1

G.R. No. L-26278

August 4, 1927

LEON SIBAL , plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EMILIANO J. VALDEZ ET AL., defendants.
EMILIANO J. VALDEZ, appellee.

judgment be rendered in his favor and against the

defendants ordering them to consent to the redemption
of the sugar cane in question, and that the defendant
Valdez be condemned to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,056 the value of palay harvested by him in the two
parcels above-mentioned ,with interest and costs.

JOHNSON, J.:

On December 27, 1924, the court, after hearing both

parties and upon approval of the bond for P6,000 filed
by the plaintiff, issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the complaint.

The action was commenced in the Court of First

Instance of the Province of Tarlac on the 14th day of
December 1924. The facts are about as conflicting as it
is possible for facts to be, in the trial causes.

The defendant Emiliano J. Valdez, in his amended

answer, denied generally and specifically each and
every allegation of the complaint and step up the
following defenses:

J. E. Blanco for appellant.

Felix B. Bautista and Santos and Benitez for appellee.

(a) That the sugar cane in question had the

As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the
nature of personal property and was not,
defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the
therefore, subject to redemption;
Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
(b) That he was the owner of parcels 1, 2 and 7
attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez
described in the first cause of action of the
the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants
complaint;
on seven parcels of land described in the complaint in
the third paragraph of the first cause of action; that
within one year from the date of the attachment and
(c) That he was the owner of the palay in
sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and
parcels 1, 2 and 7; and
tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient
to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon
(d) That he never attempted to harvest the
and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid
palay in parcels 4 and 5.
thereon after the purchase, and the interest
corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to
The defendant Emiliano J. Valdez by way of
accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the
counterclaim, alleged that by reason of the preliminary
plaintiff.
injunction he was unable to gather the sugar cane,
sugar-cane shoots (puntas de cana dulce) palay in said
As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that
parcels of land, representing a loss to him of P8,375.20
the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was attempting to
and that, in addition thereto, he suffered damages
harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels
amounting to P3,458.56. He prayed, for a judgment (1)
mentioned in the first cause of action; that he had
absolving him from all liability under the complaint;
harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of
(2) declaring him to be the absolute owner of the sugar
said seven parcels and in another parcel described in
cane in question and of the palay in parcels 1, 2 and 7;
the second cause of action, amounting to 300 cavans;
and (3) ordering the plaintiff to pay to him the sum of
and that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff.
P11,833.76, representing the value of the sugar cane
and palay in question, including damages.
Plaintiff prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued against the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez his
Upon the issues thus presented by the pleadings the
attorneys and agents, restraining them (1) from
cause was brought on for trial. After hearing the
distributing him in the possession of the parcels of
evidence, and on April 28, 1926, the Honorable
land described in the complaint; (2) from taking
Cayetano Lukban, judge, rendered a judgment against
possession of, or harvesting the sugar cane in question; the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants
and (3) from taking possession, or harvesting the palay
in said parcels of land. Plaintiff also prayed that a

(1) Holding that the sugar cane in question was

personal property and, as such, was not subject
to redemption;
(2) Absolving the defendants from all liability
under the complaint; and
(3) Condemning the plaintiff and his sureties
Cenon de la Cruz, Juan Sangalang and Marcos
Sibal to jointly and severally pay to the
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sum of
P9,439.08 as follows:
(a) P6,757.40, the value of the sugar
cane;
(b) 1,435.68, the value of the sugarcane shoots;
(c) 646.00, the value of palay harvested
by plaintiff;
(d) 600.00, the value of 150 cavans of
palay which the defendant was not able
to raise by reason of the injunction, at
P4 cavan. 9,439.08 From that judgment
the plaintiff appealed and in his
assignments of error contends that the
lower court erred: (1) In holding that
the sugar cane in question was personal
property and, therefore, not subject to
redemption;
(2) In holding that parcels 1 and 2 of the
complaint belonged to Valdez, as well as
parcels 7 and 8, and that the palay therein was
planted by Valdez;
(3) In holding that Valdez, by reason of the
preliminary injunction failed to realized
P6,757.40 from the sugar cane and P1,435.68
from sugar-cane shoots (puntas de cana dulce);
(4) In holding that, for failure of plaintiff to
gather the sugar cane on time, the defendant
was unable to raise palay on the land, which
would have netted him the sum of P600; and.
(5) In condemning the plaintiff and his sureties
to pay to the defendant the sum of P9,439.08.
It appears from the record:

