nature of Nibbna is such that it cannot be clung to (see the last
section of this paper).
Bhikkhu Brahmli
39
But the fact is that the Buddha did not recommend any sort of clinging:
When, Ngita, one dwells contemplating the rise and fall in regard to the five
aggregates affected by clinging, repulsiveness in respect of clinging (updne
pikklyat) is established. (AN III 32, my translation)
In fact, the suttas do not lack clear denials of final Nibbna being a permanent
self:
Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and
established, then this standpoint for views, namely, This is self, this the world;
after death I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change; I shall
endure as long as eternity would it not be an utterly and completely foolish
teaching? (MN I 138)
Then the Blessed One took up a little lump of cow-dung in his hand and said to
that bhikkhu: Bhikkhu, there is not even this much individual existence (attabhvapailbho) that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, and that will
remain the same just like eternity itself. If there was this much individual existence
that was permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, this living of the holy
life for the complete cessation of suffering could not be discerned. (SN III 144) 22
It is, nanda, because it is empty (suam) of self and of what belongs to self that
it is said, Empty is the world. (SN IV 54)
There is no permanent att in or outside of the five khandhas:

Friends, I do not speak of form as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from form.
I do not speak of feeling as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from feeling. I do
not speak of perception as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from perception. I
do not speak of volitional formations as I am, nor do I speak of I am apart from
volitional formations. I do not speak of consciousness as I am, nor do I speak of
I am apart from consciousness. (SN III 130)
Bhikkhus, I am is a conceiving (maitam); I am this is a conceiving; ...
Conceiving is a disease, conceiving is a tumour, conceiving is a dart. Therefore,
bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: We will dwell with a mind devoid of
conceiving. Bhikkhus, I am is a perturbation (ijitam) a palpitation (phanditam)
a proliferation (papacitam) an involvement with conceit (mnagatam) We
will dwell with a mind in which conceit has been struck down. (SN IV 202)
The arahant knows of no permanent att: With the fading away of ignorance
and the arising of true knowledge, I am does not occur to him; I am this does
not occur to him (SN III 47). If arahants discovered their true att, would it not
occur to them that I am and I am this?
Is final Nibbna a form of consciousness?

It is sometimes argued that even if there is no att, the purpose of the Buddhist
training is to attain a permanent form of consciousness (via).23 But if there
22. There is no reason to see the denial here of individual existence as implying the existence of
a universal self or any other non-individual permanent entity.
23. See in particular Harvey 1995, 198214 and Johansson 1969, 111. Harvey does not in fact use
the words permanent consciousness in describing final Nibbna. Instead, he says final Nibbna
is a stopped discernment (Harvey 1995, 201; discernment being Harveys translation of
via) or consciousness beyond time (208). (He also argues that this timeless Nibbna
40
were such a thing as a permanent consciousness devoid of suffering, that would

be precisely the sort of phenomenon that the Buddha would describe as a self: it
is the characteristics of impermanence and suffering that make the description
of something as att impossible.24 If this argument is accepted, it follows that
the idea of a permanent consciousness that is anatt is inherently self-contradictory.25
It might also be noted here that the mere absence of the thought or perception I am in certain states of deep samdhi does not mean that by attaining those
states one has penetrated the Buddhas teaching of anatt. When one emerges
from these states the notion I am will reappear, often taking that very state of
samdhi as its object.26 As long as the underlying tendency to the view I am has
can be periodically experienced by the arahant during life, 208). But the idea that nirodha can
be understood as a stopped state rather than just cessation is not supported by the use of
nirodha in the Nikyas. Wherever its meaning is unambiguous it means ending, cessation;
there is never any sense that it refers to a state.
To make his point Harvey also employs the double meaning in English of the word stopped.
For him a stopped discernment is thus a consciousness that stands still, continuing without
change, not a consciousness that has ended. In Pali, however, nirodha/niruddha has no such
double meaning, it only means stopped as in ceased or ended.

As for Harveys use of the phrase consciousness beyond time, as opposed to permanent
consciousness, it is difficult to see that it makes any difference. As a general tool of
interpretation, it seems clear that the Nikyas cannot possibly refute every single formulation
that constitutes a contradiction to their outlook. In many cases, such as the present one, one
has to make reasonable assumptions as to the implications of the suttas statements. As far
as I can see, a consciousness beyond time would for all practical purposes be the same as a
permanent consciousness, since it is change that gives rise to a perception of time. Moreover,
since Nibbna is specifically said to be dhuva, stable (SN IV 370), which in the suttas is used
as a synonym for nicca, permanent, the idea of consciousness beyond time as opposed to
permanent consciousness seems to be a red herring. (Editor: though, beyond the Nikyas, we
see that Dhammasaga 1416 and Milindapaha 270 and 323 say that Nibbna is neither past,
present nor future. The meaning of this is a matter of debate.)
24. See in particular the Paca Sutta (which is identical to the Anattalakkhaa Sutta) at SN III 6668.
This does not mean that Nibbna is a permanent self, since Nibbna is not a phenomenon. See
the last section of this paper for why this is so.
25. Again, since Nibbna is entirely different from consciousness (or any of the five khandhas),
this does not mean that Nibbna is not anatt.
26. Deep states of samdhi will be particularly attractive to grasp as a self because of their qualities
of peace, stability, contentment, bliss, etc. If one has not heard or properly understood the
Buddhas teachings, it seems there will be an almost irresistible pull towards seeing these
states as ones true att.

An interesting passage in this context is found at DN II 6668. Here the Buddha asks the
following semi-rhetorical question: Where nothing at all is felt, could there be any sense of
I am with reference to that (tattha)? (DN II 67, 19). From the subsequent conversation it is
clear that the correct answer is no and therefore that such a state cannot be regarded as a
self.
Harvey (1995, 31) seems to interpret this to mean that if there is no experience of I am at
the time one abides in a particular state, i.e. that there is no self-awareness in that state, then
that is sufficient to show that that state cannot be regarded as a permanent self. If this were
correct, then any deep state of samdhi, during which there is no perception I am, could also
not be taken as a self. Yet, as I have argued above, it is perfectly possible to regard such states
as an att once one emerges from them.

But the passage at DN II 6668 does not have to be interpreted as Harvey does. Its interpretation hinges on the import of the word tattha, which Harvey translates as there. But, as
is implied in my translation above, tattha frequently has a locative sense, meaning in this
Bhikkhu Brahmli
41
not been abandoned, the perception I am will always return in spite of such
periods of temporary absence.27
Let us now turn to what the Buddha said about consciousness:
Is consciousness (via) permanent or impermanent? Impermanent, venerable sir. Is what is impermanent suffering or happiness? Suffering, venerable
sir. Is what is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded
thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self? No, venerable sir. (SN III 67)
For in many discourses I have stated consciousness to be dependently arisen
(paiccasamuppanna) since without a condition there is no origination of consciousness. (MN I 259)
And what are the conditions for the arising of the various types of consciousness?
Bhikkhus, consciousness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent upon
which it arises. When consciousness arises dependent on eye and forms, it is
reckoned as eye-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on ear and
sounds, it is reckoned as ear-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on nose and odours, it is reckoned as nose-consciousness; when consciousness
arises dependent on tongue and flavours, it is reckoned as tongue-consciousness;
when consciousness arises dependent on body and tangibles, it is reckoned as
body-consciousness; when consciousness arises dependent on mind and mindobjects, it is reckoned as mind-consciousness. (MN I 259)
In fact, by definition, consciousness exists only together with its object of

cognition:
It cognises, it cognises (vijnti), friend; that is why consciousness (vian)
is said. What does it cognise? It cognises: [This is] pleasant; it cognises: [This is]
painful; it cognises: [This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant. It cognises, it cognises, friend; that is why consciousness is said.28 (MN I 292)
Objectless consciousness does not exist:

Feeling, perception and consciousness, friend these states are conjoined
(sasah), not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from
the others in order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels,
that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises.29 (MN I 293)
case, about this, with reference to this. If this is the intended meaning also in the present
case, then the passage means there can be no sense of I am with reference to that state. In
other words, one is incapable of taking that state as a permanent self even after one emerges
from it, which is precisely what one would expect of a state where nothing at all is felt,
where nothing at all is experienced.
27. For the underlying tendency to the view and conceit I am (asm ti dihimnnusaya), see
MN I 47.
28. This statement seems to be absolute. No allowance is made for a stopped consciousness.
29. In other words, at the very least feeling together with some sort of perception, no matter
how subtle, would be the object of consciousness. Usually the situation would be much more
complex, but feeling and perception would always be present with consciousness.
I will discuss passages that may seem to refer to an objectless consciousness in the section
below on unestablished consciousness and in the last part of this paper.
42
Of the five aggregates, it is most commonly via that is grasped as a self

because, although all the other mental factors change continuously, consciousness or awareness can appear to be an independent, unchanging, and everpresent reality. But as we have already seen, the Buddha said that consciousness
is impermanent. Indeed, there is no such thing as a permanent consciousness:
Consciousness that is permanent (nicca), stable (dhuva),30 eternal (sassata),
not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I
too say that it does not exist. (SN III 139)
There is no consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change,
and that will remain the same just like eternity itself.31 (SN III 144)
Indeed, the eightfold path leads to the ending of consciousness, not to a state
of permanent consciousness:
With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of consciousness
(vianirodho). This noble eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of
consciousness.32 (SN III 64)
Bhikkhus, whatever desire there is for consciousness, whatever lust, delight, craving abandon it. Thus that consciousness will be abandoned, cut off at the root,
made like a palm stump, obliterated (anabhvakata) so that it is no more subject
to future arising. (SN III 161)
By the utter destruction of delight in existence,
By the extinction of perception and consciousness (sa-via-sakhay),
By the cessation and appeasement of feelings:
It is thus, friend, that I know for beings
Emancipation, release, seclusion. (SN I 3)
The body disintegrated, perception ceased,
All feelings were utterly consumed,
Mental activities were extinguished
And consciousness came to an end (attham agam 33). (Ud 93)34
It seems clear, then, that final Nibbna is not a state of consciousness. But if
this is so, how is one to understand some of the exotic forms of consciousness
30. Nibbna is specifically said to be dhuva at SN IV 370, in direct contrast to how via is
described here. This seems to rule out any link between final Nibbna and consciousness.
31. It is hard to imagine a statement more explicit and clear than this one that a permanent
consciousness does not exist. There is no consciousness that is stable (dhuva) is again in
direct contrast to the description of Nibbna at SN IV 370.
32. Again, pace Harvey, nirodha means ceased in the Nikyas. There is no place where it
unambiguously refers to a (stopped) state.
33. Johansson (1969, 77) suggests gone to rest and gone home as translations of attham agam.
But the only meaning in the Nikyas of attha-gam and its cognate forms is come to an end.
See in particular CPD which lists disappear, cease, destroyed, gone out of existence and
annihilated and DP which adds end. (Though attha-gam is also used for the setting of the
sun, the sun doesnt go home or go to rest; but it certainly disappears, at least temporarily.
If there were any other clear cases where such metaphors were used of the sun, then perhaps
go home could be accepted as a rendering.)
34. This passage describes the final Nibbna of the arahant Dabba Mallaputta.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
43
sometimes mentioned in the suttas, which some commentators take as equivalent to final Nibbna?35
Anidassana via, non-manifest consciousness36

