G.R. No.

L-46903

July 23, 1987

BUHAY DE ROMA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD
CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda de Roma, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay
de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30,
1971, and administration proceedings were instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian
of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time
filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda
on the ground that certain properties earlier donated by
Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been
included.1
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut
land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute regarding their
evaluation; what the parties cannot agree upon is whether these
lands are subject to collation. The private respondent rigorously
argues that it is, conformably to Article 1061 of the Civil Code.
Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no
obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such
collation and the donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place
among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donor

should repudiate the inheritance, unless the

donation should be reduced as inofficious.
The issue was resolved in favor of the petitioner by the
trial court,* which held that the decedent, when she made
the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly prohibited
collation. Moreover, the donation did not impair the
legitimes of the two adopted daughters as it could be
accommodated in, and in fact was imputed to, the free
portion of Candelaria's estate.3
On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the
respondent court** holding that the deed of donation
contained no express prohibition to collate as an
exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered collation
and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
including the fruits of the donated property, between
Buhay and Rosalinda.4
The pertinent portions of the deed of donation are as follows:
IKALAWA. Na alang-alang sa aking pagmamahal,
pagtingin at pagsisilbi sa akin ng aking anak na si
BUHAY DE ROMA, kasal kay Arabella Castaneda, may
karampatang gulang, mamamayang Pilipino at
naninirahan at may pahatirang-sulat din dito sa Lunsod
ng San Pablo sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito ay
kusang-loob kong ibinibigay, ipinagkakaloob at inililipat
sa nabanggit na BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga
kahalili at tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay
na di na mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng
lupa na sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na
ngayon pa ay siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng
mga lupang ito at kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga
hoja declaratoria ng mga lupang ito sa kanyang
pangalan, datapwa't samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay
ako rin ang makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at
mamomosesion sa mga nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang
mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa
pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng

mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga

lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan
na ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion. 5
We agree with the respondent court that there is nothing in the
above provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated
properties. As the said court correctly observed, the phrase "sa
pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli" merely
described the donation as "irrevocable" and should not be
construed as an express prohibition against collation.6 The fact
that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the
subject thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime" and "free
portion" in the deed of donation that it was prepared by a lawyer,
and we may also presume he understood the legal consequences
of the donation being made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the
precise language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been the
donor's intention.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under
the clear language of Article 1062.1awphil The suggestion that
there was an implied prohibition because the properties donated
were imputable to the free portion of the decedent's estate merits
little consideration. Imputation is not the question here, nor is it
claimed that the disputed donation is officious The sole issue is
whether or not there was an express prohibition to collate, and we
see none.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly
and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced
in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we
apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
There is no need to dwell long on the other error assigned by the
petitioner regarding the decision of the appealed case by the
respondent court beyond the 12-month period prescribed by
Article X, Section 11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. As we held
in Marcelino v. Cruz,7 the said provision was merely directory and

failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding

courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
It is worth stressing that the aforementioned provision has now
been reworded in Article VIII, Section 15, of the 1987 Constitution,
which also impresses upon the courts of justice, indeed with
greater urgency, the need for the speedy disposition of the cases
that have been clogging their dockets these many years. Serious
studies and efforts are now being taken by the Court to meet that
need.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

The hero of this story we shall call Old Man Tumpao although at
the time it all began he was still a young and vigorous man. He
had a first wife by whom he begot three children, who are the
private respondents in this case. 1 Upon her death, he took to
himself a second wife, by whom he had no issue but who had two
children she had "adopted" according to the practice of the Igorots
then. 2 It is their children who, with some others, are the
petitioners in this case.
The facts are as simple as the ancient hills.
On September 4, 1937, Old Man Tumpao executed what he called
a "last will and testament" the dispositive portion of which
declared:

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986

ANITA MANG-OY, assisted by her husband, William Mang-oy;
LEONORA MIGUEL, assisted by her husband, Miguel Olila;
HELENA TAYNAN, and JOSE TUMPAO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, BANDO TUMPAO, LAMBIA
TUMPAO, married to Salming Pirazo, and ABITO
TUMPAO, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
We are back to the early 1900's in the cool regions of the
Mountain Province, setting of many legends of adventure and
romance among the highlanders of the North. Our story is not as
fanciful, involving as it does not a rivalry for the hand of a beautiful
Igorot maiden but a prosaic dispute over a piece of land. Even so,
as in those tales of old, the issue shall be decided in favor of the
just and deserving albeit according to the dictates not of the heart
but of the law.