(1) That on May 11, 1923, the deputy sheriff of

the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of writ of
execution in civil case No. 20203 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila (Macondray & Co.,
Inc. vs. Leon Sibal),levied an attachment on
eight parcels of land belonging to said Leon
Sibal, situated in the Province of Tarlac,
designated in the second of attachment as
parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Exhibit B,
Exhibit 2-A).
(2) That on July 30, 1923, Macondray & Co.,
Inc., bought said eight parcels of land, at the
auction held by the sheriff of the Province of
Tarlac, for the sum to P4,273.93, having paid
for the said parcels separately as follows
(Exhibit C, and 2-A):

Parcel
1 ............................................
.........................

P1.00

2 ............................................
2,000.00
.........................
3 ............................................
.........................

120.93

4 ............................................
1,000.00
.........................
5 ............................................
.........................

1.00

6 ............................................
.........................

1.00

7 with the house

thereon ..........................

150.00

8 ............................................ 1,000.00
.........................
=======
===
4,273.93
(3) That within one year from the sale of said
parcel of land, and on the 24th day of
September, 1923, the judgment debtor, Leon
Sibal, paid P2,000 to Macondray & Co., Inc.,
for the account of the redemption price of said
parcels of land, without specifying the

particular parcels to which said amount was to

applied. The redemption price said eight
parcels was reduced, by virtue of said
transaction, to P2,579.97 including interest
(Exhibit C and 2).
The record further shows:

(6) That on the same date, June 25, 1924,

Macondray & Co. sold and conveyed to Emilio
J. Valdez for P2,579.97 all of its rights and
interest in the eight parcels of land acquired by
it at public auction held by the deputy sheriff of
Tarlac in connection with civil case No. 20203
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as
stated above. Said amount represented the
unpaid balance of the redemption price of said
eight parcels, after payment by Leon Sibal of
P2,000 on September 24, 1923, fro the account
of the redemption price, as stated above.
(Exhibit C and 2).

(1) That on April 29, 1924, the defendant

Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the
Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of
execution in civil case No. 1301 of the
Province of Pampanga (Emiliano J. Valdez vs.
Leon Sibal 1. the same parties in the
present case), attached the personal property of The foregoing statement of facts shows:
said Leon Sibal located in Tarlac, among which
was included the sugar cane now in question in
(1) The Emilio J. Valdez bought the sugar cane
the seven parcels of land described in the
in question, located in the seven parcels of land
complaint (Exhibit A).
described in the first cause of action of the
complaint at public auction on May 9 and 10,
1924, for P600.
(2) That on May 9 and 10, 1924, said deputy
sheriff sold at public auction said personal
properties of Leon Sibal, including the sugar
(2) That on July 30, 1923, Macondray & Co.
cane in question to Emilio J. Valdez, who paid
became the owner of eight parcels of land
therefor the sum of P1,550, of which P600 was
situated in the Province of Tarlac belonging to
for the sugar cane (Exhibit A).
Leon Sibal and that on September 24, 1923,
Leon Sibal paid to Macondray & Co. P2,000
for the account of the redemption price of said
(3) That on April 29,1924, said deputy sheriff,
parcels.
by virtue of said writ of execution, also
attached the real property of said Leon Sibal in
Tarlac, including all of his rights, interest and
(3) That on June 25, 1924, Emilio J. Valdez
participation therein, which real property
acquired from Macondray & Co. all of its
consisted of eleven parcels of land and a house
rights and interest in the said eight parcels of
and camarin situated in one of said parcels
land.
(Exhibit A).
(4) That on June 25, 1924, Emilio J. Valdez
(4) That on June 25, 1924, eight of said eleven
also acquired all of the rights and interest
parcels, including the house and the camarin,
which Leon Sibal had or might have had on
were bought by Emilio J. Valdez at the auction
said eight parcels by virtue of the P2,000 paid
held by the sheriff for the sum of P12,200. Said
by the latter to Macondray.
eight parcels were designated in the certificate
of sale as parcels 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11. The
(5) That Emilio J. Valdez became the absolute
house and camarin were situated on parcel 7
owner of said eight parcels of land.
(Exhibit A).
The first question raised by the appeal is, whether the
(5) That the remaining three parcels, indicated sugar cane in question is personal or real property. It is
in the certificate of the sheriff as parcels 2, 12, contended that sugar cane comes under the
and 13, were released from the attachment by
classification of real property as "ungathered products"
virtue of claims presented by Agustin Cuyugan in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said
and Domiciano Tizon (Exhibit A).
paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates as real property
the following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products,
while they are annexed to the land or form an integral

part of any immovable property." That article,

however, has received in recent years an interpretation
by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which holds that,
under certain conditions, growing crops may be
considered as personal property. (Decision of March
18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil Jurisprudence of Spain.)

situacion en que se encuentre. (3 Manresa, 5.

edicion, pags. 22, 23.)

