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EVIDENCE
1.

What are the three requisites of Estoppel in Pais? (Kalalo vs. Luz 34 SCRA 337)
a. As to the party to be stopped;
(1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated
to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the
party subsequently attempts to assert;
(2) intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the
other party; and
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.
b.

As to the party claiming estoppels

(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in questions;
(2) (reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) action or
inaction based thereon of such character as To change the position or status of the party claiming the
estoppel, to his injury, detriment or prejudice. 1

2.

What is the presumption as to the sanity and motives of a person?

(Vales vs. Villa, December 16, 1916)
All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be moved by substantially the same motives.
When of age and sane, they must take care of themselves. In their relation with others in the business of life,
wits, sense, intelligence, training, ability and judgment meet and clash and contest, sometimes with gain and
advantage to all, sometimes to a few only, with loss and injury to others. In these contests men must depend
upon themselves upon their own abilities, talents, training, sense, acument, judgment. The fact that one
may be worsted by another, of itself, furnishes no cause of complaint. One man cannot complain because
another is more able, or better trained, or has better sense of judgment than he has; and when the two meet
on a fair field the inferior cannot murmur if the battle goes against him.
The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior, any more than it protects the
strong because he is strong. The law furnishes protection to both alike to one or more or less than to the
other. It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish, the great and the small, the strong and the
weak. The foolish may lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back to
them again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him
from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts
cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not
because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or
overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose
money by them indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.
There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong,
before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.

3.

What is the test in determining where the burden of proof lies? (Aznar vs. Aying, 458 SCRA 746)
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail
if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to
obtain.
Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of proving it and unless the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, his cause
will not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up
in answer to the plaintiffs claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts the truth of the matter he
has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to
do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.

4.

Burden of Proof of Negative Allegation; Compare the SC Ruling in the following cases:

a. People vs. Quebral , September 27, 1939

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LJC Notes

b. Abenes vs. CA , 515 SCRA 690 (2007)

c. People vs. Lagman 573 SCRA 224 (2008)
d. Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCRA 592 (2007)
CASE
People vs. Quebral
September 27, 1939

Abenes vs. CA ,
515 SCRA 690 (2007)

People vs. Lagman

573 SCRA 224 (2008)

Berdin vs. Mascarinas

526 SCRA 592 (2007)

RULING
The rule is, and has always been, that, if the subject of the negative avernment,
like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law,
inheres in the offense as an essential ingredient thereof, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the same. In view, however, of the difficult office of proving a
negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need do no more
than make a prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable.
he rule, however, is different when the subject of the negative avernment does
not constitute an essential element of the offense, but is purely a matter of
defense. In such case, the burden of proof is upon the defendant.
In view of the foregoing provisions, while it is well-settled that under P.D. No.
1866, as amended, the burden to prove the negative allegation that the accused
has no license or permit to carry a firearm lies with the prosecution; under the
Omnibus Election Code, however, the burden to adduce evidence that accused is
exempt from the COMELEC Gun Ban, lies with the accused.
The GENERAL RULE is that if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative
allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the
prosecution has the burden to prove the charge. However, this rule is not
without exception.
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the
facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the
truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if
untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a
charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a license
(as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of a regulated
drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter which is
peculiarity within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer
conviction. (Emphasis supplied)
Although a public hearing is necessary for the enactment of Tax Ordinance No.
88-11-36, still we uphold its validity in view of petitioners failure to present
evidence to show that no public hearing was conducted.[41] Petitioners, as the
party asserting a negative allegation, had the burden of proving lack of public
hearing.
Although the Sangguniang Bayan had the control of records or the better
means of proof regarding the facts alleged and respondent public officials
assumed an uncooperative stance to petitioners request for copies of the
Minutes of their deliberation, petitioners are not relieved from this burden.

5.

May estoppels arise from silence? (Pasiom vs. Melegrino, 519 SCRA 378, 2007)
Estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words. Estoppel by silence arises where a person, who by
force of circumstances is obliged to another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby induces the other to
believe in the existence of a state of facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may support an
estoppel whether the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.

6.

What are the requisites for presumption of suppression of evidence to apply? (Blue Cross vs.
Olivares, 544 SCRA 580 (2008)

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LJC Notes

a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;

(b) the suppression was not willful;
(c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative and
(d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege
7.

Meaning of possession of stolen objects under Section 3 (j), Rule 131 (Roque vs. People , 444
SCRA 61, 2004)
Under the rules of evidence, there is a fixed number of presumptions. These are contained in Sections 2 and 3
of Rule 131, of the Revised Rules of Court. Courts of law should not be too ready to generate other
presumptions. After a thorough review of all the presumptions enumerated in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 131, the
presumption that comes closest to the one the RTC and Court of Appeals relied on is paragraph (j), Section 3
of Rule 131, which reads:
That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the
doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
In a long line of cases,[21] this Court has always applied this presumption to a situation where property has
been stolen and the stolen property is found in the possession of the accused. In these cases the possession
of the accused gives rise to the presumption that the accused is the taker of the stolen property. In the
presumption availed of by the lower courts the property found in the possession of the accused, which is the
withdrawal slip, is not stolen property. Furthermore, the presumption the lower court made was not that the
petitioner stole anything, but rather that the petitioner was the maker of the withdrawal slip. It is plain that
the presumption used by the lower court and the one found in paragraph (j), Section 3 of Rule 131 are
different. Consequently, there is no basis for the finding that the withdrawal slip was prepared by the
petitioner.

