Legal Ethics Digest

Legal Ethics
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES v. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

A.C. No. 6691, 27 April 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.)
Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson while
Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of Henson. After the probate
proceedings, the RTC issued an order directing Jimenez to deliver the residue of
the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Atty Briones refused to
deliver the estate.
Consequently, Atty. Jimenez and the Heirs filed a criminal complaint and
executed an affidavit against Atty Briones for resisting and seriously disobeying
the RTC Order. Atty. Briones filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Jimenez for forum shopping and violation of Canons 19 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and
in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs in filing the
criminal complaint against herein complainant after the latter ignored the
demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the exercise of
utmost prudence and capability.
There is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent

violated Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering that
complainant did not reply to the demand letters, respondent opted to file said
criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of
the court.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent

his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers
performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the
law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client.
Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients
compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to
resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of
their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients
and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they
are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Jimenez violated Canons 19 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD:
A lawyer must represent his client with zeal, however, the
performance of his duties towards his clients must be within the bounds of law.
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.
Records show that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson,
filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order
of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co. as
auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the
Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to
complainant. It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of
action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO

A.C. No. 7298, 25 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Aparicio is legal counsel for Hufana in an illegal dismissal case filed with the NLRC
against Pena. Pena is president of MOF company. Aparicio sought the payment
of separation pay to his client. Pena rejected the demand and sent notice to
Hufana to return to work. Aparicio, in a reply letter to Pena, reiterated the claim
of his client.
In his letter Apparicio also made threats saying that if the claims were not paid
they would file multiple criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification and the
cellation of Penas business license. Because of this Pena filed the administrative
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Kulangot Notes: Reader discretion is advised. Read the Original case (full text).
Legal Ethics
proceeding against Aparicio with the IBP for violation of Canon 19, specifically
rule 19.01. IBP dismissed the complaint because Pena failed to file his position
paper and certification against forum shopping. Aparicio filed an MR reiterating
his claim for damages against Pena (defamation) in the amount of 400M.
ISSUE:
1)
Whether or not the dismissal of the IBP for foreign shopping constitutes
a bar in the Administrative proceedings
2)
Whether or not Atty Aparicio violated Canon 19
HELD:
of the law.
A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
1) The rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every

initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedurewhich is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured
the supposed defect in the original complaint.
2) Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case
or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to

compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's
client.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or

exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as
a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing
some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an
injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats,
or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers
to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay
the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due
to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19,
but they also amount to blackmail.
GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO

A.C. No. 6504, 9 August 2005, SECOND DIVISION (Tinga, J.)
Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The
Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito,
owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed
under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before
the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying
tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.
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Solatans sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment
to Solatan and other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for nonpayment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered in a
judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was occupying
said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes
of his desire to arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which
he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to
Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the
Genito Apartments.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which
complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including
awarded attorneys fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the
name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys fees.
Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with
Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in
the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to
release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment.
Acting on Atty. Camanos advice, complainant presented an affidavit of
ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove
was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit
of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend
Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty.
Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.
ISSUE:
1)
Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
2)
Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and
dealings with their clients.
An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person
without being retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the
instant case.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to
observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the
advice given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the
rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his
duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with
the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties.
The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon
showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the
essence of double dealing and betrayal.
2. Atty. Inocentes failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under

the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner
of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the responsibility to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity
to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latters
dealings with complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over
Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold
supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in
apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons
over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary
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efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
persons under their charge.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Last March 8, 2011 on A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, the Supreme Court reminded
University of the Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C.
Laforteza and 35 other faculty members of the UP College of Law, as well as
admonishing Dean Marvic Leonen for vio, Restoring Integrity, a scathing
manifesto calling for SC Associate Justice Mariano del Castillos resignation for
the latters alleged plagiarism on his decision on the case of Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) promulgated last April 28, 2010.
Consequently, Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Catindig and Laforteza
and a manifestation filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore O.
Te, relying on the ground that the proceeding, while docketed as an
administrative matter, is premised on a finding of indirect contempt and that
they were not accorded due process under indirect contempt proceedings.
reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief,
the Court resolves to merely note the same.
Contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if

committed by a member of the Bar, subject the offender to disciplinary
proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that
lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. In such disciplinary
cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment,
suspension, reprimand or admonition. Contumacious speech and/or behaviour
directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as
contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings

against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behaviour
directed at the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the
degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice.
Verily, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a
respondent lawyer, the mere citation or discussion in the orders or decision in
the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is
punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt
proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not SC erred in finding that the respondents are in breach of
their ethical obligations for having issued the restoring integrity statement
HELD: Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on
the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation,
or both in the discretion of the Court.
The petition was denied for No substantial arguments to warrant a
reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of
the reliefs prayed for in their motion. The Manifestation, apart from being an
expression of support for Professors Catindig and Lafortezas motion for
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RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE
OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN
THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
SC Justice Mariano Del Castillo rendered a decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque)
and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares) for Vinuya, et al. (the Malaya
Lolas), filed a supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, on the ground that,
inter alia, charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision and a twisting of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponencia was made to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for
denying the Petition. Works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents article A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens; (2) Christian J. Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime. Such supplemental motion for reconsideration appeared on
internet sites.
Thereafter, a statement entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty

of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was submitted by Dean
Marvic M.V.F. Leone to the Court through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The
statement basically conveys that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya
v Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high
standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected
of the Supreme Court. (See attachment for complete text of the statement). The
SC Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc. The high court
said the UP law professors statement was evidently intended to discredit its
April 28 decision on the Vinuya et al. v the Executive Secretary et al. case. It
claimed that the law faculty wanted to undermine the courts honesty, integrity
and competence in addressing the motion for reconsideration of 70 comfort
women.
Accordingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law faculty-signatories to show cause,

within ten (10) days from receipt why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be disciplined as Members of the Bar

under the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or
private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath,
as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves
with good fidelity towards the courts.
The administrative matter is decided by reminding the Thirty-five UP professors

of their duty as officers of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen was
admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer
of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.
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RULE 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
which are accepted by the general community. The Show Cause Resolution does
not interfere with respondents academic freedom.
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.
What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of

expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interest. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the
context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the Common
Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty
to participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting
efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice
under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11
and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid
conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are
expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the
matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision
itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still both sub judice or
pending final disposition of the Court.
TERESITA D. SANTECO v. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE

A.C. 5834, 22 February 2011, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
An administrative complaint was filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent
Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, which was filed
before the RTC of Makati City. The result of such administrative complaint was
the suspension of Avance from the practice of law for five years and ordered to
return P3,900 to her client after she was found guilty of gross misconduct for
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abandoning her client in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful
orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so.
However, while still suspended, Avance appeared in three cases as Atty. Liezl
Tanglao as stated in a letter-report of Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, presiding
Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales. In a resolution, the Court ordered Avance to
comment on said letter-report. However, she failed to do so. The Court then
reiterated its order. Again, despite receipt of the two resolutions, she still failed
to comply.
Thus, the Court issued a resolution finding Avance guilty of indirect contempt
and ordering her to pay a fine amounting to P30,000. It also sternly warned her
that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more
severely. Despite due notice, she failed to pay the fine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action or inaction of Atty. Avance is a ground for her
disbarment
HELD:
A lawyer who willfully disobeys the lawful order of the court
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
It held that respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her
as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts
orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice
despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented
herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when
she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still
suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions form
this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000 fine imposed in the Resolution.
In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself
unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent
to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an
officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN v. ATTY. IBARO B.

RELAMIDA, JR.
A.C. No. 8481, 3 August 2010, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)
Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines
in the NLRC. The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating that Ebanen
voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed to the NLRC which only affirmed the
appealed decision. Ebanen then filed for reconsideration but was denied. The
case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Courts Resolution has already
become final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been
issued dismissing the petition and holding that there was no illegal dismissal.
However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty. Relamida, Jr. filed a
second complaint for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of
constructive dismissal against Servier. Thus, Servier, thru counsel, filed a lettercomplaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that
respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum
shopping and res judicata. Respondents admitted the filing of the second
complaint against Servier. However, they opined that the dismissal did not
amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due
process since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the
production of vital documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor
Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping and res judicata
thus violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
During the IBP hearing, it was manifested that Ebanen is not a lawyer but the
daughter of Atty. Aurelio the senior partner in a law firm where Atty. Relamida
is employed as associate lawyer. The latter then reasoned out that as a courtesy
to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the latter.
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Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due
to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then
argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was
no res judicata. He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by
serving the interest of his client. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Relamida,
Jr. be suspended for 6 months for violating the rules on forum shopping and res
judicata.
The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The
filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and
improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory judgment)
subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any
better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be
just and are consistent with truth and honor.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of
the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the
Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."
Four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each
of which he was found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law. All the four cases against him involved grave issues of dishonesty
and deceit. Recidivism or habitual delinquency was patent. The 4 offenses
deserved disbarment as a final penalty. Yet, the Court contented itself with mere
suspensions.
In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan),
promulgated on October 21, 2004, Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6)months,
effective immediately upon receipt of the Decision. He was further ordered to
return the amount of P30,000 to complainant for legal services he did not
render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on
November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12,
2005.
In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on
April 15, 2005, Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay
complainant P17,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of the
promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned. Per
records, the Courts decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his
suspension would have ended on November 13, 2005.
In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27,
2006, respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount
of P100,000.00. Upon investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2) years. This was modified by the
Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the penalty
was reduced to six (6) months suspension with warning, effective upon receipt
of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for
the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was full payment of the
loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007.
CARLOS REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN

A.C. No. 5835, 18 August 2010, EN BANC (Nachura, J.)
In the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty.
Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 2, 2007, respondent was found to have
failed to render the legal services sought after he had received the amount of
P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning.
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The Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should
have lapsed on April 18, 2008.
(c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to
May 12, 2005; and
In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been
repeatedly suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30
months or 2 years. Accordingly, respondent should have served the orders of
suspension successively pursuant to the Courts resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-041857, entitled Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong, where the Court
clearly stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served
successively by the erring respondent. It is, therefore, incumbent upon
respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law
for a period of at least 2 years.
(d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated July 27, 2006.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension can be lifted

HELD:
The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued
the guidelines on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict
observance thereof. However, the Court will not hesitate to withhold the
privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the
Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the
public.
Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT
Respondents Petition for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the
Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact:
1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him
successively;
2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel
in any court during the periods of suspension, as follows:
(a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to
November 13, 2005;
(b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18,
2008;
3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by

the Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof:
(a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum
from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have
been returned; and
(b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000.
Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn
Statement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as
mandated in Maniago.
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

A.C. No. 6258, 24 August 2010, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty Bernabe applied for consideration of the disbarment complaint filed by
Luzviminda R. Lustestica (complainant) against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe
(respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged Deed of Donation of real
property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
(complainant's father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were
already dead at the time of execution of the said document.
Atty Bernabe admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia
P. Rivero, considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The
respondent claimed, however, that he had no knowledge that the real
Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the time he
notarized the Deed of Donation. 2 cralaw He also claimed that he exerted efforts
to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him and
represented themselves as the donors under the Deed of Donation.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his