From the foregoing it appears (1) that, under Spanish

authorities, pending fruits and ungathered products
may be sold and transferred as personal property; (2)
that the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of ejectment
Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish
of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee
Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the Civil
was entitled to gather the products corresponding to
Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme
the agricultural year, because said fruits did not go
Court of Spain, admits that growing crops are
with the land but belonged separately to the lessee; and
sometimes considered and treated as personal property. (3) that under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as
He says:
amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not
include the fruits and products existing thereon, unless
the contract expressly provides otherwise.
No creemos, sin embargo, que esto excluya la
excepcionque muchos autores hacen tocante a
la venta de toda cosecha o de parte de ella
An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court
cuando aun no esta cogida (cosa frecuente con of Louisiana may give us some light on the question
la uvay y la naranja), y a la de lenas,
which we are discussing. Article 465 of the Civil Code
considerando ambas como muebles. El
of Louisiana, which corresponds to paragraph 2 of
Tribunal Supremo, en sentencia de 18 de marzo article 334 of our Civil Code, provides: "Standing
de 1904, al entender sobre un contrato de
crops and the fruits of trees not gathered, and trees
arrendamiento de un predio rustico, resuelve
before they are cut down, are likewise immovable, and
que su terminacion por desahucio no extingue
are considered as part of the land to which they are
los derechos del arrendario, para recolectar o
attached."
percibir los frutos correspondientes al ao
agricola, dentro del que nacieron aquellos
The Supreme Court of Louisiana having occasion to
derechos, cuando el arrendor ha percibido a su interpret that provision, held that in some cases
vez el importe de la renta integra
"standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as
correspondiente, aun cuando lo haya sido por
personal property. In the case of Lumber Co. vs.
precepto legal durante el curso del juicio,
Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme
fundandose para ello, no solo en que de otra
Court said: "True, by article 465 of the Civil Code it is
suerte se daria al desahucio un alcance que no provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not
tiene, sino en que, y esto es lo interesante a
gathered and trees before they are cut down . . . are
nuestro proposito, la consideracion de
considered as part of the land to which they are
inmuebles que el articulo 334 del Codigo Civil attached, but the immovability provided for is only one
atribuge a los frutos pendientes, no les priva
in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the
del caracter de productos pertenecientes, como crop acquired by others than the owners of the
tales, a quienes a ellos tenga derecho, Ilegado property to which the crop is attached. . . . The
el momento de su recoleccion.
existence of a right on the growing crop is a
mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were in
xxx
xxx
xxx
advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right
acquired therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the
possible mobilization of the growing crop." (Citizens'
Mas actualmente y por virtud de la nueva
edicion de la Ley Hipotecaria, publicada en 16 Bank vs. Wiltz, 31 La. Ann., 244; Porche vs. Bodin, 28
La., Ann., 761; Sandel vs. Douglass, 27 La. Ann., 629;
de diciembre de 1909, con las reformas
Lewis vs. Klotz, 39 La. Ann., 267.)
introducidas por la de 21 de abril anterior, la
hipoteca, salvo pacto expreso que disponga lo
contrario, y cualquiera que sea la naturaleza y
"It is true," as the Supreme Court of Louisiana said in
forma de la obligacion que garantice, no
the case of Porche vs. Bodin (28 La. An., 761) that
comprende los frutos cualquiera que sea la
"article 465 of the Revised Code says that standing
crops are considered as immovable and as part of the