One often discussed passage which only occurs twice in the Pali Canon refers
to a form of consciousness known as anidassana via:37
Where do earth, water, fire and air no footing find?
Where are long and short, small and great, fair and foul
Where do name-and-form wholly cease?
And the answer is:
Where consciousness is non-manifesting (via anidassana), boundless
(ananta), all-luminous (sabbato pabha38),
Thats where earth, water, fire and air find no footing,
There both long and short, small and great, fair and foul
There name-and-form wholly cease.
With the cessation of consciousness this all ceases. (DN I 223)39
Consciousness non-manifesting (via anidassana), boundless (ananta), allluminous (sabbato-pabha). (MN I 329)
35. See references below.
36. Harveys translation, non-manifestive, by which he means that nothing can appear on or
in this consciousness (1995, 206), in my opinion stretches the meaning of anidassana beyond
what is reasonable. At the very least such a meaning would require a causative construction
and probably something more involved (e.g. the consciousness with which nothing else
manifests), not just the simple adjective. The straightforward meaning of anidassana via
is that the consciousness itself is non-manifest.

Harvey supports his understanding by referring to a passage at MN I 127 where anidassana,
together with arp, is used to describe space: no picture can be drawn on space (ksa) since
it is anidassana and arp. But one cannot deduce the exact meaning of anidassana simply by
giving it the meaning best suited to the simile. If this were possible then arp would also
mean non-manifestive (in Harveys sense of the word), which it clearly does not.
It also seems worth noting that this consciousness must be non-manifest with reference to
something; that is, it is a relative non-manifestation, not an absolute one. At the very least it
is not non-manifest for the person who experiences it.
37. For example in Harvey 1995, 199-201; amoli 2001, 1249; Johansson 1969, 76.
38. Although the PTS version at DN I 223 has the reading paha, I understand the correct reading
here to be pabha. The reading paha seems to be unique to the Sinhalese tradition and is
explained by Norman (1992: 189) as likely to be an error in the Sinhalese scribal tradition,
where ha and bha are very similar and easily confused. Moreover, the reading pabha also
seems to be the basis for the Chinese version of this sutta, which has a reading meaning
shining (T I 102c17).
39. Kattha po ca pahav tejo vyo na gdhati
Kattha dgha ca rassa ca au thla subhsubha,
Kattha nma ca rpa ca asesa uparujjhat ti
Tatra veyykaraa bhavati:
Via anidassana ananta sabbato pabha
Ettha po ca pahav tejo vyo na gdhati,
Ettha dgha ca rassa ca au thla subhsubha
Ettha nma ca rpa ca asesa uparujjhati,
Viassa nirodhena ettheta uparujjhat ti.
(My translation, based on Walshe 1995).
44
It has been suggested that anidassana via refers to a state of consciousness that is equivalent to final Nibbna (e.g. Harvey 1995, 201),40 but in light of
the discussion of via in the previous section, such an interpretation is untenable. However, to establish the correct interpretation of anidassana via is
far from easy. Firstly, in the whole Pali Canon the expression anidassana via
only appears in the above two passages.41 Secondly, Pali verse is notoriously difficult to translate: the correct Pali reading is often difficult to establish and poetic
licence etc. can complicate matters further.42 Moreover, as in poetry in general,
the exact meaning of Pali verse is often vague as its emphasis is on appealing
to emotion and intuition rather than on making precise doctrinal statements.43
Finally, Pali verse often contains rare words and phrases that sometimes occur
nowhere else in the tipiaka.44
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, and to show that there are other
interpretations of anidassana via that are just as good as or even better than
that of a permanent consciousness, I shall put forward an alternative interpretation. To this end, it is necessary to analyse the above quotes in more detail.
The first thing to note is that, due to the qualifiers ananta and pabh, anidassana
via is described in a way that resembles the description of certain states of
samdhi. Ananta is closely connected to samdhi, and it is specifically used in the
40. Again, Harvey calls it a consciousness beyond time. However, as I have explained above,
I cannot see how this in practice is distinguishable from a permanent consciousness Moreover,
Nibbna is itself called dhuva, permanent.
Harvey also argues that this consciousness can be attained by the arahant while he is still alive.
41. Only two seemingly identical occurrences in the entire Pali Canon makes anidassana via
a marginal concept. This in itself is a sufficient argument to set this expression aside and not
allow it to affect our understanding of the relationship between via and final Nibbna.
Apart from its use with via, anidassana is also found on its own, specifically at MN I 127,
36; DN III 217, 23 and SN IV 370, 12. In the last of these three, anidassana is used as a description
of Nibbna. But this does not mean that the word anidassana is equivalent to Nibbna. Of the
altogether 32 synonyms for Nibbna found at SN IV 368373, a large number are ordinary
everyday words which are much more frequently encountered in contexts other than that of
Nibbna. In other words, just because anidassana is used as a synonym for Nibbna at SN IV 370
does not in any way mean that it is not used with very different connotations elsewhere.
42. See Warder 2001, viii and Bodhi 2000, 13. The following passage in Norman 1996, 157, commenting
on the difficulty in translating Pali verse, is particularly instructive: When John Brough, one
of the greatest British Sanskrit scholars of this century [i.e. the 20th century], had just spent
several years producing his study of the Gndhr Dharmapada, and had the whole of the
Dhammapada-related literature at his fingertips, he was asked if he would produce a translation
of the Dhammapada for the Pali Text Society. He replied: I cannot. It is too difficult .

It is not immediately clear whether the second passage quoted above, MN I 329, is verse or
prose: MLDB treats it as verse but most Pali versions of the same passage seem to treat it as
part of the prose. However, Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi informs me (private communication) that
the passage at MN I 329 is in meter and therefore clearly verse.
43. Moreover, both of the above passages are spoken to non-monastics (the householder
Kevaddha and Baka the brahm), neither of whom seems particularly well-versed in the
Buddhas teachings. Generally, at the time of the Buddha it was the monks and nuns who
were the experts on the Buddhist doctrine. Most suttas spoken to lay Buddhists are simple and
straightforward practical instructions. It seems quite possible, therefore, that the usage here
of anidassana is simply evocative, not a precise reference to a specific state.
44. i.e. via anidassana in the present case.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
45
standard description of the first two immaterial attainments.45 Equally important is

that appama, immeasurable, which is semantically very close to ananta,46 is very
frequently connected with samdhi. In particular, it is used in the standard passage
on the divine abidings (brahma-vihras; e.g. at MN I 38), but it is also employed as a
general qualifier of samdhi.47 As for the second qualifier, pabh, it does not seem
to be used elsewhere to directly qualify samdhi. However, the closely related
term pabhassara, shining, is often used to describe the mind without hindrances
(nvaraa), the most obvious example of which is the mind in samdhi.48 Thus, given
the usage of ananta and pabh in the above quotes, it seems plausible, perhaps even
likely, that anidassana via refers to a state of samdhi.
Next, it is necessary to look more carefully at the structure of the above verses.
For the present purposes, an important fact which is rarely pointed out is that the
first verse (the question verse) in the above DN I 223 passage seems to contain
two questions rather than one.49 When we turn to the second verse (the answer
verse), it seems that we are again dealing with two separate answers: otherwise there would be a contradiction between the via with various attributes
described in the first line and the cessation of via described in the last line
consciousness cannot be described as ananta sabbato pabha and at the same
time be said to have ceased. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the
first line of the question verse is answered by the first two lines of the answer
verse, and the last two lines of the question verse are answered by the last three
lines of the answer verse.50 If this structural analysis is accepted, then it becomes
clear that anidassana via is simply a form of consciousness where earth,
45. The first two immaterial attainments are known respectively as ksnacyatana, the base of
unlimited (ananta) space, and viacyatana, the base of unlimited (ananta) consciousness
(e.g. at MN I 436).
Moreover, it seems that ananta is never used with mind or consciousness apart from describing states of samdhi. It never seems to be used to describe the normal consciousness of the
arahant, for example.
46. This semantic closeness becomes particularly important with verse. Due to metrical
constraints, words which may have slightly different import in prose often become
interchangeable in verse.
47. E.g. with kasia meditation at MN II 14, and with samdhi more generally at AN III 51.
48. Of course, the mind without hindrances could also be a reference to the mind of the arahant,
but pabhassara does not seem to be used in this sense. See for example SN V 92 and AN III 16.
49. Of the three lines of the first verse, the first and the third line end with present tense indicative
verbs. Thus we seem to have two separate sentences, each being a question. Moreover, while
the Pali is ambiguous as to whether the response gives one or two answers, the parallel
passage in the Chinese Canon (see below) seems to give two.