oath as a lawyer and his duties as Notary Public
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
HELD:
We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In
Gonzales v. Ramos, we stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization
by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the publics
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent
in discharging his duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities
of the affiants before him and failed to comply with the most basic function that
a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties presentation of their
residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the
respondents admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when
he notarized the Deed of Donation, we have no doubt that he failed in his duty
to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him as donors in
the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not
only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law
(Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law) states:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer
taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who
JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2204, 26 October 2009
Former representative of Pampanga Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) charged
Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-Simbulan (Simbulan) with partiality, gross ignorance
of the law, and gross misconduct in the handling of the criminal cases for
violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification of public documents against Spouses
Salvador and Flordeliz Totaan (accused).
Bondoc alleged that Judge Simbulan, after having issued an order suspending the
accused pendent lite, asked the lawyers of the parties to approach the bench
and suggested that the cases be settled because she did not want the accused
to be administratively suspended. That at the continuation of the pre-trial,
Judge Simbulan asked the accused to choose a date and promised to
accommodate the accused in order to effect a speedy trial in view of their
suspension. Bondoc also alleged that on the same day, Judge Simbulan directed
Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Lanee) to be prepared for the hearing of the cases since
accused had been suspended upon motion of Private Prosecutor Stephen David
(Stephen), Atty. Lanees husband and co-counsel for Bondoc in the criminal
cases. It was also averred that Judge Simbulan never carried out the suspension
order against the accused and that despite Atty. Lanees explanation that Atty.
Militante (Ombudsman Investigator) refused to testify on the ground that the
substance of her testimony is covered by official documents, Judge Simbulan
issued an order requiring Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited
in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the court. In the supplemental
complaint, Bondoc charged Judge Simbulan with conduct unbecoming of a judge
for her denial of private prosecutors motion foe her inhibition.
Judge Simbulan, in her Comment, stated that she did not fast track the resolution
of the case but it was her habit to act fast on all cases before her. She also denied
the charge of partiality for her failure to act on the suspension claiming that it
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was private prosecutors duty to file a motion to cite responsible heads of
government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to implement the
lawful orders of the court. Judge Simbulan also explained that her persistence in
requiring Atty. Militantes appearance was due to the misunderstanding
between Atty. Militante and the private prosecutors, therefore, she wants to
find out the truth.
In Bondocs Opposition to the Comment, it was stated that Judge Simbulan
refused to answer the serious charges of partiality, abuse of authority and
conduct unbecoming of a judge. In Judges Simbulans rejoinder, she requested
that Bondoc be made to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of
court, and Attys. Stephen and Lanee to show cause why they should not be
administratively sanctioned as members of the bar and officers of the court.
The complaint against Judge Simbulan was dismissed, hence, OCA
recommended that Attys. Stephen and Lanee be cited for indirect contempt
since the complaint against Judge Simbulan could not have been filed without
the active prodding and instigation of the lawyers and that private prosecutors
were the primary sources of the allegations contained therein which Bondoc did
not personally witness.
HELD:
Lawyers have the duty not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected
conduct as members of the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the
administrative complaint against the respondent. As the OCA noted, while the
complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc,
he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair
treatment in the complaint which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The
complainant thus relied primarily on the information relayed to him by his
lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two lawyers
can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their clients
complaint.
possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in the

courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the
court. In these regards, Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting.
From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the
conclusion that the information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their
client was patently misleading and slanted to cover up their gross shortcomings
as lawyers, as the respondent aptly put it. On four occasions, private
prosecutors never appeared before the court prepared. No proof was presented
to corroborate the charge that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases
settled; neither was there a showing that the respondent fast tracked the cases
to favor the accused.
The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did is just a
consequence of their commitment to their client can hardly exculpate them. A
clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not
to their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a
lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its dignity and
authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.
ALFREDO B. ROA, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO

A.C. No. 8382, 21 April 2010, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
Atty. Juan R. Moreno sold to Roa a parcel of land to Alfredo B. Roa and paid Atty.
Moreno P70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Atty. Moreno did not issue a
deed of sale instead he issued a temporary receipt and a Certificate of Land
Occupancy. Atty. Moreno assured Roa that he could use the lot from then on.
Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys.

Stephen and Lanee David for the substance of the complaint. Nonetheless, as
officers of the court, counsels are expected to be as truthful and as objective as
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Roa learned that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the
Register of Deeds. When Roa went to see Atty. Moreno, the latter admitted that
the real owner of the lot was a certain Rubio. He also said there was a pending
legal controversy over the lot. Thereafter, Roa sent a letter to Atty. Moreno
demanding the return of the P70,000 paid for the lot.
Roa then filed a criminal case against Atty. Moreno. MTC rendered a decision
convicting Atty. Moreno of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article
316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the RTC, for lack of
evidence establishing Atty. Morenos guilt beyond reasonable doubt, acquitted
Atty. Moreno.
Roa filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint
against Atty. Moreno. The IBP found Atty. Moreno guilty of violating Rules 1.01
and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended to
suspend Atty. Moreno from the practice of law for three months and ordered
him to return the amount of P70,000. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the
present case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Moreno should be disciplined and ordered to return
the amount of money paid for the sale
HELD:
Atty. Morenos refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the
lot is unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his
conduct, Atty. Moreno failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Morenos credibility is highly questionable. Records show that he even

issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to Roa whose only fault was that
he did not know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges of
intent to defraud. It purports to be issued by the "Office of the General
Overseer." It contains a verification by the "Lead, Record Department" that the
lot plan "conforms with the record on file." It is even printed on parchment paper
strikingly similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, it can easily pass off
as a document evidencing title. True enough, Roa actually tried, but failed, to
register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Roa readily
parted with P70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the sham
certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of Atty. Moreno are not
without recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states "A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, xxx." Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct."
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court.
In the present case, Atty. Moreno acted in his private capacity. He
misrepresented that he owned the lot he sold to Roa. He refused to return the
amount paid by Roa. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with Roa.
It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who
continue to display unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their dealings with their
clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty, including suspension and even disbarment.
Atty. Morenos refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the lot is unbecoming
a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, Atty. Moreno
failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Atty. Morenos acts violated the trust and respect
Roa reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. However,
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Legal Ethics
the penalty of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is insufficient
to atone for Atty. Morenos misconduct in this case.
Supreme Court did not sustain the IBPs recommendation ordering Atty. Moreno
to return the money paid by Roa. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. The court's only concern is the determination of Atty.
Morenos administrative liability.
MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