land to which they are attached, and article 466

a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the
declares that the fruits of an immovable gathered or
crop movable quoad the right acquired thereon.
produced while it is under seizure are considered as
The provision of our Code is identical with the
making part thereof, and incurred to the benefit of the
Napoleon Code 520, and we may therefore
person making the seizure. But the evident meaning of
obtain light by an examination of the
these articles, is where the crops belong to the owner
jurisprudence of France.
of the plantation they form part of the immovable, and
where it is seized, the fruits gathered or produced inure The rule above announced, not only by the Tribunal
to the benefit of the seizing creditor.
Supremo de Espaa but by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, is followed in practically every state of the
A crop raised on leased premises in no sense
Union.
forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the
lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be
From an examination of the reports and codes of the
gathered or not, and it may be sold by his
State of California and other states we find that the
judgment creditors. If it necessarily forms part settle doctrine followed in said states in connection
of the leased premises the result would be that with the attachment of property and execution of
it could not be sold under execution separate
judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor
and apart from the land. If a lessee obtain
and cultivation are considered personal property. (6
supplies to make his crop, the factor's lien
Corpuz Juris, p. 197; 17 Corpus Juris, p. 379; 23
would not attach to the crop as a separate thing Corpus Juris, p. 329: Raventas vs. Green, 57 Cal., 254;
belonging to his debtor, but the land belonging Norris vs. Watson, 55 Am. Dec., 161; Whipple vs.
to the lessor would be affected with the
Foot, 3 Am. Dec., 442; 1 Benjamin on Sales, sec. 126;
recorded privilege. The law cannot be
McKenzie vs. Lampley, 31 Ala., 526; Crine vs. Tifts
construed so as to result in such absurd
and Co., 65 Ga., 644; Gillitt vs. Truax, 27 Minn., 528;
consequences.
Preston vs. Ryan, 45 Mich., 174; Freeman on
Execution, vol. 1, p. 438; Drake on Attachment, sec.
In the case of Citizen's Bank vs. Wiltz (31 La. Ann.,
249; Mechem on Sales, sec. 200 and 763.)
244)the court said:
Mr. Mechem says that a valid sale may be made of a
If the crop quoad the pledge thereof under the thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is
act of 1874 was an immovable, it would be
reasonably certain to come into existence as the natural
destructive of the very objects of the act, it
increment or usual incident of something already in
would render the pledge of the crop objects of existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then
the act, it would render the pledge of the crop
title will vest in the buyer the moment the thing comes
impossible, for if the crop was an inseparable
into existence. (Emerson vs. European Railway Co., 67
part of the realty possession of the latter would Me., 387; Cutting vs. Packers Exchange, 21 Am. St.
be necessary to that of the former; but such is
Rep., 63.) Things of this nature are said to have a
not the case. True, by article 465 C. C. it is
potential existence. A man may sell property of which
provided that "standing crops and the fruits of
he is potentially and not actually possessed. He may
trees not gathered and trees before they are cut make a valid sale of the wine that a vineyard is
down are likewise immovable and are
expected to produce; or the gain a field may grow in a
considered as part of the land to which they are given time; or the milk a cow may yield during the
attached;" but the immovability provided for is coming year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow
only one in abstracto and without reference to upon sheep; or what may be taken at the next cast of a
rights on or to the crop acquired by other than
fisherman's net; or fruits to grow; or young animals not
the owners of the property to which the crop
yet in existence; or the good will of a trade and the
was attached. The immovability of a growing
like. The thing sold, however, must be specific and
crop is in the order of things temporary, for the identified. They must be also owned at the time by the
crop passes from the state of a growing to that vendor. (Hull vs. Hull, 48 Conn., 250 [40 Am. Rep.,
of a gathered one, from an immovable to a
165].)
movable. The existence of a right on the
growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation,

It is contended on the part of the appellee that

paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been
modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as well as by Act No. 1508, the Chattel
Mortgage Law. Said section 450 enumerates the
property of a judgment debtor which may be subjected
to execution. The pertinent portion of said section
reads as follows: "All goods, chattels, moneys, and
other property, both real and personal, * * * shall be
liable to execution. Said section 450 and most of the
other sections of the Code of Civil Procedure relating
to the execution of judgment were taken from the
Code of Civil Procedure of California. The Supreme
Court of California, under section 688 of the Code of
Civil Procedure of that state (Pomeroy, p. 424) has
held, without variation, that growing crops were
personal property and subject to execution.
Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully
recognized that growing crops are personal property.
Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property
shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the
provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in
pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage."
Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be
mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement
stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly
to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing.
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No.
1508 was enacted on the assumption that "growing
crops" are personal property. This consideration tends
to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated, that
paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been
modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act
No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as
mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the
nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase
"personal property" should be understood to include
"ungathered products."
At common law, and generally in the United
States, all annual crops which are raised by
yearly manurance and labor, and essentially
owe their annual existence to cultivation by
man, . may be levied on as personal property."
(23 C. J., p. 329.) On this question Freeman, in
his treatise on the Law of Executions, says:
"Crops, whether growing or standing in the
field ready to be harvested, are, when produced
by annual cultivation, no part of the realty.
They are, therefore, liable to voluntary transfer