It might be objected that the lead-up to the verses at DN I 223 only contains one question.
Why would the Buddha reformulate a single question into two? According to AN II 46 there
are four ways of answering a question, one of which is using analysis. In the present case, the
original question clearly has more than one answer (as will become clear below), and thus the
Buddhas reformulation may simply be a response to this fact.
50. Note the this, eta, in the last line of the answer verse. This would seem to refer back to
nma ca rpa ca of the previous line; that is, these lines are connected. Thus the last line
cannot simply be regarded as an add-on which does not refer to any of the questions in the
question verse.
46
water, fire and air find no footing;51 it is not related to the cessation of nameand-form.52
At this point we must consider the second passage quoted above (MN I 329).
The wider context of this verse makes it clear that anidassana via is not
commensurate with the allness of all (sabbassa sabbattena ananubhta; MN I
330), that is, not the same nature as all. If all here is to be understood as all of
sasra, then anidassana via must be based on an awareness or knowledge
of what lies beyond sasra.53 In other words, anidassana via must refer to a
state of consciousness, perhaps a form of samdhi, possessed by a person who has
an outsiders perspective on sasra, one who has seen the potential for sasra
to cease.54 This potential is only known to the ariyas.55
51. Taking this verse in isolation, the most obvious candidate for this would be the immaterial
attainments. But the use elsewhere of the phrase where earth, water, fire and air find
no footing (see in particular Ud 9 and SN I 33) indicates that it refers to something more
profound than the immaterial attainments. It is perhaps a poetic way of expressing a full
escape from sasra. See also the discussion below.
52. I take long and short, small and great, fair and foul to be poetic examples of name-andform and thus to be included within name-and-form. In the suttas name-and-form is usually
understood to encompass all phenomena apart from consciousness.
It is significant that the Chinese version of these verses (at T I 102c, 1419) supports the
above analysis. The question verse of the Chinese is virtually identical with the question
verse of the Pali. (In both versions, this verse is the Buddhas reformulation of the original
single question into two questions.) The answer verse is as follows: One should answer
(): Consciousness without form (); infinite, self-illuminating (
); when this ceases then the four great [elements] cease (); gross, subtle,
beautiful, ugly cease (); therefore name-and-form cease ();
consciousness ceases, remainder also ceases (). Here it is quite clear that we
have two answers. The first one is consciousness without form, infinite, self-illuminating.
This would then be the answer to the first question about where the four elements cease or
find no footing. Since the second line begins when this ceases , this presumably referring
back to the consciousness without form of the previous line (it is difficult to see what else it
might refer to), this must be a second answer. This answer would correspond to the second
question, concerning where name and form wholly cease. (Admittedly, the Chinese is a bit
confusing here, since it starts the second answer with then the four great elements cease. I
take this mention of the four great elements as simply an elaboration on some of the aspects
of name-and-form.) Moreover, it is clear in the Chinese that the consciousness without form
cannot be a reference to Nibbna since it ceases together with all other phenomena.
53. If, on the other hand, all is not to be regarded as equivalent to sasra in its entirety, then
anidassana via potentially becomes correspondingly broader. For example, if all here
instead only refers to everything within Baka the Brahms knowledge (Baka the Brahm
being the Buddhas interlocutor in the passage at M I 329), then anidassana via could be a
reference to the immaterial attainments.
54. This does not require this consciousness to exist outside of sasra. Rather, it is a type of
consciousness which is based on the full understanding of the Dhamma.
55. There are, in fact, good reasons for questioning whether this passage should be included in
our analysis at all, since the reading in the above MN I 329 quote is very uncertain. According
to the Burmese version of this verse (Be: MN I 405), it is the Buddha who speaks it, referring
to his own special understanding. However, according to the Sri Lankan (Ce: MN I 770), the
Thai (Se: MN I 596), and the PTS versions of this verse, it is spoken by Baka the Brahm,
referring to his special understanding (see Anlayo, forthcoming, footnote 162 to MN 49). This
is obviously highly significant, because if this refers to Baka the Brahms knowledge, then
anidassana via must refer to a state of consciousness that he can access, i.e. most likely
a jhna state. This interpretation is further reinforced by the Chinese version of this sutta,
also according to which it was Brahm who spoke, see T I 548b, 11. (It is also significant that
Bhikkhu Brahmli
47
Given the above analysis, we are now in a position to be quite specific in our
understanding of anidassana via. We have seen that anidassana via is:
(1) a form of samdhi; and (2) that it is a type of consciousness accessible only to
the ariyas.56 This description fits well with the type of samdhi I have called ariyasamdhi in the introduction to this paper.57 This then becomes our interpretation
of anidassana via.
In sum, it may never be possible to pin down the exact meaning of anidassana
via with perfect certainty. However, given the broader message of the suttas
concerning via, and given that there is at least one solid explanation of anidassana via which does not contradict this broader message, one is forced to
reject the idea that anidassana via is equivalent to the state of final Nibbna
in the form of a permanent (or timeless) consciousness.58
Appatihita Via, unestablished consciousness

The sutta phrase appatihita via, unestablished consciousness, is sometimes
taken as referring to final Nibbna. In this way final Nibbna is again seen as a
state of consciousness (see in particular Harvey 1995, 201203).59 The following
three sutta passages are sometimes used to support this assertion:
If, bhikkhus, there is no lust for the nutriment edible food, or for the nutriment
contact, or for the nutriment mental volition, or for the nutriment consciousness,
if there is no delight, if there is no craving, consciousness (via) does not
become established (appatihita) there and come to growth ... Suppose, bhikkhus,
there was a house or hall with a peaked roof, with windows on the northern, southern, and eastern sides. When the sun rises and a beam of light enters through a
window, where would it become established (patihit)? On the western wall,
venerable sir. If there were no western wall, where would it become established? On the earth, venerable sir? If there were no earth, where would
it become established? On the water, venerable sir. If there were no water,
where would it become established? It would not become established anywhere
(appatihit), venerable sir. (SN II 102; cf. Harvey 1995, 202)
But, bhikkhus, when one does not intend, and one does not plan, and one does
not have a tendency towards anything, no basis exists for the maintenance of
consciousness. When there is no basis, there is no support for the establishing
56.
57.

58.
59.
in the Chinese there is no equivalent of anidassana.) Given this uncertainty in the reading, it
would be quite reasonable, maybe even preferable, to leave the passage at MN I 329 out of the
present discussion. In spite of this, I have decided to incorporate the passage at M I 329 in my
argument.
This may also explain the usage of the term anidassana. According to our analysis, being
accessible only to ariyas, anidassana via is non-manifest (i.e. inaccessible) to all
puthujjanas, including the devas of the very highest realms.
This is the samdhi referred to at AN I 132134, AN V 79, and AN V 318326.
As mentioned in the introduction, and contrary to the view of some, I do not regard this
consciousness as taking Nibbna as its object. Rather, I see this as a samdhi gained through a
particular perception that is based on the knowledge of what Nibbna is.
Nor would it refer to an ariyas direct experience of Nibbna during life: see my discussion of
ariya-samdhi in the introduction.
Harvey also sees this state of consciousness as experienceable by arahants during life, but
different from their ordinary consciousness (1995, 201203). Here, however, I will focus on
the aspect of final Nibbna.
48

of consciousness. When consciousness is unestablished (appatihita) and does
not come to growth, there is no descent of name-and-form. With the cessation of
name-and-form ageing-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and
despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.
(SN II 66; cf. Harvey 1995, 202)
Monks, with consciousness unestablished (appatihitena), the clansman Godhika
has attained final Nibbna. (SN I 268; cf. Harvey 1995, 209210)
In the first quote above (SN II 102), there is no good reason why appatihita
via should be understood as referring to final Nibbna. Consciousness is said
to be unestablished if there is no delight, if there is no craving. The reference
to absence of craving seems to make it fairly straightforward that this concerns
the ordinary consciousness of the living arahant.60
The second passage (SN II 66) concerns a person who does not intend, does
not plan, and does not have a tendency towards anything. His consciousness
is then unestablished and there is no descent of name-and-form. If, as seems
likely, descent of name-and-form refers to future rebirth, then the unestablished
consciousness must refer to the living arahant. Indeed, the suttas immediately
preceding and following this one, which are direct parallels to it, explicitly mention future rebirth (yati punabbhavbhinibbatti and yati jti respectively)
where the present sutta mentions descent of name-and-form. This leaves little
doubt that appatihita via also in the present sutta refers to the consciousness
of the living arahant. Moreover, the expression when consciousness is unestablished there is no descent of name-and-form seems to indicate that this concerns consciousness in general, not a specific state. Thus, again, this seems to be
a reference to an arahants general state of consciousness.
The third passage (SN I 268) is more ambiguous, but it can easily be understood
to mean that Godhikas consciousness was unestablished at the time of death. In
other words, there is no need to bring in any theory of final Nibbna consciousness that, in my opinion, clearly contradicts the suttas general message on the
subject.61
Finally, there are still other passages in the suttas where appatihita via
clearly refers to the general consciousness of the living arahant:
When that consciousness is unestablished (apatihita),62 not coming to growth,
nongenerative, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it
is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally
attains Nibbna. (SN III 53 and SN III 55)63
60. I understand this passage to be another way of saying that consciousness is not attached to
anything; it does not grasp at anything or take anything up. Because of being unestablished
in this way, it does not get established in, i.e. commence, a new existence. That is, the passage
concerns the cessation of the source of consciousness. Upon the attainment of arahantship, consciousness becomes devoid of the kind of desire that would otherwise have caused
the future establishment of consciousness in a new rebirth. For the arahant, the source of
consciousness has ceased, but consciousness itself only ceases when he dies.
61. See the general discussion on consciousness above.
62. The spelling apatihita seems to be an error for appatihita.
63. The expression being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbna, is a common way in the
suttas to describe Nibbna in this life, i.e. the attainment of arahant-ship as opposed to final
Bhikkhu Brahmli
49
In sum, all the available evidence suggests that appatihita via is a reference to the ordinary consciousness of the living arahant. Although the suttas do not seem to contain an outright denial that this consciousness applies
to final Nibbna, there is no passage that unambiguously states that it does. In
these circumstances, it seems to me little more than speculation to suggest that
unestablished consciousness refers to a state of final Nibbna. And given that
the existence of a permanent consciousness is explicitly denied elsewhere (see
above), it becomes untenable.
Could Citta (mind) be a referent of final Nibbna?