Lastly, I appoint my son BANDO TUMPAO,

whom I named, that after departing from this
life, he shall be the one to carry or fulfill my
Testament, and that he shall have the power to
see and dispose all what I have stated, he shall
not change what I have already stated in my
Testament so that there is truth in my will. I will
affix my right thumbmark at the end of my
written name because I do not know how to
read and write, after it has been read to me and
affirm all what is my Win this 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon this 4th day of September 1937,
before those who are present and have heard
what I have stated, Pico La Trinidad, Benguet,
4th September, 1937. 3
The contents of this document were read to the beneficiaries
named therein who at the time were already occupying the
portions respectively allotted to them. In implementation of this
document, they then, on September 7, 1937, executed an
agreement providing as follows:
We who are named children and who will inherit
from our father TUMPAO: BANDO TUMPAO,
LAMBIA ABITO, JOSE and LABET, and we also
whose lands are included, SUCDAD BUTIOG,
TULINGAN PUL-OT and ANTHONY MENECIO
all of legal age and residing in the town of La

Trinidad, Sub-Province of Benguet we say in

truth after swearing under oath in accordance to
law that the testament of our father TUMPAO
who is presently ill by virtue of our right to inherit
and also acknowledge or recognize the lands as
included in the area of said land as appearing in
Title No. 416 in the name of our father TUMPAO
here in La Trinidad, Barrio Pico, have heard and
understood the Will as told by him concerning
our right to the land which we will inherit and
also to those whose lands which were included
in the said Title No. 416 because we were all
called be present and hear his wilt We heard
and agreed to his will as appearing in his
testament regarding the land which we will
inherit. We also recognized and agree to the
appointment of our brother BANDO to whom the
parcels of land is to be delivered and he will
also be the one, to deliver to us our shares as
soon as we will demand the partition in
accordance with the will of our father TUMPAO
as soon in the Testament which we saw and
have heard by all.
It is also agreed upon among us in this
confirmation that when our brother BANDO who
is appointed to distribute to us our shares we
affirm in this instrument that will answer for all
the expenses when it shag be surveyed so the
share of each will be segregated so also with
the approval of the title, which shall appear the
name of each of us and that we do not dispute
the land which we are actually working shall
pertain to us as embodied in the said win of our
father TUMPAO.
We execute this deed of confirmation in the
presence of the Notary Public here in Baguio so
that this Will, be used as our agreement so also
with the wig of our father so that they be one to
be followed as regard upon by all and we affix
our right thumbmark at the end of our written
name because we do not know how to read and

write this 7th day of September, 1937 in the City

of Baguio. 4
Two days later, Old Man Tumpao died.
The parties remained in possession of the lots assigned to them,
apparently in obedience to the wish of Old Man Tumpao as
expressed in his last "will" and affirmed by the other abovequoted
instrument. But things changed unexpectedly in 1960, twenty
three years later, that brought this matter to the courts.
On November 4, 1960, the respondents executed an extrajudicial
partition in which they divided the property of Old Man Tumpao
among the three of them only, to the exclusion of the other
persons mentioned in the above-quoted documents. 5 By virtue of
this partition, Old Man Tumpao's title was cancelled and another
one was issued in favor of the three respondents. 6
It is this title that is now being questioned by the petitioners, who
are suing for reconveyance. They had been sustained by the trial
court, 7 which, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
They are before this Court to challenge that reversal.
In deciding against them, the Court of Appeals held that the "will"
executed by Old Man Tumpao was null and void because it had
not been probated The agreement of partition among the
supposed beneficiaries of the will was nullified because it was a
partition inter vivos and had not been approved by the Director of
the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes. It was likewise held that the
land in dispute was acquired during Old Man Tumpao's first
marriage although it was registered during his second marriage
and so the petitioners were liable in rentals for the lots occupied
by them, as well as attorney's fees. 8
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made
both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals-that the will, not
having been probated as required by law, was inoperative as
such. The settled principle, as announced in a long line of
decisions in accordance with the Rules of Court, is that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or
allowed in court. 9

