G.R. No.

L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly
similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent
Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa
Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao,
is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed
his certificate of candidacy for said position of
Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a
qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter,
and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the
constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to
violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in
existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal
official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law, and who shall have been 6,5
years of age at the commencement of the
term of office to which he seeks to be elected
shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has
retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision
is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr.
assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner

removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a
term of six (6) years, which shall commence
on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of
disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be
qualified to be a candidate for any of the
offices covered by this Act, or to participate in
any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any
of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing
and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials
... The election shall be held on January 30,
1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period
The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with
Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall commence on
December 29, 1979 and terminate on January
28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners
Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent
COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg.
53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art.
XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona
fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from
any form of harassment and discrimination. "The
question of accreditation will not be taken up in this
case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et
als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely
raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they
have challenged be declared null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition
suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For
one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.
Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of
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petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao

does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the
burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join
Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely
different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has
joined this suit in his individual capacity as a
candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit.
Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the
reason of their joint Petition, it would have required
only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao,
on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on
the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest
of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be
followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial
review, namely (1) the existence of an appropriate
case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the
party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea
that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case
(People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been
complied with, which is, that the parties have raised
the issue of constitutionality early enough in their
pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other
three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to
the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the
first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and
seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not
been adversely affected by the application of that
provision.
No
petition
seeking
Dumlao's
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC.
There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the
matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a
hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an
advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered
without the benefit of a detailed factual record
Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary
jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief
Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA
30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided
for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the
pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have
the following power and functions:
1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the elections, returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and
elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to
section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of
the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from his receipt of a
copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was
only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot
is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it
cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted
nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective
positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to
have been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional
Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no
personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the
absence of any litigate interest, they can claim
no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have
instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the
rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has
been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public
Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute
may be contested only by one who will sustain
a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that "the expenditure of public
funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request
of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest
essential to give the requisite standing to
attack the constitutionality of a statute, the
general rule is that not only persons
individually affected, but also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and
they
may,
therefore,
question
the
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constitutionality
of
statutes
requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs.
Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this
case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1,
and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the
disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the
elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners
allege that their tax money is "being extracted and
spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication
of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual
vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]),
or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is
no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court
in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]),
speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court
is vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a
wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of
the legislature will not be determined by the courts
unless that question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set
forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an
"appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for
petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually
without cause of action. It follows that the necessity
for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent,
and procedural regularity would require that this suit
be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two
of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being
entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus,
adherence to the strict procedural standard was
relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu
vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs.
Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the
Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our
present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved
and the proximity of the elections which will be held
only a few days hence.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP

Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is
belied by the fact that several petitions for the
disqualification of other candidates for local positions
based on the challenged provision have already been
filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15,
respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary
to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well
taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class.
For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from
younger employees. Employees attaining that age are
subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be
a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law would
be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might
be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from
government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from government
service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65
year old retiree could be a good local official just like
one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official,
who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running
for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for
new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the
retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee
has already declared himself tired and unavailable for
the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is
for this very reason that inequality will neither result
from the application of the challenged provision. Just
as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated
are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection
clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is
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germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all

Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas,
18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil.
1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments.
The classification in question being pursuant to that
purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice
Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977
ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is
a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned
provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and equivocal breach. Courts are practically
unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not
be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt
(Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing
Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on
Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is
within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe
qualifications for one who desires to become a
candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as
in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are
concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and
which they challenge, may be divided in two parts.
The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the
cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the
well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and
that Courts will not set aside a statute as
constitutionally defective "except in a clear case."
(People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold
that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article
IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous
with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office
on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It
condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is
made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty
and one against whom charges have been filed for

such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run

for public office. A person disqualified to run for public
office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as
a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty
of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty
of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as
but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that
because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of
acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather
than before an administrative body such as the
COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings
between two government bodies, to the extreme
detriment of a person charged, will thereby be
avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial
declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion
is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of
the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of
Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition
to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of
the
Constitution
and
disqualifications
mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in Section 1
hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal official, who has received payment
of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has
retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52
providing that "... the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court
or
military
tribunal after
preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact", is hereby declared null and void,
for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.
SO ORDERED.
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