Is it reasonable, as is sometimes done, to use the term citta (mind), or a particular
state of citta, as a synonym for Nibbna?64 There is no clear evidence in the suttas
of citta ever being used in this way and, as I shall now try to show, the evidence
to the contrary is compelling.
Citta refers to what in English one would understand by mind. In the Nikyas,
citta often has a broader scope than via, sometimes referring to intention
for example and at other times to thought.65 Despite this distinction between the
two terms,66 they are nevertheless closely related. In fact, they are often used
synonymously. For example, there are several instances in the suttas where one
term appears where one would normally expect to find the other: When that
Nibbna. See for instance MN III 244, where Nibbna is described in similar terms, but final
Nibbna clearly happens later. Also note that in this case consciousness in fact becomes
unestablished immediately prior to the attainment of arahant-ship. This strengthens the
argument further.

Appatihita also recurs at Ud 80 where it seems to qualify a particular state (of samdhi,
perhaps) of the living arahant. Since it concerns an arahant, his consciousness is by definition
appatihita, unestablished, as discussed above. For further discussion of Ud 80 see section on
Nibbna below.
64. Johansson (1969, 131) states that The new, transformed state of citta is Nibbna He then
claims that this citta continues after the death of the arahant: But when an Arahant dies
the stillness and emptiness of the citta makes it survive, free and anonymous (133).
Johansson evidently takes a particular state of citta as equivalent to final Nibbna.
A similar position seems to be taken in Mah Boowa (1980, 23): The Citta by its very nature is
amata - Undying ; Once pa has totally shattered and cleared the kilesas away, the Citta
will be transformed into the state of purity How can it vanish? this one is the genuine
amata (the Undying). Immortal by way of purity This is the real and true substance or
essence which is in the midst of our khandha (45); The kilesas cant destroy the Citta This
nature is unassailable, absolute and permanent. It cannot be annihilated (76). It must be kept
in mind, however, that the teachings given by Thai meditation teachers are often difficult to
interpret. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the idiom of Thai meditation teachers,
particularly those associated with the Thai forest tradition, is notoriously idiosyncratic. They
rarely use the expressions and words found in the Nikyas, and if they do, they sometimes
give these expressions new meanings. Secondly, the language they use is often not very
precise, at least compared with that of the suttas, and thus there are significant problems of
interpretation. Thus it is possible that Ven. Ajahn Mah Boowa may be referring to something
other than the English translation appears to show. Still, the translation as it stands is hard to
square with the descriptions of Nibbna and citta in the suttas.
65. In the Vinaya-piaka the Buddha typically asks a monk who thinks he may have committed
an offense, kicitto, what (was your) intention?, e.g. at Vin III 116, 23. Citta seems to mean
thought in the standard description of thought-reading, e.g. at DN I 214. For a further sense
of the wide use of the term citta see PED.
66. Cf. CDB, 769, n.154.
50
consciousness (via) is unestablished, not coming to growth, nongenerative, it is liberated (vimutta) (SN III 53 and 55). Usually it is the citta which is
said to be liberated.
Another example of this is as follows: With the origination of name-and-form
(nmarpa-samuday) there is the origination of mind (cittassa samudayo). With
the cessation of name-and-form there is the passing away of mind (SN V 184). It
is usually via which is said to be thus conditioned by name-and-form. But as
the context here is the four satipahnas, the third of which is mind contemplation (cittnupassana), citta is used instead.
Where the suttas analyse the mind into mental factors, via usually
forms part of the list. In the following passage, however, citta is used in place of
via:
And the states in the first jhna the applied thought, the sustained thought, the
rapture, the pleasure, and the unification of mind; the contact, feeling, perception,
volition, and mind (citta); the zeal, decision, energy, mindfulness, equanimity,
and attention ... (MN III 25)67
Elsewhere, citta and via are used together to refer to the same thing: When
in his mothers womb the first thought (citta) has arisen, the first consciousness
(via) appeared, his birth is (to be reckoned) from that time (Vin I 93).68
This interchangeability of citta and via is not surprising when one considers the matter carefully. From the suttas it can be seen that, although via as
a technical term only refers to consciousness or awareness, via devoid of
other mental factors is merely a theoretical construct which in actual experience
does not occur. Thus citta, even in its broadest sense, is implied by via:
Feeling, perception and consciousness, friend these states are conjoined
(sasah), not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from
the others in order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels,
that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one cognises. (MN I 293)
So whenever there is consciousness, the other mental factors will also be

present (cf. MN III 2529), and thus via is in effect no different from citta.69
Citta in turn cannot exist without via: mind without consciousness is surely
an unintelligible concept. Thus, where there is citta, there is also via; and
where there is via, there is also citta. In practice they are inseparable and
very closely related: But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind (citta)
67. The use of citta here, in place of via, could perhaps be under the influence of the Abhidhamma.
See Ven. Anlayos study of the Anupada Sutta, MN 111, in Anlayo forthcoming.
68. Citta which is usually translated as mind is here translated as thought because mind does
not really fit the context. Perhaps mental state would be a better translation.
69. It seems clear that citta is often regarded as including other mental factors apart from via.
See discussion above.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
51
and mentality (mano) and consciousness (via) (SN II 94)70; But what is
called thought (cittan), or mind (mano), or consciousness (vian) (DN I 21).71
Therefore, if via is not permanent and eternal, the same must be true
for citta:
Here, a certain ascetic or Brahmin is a logician, a reasoner. Hammering it out by
reason, following his own line of thought, he argues: Whatever is called eye or
ear or nose or tongue or body, that self is impermanent, unstable, non-eternal,
liable to change. But what is called thought (cittan), or mind (mano) or consciousness (vian), that self is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change, the
same for ever and ever! (DN I 21)72
But, bhikkhus, as to that which is called mind (citta) and mentality (mano) and
consciousness (via) the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience
revulsion towards it, unable to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated
from it. For what reason? Because for a long time this has been held to by him,
appropriated, and grasped thus: This is mine, this I am, this is my self. Therefore
the uninstructed worldling is unable to experience revulsion towards it, unable
to become dispassionate towards it and be liberated from it.
It would be better, bhikkhus, for the uninstructed worldling to take as self this
body composed of the four great elements rather than the mind (citta). For what
reason? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for
one year, for two years, for three, four, five, or ten years, for twenty, thirty, forty,
or fifty years, for a hundred years, or even longer. But that which is called mind
(citta) and mentality (mano) and consciousness (via) arises as one thing
and ceases as another by day and by night. Just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs
still another, so too that which is called mind and mentality and consciousness
arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. (SN II 94)
Thus, according to the suttas, holding the view that citta in some way can be
regarded as permanent, is a mistake. Moreover, when one gains the full ariyan
insight into the impermanent and suffering nature of the mind, one feels revulsion (nibbid) and dispassion (virga) towards it. And when the arahant attains
final Nibbna, the citta comes to an end:
Like the deer roaming at will in the variegated grove, having
70. In both this quote and the one below the singular ya ca kho eta/ida, and that/this
which, is used. Thus citta, mano, and via refer to the same entity. Also note that Ven.
Bhikkhu Bodhi here has translated itipi with and, a translation normally used for ca. A
more literal translation of itipi might be also or too: But, bhikkhus, as to that which is
called mind, also mentality, also consciousness. It is significant that this phrase is also found
in the Chinese and the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit versions of this sutta, cf. respectively T II 81c,
7 and Triph, folio 5 V3.
71. Apparently the Tibetan counterpart to this sutta has the equivalent phrase; cf. Weller, 1934:
26.
MN138 provides another striking example of via and citta being used interchangeably.
In the summary at the beginning of the sutta, at MN III 223, 10+12, via is used. Later on in
the same sutta, in the section explaining this via, citta is used in its place; see MN III 226, 9f
and MN III 227, 1f. Further, in the explanation itself, via and citta are used together.

For further references to the interchangeability of via and citta in non-Pali Buddhist
texts (i.e. primarily Chinese and Sanskrit sources), see Anlayo forthcoming, footnote 168 to
MN 138.
72. This passage refers to a wrong view.
52

entered the delightful mountain, wreathed in clouds, I shall
rejoice there on the uncrowded mountain; you, mind (citta), will
certainly perish (parbhavissasi). (Thag 114344)73
You are seen, housebuilder, you will not build a house again.
All your rafters are broken your gables are torn asunder. The
mind (citta), made free of boundaries, will blow away (vidhamissat) in this very
existence. (Thag 184)74
It [the citta] remains steady, attained to imperturbability, and he observes its
vanishing (vaya cassnupassati). (AN III 377)
With the cessation of name-and-form there is the cessation of mind (cittassa).
(SN V 184)
Pabhassara Citta, the radiant mind

At AN I 10 we find the following oft-quoted passage: This mind (citta), bhikkhus,
is radiant (pabhassara), but is defiled by defilements which arrive. Might this
pabhassara citta be an eternal, radiant, and pure mind? It seems clear from the
following that this cannot be the case:
So too, bhikkhus, there are these five corruptions of the mind (cittassa), corrupted
by which the mind is neither malleable nor wieldy nor radiant (pabhassara) but
brittle and not rightly concentrated for the destruction of the taints. What five?
Sensual desire ... ill will ... sloth and torpor ... restlessness and remorse ... doubt is
a corruption of the mind, corrupted by which the mind is neither malleable nor
wieldy nor radiant but brittle and not rightly concentrated for the destruction of
the taints. (SN V 92 and A III 16, cf. AN I 257 and MN III 243)
This appears to be the only unambiguous usage of pabhassara in the suttas. It follows that the only reasonable interpretation of pabhassara citta is that it is the
mind freed from the five hindrances, the most obvious example of which is the
mind in jhna.75
Does the Term Citta have two Fundamentally Distinct Referents?