We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the

basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force
at the time the said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao
in 1937. The said article reads as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition
of his properties by an act inter vivos, or by win,
such partition shall stand in so far as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
On this score, we agree with the trial court. The applicable
decision is Albela vs. Albela, 10 also decided by the Court of
Appeals, with Justice J.B.L. Reyes as the ponente.
In this case, Agustin Albela executed on January 19, 1935, a deed
of partition dividing two parcels of land between hisdaughters,
Eduarda and Restituta, who indicated their conformity by signing
the instrument. The took possession of their respective shares
upon his death, but fourteen years later, Restituta ejected
Eduarda from her lot, alleging title by purchase from a third party
and denying the existence of the partition. Eduarda sued for
recovery and was upheld by the trial court on the basis of the
deed of partition.
Let Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who later became a distinguished
member of this Court, take over at this point:
In their argument, appellants do not question
the authenticity of the above document, but
argue against its validity, on the grounds
summarized in their brief (p. 7), as follows:
Therefore the allegations of the plaintiffappellee, Eduarda Albela, rest on a document
which defies classification. If it is a deed of
partition, it is null and void because it is not
embodied in a public document; if it is a simple
donation of realty, it is also null and void,
because it is not in a public document and there
is no acceptance; if it is a donation Mortis
Causa, certainly it is null and void because it
does not follow the rules governing
testamentary succession; and if ever it is to be

classified as a will, more so, it is still null and

void because it does not conform to the
requirements of Section 618, Act 190 as
amended by Act 2645.
None of these objections is valid in law. The
appellants evidently fail to realize that Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1889 authorizes a
testator to partition inter vivos his property, and
distribute them among his heirs, and that this
partition is not necessarily either a donation nor
a testament, but an instrument of a special
character, sui generis, which is revocable at any
time by the causanteduring his lifetime, and
does not operate as a conveyance of title until
his death. It derives its binding force on the
heirs from the respect due to the will of the
owner of the property, limited only by his
creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of
the forced heirs. 'El testador es libre y sus
herederos han de pasar por lo que haga en
cuanto no perjudique la legitime de los
forsozos. Inutil es sonar en otras limitaciones
que no existen.' (7 Manresa Commentaries, 6th
Ed., p. 639.
That such partition is not governed by the rules
of wills or donations inter vivos is a
consequence of its special nature. Says the
learned Manresa on this point:
Con estas palabras (en acto entre vivos) la ley
en el Articulo 1056, como en el 1057, que
despues examinaremos, alude a las
formalidades con que puede practicarse la
particion, no a los efectos de esta, significando
que para ella no es preciso que intervengan las
formas solemnes que todo testamento o acto
de ultima voluntad en general requiere. Ni aun
sera preciso guardar las formalidades
especiales de las donaciones, porque no se
trata de disponer a titulo gratuito, sino de divider
aquellos bienes de que ya anteriormente

sedispuso en forma legal (Emphasis supplied.

Op. Cit., p. 635)
It was sufficient, therefore, that the partition
Exhibit A, should be in writing. It does not have
to be in a public document except to affect third
persons (Art. 1280), being valid between the
parties who signed it in its present form.
If any invalidity could be alleged against the
partition, it would lie in the absence of a
previous testament preceding it (Legasto v.
Verzosa, 54 Phil. 766). And even this may not
be indispensable in the present case, for the
testator's partition did not depart from the
shares allotted to his heirs by the law of
intestacy. Nor is a prior win necessary under
Article 1080 of the new Civil Code, which
replaced the word 'testator' in Article 1056 of the
Code of 1889 with the broader term 'person.'
Be that as it may, the nullity of the partition
Exhibit A would not alter the result. There being
only two daughters surviving the deceased
Agustin, each one of them would necessarily be
entitled to one-half of each of the two parcels he
owned at his death, and Agustin's former
ownership is no longer disputed by the
appellants in this instance. In addition, since
both daughters signed the partition Exhibit A, its
terms would bind both, and estop them from
asserting a different interest. Appellants' act; in
appropriating the whole inheritance and its fruits
can find no support in law or justice.
There is no difference in legal effect between Agustin Albela's
deed of partition and Old Man Tumpao's "last will and testament."
Both are sustainable under Article 1056 of the Civil Code, which
was in force at the time they were executed Even as Agustin
Albela's partition was signed by the two daughters themselves, so
was Old Man Tumpao's "will" affirmed by the beneficiaries in their
agreement of September 7, 1937, which reiterated and
recognized the terms of such "will." While not valid as a

partition inter vivos under Articles 816 and 1271 of the old Civil
Code, it was nevertheless binding on the parties as proof of their
conformity to the dispositions made by Old Man Tumpao in his
"last will and testament."