as chattels. It is equally well settled that they

may be seized and sold under execution.
(Freeman on Executions, vol. p. 438.)
We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article
334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section
450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No.
1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment
and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature
of personal property. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in holding that the sugar cane in
question was personal property and, as such, was not
subject to redemption.
All the other assignments of error made by the
appellant, as above stated, relate to questions of fact
only. Before entering upon a discussion of said
assignments of error, we deem it opportune to take
special notice of the failure of the plaintiff to appear at
the trial during the presentation of evidence by the
defendant. His absence from the trial and his failure to
cross-examine the defendant have lent considerable
weight to the evidence then presented for the defense.
Coming not to the ownership of parcels 1 and 2
described in the first cause of action of the complaint,
the plaintiff made a futile attempt to show that said
two parcels belonged to Agustin Cuyugan and were the
identical parcel 2 which was excluded from the
attachment and sale of real property of Sibal to Valdez
on June 25, 1924, as stated above. A comparison of the
description of parcel 2 in the certificate of sale by the
sheriff (Exhibit A) and the description of parcels 1 and
2 of the complaint will readily show that they are not
the same.
The description of the parcels in the complaint is as
follows:
1. La caa dulce sembrada por los inquilinos
del ejecutado Leon Sibal 1. en una parcela de
terreno de la pertenencia del citado ejecutado,
situada en Libutad, Culubasa, Bamban, Tarlac,
de unas dos hectareas poco mas o menos de
superficie.
2. La caa dulce sembrada por el inquilino del
ejecutado Leon Sibal 1., Ilamado Alejandro
Policarpio, en una parcela de terreno de la
pertenencia del ejecutado, situada en Dalayap,
Culubasa, Bamban, Tarlac de unas dos

hectareas de superficie poco mas o menos."

The description of parcel 2 given in the
certificate of sale (Exhibit A) is as follows:
2a. Terreno palayero situado en Culubasa,
Bamban, Tarlac, de 177,090 metros cuadrados
de superficie, linda al N. con Canuto Sibal,
Esteban Lazatin and Alejandro Dayrit; al E.
con Francisco Dizon, Felipe Mau and others;
al S. con Alejandro Dayrit, Isidro Santos and
Melecio Mau; y al O. con Alejandro Dayrit
and Paulino Vergara. Tax No. 2854, vador
amillarado P4,200 pesos.
On the other hand the evidence for the defendant
purported to show that parcels 1 and 2 of the complaint
were included among the parcels bought by Valdez
from Macondray on June 25, 1924, and corresponded
to parcel 4 in the deed of sale (Exhibit B and 2), and
were also included among the parcels bought by
Valdez at the auction of the real property of Leon Sibal
on June 25, 1924, and corresponded to parcel 3 in the
certificate of sale made by the sheriff (Exhibit A). The
description of parcel 4 (Exhibit 2) and parcel 3
(Exhibit A) is as follows:
Parcels No. 4. Terreno palayero, ubicado en
el barrio de Culubasa,Bamban, Tarlac, I. F. de
145,000 metros cuadrados de superficie,
lindante al Norte con Road of the barrio of
Culubasa that goes to Concepcion; al Este con
Juan Dizon; al Sur con Lucio Mao y Canuto
Sibal y al Oeste con Esteban Lazatin, su valor
amillarado asciende a la suma de P2,990. Tax
No. 2856.
As will be noticed, there is hardly any relation between
parcels 1 and 2 of the complaint and parcel 4 (Exhibit
2 and B) and parcel 3 (Exhibit A). But, inasmuch as
the plaintiff did not care to appear at the trial when the
defendant offered his evidence, we are inclined to give
more weight to the evidence adduced by him that to
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, with respect to
the ownership of parcels 1 and 2 of the compliant. We,
therefore, conclude that parcels 1 and 2 of the
complaint belong to the defendant, having acquired the
same from Macondray & Co. on June 25, 1924, and
from the plaintiff Leon Sibal on the same date.
It appears, however, that the plaintiff planted the palay
in said parcels and harvested therefrom 190 cavans.
There being no evidence of bad faith on his part, he is

therefore entitled to one-half of the crop, or 95 cavans.