If, as suggested by Harvey (1995), one sees the Nikyas as including a doctrine
of two fundamentally different types of consciousness, i.e. a samsric consciousness and a timeless Nibbnic consciousness, then, in view of the close relationship
between via and citta, one would expect the Nikyas to make a similar dis73. Although I have argued in the above section concerning anidassana via that the
interpretation of verse is often difficult, this becomes particularly relevant if a verse is
interpreted in a way that is contrary to what can be established from Canonical prose passages
alone. In the present case, the verses merely reinforce what can be established elsewhere.
74. The translation is based on the alternative reading vimariydikata in the last line.

Normans translation of vidhamissati, will blow away, can probably be improved upon.
Other possible translations include: will be demolished (cf. CDB, p.985), will be ruined, will
fall away, and will be destroyed.
75. See also Anlayo 2003: 191, n.39.

My understanding is that the radiance is always available, it is only matter of overcoming
the hindrances. But when the defilements are present the mind is not radiant: otherwise we
would be able to observe that radiance, since the mind can only be known through direct
experience.
53
Bhikkhu Brahmli
tinction between two fundamentally different types of citta. Thus the term citta
would sometimes refer to the ordinary citta of the puthujjana and at other times
refer to a permanent citta known to the arahant.76 A phrase such as citta vimuccati (e.g. at MN I 348), the mind is liberated, would then refer to the liberated
eternal mind, or original pure mind, known to the arahant.77
But there is no evidence to support making this distinction. Nowhere in the
suttas do we find that two such different realities could both be referred to as
citta. Considering the centrality of this issue for the proper understanding of the
Dhamma, it seems highly unlikely that the Buddha should have used the term citta
in such distinct ways without clearly commenting upon it.78
In my opinion, the only possible meaning of such phrases as cittam vimuccati is that the ordinary mind is liberated from the defilements (sav). There
is no indication that this mind is somehow permanent. Indeed, one would have
expected citta to be used synonymously with Nibbna if this thesis were correct.
But citta is never used in this way in the suttas.79
Citta and Mano (Mind)

Citta and mano are even more closely related than citta and via:80
What is mind (citta), that is mentality (mano); what is mentality (mano), that is
mind (citta). (Vin III 74, my translation)
Thus is your mind (mano), and in this way is your mind (mano), and thus is your
mind (cittan). (DN I 213, DN III 103 and AN I 170, my translation) 81
Always frightened is this mind (citta),

the mind (mano) is always agitated. (SN I 123)82
76. Whether the other ariyas would know of such a citta seems unclear. See my discussion of
ariya-samdhi in the introduction.
77. Following Harveys approach, one might alternatively call this a timeless (mode of) mind. I
have already discussed why the idea of timelessness, in my opinion, does not add anything
new. See discussion of via above.
78. Moreover, consciousness (via) is also occasionally said to be freed; see in particular SN
III 53 and 55, above. If mind has a distinct meaning in the phrase the mind is liberated, then
the same would have to be true for via in this parallel construction. But we have already
seen that the Buddha rejects the idea of via as a permanent entity.
79. See for example the Asakhata-sayutta (SN IV 359373) where there are 32 synonyms for
Nibbna, none of which is citta or any particular state of citta.
80. As with via and citta, mano and citta have their own more or less distinct spheres of usage
in the suttas. Sometimes in the analysis of mental processes the Buddha uses mano to describe
the mind in relation to mind-consciousness but not in relation to the other five types of
consciousness. In this analysis, mano is the sense through which mind-consciousness arises.
Citta, on the other hand, apparently encompasses all six types of consciousness. Outside such
technical usage, however, mano and citta seem to be used synonymously.
81. This passage concerns mind reading.
82. Both mano and citta are usually translated as mind. When the words are used together in the
suttas, translators often seem to struggle to find a second English word that also means mind
(cf. CDB, 769, n.154).

The following two examples are also instructive of the close relationship between citta and
mano:
A mind of ill-will (vypanna-citto), mental intention of hate (paduha-manasakappo). (SN III 93, my translation)
54
Given this close relationship, even identity, between citta and mano, a whole
new line of argument against the idea of a permanent citta could be developed
by showing the impermanent, non-self nature of mano. However, as I feel the
above arguments are already sufficient, I will just quote a few passages from the
suttas to illustrate:
The mind (mano) is subject to disintegration (palokadhammo). (SN IV 53)
The mind (mano) is non-self. The cause and condition for the arising of the mind
is also non-self. As the mind has originated from what is non-self, how could it be
self? (SN IV 130)
If anyone says, the mind (mano) is self, that is not tenable. The rise and fall of
mind are discerned, and since the rise and fall of mind are discerned it would follow: my self rises and falls. That is why it is not tenable for anyone to say: the
mind is self. Thus the mind is not self. (MN III 283)
The arahants maintain that when the mind exists (manasmi sati) there is pleasure and pain, and when the mind does not exist (manasmim asati) there is no pleasure and pain. (SN IV 124)
The mind (mano) is yours, Evil One, mental phenomena are yours, mind-contact
and its base of consciousness is yours; but, Evil One, where there is no mind, no mental phenomena, no mind-contact and its base of consciousness (-viyatana)
there is no place for you there, Evil One. (SN I 256)
Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is beyond training (an arahant) understands the
six faculties the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty,
the body faculty, the mind (mano) faculty. He understands: These six faculties will
cease completely and totally without remainder, and no other six faculties will
arise anywhere in any way. (SN V 230)
As with consciousness, one has to conclude that final Nibbna has nothing to
do with mind.
Final Nibbna
The discussion so far has emphasized that, according to the Nikyas, final Nibbna
cannot be regarded as some sort of permanent or timeless consciousness or mind
and that it cannot be regarded as a self (att). But highlighting what final Nibbna
is not obviously begs the question: What then is final Nibbna? Indeed, it might
be asked, is it anything at all apart from the cessation of existence?83
Before I attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to investigate a
number of sutta passages that concern Nibbna more directly. These passages
An undaunted mind (apatitthna-citto), a non-dejected mind (adna-mnaso), a
mind without ill-will (avypanna-cetaso).
(SN V 74 but cf. CDB, 1904, n.69; my translation)
In the above mano and citta, as well as ceto, seem to be used as synonyms.

Yet another example of this close relationship is the use of kya (body), vc (speech), and
mano (mind) to denote the three doors of wholesome and unwholesome actions; occasionally
the three doors are denoted as kya, vc, and citta; cf. SN II 231, SN II 271 and SN IV 112. See
also Dhp 348 where one finds vimutta-mnaso in place of the standard ceto-vimutti.
83. That is, the cessation of the five aggregates. This does not imply anything except the cessation
of an entirely impersonal process. This is very different from the annihilation of a permanent
entity. See discussion below.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
55
are often referred to as evidence that final Nibbna is some sort of state84 (see
for instance Bodhi 2005, 318).85 But I would contend that they do not need to be
interpreted in this way.
Sometimes Nibbna is called Nibbnadhtu, e.g. at SN V 8.86 The word dhtu is
often translated as element. Basing ones understanding on this translation it
is natural to conclude that Nibbna must be something. However, this would
be to ignore the range of meanings of the word dhtu.87 In addition to meaning
element, it also has the sense of property (see PED).88 This meaning is prominent in such compounds as nirodha-dhtu (It 45), the property of cessation,
and nekkhamma-dhtu (SN II 152, 21), the property of renunciation.89 Indeed,
Nibbnadhtu itself is explained at SN V 8 as nothing other than the removal
(vinayo) of lust, the removal of hatred and the removal of delusion. Here, again,
it is the property aspect which is to the fore, and the best translation would perhaps be the property of extinguishment.90
Another set of suttas, at SN IV 368373, present 32 synonyms for Nibbna.
This could easily be regarded as evidence of final Nibbna as an existing state.
However, in this case we need to be careful to distinguish between Nibbna as an
aspect of arahant-ship (i.e. the destruction of lust, hatred and delusion) and final
Nibbna. Because all these suttas are about the destruction of the defilements they
would seem to concern arahant-ship.
Two suttas relevant to the present discussion are found at Ud 80. The first of
these reads as follows:
Monks, there is that base (yatana) where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no
air; no base consisting of the infinity of space, no base consisting of the infinity of
consciousness, no base consisting of nothingness, no base consisting of neitherperception-nor-non-perception; neither this world nor another world; neither sun
nor moon. I say, bhikkhus, it is not coming, going or remaining, not passing away
84. I use quotes here and below to emphasize that such a state, or existing entity, would be
completely different from anything that can normally be experienced by human beings. Thus
the word state is only used for lack of suitable terminology.
85. hnissaro Bhikkhu (1993, 4) also seems to support the idea that final Nibbna is more than
mere cessation: As for the question of how nibbana is experienced after death, the Buddha
says that there is no limit in that experience by which it could be described. Note in particular
the words that experience, referring to Nibbna after the death of the arahant.
86. Or it may be called asakhatadhtu, see MN III 63, 13, or amatadhtu, see AN III 356,14.
87. It also ignores the distinction between Nibbna and final Nibbna. From the definition of
Nibbna-dhtu at SN V 8, see below, it seems clear that it refers to the state of arahant-ship,
not final Nibbna.
88. That is, property in the sense of quality.
89. The point of these expressions is presumably simply to point out that there are such things as
cessation and renunciation.
90. That is, the extinguishment of the defilements of lust, hatred and delusion.

Moreover, dhtu is used for savedayitanirodha, the cessation of perception and feeling
(SN II 150). In this case it can clearly not refer to an element as something existing. Rather, it
seems to refer to the existence of the possibility of the cessation of the mental khandhas.