Under the old Civil Code, it was within the free

disposable portion of ones' estate despite the
existence of any forced heirs. (See old Civil
Code, Art. 808)

As the trial court put it:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the

defendants are ordered to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs of the areas
respectively owned and occupied by them and
to pay the costs.

The will alone, 'Exh. B', would be inoperative for

the simple reason that it was not probated,
However, when the persons who were named
therein as heirs and beneficiaries voluntarily
agreed in writing to abide by its terms probably
to save the expenses of probate. and
furthermore, carried out its terms after the death
of the testator until now, then it must be held to
be binding between them.
Said agreement was not a disposal of
inheritance by a prospective heir before the
death of the testator, but an agreement to carry
out the will. It was not contested by the
defendants and after the lapse of 25 years their
right, if any, to assail it has prescribed under Art.
1144 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1144-The following actions must be brought
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
1) upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment.
Any formal defect of the deed, 'Exh. 'C', was
cured by the lapse of time.
What the plaintiffs received had an aggregate
area of less than 1/3 of the land of Old Tumpao.
It covers about 11,000 square meters while the
total area was more than 35,000 square meters,

Sucdad Butiog is ordered to pay the defendants

P160.00 more as a reasonable amount of his
additional share in the expenses of segregating
his lot but the (defendants) are ordered to
execute a deed of conveyance in his favor of
the said lot owned by him.
The expenses of Survey and segregation must
be borne by the plaintiffs.
We may add that the agreement entered into by the parties in
implementation of Old Man Tumpao's "will" did not have to be
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
because the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was not
extended to the Mountain Province. 11 Moreover, the document
was not a conveyance of properties or property right. 12
It remains to state that the property in dispute having been
registered in 1917, the presumption is that it was acquired during
the second marriage and so cannot be claimed by the
respondents as the conjugal property of their mother and Old Man
Tumpao. Hence, they are not entitled to retain the entire land as
their exclusive inheritance or to collect rentals for the lots
occupied by the petitioners.
The trial judge, the Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, was correct in
ordering the reconveyance to the petitioners of their respective
shares. We affirm his decision in toto.
How much simpler was life among the natives in the North during
the early days, when right and wrong were weighed according to

the primal code of the ancient hills. Even so, though that past is
gone forever, justice now, as it was then, is still for the deserving.

reversed the decision dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of

First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch 1.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and that of the trial court reinstated, with costs
against the respondents.

The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner

Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children,
named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and
Floserpina. The first three were the plaintiffs and the last three,
with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.

SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ.,
concur.

On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her

mother, Manuela Buenavista, executed a deed of sale whereby
she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her
sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.

G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990

RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA
BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases
Division), ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO CHAVEZ and
CONCEPCION CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.
Jose L. Lapak for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R.
No. CV-64708 which (1) annulled the sale made by Manuela
Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez
and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the subsequent sale by said
spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared
that the earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by
Manuela and her children constituted a valid partition of the land,
subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby

Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the

conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the
same land to her sister, Concepcion, for the same price of P450.
On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother,
likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same property to
Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of
Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby
became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in
question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6
shares.
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana
na sa amin ng aming ina, ang nasabing
Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay hatiin
naming anim (6) na mga magkakapatid,
bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang
paghihiwatig o partition; ako bilang isa sa anim
na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang
ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa,
gayon pa man ang kasunduan sa nasabing
pagkamana namin ay samantalang nabubuhay
pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at
makikinabang sa nasabing pag-aari. (p. 14,
Rollo.)

meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or

distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her
paraphernal property situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio
Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of
4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No. 9303 and
assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself
the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during
her lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed
with her conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on
August 27, 1968, signed a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the
entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her
husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968, Antonio, Rosario
and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother
Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the
entire property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 (Exh. F) with
right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional
defendant in Civil Case No. 1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing
the complaint, dissolving the preliminary injunction it had
previously issued, and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The
court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 64708-R).
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the
appealed decision and render another one
declaring the deeds of sale in favor of Raquel
Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the
sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito
Ferrer as null and void ab initio, and declaring
further that the documents (Exhs. A, B, C and
D) are evidence of a valid partition of the land in
question by and between Manuela Buenavista
and her children, subject to her right of usufruct
during her lifetime, without pronouncement as to
damages and costs. (p. 17, Rollo.)