8.

Does the presumption of regularity of official duty apply to:

a.) Discretionary acts? (Republic vs. Principalia, 487 SCRA 609, 2006 ; G.R. NO. 167639)
Finally, the presumption of regular performance of duty by the POEA under Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, finds no application in the case at bar, as it applies only where a duty is imposed on an
official to act in a certain way, and assumes that the law tells him what his duties are. Therefore the
presumption that an officer will discharge his duties according to law does not apply where his duties are
not specified by law and he is given unlimited discretion.23 The issue threshed out before the trial court
was whether the order of suspension should be implemented pending appeal. It did not correct a
ministerial duty of the POEA. As such, the presumption on the regularity of performance of duty does not
apply.

b.) When the act pertain to another person or agency? (Reyes, Jr. vs. Belisario, 596 SCRA 31 (2009)
As a general rule, "official acts" enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be overthrown
only by evidence to the contrary. When an act is official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the
assumption that the law tells the official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties accordingly.
But not all acts of public officers are "official acts," i.e., acts specified by law as an official duty or as a function
attached to a public position, and the presumption does not apply when an officials acts are not within the
duties specified by law, particularly when his acts properly pertain or belong to another entity, agency, or
public official.
9.

Sufficient consideration for contract, who has the burden of proving it? (Estate of Miller vs. Estate
of Parsons, 504 SCRA 67 (2006)
A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a
fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the

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LJC Notes

fact presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of overthrowing by substantial and
credible evidence the presumption. Under the law on evidence, it is presumed that there was sufficient
consideration for a contract.
10. What requisites must be established for the presumption of receipt of mail matter to apply?
(Barcelon vs. CIR, 498 SCRA 126, 2006)
In Protectors Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered
mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was
received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are:
(a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and
(b) that it was mailed.
While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a
disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden
upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
addressee.
11. Presumption of continuing existence of a thing ; what is its effect in the burden of proof? (Teves
vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309 , 2004)
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal
application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any
evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is
rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with
things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he
turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [could no longer
devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure is not sufficient proof that he
divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to
Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
12. May the transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) of the testimony of a witness-accused in another
trial be admissible in evidence against him? (Fullero vs. People 533 SCRA 97)
Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript of the record of the
proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be
deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.
Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March
1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly admitted that he is
a civil engineer, is not what it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct. Moreover, as earlier elucidated,
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a
public officer. Exhibit F, being an official entry in the courts records, is admissible in evidence and there is no
necessity to produce the concerned stenographer as a witness.
13. What is the doctrine of incomplete testimony? Does the rule admit any exception? (People vs.
Gorospe, GR No. 51513, May 15, 1984; De Castro vs. De Casro, 589 SCRA 277)
DOCTRINE OF INCOMPLETE TESTIMONY: When cross examination cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party who offered the witness, the incomplete testimony is rendered incompetent
and should be stricken from the record. Except: where the prosecution witness was extensively crossexamined on the material points and thereafter failed to appear and cannot be produced despite a warrant for

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his arrest. (People v. GOrospe, GR 51513, May 15, 1984)

14. May an adverse evidence presented by a party to be considered against him or an evidence
presented by the plaintiff be considered in favor of the defendant?
15. Is the party who calls the adverse party as his hostile witness bound by whatever testimony the
latter gives? (Gaw vs. Chua, 551 SCRA 505; Titan Construction vs. Uni-field , 517 SCRA 180)
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be bound by the
formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance that his adversary was put on the witness
stand. Under a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party does not
vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his testimony if it is not contradicted or remains
unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only in the sense
that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness
testifies on. A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony
does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, but merely that the calling party shall
not be precluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him.
This, Concepcion failed to do as in her own testimony, she failed to discredit the Suy Ben Chuas testimony on
how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property.
In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be considered, regardless of the party who
offered them in evidence. The testimony of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its
proper weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach the witness or
contradict his testimony.
16. May a complainant in an administrative case be impeached that she was charged with criminal
cases? (CSC vs. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578)
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a persons
integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief.[19] A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his
general reputation for truth,[20] honesty[21] or integrity.[22] Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness. A witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to character or
reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in his own behalf places
himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be impeached by an attack on his
character or reputation.[23]

17. Are documents kept by the church considered public documents? (Sps. Fidel vs. CA, 559 SCRA
186; Llemos vs. Llemos, 513 SCRA 128)
It is well-settled that Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation
of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by
duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are
all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.