The word pada, lit. foot, has a similarly broad application. For example, the expression
amata pada (e.g. at AN II 51, 29), which is used as a synonym for Nibbna, might perhaps be
rendered the characteristic of freedom from death; see PED. (See discussion of Ud 80 below
(second sutta) for why amata is better rendered as freedom from death than the deathless.
See also CPD.)
56

or reappearing. It is unestablished, not moving, without basis. Just this is the end
of suffering. 91 (Ud 80)
The first part of this quote, where there is no earth neither moon nor sun,
is identical to the standard description of what I call ariya-samdhi.92 That we
are here dealing with a state of samdhi would fit well with the use of the word
base, yatana, which is often used of samdhi attainments.93
The second part of the quote, it is not coming, going or remaining, not passing
away or reappearing; it is unestablished, not moving, without basis (neva gati
na gati na hiti na cuti na upapatti, appatihita appavatta anrammaam
eva ta), seems to be nothing other than a description of arahant-ship. The initial
phrase, no coming or reappearing, elsewhere refers to arahant-ship (see Ud
81, MN III 266 and cf. SN II 67): there is no future coming, going, passing away, or
reappearing for the arahant as he has cut these things off. They cease here and
now because their cause has been removed.94 That unestablished, appatihita,
also refers to arahant-ship, I have already shown in the above section on unestablished consciousness. Without basis, anrammaa,95 is often found together with
unestablished (SN II 6567) and would therefore also seem to refer to arahantship. Not moving, appavatta, does not seem to be encountered elsewhere in the
Nikyas, but it appears to be a simple reference to not moving in sasra, being
the opposite of pavatta, moving on/going on. Again, it seems natural to identify this with arahant-ship.
The final line of the verse, just this is the end of suffering, would normally
refer to the living arahant. Just this is the end of suffering, or more commonly
the end of suffering, is a standard way of describing the attainment of arahantship, e.g. at MN III 266. In sum, the above passage at Ud 80 seems to describe
something related to both ariya-samdhi and arahant-ship. It seems clear therefore
that it must relate to Nibbna, with final Nibbna perhaps being the most likely
candidate.96 But even if this is the case, the word yatana, like the word dhtu, is
used so broadly in the Nikyas that this would still not be decisive in showing that
final Nibbna is a state. At AN IV 426, AN IV 452, 16 and AN IV 453, 18, for example, yatana is used to describe savedayitanirodha, an attainment where the
91. My translation, based on Bodhi 2005.
92. See introduction. This samdhi is described at AN V 79 and AN V 318326. (AN I 132134 is
also closely related.) The only difference is the absence of neither sun nor moon in the AN
passages. The sun and moon seem to have been regarded as belonging to another world in
ancient India (see DN II 319, 23), and thus the inclusion of this expression does not seem to
add anything new. I would regard its addition to Ud 80 simply as poetic flourish.
93. E.g. the immaterial attainments are all called yatana.
94. But note that the Ud 80 verse includes the word hiti which is not found in the parallel
passages. It seems likely that this refers to the remaining in a particular existence, between
ones arising there and ones subsequent passing away.
95. Or an equivalent formulation such as rammae asati, e.g. at SN II 66, 1.

Harvey (1995, 203) translates anrammaa as without object. However, in relation to SN II
6567 the commentary glosses the term with paccaya, condition or basis. I cannot see any
reason why the commentarial explanation should be rejected. (In the Abhidhamma, however,
rammaa-paccaya, seems to have the sense of object-condition.)
96. Alternatively, or additionally, it might refer to savedayitanirodha or perhaps even ariyasamdhi itself. This being verse, the ambiguity could be deliberate.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
57
mental aggregates temporarily cease. Clearly yatana cannot refer to an existing

entity in such a context.
The other sutta of interest at Ud 80 reads as follows: Monks, there is a freedom from what is born, a freedom from what has become, a freedom from what
is made, a freedom from what is produced (atthi bhikkhave ajta abhta akata
asakhata) (Ud 80, my translation). What is here rendered as freedom from
what is born, ajta, is often translated as the unborn, giving a definite sense
that this sutta describes something positively existing.97 However, as Johansson
(1969, 39, 54) points out, ajta recurs at MN I 163, 10 where the context requires
it to mean freedom from birth. Having understood that he is subject to birth,
the Buddha-to-be seeks the ajta. If birth is a problem, then surely the natural
thing to do is to seek a freedom from birth, not a state that is unborn.98 The
most reasonable translation of ajta, therefore, would seem to be freedom from
what is born or freedom from birth.99 If this is accepted, it is natural to translate all the initial as at Ud 80 as privatives, that is, as freedom from. According
to this interpretation (see my translation above), what is being described here
is not necessarily a state at all. In my opinion, all this passage does is to affirm
the possibility of ending sasra.100 Indeed, this is precisely the broader context
of this extract.101
None of the passages discussed in this section need be read as descriptions
of final Nibbna, let alone as final Nibbna being something in a positive sense.
Indeed, it may be that the standard practice of leaving Nibbna untranslated prejudices our perception of this concept, giving it a sense of real existing entity
when in fact this may not be warranted. If instead we were to translate Nibbna
in accordance with its meaning, perhaps with extinguishment,102 then our perception of Nibbna would probably alter accordingly.103
In the end, the passages discussed in this section are not decisive in regard to
the ontological status of final Nibbna.104 This brings us back to the question with
97. It is usually further assumed that this positively existing something is final Nibbna.
98. Moreover, by interpreting the Buddhas reflection to refer to an unborn state one is adding a
pre-condition to the Buddhas search that reduces the sphere of potential solutions. It seems
unlikely that the Buddha-to-be would add a stipulation which might stop him from reaching
his goal.
99. The same argument would hold true of amata, which occurs in the same context at MN I 163,
and which therefore should be translated as freedom from death.
100. Either in the sense of attaining arahant-ship or in the sense of final Nibbna.
101. The broader passage reads as follows: If, monks, there were no freedom from what is born
no freedom from what is produced, no escape would be discerned from what is born
from what is produced. In other words, if there were no such thing as the cessation of the
khandhas, then no escape from suffering would be possible. See discussion below.
102. See discussion in footnote 7 above.
103. In this context it is significant that in the suttas one of the most common synonyms for
Nibbna is nirodha, cessation.
104. Harvey (1995, 201203) also discusses a number of passages in the Sayutta Nikya in support
of his interpretation of final Nibbna (as well as Nibbna in life, but here the discussion concerns
final Nibbna). All of these suttas revolve around the idea of unestablished consciousness,
appatihita via, which I have already discussed above. Again, the idea of unestablished
consciousness quite clearly refers to the living arahant and there seems to be no reason to
take it as referring to final Nibbna.
58
which we started the present section: Is final Nibbna anything at all apart from
the cessation of existence?
Might Final Nibbna be an Existing Entity Entirely Different from the Five
Khandhas?
The reason why the above analysis has not produced any decisive result regarding the nature of final Nibbna is simply that the suttas very rarely seem to speak
of final Nibbna; their emphasis is on Nibbna during life, the experience of arahant-ship. Nevertheless, we have seen that final Nibbna cannot be equated with
a form of consciousness or mind. Indeed, it is clear that it must be other than the
five khandhas. This being the case, could final Nibbna be a state, some sort of
existing entity, quite separate from the five khandhas?
The idea that final Nibbna is an existing entity is usually matched with the
idea that this state can be experienced while the arahant is still alive.105 In fact,
these two ideas of necessity go together: if the final Nibbna state was not experienceable by living arahants, they would not know of its existence and consequently there could be no record of it for posterity. But the idea that final Nibbna
can be experienced by the living arahant is doctrinally problematic. An experience of something without which one cannot know that it exists by definition includes consciousness. Thus, an experience of the equivalent of final
Nibbna while alive must involve consciousness. Indeed, this is also the standard
explanation for how Nibbna is said to be experienced: the mind or consciousness takes it as its object.106
The problem with this idea is that it does not fit the Nikyas explanation of
consciousness. As I have already pointed out in the introduction to this paper,
consciousness is always defined by the object it takes and thus there are precisely six classes of consciousness, one for each of the five senses and one for the
mind (e.g. at SN III 64). There is no indication anywhere of any further classes of
consciousness. Yet the idea of final Nibbna as an object of consciousness would
require a seventh class of consciousness: it does not fit into any of the six classes
mentioned in the suttas.107 Thus, to see consciousness as taking final Nibbna as
its object is to go beyond fixed sutta categories and therefore a baseless extension
of what appears to be a full description of reality in the Nikyas.
More generally, is it sensible to speak of a final Nibbna state that is entirely
other than the five khandhas? If consciousness ceases once and for all, what could
final Nibbna possibly be? It makes no sense to speak of a state which by definition cannot be known. Such a state becomes a mere cipher, something completely
devoid of meaning. It is tantamount to not existing at all.
105. Or that it can be experienced by any ariyan. See for instance Bodhi (2005, 318) and Harvey
(1995, 210).
106. See for instance Bodhi (2005, 379): his mind focuses upon the deathless element,
Nibbna. See also footnote 12 above.
107. In the Nikyas, on a large number of occasions, the six senses, their objects, and the six
corresponding classes of consciousness are all said to be impermanent and suffering (e.g. at
SN IV 25). No exception is ever explicitly mentioned. Clearly Nibbna cannot be part of this
scheme.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
59
That the idea of final Nibbna being a state is a weak one, is also clear from
the principle of Occams razor. This philosophical principle states that the fewest
possible assumptions are to be made in explaining things.108 In the present case,
all ideas of final Nibbna being an existing reality produce complications and
therefore a need for further assumptions109 that make these ideas less compelling according to Occams razor. The simplest explanation of what happens
at final Nibbna is simply that the five khandhas cease. The simplicity and directness of this idea and its fit, as I have tried to show, with all aspects of the teachings found in the Nikyas, makes it by far the strongest candidate for explaining
final Nibbna.110
Finally, I wish to point out one remaining danger with insisting that final
Nibbna is a state of something. For a puthujjana such a state would be quite
literally unimaginable.111 In trying to understand it, he would quite naturally
employ some version of the five khandhas. Anyone who accepts the Buddhas
teaching that final Nibbna is the highest happiness would therefore almost unavoidably grasp at or attach to that version of the five khandhas. Because the khandhas can manifest in extremely subtle ways for instance, for anyone who has not
experienced it, it would be virtually impossible to imagine what the experience
of the base of nothingness is like one would quite likely not even be aware of
ones attachment. In this way one ends up grasping the khandhas that is, grasping what is in reality suffering thinking it to be final Nibbna. And instead of
reaching final Nibbna one ends up perpetuating sasra. The view that final
Nibbna is just cessation is thus not only the one that seems most in tune with
the Nikyas but also the one that quite pragmatically is most likely to lead to an
exit from sasra.112
If Final Nibbna is Mere Cessation, How is this Different from Annihilation?