He should therefore be condemned to pay to the
defendant for 95 cavans only, at P3.40 a cavan, or the
sum of P323, and not for the total of 190 cavans as
held by the lower court.
As to the ownership of parcel 7 of the complaint, the
evidence shows that said parcel corresponds to parcel
1 of the deed of sale of Macondray & Co, to Valdez
(Exhibit B and 2), and to parcel 4 in the certificate of
sale to Valdez of real property belonging to Sibal,
executed by the sheriff as above stated (Exhibit A).
Valdez is therefore the absolute owner of said parcel,
having acquired the interest of both Macondray and
Sibal in said parcel.
With reference to the parcel of land in Pacalcal, Tarlac,
described in paragraph 3 of the second cause of action,
it appears from the testimony of the plaintiff himself
that said parcel corresponds to parcel 8 of the deed of
sale of Macondray to Valdez (Exhibit B and 2) and to
parcel 10 in the deed of sale executed by the sheriff in
favor of Valdez (Exhibit A). Valdez is therefore the
absolute owner of said parcel, having acquired the
interest of both Macondray and Sibal therein.
In this connection the following facts are worthy of
mention:
Execution in favor of Macondray & Co., May 11,
1923. Eight parcels of land were attached under said
execution. Said parcels of land were sold to
Macondray & Co. on the 30th day of July, 1923. Rice
paid P4,273.93. On September 24, 1923, Leon Sibal
paid to Macondray & Co. P2,000 on the redemption of
said parcels of land. (See Exhibits B and C ).
Attachment, April 29, 1924, in favor of Valdez.
Personal property of Sibal was attached, including the
sugar cane in question. (Exhibit A) The said personal
property so attached, sold at public auction May 9 and
10, 1924. April 29, 1924, the real property was
attached under the execution in favor of Valdez
(Exhibit A). June 25, 1924, said real property was sold
and purchased by Valdez (Exhibit A).
June 25, 1924, Macondray & Co. sold all of the land
which they had purchased at public auction on the 30th
day of July, 1923, to Valdez.
As to the loss of the defendant in sugar cane by reason
of the injunction, the evidence shows that the sugar

cane in question covered an area of 22 hectares and 60

ares (Exhibits 8, 8-b and 8-c); that said area would
8,900.80
have yielded an average crop of 1039 picos and 60
============
cates; that one-half of the quantity, or 519 picos and 80
cates would have corresponded to the defendant, as
In all other respects, the judgment appealed from is
owner; that during the season the sugar was selling at
hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
P13 a pico (Exhibit 5 and 5-A). Therefore, the
defendant, as owner, would have netted P 6,757.40
from the sugar cane in question. The evidence also
shows that the defendant could have taken from the
sugar cane 1,017,000 sugar-cane shoots (puntas de
cana) and not 1,170,000 as computed by the lower
court. During the season the shoots were selling at
P1.20 a thousand (Exhibits 6 and 7). The defendant
therefore would have netted P1,220.40 from sugarcane shoots and not P1,435.68 as allowed by the lower
court.
As to the palay harvested by the plaintiff in parcels 1
and 2 of the complaint, amounting to 190 cavans, onehalf of said quantity should belong to the plaintiff, as
stated above, and the other half to the defendant. The
court erred in awarding the whole crop to the
defendant. The plaintiff should therefore pay the
defendant for 95 cavans only, at P3.40 a cavan, or
P323 instead of P646 as allowed by the lower court.
The evidence also shows that the defendant was
prevented by the acts of the plaintiff from cultivating
about 10 hectares of the land involved in the litigation.
He expected to have raised about 600 cavans of palay,
300 cavans of which would have corresponded to him
as owner. The lower court has wisely reduced his share
to 150 cavans only. At P4 a cavan, the palay would
have netted him P600.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from
is hereby modified. The plaintiff and his sureties
Cenon de la Cruz, Juan Sangalang and Marcos Sibal
are hereby ordered to pay to the defendant jointly and
severally the sum of P8,900.80, instead of P9,439.08
allowed by the lower court, as follows:
P6,757.40 for the sugar cane;
1,220.40 for the sugar cane shoots;
323.00

for the palay harvested by

plaintiff in parcels 1 and 2;

600.00

for the palay which

defendant could have raised.