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18. Are financial reports of a corporation considered public documents? Does it make any difference
if the said report is an audited one ? What about if, the copy was obtained from and certified as a
true copy by either the BIR or the SEC ? (Salas vs. Sta. Mesa Market, 527 SCRA 465)
Financial statements, whether audited or not, are, as general rule, private documents. However, once financial
statements are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness. [30] On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly
authenticated.
19. How should the execution of a private document be proven? (Lee vs. People, 440 SCRA 662)
Rule 132, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure on how the authenticity and due
execution of a private document which is offered as authentic may be proved:
Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The testimony of an eyewitness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must state that
the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. 45 The admission of that
party against whom the document is offered, of the authenticity and due execution thereof, is admissible in
evidence to prove the existence, authenticity and due execution of such document.

20. What does it means when a person admits genuineness and due execution of a document he
executed? (Simon vs. Canlas, 487 SCRA 433)
This Court ruled that the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document simply means that
the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another
for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in
the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by
law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. However, it does
not preclude a party from arguing against it by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration. Petitioners therefore are not barred from presenting evidence
regarding their claim of want of consideration.
21. What is the evidentiary value of a public document? (Angeles vs. Angeles, 469 SCRA 363)
A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth certificate prima
facie evidentiary value of filiation:
Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried
mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias.
How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her
legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And
any lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such
prima facie evidence when and if the father dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx[30]

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22. How may official records in the Philippines be proved? (Heirs of Gabatan vs. CA, 581 SCRA 70)
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the formalities
required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating
and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private
document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private
document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court.
23. What is the effect of the notarization of a document?;
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity.
Does the allegation that the party who supposedly acknowledged the document did not appear
before the notary public render the document inadmissible in evidence? (Tigno vs. Sps Aquino,
444 SCRA 61; St. Marys Farm vs. Prima Real Property, 560 SCRA 704)
We do not agree, because in the past, we have already held that the non-appearance of the party before the
notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties transaction void ab
initio.10 However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which
warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, we agree with the respondent court that it is not
enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board resolution.
To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
24. What is the effect of using a jurat instead of acknowledgement when the document is required
by law to be acknowledged? (Pan Pacific vs. CA, 482 SCRA 163, Tigno vs. Sps Aquino, see no. 11)
The use of a jurat, instead of an acknowledgement does not elevate the Marital Consent to the level of a public
document but instead consigns it to the status of a private writing.The lack of acknowledgment, however, does
not render a deed invalid. The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real
rights over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience; it is not
essential for validity or enforceability.
From the perspective of the law on evidence, however, the presumption of regularity does not hold true with
respect to the Marital Consent which is a private writing.

25. Is it necessary that a notarized document be submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court for its
admissibility in evidence? (Destreza vs. Rinoza- Plazo, 604 SCRA 775)
Indeed, the notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary Public in
submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila. It is the swearing of a person before
the Notary Public and the latters act of signing and affixing his seal on the deed that is material and not the
submission of the notarial report.
Parties who appear before a notary public to have their documents notarized should not be expected to follow
up on the submission of the notarial reports. They should not be made to suffer the consequences of the
negligence of the Notary Public in following the procedures prescribed by the Notarial Law.

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26. May documents not formally offered during the trial be considered in evidence on appeal? (Sps.
Ragudo vs. Fabella, 466 SCRA 131 (2005) ; Heirs of Cruz- Zamora vs. Multiwood, 576 SCRA 137)

SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (Emphasis supplied).
To stress, it was only during the hearing of the motion for execution pending appeal that said documents were
presented and offered in evidence. Sure, the trial court admitted them, but the admission was only for the
purpose for which they were offered, that is, by way of opposition to FETAs motion for execution pending
appeal. It is basic in the law of evidence that the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which
it was offered.[23]
While the said documents may have the right to stay in the records of the case for purposes of the incidental
issue of execution pending appeal, they do not have that same right insofar as far as the main case is
concerned, and ought not be considered in the resolution thereof.

27. What is the effect of a partys failure to offer its evidence? (Heirs of Pasag vs. Parocha, 522 SCRA
410)
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable
period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it.
Waiver of the Offer of Evidence
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A
formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only
and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.10 Its function is to enable the trial judge to
know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence.11 On the other hand, this
allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as
the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of Appeals13 ruled
that the formal offer of ones evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a considerable period
of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months
because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in
effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."14
28. When should the court rule on the admissibility of a documentary evidence? (Yu vs. CA, 476 SCRA
443)
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the
evidence has been formally offered. For a long time, the Court has recognized that during the early stages of
the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is
relevant or not, and thus the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be
avoided
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much
less formally offered before it. In fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming
that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to
make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject documents prior
to the assessment of its probable worth. As observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling
on the admissibility of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the proper conduct of trial.