At AN V 63, we find the following revealing passage:
Monk, among the views of outsiders, this is the highest: I might not be and it
might not be mine; I shall not be and it will not be mine (no cassa, no ca me siy,
na bhavissmi, na me bhavissat ti). For one, monks, who has such a view, it can be
expected that he will not feel attracted to existence and will have no aversion to
the cessation of existence. (AN V 63; adapted from NDB 246)
108. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1995, ninth edition.
109. Such as a timeless consciousness or a seventh class of consciousness.
110.It might be objected that Occams razor is primarily applicable to scientific explanations.
But scientific explanations are explanations of real and observable phenomena, and from a
Buddhist point of view the extinguishment that happens at final Nibbna is also a real and (in
some ways) observable phenomenon.
111.And if, as suggested above, such a state of final Nibbna cannot be experienced even by
arahants, the same would be true of all ariyas.
112.Could such a view of final Nibbna lead to vibhava-tah, a craving for annihilation? Possibly it
could. But it seems to me that it is far more common for people to hold an eternalist view than
an annihilationist view. Moreover, the Buddha himself considered the annihilationist view
superior; see my discussion immediately below. In other words, although ideally one should
realize that the Buddha taught neither eternalism nor annihilationism (see next section), it is
preferable to err on the side of annihilationism.
60
The view mentioned here is identified as annihilationism at SN III 99, 6. Since

annihilationism is always contrasted with eternalism in the Nikyas, this sutta
in effect states that the annihilationist view is superior to the view of eternalism. Again, this undermines any claim that final Nibbna exists in some sense or
other.113
The above quote also makes it clear that the Buddhas teaching is not annihilationism.114 What then is the distinction between cessation and annihilation? At
SN III 109 we find a sutta that deals precisely with this question:
[Ven. Sriputta:] Is it true, friend Yamaka, that such a pernicious view as this has
arisen in you: As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu
whose taints are destroyed is annihilated (ucchijjati) and perishes (vinassati) with
the breakup of the body and does not exist after death (na hoti param mara)?
[Ven. Yamaka:] Exactly so, friend. (SN III 110111)
Here Yamaka specifically holds the view that an arahant is annihilated at

death and it is clear from the narrative and Sriputtas subsequent questioning
of Yamaka that this is contrary to the Dhamma. Sriputtas questioning of Yamaka
establishes that anything one might take a Tathgata/arahant to be115 that is,
anything among the five khandhas is all impermanent and suffering. Thus there
is no permanent self and therefore no real person/arahant/Tathgata to be annihilated in the first place:
What do think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form feeling perception volitional formations consciousness as the Tathgata? No, friend. What do
think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathgata as in form feeling perception volitional formations consciousness No, friend. Do you regard
the Tathgata as apart from form feeling perception volitional formations
consciousness ? No, friend. What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you
regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness [taken
together] as the Tathgata? No, friend. What do you think, friend Yamaka,
do you regard the Tathgata as one who is without form, without feeling, without
perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness? No, friend.
But, friend, when the Tathgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual
in this very life (diheva dhamme saccato thetato anupalabbhiyamno), is it fitting for
you to declare: As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu
whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the
body and does not exist after death? (SN III 111112)
After Yamaka has understood Sriputtas teaching,116 we find the following

exchange between them:
If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you: Friend Yamaka, when a bhikkhu is an
arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, what happens to him with the breakup
of the body, after death? being asked thus, what would you answer?
113.Since the idea that final Nibbna is an existing entity would seem to be closer to eternalism
than annihilationism.
114.Because annihilationism is the view of outsiders.
115. The words arahant and Tathgata appear to be used synonymously in this sutta.
116. That is, after he has fully penetrated it with insight. He seems to have attained streamentry
while Sriputta was teaching him.
Bhikkhu Brahmli
61
If they were to ask me this, friend, I would answer thus: Friend, form is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased (niruddha)
and passed away (atthagata). Feeling is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased and passed away. Perception is impermanent;
what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased and passed away.
Volitional formations are impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what
is suffering has ceased and passed away. Consciousness is impermanent; what is
impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased and passed away. Being
asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way. (SN III 112)
This, then, is what really happens at the death of an arahant. Because human
beings, including arahants, are nothing more than an impersonal process (i.e.
devoid of a stable self) which is impermanent and suffering, all that happens
when an arahant dies is that this process comes to an end. From arahants point of
view the khandhas have nothing to do with them;117 nor are they anything apart
from the khandhas, as we have seen in the Yamaka Sutta. Moreover, because the
khandhas are suffering, their cessation can only be a good thing. The death of an
arahant is just the end, the cessation, of an unwanted process. Nothing of value
is being lost; nothing is being annihilated.118 This is why the death of an arahant
does not count as annihilation. The reason an arahant is not annihilated at death
has nothing to do with the nature of final Nibbna.119
If the cessation of the khandhas is the full end of suffering and thus the highest possible happiness, then one would expect the attainment of the cessation
of perception and feeling, savedayitanirodha, to be the same. Indeed, this is
exactly what one finds:
Should anyone say: that [i.e. the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception]
117. See for instance SN III 3334: Form feeling perception volitional formations
consciousness is not yours: abandon it. When you have abandoned it that will lead to your
welfare and happiness. The sutta then gives the well-known simile of the grass, sticks and
leaves in the Jetavana: just as the monks do not identify with those things, so too they should
not identify with the five khandhas.
118. That is, nothing is annihilated from the arahants point of view. Once sakkya-dihi (seeing
a permanent self in the khandhas) is abandoned, the perception that an arahant can be
annihilated is also abandoned. The death of an arahant is just the end of suffering. This is the
point of the Yamaka Sutta, see above.
119. Harvey (1995, 240) states that as only dukkha ends at the death of an Arahat, the total nonexistence of a Tathgata beyond death seems to be ruled out. But the point of the Yamaka
Sutta, and indeed the suttas taken more broadly, is that there is nothing but dukkha even prior
to the death of the arahant. This is how the bhikkhun Vajir expresses this:
This is a heap of sheer formations:
Here no being is found.
Its only suffering that comes to be,

Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases. (SN I 297; see also SN II 17)
If everything experienced by an arahant, and indeed all beings, is ultimately dukkha, and all
dukkha ceases when an arahant dies, then even without any further sutta evidence any view
of final Nibbna existing in some sense is at the very least superfluous, but more likely misleading.
(Editor: but note that the above verse is about what comes to be and ceases, which are not
seen as characteristics of Nibbna. Also, it is only said that all conditioned things are dukkha.)
62

is the utmost pleasure (sukha) and joy (somanassa) that beings experience, I
would not concede that to him. Why is that? Because there is another kind of
pleasure loftier and more sublime than that pleasure. And what is that other kind
of pleasure? Here, nanda, by completely surmounting the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the cessation of
perception and feeling. This is that other kind of pleasure loftier and more sublime
than the previous pleasure.120 (MN I 400 and SN IV 228)
This means that the full ending of everything is more pleasurable and desirable than the blisses of even the most profound states of samdhi.121 In other
words, complete cessation is superior and preferable to the highest bliss experienceable by human beings.
Conclusion
The idea that final Nibbna is nothing apart from the cessation of the khandhas
might seem bleak. If it seems bleak, it is only due to the false sense of having
a permanent self, or more precisely, because of the view of personal identity,
sakkya-dihi.122 The sense that one has a permanent core a distortion of perception that is unavoidable for all puthujjanas makes cessation appear like annihilation and the successful practice of the path like a form of suicide. If cessation
seems undesirable, it is only due to this distorted outlook.
Consider the following discussion between Ven. Sriputta and Ven. MahKohita:
[Mah-Kohita:] Friend, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the
six spheres of sense contact (i.e. final Nibbna), is there anything else? ... is there
not anything else?
[Sriputta:] Speaking thus: Friend, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six spheres of sense contact, is there anything else? ... is there not
anything else?, one proliferates (papaceti) about that which is without proliferation (appapaca). (AN II 161, my translation)
By asking is there anything else? and is there not anything else? the questioner reveals his distorted outlook, his preoccupation and concern about the
fate of his non-existing self.123 This is why Sriputta calls the questions papaca,
120.Since this is the culmination of a long list of pleasures, each in turn superior to the preceding
one, the implication is that this is the highest.
121.How the cessation of all feelings can be considered the highest pleasure is explained at AN
IV 414418 and elsewhere.
122.This is implied by the suttas, since it is sakkya-ditthi that is responsible for the sense of
permanence.
123. It is not clear whether Mah-Kohita himself is caught up in sakkya-dihi, whether he is
testing Sriputta or whether he is asking the questions for the benefit of others who are
present. (According to the commentary the last of these is the correct explanation).

Concern about the nature of final Nibbna is essentially the same as speculation about the
nature of the Tathgata after death. In the following quote it is said that such speculation is
a result of sakkya-dihi, the view of personal identity, and that with the abandonment of
sakkya-dihi such speculation is also abandoned:
What, Master Gotama, is the cause and reason why, when wanderers of other sects
are asked such questions, they give such answers as: the Tathgata exists after
death or the Tathgata does not exists after death And what is the cause and
Bhikkhu Brahmli
63
proliferation, papaca being the distorted thinking process that arises from a
distorted perception of reality.124 The puthujjana is trapped by sakkya-dihi, by
the perception of a permanent core in himself. But from his own point of view,
whether he is aware of it or not, he is simply concerned with the destiny of what
he sees as his own true essence.125
But if the illusion of personal identity is seen through, if the perceived solid
core is seen not to exist, there is nothing to be concerned about anymore.126
When it is seen that all a being is made up of are the ever-impermanent khandhas,
utterly tied up with suffering, then cessation becomes the most desirable thing
possible. Questions such as is there anything else? and is there not anything
else? are quite simply beside the point.127
In the final analysis, the Buddhas teachings concern only the ending of suffering. Although it seems clear that mere cessation is the correct interpretation of final Nibbna and although there are obvious dangers in regarding final
Nibbna as something, ultimately it is irrelevant whether the state that supervenes when the arahant dies is something or nothing. All that matters is that
the five khandhas that is, suffering cease without remainder. Consider how
the Buddha sometimes would summarize his teachings: Good, good, Anurdha.
Formerly, Anurdha, and also now, I make known just suffering and the cessareason why, when Master Gotama is asked such questions, he does not give such
answers?
Vaccha, wanderers of other sects regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or
form as in self, or self as in form. They regard feeling as self ... perception as self ...
volitional formations as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the
wanderers of other sects are asked such questions, they give such answers as: the
Tathgata exists after death or the Tathgata does not exists after death ... But,
Vaccha, the Tathgata, the arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, does not regard
form as self ... self as in consciousness. Therefore, when the Tathgata is asked such
questions, he does not give such answers. (SN IV 395).

The above taking of a self in relation to the five aggregates is the definition of sakkya-dihi;
see MN I 300.
124.This does not mean that one may not have a legitimate discussion on the nature of final
Nibbna, only that one has to be very careful not to be taken in by sakkya-dihi. Indeed,
one should keep in mind that no matter how hard one tries, there will always be a minimum
degree of distortion of reality until sakkya-dihi is abandoned.
125.The view of personal identity will tend to give rise either to an eternalist outlook or to an
annihilationist one, since these are the two most obvious destinies of a permanent self. In
fact, the commentary relates the above questions to eternalism and annihilationism (Mp III
150, 15).
126.When the illusion is seen for what it is, not only does one abandon the idea of a solid core,
one also sees that the idea of ownership is an illusion. In this way the entire sasra has lost
whatever value it may previously have had.
127.They are beside the point only in so far as it is cessation that is the true goal. A debate about
final Nibbna is still useful to the extent that it makes this clear. And, given the discussion
so far, it is useful for pointing out that postulating anything additional to mere cessation
does not make good sense and for showing that seeing final Nibbna as a state may prove
obstructive to achieving ones goal. The concern over is there not anything else? relates to
annihilationism (again, see Mp III 150, 15), and I have argued that cessation is different from
the annihilation of a permanent self.
64
tion of suffering (SN III 119).128 And since suffering is coterminous with sasra,
it follows that Nibbna is the greatest bliss. (MN I 510 and Dhp 204). What more
can you ask for?
128.This passage is almost as explicit as can be that there is nothing apart from dukkha and its
cessation.
It is sometimes argued that the Buddha never speaks of final Nibbna as just cessation (Bodhi
2005, 319). (Ven. Bodhi in fact uses the word nonexistence rather than cessation. Although
the term nonexistence is unfortunate since it implies something as existing prior to final
Nibbna see SN II 17 where the ideas of existence and nonexistence, atthita and natthita,
are presented as false it seems to me that Ven. Bodhi actually means nonexistence in the
sense of (mere) cessation.) But on a number of occasions the Buddha uses terminology that it
seems should be understood in just this way, for instance at MN III 245: On the dissolution of
the body, with the ending of life, all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right
here. At the same time it is hardly surprising that the Buddha should not spend too much
time proclaiming that the nature of final Nibbna is just cessation. Such statements are bound
to be misunderstood by the vast majority of people because of their sense of a permanent self
(the Buddha is in fact disparaged as an annihilationist in the suttas on a number of occasions,
for instance at AN IV 174 and M I 140), and thus it would be counterproductive to teach the
Dhamma in this way. It seems that the relative paucity of statements on the nature of final
Nibbna is simply a result of the Buddha being pragmatic as to what teachings would inspire
the majority of people who are not ariyas, whether monastic or lay.
65
Bhikkhu Brahmli
ABBREVIATIONS
AN
Aguttara-nikya (partial translation: aponika Thera and

Bhikkhu Bodhi, 1999
CDB
CPD
Dhp
DN
DP
It
MLDB
MN
Mp
NDB
The Connected Discourses of the Buddha (SN translation)

A Critical Pali Dictionary
Dhammapada
Dgha-nikya (translation: Walshe, 1995)
A Dictionary of Pali
Itivuttaka (translation: Bodhi, 2005)
The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (MN translation)
Majjhima-nikya (translation: amoli and Bodhi, 2001)
Manorathapran, the commentary on AN
The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha (Bodhis partial translation of AN)
PED
SN
Pali English Dictionary

Sayutta-nikya; references to SN I are all to the new edition
published in 1998 (translation: Bodhi, 2001
T
Thag
Ud
Vibh
Vin
Taish (edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon)

Theragth (translation: Norman, 1995)
Udna (translation: Ireland, 1997)
Vibhaga
Vinaya-piaka (translation: Horner, 19381966)
References are to the Pali Text Societys editions of the Pali texts. I have generally used the translations mentioned above in brackets (full reference below)
though in some instances no satisfactory translation was available, in particular
for the Aguttara-nikya and Vinaya-piaka. In these cases I have translated the
passages myself, as indicated above.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anlayo. 2003. Satipahna: The Direct Path to Realization. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist
Publication Society.
. Forthcoming. A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikya.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, ed. 1993. A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma. Kandy, Sri Lanka:
Buddhist Publication Society.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. 2000. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom
Publications.
. 2005. In the Buddhas Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the Pli Canon. Boston:
Wisdom Publications.
Cone, Margaret. 2001. A Dictionary of Pli, Part I, akh. Oxford: The Pali Text Society.
Harvey, Peter. 1995. The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvna in Early
66
Buddhism. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.

Horner, I.B., trans. 19381966. The Book of the Discipline, 6 vols. London: Pali Text Society.
Ireland, John D., trans. 1997. The Udna and The Itivuttaka: Two Classics from the Pali Canon.
Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society.
Johansson, Rune. 1969. The Psychology of Nirvana. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
Mah Boowa, Ajahn. 1980. Amata Dhamma. Wat Pa Bahn Tahd, Udorn-Thani, Thailand.
Published for free distribution.
amoli, Bhikkhu and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. 2001. The Middle Length Discourses of the
Buddha. Oxford: Pali Text Society.
aponika Thera and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. 1999. The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha.
Lanham: Altamira Press.
Norman, K.R. 1991. A note on att in the Alagaddpama-sutta in his Collected Papers II,
200209. Oxford: Pali Text Society.
. 1992. An Epithet of Nibbna in his Collected Papers III, 183189. Oxford: Pali Text
Society.
. 1996. Pli translations, review article R4 in his Collected Papers VI, 156170.
Oxford: Pali Text Society.
Norman, K.R., trans. 1995. Poems of Early Buddhist Monks. Oxford: Pali Text Society.
Rhys Davids, T.W. and William Stede. 1995. Pali-English Dictionary. Oxford: The Pali Text
Society.
hnissaro Bhikkhu. 1993. Not-self Strategy. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/notself.html
. 1993. The Mind Like Fire Unbound. Barre, MA: Dhamma Dana Publications.
Tranckner, V. et al. 19242001. A Critical Pali Dictionary. Copenhagen: The Royal Danish
Academy of Sciences and Letters.
Triph, Chandrabhl. 1962. Fnfundzwanzig Stras des Nidnasayukta. Sanskrittexte aus
den Turfanfunden, vol.8. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Walshe, Maurice, trans. 1995. Thus Have I Heard. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Warder, A.K. 2001. Introduction to Pali. Oxford: The Pali Text Society.
Weller, Friedrich. 1934. Brahmjlastra, Tibetischer und Mongolischer Text. Leipzig: Otto
Harrassowitz.

What The Nikayas Say About Nibbana

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BSRV 26.

Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897

What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about

The only way of moving towards consensus on the controversial subject of

What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

In the following discussion on the nature of Nibbna I will therefore base my

An initial investigation into the referents of the term Nibbna

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009

is the final destruction of the defilements, is presumably instantaneous: either

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009

Equinox Publishing Ltd 2009

What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

Is final Nibbna a permanent self?

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There is no permanent att in or outside of the five khandhas:

Is final Nibbna a form of consciousness?

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

were such a thing as a permanent consciousness devoid of suffering, that would

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In fact, by definition, consciousness exists only together with its object of

Objectless consciousness does not exist:

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

Of the five aggregates, it is most commonly via that is grasped as a self

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Anidassana via, non-manifest consciousness36

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

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standard description of the first two immaterial attainments.45 Equally important is

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

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Appatihita Via, unestablished consciousness

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

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Could Citta (mind) be a referent of final Nibbna?

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

So whenever there is consciousness, the other mental factors will also be

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

Pabhassara Citta, the radiant mind

Does the Term Citta have two Fundamentally Distinct Referents?

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Citta and Mano (Mind)

Always frightened is this mind (citta),

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

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What the Nikyas Say and Do not Say about Nibbna

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mental aggregates temporarily cease. Clearly yatana cannot refer to an existing