A.C. No. 8391, 23 November 2010, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico.
Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses
of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In
turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to
collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly
to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico
readily issued to Gutierrez a check amounting to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez
promised to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time."
Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text
message he asked for an extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message,
Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that
his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure
examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all
his debts within a month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez
any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his
debts.
Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give
him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no
avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of nonpayment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise
guilty of gross misconduct
HELD:
Lawyers must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment
of financial obligations
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.
They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves
in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of

the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for
interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire
Page 13 of 30
Legal Ethics
financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are
beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and

misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of
paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of
paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he
sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses
without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible.
Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers
of the court.
Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the Court had
already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to
non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the
foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it cannot, however,
adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering
that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed
out, the court does not have double or multiple disbarments in its laws or
jurisprudence. Neither do it have a law mandating a minimum 5-year
requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's
infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot disbar him anew.
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

A.C. No. 7024, 30 January 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she
retained the services of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case filed
by Golden Collection Marketing Corporation against her and other codefendants. Her defense was that it was the corporation who actually owed her
P800,000.00. She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense at the
trial. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his appearance
as counsel after securing his acceptance fee.
She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the
respondent failed to fully inform her of further developments in the case. She
only heard about the case when there was already a decision against her and her
co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his
discharge as counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to the
respondent's claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that the
respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her
had he been in good faith. Execution of the court's decision followed, resulting
in the sale of her house and lot at public auction despite her efforts to reverse
the judgment with the help of another lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to whom
her property had been mortgaged sued her. She found the respondent's excuse
- that he could not contact her because she had changed her office address - to
be unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of miserably failing to comply
with his oath as a lawyer and to discharge his duty of ably representing her.
Respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of him as
counsel. The respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue
as the complainant's counsel. He reasoned out that under the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw from a case upon a good
cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's
services, or fails to comply with the terms of the retainer agreement, or when
the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office. Two of these possible causes
applied to his situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI requiring
full-time work and the complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him
amounting to P27,000.00. He filed the formal notice of withdrawal without the
conformity of the complainant because he could not locate her.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to serve his client diligently
HELD:
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We find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having fallen short of
the standards required of him as defense counsel. He violated the basic rule,
expressed under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, that "a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." While it may be
said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of
the complainant's defense left much to be desired.
The complainant was never informed the development of the case and the
omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the defendants. The
respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact
the defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for
admission were pending. It appears that he really had not; by his own admission,
his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to
inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only
after the discovery of the closure of the defendant's office did the respondent
try to contact the complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could
not be reached.
Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not
to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital
information from her. The respondent failed to provide details on the
developments that led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions
and the judgment on the pleadings.
On the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from the case, the respondent
might have had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his
client. As the respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e)
and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility - i.e., deliberate failure of the
client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the retainer
agreement, or appointment or election to public office. However, he does not
appear to have cited these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely filed
a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his client's unknown location and
failure to communicate as reasons for his client's lack of express consent to his
withdrawal. It is undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent's notice
of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the

responsibilities that his representation carried.
What lightens the impact of the respondent's mishandling of the case is the
complainant's own failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that
we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law practice is not a pro bono proposition
and a lawyer's sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable;
lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on
their law practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent's
appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter that
none of the parties have fully examined. Both the non-payment of fees and the
appoint to a public office, however, were not reasons properly presented before
the trial court through a motion that informed the court of all the surrounding
circumstances of the desired withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by
way of a mere notice lacking the client's express consent. Thus, the court's denial
of the desired withdrawal was not totally unexpected.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the complainant demands in
light of the complainant's own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate
remedy in the professional world, no less serious and weighty as the power to
impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both, recovery from the penalty
- although not totally impossible - is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we must
at all times act with caution and due consideration, taking into account not only
the interests of the immediate parties, but the interest of the public, the bar and
the administration of justice as well.
WILSON CHAM v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA

A.C. No. 7494, 27 June 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.)
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A disbarment complaint was filed by Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva
Paita-Moya, who he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment
unit and, thereafter, vacating the same without paying the rentals due.
Respondent entered into a Contract of Lease with Greenville Realty and
Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and
General Manager, involving a residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located
at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a consideration of P8,000.00 per
month for a term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the

complainant that she would no longer renew the same but requested an
extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000 with a
commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension
period. Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to
P8,650.00 per month. Respondent stayed in said premises for several months
without paying any rent and even failing to pay her electric bills. A report reached
complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit,
bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed
complainant's repeated written demands for payment of her obligations despite
due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file the present Complaint.
Respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had
not vacated the apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she
transferred to another place because she was given notice by the complainant
to vacate the premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the same,
but which never happened until presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask
that complainant to account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could
not do so since she did not know complainant's address or contact number. For
the same reason, she could not turn over to the complainant the door keys to
the vacated apartment unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility
HELD:
Lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful
failure to pay just debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent
has existing obligations that she failed to settle. Respondent did not expressly
deny receipt of letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint. Having failed
to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them.
A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have

been delivered. In the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge the
burden of proving payment, for she was unable to produce receipts or any other
proof of payment. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed
to pay her just debts. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully
failed to pay her just debts.
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal
responsibility to settle them when they became due. Respondent should have
complied with just contractual obligations, and acted fairly and adhered to high
ethical standards to preserve the court's integrity, since she is an employee
thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts,
such act already constituted a ground for administrative sanction. Respondent
left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid obligations, and without the
complainant's knowledge and consent. Respondent's abandonment of the
leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills
constitutes deceitful conduct violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which explicitly state:
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"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly
pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend
lawyers for any professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.
HEIRS OF BOBADILLA v. JAIME CASTILLO