On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration

alleging among others:
3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de
Chavez, one of the defendants-appellees, was
found lately to have executed during her lifetime
a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT ... and there is
now a pending petition for probate of said last
will and testament before the Municipal Trial
Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
xxx xxx xxx
6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late
Manuela Buenavista's execution of the
documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C and D
are valid, nevertheless its validity ceases from
the time that she executed the Last Will and
Testament . . . because the execution of the
Last Will invalidates the former act of the said
Manuela Buenavista;
7. That the Last will and Testament . . . which
his now pending probate in the Municipal Trial
Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte, will finally
affect the property hence, there is a ground
for this motion for reconsideration and/or to
suspend the decision-pending final outcome of
the probate of the last will and testament of the
late Manuela Buenavista. (pp. 88-89, Rollo.)
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration
asserting that the partition inter vivos which had been
implemented long before the execution of the said Last Will and
Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the
supposed Last Will and Testament was executed on December
11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the complaint for
annulment on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista
was already senile and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela
Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds
of Sale, the supposed Last Will and Testament bears her
thumbmark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no more property

to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, when she supposedly

executed her Last Will and Testament.
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the petitioners allege:
(l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) erred in declaring valid the
deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as a
partition by an act inter vivos considering that
examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is
not a testament amounting to a will of Manuela
Buenavista;
(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred
in ruling against Article 1347 of the New Civil
Code. (p. 126, Rollo.)
We find those contentions not well-taken.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a
partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and
such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits
contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as
provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art.
1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p.
744.) Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two
options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter
vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is
imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance
with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person
makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form
of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime
of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated
that parol partitions may be sustained on the

ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the

rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land
divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a
court of equity will recognize the agreement and
decree it to be valid and effectual for the
purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.

or without the petitioner's knowledge, the

partition barred any further litigation on said title
and operated to bring the property under the
control and jurisdiction of the court for proper
disposition according to the tenor of the
partition... They cannot attack the partition
collaterally ... (Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, 172
SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs.
Encarnacion and De Borja, No. L-4681, July 31,
1951, 89 Phil. 678.)

A parol partition may also be sustained on the

ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced
in and ratified the partition by taking possession
in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal,
et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)

As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their

memorandum, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela
Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the sales she herself
authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her
son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter
Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the
property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run
counter to the doctrine that "no person should be allowed to
unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the

Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel,
all surnamed Chavez (Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of Concepcion
Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by
and between Manuela Buenavista and her children as she not
only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The
Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into
with respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who
signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such
partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is
valid.
.... As the defendants freely participated in the
partition, they are now estopped from denying
and repudiating the consequences of their own
voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law
that no one may be permitted to disavow and go
back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary
thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)
Where a piece of land has been included in a
partition, and there is no allegation that the
inclusion was effected through improper means

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the

Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is
affirmed in toto. The petition for review is dismissed for lack of
merit, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 78778 : December 3, 1990.] 191 SCRA 814

LEONIDA CORONADO, FELIX BUENO, MELANIA RETIZOS,
BERNARDINO BUENASEDA and JOVITA MONTEFALCON,
Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and JUANA
BUENO ALBOVIAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the
decision* of the respondent appellate court dated March 3, 1987
CA-G.R. CV No. 06911 entitled "Juana (Bueno) Albovias et al., v.
Leonida Coronado, et al.," affirming the decision of the lower
court, the decretal portion of which reads:: nad
"WHEREFORE, premises
hereby rendered:

considered,

judgment

is

1. Declaring Leonida Coronado to have no title or interest

over the property in question, hence, has no authority to
dispose of the same in favor of her co-defendants;
2. Declaring the sales executed by Coronado and
subsequent transactions involving the same property null
and void ab initio;
3. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and legal owner of
the subject parcel of land;
4. Ordering the defendants to vacate the subject
premises and to surrender possession thereof unto the
plaintiff;
5. Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay
unto the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Costs against the defendants." (Rollo, p. 17)
As found by the respondent appellate court, the property subject
of this case is a parcel of land situated in Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing 277 square meters, more particularly described as
follows:: nad
"A parcel of land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of
Nagcarlan, province of Laguna. Bounded on the North,
by property of Epifania Irlandez (formerly Bonifacio
Formentera); on the East, by that of Julio Lopez; on the
South, by that of Dalmacio Monterola (formerly Domingo
Bueno); and on the West, by C. Lirio Street. Containing
an area of two hundred seventy seven (277) square
meters, more or less. Assessed at P3,320.00 under tax
declaration No. 241." (Ibid., p. 15)

Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein

private respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado,
Felix Bueno, Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita
Montefalcon, herein petitioners, on the other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in
question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the
last will and testament executed in 1918 by Melecio Artiaga,
grandfather of JUANA. This bigger lot was inherited under that will
by JUANA, her brother Domingo Bueno, and two other
grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and Herminigildo, both surnamed
Formentera. Parcel G is described as follows:
"Isang lagay na lupa na ang bahagi ay walang tanim na halaman
at ang bahagi naman ay may tanim na saguing, tumatayo sa
gawin Canloran ng Calle Avenida Rizal nitong Nagcarlan, at
humahangan sa Ibaba; sa ari cong Testador; sa Silangan, sa cay
Enrique Jovellano; sa Ilaya, sa namatay na Perfecto Nanagas, at
sa Canloran, tubig na pinamamagatang San Cido." (Ibid., p. 16)
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio
Street was created by the Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said
Parcel G and thus dividing it into two portions, one on the west of
C. Lirio St. and the other to the east of said street. Parcel G was
divided by the heirs in the following manner; the land was divided
into two portions, the northern portion of which was adjudicated in
favor of the Formenteras and the southern portion was given to
JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern portion in turn was
partitioned between JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the former
getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and
the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto
Nanagas (not owned by Dalmacio Monterola). The part allocated
to Domingo was later sold by him to Dalmacio Monterola, owner
of the adjoining property (Ibid.).: nad
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together
with the two parcels of land owned by Dalmacio Monterola, which
were sold by Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado
(now married to Felix Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18,
1970. Melania Retizos in turn sold the lots, including that one
being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse Bernardino Buenaseda
and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present possessors thereof,
sometime in 1974 (Ibid., pp. 16-17).
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners
(CORONADO, for brevity) claim that the property in question was
bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr.
Dalmacio Monterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof
even before the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC283, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida
F. Coronado, petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with her

husband, opposed the said probate. Despite their opposition,

however, the Will was allowed by the then Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch (Ibid., p. 106). On appeal, said
decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
40353, entitled "Leonida F. Coronado, petitioner-appellee v. Heirs
of Dr. Dalmacio Monterola, oppositors-appellants" (Ibid.). It is not
apparent, however, from the record whether or not said decision
has already become final and executory.
As a result of the conflicting claims over the property in question,
JUANA filed an action for quieting of title, declaratory relief and
damages against CORONADO in the Regional Trial Court of the
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No. 7345 (Ibid., p. 4).
As adverted to above (first par.), the lower court rendered
judgment in favor of JUANA.
Not satisfied with the decision of the lower court, CORONADO
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision appealed from (Ibid., p. 20). Hence, this petition.:-cralaw
CORONADO raised the following assigned errors:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN
NOT APPLYING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
(Ibid., p. 108)
II
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE
LAND IN QUESTION CLAIMED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
THE SAME PROPERTY ADJUDICATED TO JUANA BUENO
UNDER THE WILL OF THE DECEASED MELECIO ARTIAGA;
NEITHER IS THERE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT SAID WILL
HAD BEEN PROBATED. (Ibid., p. 114)
III
PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
IS
IN
ESTOPPEL
FROM
QUESTIONING THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PETITIONER OVER
THE LAND IN QUESTION HAVING FAILED TO RAISE THE
SAME IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING IN THE TRIAL COURT
AND EVEN ON APPEAL. (Ibid., p. 119)
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPRECIATED
THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AND FACTS ADMITTED ON
RECORD. IT THEREFORE COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
ERROR. (Ibid., p. 121)
As required by this Court, CORONADO filed their memorandum
on May 8, 1989 (Ibid., p. 105); while that of JUANA was filed on
October 13, 1989 (Ibid., p. 139).

The petition is devoid of merit.

Under the first assigned error, CORONADO assails the
respondent appellate court's finding that Dr. Dalmacio Monterola
could not have acquired the subject land by acquisitive
prescription. Citing Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code in relation to
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CORONADO claims
that JUANA had already foreclosed whatever right or legal title
she had over the property in question, the reason being that
Monterola's continued possession of the said property for over ten
years since 1934 ripened into full and absolute ownership (Ibid., p.
112).
The argument has no factual basis.
Time and again, it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might
have been committed. Absent, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record,
so that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme
Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties (Andres v.
Manufacturers Hanover & Trust Corporation, G.R. 82670,
September 15, 1989). There are no convincing reasons in the
instant case to depart from this rule.
As found by the respondent appellate court, Monterola never
claimed ownership over the property in question. As a matter of
fact, one of the deeds of donation executed by Monterola in favor
of Leonida Coronado acknowledged that the boundary owner on
the property conveyed to her is JUANA. This is precisely the
reason why during the lifetime of the late Dalmacio Monterola,
JUANA had always been allowed to enter and reap the benefits or
produce of the said property. It was only after the death of said
Monterola in 1970 that Leonida Coronado prohibited JUANA from
entering it (Ibid., p. 18).:- nad
Even assuming arguendo that Monterola was indeed in continued
possession of the said property for over ten years since 1934,
said possession is insufficient to constitute the fundamental basis
of the prescription. Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute
the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under
claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law
equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of possessory
character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the
owner are clearly not en concepto de dueno, and such
possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start

the running of the period of prescription (Manila Electric Company

v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 71393, June 28, 1989).
In this case, Monterola, as found by the respondent appellate
court and the lower court, never categorically claimed ownership
over the property in question, much less his possession thereof en
concepto de dueno. Accordingly, he could not have acquired said
property by acquisitive prescription.
Anent the contention of CORONADO that Leonida Coronado
could tack her possession to that of Monterola, so that claim of
legal title or ownership over the subject property, even against the
petitioners, the Buenasesas, who are purchasers for value and in
good faith, is a foregone or settled issue, the respondent appellate
court aptly answered the same in this wise:
"It follows that Leonida Coronado could not have derived
ownership of the land in question from her predecessor-in-interest
Dalmacio Monterola, whether by prescription or by some other
title. Neither can she claim acquisitive prescription in her own
name. It was only in 1970 after the death of Dalmacio Monterola
that she asserted her claim of ownership adverse to that of
plaintiff-appellee. Having knowledge that she had no title over the
land in question, she must be deemed to have claimed it in bad
faith. Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, ownership and other
real rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or
good faith. And even granting that she had no notice or defect in
her title and was, therefore, in good faith, a period of ten years of
possession is necessary for her to acquire the land by ordinary
prescription. (Article 1134, Civil Code). But she can claim to have
possessed the land only in 1968, the year the Monterola lots were
donated to her. The period, however, was interrupted in 1975, or 7
years after, when the complaint below was filed." (Rollo, pp. 1819)
Under the second assigned error, CORONADO claims that the will
under which JUANA inherited the property in question from her
grandfather, Melecio Artiaga, was never probated; hence, said
transfer for ownership was ineffectual considering that under Rule
75, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court (formerly Sec. 125 of Act No. 190,
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in the proper court (Ibid., p. 115).
The contention is without merit.chanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art.
838, Civil Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained
on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was
in force at the time said document was executed by Melecio
Artiaga in 1918. The said article read as follows:

"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his

properties by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall
stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced
heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
In this case, nowhere was it alleged nor shown that Leonida
Coronado is entitled to legitime from Melecio Artiaga. The truth of
the matter is that the record is bereft of any showing that Leonida
Coronado and the late Melecio Artiaga were related to each other.
Under the third assigned error, CORONADO claims that JUANA is
estopped from questioning the ownership of Leonida Coronado
over the land in question having failed to raise the same in the
estate proceedings in the trial court and even on appeal (Rollo, p.
119).
The contention is likewise without merit.
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic
validity. The authentication of a will decides no other questions
than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of the wills. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or
null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even
after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not
estopped from questioning the ownership of the property in
question, notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of
the will executed by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is
claiming title to the said property.:-cralaw
Under the fourth assigned error, it is alleged by CORONADO that
JUANA's petition is weak for want of factual and legal support; the
weakness of JUANA's position lies in the fact that she did not only
fail to identify the subject land, but also failed to explain the
discrepancy in the boundary of the property she is claiming to be
hers (Rollo, p. 125).
The contention is unavailing.
The fact that JUANA failed to identify the property in question and
to explain the discrepancy in the boundary of said property,
assuming they are true, is immaterial, in view of the findings of the
lower court as to the identity of the property in question. Moreover,
the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to
JUANA under the will of Melecio Artiaga, and that CORONADO
has no right whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such
findings are conclusive upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 220 [1989]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera,
Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 137287

Padilla,

Sarmiento

and

February 15, 2000

REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA

VIADO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO,
CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO,respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Petitioners, in their petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seek a reversal of the 29th May 1996
decision of the Court of Appeals, basically affirming that rendered
on 30 April 1991 by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Queron
City, Branch 23, adjudicating the property subject matter of the
litigation to respondents. The case and the factual settings found
by the Court of Appeals do not appear to deviate significantly from
that made by the trial court.
During their lifetime, the spouses Julian C. Viado and Virginia P.
Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a house and
lot located at 147 Isarog Street, La Loma, Quezon City, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42682. Virginia P. Viado died on
20 October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15
November 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo Viado,
Leah Viado Jacobs, and herein petitioners Rebecca Viado,
married to Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo Viado and Leah Viado
Jacobs both died on 22 April 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his
own sole heirs herein respondents his wife Alicia Viado and
their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common
residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would
appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca Viado and
respondent Alicia Viado after the former had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to make
room for the growing children. Respondents, forthwith, claimed
absolute ownership over the entire property and demanded that

petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. On 01

February 1988, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the
property in question, filed a case for partition before the Quezon
City RTC (Branch 93).1wphi1.nt
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over
the subject property on two documents a deed of donation
executed by the late Julian Viado covering his one-half conjugal
share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and a deed of
extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah Viado Jacobs
(through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner
Rebecca Viado waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and
interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia
Viado. Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and
registered on 07 January 1988 by virtue of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42682 was cancelled and new Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 373646 was issued to the heirs of Nilo
Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the
foregoing instruments, contending that the late Nilo Viado
employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian Viado to
execute the deed of donation. Petitioner Rebecca Viado, in her
particular case, averred that her brother Nilo Viado employed
fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister,
Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's
preterition that should warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners
asseverated that the assailed instruments, although executed on
23 August 1983, were registered only five years later, on 07
January 1988, when the three parties thereto, namely, Julian
Viado, Nilo Viado and Leah Viado Jacobs had already died.
Assessing the evidence before it, the trial court found for
respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her children as being
the true owners of the disputed property.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification by ordering the remand of the records of
the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine

the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay
to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of
extrajudicial settlement.
Petitioners are now before the Supreme Court to seek the
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court ruled correctly.
When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the
conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was
transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children
Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The
inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the
decedent,1 remained under a co-ownership regime2 among the
heirs until partition.3 Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition
although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.4
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among
the parties hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and
deed of extrajudicial settlement which consolidated the title solely
to Nilo Viado. Petitioners assail the due execution of the
documents on the grounds heretofore expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil
down to the appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been
resolved by both the trial court and the appellate court. The Court
of Appeals, in sustaining the court a quo, has found the evidence
submitted by petitioners to be utterly wanting, consisting of, by
and large, self-serving testimonies. While asserting that Nilo Viado
employed fraud, forgery and undue influence in procuring the
signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation and of
extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how
and in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have
petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held
incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and
interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of

petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of

extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument
merely pertained to the administration of the property is too
tenuous to accept. It is also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca
Viado, a teacher by profession, could have misunderstood the
tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after
the date of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor
would such circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The
registration of the documents was a ministerial act5 and merely
created a constructive notice of its contents against all third
persons.6 Among the parties, the instruments remained
completely valid and binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate,
from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect
of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of
proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not
attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted
properly in ordering the remand of the case for further
proceedings to make the proper valuation of the isarog property
and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia
Viado.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the decision,
dated 29 May 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 37272 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.