G.R. No. 165771, 29 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO MORALES, J.)
For over 20 years, Antonio Bobadilla, Maria Del Mundo and Ernesto, Danilo,
Policarpio, have been leasing portions of a 348 square meter parcel of land
located at Gen. Luna Street in Caloocan City on a verbal agreement from owner
Virginia Rayo. After August 1991, Rayo offered to sell the land to Bobadilla. Rayo
gave Bobadilla two months to decide whether to purchase the land. Having
heard nothing from Bobadilla after two months, Rayo sold the parcel of land to
Jaime Castillo.
Castillo required Bobadilla, Del Mundo and the Serranos to vacate the land after
failing to heed his previous demands to pay a monthly rental of P10 per square
meter. Bobadilla instituted a complaint at the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) to annul the sale between Rayo and Castillo based on fraud and bad faith.
Bobadilla asserted the right of first refusal of their predecessor-in-interest under
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Act.
As the decree is not self-executing, Proclamation No. 1967 was issued identifying
244 specific sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development (APD)
and Urban Land Reform Zones (ULRZ).
HELD:
Lawyers must exercise utmost care and complete candor in the
preparation of pleadings.
This Court observes the perfunctory manner by which Castillo complied with this
Courts Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. In his terse
comment incorporated in his Compliance, he pithily averred in one sweeping
paragraph that the allegations contained in the petition are all rehash or
reiterations of the issues and arguments already passed upon by the appellate
court. With such lackadaisical outlook, Castillo blinded himself with what
appeared to be gross misrepresentation foisted by Bobadilla, which would have
otherwise put him on guard.
At this juncture, it is apropos to firmly remind lawyers of their duties, as officers
of the court, to exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation of
pleadings and to lay before the court the pertinent facts with methodical and
meticulous attention, without any suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation
or distortion thereof.
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP
NO. 103692 [ANTONIO ROSETE, ET AL. V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, ET AL.]
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 9 September 2008, EN BANC (PER CURIAM)

LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUES
B.M. 1370, 9 May 2005, EN BANC (Chico-Nazario, J.)
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. (Arevalo) sought exemption from payment of IBP dues
as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He claims that after
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having been admitted to the bar on 1961 he worked for the Civil Service
Commission from 1962 to 1986. Subsequently, he migrated to the United States
and until his retirement in 2003. He maintains that he cannot be assessed IBP
dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government
service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.
The IBP submitted its comment stating: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll
of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP
Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing
dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no
exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's
directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration
of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment
of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner
could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
In his reply, Atty. Arevalo contends that the Policy of Non-Exemption would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive
status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his
removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not an inactive member of the Bar may be compelled to pay
his IBP dues
HELD: Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of
which is the payment of membership dues - failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic
move.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong,
as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as
obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment
of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged class, such as
lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's

membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in. IBP in its comment stated that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members
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Legal Ethics
under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity.
In the meantime, Atty. Arevalo is duty bound to comply with his obligation to
pay membership dues to the IBP.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Atty. Arevalo also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Petitioner also contends that the
enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights. As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership
dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
Rule 3.01. A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.
Canon 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
Rule 3.02. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.
Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Rule 3.06. While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or
clear up some obscurity, property intervene in the presentation of evidence
during the trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may
prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A.

BRAWNER
A.C. No. 7732, 30 March 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
Atty. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against Comelec

Commissioners Atty. Borra and Atty. Brawner for violating Canons 1 (1.01, 1.02
and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and 3.06) of the Code of Judicial Conduct
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Additionally,

complainant charges respondents of violating Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of
complainant and Diogenes S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a separate list of
nominees for the party-list group Alagad. With Alagad winning a seat in the
House of Representatives, the two protagonists contested the right to represent
the party. By Omnibus Resolution of July 18, 2007, the dispute was resolved by
the Comelecs First Division in favor of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the
ponencia while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The dispute was elevated to
the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution of November 6, 2007, reversed the
First Division Resolution and reinstated the certificate of nomination of
complainants group. For failing to muster the required majority voting,
however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the controversy.
Notwithstanding the conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary majority vote could
Page 19 of 30
Legal Ethics
not still be obtained. The Comelecs First Divisions Omnibus Resolution was
eventually affirmed.
HELD:
An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be
disbarred without first being impeached.
Respondent Brawner, in his Answer dated April 2, 2008, asserted in the main
that the remedy of complainant is not to file a complaint for disbarment, but to
file an appeal before [the Supreme Court] via [p]etition for [c]ertiorari, and that
being members of a constitutional body enjoying presumption of regularity in
the performance of their functions, he and co-respondent Borra are supposed
to be insulated from a disbarment complaint for being impeachable officers.
At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in previous cases, has
laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar
cannot be disbarred without first being impeached. As an impeachable officer
who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent Borra must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before he may
be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and
actions.
In his Comment, respondent Borra contended that the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canons of Judicial Ethics could be made to apply to him and his corespondent, they not being members of the judiciary; and that since they
performed quasi-judicial functions as well as administrative duties, they were
bound by the Comelecs own set of internal rules and procedure over and above
a Code of Conduct that prescribed the norms and standards of behavior to be
observed by the officials and employees of the Comelec, a constitutional body.
Respondent Borra further contended that present complaint was premature as

the validity and legality of the resolutions are still subject to review; and that
the complaint was meant to harass [him] and punish him for exercising his
judgment on the case filed before him. The Court took notice that respondent
Borra had retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008 while respondent
Brawner passed away on May 29, 2008. As regards respondent Brawner then,
the present case was already moot.
The Court thus found respondent Borras contention that the grounds-bases of
the disbarment complaint, fastened on supposed errors of judgment or grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, were proper for an appeal,
hence, complainants remedy was judicial, not administrative.
The Court stated that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary applied only to courts of law, of which the Comelec was not, hence,
sanctions pertaining to violations thereof were made exclusively applicable to
judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the Comelec
chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them.
Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, no specific incidents and sufficient
evidence can be gathered to show that respondent did engage in dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that
the acts particularized in the complaint pertain to respondent Borras duties as
a Comelec commissioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not complaint for disbarment is the proper remedy and not
appeal
As for the release of retirement benefits to respondent Borra, there was nothing
irregular therewith, the same being in line with Memorandum Circular No. 10
(series of 1995) of the Office of the Ombudsman reading:
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x x x a person retiring from the government service, whether optional or
compulsory, needs only to present a certification from this Office whether or not
he has a pending criminal or administrative case with it. In the event the
certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case,
the responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as
well as the imposition of necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in
the event the retiree is found guilty, rests upon and shall be left to the sound
discretion of the head of the department, office or agency concerned.
ERLINDA R. TAROG v. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT

A.C. No. 8253 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067), 15 March 2011, EN BANC (Per
Curiam)
The Tarogs engaged the services of Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on
accountregarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region.
Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave
to him. He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to
counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed
property.
After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the
consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the
amount (in check) in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the
money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would
be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort
that the money was in good hands.
The Tarogs furthered delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for making a

memorandum, but he did not file the memorandum. When it became apparent
to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning
the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December
3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and the
P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any
reply from Atty. Ricafort.
In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be
deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services
under a "package deal. Findings of the IBP Commissioner: Atty. Romulo L.
Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and
P15,000 which he got from his client. Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty.
Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of
his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return
the amount of P65,000.00 to them.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Resolution resolving to return the
matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was
evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of
attorney's fees and other expenses. Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report
and Recommendation, in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present
any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had
been part of his attorney's fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the
demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty.
Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter
had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty.
Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability,
but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to
allow him to settle his obligation.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and
P15,000.00 to Erlinda.
Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration, maintaining that a retainer agreement

was immaterial because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and
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Legal Ethics
having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because
"the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without
duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt and
considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had
issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a
similar receipt for attorney's fees had been made at the time when the case had
been about to be filed in the RTC.
Acting on Atty. Ricafort's motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors
downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension. Atty. Ricafort
filed a second motion for reconsideration, assailing the resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to
clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was
based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort may be disbarred based on the grounds
mentioned
HELD:
SC affirmed the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were
supported by substantial evidence. However, SC imposed the penalty of
disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension
considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was
aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a
similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a
similar offense.
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00
and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most
instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client
to demand for a receipt." But such explanation does not persuade the Court.
Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him
to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for
his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys
entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring
accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts.
Atty. Ricafort's acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary
duties as an attorney. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust
any money and property of his clients that came into his possession, and he
needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in
him.Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his
professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his
clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand.
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on
an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and
apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit:
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
Atty. Ricafort's plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients
rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and
Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of
professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and
deserved punishment.
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Conrado G. Fernandez vs. Atty. Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon
A.C. No. 7084,
Fernandez was the respondent in a Civil case in which Palacios sought to nullify
the Deed of donation he purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. Atty.
Villalon was Palacios counsel at the early part of that case until she withdrew
after her appointment as prosecutor of QC.
In that civil case, Palacios alleged that he was the owner of a lot in Brgy. San
Lorenzo, Makati City and he became aware that his lot was being eyed by a landgrabbing syndicate by pretending to be him and filing a Petition for
Reconstitution of Lost Owners Duplicate Original Copy of his title. Palacios seek
the help of Fernandez and they eventually succeeded.
Palacios visited the Village administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association
and bumped into Mrs. Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios property. She
heard that it was being sold by Fernandez. Palacios was shocked and upon
investigation he discovered that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of donation that
he (Palacios) purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. The deed was duly
registered and the TCT in Palacios name was cancelled and a new TCT was issued
in Fernandez name. Palacios then employed the services of Atty. Villalon to file
a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation.
In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his name was proper
on account of a Deed of Absolute Sale and it was Palacios who falsified the Deed
of Donation to cheat the government in paying lower taxes (donors tax instead
of capital gains tax) and in order to have a ground for the annulment of the new
TCT issued in favor of him and to recover the property.
Fernandez filed a complaint for DISBARMENT against Atty. Villalon for violation
of
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or mispresent the contents
of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 1.01, Rule 7.03, Rule 10.01, Rule 10.02 and Rule 10.03 if the Canons of
Professional Responsibility in the ff. grounds:
1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended Complaint her
knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12,
2005;
2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the court into trying
Civil Case No. 05-1071, the action for the annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite
her knowledge of the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale;
3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether the attached
Deed of Absolute Sale was properly notarized, the respondent Villalon personally
inquired before the notarial section of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City thru a letter-request, whether a record of the deed existed in the said office;
in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented that there was already a
pending case in the RTC of Makati before November 9, 2005;
4. refused to receive the complainants Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
so that she could file on behalf of her client an Amended Complaint without
leave of court and without presenting the Deed of Absolute Sale;
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5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a false Affidavit by telling
her that it would only be for purposes of compelling Fernandez to pay additional
sums to her client; however, Atty. Villalon used it as evidence to frame the
complainant Fernandez for her own personal gain;
6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature examination and
certification by the NBI and intentionally failed to submit the Deed of Absolute
Sale
The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation. Commissioner Funa of
the IBP recommended dismissal the case stating that Atty.Villalon did not
commit any act for which she should be disciplined or administratively
sanctioned.
With regard to the first & second ground, Commissioner agrees with Atty.
Villalons argument that only the clients opeative facts and not other evidentiary
facts need to be included in the Complaint. It is correct for the respondent to
argue that said Deed of Sale was a matter of defense which defendant can freely
point out to the trial judge through his own pleading. It cannot be said that
respondent suppressed it when in fact the existence of the document is known
to everyone else especially the opposing party.
With regard to the third ground, assuming a misrepresentation was committed,
such act does not attain a degree of materiality or gravity so as to attribute evil
malice on the part of the respondent. The intent remains which is to obtain
relevant information. Besides a civil complaint was in fact filed the very next day
the letter was sent.
As to the fourth ground, such has not been factually substantiated. Fernandez
filed a Petition for Review in the SC alleging that Commissioner Funa committed
a grave abuse of discretion in recommending the dismissal of the disbarment
case and in failing to resolve one of the matters regarding the affidavit of
Heredia.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villalon can be disbarred on such grounds
HELD:
A lawyer has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings, however,
such duty does not require that a lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf
of the clients opponent.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful in all his dealings.
However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense
on behalf of his or her clients opponent. A lawyer is his or her clients advocate;
while duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the
case for his or her clients opponent. Assuming arguendo that the respondent
knew of the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its existence, is, indeed a
matter of defense for Fernandez.
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS

A.C. No. 5580, 15 June 2005, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos (Romanillos) represented San Jose Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission
(HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI). The suit was for violation
of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Act (PD 957). SJHAI
alleged that a certain lot was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan
that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands, but no school was ever built, and in
fact, the subject lot was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano.
While Atty. Robert B. Romanillos (Romanillos) was still counsel for San Jose
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI), he represented Myrna and Antonio
Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs conformity to construct a school building
in the subject lot, to be purchased from the spouses Durano. This request was
denied, and Romanillos applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of the Montealegres. It was at this point that
SJHAI terminated his services as counsel, and got another lawyer.
When Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI, the
latter filed a disbarment case against him. Upon investigation, it was found and
recommended that Romanillos failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing
with his clients, representing the Montealegres against SJHAI even when he
served as Board Member and counsel of the latter, and even served as counsel
for DCI in a suit against SJHAI. Romanillos got off with an admonition but
continued to act as DCIs counsel in the latter case, which prompted SJHAI to file
Page 24 of 30
Legal Ethics
a second disbarment case, concerning such representation, and adding that
Romanillos has been using the title Judge in his advertisements.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romanillos is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
Lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of

respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of
opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating
his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically
mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is
also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title "Judge"
violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any
misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The
quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is
deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the
order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped
of the privilege.
Roomanillos did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being
a judge during the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was
eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been
dismissed from the service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent was
found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant.
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled with prejudice to
reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or

corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is one of such privileges.
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with

conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but
also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to
promote the publics faith in the legal profession.
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the
obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of
all classes and professions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law,"
it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their
oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT OF THE BOOKS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
A.M. No. P-06-2177, 19 April 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Corona, J.)
During an audit of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the books of
accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho (Kho), former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern
Samar, it was found that there was a shortage of money in the General Fund, the
Sheriffs General Fund, the Fiduciary Fund, and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund. According to Kho, he was not able to deposit the money
immediately with the Land Bank since there was no branch thereof in their
locality. He said that it had been his practice to keep the money in the courts
safety vault.
In addition to such shortages, it was found that Kho and his common-law wife
had been in the practice of lending out the money the former receives in his
capacity as clerk of court. They would then earn interest on the money loaned
out. It was also found that some of the money had been kept in the vault for
more than year, in clear violation of the OCA Circular in 1993.
Page 25 of 30
Legal Ethics
ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA
Public office is a public trust. Those charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond
suspicion.
A.C. No. 6296, 22 November 2005, THIRD DIVISION (Garcia, J.)
A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the courts funds, revenues,
property and premises, is also entrusted with the primary responsibility of
correctly and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds.
Safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to an orderly administration of
justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of
the circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds.
Clerks of court have always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit
the various funds received by them to the authorized government depositories
for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal
from the service even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed
remorse by immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the
directives of the audit team. And considering that this is his first offense, we find
that the penalty of P10,000 fine is sufficient.
Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His
malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain why no further disciplinary
sanction should be imposed on him.
Atty. Evelyn Magno (Magno) had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos
(inos) over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In order to set things
right, Magno addressed a letter, styled Sumbong to Bonifacio Alcantara
(Alcantara), their barangay captain. During the conciliation/confrontation
proceedings, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Jacoba) appeared for Inos, on the
strength of a Special Power of Attorney, together with Inos son, Lorenzito. When
Magno objected to Jacobas appearance, the latter said that she was there not
as counsel, but only as attorney-in-fact.
However, Jacoba, according to Magnos evidence, acted as counsel during the
proceedings, asserting her procedural know-how into every stage thereof, which
made the proceedings drag on longer than normal. It was because of these
numerous instances that Magno charged Jacoba with willful violation of the
Local Government Code and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is guilty of violating the Code
of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Jacoba alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the
Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by
Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a
conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, she submits
that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan
pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her
appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement in the LGC is to
enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and
issues, the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties.
Page 26 of 30
Legal Ethics
There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate
and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the
unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and
confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to
use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite
settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation

proceedings was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the
aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed
her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter
proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state
that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of
the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the
barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Given the above perspective, the Supreme Court joins the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline in its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition
prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of
mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct
tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay
system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored
complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay
conciliation proceedings.
BENILDA M. MADDELA v. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO
A disbarment case was filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
by herein complainant Benilda M. Maddela (Maddela) against Atty. Rosalie
Dallong-Galicinao (Atty. Galicinao) for acts unbecoming a public servant and a
lawyer, grave misconduct and slander.
Maddela averred that she loaned an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) from Atty. Galicinao. In November 2001, since part of the loan
remained unpaid, Atty. Galicinao went to Maddela's office and took the latters
cash gift check amounting to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in her absence and
without her knowledge. There, Atty. Galicinao 'uttered unsavory and humiliating
words' against her. On other occasions, Atty. Galicinao collected from Maddela
an amount equivalent to one-half of the face value of the checks she received as
benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 10 December 2002, the respondent went again to the office of the
complainant and demanded one-half of the value of the check representing a
cash gift of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000). Maddela refused, reasoning that it
was a cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore, not covered by their agreement.
Maddela's refusal to part with the amount angered Atty. Galicinao, prompting
the latter to raise her voice, utter 'unsavory remarks' against Maddela, and
banged her fist on top of the Maddela's table, causing the glass top of the table
to break.
To further support her bid for the disbarment of Atty. Galiciano, Maddela,
through the affidavit of a certain Mr. Rilloraza, alleged that Atty. Galicinao is also
guilty of notarizing documents outside the area of her commission. Maddela
claimed that although Atty. Galicinao was not yet a lawyer, she was issued a
notarial commission and even notarized certain documents outside of her
commission.
Maddela likewise alleged that despite the death of Atty. Galicinaos husband,
Atty. Galicinao continued to receive and encash for at least (3) three months
checks corresponding to her husband's salaries as Ex-OfficioSheriff of the Office
of the Clerk of Court of Nueva Vizcaya. Maddela even pointed out that Atty.
Galicinao continued to claim the higher allowable deductions as a married
individual despite the death of her husband.
A.C. No. 6491, 31 January 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Davide, CJ, J.)
Page 27 of 30
Legal Ethics
Atty. Galiciano denied the allegations but with respect to the documents that
she notarized outside of her notarial commission, she reasoned that she did such
for her relatives and she did not derive any income from the transactions . In
2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her report and
recommendation. She stated that Atty. Galicinao was able to prove that she was
not the creditor of the Maddela and that Atty. Galicinao did not claim her
husband's salary and avail herself of the higher allowable tax deductions even
after his death. However, she will be suspended for six (6) months for the acts of
notarizing outside the area of her notarial commission and obtaining the JDF
checks of the complainant from the cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 27-2001.
On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVI2004-227 in CBD No. 03-1060, annulling and setting aside Commissioner Maala's
recommendation; dismissing the administrative complaint against Atty.
Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a Supreme Court Circular for
collecting a loan for which she acted as a guarantor; and imposing upon the
respondent the penalty of reprimand for her act of notarizing documents outside
the area where she was commissioned as a notary public. The said ruling was
affirmed by the Supreme Court with a modification as to the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Galicinao should be disciplined for having notarized
documents outside of her notarial commission
HELD:
Notarization is invested with substantive public interest such
that only those who are qualified may act as notaries public.
We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts,
and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of the authenticity thereof (Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160
[1999]).
Thus, we are not satisfied with respondent's explanation that she notarized
documents outside of the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her
relatives and for free. Whether the respondent derived profit from her act of
notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact remains
that she notarized outside the area of her commission. Considering, however,
that her misconduct as a notary public was committed while she was not yet a
lawyer, she could not be disciplinarily dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that
should be meted to her should, therefore, be as a notary public before she was
admitted to the Bar. The penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.
XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR

G.R. No. 156310, 31 July 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J.)
A parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 was issued on
November 19, 1923 in the name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana
Villanueva is the subject of the instant case. Before the issuance of OCT No.
20461, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had predeceased her
husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over said
property. The lot was partitioned and distributed to Demetrio Banares, Ramon
and David Abadiano and Amando Banares. The partition is embodied in a Deed
of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary
Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.".
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in
lieu thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over the same property, still in
the name of Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva. On June 14, 1957
Demetrio Baares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The same was
annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).
Page 28 of 30
Legal Ethics
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first,
the confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by
David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second,
the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance
of a new certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22,
1962, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares,
Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for
Negros Occidental.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a spurious document

HELD:
The Supreme Court, in its decision, discussed the due execution and authenticity
of the Compra Y Venta.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
On the other hand, spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir (Spouses Martir) alleged that,
prior to the issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on
behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over the
property to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of
sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary
Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60,
Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano
in a document dated September 30, 1939.
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs
were in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner of the property.
Thus, Spouses Martir filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of
Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Herein
Petitioners denied allegations of Spouses Martir and it was maintained that the
property was never conferred to Victor Garde through a Compra Y Vente. Xerxes
Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise
that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to
Victor Garde. The trial court ruled in favor of Spouses Martir declaring them as
the true and legitimate owners of the property. The Court of Appeals likewise
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their

complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document
was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy
from that office but their request was refused. No other evidence but these bare
assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the
custody of the Register of Deeds or that respondents due and diligent search for
the same was unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
Page 29 of 30
Legal Ethics
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of
the document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under
the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine
and proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document
presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on
Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though
executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both
documents contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same
notarial inscription.
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not
have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the same error would have
meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus,
not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out
of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need
not be proved. Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution
and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioner.
Page 30 of 30

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Legal Ethics

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES v. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

There is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO

Whether or not Atty Aparicio violated Canon 19

1) The rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every

or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or

GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO

2. Atty. Inocentes failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

Contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if

When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings

Thereafter, a statement entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty

Accordingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law faculty-signatories to show cause,

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The administrative matter is decided by reminding the Thirty-five UP professors

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of

TERESITA D. SANTECO v. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE

ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN v. ATTY. IBARO B.

CARLOS REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN

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LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

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JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN

possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in the

ALFREDO B. ROA, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO

Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainants dependence on Attys.

Atty. Morenos credibility is highly questionable. Records show that he even

MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of

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OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record burdened with all the

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Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the

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Lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.

A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have

HEIRS OF BOBADILLA v. JAIME CASTILLO

A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 9 September 2008, EN BANC (PER CURIAM)

The compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's

Canon 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A.

Atty. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against Comelec

and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Additionally,

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ERLINDA R. TAROG v. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT

The Tarogs furthered delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for making a

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Lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law.

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of

government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or

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ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA