Alexander Turner-Cambrai 1917 - The Birth of Armoured Warfare (Campaign) - Osprey Publishing (2007)

Cambrai 1917
The birth of armoured warfare
ALEXANDER TURNER is a
serving British Army officer
in the Irish Guards. His
operational experience
includes Northern Ireland,
Kosovo, the Iraq war of 2003
and service as a United
Nations Military Observer.
He has a BA in War Studies
from King's College London
and is a graduate of the UK
Command and Staff College.
He also wrote Campaign 151:
Vimy Ridge 1917 for Osprey.
PETER DENNIS was

born in 1950. Inspired by
contemporary magazines such
as Look and Learn he studied
illustration at Liverpool Art
College. Peter has since
contributed to hundreds
of books, predominantly
on historical subjects.
He is a keen wargamer and
modelmaker. He is based
in Nottinghamshire, UK.
Cambrai 1917
The birth of arllloured warfare
Campaign 187
Call1brai 1917
The birth of arllloured warfare
Alexander Turner Illustrated by Peter Dennis
First published in Great Britain in 2007 by Osprey Publishing,

Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 OPH, UK
443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA
E-mail: info@ospreypublishing.com
Dedication
Dedicated to the memory of Lance-Corporal Ian Malone and
Piper Christopher Muzvuru, Irish Guards; killed in action in Basra
on Sunday 6 April 2003. Quis Separabit.
2007 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

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A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978 1 84603 147 2
Editorial by !Iios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com)
Page layout by The Black Spot
Index by Alan Thatcher
Typeset in Helvetica Neue and ITC New Baskerville
Maps by the Map Studio Ltd
3D bird's-eye views by The Black Spot
Battlescene illustrations by Peter Dennis
Originated by United Graphics Pte Ltd, Singapore
Printed in China through World Print Ltd
07 08 09 10 11
Acknowledgements
As the aphorism goes, 'history is merely the rearrangement of other
people's words' so I am grateful for all the scholarship, military
report writing and journal keeping that made this exercise possible.
David Fletcher and Janice Tait at the Bovington Tank Museum
Library were especially helpful in navigating me around that
first-class resource. As always, the staff at the Imperial War
Museum and National Archives were exemplary. Thanks also to:
Vince McEllin and Don Kearney at Regimental Headquarters Irish
Guards, Crispin Daly for wading through the German official history
and its indecipherable Gothic script, Peter Dennis for his infectious
enthusiasm and the editor Marcus Cowper for putting up with my
opinions well into the early hours.
Author's note
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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In describing military formations the text of this narrative conforms

to the convention of only using capital letters in the formal titles
of units. Generic references to corps, divisions, brigades and
regiments etc. remain in the lower case as demonstrated here.
Where denoting a numbered battalion within a regiment, it will
read (for example) 7th/Black Watch. Regional affiliations with
British divisions will only be specified the first time that formation
is mentioned. German words are expressed in italics. Unless part
of the author's collection, all photographs are reproduced with
the kind permission of the Imperial War Museum, Tank Museum
Bovington or Regimental Headquarters Irish Guards.
www.ospreypublishing.com
FRONT COVER 'Hyacinth' (Male H45 commanded by 2nd Lieutenant
Imperial War Museum Collections
F. H. Jackson) stuck on Hindenburg Support Line west of Ribecourt

on 20 November 1917. Attendant infantry are from the 71st Brigade
of 6th Division. (IWM Q 6432)
TITLE PAGE A Female Mark IV from the perspective of a defending
German trench occupant: inhuman and invulnerable. The reality was
very different. (IWM Q 6284)
Key to military symbols
Army Group
D
CJ
Company/Battery
Airborne
0
Army
p
UnitHQ
l:ZSJ
rn
[ill]
[2]
LSJ
0
0
0
EJ
GJ
[I]
Mountain
Navy
bd
00
Corps
Section
Air defence
Air aviation
Anti-tank
Medical
0
0
Missile
Signal
Supply
Division
Squad
III
II
cg]
Brigade
Regiment
Infantry
Artillery
Battalion
Cavalry
Airmobile
bd
EJ
Air Force
Air transportable
Amphibious
EJ
EJ
[ill
rn
rn
Bridging
Transport
Headquarters
Engineer
Nuclear, biological,
chemical
Rocket artillery
Air defence artillery
Many of the photos in this book come from the Imperial War
Museum's huge collections which cover all aspects of conflict
involving Britain and the Commonwealth since the start of the
twentieth century. These rich resources are available online to
search, browse and buy at www.iwmcollections.org.uk. In addition
to Collections Online, you can visit the Visitor Rooms where you
can explore over 8 million photographs, thousands of hours of
moving images, the largest sound archive of its kind in the world,
thousands of diaries and letters written by people in wartime,
and a huge reference library. To make an appointment, call
(020) 7416 5320, or e-mail mail@iwm.org.uk. Imperial War Museum
www.iwm.org.uk
Artist's note
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the
colour plates in this book were prepared are available for private
sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever.
All enquiries should be addressed to:
Key to unit identification
Peter Dennis, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT

Unit~parent
identifier
unit
Commander
(+) with added elemenls
(-)Iesselemenls
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence

upon this matter.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Origins of the campaign
CHRONOLOGY 11
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 13
The British The Germans
OPPOSING FORCES 16
The Germans The British Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS 25
The Germans The British
THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 35

Final assembly A tide of iron Heroics at Flesquieres
Scramble for canal crossings A Herculean repeat
'Hell's Ladies' dance in Fontaine 'A tot of rum and we were off'
Bourlon blooded Das Ringen um Sourlon Beginning of the end
'A dirty and a noisy place was Bourlon' Rupprecht's turn Angriffschlacht
AFTERMATH
88
Recrimination Elusive exploitation The birth of armoured warfare
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 92

FURTHER READING 94
INDEX 95
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British front line

German front line
British initial objectives
British intermediate objectives
British day one objectives
xxxx
Eventual consolidated line
ThirdlZl
Exploitation route for cavalry corps

- -xxx-- Corps boundary (day one)
Cav
2 miles
I
2km
INTRODUCTION
In the front ... tanks, manoeuvring back and forth! We pull the ammunition
belts from the boxes - our machine gun works itself into a glow and the cooling
water hisses. Now a heavy tank has reached the line. It rolls over and away.
Some men try to escape. The tank gun stretches them down. One of these wide,
dangerous shod wheels drives over the lying wounded Liesenfield, pounding
him; pounding his body into the soft ground. 1
his perception of the tank's emergence onto the battlefields of
World War I has, to a large extent, substituted myth for reality.
Initially, the metal beasts crawling inexorably across no man's
land were a terrible and effective shock to German defenders. Yet events
were quick to show that the tank was not destined to be a 'silver bullet'
that would break trench deadlock and open up the war on the Western
Front. Far from e~oying the invincibility popularly associated with
them, early tanks were still defined by their limitations; ponderous,
unreliable and surprisingly vulnerable to all forms of enemy fire. Only
hindsight confers laurels on a weapon system whose relevance was less
than certain at conception.
Nevertheless, whilst the tank's hulking anonymity appears so
incompatible with human endeavour, the men inside displayed
astonishing fortitude in pursuit of that ever-elusive 'breakthrough'.
Mter early disappointments, they maximized the utility of this budding
innovation by harnessing it to the traditional military tenets of
coordination, cooperation and training; demonstrating the tank's true
promise through kinship with parallel advances in combat aviation
and artillery. Rather than complementing existing plans, they sought to
employ tanks in an operation that was conceived with these strengths
in mind - surprise and concentration of force. At Cambrai in November
1917 the fledgling Tank Corps found their first opportunity.
T
OPPOSITE Cambrai's significance
as a transport hub is self-evident
from this map. Its capture would
cause chaos for the German
army's logistic effort.
The Cambrai battlefield is
bounded by the St Quentin Canal
to the east and Bourlon Ridge
and Sensee River to the north.
As the operation was conceived
originally as a raid, these
limitations on manoeuvre were
intended to disrupt German
counterattacks. Once Byng and
Haig's ambitions for breakthrough
entered the equation, they
became a liability.
Specific objectives (Blue, Brown
and Red Lines) were only set
for day one (1). Thereafter the
planners envisaged a fluid battle
of exploitation, with the Cavalry
Corps sweeping through a
narrow gap to wreak havoc
beyond Cambrai (2) and infantry
pressing onto Bourlon Ridge. The
eventual aim was to consolidate
on the Sensee River in order to
threaten the entire Hindenburg
system north of Cambrai (3).
Subsidiary attacks west of the
Canal du Nord would protect
the flanks of the breach (4).
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The opportunity for an offensive at Cambrai was established by
Germany's retirement to the mighty Siegfried Stellung in February
1917. Since the failure of the August 1914 Schlieffen Plan, the German
High Command (OHL) had opted for a defensive posture on the
Western Front, concentrating instead on defeat of the Russians in
the east. Nonetheless, an absolute refusal to accept any territorial
withdrawal in the face of sustained Allied attacks through 1915 and
1916 had come at a high price. These extravagances on Verdun and
1 P. Ettighoffer, Gespenter am Toten Mann Bertelsmann: GOttersloh, 1937.
The bloody morass of Flanders

was the worst possible
environment for tanks to prove
their worth. Their reputation
mired alongside the fortunes
of Haig's offensive. Whether
judged to be a Pyrrhic victory
or humiliating impasse, the net
strategic result was the same:
exhaustion. (Regimental
Collection, Irish Guards)
the Somme cost them nearly 750,000 men. Infantry divisions were
halved in size to disguise the damage but Germany could not match the
Allies' stocks of manpower. The retirement they had resisted for so long
became inevitable.
Originally conceived as an insurance policy, the Siegfried Stellung
defensive system ran between Arras on the river Scarpe and the Chemin
des Dames ridge above the river Aisne, saving 25 miles of front. In
manning terms this equated to 13 divisions, precisely the number the
Germans needed to create a viable theatre reserve. In the Cambrai area,
these defences ran between the prominent obstacles of the St Quentin
canal and uncompleted Canal du Nord, which was effectively a deep,
dry ditch. Moving north, the line then cut abruptly north-west, across
the Canal du Nord, in order to protect the vital rail hub at Cambrai and
logistic conduit of the Sensee River. This created a bulge shaped like a
nose, with the commanding Bourlon Ridge at its base. Salients always
make tempting points to attack because they offer the opportunity to cut
off enemy forces with only a modest penetration of their defences. The
Cambrai area had added potential because it had not been fought over
yet. Its gentle, chalk farmland was firm going and unscarred by shellfire.
This first attracted attention during the Allied spring offensives of
April 1917 when the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary
Force (BEF) , Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, suggested a combined
Anglo-French attack on the tempting Cambrai sector. LieutenantGeneral Sir William Pulteney's IV Corps was instructed to submit a
scheme but, by its completion, preparations for the summer Flanders
offensive were well under way. Haig was still enthused by his Cambrai
project but Flanders took precedence and General Headquarters
(GHQ) shelved Pulteney's work.
Meanwhile, exponents of the tank were busy hatching schemes of
their own. The tank's debut at Flers-Courcelette on the Somme in
September 1916 had been premature. Though technologically cutting
edge, the failing lay in application. In its conception, the tank was a
means of protecting infantry and thus it was employed, spread thin as
This aerial photograph illustrates

the attractiveness of the
Cambrai sector to Tank Corps
planners. British trenches
are in the foreground and the
St Quentin Canal runs between
Masnieres and Crevecoeur in
the distance. The shell holes are
relics of November 1917's battle
as the photo dates from ten
months later. (IWM Q 50944)
'an adjunct to infantry attack'. Unfortunately for its advocates, this

emphasized the tank's shortcomings. In penny packets, mechanical
unreliability had more impact. The tanks bogged down in the quagmire
of old battlefields. Without doctrine and training, they failed to
integrate with the infantry they were supporting. Despite evident
potential, it was an inauspicious beginning.
The first step in rectifying this impasse was the creation of the Tank
Corps on 27 July 1917. Hitherto, it had been part of the Machine Gun
Corps as its 'Heavy Branch'. Now free to pursue their own doctrine,
they were desperate to organize a bespoke operation. They knew that
Flanders was the worst possible environment and would only exacerbate
the scepticism of senior commanders and fighting infantrymen alike.
Colonel John Fuller (always known by his initials 'J. F. C.'), the
now-famous interwar military thinker, was then Chief of Staff to BrigadierGeneral Hugh Elles, commander of the Tank Corps. He recommended a
large-scale raid as the best showcase for their tanks. GHQ turned down
an initial suggestion of Neuve Chapelle because of a lack of infantry
to support it. Undeterred, Fuller settled on Cambrai as it carried the
potential for French involvement, thus addressing the misgiving over lack
of infantry. He too saw its favourable setting - perfect for a raid. Bounded
by the St Quentin Canal, his proposed force of infantry, tanks, cavalry
and aircraft could wreak havoc behind the German front line, whilst
protected from counterattack by the canal obstacle.
Their plan secured the interest of Haig and his operations staff
but was vetoed by the ever-practical Lieutenant-General Sir Lancelot
Kiggell, the Chief of General Staff BEF, on the grounds that it would
detract from the ongoing Flanders offensive. However, it also came
to the attention of General Sir Julian Byng, recently promoted to
command of Third Army off the back of a prodigious spell leading the
Canadian Corps in First Army. Third Army had assumed responsibility
for the Cambrai sector during June in order to free up forces for
Flanders. An imaginative officer, Byng latched onto Fuller's ideas and
directed his staff to start incorporating the legacy arrangements
inherited from Pulteney.
Sourlon Village viewed from

the ridge above. The Sensee
River valley can be seen in
the distance, proving the
significance of Bourlon to
British plans for exploitation
on a northern axis.
(Author's collection)
Coincidentally, the lobbying effort was assisted by yet another

proposal for a Cambrai raid, this time from the fertile imagination of
Brigadier-General H. H. Tudor, Commander Royal Artillery in 9th
Division (part of IV Corps in Byng's Third Army on the Cambrai front).
He wanted to test his theories on 'silent registration' of artillery fire
by conducting a lightning raid against the Siegfried Stellung in the
Flesquieres sector.
There was now considerable interest in a Cambrai offensive and
Byng took the lead in coordinating the disparate strands into one
coherent plan. It was during this process that the parameters of the raid
stretched to incorporate contingencies for exploitation. Reacting to
intelligence reports that there were, in effect, only two German infantry
divisions holding the front at Cambrai, Byng and Elles entertained the
possibility of using cavalry to break out before German reserves could
be brought in to mount counterattacks. Haig approved of this ambition
but, as Byng continued pressing GHQ through September, he was always
given the same answer: complete as much preparation as possible
without endangering operational security. With the Flanders offensive
being renewed, infantry availability remained the principal constraint.
By October, it had become abundantly clear that the limited gains
made in Flanders were Pyrrhic at best. Subsidiary attack was the only
means of maintaining pressure on the Germans while the French Army
rebuilt itself. Furthermore, if Haig did not give Byng the go-ahead
imminently, an offensive would not be possible until the New Year.
The shortage of infantry could be mitigated by the concentration of
an ad hoc theatre reserve under Lieutenant-General Lord Cavan's XIV
Corps HQ. Byng would also be given Lieutenant-General Sir Charles
Kavanagh's Cavalry Corps and all three brigades of the Tank Corps.
On 13 October, Operation GYwas sanctioned.
The stated aim was 'to break the enemy's defensive system by a coup
de main ... to seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood, and the passages over the
Sensee River and to cut off the troops holding the German front line.'2
10
2 The Third Army Plan for Operation GY, issued 13 November 1917.
CHRONOLOGY
1914
3 August - German cavalry patrols enter Belgium at the spearhead of an invading army
August - Battles of Mons, Ardennes and Le Cateau as the BEF and French try to
stem the German advance into Belgium and France
September - Allied counterattacks on the Marne, Artois and Aisne drive the
Germans back
October - The struggle for manoeuvre culminates in the battle for the Flemish town
of Ypres. The hasty defences from Switzerland to the Channel ports solidify
through the winter
1915
March - British offensive at Neuve Chapelle. Failure attributed to 'poor
communication'
April - Germans initiate second battle of Ypres. Poisonous gas used for the first time
May - British attack at Aubers Ridge and Festubert to no avail while French launch
the costly second battle of Artois north of Arras
September-October - British offensive at Loos. First use of the 'creeping barrage'.
Battle of Artois continues with a subsidiary French effort east of Reims. Initial
success soon gives way to impasse
December - Haig replaces Field Marshal French in command of BEF
1916
February - Germans attempt to draw the French into unsustainable attritional battle
by attacking at Verdun. It grinds on, bloody and indecisive, through to June
July - In part to relieve pressure on the French, the British launch their offensive on
the Somme. Negligible gains came at horrendous cost but Germany persuaded to
suspend Verdun offensive. Falkenhayn replaced in command of German forces by
Hindenburg and Ludendorff
July-September - Somme offensive continues with attacks at Delville Wood, Pozieres
and Thiepval. Tanks used for the first time at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September
October - French counterattack at Verdun
November - Battle of Somme concluded after battle of Ancre. Gains of just seven
miles no consolation for 500,000 casualties. Germans lose 420,000
December - At Verdun, the French finally drive the Germans back to where they
started. Marshal Joffre replaced at head of French Army by General Nivelle
1917
February - Gross manning pressures compel German withdrawal to Siegfried Stellung
(Hindenburg Line). Calais Agreement between Haig and Nivelle on shape of the
year's offensive operations
April - America enters the war. Allied joint spring offensive. British attack astride the
river Scarpe at Arras. Some spectacular gains, including Vimy Ridge, but pause
called after a week. The French effort at the Chemin des Dames makes
encouraging early progress but falters after heavy losses. Idea to strike at Cambrai
first mooted
May - Both Arras and the Chemin des Dames offensives are concluded. French suffer
acts of 'mutiny' and Petain replaces Nivelle
11
June - Haig prepares for Flanders offensive by taking Messines Ridge with the
detonation of 19 vast mines
July - Third battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) is launched. Early August failures at
Gheluvelt Plateau, Langemarck and St Julien are improved by judicious limited
operations like Polygon Wood in September. However, having bogged in a rainy
quagmire, both Britain and Germany suffer terrible casualties - 400,000 versus
348,000. The offensive is brought to a close in November. Nowhere is the
stubborn folly of trench warfare more pronounced
13 October - Third Army Operation GYapproved by Haig
20 November - Attack commences at Cambrai with stunning initial successes
21 November - Offensive operations resume towards Bourlon, Fontaine, Cantaing
and canal crossings at Crevecoeur
22 November - Germans counterattack Fontaine
23-27 November - Attempts to capture Bourlon Ridge and Fontaine
30 November - German Second Army launches its counterattack across the
Cam brai front
1 December - British commence withdrawals. Completed by 7 December
2 December - In the wake of revolution, Russia withdraws from the war under the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
1918
March - Germans open the Kaiserschlacht offensive on the Somme, making huge
gains but exhausting their logistic capabilities
April - German subsidiary offensive in Flanders fails as the buttress of Ypres holds firm
May - After a diversionary attack west of the Chemin des Dames, Germany throws
itself once more at the French. The biggest advances since 1914 see the Germans
pressing against the river Marne once more but overextended forces are checked
with the assistance of fresh US divisions
June-July - Further German offensives lack the impetus of early efforts and result
in withdrawals
August - Allied counterattacks commence across the entire front. Spent German
forces are soon in full retreat. Ludendorff dubs 8 August - the battle of Amiens his 'black day'
September - Germans have been driven back to their start point on the Siegfried
Stellung by the end of the month. US forces make significant gains south-east
of Verdun.
October - BEF, French and US armies press home concerted, coordinated offensives
across the entire Western Front, breaching German defensive lines routinely.
British First Army reaches Mons
11 November - Armistice is signed and the Germans agree to pull back east of the
Rhine within 14 days
12
OPPOSING
COMMANDERS
THE BRITISH
espite its convoluted conception, Byng and Elles were the chief
architects of Operation GY Even so, Haig was always in the
background. Though he tried to keep a respectful distance
from detailed planning, in practice his influence was significant. He
controlled the tap on reserves and gave Byng just 48 hours to
demonstrate that GYwas going to achieve its objectives. Mter the costly
obstinacy of Flanders, Haig was conscious not to push his infantry too
far. Cambrai represented an opportunity; desirable but not essential to
the effort on the Western Front.
In terms of both planning and execution, Cambrai reflects some of
the enduring challenges of command in World War I. Of particular
pertinence was the integration of emerging technology. It is a common
temptation to criticize senior commanders of the period for failing to
exploit technologies we now know to be pivotal. Tanks are an excellent
example. Their dominance in modern warfare does not necessarily secure
their relevance to the conduct of operations in 1917. Myopic as they often
appear, commanders were under pressure to win a war. Inevitably, this
involved the painful task of prioritizing industrial and military resources.
As Paddy Griffith puts it in his study of battle tactics on the Western Front,
it was always deemed preferable 'to take a longer but more certain path
to victory ... than opt for some "death or glory" adventure which ran
every chance of failure.'3 The fluidity of battle imbues all soldiers with a
highly developed sense of practicality, placing stock in simplicity of plans,
reliability of equipment and sustainability of effort.
Nevertheless, the primary constraint on exploitation of technology
was not conceptual. It was the abject inability of commanders to influence
events once operations were in progress. Telegraph, field telephones and
motorized dispatch aided administration and formulation of planning
but were redundant once troops crossed the start line. Thereafter,
battlefield communications were little more advanced than in
Napoleonic times: runner, bugle, flag, etc. At least the Napoleonic
commander was able to survey his battlefield. Trench warfare was a
nightmare - diffuse and yet slaved to interdependence with flanking
units. By late 1917, the situation had been mitigated by novel solutions
like the use of ground marker panels to signal passing aircraft. But these
stopgap measures were not extensive enough to alleviate the imperative
for prescriptive planning. Only by timetabling events and imposing
pauses were commanders able to maintain a semblance of control. The
consequence was a catalogue of exasperating lost opportunities.
3 Battle Tactics of the Western Front, Paddy Griffith, p. 169.
13
General the Honourable Sir Julian Byng
General Sir Julian Byng. He was

a popular and respected figure.
D'Oyly Snow, General Officer
Commanding VII Corps, recorded
Byng's appointment to command
of Third Army in his diary: 'I was
very glad to hear that they had
promoted Bungo. It is very much
his show.' (lWM CO 1369)
It is no coincidence that an operation as seminal as Cambrai had Byng

at its head. A commander of noted imagination and thoroughness, he
had already masterminded the elite Canadian Corps' efficient capture
of Vimy Ridge in April 1917.
Byng was born into the aristocracy, educated at Eton and commissioned
into the 10th Hussars. An exemplary record in the colonial campaigns of
Sudan and the Second Boer War accelerated his rise through the ranks of
Britain's small professional army. In the latter he led an irregular cavalry
unit with elan and daring. Deft command of the 3rd Cavalry Division in the
dynamic campaigns of summer 1914 earned him promotion and a posting
to orchestrate the delicate withdrawal of IX Corps from the Dardanelles in
1915. He was promoted again the following year and assumed command of
the Canadian Corps. His evident success in building the reputation of that
formation made him a natural choice for command of Third Army when
General Allenby left them to command British Forces Egypt in June 1917.
Byng had an affinity with the resourceful Canadians and encouraged
many of the enterprising innovations that their officers put to him. Under
his aegis, major advances had been made in areas such as the science of
artillery counter-battery fire. Therefore when in command of Third Army,
he was bound to be attracted to the pioneering Elles.
Brigadier-General Hugh Elles
A Royal Engineer by background, Elles was one of many 'Sappers' to be

involved in the development of the tank. He was still only a major when
posted to the development programme in 1915 but his obvious zeal for
this new technology propelled him to the rank of colonel when selected
to command of the first tank unit, 'Heavy Branch' Machine Gun Corps,
in 1916. The formation of the Tank Corps in July 1917 warranted his
promotion to brigadier-general at the relatively young age of 37. By
attaching himself to such a high-profile procurement project, Elles had
risen from obscurity in meteoric fashion - and deservedly so. The BEF
is often accused of perpetuating hierarchical strictures but they were no
barrier to merit when it mattered.
Mention of Elles would be incomplete without reference to his Chief
of Staff, ColonelJ. F. C. Fuller. Fuller was an equally passionate devotee
of the tank and worked hand-in-hand with Elles to sell its capabilities.
He was absolutely fundamental to the creation of written doctrine for
use of tanks and, as an infantryman, particularly insistent on a
'combined arms' approach. He went on to be an extremely well-known
military thinker whose post-war treatises on armoured warfare heavily
influenced the German authors of so-called blitzkrieg doctrine.
The innovative Hugh Elles
photographed demonstrating
his Tank Corps vehicles to King
George V in 1918. By then he
was a major-general. Ash sticks
are carried by Royal Tank
Regiment Officers to this day.
(Tank Museum 5412/E4)
14
THE GERMANS
Though at this stage their contribution to the emergence of armour was
negligible, the Germans were adapting well to the new ways of war. Von
Moltke's legacy of a highly evolved General Staff to plan, execute and
administrate military campaigns was paying dividends in the deliberate,
logistically demanding environment of trench warfare. They were also
extremely flexible.
The Gruppe system of creating ad hoc formations from disparate subunits was genius. It reflected a military culture that, though indisputably
rigid in so many ways, always deferred to the person best placed to
deliver success on the 'battlefield. During periods of calm, Gruppen built
around a corps headquarters were ideally suited to manage the constant
state of flux as divisions came in and out of the line. Amidst the chaos
of battle, smaller Gruppen would form to marshal the remnants of
decimated units with lead elements of reinforcing ones. Moreover, when
the senior commander of a reinforcing regiment arrived at the front, it
was not uncommon for him to subordinate himself to a more junior
incumbent with better situational awareness. Cambrai is an exemplar of
this command system.
Kronprinz Rupprecht of Bavaria
The western front was split into two by German High Command
and Rupprecht was the commander of German Army Group North.
Although, as Haig's equivalent, he may seem somewhat remote from
events, owing to the importance of reserves to the German conduct of
this battle, Rupprecht was instrumental in its outcome. He also planned
the counterattacks they went on to launch in response.
Eldest son of Ludwig III, the last King of Bavaria, Rupprecht had
a rich pedigree. His full title was 'His Royal Highness Rupprecht
Maria Luitpold Ferdinand, Crown Prince of Bavaria, Duke of Bavaria,
Franconia and Swabia, Count Palatine of the Rhine'! Initial command
of the German Sixth Army in 1914 was a function of his Royal position
but a life of study and elevated status had equipped him well for the
responsibility. He proved a highly able commander, first checking
the August 1914 French counterattack at Lorraine and then managing
to mount one of his own. His promotion to command of Army Group
North in 1916 was well deserved and he held it until the Armistice in
1919. Having lost his formal powers in the post-war years, he opposed
Nazi rule and was forced into exile in 1939.
Kronprinz Rupprecht of Bavaria.

His appointment to command of
the Germans' northern Army
Group on the Western Front
owed nothing to nepotism.
He was an able commander.
(IWM Q 23727)
General von der Marwitz
Byng's counterpart at Cambrai was General Johannes von der Marwitz,

commander of the German Second Army. Also a cavalryman, von der
Marwitz had a pre-war career split equally between his regiment and the
staff. Most of his World War I service was seen on the Eastern Front,
where he commanded the XXXVIII Reserve Corps at the winter
(second) battle of the Masurian Lakes in Feburary 1915. Decorated
Pour le Mente for his service there, he served for a spell in command of
VI Corps on the Western Front before returning again to the east in
the summer of 1916. Three months as the Kaiser's Adjutant preceded
his selection to command Second Army at the end of that year. The
fact that von der Marwitz was always being shunted around from
one offensive to the next is testament to his standing in the eyes of
Germany's High Command.
General von der Marwitz,

commander of German Second
Army. He was not convinced
that the Cambrai sector was
at all vulnerable 'because our
defensive system is particularly
strong'. At the very least,
he expected systematic
bombardment as warning.
(IWM Q 68033)
15
OPPOSING FORCES
THE GERMANS
ermany's manning respite was short lived. Flanders proved almost
as costly for Germany as it was for the BEF - 348,000 casualties
versus 397,000 respectively. The divisions saved by the withdrawal
to the Siegfried Stellung were largely absorbed by the necessity to raise
an army for operations against the Italians in autumn 1917. Success on
the Eastern Front was starting to release divisions for the west but in midOctober, these were only just becoming available. The German army was
tired and stretched thin. In quiet sectors, units were undermanned and
often recuperating from battle. Cambrai was nicknamed the 'Flanders
Sanatorium' for its preponderance of combat-weary units.
This parlous state created strategic headaches for Germany, but
their fighting men were still a force to be reckoned with. They too had
been adapting and innovating. German defensive doctrine was highly
developed and wedded to inventions like reinforced concrete. Advances
were also being made in the offensive domain with the emergence of
Stosstruppen - stormtroops.
A great deal of mystique now surrounds these units. In truth, they
were simply applying tactical common sense, certainly similar to the
infantry doctrine being adopted by the BEF during the same period.
In March 1915, OHL ordered the formation of an experimental unit
to test new equipments and tactics. This became the 1st Sturmabteilung
Battalion, a training formation. Indeed, all the first Stosstruppen units
Sfossfruppen training with a
flame-thrower. The essence of

their tactics was orchestration
of manoeuvre and firepower.
Man-portable weapons like this
one were favoured because
they were organic to local
commanders and so could be
employed exactly when and
where needed for best effect.
(lWM Q 55426)
16
German Siegfried Stellung

positions were typically well
constructed; solid and carefully
sited. The convivial atmosphere
and lack of steel helmets
would suggest a support line
somewhere quiet. (IWM Q 44168)
were formed to spread best practice. Officers and non-commissioned

officers (NCOs) were posted for short periods in order to gain
experiences they could pass on to their regiments. But unlike the
BEF, which was attempting much the same thing with its centralized
battle schools, Stosstruppen units were active fighting formations that
spearheaded local raids and offensives. Once they had demonstrated
their worth, the idea spread. By October 1916, every army commander
on the Western Front was ordered to raise a Sturmbataillon. As intended,
it became a culture that infantrymen aspired to. Recruits had to have
an exemplary record, both in terms of discipline and fitness. These
procedures are what have spawned the elite reputation of Sturmbataillone
but even in late 1917 such men were in very short supply. Most German
infantry had a rather more mundane existence.
The forces facing Operation GY at Cambrai were part of Gruppe
Caudry, one of three such formations in von der Marwitz's Second Army
(the others being Gruppen Arras and Quentin). Gruppe Caudry was
based around XIII Corps headquarters, under the command of
General Freiherr von Watter. It contained four infantry divisions: the
20th Landwehr in the north, 54th Infantry and 9th Reserve Infantry
in the centre and 183rd Infantry Division in the far south. The 20th
Landwehr was relieving the 204th Infantry Division; a process not
completed until 12 November.
By this stage, the pre-war categorizations of 'Reserve Infantry' and
'Landwehr' effectively had lost their meaning; all infantry divisions were
manned and equipped on similar lines. They had also shed brigade
structures as part of the 1916 manpower reduction. A division now
fielded three regiments, which were subdivided into three battalions,
each of four companies. The company was the basic manoeuvre
element, especially in defence. Established for 264 men, in practice they
mustered nearer 150. Casualties and sickness had taken their toll.
Regiments also drew on the rifle companies for the creation of
unofficial machine-gun detachments and assault units.
17
In defence, the regiment was given a portion of the division's

frontage and manned it in depth by rotating the three battalions
through the front-line, support and reserve trench systems. Given that
the reserve positions were beyond the range of enemy field artillery,
troops generally lived at rest in billets, fulfilling administrative functions
like road repair. They were also earmarked for counterattack if forward
positions fell to attack.
When occupying fighting positions, routine in the 'Flanders
Sanatorium' was not necessarily baneful. The trenches included dugouts
deep enough to resist shelling and foul weather. Foul air and vermin
infestations were in the bargain but the stolid infantrymen were used to
that. Quality of life really depended on the aggressiveness of the British
unit opposite - some raided and harassed more than others.
THE BRITISH
Given the modest size of its pre-war nucleus, the 1.5-million-strong BEF
of 1917 was a remarkable entity. Expansion occurred in concert with
rapid progress across the sphere of military capability from munitions
to military medicine. The pace of change during World War I was
unprecedented in military history. Generals that had started their
military careers using single-shot weapons and infantry squares were
now able to call upon the likes of aerial photoreconnaissance, chemical
weapons and tanks.
Some of the most astonishing developments are to be found in the
realm of airpower and artillery. The Royal Flying Corps deployed to
France in August 1914 with 50 light observation aircraft. By November
1917, they were operating a mixed force of 1,000 fighters, bombers, and
reconnaissance aircraft. Many of the latter were being used to adjust the
fire of long-range artillery; a capability not superseded until the advent
of unmanned drones some 80 years later.
18
By late 1917, British artillery

was becoming remarkably
sophisticated. 18-pdr field
artillery batteries like this one
were the workhorses, delivering
stunningly precise creeping
barrages to protect advancing
infantry. Camouflage awnings
are in place to defeat balloon
observation. (IWM Q 2247)
Indeed, modern artillery owes much to that frenetic period of

modernization. Artillerymen started the war in expectation of firing
at targets in line of sight but were soon perfecting the science of
indirect fire using distant observers, variable charges and complex
fuses. Meteorology, metallurgy and trigonometry all became essential
disciplines in achieving accuracy over escalating distances. Scientists
perfected flash spotting and sound ranging methods for locating enemy
gun batteries to within 10m. Infantry were protected in the assault by a
'creeping barrage' of light field gun shells that laid a curtain of fire as
little as 75m ahead. Impressive as this was, the dominance of artillery
provoked an equal and opposite reaction from the men creating field
fortifications. Their efforts required ever-increasing preparatory
bombardment; always to the detriment of surprise. Thus forewarned,
defenders then had their reserves primed to preclude disaster.
The arrival of the tank was an encouraging development. It could
crush barbed wire, which hitherto had proved the most problematic
preparatory task. However, all the accompanying missions like counterbattery fire and 'standing' barrage of depth targets still required
'registration' - the process of adjusting rounds onto the target. This is
necessary because rounds seldom hit the target first time. Weather
conditions, ammunition batches and gun barrel temperatures always
differ. Complete surprise could only be achieved if the artillery was able
to refine nascent techniques for registering without firing.
Brigadier-General Tudor already harboured ambition for this 'silent
registration' and Byng was keen to develop it. Essentially, the process
involved firing purely by map. Exceptional cartography and thorough
survey of gun positions were the key prerequisites. Data was also
compiled for atmospheric effects on artillery rounds, muzzle velocities
and barrel wear rates. With all the key variables covered in this way,
mathematical prediction of impact was feasible.
The prospect of genuine surprise was tantalizing. It was now down to
the tanks to get the infantry through the wire. Protection of infantry in
the assault presented the most intractable conundrum of the war. Even
a single machine gun had sufficient reach and lethality to hold up a
battalion. As previously mentioned, the creeping barrage had proved its
worth in shielding advancing infantry but its inflexible timetabling could
also be a liability. Troops often either paused needlessly or lagged too
far behind. In theory, some kind of off-road armoured vehicle could
address most of these issues.
It is beyond the scope of this Campaign title to chart the development
of the tank. Any of David Fletcher's works (see Further reading) will
inform with abundant detail and anecdotal colour. Suffice it to say, it was
an outstanding engineering accomplishment. From the initiation of the
'Landship' Committee in February 1915, it took them just seven months
to build a working prototype. Thirty-two tanks went into battle for the
first time as C and D Companies of Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps
at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September 1916. By November 1917 the tank
was on its fourth iteration, incorporating many design improvements.
The Mark IV tank came in two mechanically identical forms: Male
and Female. Male variants were armed with two Lewis light machine
guns and two Hotchkiss naval quick-firing 6-pdr guns in the side
sponsons, whereas the Female just mounted four Lewis guns instead.
19
This fearsome wire entanglement

has been contrived to
demonstrate the Mark IV's
capabilities. F1 is a Female
variant with two Lewis guns
protruding from each sponson.
She is also bearing a supply
of 'Spuds' - track attachments
that increased the width and
therefore, grip. One can be seen
fitted on the front right. They
proved impractical, picking up
wire and dragging it along.
(IWM Q 6424)
20
Originally, this reflected a shortage of 6-pdrs but Females proved their

utility because machine guns were able to fire on the move - something
impossible for the 6-pdr owing to transmission vibrations disturbing
its sights. All variants had one forward-firing and (notionally) one rearfiring Lewis. Target acquisition was limited by narrow vision slits.
With an optimistic top speed of 3.7mph, the Mark IV was never in a
hurry. Direction changing was so complicated that it could take up to
five minutes to pull a V-turn. Very minor adjustments could be made by
the driver applying one of the track brakes but the only totally practical
method was for the tank to stop, lock its differential and get the
gearsmen in the back to engage (or disengage) secondary gears so
that only one track was then under power.
In terms of protection, the armour plate on tanks of this period was
nowhere near as advanced as it is today. These early designs did not
incorporate the advantages to be gained by sloping armour, nor had
they mastered the ability to 'face harden' rolled steel, thus leaving the
inside much less brittle. Consequently, early tanks suffered terribly
from 'spall' - jagged pieces of steel being knocked off the inside of
armour by a bullet strike to the outside. The Mark IV was not proof
against armour-piercing rifle ammunition and any hit from a direct-fire
artillery round would generally prove catastrophic. Enemy infantry also
soon learnt to fire at vision slits. This created an effect that crews called
'splash' - ricochets and fragments of copper bullet jacket whizzing into
the tank's interior.
Fire was a terrifyingly realistic prospect. Rear-mounted external
petrol tanks were fairly vulnerable but crews also perched astride the
engine and transmission. There were no firewalls or baffles to protect
them. Airspaces were thick with fuel vapour; worse yet, canvas coveralls
were saturated with oil and petrol. The final moments of many a crew
were captured by a cluster of immolated remains around inadequate
egress hatches.
In fact, life for a tank crew was unpleasant in most respects. Though
half the width and weight of a modern four-man Main Battle Tank, the
Mark IV squeezed in eight men: commander, driver, two gunners, two
loaders and the two gearsmen in the back. Once inside and 'closed
down', the Stygian gloom was penetrated only by a few dim lamps
and shafts of light from vision slits. The engine was so noisy that
The Tank Corps soon generated

a strong esprit de corps. Then as
now, the crews also developed
superstitious affinity with their
vehicles, which always have
a peculiar character of their
own. 'Cross-decking' into a
replacement is like losing
a faithful horse.
(Tank Museum 56/C2)
communication was impossible except by hand signal. Lacking any

form of suspension, the ride was literally bone jarring. Temperatures
soared quickly to 50 degrees Celsius (120 Fahrenheit), irrespective of
conditions outside. Fumes from the engine and weapons systems
created a noxious cocktail of petrol vapour, carbon monoxide, oil smoke
and cordite. It was perfectly normal for crewmen to pass out. Current
health and safety legislation would not permit five minutes in these
conditions. Tank Corps crews in 1917 regularly tolerated seven to eight
hours. Service with the Tank Corps was no easy ride.
Nevertheless, casualty rates were broadly still lower than the
infantrymen they were supporting. Then, as now, defences could only
be cleared and consolidated by the feral aggression of men with rifles,
grenades and bayonets. Akin to the German army, BEF infantry tactics
had reached significant maturity.
The cornerstone of this new doctrine was 'fire and movement'.
Thirty-six-man infantry platoons were balanced to create an assault
element, suppression elements and a reserve. Once presented with a
specific objective, the platoon would lay down suppressive fire with its
Lewis light machine gun (supported by eight ammunition bearers)
and a nine-man section of 'rifle bombers'. The assault section (nine
'bombers' equipped with hand grenades) could then work their way
around to an exposed flank and clear the position. A mixed reserve
section sat with the command element in preparation to support either
function as necessary. This basic procedure has not changed since.
Indeed, an infantryman from 1917 would assimilate modern infantry
weapons and tactics with ease.
21
ORDERS OF BATTLE
Note: Vital as they were, space precludes detailing formation

support units such as aircraft, artillery, engineers, pioneer,
cavalry and logistics. This information is readily available in
the National Archives records, Official Histories or by
correspondence with the author.
BRITISH
87th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. H. T. Lucas

1st Battalion King's Own Borderers
1st Battalion Border Regiment
1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers
2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers
88th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. H. Nelson
1st Battalion Essex Regiment
1st Battalion Newfoundland Regiment
2nd Battalion Hampshire Regiment
4th Battalion Worcestershire Regiment
THIRD ARMY - Gen. Hon Sir J. H. G. Byng

IV CORPS - Lt. Gen. Sir C. L. Woollcombe
III CORPS - Lt. Gen. Sir W. P. Pulteney
6th Division - Maj. Gen. T. O. Marden
16th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. H. A. Walker
8th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment
2nd Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment
1st Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry
1st Battalion East Kent Regiment 'Buffs'
18th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. G. S. G. Craufurd
1st Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment
2nd Battalion Durham Light Infantry
14th Battalion Durham Light Infantry
11 th Battalion Essex Regiment (attached to 71 st Bde. for GY)
71 st Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. P W. Brown
1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment
9th Battalion Suffolk Regiment
9th Battalion Norfolk Regiment
2nd Battalion Sherwood Foresters
20th (Light) Division - Maj. Gen. W. Douglas Smith
59th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. H. H. G. Hyslop
10th Battalion Rifle Brigade
11 th Battalion Rifle Brigade
10th Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps
11 th Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps
60th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. F. J. Duncan
12th Battalion Rifle Brigade
12th Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps
6th Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
6th Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry
61 st Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. W. E. Banbury
7th Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry
7th Battalion Somerset Light Infantry
7th Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
12th Battalion Liverpool Regiment (King's)
12th (Eastern) Division - Maj. Gen. A. B. Scott
35th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. B. Vincent
9th Battalion Essex Regiment
5th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment
7th Battalion Norfolk Regiment
36th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. S. Owen
7th Battalion Sussex Regiment
8th Battalion Royal Fusiliers (City of London)
11 th Battalion Middlesex Regiment
37th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. A. B. Incledon-Weber
7th Battalion East Surrey Regiment
6th Battalion East Kent Regiment 'Buffs'
6th Battalion Royal West Kent Regiment (Queen's Own)
6th Battalion Royal West Surrey Regiment (Queen's)
36th (Ulster) Division - Maj. Gen. O. S. W. Nugent

107th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. W. N. Withycombe
8th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles
1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers
108th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. R. J. Griffith
11 th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles
9th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers
109th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. A. St Q. Ricardo
9th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
10th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
11 th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
51st (Highland) Division - Maj. Gen. G. M. Harper
152nd Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. H. P. Burn
5th Battalion Seaforth Highlanders
6th Battalion Gordon Highlanders
8th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
153rd Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. A. T. Beckwith
6th Battalion Black Watch
7th Battalion Black Watch
154th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. K. G. Buchanan
9th Battalion Royal Scots
62nd (West Riding) Division - Maj. Gen. Sir W. P. Braithwaite
185th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. Viscount Hampden
5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment
186th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. R. B. Bradford VC
4th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment
5th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment ..
187th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. R. O'B. Taylor
4th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment
5th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment
CAVALRY CORPS - Lt. Gen. C. T. McM. Kavanagh
22
29th Division - Maj. Gen. Sir H. de Beauvoir de Lisle

86th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. G. R. H. Cheape
1st Battalion Royal Guernsey Light Infantry
1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers
2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (City of London)
16th Battalion Middlesex Regiment
1st Cavalry Division - Maj. Gen. R. L. Mullens

1st Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. E. Makins
2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays)
5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales')
11 th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)
2nd Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. D. J. E. Beale-Brown

4th Dragoon Guards (Royal Irish)
9th Lancers (Queen's Royal)
18th Hussars (Queen Mary's Own)
9th Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. D'A. Legard
1st Bedfordshire Yeomanry
15th Hussars (The King's)
19th Hussars (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal)
2nd Cavalry Division - Maj. Gen. W. H. Greenly
3rd Cavalry Brigade - n/k
4th Hussars (Queen's Own)
5th Lancers (Royal Irish)
16th Lancers (The Queen's)
4th Cavalry Brigade - n/k
6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers)
3rd Hussars (King's Own)
1st Oxfordshire Yeomanry
5th Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. L. K. Campbell
2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys)
12th Lancers (Prince of Wales' Own Royal)
20th Hussars
3rd Cavalry Division - Brig. Gen. A. E. W. Harman
3rd Dragoon Guards (Prince of Wales')
1st Royal Dragoons
1st North Somerset Yeomanry
1st Life Guards
2nd Life Guards
Royal Horse Guards
10th Hussars (Prince of Wales' Own Royal)
1st Essex Yeomanry
4th Cavalry Division - Maj. Gen. A. A. Kennedy
Sialkot Cavalry Brigade - n/k
17th Lancers (Duke of Cambridge's Own)
6th Cavalry (King Edward's Own)
19th Lancers (Fane's Horse)
Mhow Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. N. M. Haig
2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse)
38th Central India Horse (King George's Own)
6th Inniskilling Dragoons
Lucknow Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. M. F. Gage
36th Jacob's Horse
Jodhpur Lancers
29th Lancers (Deccan Horse)
5th Cavalry Division - Maj. Gen. H. J. M. MacAndrew
Ambala Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. H. Rankin
8th Hussars (King's Royal Irish)
9th Lancers (Hodson's Horse)
18th Lancers (King George's Own)
Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade - n/k
7th Dragoon Guards (Princess Royal's)
34th Poona Horse
20th Lancers (Deccan Horse)
Canadian Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. J. E. B. Seely
Lord Strathcona's Horse
Fort Garry Horse
Royal Canadian Dragoons
TANK CORPS - Brig. Gen. H. J. Elles
I Tank Brigade - Col. C. D'A. B. S. Baker Carr
o Battalion Tank Corps
E Battalion Tank Corps
G Battalion Tank Corps
II Tank Brigade - Col. A. Courage
A Battalion Tank Corps
B Battalion Tank Corps
H Battalion Tank Corps
III Tank Brigade - Col. J. Hardress-L1oyd
C Battalion Tank Corps
F Battalion Tank Corps
I Battalion Tank Corps
Units in action from 23 November:

Guards Division - Maj. Gen. G. P. T. Feilding
1st Guards Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. R. Champion de Crespigny
2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards
2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards
3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
1st Battalion Irish Guards
2nd Guards Brigade - Brig. Gen. B. N. Sergison Brooke
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards
1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
1st Battalion Scots Guards
2nd Battalion Irish Guards
3rd Guards Brigade - Brig. Gen. Lord Seymour
1st Battalion Grenadier Guards
4th Battalion Grenadier Guards
2nd Battalion Scots Guards
1st Battalion Welsh Guards
40th Division - Maj. Gen. J Ponsonby
119th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. F. P. Crozier
19th Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers
12th Battalion South Wales Borderers
17th Battalion Welsh Regiment
120th Infantry Brigade - n/k
13th Battalion East Surrey Regiment
14th Battalion Highland Light Infantry
11 th Battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment (King's Own)
121 st Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. J. Campbell
13th Battalion Yorkshire Regiment
21 st Battalion Middlesex Regiment
56th (1st London) Division - Maj. Gen. F. A. Dudgeon
167th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. G. H. B. Freeth
1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers (City of London)
3rd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (City of London)
168th Infantry Brigade - n/k
12th Battalion London Regiment (The Rangers)
13th Battalion London Regiment (Kensington)
14th Battalion London Regiment (London Scottish)
169th Infantry Brigade - Brig Gen E. S. D'E. Coke
5th Battalion London Regiment (London Rifle Brigade)
9th Battalion London Regiment (Queen's Victoria Rifles)
16th Battalion London Regiment (Queen's Westminster Rifles)
2nd Division - Maj. Gen. C. E. Pereira
5th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. W. Bullen Smith
2nd Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry
2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry
6th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. R. K. Walsh
1st Battalion King's Regiment (Liverpool)
2nd Battalion South Staffordshire Regiment
13th Battalion Essex Regiment
99th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. R. O. Kellett
1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps
1st Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment
23rd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (City of London)
47th (2nd London) Division - Maj. Gen. G. F. Gorringe
140th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. H. P. B. L. Kennedy
6th Battalion London Regiment (City of London Rifles)
7th Battalion London Regiment (City of London)
8th Battalion London Regiment (Post Office Rifles)
15th Battalion London Regiment (Civil Service Rifles)
141st Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. J. F. Erskine
17th Battalion London Regiment (Poplar and Stepney Rifles)
23
18th Battalion London Regiment (London Irish Rifles)

19th Battalion London Regiment (St Pancras)
20th Battalion London Regiment (Blackheath and Woolwich)
142nd Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. V. T. Bailey
21 st Battalion London Regiment (1 st Surrey Rifles)
22nd Battalion London Regiment (The Queen's)
23rd Battalion London Regiment (County of London)
24th Battalion London Regiment (The Queen's)
55th (West Lancashire) Division - Maj. Gen. H. S. Jeudwine

164th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. I. Stockwell
4th Battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment (King's Own)
4th Battalion Royal North Lancaster Regiment
8th Battalion King's Regiment (Liverpool)
5th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers
165th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. L. B. Boyd Moss
166th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. F. G. Lewis
5th Battalion Royal Lancaster Regiment (King's Own)
5th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment
5th Battalion Royal North Lancaster Regiment
GERMAN
SECOND ARMY - Gen. von der Marwitz
XIV CORPS - Gruppe Arras - Gen.Lt. von Moser
111th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Busse
73rd Fusilier Regiment
76th Infantry Regiment
240th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Muller
471 st Infantry Regiment
20th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Wellmann
92nd Infantry Regiment
XIII CORPS - Gruppe Caudry - Gen.Lt. von Watter

20th Landwehr Division 384th Landwehr Infantry
386th Landwehr Infantry
387th Landwehr Infantry
Gen.Maj. von Hanstein

Regiment
Regiment
Regiment
54th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Watter

27th Reserve Infantry Regiment
9th Reserve Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Hildemann
183rd Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Schussler
Added as battle reinforcement or for the 30 November counteroffensive:
107th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Havenstein

52nd Reserve Infantry Regiment
232nd Reserve Infantry Regiment
119th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Berger
28th Infantry Division - Gen. Maj. Langer
40th Fusilier Regiment
Lieb Grenadier Regiment
11 Oth Grenadier Regiment
30th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Freiherr von der Wenge
143rd Infantry Regiment
220th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Bassewitz
Added as battle reinforcement or for the 30 November counteroffensive:

Formed for the 30 November counteroffensive:
3rd Guards Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Lindequist

Guard Fusilier Regiment
Lehr Infantry Regiment
9th Grenadier Regiment
21 st Reserve Infantry Division - Gen. Maj. Briefe
221st Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von la Chevallerie
41st Infantry Regiment
1st Ersatz Reserve Infantry Regiment
214th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Brauchitsch
363rd Infantry Regiment
49th Reserve Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Unger
24
XXIII CORPS - Gruppe Busigny - Gen.Lt. von Kathen

34th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Leezmann
208th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Grodded
5th Guards Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von der Often
3rd Guard Regiment
3rd Guard Grenadier Regiment (Elizabeth)
Note: 183rd Infantry Division was attached for the duration of 30 November
counteroffensive.
OPPOSING PLANS
THE GERMANS
traightforward force comparisons create the impression that von
Watter's under-strength Gruppe Caudry was grossly overmatched.
Some accounts (including the British Official History) also
observe that his three divisions in the line were deficient in artillery. This
is not strictly accurate. To take the 54th Division as an example, records
attest that its attached Field Artillery Regiment had 34 guns: three
batteries of the versatile 10.5cm howitzer and six 7.7cm field gun batteries
- a total of 34 pieces. In 1917 a German infantry division was technically
allocated only three batteries of each, i.e. 24 pieces. Their problem
was ammunition: just 1,500 rounds on the 54th's gun lines and a paltry
reserve of 4,600. Shortfalls in hardware were much more apparent at
Gruppe level. Von Watter's medium artillery comprised one battery of
four 5.9in. howitzers and three of captured Russian, French and Belgian
guns. There was also a rather incongruous detachment of coastal defence
mortars. None of these weapons could range beyond 5,500m.
Strange as it might seem, the situation did not create alarm. There
was unshakeable confidence in the mighty Siegfried Stellung. Having had
the advantage of being designed, sited and constructed out of contact,
the defences were a perfect embodiment of the latest German defensive
doctrine. Termed Eingreifentaktik - intervention tactic - the idea was to
Von der Marwitz was not quite

as short of field artillery as
accounts suggest. More
pertinent is the degree to
which he was overmatched
by a significant concentration
of medium and heavy guns
in support of Third Army's
offensive. For instance, Gruppe
Caudry had only four of these
5.9in. howitzers, whereas Byng
marshalled 152 weapons of
similar calibre. (IWM Q 55411)
25
The genius of German defensive

planning was to be found in their
use of ground. This photograph
was taken from the roof of a
reinforced concrete bunker on
the Siegfried Stellung support
line at Flesquieres. It dominates
the valley yet cannot be engaged
until the enemy crests the far
ridge. (Author's collection)
move away from heavily front-loaded linear trench systems in favour of

a defence in depth. The Somme battles had proved that wire, artillery
and machine guns were the key to defending ground. Large numbers
of infantry had often been captured in their dugouts without making a
telling contribution. These men had a much greater utility as an offensive
force. Hence counterattack was the cornerstone of Eingreifentaktik.
Physical defences were arranged in a series of zones thousands of
metres apart. The Vorwartszone - 'outpost zone' - lacked traditional
trench lines. Instead they built a chequerboard of mutually supporting
strongpoints known as Widerstandsnester. These could be short sections
of trench, concrete pillboxes or fortified farm buildings but they
were always lightly held and bristling with machine guns. Thick belts
of slanting wire would channel the enemy towards pre-planned killing
areas forwards of the Widerstand - 'resistance line' or 'battle zone'. This
contained concentric repetitions of more orthodox trench systems
(known as Stellungen 4 ) complete with telltale right-angle 'switches' and a
revetted fire step. Each Stellung had a 'front' and 'support' trench about
200m apart, both well constructed 2.5m deep and 3.5m wide at the top.
They too were studded with concrete pillboxes configured to fire in
a 360-degree arc. Where possible, trenches were placed on a 'reverse
slope' so that the advancing enemy would be ambushed as they crested
a rise. The forward Stellung of the Widerstand was repeated by an
identical support system (sometimes known as a Zwischenstellung) some
1,500m to the rear. Communications trenches linked them to form a
thick matrix. Villages were fortified and incorporated as hubs.
With the enemy thus embroiled beyond the safety of his own lines
(and supporting artillery), he would be subjected to the Eingreifen:
counterattack by large numbers of fresh infantry with Sturmbataillone at
their head. Planning assumptions for mounting these attacks were
generous on account of the belief that the enemy's preparatory
bombardment and stubborn resistance by the Widerstand would provide
plenty of time to marshal forces.
26
4 Meaning literally, 'positions'.
If one thing gave German

planners utmost confidence in
the Siegfried Stellung, it was
wire belts like these. Front lines
were protected by up to four
bands, each 50m thick. Slanting
belts, projecting like arrowheads,
were designed to channel
attacking infantry into
pre-registered 'killing areas'.
(IWM CO 3392)
British plans were seeking to shatter these assumptions. An

intelligence report prepared in support of Operation GY deduced that
German counterattack formations would not be in a position to
influence the battle for the first 48 hours. A combination of surprise and
shock action could unlock Eingreifentaktik before its ace card was played.
Two factors conspired to frustrate the impact of Byng's coup de main.
By chance, the Germans were in the midst of a relief in place. On
25 November, the 20th Landwehr Division was due to be replaced in
the line by 107th Infantry Division, which was redeploying from the
Russian Front. Two of the 107th Division's three regiments were in the
Cambrai area by 19 November, along with five of its six field artillery
batteries. Secondly, some months previously the Germans had started
construction of the so-called Siegfried II, an entire second Widerstand
that ran as a backstop east of the St Quentin Canal. British accounts
refer to it as the Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line. Though unfinished at
this stage (shallow trenches and only one belt of protective wire), it
dominated the routes intended for exploitation beyond canal crossings
and Bourlon Ridge. Were it not for the fortuitous presence of extra
troops, only reserve battalions would have manned this line.
THE BRITISH
Third Army did not bring its entire weight to bear against Gruppe
Caudry. Of six corps under command, only III and IV were to provide
attacking forces to the initial thrust. Three were holding front line
positions elsewhere (VII, VI and XVII) and V Corps provided the Army
reserve. French High Command also offered three divisions of infantry
and two of cavalry in the event of 'breakthrough'.
The task for the tanks and infantry was to penetrate the Siegfried
Stellung to its full depth and secure two features: Bourlon Ridge at the
north end of the breach and the crossings over the St Quentin Canal at
the south. Defensive flanks would be created at both ends to secure the
passage of exploitation forces. Cavalry Corps could then stream through
the gap to invest Cambrai and sweep north to seize crossings over the
27
Bourlon Wood with the

Bapaume-Cambrai road
and Anneux Chapel in the
foreground. Haig deemed it vital
to the achievement of Operation
GY objectives. (IWM Q 63739)
Sensee River. V Corps was ordered to advance in their wake, coming

down off Bourlon Ridge and driving north to north-east. Various
subsidiary attacks were scheduled across Third Army's front, as Byng
wanted to create confusion about the aim and scope of his offensive.
Consistent with standard practice, initial objectives were expressed
by a series of colour-coded lines like tidemarks. At first glance, this
appears overly thorough - troops should be encouraged to drive deep
and fast into the enemy rear areas - but it was the best means of
reconciling geographic objectives with the linear creeping barrage
timetables. Broadly they also corresponded with the successive belts
of the Siegfried Stellung: Blue Line was the forward Stellung (including
outpost zone), Brown Line the Zwischenstellung and Red Line the
Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line.
Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Woollcombe's IV Corps was given
the northern portion of the battlefield, focusing on Bourlon Ridge.
They had I Tank Brigade and 1st Cavalry Division in support. The 51st
(Highland) Division sought to capture Flesquieres Ridge and press east
towards the spur above Cantaing as its Red Line objective, with D and E
Battalions of the Tank Corps attached. 5 The Yorkshiremen of 62nd (West
Riding) Division and G Battalion Tank Corps had the unenviable task
of clearing Bourlon and Bourlon Wood via the village of Anneux on
the Bapaume-Cambrai road. Meanwhile, 36th (Ulster) Division was to
protect the flanks by attacking north up the Canal du Nord towards
Moeuvres. Once the Red Line had been secured, 1st Cavalry Division was
going to mount a joint attack with tanks to 'turn' Fontaine-Notre-Dame
(hereafter referred to as Fontaine), Cantaing and Noyelles in succession.
III Corps had a broader frontage and more attacking divisions. With
both II and III Tank Brigades in support, their main effort was the
St Quentin Canal crossings at Marcoing and Masnieres. The 55th (West
Lancashire) Division were holding the southern 'hinge' of the
battlefield from Banteux. Immediately to their north, 12th (Eastern)
Division with C and F Battalions Tank Corps would advance to create a
flank guard across Bonavis Ridge. The 20th (Light) Division with A and
I Battalions Tank Corps aimed to capture the Blue and Brown Lines,
paving the way for 29th Division's dash for the canal crossings and the
28
5 One company of E Battalion was cut to reinforce G Battalion.
Red Line with just one company of tanks from A Battalion. III Corps
commander, Lieutenant-General Pulteney, kept 6th Division as his
insurance policy, beefed up with Band H Battalions Tank Corps. It had
objectives of its own through Couillet Wood but was ordered to make
contingency plans for a defensive flank on the boundary with IV Corps.
He also had the headache of making space for the bulk of Kavanagh's
Cavalry Corps. The 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions were expected to cross
the canal on day one, with 4th Division planning a raid to the south-east
of Cambrai towards Waincourt soon after. Each division had nearly
10,000 horses. In the opening stages of the attack, the only routes
through the Siegfried Stellung would be those made by tank tracks.
Horses struggled to negotiate the crushed wire so paths had to be
improved by hand. They would also be in direct competition with other
traffic: artillery and logistics going forwards, battle casualties and
prisoners of war coming back - a staff officer's nightmare but Byng's
metier. As proved at Vimy Ridge in April of that year, he put stock in
meticulous preparation, leaving as little as possible to chance.
The first priority was his artillery. Aside from existing corps and
divisional allocations, GHQ made extra weapons available. For example,
four entire field artillery brigades from beyond Third Army. To this,
Byng added five field artillery brigades from Third Army's central
artillery train and the divisional artilleries of 40th and 56th (1st
London) Divisions. All the Cavalry Corps' artillery was also pulled into
the operational fire plan. In total, Byng amassed 1,003 pieces (see table
for breakdown by type).
Weapon type
III Corps
IV Corps
Total
13-pdr
36
18
54
18-pdr
264
234
498
4.5in. howitzer
66
66
132
60-pdr
54
42
96
6in. gun
12
6in. howitzer
72
68
140
8in. howitzer
14
16
30
16
12
28
12in. howitzer
15in. howitzer
537
466
1,003
9.2in. gun
9.2in. howitzer
Totals
The lack of preparatory bombardment was both a help and a hindrance.

Dispositions were made easier because there was no requirement for
flash-proof cover - by the time the guns opened up, it would be too
late for German counter-battery effort. Ammunition logistics was also
facilitated because daily expenditures in the weeks before Operation
GYwere normal. 6 However, without the usual gradual intensification of
6 An absence of harassing fire would have aroused nearly as much suspicion as concerted bombardment.
29
30
effort, all the tasks associated with a preparatory bombardment (less

wire crushing) would have to be achieved in a matter of hours rather
than days and weeks. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that
assaulting divisions expected to advance beyond the range of field
artillery within hours of the offensive.
Artillery planners solved the first of these two problems by
prioritizing targets and coordinating the fireplan. Headed by the
obvious necessity for destruction of enemy artillery batteries, the highpriority target list went on to specify: counterattack rally points such
as communication trench entrances, then command posts and finally,
depth targets such as troop billets. The creeping barrage was to be
dispensed with after four hours so that field guns could limber up and
start pressing forwards to support the capture of depth objectives.
The Royal Flying Corps was working on its own solution to the
dearth of fire support for rapid advances: fighter ground attack. Roving
fighter planes could act as aerial artillery (a term still used today) to
strafe and bomb enemy ground forces. They were also carving a niche
for themselves conducting air interdiction well behind enemy lines,
attacking enemy aerodromes, railway sidings and supply depots.
III Brigade RFC was Third Army's subordinate air wing. For
Operation GY their six multi-role squadrons (125 aircraft) were
reinforced by a further seven fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance
squadron and two flights of DH4 day bombers for air interdiction
missions. This brought the total up to 298. Their operation order
states that tasks were to include: medium distance reconnaissance of
approaches from the north, bombing of Gruppe Caudry HQ and railway
junctions, ground attack of enemy forces and fighting patrols to counter
enemy aircraft. Such were the perils of hurried training for low-level
ground attack in the run-up to Cambrai, many pilots crashed.
Training was another of Byng's fixations. In this instance, he placed
the most emphasis on tank/infantry cooperation. Opportunities for this
activity were limited. Each division had just ten days to train with the
tanks, which equated to two days per battalion. Fortunately, the tactics
devised by Col. Fuller were simple to assimilate. Each package started
Four broad-gauge railway routes

served the Cambrai build-up.
In bulk terms, road-building
materials took up the most
space but this was followed
closely by the two principal
consumables: animal fodder
and artillery ammunition.
(lWM Q 4623)
TANK TACTICS
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1. Normally, the tank section of three vehicles was in direct support of four platoons - an
infantry company. Assaulting elements were termed 'Trench Cleaners', backed up by two
platoons of 'Trench Stop Parties'. These men were tasked with sealing off the objective
and improving routes through it. Some accounts describe four platoons of each. This is
wrong. Doctrine states clearly that 'in most cases it will not be advisable to allot more than
one [assaulting] platoon to each tank'.
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2. The Advance Guard tank (1) creates a path through the wire and swings left to suppress
the front trench. The Main Body tank (2) drops a fascine and also swings left to support
its Trench Cleaners (A) as they assault the objective. It then loops round to suppress the
depth objective, support trench.
3. The second Main Body tank (3) pushes through with its platoon (C) onto the depth objective,
dropping a fascine and swinging left to assist the assault.
4. In their wake, the Trench Stop Parties (B and D) seal off the objective (in this case delineated
neatly by communications trenches). In practice this often meant liaising with neighbouring
companies.
Trench
Stop Parties
Trench
Stop Parties
5. Its fascine unused, the Advance Guard tank (1) rallies with the Main Body beyond the
objective and awaits the supporting echelon to continue advancing.
31
A British DH4 bomber. Versatile,

it also undertook reconnaissance
duties and was fast enough to
outdistance enemy fighters.
Forward-firing Vickers and
observer's Lewis machine guns
provided protection. It also had
dual controls, which improved
survivability. Three squadrons
flew at Cambrai. (lWM Q 11672)
A fascine-Iaden Mark IV Male

manoeuvres onto railway flatcars
for the journey up to Cambrai.
Note how the sponson has been
detached and pushed into the
gunners' recess. Without this
laborious adjustment they were
too wide for tunnels.
(Tank Museum 60/F5)
32
with a demonstration of the tank's capabilities in order to foster

confidence. Then the platoons had a chance to practise moving behind
them and working together to clear sections of trench. It was necessary
to agree established drills because tanks had no satisfactory means of
communicating with their accompanying infantry. All they could do was
display a series of coloured discs and drop a flag to mark lanes through
barbed wire.
Commonly, each infantry battalion in the lead of an advance was
given a company of 12 tanks. These operated in four sections of three, the
section being the basic fighting unit under command of a captain. Sections
dispersed with one tank forwards (known as the 'Advanced Guard' tank)
and two abreast some 100m behind. This was termed the 'Main Body'.
Infantry moved in platoon 'worms' behind the main body tanks, ready to
break off into trench clearance when the objective was reached.
Infantry were advised to task organize into three groupings: trench
cleaners, trench stops and supports. 'Cleaners' were the fighting element
while the 'stops' consolidated. 'Supports' is simply another designation
for reserve, usually formed by the next echelon battalion, ready to
Sledge tanks were a novel way

of solving the immediate logistic
demands of tank companies
but they did little to obviate
difficulties in supplying an
advance once attacking forces
cut the umbilical cord of road
and railheads. (lWM Q 7285)
resume the advance onto subsequent objectives. The drill for a tank
section/infantry company attack is depicted in the schematic on page 31.
Not all divisional commanders were in favour of such intimate
association with tanks. Much documented is the aversion displayed by
Major-General Harper, commander of the 51st Division. He felt that
troops sticking too close to tanks would suffer unnecessary casualties so
his infantry were forbidden to stray within 100m. Unfortunately, this was
to create problems with both identifying gaps and passing through them.
Tank crews were anxious about the dimensions of the Siegfried
Stellung. In the hope of creating an impassable obstacle, German
engineers had built the trenches especially wide at the top. British
sappers arrived at a solution reminiscent of medieval warfare. For
centuries, faggots of wooden sticks known as 'fascines' had been used
in siege warfare for filling in moats. Third Army ordered 400 of them
to be built in three weeks. Carried above the driver's cab, fascines were
deployed by dipping the tank's nose into the trench and releasing !he
retaining mechanism from within.
There was also concern about the inability of cavalry to negotiate
crushed wire. Consequently, each tank battalion dedicated four tanks to
'wire pulling' duties. Once the assaulting battalions had passed through,
these vehicles would approach the gaps and attach a sizeable fourpronged grapnel. They then dragged the torn tangles of angry barbed
wire off to a flank, where it piled up like a bank of iron bramble.
Although each tank battalion already had two unarmed supply tanks
(which carried fuel and ammunition for the others in its vacated
sponsons), the ever-resourceful tank crews also devised long wooden
sledges to ferry stores over the battlefields in advance of road building
teams. The sledges came in three parts and could carry 14 tons of fuel,
lubricants, ammunition, rations and water. There were 54 in total at
Cambrai. Being the only vehicles large enough to carry one, each
battalion also fielded a wireless tank for maintenance of contact with
aircraft and/or divisional HQ.
Unsurprisingly, the wider logistic effort was equally impressive. The
appetite for materiel betrays the true magnitude of effort in World War
I. It took 36 trains to transport the 476 tanks towards the front. These
were 378 fighting machines, supported by the specialist vehicles
described. This tally exceeds the current total of Main Battle Tanks in
the British Army (386). For the tanks alone, Third Army's light railway
33
Camouflaging roads may seem

like an absurdity but the screens
were surprisingly effective in
masking movement from high
ground and observation balloons.
As indicated by the sign though,
darkness was the only reliable
means of cloaking preparations
for GY. {IWM Q 11079}
network ferried forwards 750,000 litres of petrol, 34,000kg of grease,

5 million rounds of small-arms ammunition and half a million rounds
of 6-pdr shells.
Road construction and improvement materials were a major
consideration, not just to move combatants into position but also to
ensure they could be supplied once under way. Without plank roads
and teams to build them, re-supply across no man's land would have to
be conducted by pack animal or porter as the sledge tanks only really
took care of their own. Traffic management was a necessity, not least to
prevent route degradation.
Artillery ammunition, then as now the most insatiable of all logistic
demands, accounted for 5,000 tons of rail cargo. The 498 18-pdr guns
stockpiled 568,000 rounds.
This hive of activity threatened to betray Byng's intentions,
potentially squandering his advantage of surprise. Security therefore
took precedence over all else. Planning detail was kept on as close a
hold as possible, confirmation of Z-Hour not being promulgated until
18 November. All reconnaissance parties removed unit insignia.
Gun positions, supply dumps and forward assemblies of cavalry were
all camouflaged. Physical preparations were controlled by dividing rear
areas into zones. A belt two miles deep behind the front line was termed
'Daylight Zone'. No daylight movement was permitted in groups of over
two men - even these had to remain at least 100m apart. 'Central Zone'
allowed work parties but no construction as it was visible to enemy
observation balloons on a clear day. Only the rear area, some five miles
beyond the line, was not subject to restrictions. This procedure was
aided by a period of dull, misty weather.
On 16 November, von der Marwitz reported to Rupprecht that,
'hostile attacks on a large scale against the [Second] Army front are not
to be expected in the near future.'? The British had given no indication
of an imminent offensive. All normal air and ground patrolling activity
was maintained. Desultory shelling of German forward positions
whistled over as usual, violating the damp tranquillity with a crump.
34
7 Die Tankschlacht bei Cambrai 1917, Reichsarchiv.
THE BATTLE
OF CAMBRAI
FINAL ASSEMBLY
11 the imagination and subterfuge of the preceding weeks was
nearly undone by an entirely coincidental German decision to
raid the front held by 36th Division on the night of 18 November.
In debrief, two prisoners volunteered the information that an attack
was being planned in the Havrincourt area for 20 November and tanks
had been seen under nets in woodland. This came as a surprise to the
Germans as a similarly successful raid against 55th Division in VII Corps
area had turned up no intelligence of consequence. A report was filed
to von der Marwitz, who ordered extra vigilance across Gruppe Caudry.
As units arrived for the relief of the 20th Landwehr Division, he placed
them under operational control of the threatened 54th Division. There
was little more that he could do in so limited a time frame.
Unaware of these developments, the British pressed ahead with the
process of final assembly. Under cover of darkness, artillery units had
started occupying gun positions a fortnight before but the silent
registration gun-line survey effort was struggling to meet this timetable.
Adamant that no gun would fire spotting rounds before Z-Hour, Byng
ordered the survey companies to redouble their efforts. Toiling under
umbrellas and by torchlight where necessary, they managed it, 3rd Field
Survey Company finishing their last task at 0200hrs on 20 November.
Royal Irish Fusiliers from 36th

(Ulster) Division filing up to the
front via a communications
trench. Some of the infantry
were in position up to 24 hours
before Z-Hour. It was an
uncomfortable wait.
(IWM Q 3187)
35
Infantry and cavalry had been called forwards as early as the night
of 17/18 November, prompting an uncomfortable wait crowded into
trenches, villages and woodland. Most moved on the eve of the attack.
In darkness, infantry slipped and shuffled for miles along muddy
roads. The pace on night moves like this always becomes uneven so the
columns concertina, forcing men to march faster to catch up or wait in
unexplained silence while the sweat cools on the back, bringing shivers.
Tanks waited until the last possible moment, all making their way up
during the final night. Imbued with a fervent sense of occasion, Elles
produced the now infamous 'Special Order No.6' that was promulgated
to all tank crews. It read:
1. Tomorrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has been
waiting for many months - to operate on good going in the van of
the battle.
2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the
u1ay ofpreparation.
3. It remains for unit commanders and for tank crews to complete the
work by judgement and pluck in the battle itself.
4. In light ofpast experience I leave the good name of the Corps in great
confidence in their hands.
5. I propose leading the attack in the centre division.
Tank Corps reconnaissance officers marked routes with white tape and
commanders led their vehicles along it in the manner of an early motor
car. In order to keep quiet, drivers were ordered to crawl forwards in
second gear at a speed of under lkm per hour. 22-year-old Captain
Hickey of H Battalion describes how his section was doing fine
whereupon:
The tape. .. ended abruptly. It was quite impossible to direct the tanks
by the lie of the country for the night was pitch black and no landmarks
were visible. I walked ahead trying to pick out the track marks of a
preceding tank by the light of a cigarette. 8
With the forces in place by approximately 0300hrs, the men were issued
their obligatory tea and rum. Crews started engines every two hours
and rolled backwards and forwards to stop the tracks freezing. German
captives questioned after the battle said they heard nothing of the buildup though alert sentries did detect some parties cutting preparatory
lanes through British wire at about 0500hrs. This stirred up a brief but
alarming artillery barrage. It seemed that the Germans knew what
was coming - in retrospect J. F. C. Fuller described the sensation as
'disquieting in the extreme' - but the firing soon dissipated.
Shortly before 'the go', Elles strode along H Battalion's 27th
Company, stopped at Hilda (HI), rapped it on the side with his ash
stick and took his place for the advance. Across the six-mile front, crews
clambered through the small hatches, sharing quips to fend off tension.
Cranking handles brought the cold beasts to life with a belch of oil
smoke and they sat vibrating as if in anticipation of the appointed hour.
36
8 Rolling Into Action; Memoirs of a Tank Corps Section Commander, by Captain D. E. Hickey.
A TIDE OF IRON
The tanks lurched forwards at 0610hrs precisely - ten minutes ahead of
Z-Hour. Their form-up locations were half a mile or so behind the front
line to minimize risk of them being heard getting into position. It also
gave them a rolling start to achieve section formation.
In the blue-grey twilight, the folds of rolling countryside were
blanketed in a cold pale mist; distant woods still just thin bands of black
ink on the scene. In the communications trenches and sunken lanes
parallel with the leisurely advance, stiff infantrymen were helping each
other up, shrugging into a more comfortable fit on webbing equipment
while their officers squinted to identify the allotted tank section.
Inaudible to the tank crews but heartening to any infantryman was
the unmistakable, croaky whistle of passing shells. Z-Hour - 0620hrs.
German front-line positions became delineated with a brilliant band of
rending explosions, blast waves pulsing palpably in the damp morning
air. German sentries were launching distress flares, a signal for their
artillery to respond. Nothing came over in reply. British counter-battery
missions were being fired from the heavier guns further back,
suppressing or destroying their counterparts with remarkable precision.
The regime of silent registration was vindicated, particularly as many of
the Germans in front-line positions were content to remain sheltering in
dugouts. They expected the bombardment to continue for some time
before any assault.
The first thing to greet Advance Guard tanks was the wire. Even
though the tanks had proved their wire-crushing credentials before,
commanders still felt trepidation as the great swathes came into view.
These belts were dense, but not impenetrable. Tanks had no difficulty
forging through. In their wake, they left springy, matted beds for the
infantry to negotiate, like walking on giant-sized scouring pads.
Byng's barrage opened with
complete surprise at 0620hrs on
20 November. Heavier guns like
this 60-pdr fired at depth targets
like German artillery batteries,
headquarters and villages where
reserve battalions were billeted.
(IWM Q 9333)
37
A TIDE OF IRON - THE ADVANCE OF III

CORPS ON 20 NOVEMBER 1917 (pages 38-39)
36th Brigade, 12th Division, III Corps, and F Battalion Tank
Corps breach the Siegfried Stellung front-line trenches south
of the fortified village of La Vacquerie, 0700hrs, 20 November
1917. The concentration of tanks depicted in the field of view
may appear to be exaggerated but is in fact accurate. Initial
objectives in this area of the front were narrow, broadening
out as 12th Division exploited towards Marcoing and
Masnieres. The chief concession to clarity in this illustration
is the light levels. At 0700hrs on 20 November, it was still
fairly gloomy and one would not have been able to distinguish
La Vacquerie (1) so clearly. The protective 'creeping barrage'
has now moved on to suppress the support-line defences (2),
isolating forward positions for capture. Evidence of its
passage forward is provided by the proliferation of fresh shell
holes astride the brigade's current objective. By comparison
to the Tank Tactics schematic on page 31, formations are
haphazard. Ditchings or breakdowns, such as the Female Mk
IV being chided by passing infantry at (3), created gaps and
bunching was inevitable once the Advance Guard vehicles
encountered the front line they had to cross. Dropping the
fascine was complicated enough even without the presence
of enemy. Poor visibility necessitated a tentative approach.
The driver dipped the tank's nose into the chasm just
sufficient to deploy his fascine, which filled a trench only
partially (4). Rocking back with the release of this burden, he
40
would then crawl forward, waiting for the imbalance to carry

the tank into the gap as gently as possible. Applying full
throttle, he would then try and claw his way out, scraping and
fighting like a migrating wildebeest exiting a steep river bank.
Presuming he was successful, the tank would rear up, pass
its fulcrum and come crashing down on the other side, which
given the absence of suspension, must have been bone
jarring. Moving forward a short distance, the crew then had
to negotiate a gear-crunching 90-degree turn (5). If the whole
manoeuvre went wrong, the crew's only recourse was to exit
the vehicle and deploy its 'unditching beam' carried on rails
at the rear of the tank (6). Affixing it to the tracks with chains,
the beam would be drawn underneath the tank, affording it
purchase on the loose soil created by failed exits. Infantry
trench-clearing platoons are keeping close to their allotted
vehicle and having no difficulty negotiating the now-matted
barbed wire. However, these narrow paths mean that they
must wait until almost on top of the trench before being able
to spread out into the assault (7). Tanks certainly gave the
infantry more confidence; one passing Sopwith Camel pilot
flying up the axis of advance (8) reported the glow of
cigarettes on their lips. Low flight was a necessity to mitigate
the threat of ground fire and passing 'friendly' artillery shells.
The combination of surprise, accurate artillery fire and
concentration of force has left the undermanned German
infantry companies little choice but to surrender or flee (9).
(Illustration by Peter Dennis)
Tanks cut paths through the

vaunted wire with such ease that
one commander said it may as
well have been a 'bed of nettles'.
Where the grapnel tanks
followed, wire was piled into
great banks like this one.
(IWM Q 7847)
In most places, the outpost line was vanquished almost without

breaking stride. Dazed defenders felt the weight of this irresistible
onslaught and threw their hands up. Nevertheless, the state of terror
and panic caused by the tanks is probably overemphasized. By now,
many German infantrymen had seen them before. What they were not
prepared for was the shock effect of an attack mounted with such
surprise and momentum. Even if they did put up resistance, the tide
enveloped them hopelessly quickly.
Throughout their depth, the Germans were also being subjected to
ground attack by III Brigade RFC. Flying so low that one pilot recalls
having to literally 'leap over' tanks, ground fire was a significant hazard,
accounting for casualty rates of approximately 30 per cent per day. Even
so, their contribution was telling. As planned, rear areas were harassed,
artillery batteries bombed, troops and horse-drawn vehicles strafed.
Pilots flew sorties all day, landing to refuel, re-arm and charge their
courage with a slug of strong brandy.
In III Corps' area, 6th Division made remarkable progress. German
defenders from 387th Landwehr Regiment (20th Landwehr Division)
were cleared out of Couillet Wood with the assistance of snipers, cruelly
analogous to driven game shooting. Either side of 6th Division, it was
harder. Bolstered by retreating forces and now forewarned sufficiently
to man machine guns, the support lines put up more resistance.
20th Division were pushing over Welsh Ridge and their initial
objectives included the fortified hamlet of La Vacquerie. Although this
fell relatively swiftly to 61st Brigade, the support lines beyond were more
stubborn. Eleven tanks from A Battalion were knocked out by divisional
field artillery batteries firing over open sights (a scene to be repeated
elsewhere this day). The 60th Brigade to their left also became tangled
in the support line. One company of the 12th/King's Royal Rifle Corps
lost all of its commanders and had to be rallied by Private Albert
Shepherd, an officer's runner. Similar demands were placed on the
individual during the second phase of 60th Brigade's attack. A Company
of 12th/The Rifle Brigade (confusingly named for an infantry
regiment) faltered during their attack on a section of the support line.
As per the drill, tank A2 from their accompanying section turned to
41
This photograph of the main

street in Ribecourt was taken
soon after capture - so soon in
fact that German machine-gun
fire damaged the camera within
moments of this shot!
(IWM Q 6272)
By 1800hrs on 20 November,
Third Army had collected
4,211 German prisoners of war.
The rate of advance at Cambrai
was so great that many units
surrendered simply on account
of being hopelessly cut off.
(IWM CO 3302)
42
attack but was destroyed at short range by a trench mortar. It was

carrying the section commander, Captain Richard Wain, who was
one of only two survivors. Dismounting a Lewis gun, he charged the
troublesome position, capturing half of its garrison and routing the
remainder, which he engaged with rifle fire until killed by a shot to
the head. Captain Wain's posthumous Victoria Cross was the single
one awarded to the Tank Corps at Cambrai.
At the southern extremity of the battlefield, 12th Division were trying
to create the defensive flank against Banteux, a manoeuvre obstructed
by the tenacity of isolated German positions. The 19th Reserve Infantry
Regiment (9th Reserve Division) showed serious mettle in defence of
four fortified farm complexes - Bleak House, Le Pave, Pam Pam Farm
and Le Quennet Farm. All had been left largely untouched by the
British bombardment, a cost of putting faith in tanks to overcome

strongpoints that hitherto would have been battered by heavy artillery
for days. By contrast, Bonavis Farm, which had received the attention
of eight 15in. howitzer shells that morning, surrendered readily. The
tanks did prove their worth and the assaulting infantry cleared the first
three farms after a spirited skirmish, Pam Pam Farm being subdued by
the direct fire of no less than ten vehicles. Le Quennet Farm proved
tougher. The 6th/Royal West Kents (37th Brigade) even had some of
their men captured. Three of the six C Battalion tanks involved were
knocked out before Le Quennet's defenders saw the writing on the wall
and retreated. Once Lateau Wood had been cleared, 12th Division were
able to consolidate facing south-east as planned.
III Corps were doing well. Relative to recent experience, their
progress was a wonder. They had trounced enemy defences that by
rights should have inflicted terrible cost. By 1100hrs - in just four hours
and 40 minutes - they had reached Brown Line objectives and were able
to muster 55 fit tanks to lead 29th Division onto the St Quentin Canal.
HEROICS AT FLESQUIERES
On the northern half of the attack frontage, IV Corps were driving at
Fontaine and Bourlon. Major-General Harper's 51st Division held the
boundary with III Corps' 6th Division and advanced on a northerly
axis towards Flesquieres Ridge with the intention of exploiting onto
Fontaine. His leading brigades - 152nd and 153rd - tackled the outpost
and front-line systems in businesslike fashion. Those machine-gun nests
that put up a fight were soon overcome by textbook platoon attacks.
Map reconnaissance had created concern about a depression named
'Grand Ravine' but it proved anti-climatic. Instead, the tanks discovered
that the trenches in this sector were unusually wide and deep.
Consequently, six of the 24 tanks in D Battalion (supporting 153rd)
ditched. Shortly after 0900hrs the remaining tanks clambered uphill
towards the railway embankment just beyond their Blue Line objective.
It was on the approach to the Brown Line beyond Flesquieres that
the Highlanders ran into serious trouble. This is one of the most wellknown and hotly debated episodes in the battle.
Akin to the situation farther south, the support line - Zwischenstellung
- was forewarned of the onslaught. The 27th Reserve Infantry Regiment
was ordered from Marcoing to Flesquieres in order to support the
garrison unit, 84th Infantry Regiment. Arriving on horseback ahead of
the main body, 27th Regiment's commander, Major Krebbs, was greeted
by a contagious sense of confusion. Still hidden in the early morning
mist, forward positions were not answering field telephones, though
attack alarms and distress flares were in still in evidence. Some wounded
and retreating forces began to appear with breathless and bewildered
reports of innumerable tanks. Soon thereafter, the Flesquieres positions
came under a sharp bombardment, including smoke. The first tanks
appeared. These were D and E Battalions seeking to invest Flesquieres
itself. Standing next to Krebbs, the 84th Regiment's commander, M~or
Hoffmeister, immediately was wounded in the head and evacuated.
Krebbs now had overall command.
43
Brigade staff from 51 st

(Highland) Division observe the
advance. 'Chateau Generalship'
is the abiding impression of
leadership in the Great War but
by the end of 1917, 40 brigadiergenerals had been killed in
action or died of wounds
(including one at Cambrai).
(IWM Q 6326)
Two captured German MG 08/15

light machine-gunners with their
Highland escort. They have not
even had a chance to be relieved
of their weapons so this is a
timely shot. Note the wirecutting attachment on the
Highlander's Lee Enfield rifle
and the canvas apron protecting
his kilt. (IWM Q 6274)
44
The Highlanders came on. Flesquieres was home to a thick

concentration of field artillery, the best part of two field artillery
regiments and one battery from a third. Though they had taken a
pounding from British counter-battery fire and air attack by four DH5s
at 0700hrs, many of the guns were still in action and had been dragged
out of their emplacements into the open. This could have been done
in anticipation of reported tanks but it is more likely that they were
trying to stay one step ahead of the counter-battery effort. All the same,
owing to the orthodox principle of reverse slope placement, they were
lying in ambush.
Flesquieres' Zwischenstellung defences were nearer the crest and they
came into contact first. A furious battle flared up in and around the
village. A mixed force of 600 German infantrymen was outnumbered
about four to one.
A Mark IV tank destroyed by

direct artillery fire. As evident
from the gaping holes knocked
through its steel plate, its
armour offered no protection
whatsoever against this threat.
Worse yet, they lacked the
manoeuvrability to challenge
German gunnery. (lWM Q 14571)
Tanks pushed around Flesquieres to outflank it and were decimated

as they inched over the skyline. D Battalion lost ten tanks to the German
gunners, many of whom had been specifically trained in anti-tank
gunnery as part of lessons identified from the 1917 spring offensives. To
the east of the village, E Battalion lost 18 - seven to 8 Battery, 108th Field
Regiment alone. Unsurprisingly, the attack faltered. The systematic
destruction of supporting tanks and fanaticism of Krebbs' defenders
around Flesquieres was making it impossible for the Highlanders to
maintain a foothold. With characteristic determination, the Seaforths,
Gordons and Black Watch pressed forwards repeatedly through late
morning and into the afternoon. Finally, they managed to consolidate a
section of trench to the south of the village and bring up machine-gun
detachments to hold it.
However, the Germans had succeeded in stalling the British advance
in a vitally central position. Incredulity at the failure of this attack on
such a successful day has created debate. Harper's faulty tactics or
the exploits of a mythical German artillery officer now identified as
Unteroffizier Kruger are common explanations but commentators seem
reluctant to accept that 51st Division ran into a well-trained, committed
force holding perfect defensive ground. Light field guns in ambush
were always going to outperform unmanoeuvrable tanks that had
primitive target acquisition capabilities (a crewman peering through a
narrow slit while being bounced about).
This setback had an unsettling effect on 62nd Division attacking to
the north. Consistent with form of the day, the Yorkshiremen carried
Blue Line objectives within a couple of hours. The only problem was
Havrincourt Village, which contained a fortified chateau dominating the
western extremity of Flesquieres Ridge. Here the 2nd/84th Regiment
put up a valiant resistance despite being bypassed and cut off very early
on. G Battalion tanks had been held up at the start line trying to
exit Havrincourt Wood in the dark and arrived to find the 6th/West
Yorkshires pinned down in the outskirts. Direct fire from some German
guns put six tanks out of action immediately but G3 made it in alone. Very
45
FLESQUIERES RIDGE
AND A FOOTHOLD IN FONTAINE
20 and 21 November 1917, attack of Third Army's IV Corps
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km/1 ,094yds
EVENTS
20 NOVEMBER
1. 0820hrs: the 'Grand Ravin' proves to be
an overstatement and it is taken along with
the Siegfried Stellung front system by the
185th Brigade, 62nd (West Riding) Division.
2. 0930hrs: both leading brigades of the
51st (Highland) Division are stopped in their
tracks by reverse slope positions beyond
Flesquieres Ridge. Tanks are decimated by
field gun batteries firing over open sights as
the ponderous armoured advance is sky-lined
on the ridge.
3. 1100hrs: advance of the 109th Brigade,
36th (Ulster) Division, is aided by a spreading
sense of isolation amongst German infantry
holding the line west of the Canal du Nord.
Conforming to the defeat and/or retreat
of their comrades in the Siegfried Stellung
support system, they either flee northwards
or surrender to the tenacious Irishmen.
46
4. 1430hrs: the impasse on Flesquieres Ridge

compels Woollcombe to request a flanking
attack by the less pressed 18th Infantry
Brigade from the 6th Division towards
KEY TO UNITS
21 NOVEMBER
xxx
Gruppe
r":7I
Caudry~
VONWATTER
xx
54~
VON WATTER
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
E
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 52,
107th Division
F
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 232,
107th Division
G 3rd Battalion, Infantry Regiment No. 77
and 2nd Battalion, Infantry Regiment
No. 92, 20th Division
H
Infantry Regiment No. 175, 36th Division
BRITISH
IV CORPS
36th (Ulster) Division
11 109th Infantry Brigade
62nd (West Riding) Division
51 st (Highland) Division
14 152nd Infantry Brigade
15 153rd Infantry Brigade
56th (1 st London) Division
KEY TO UNITS
20 NOVEMBER
MARDEN
HARPER
Ribecourt. The inherent shortcomings in
operational communication between corps
preclude the initiative as by the time it
comes to fruition, darkness is setting in.
5. 1530hrs: despite the loss of six tanks to

direct artillery fire, the village of Graincourt is
captured by Brigadier-General 'Boy' Bradford's
186th Brigade at the point of the bayonet.
21 NOVEMBER
6. 0200hrs: conforming to the defeat and/or

withdrawal of units to each flank, Infantry
Regiment No. 84 pulls out of Flesquieres
under the cover of darkness. The Highlanders
of the 51st Division discover this at first light
and occupy the village.
7. 0900hrs: the 5th and 6th Seaforths of 152nd

Brigade, 51st (Highland) Division, are held up
on the outskirts of Cantaing by fresh reserves
from the German 107th Division but the 154th
Brigade pushes through with tank support.
8. 1500hrs: exploiting the momentum of their

success, Brigadier-General Buchanan's 154th
Brigade pushes on to Fontaine, leaving the
remnants of Cantaing's defenders to be
'mopped up' by the Seaforths. Fontaine is
carried but Buchanan's men are too isolated
and exhausted to consolidate properly.
9. 1300hrs: 'Boy' Bradford's Yorkshiremen

resume the push towards Bourlon and though
vanquishing Anneux, attempts to capture the
chapel complex on the Cambrai-Bapaume
Road are frustrated by intense fire from
the positions forward of Bourlon Wood.
1 O. 1530hrs: the 185th Infantry Brigade, 62nd
(West Riding) Division, fares better initially in
its mission to roll up the Siegfried Stellung
support line between Bourlon and the Canal
du Nord but they too are fixed by enfilading
fire from defences around Bourlon Wood.
11. The Ulsters' subsidiary operation to
threaten Moeuvres and cut off its defenders
from the main German positions to the east
suffers from lack of tank support and thick
belts of wire. Nevertheless, they succeed in
getting close enough to threaten the Village.
12. The 169th Brigade of the 56th (1st
London) Division is stood by to attack north
towards Tadpole Copse in support of the
36th (Ulster) Division but is not required.
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
54th Division
A
Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 387
(attached from 20th Landwehr Division)
B
Infantry Regiment No. 84
20th Landwehr Division
C
D
Note: Both divisions included elements of
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 27, which
was committed in full as the Gruppe Caudry
operational reserve.
BRITISH
IV CORPS
36th (Ulster) Division
1
107th Infantry Brigade
2
3
4
5
6
7
152nd Infantry Brigade
8
153rd Infantry Brigade
Flanking units
9
56th Division, IV Corps - north
10 6th Division, III Corps - south
47
With their arcs established and

the guns prepared for firing, this
Vickers detachment on the
support line east of Ribecourt is
settling down for a well-earned
brew break. Consolidation of
gains was a preoccupation born
of hard experience. (lWM Q 6279)
Infantry doing what they do best:

waiting around. Operational
'pauses' at each objective line
were essential in order for the
field artillery to prepare the next
phase of their creeping barrage:
ferrying ammunition, cooling
barrels, clearing empty cases
etc. (IWM Q 3177)
48
soon it was set ablaze by enemy fire and had to be evacuated. Its
commander, 2nd Lieutenant McElroy, returned to the vehicle and
killed eight Germans with his revolver before manning a Lewis gun
and defending G3's wounded survivors for an hour. By then, the West
Yorkshires had worked their way into the village and relieved him. Under
an equally courageous Hauptmann Soltau, the remnants of 2/84th
withdrew to some buildings outside the village and fought to the last man.
62nd Division went on to achieve their Brown Line objectives by
1020hrs but were starting to feel exposed on their right flank, where the
Flesquieres disaster was unfolding. Nonetheless, Brigadier-General 'Boy'
Bradford VC - promoted at 25 years old - took up the advance with his
186th Brigade in an attempt to capture Graincourt and invest Bourlon
Wood from the west. It was a tall order for just one brigade, particularly
because mopping operations continued in their rear. In the event, they
secured Red Line objectives in Graincourt by mid-afternoon but could

go no further. Yet more field guns had taken a toll on Bradford's 13
tanks from G Battalion and he could spare only three for a tentative
reconnaissance of Bourlon Wood that afternoon. Even if Bradford had
been able to exploit further, 62nd Division's commander, Major-General
Braithwaite, was concerned about Flesquieres and ordered him to
consolidate while they prepared a flanking attack. Moreover, to his left,
36th Division's subsidiary attack with 109th Brigade on the west of Canal
du Nord had culminated at a similar extent.
SCRAMBLE FOR CANAL CROSSINGS

Down in III Corps, 29th Division had resumed the attack towards the
St Quentin Canal, leaving forward assembly areas at approximately
1015hrs. They had been on the move since 0100hrs, covering ten miles
before hitting their first objectives. Morale was high though and their
push for canal crossings was joined by 59th Brigade of 20th Division to
the north-west.
Planners had identified a total of ten potential crossings over the
canal between Marcoing and Crevecoeur. Beyond them lay the Siegfried
II (or Masnieres-Beaurevoir Line). This element of Operation GYwas
the decisive act: launching columns of marauding cavalry into German
rear areas. Besides the four infantry brigades converging on these
objectives, A and F Battalions of the Tank Corps managed to muster
20 and 13 tanks respectively.
Farther west, 17 tanks from H Battalion struck out for Noyelles and
Nine Wood but the 71st Infantry Brigade (6th Division) that they were
supporting was too concerned about the open flank with 51st Division
to follow. Instead, the 6th Division infantry effort came from 16th
Brigade, who were also making for Marcoing with 12 tanks from B
Battalion hoping to capture the railway bridge.
As is clear from the narrative, this phase of the operation
degenerated into a rather crude scramble. Formations became mixed
up and tanks tended to operate somewhat independently from the
infantry - especially H Battalion. Everybody was gripped by the
imperative for establishing a canal bridgehead without delay. Major
Phillip Hamond, commander of the F Battalion scratch force, even set
off on foot to try and make sure that the Germans did not blow the
bridge in Masnieres.
Many eyewitnesses recall a sense of opportunity. The Germans were
in full flight and the 54th Division had virtually ceased to exist. As the
British infantry entered Masnieres at about midday, French civilians
em~rged from their cellars in jubilant mood. However, German
engineers succeeded in_damaging the road bri'q.ge in ,Masnieres and a
withering fire from the far bank welcomed the lead elements of 88th
Brigade as they approached. Snipers also populated the town, harassing
the tanks and infantry as they spread out to find alternative crossings.
As much out of frustration as hope, F22 - 'Flying Fox II' - was ordered
to try and negotiate the damaged bridge. In a rare moment of slapstick
(as the whole crew escaped unharmed) F22 collapsed the structure,
entering the water in a huge cloud of steam. Moreover, the commander
49
F22 'Flying Fox' photographed

after the battle with some
curious Germans balanced on
top. It was plucky to try their
luck but the resulting calamity
narrowed the options for 5th
Cavalry Division behind them.
(Tank Museum 1546/D2)
is reputed to have lost his wig during the evacuation. 2nd/Hampshire

Regiment had more success, finding a lock bridge half a mile to the
east. Once across, they linked up with the two companies of 4th/
Worcestershire Regiment that had already crossed on the central axis.
The Newfoundland Regiment found a wooden footbridge to the west
and was digging in short of Siegfried II as they had no artillery support
to attack it (the assumption probably being that tanks would be across).
16th Brigade/B Battalion's advance was the first to arrive into
Marcoing, seizing the railway bridge intact. 87th Brigade soon arrived
to complete the town's capture. Subsequently, elements succeeded in
crossing to probe Siegfried II and find Newfoundland Regiment positions
west of Masnieres. Two A Battalion tanks patrolled over the railway bridge
and attacked Flot Farm, while 1st/Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers even
assaulted and occupied a section of Siegfried II's front line. 86th Brigade
arrived in Nine Wood to discover it in the hands of H Battalion's tanks,
which obtained a written receipt and withdrew. Patrols from 2nd/Royal
Fusiliers were thrown forwards into unoccupied Noyelles.
This rather disparate toehold on the far bank seemed adequate for
cavalry at least to attempt a breakout. The Cavalry Corps had been
moving forward since 0850hrs in anticipation of this so 5th Cavalry
Division was in a position to release leading regiments soon after
midday. Major Hamond describes the arrival of 5th Division's Canadian
Cavalry Brigade in Masnieres:
Then a most ludicrous thing happened. There was a great deal of
clattering, galloping and shouting and a lot of our medieval horse
soldiers came charging down the street. I yelled to them that the bridge
was gone but they took no notice of me and went right up to it. They
turned about and came trotting back with a very piano air. 9
Undeterred, the resourceful Fort Garry Horse made for the narrow
lock bridge used by the Hampshires and managed to get B Squadron
across it by 1530hrs. Unfortunately, by this stage, it was increasingly clear
50
9 Major Hamond quoted in The Ironclads of Cambrai, Bryan Cooper.
The lock bridge east of

Masnieres in its current guise.
The satchel is for scale. Even
after some hasty improvement
with the help of locals, it took
B Squadron Fort Garry Horse half
an hour to get its 150 mounts
over. (Author's collection)
to commanders on the ground that they had neither the forces nor
daylight to breach Siegfried II that day. All cavalry were ordered to
remain on the home bank. This message could not reach B Squadron,
who had made off in the direction of Rumilly with gallant alacrity.
Their commander, Captain Campbell, was killed and it fell to Lieutenant
Strachan to continue. They charged an artillery battery - Strachan killing
seven Germans with his sword - before making their way back in
darkness. Other cavalry units already committed to the front dismounted
and consolidated as infantry. For instance, 7th Dragoon Guards from
5th Cavalry Division had occupied Noyelles in that capacity.
As darkness fell on 20 November, the British held gains equating
roughly to Red Line objectives. At first glance it had been a stunning
success: three to four miles' penetration on a six-mile front at
unprecedented speed. German reaction swung from incredulity to helpless
despondency; that morning Rupprecht had considered ordering a general
retirement. Cambrai was barricaded in anticipation. Even as
the momentum of British attacks dissipated later in the day, the picture
remained bleak. Eingreifentaktik failed him because the surprise and
destructiveness delivered by Byng's offensive was so total. Gruppe Caudry's
fighting divisions in contact had been all but wiped out; therefore forces
earmarked for counterattack were now manning Siegfried II trenches.
Fortuitous arrival of the relieving 107th Division plugged the most perilous
gaps and six reserve battalions from neighbouring Gruppen Arras and
Quentin started arriving that night. Rupprecht authorized transfer of three
Army Group reserve divisions but they were still at least 48 hours away.
Gruppe Caudry's situation remained highly tenuous.
Reaction in Britain was euphoric. Church bells were rung; a great
victory had been achieved. Yet in the minds of the field commanders, it
had fallen short of what needed to be achieved on the first day. Now
surprise had been lost they would be in a race against German reserves.
B Squadron Fort Garry Horse
with Lieutenant Harcus Strachan
at their head. He was awarded
the Victoria Cross for his
gallantry and resourcefulness
at Masnieres. Only 23 of the
squadron returned - none of
them mounted. (lWM CO 2295)
51
Scenes like this were repeated

throughout Army Group North
on 20 November, as reserve
units sprung from their billets
and rushed towards Cambrai.
Most entrained but a shortage of
motor transport compelled some
units to march through the night.
(lWM Q 55428)
No breach had been made in Siegfried II at Masnieres; Flesquieres had

blunted the 51st Division and Bourlon Ridge was yet to be attacked.
Flesquieres was a frustrating failure because it held up the approach to
Bourlon. It had also compelled 1st Cavalry Division to re-route south,
compounding the delay in getting cavalry forwards.
Third Army's brush with unmitigated triumph invites hypothetical
speculation but it is tempting to overstate the ease with which Third
Army breached the Siegfried Stellung that day. Strongpoints like
Havrincourt, Graincourt and Le Quennet did not fall without a fierce
fight. Whilst relatively speaking, casualties had been light (approximately
4,000, some battalions not losing a single man), 179 out of 378 fighting
tanks were out of action - a 47 per cent attrition rate.
It was only going to become harder. Promulgation of plans for
21 November was a priority. Byng had spoken to Haig at 1630hrs. They
agreed to keep pressing without any alteration to the plan. Attempts
were made to rebalance tank allocations. II Brigade (remnants of A,
Band H Battalions) switched over to IV Corps. Z-Hour for III Corps
around Masnieres was 1100hrs. IV Corps would resume advance at
1000hrs, preceded by a preliminary dawn attack to secure Flesquieres.
This looked elegant on map boards but execution was going to be
problematic. Operations orders needed to cascade down to attacking
battalions that were occupying forward positions. In some instances,
it took hours to find commanding officers. Moreover, the men were
shattered. By that evening most had been up marching and fighting
for at least 24 hours. It was a foul night to be spending in the open
without a hot meal: 'a dismal rain ... eventually we could feel it trickling
through our puttees' .10 As the infantry curled up under groundsheets
to snatch a fleeting rest, engineers, signallers and gunners toiled to
improve forward lines of communication and prepare support for
the resumption of attack. There was no doubting their fortitude but
Third Army stood little chance of repeating the impetus of this first
momentous day.
52
10 Everyman at War (1930), edited by C. B. Purdom.
A HERCULEAN REPEAT
It was a tedious wait for the

cavalry divisions so eager to
exploit. Wet, cold and bored,
they gathered behind the
front with only rumour and
countermanded orders to break
the monotony. 21 November was
another day of disappointment
for this group of motor machinegunners and horse artillery.
(IWM Q 6311)
During the night, Major Krebbs was informed

that reinforcements were not forthcoming so he
pulled his survivors back from the Flesquieres
salient to bolster defensive positions being
occupied around Cantaing and Fontaine. It made
good sense. They were expecting converging
flank attacks to cut them off at any minute. Thus,
when a reconnaissance patrol of Highlanders
crept into the town under cover of darkness, they
found no sign of life.
A hasty advance by 152nd and 153rd Brigades
started before dawn at 0600hrs, reaching the
Graincourt to Premy Chapel road (their original
Red Line objective) three hours later. Contact with Germans was
re-established on the outskirts of Cantaing and 154th Brigade came
forwards through the drizzle to mount an attack. Tanks did not receive
their orders until 0900hrs so they were late for the 1000hrs Z-Hour.
Brigadier-General Buchanan pushed on without them and predictably
was checked. However, this time a flanking force did arrive. Thirteen
tanks from B Battalion came up from the direction of Nine Wood
with the 2nd Dragoon Guards and elements of 16th Brigade; a genuine
all-arms attack. Private Chris Knight was there with the Dragoons:
The village lay about three-quarters of a mile away. We galloped fiercely
to the outskirts, rapidly formed sections, numbers 1 and 2 troops
cantering into the village first. Donnelly, the Irishman, went raving
mad, cutting and thrusting wildly at retreating Germans. Indescribable
scenes followed. 11
Cantaing was carried. Farther west, the 7th/Argyll and Sutherland

Highlanders and 4th/Seaforth Highlanders (154th Brigade) took
advantage of this collapse to make a dash for Fontaine in the company
of six H Battalion tanks. These outstripped the infantry but were able
to roam around the town creating mischief and silencing machine
guns that hindered the Scottish advance. German defenders from 2nd
Battalion 52nd Reserve Infantry Regiment were winkled out and fled.
By nightfall, short of fuel and ammunition, the four surviving vehicles
withdrew leaving the depleted Highlanders to defend the village. As the
infantry consolidated in gathering gloom, troop trains could be heard
pulling into Cambrai, disgorging the reinforcements they would fight
the following day.
The reason these men were so isolated was that 62nd Division's
thrust towards Bourlon did not make enough ground to link up.
Bearing in mind that Bradford's brigade had also been in action on
20 November, they fared extremely well. His four battalions of the Duke
of Wellington's Regiment bombed their way north up Siegfried Stellung
support positions to invest Bourlon from the west, pushed north-east out
of Graincourt to capture Anneux and even got into the quarry at the
11 Everyman at War (1930), edited by C. B. Purdom.
53
xx
EVENTS
20 NOVEMBER
1. 0700hrs: 7/Somerset Light Infantry from

61st Brigade, 20th Division, take the vaunted
La Vacquerie outpost line redoubt without
incident. The German defenders make for the
relative sanctuary of the Siegfried Stellung
front-line system.
xx
2. 1100hrs: after a sharp fight in which

the Germans capture some of the depleted
attacking force, La Quennet Farm is
consolidated by 37th Brigade, 12th (Eastern)
Division, opening the route down to the
St Quentin canal. Hasty defensive positions
are thrown up to protect the east flank of
the advance.
3. 1015hrs: the 29th Division conduct

a forward passage of lines, rolling
through 20th Division while
they are still in the process
of consolidating the
Siegfried Stellung
support
system.
KEY TO UNITS
20 NOVEMBER
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
9th Bavarian Reserve Division
A
Bavarian Reserve Infantry
Regiment No. 19
54th Division
B
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 90
C
(attached from 20th Landwehr Division)
BRITISH
III CORPS
6th Division
1
71 st Infantry Brigade
2
3
20th (Light) Division
4
5
6
61 st Infantry Brigade
12th (Eastern) Division
7
8
9
29th Division
88th Infantry Brigade, 29th Division in detail
12 The Newfoundland Regiment
13 1st Battalion The Essex Regiment
14 2nd Battalion The Hampshire Regiment
15 4th Battalion The Worcestershire Regiment
5th Cavalry Division
16 Fort Garry Horse, Canadian Brigade
Flanking units
17 51st Highland Division, IV Corps - North
18 55th Division, VII Corps - South
54
MARDEN
4. 1240hrs: with Les Rues Vertes in the hands

of a combined force from the 59th Brigade
(20th Division) and 88th Brigade (29th
Division), tank F22 crashes into the river
attempting to get across the canal bridge
in Masnieres.
5. 1530hrs: the Fort Garry Horse exploits the
lock bridge found by 2/Hants but are repulsed
with heavy casualties. The commander of
the 2nd Cavalry Division (Maj. Gen. Greenly)
orders his Canadian Cavalry Brigade to assist
in consolidation rather than attempt further
penetration as daylight is fading and no more
suitable crossing sites are found.
21 NOVEMBER
8. 1030hrs: meanwhile, reinforcements from

the 107th Division attempt to evict 2/Royal
Fusiliers and 1/Lancashire Fusiliers from
Noyelles. Dismounted cavalry from the 18th
Hussars and 9th Lancers join the defence.
Fighting continues through the day.
6. 0630hrs: 10/RB make an attempt to

capture the lock bridge west of Crevecour but
only manage to get into the village of Les Rue
de Vignes. One company is left in overwatch
while the remainder withdraw back towards
Bonavis Ridge.
9. 1320hrs: after a two-hour delay owing

to absence of supporting tanks, 11/KRRC
mount an attack east along the canal in
order to secure crossings at Crevecour,
but they come under heavy fire from the
Masnieres-Beaurevoir line. Four tanks assist
but the force is too weak to consolidate.
7. 1030hrs: two German battalions make a

concerted counterattack towards Mon Plaisir
Farm (occupied by elements of 4/Worcesters
and 2/Hants). They are met with enfilading
machine guns and field artillery and driven off.
1 O. 1400hrs: having got 30 tanks across the

Marcoing railway bridge at noon, the 87th
Brigade pushes west with two battalions to
link up with 88th Brigade forces in Masnieres.
The attack is unsuccessful owing to poor
THE LUNGE FOR CANAL CROSSINGS

20 and 21 November 1917, attack of Third Army's III Corps
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km/1 ,094yds
KEY TO UNITS
21 NOVEMBER
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
o 1st Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment
No. 232, 107th Infantry Division
E
1st Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment
No. 262, and 1st Battalion Reserve
Infantry Regiment No. 128
BRITISH
III CORPS
19 10th Battalion The Rifle Brigade,
59th Infantry Brigade, 20th (Light Division)
11 th Battalion Kings Royal Rifle Corps,
59th Infantry Brigade, 20th (Light) Division
2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers
and 1st Battalion Kings Own Scottish
Borderers, 87th Infantry Brigade,
29th Division
1st Battalion Essex Regiment,
88th Infantry Brigade, 29th Division
tank/infantry tactical cooperation; the tanks

spending two hours 'blazing away' at the
enemy trenches on a lateral axis rather than
penetrating them.
11. 1430hrs: 1/Essex try and push forward
from Masnieres in support of the 87th Brigade
but are also driven back.
xx
12
C8:I
SCOTT
12. 1600hrs: the German 1/232 Regt., 107th

Division, is finally pushed out of Noyelles by
a scratch force of dismounted 9th Lancers
and 86th Brigade's Fusiliers with the
assistance of two tanks.
55
southern tip of Bourlon Wood before being forced to retire. As the

British Official History attests, 186th Brigade had accomplished tasks
that 'would have taxed a fresh division' .12 After dark they were relieved
by 185th Brigade, which held a line along the Cambrai-Bapaume road
up to Anneux Chapel.
It was an altogether more chaotic day for III Corps, principally on
account of German aggression. The Hampshires and Worcestershires
had spent the night street fighting in Masnieres and their haggard
faces greeted the dawn 200m beyond the town towards Rumilly.
10th/The Rifle Brigade mounted an operation at 0630hrs to force
a canal crossing at a lock bridge south of Crevecoeur. It proved
impossible as overlapping machine-gun arcs swept the gates. More
disruption was delivered by 1st/232nd Reserve Infantry Regiment's
concerted counterattack against Noyelles at 1030hrs. An eclectic band
of defenders from the Lancashire Fusiliers, Royal Fusiliers and 18th
Hussars were joined by one dismounted squadron of 9th Lancers and
two tanks from B Battalion to keep the attackers at bay. Other elements
of 86th Brigade were also in action all day trying to keep Germans out
of Nine Wood.
The St Quentin Canal valley echoed with a persistent stutter of
machine-gun fire that grey November morning as 87th Brigade
postured to throw itself at Siegfried II between Noyelles and Marcoing.
Joined by 17 tanks from A and F Battalion, this operation never
achieved any momentum. With only one crossing, the force trickled into
action achieving no breach for the two battalions of infantry to exploit.
Whilst only three tanks were actually knocked out, surviving vehicles
limped back in a sorry state. German reinforcements in this sector
had been issued with armour-piercing ammunition. A54 returned with
100 holes in it.
The 59th Brigade's similar effort to the east of Masnieres proved
equally inconclusive. Its four supporting F Battalion tanks failed to
arrive until 1500hrs - 90 minutes into the battle. They found
11 th/King's Royal Rifle Corps huddled on the home bank in a furious
firefight having only got one company across the canal. Cognisant of
F22's fate, tank crews expressed understandable reluctance to cross
the wooden bridge so they cruised up and down the bank adding little
value to proceedings.
Pulteney's efforts to get III Corps through Siegfried II were fast
entering the realm of folly. The 88th Brigade never even crossed the
start line on their attack. The men were too exhausted. At the same
time as their divisional commander, Major-General de Lisle, reported
this, Pulteney was already in discussion with Third Army about ceasing
offensive operations altogether. There was no decision to make.
That evening, Byng and Haig discussed the situation. 48 hours had
always been the desired period to assess the merit of persisting with
Operation GY Further attacks on the St Quentin Canal were out of
the question. Discussion rested on whether to persevere with Bourlon.
V Corps' three divisions of infantry were available and the alternative
was a general retirement back to the vicinity of Brown Line objectives.
If they could seize Bourlon Ridge, it would form the basis of a solid
56
12 British Official History, The Battle of Cambrai 1917, Captain Wilfrid Miles.
consolidation of what had already been achieved. At this stage, Anneux,

Fontaine and Cantaing were in British hands. Haig opted to proceed.
The problem was that the operation would require deliberate
preparation, taking time that favoured a German force frantically
reinforcing. Haig compromised by selecting 23 November, leaving one
day for what he termed, 'housekeeping'.
'HELL'S LADIES' DANCE IN FONTAINE

Fontaine's defenders were not given that breather. In a bid to link up,
7th/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were withdrawn during the
night and placed below Bourlon Wood east of Anneux. Four companies
of Seaforth Highlanders remained and spread themselves to cover the
3,500m perimeter. Enemy aircraft were spotted in the ubiquitous dawn
drizzle; artillery fire shrieked in soon thereafter. Gruppe Caudry used
recent arrivals from 119th Infantry Division to assault Fontaine - 1st and
2nd/46th Regiment. At 1000hrs, they attacked under a barrage from the
south-east, utilizing machine guns in La Folie Wood. Distress rockets
begged assistance from 51st Division's field artillery but they were lost
in the mist. The Seaforths were alone. For six hours, the streets of
Fontaine rang with the cacophony of battle. Although already low on
ammunition, the kilted Scotsmen lived up to their German moniker
'Hell's Ladies' in Fontaine. Many outposts fought to the death. Wild,
screaming counterattacks sprang from side streets before the German
infantry could establish themselves at junctions. When cornered by six
Germans and bid to surrender, the wounded commanding officer,
Lieutenant-Colonel Unthank, sprang up and escaped by clubbing
them with his empty rifle. For all this, the outcome was never in doubt
and Unthank led the beleaguered remnants of his battalion back to
Cantaing at 1430hrs, leaving 319 men behind.
The 62nd Division also bore the weight of counterattack on their day
off. All three West Yorkshire Regiment battalions of 185th Brigade were
attacked soon after 0700hrs. Augmented by strafing runs from low-flying
aircraft, both gas and high-explosive shells rained down on the shallow
trenches they had prepared overnight, clearing the way for a fast-moving
infantry assault by mixed elements of 386th Landwehr Regiment and
the newly arrived 50th Regiment. Akin to their tenacious colleagues at
On the morning of 22 November,
Lt. Col. Unthank centred his
battalion's defence of Fontaine
on this now derelict railway
station. Their unequal struggle
encapsulates the doggedness
of 51 st Division at Cambrai.
57
Gordon Highlanders making

their way forward over an
uncompleted communications
trench. When the 6th Battalion
formed up to attack Fontaine
on the morning of 23 November,
they had already been on the
go for three days and nights.
(lWM Q 6278)
58
Fontaine, the Yorkshiremen put up a forceful resistance, answering the

inevitable retirement with counterattacks in spite of high casualties
amongst officers. Collapse was averted by the afternoon but gains made
on 21 November were largely effaced.
The 36th Division and 56th Division launched the only British attacks
of the day, continuing the effort to capture Moeuvres. The 12th/Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers were pushed back to their start lines but the
London Scottish of 56th Division took Tadpole Copse to the west.
Woollcombe's proactivity also included the night-time relief of 62nd
Division by 40th Division; an activity necessitated by the steady
accumulation of casualties sustained in the previous three days.
The attack frontage for 23 November was almost as large as the
original push had been: just short of six miles. IV Corps amassed an
impressive array of artillery pieces to support the operation: 40th Division
had six field artillery brigades under command. For his part, Elles cajoled
and cannibalized 88 tanks into action, rearranging orders of battle, crews
and commanders as necessary. Fifty RFC fighters would operate in direct
support of ground operations and keep German aircraft at bay.
In outline, the plan was simple. The 51st Division would have another
go at Fontaine with 152nd Brigade. At first glance, it appears to be rather
a modest force that Harper put into action but the Highlanders
were embarking upon their fourth day of continuous action. Some
battalions were down to less than 100 effective combatants. Thirty-six
tanks from B, Hand C Battalions would accompany them, with a further
11 from I Battalion lying in wait alongside Harper's composite reserve
of six companies.
40th Division had their sights on Bourlon Ridge. 29 tanks from G
and D Battalions were mustered to support Major-General Ponsonby's
two attacking brigades: the Welsh 119th attacking Bourlon Wood and
121st, Bourlon village. Protecting their left flank was 36th Division with
its daily attempt at driving the Germans from Moeuvres. This time it was
the turn of 108th Brigade but now with 11 E Battalion tanks in support.
Buoyed by their successes the previous day, 56th Division were also in
the fray, exploiting farther north-west up the Siegfried Stellung from
Tadpole Copse.
Opposing them was Gruppe Arras under the command of

Generalleutnant von Moser. He had two divisions in the line opposite this
offensive - 20th in Moeuvres and Inchy and 214th around Bourlon. He
kept 21st Division in reserve and could expect the services of 3rd Guards
Division when they had detrained from Flanders. Gruppe Caudry still
controlled the front at Fontaine and Cantaing, with the disjointed 107th
Division now bringing 119th Division regiments under command.
'A TOT OF RUM AND WE WERE OFF'

On yet another cold, wet and windy day, the 6th/Gordon Highlanders
formed up once more, hoisting Lewis guns onto their shoulders and
fixing bayonets. Their 19 tanks ambled noisily into position while the
shells made shrill passage overhead. Once under way, the absence of
smoke exposed them to a withering barrage of machine-gun fire from
the east. German Maxim gunners sent streams of tracer arcing towards
the distant blobs of encumbered men marching into Fontaine. As the
Gordons neared the town, the creeping barrage lifted, allowing more
German weapons to range in. They were halted 400m short of the
objective and went to ground. Impervious to this deadly rain, the tanks
forged ahead. Feeling naked and taking casualties, a few infantrymen
probably felt a bit jealous. Given the fate that awaited these crews, they
needn't have. Only six were destined to return.
On approach, the going was good; German outpost pickets being
mown down as they fled. However, once inside Fontaine, their fortunes
reversed. A battery of lorry-mounted K.Flak anti-aircraft guns lay in wait.
Two of them together accounted for seven tanks.
Soon, as into a rat trap, came nine tanks in procession towards

Fontaine. The gun crews stood to their guns, burning with eagerness.
[Hauptman HaehnerJ commanded: 'Steady men, it will soon be time'.
VVhen the tanks were hardly 100m away, the command rings: 'Rapid
fire!' The first tank rears upwards. 13
Four other B Battalion vehicles suffered an incredible intensity of smallarms fire and audacious assaults from German infantry with bundled
hand grenades, nicknamed 'ball charges'. Only three tanks from
B Battalion's force made it back to the start point. The six-strong
C Battalion force fared a little better, principally because they did not
encounter the K.Flak battery. Still, two were knocked out by infantry in
the village and one broke down.
Harper's left axis was directed at the area between Fontaine and
Bourlon Wood, with 6th/Seaforth Highlanders and 15 tanks from C and
H Battalion. Untroubled by the enfilade fire from La Folie Wood (they
were beyond range), the Seaforths achieved their objectives, fashioning
a loose outpost line to the north-west of Fontaine. C Battalion's tank
section sniffed their way into Bourlon Wood looking for trouble. One
became bogged but the other two fought alongside 40th Division. H
Battalion's company focused on trying to create a break into Fontaine
13 Anonymous German eyewitness quoted in Following the Tanks, Jean-Luc Gibot and Philippe Gorczynski.
59
A pair of motorized K.Flak

Batterie anti-aircraft guns. In a
chilling foretaste of the infamous
88mm's potency during World
War II, these flak guns proved
highly effective in the direct fire
anti-tank role, accounting for at
least 64 Mark IVs during the
course of the battle.
(IWM Q 44156)
With a macabre likeness to an

incinerator, the hatches on this
Mark IV reveal its immolated
crew. They had precious little
time to extract themselves once
the volatile mix of fuel, motor oil
and ammunition ignited. (Tank
Museum 1546/04)
60
for the Seaforths. Six vehicles fought along the north-eastern outskirts
all day, some Scotsmen perching on their backs. Ultimately, the defences
were too thick.
The failure of these attacks was deeply frustrating for the 51st and
illustrates one of the inherent shortcomings of fledgling tank warfare.
In the linear context of 20 November, protected by creeping barrage
and applying rehearsed drills with overwhelming concentrations, it all
came together. Deviate from that template and prevailing truths were
exposed. Unless tackling a lone strongpoint head on, tanks provided
no physical protection for infantry. At Fontaine, they attacked a multifaceted position from a kilometre's distance at the speed of a walk.
The enfilading machine guns of La Folie and Bourlon Wood were able
to fire as if the tanks were not there. Once inside a built-up area, the
limitations of armour are self-evident. When all is said and done, the
attacking force lacked manoeuvre and, in the absence of that, artillery
is the vital factor. Therefore, it will come as no surprise to discover that
of all the divisions in action on 23 November, the 51st had the lowest
allocation of heavy artillery.
Fontaine was an early lesson in

the vulnerability of tanks when
operating in a built-up area.
Gunners attempting to engage
upper storeys were struggling to
achieve elevation, forcing them
to cling to the opposite side of
the road as seen here.
(Tank Museum 52/E5)
BOURLON BLOODED
Bourlon Wood is really more like a forest - a dense mix of deciduous
and evergreen trees dissected by long rides and sunken roads. Dips,
gullies and mounds interrupt the general uphill trend until you emerge
on the far side and look down into Bourlon itself, snuggled up against
the shoulder of the ridge. By 23 November, both were infested with
machine-gun nests, dugouts and barricades. Preparatory shelling of the
wood had commenced the day before, adding explosive and pine sap
to the cloying aroma of decaying leaves. Shattered boughs littered the
already profuse undergrowth.
This dark, foreboding mass cast a sort of shadow on the Welshmen
of 119th Brigade as they filed into position to attack. It felt colder
than usual. Sixteen tanks from G Battalion were late so a section of D
Battalion was switched over from the neighbouring 121st Brigade. They
clattered into position, the crews by now complete veterans. The 40th
Division had never worked with them before but it was simple enough:
'follow our lead and keep close'.
No sooner had the infantry advanced, they were in disarray. On
the right, 19th/Royal Welch Fusiliers felt compelled to pause in the
old quarry and reorganize. The 12th/South Wales Borderers were
struggling up on the left. Major Watson of D Battalion recalls the scene:
On the hillside on the left we could mark the course of the battle - the tanks
with tiny flashes darting from theirflanks - clumps of infantry following
in little rushes - an officer running in front of his men until suddenly he
crumpled up and fell, as though some unseen hammer had struck him on
the head. .. the wounded staggering painfully down the hill. 14
Two hours later, somehow this ragged passage had reached the north
end of the wood and the intermingled survivors prepared a loose
defensive line. Counterattack was inevitable. Brigadier-General Crozier
split the reserve battalion (17th/Welsh Regiment) in two and sent them
forwards to stiffen his slender grip on the ridge. G Battalion tanks had
arrived by now as well.
14 A Company of Tanks, Major W. H. L. Watson.
61
THE CRIPPLING OF 'BANDIT II' - FONTAINE,

23 NOVEMBER 1917 (pages 62-63)
Mark IV tank B23 from B Battalion Tank Corps being
attacked by Germans from the 2nd Battalion, 46th Infantry
Regiment (119th Infantry Division), in Fontaine, 1100hrs,
23 November 1917. B23 had become separated from the
main force on entering the village and was preyed upon
by a company of German infantry under command of a
Leutnant Spremberg. His testimony has survived. Having
failed to subdue the 'roaring lion' with single hand
grenades (1), he 'ordered empty sandbags to be brought
and four hand grenades be placed in them, with one
grenade tied near the top of the bag' (2). Concentrating
fire on the vision slits to occupy the vehicle (3), Musicians
Buttenberg and Schroeder - both trained Sfossfruppen rushed forward and tossed their charges under B23's lefthand track (4). The resulting explosion tore the track clean
off the vehicle but Spremberg's men were unable to finish
it off because the survivors kept up a withering fire until
res~ued by a second unidentified Mark IV.
The fighting conditions experienced by tank crews in
Fontaine that day are exemplified by the testimony
of Captain Groves, commander of Number 1 Section,
B Battalion. He was riding in a Male tank, B19. 'Hell was
let loose as we turned into the street. We were being fired
at from the roofs - front, back and sides. A combination of
splash and armour flaking [spall] made it most difficult to
64
see anything when handling a gun ... The gun ports were
all lit up with sparks.'
This had the effect of 'shot-blasting' the armour plate and
often damaged the cooling sleeves around the Lewis gun
barrels (5).
'Imagine the shouting required to get the [6-Pounder] guns
onto the machine guns in the houses. Whenever I spotted
a target I had to yell instructions in the driver's ear, then
dash over to the other side of the tank to the 6-Pounder
gunner, pinch or punch him to attract his attention and
bawl into his ear where the target was ... The atmosphere
at this time was warming up, what with the engine fumes
and fumes from 6-Pounder backflash. There were two men
wounded and all the crew's faces were covered with blood
... Then, as I was observing with the periscope through the
roof, I was pinched violently in the leg, looked round and
saw the tank was on fire at the back of the batteries.
I pointed to the door to Sgt Stewart and he stood by
with his hand ready to open it. I can honestly say at this
moment I thought "Death by fire or bullets, well, bullets for
my own choice". The bullets were banging on the door like
large hailstones on plate glass.' Captain Groves managed
to put the fire out with three extinguishers and direct the
vehicle out of Fontaine to safety. He was fortunate. Fire
most often raged with terrifying speed and intensity once
initiated, creating a feral and often futile scramble for
inaccessible hatches. (Illustration by Peter Dennis)
West of the wood, 121st Brigade was forging forwards towards

Bourlon. Their fortunes were slaved in part to 36th Division's attack
up the Siegfried Stellung support line east of the Canal du Nord, which
had not gone well. Attacking parallel to the trenches, seven out of 11
tanks had been knocked out and the Ulstermen faltered, meaning that
German machine guns were able to enfilade 13th/Green Howards on
the extreme left of 40th Division's advance. 20th/Middlesex Regiment
was just beyond their reach and managed to storm the south corner
of the village with seven of D Battalion's tanks making it in with them.
They lacked the numbers to exploit the opening and three tanks
were destroyed almost immediately. 21st/Middlesex attempted to push
forwards in support but suffered grievously at the hands of German
artillery, now finding its range on this obvious approach route.
At 1500hrs, German infantry from 175th Regiment and 9th Grenadier
Regiment organized themselves to counterattack the wood. Under a
lightning barrage, their determined rush bowled the Welshmen back to a
sunken road where they rallied, surging through the trees to regain the
ridge, berserk with rage. The wood witnessed a chaotic savagery. Amidst a
pounding artillery duel that assailed all the senses, visibility was minimal.
Dodging and charging forwards over bodies ripped open by shrapnel, the
Welshmen closed with their opponents, firing, clubbing and shoving
their way forwards. Command and control had evaporated long ago.
Handfuls of men decided the outcome. Immune to the feeble entreaties
of wounded enemy, acts of pitiless murder stand equal to conspicuous
gallantry in such situations. All the certainties of right and wrong have no
voice. The only communicable language is violence.
Imagine then the Welshmen's breathless recovery as the Grenadiers'
survivors fled down towards Bourlon, a few being sought out by bursts
of machine-gun fire. Shaking, numbed, relieved; hardened noncommissioned officers already barking commands to reorganize.
The senior commander left alive was Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett,
commanding officer of 19th/Royal Welch Fusiliers. He established
his brigade headquarters in a hunting lodge and waited for further
reinforcement. It was not long in coming. As evening arrived, 120th
Brigade was fed into the front piecemeal.
Lieutenant-Colonel Plunkett
commanded the remnants of
119th Brigade from this brick
hunting lodge. It might seem
a bit conspicuous but runners
bearing messages to him in
that shattered wood will have
appreciated the landmark.
(IWM Q 56828)
65
EVENTS
23 NOVEMBER
1. 1030hrs: 6/Gordons' infantry cannot find

a way thorough the tough outer defences of
Fontaine. Later attempts by 152nd Brigade
reserve also falter. They are forced to dig
in an outpost line 500m short of the town.
2. 1130hrs: The supporting tanks of B
and C Battalion get into the village but are
decimated by direct fire from K.Flak Batterie 7
and infantry rushes with bundled grenades.
Only three of B Battalion's 13 tanks make
it back.
3. 1200hrs: Royal Welch Fusiliers on the right
flank of 119th Brigade's attack into Bourlon
Wood fare well initially, reaching the northern
extremity after a hard fight through the wood.
4. 1500hrs: concerted counterattacks by the

fresh troops from Grenadier Regiment No. 9
and Infantry Regiment No. 175 drive the
centre of 40th Division's attack back towards
the sunken road. With Germans infiltrating to
their rear, the Fusiliers and Seaforths on the
east of the wood are compelled to conform.
Both Battalions of the Welsh Regiment are
pushed into the line.
5. 1700hrs: exposed to their west flank and
pressed hard by local counterattacks, there
is no chance of the Green Howards and
Middlesex on the left of 40th Division
capturing Bourlon as tasked so they
withdraw to a hasty outpost line
on the spur to the south.
24 NOVEMBER
6. 0001hrs: through the night, the
indefatigable Lt. Col. Plunkett's 119th
Brigade are reinforced by composite
elements of 120th Brigade's infantry
battalions and dismounted cavalry. The
Germans also reinforce their positions
with Guards Fusilier Regiment, 3rd Guards
Division, and the remaining two battalions
of Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 46.
HARPEl
7. 1530hrs: 14th Battalion Highland Light

Infantry, is launched at Bourlon with 12 tanks
in support. Whereas the tanks are compelled
to withdraw by withering close range fire from
armour-piercing ammunition, the Glaswegians
of the HLI bypass the town centre and reach
the north-east corner relatively unscathed.
66
8. 1600hrs: meanwhile, the Germans

counterattack in Bourlon Wood with now
characteristic fury. This precludes any British
advance, thus leaving the Highland Light
Infantry isolated in Bourlon. A subsidiary
attack by the Suffolks to the north-west
of Bourlon also fails.
xx
40C8J
PONSONBY
9. 2130hrs: an exhausted and depleted 51st

(Highland) Division is relieved by the newly
arrived 1st Guards Brigade from the Guards
Division in Army reserve. 2nd Battalion, Scots
Guards (from 3rd Guards Brigade), is sent into
Bourlon Wood to shore up the right side of
119th Brigade.
THE BATTLE FOR BOURLON WOOD

23 to 25 November 1917, attack of Third Army's IV Corps
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 500m/524yds
xx
107~
HAVENSTEIN
KEY TO UNITS
24 and 25 NOVEMBER
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
Now under command of 3rd Guards Division,
additional units:
J
Guards Fusilier Regiment, 3rd Guards Division
K
Remainder of Reserve Infantry Regiment
No. 46
25 NOVEMBER
10. 0615hrs: 13th Battalion East Surreys,
mount a link-up operation into Bourlon in
a bid to relieve the Highland Light Infantry.
Despite attacking without tanks (they were
late), the East Surreys reach Battalion HQ
near the church. They are unable to get any
further towards the main body at the north
end of the town.
11. 0930hrs: Having withstood 16 hours of
onslaught without support of any kind, the
three companies of Highland Light Infantry
holed up around the railway station in Bourlon
are forced to surrender. Only 80 men survive.
12. 1730hrs: 186th and 187th Brigades from
62nd (West Riding) Division conduct relief in
place with the beleaguered survivors of 119th,
120th and 121st Brigades on the Bourlon
front. The 13th East Surreys remains at the
southern end of Bourlon until 27 November.
BRITISH
IV CORPS
40th Division
120th Brigade - Brigadier-General Willoughby
12 13th Battalion East Surrey Regiment
13 14th Battalion Highland Light Infantry
14 11th King's Own (Royal Lancashire
Regiment) and balance of 14th Battalion
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
15 9th Cavalry Battalion (15th Hussars, 19th
Hussars and 1st Bedfordshire Yeomanry)
in dismounted role
Guards Division
1st Guards Brigade - Brigadier-General
Champion de Crespigny
16 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards,
2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards,
3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards,
1st Battalion Irish Guards
3rd Guards Brigade - Brigadier-General Lord
Seymour
17 2nd Battalion Scots Guards
GERMAN
GRUPPE CAUDRY
Under command of 107th Infantry Division
A
1st Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment
No. 46, 119th Infantry Division
2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 46,
and elements of 3rd Battalion, Reserve
Infantry Regiment No. 46, both 119th
Infantry Division
2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 50,
107th Infantry Division
GRUPPE ARRAS
D
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 50 (all
three battalions represented), 214th
Infantry Regiment
E
One company of 1st Battalion Infantry
Regiment No. 175, 36th Division
F
Lehr Regiment and Grenadier Regiment
No.9, 3rd Guards Division
G
Infantry Regiment No. 77, 20th Division
H
3rd Battalion Infantry Reserve Regiment
No. 88
Scratch counterattack force formed from
Grenadier Regiment NO.9 and Infantry
Regiment No. 175
BRITISH
IV CORPS
152th Infantry Brigade - Brigadier-General Burn
3
Mixed force from 5th Battalion Seaforth
Highlanders and 8th Battalion Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders
40th Division
119th Brigade - Brigadier-General Crozier
4
19th Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers
5
12th Battalion South Wales Borderers
6
7
121st Brigade - Brigadier-General Campbell
8
9
29th Division
10 13th Battalion Green Howards
11 21 st Battalion Middlesex Regiment
67
56th Division's operation to expand their gains beyond Tadpole

Copse made a degree of progress towards Inchy and the 36th Division
operation west of the Canal du Nord had managed once again to
penetrate Moeuvres. Regrettably for both enterprises, problems east of
the canal and around Bourlon village made it difficult to press further.
Besides, Gruppe Arras was not ready to give up Moeuvres. The 108th
Brigade's tenancy there was as short-lived as ever; 2nd/88th Reserve
Regiment delivering a counterattack that forced the Ulstermen to
withdraw to the outskirts after dark.
For now, the whole focus of the offensive switched to 40th Division
around Bourlon. Byng brought the Guards Division under Woollcombe's
command and they promptly relieved 51st Division on the CantaingFontaine front - not before time. In addition, he authorized the
formation of two dismounted cavalry battalions (Bedfordshire Yeomanry
and 19th Hussars) to bolster 121st Brigade. Plans for 24 November put
the balance of 120th Brigade into that attack against Bourlon.
14th/Highland Light Infantry and 12th/Suffolks would strike the village
with 12 tanks from I Battalion; essentially the last serviceable vehicles
left in Third Army. 13th/East Surreys were to come down off the
ridge and envelop Bourlon from the north-east. Logistic constraints
(artillery ammunition and tank refit) meant that Z-Hour could not be
arranged before 1500hrs.
DAS RINGEN UNI BOURLON

For the first time since 20 November, von Moser could bolster his
miscellaneous collection of defenders at Bourlon with a substantial
injection of reserves. The 3rd Guards Division arrived in the Bourlon
sector on 23 November with its Lehr, 9th Grenadier and Guard Fusilier
Regiments; units going straight into action as the situation demanded.
The Gruppe system was much in evidence, with the commander of
the incumbent 50th Regiment remaining in charge despite his men
being a minority.
Rupprecht and von del' Marwitz were still engaged in damage
limitation. Large-scale, deliberate counterattack was not an option
until at least 27 November. That did nothing to diminish the offensive
spirit of local commanders and the defenders of Bourlon took every
opportunity. In command of 9th Grenadier Regiment was Colonel von
North-east Bourlon changed
hands constantly during the six
days it was fought over. Three
years on, these trees still show
evidence of shell damage.
(IW:M Q 37254)
68
Pacsynksi. In the early hours, he paraded a scratch force of able-bodied

Feld Grau (infantry) and led them into a dawn attack against Plunkett's
positions in the north-east corner of the wood.
On the approach, Feldwebel-Leutnant Hohenstein's platoon
captured a two-man British listening post, which betrayed the exact
location of 119th Brigade's forward positions as 50 yards farther into the
wood. Fanning out noiselessly, they waited for the artillery barrage to
signal their rush forwards. Presently, the grey dawn tranquillity was
shattered by the crash and shriek of impacting shells. Von Pacsynksi's
men sprang forwards, running with the distinctive crouch of an
infantryman in contact. British Vickers guns, eight of which came up
during the night, added their laboured but persistent clatter to the din,
striking the northern slopes of Bourlon Wood with heavy .303in. rounds.
This was the first of a series of concerted thrusts that morning. Every
bit the equal of yesterday's struggle, it is small wonder that the Germans
went on to call it Das Ringen um Bourlon - the wrestle at Bourlon. As
before, Plunkett's obstinate followers flatly refused to relinquish their
holes amongst the splintered trees.
Woollcombe cancelled 121st Brigade's attack at 0900hrs because he
judged the available tank and infantry forces to be inadequate for the
task of capturing Bourlon. A postponement of 24 hours was necessary.
In a classically tragic failure of World War I communications, German
artillery had cut the brigade's field telephone lines and the message
never reached them. Consequently, they launched as planned. I
Battalion's 12 tanks entered Bourlon about 200m ahead of the Highland
Light Infantry and were driven out quickly with eight losses. German
infantry were becoming much more confident in dealing with tanks.
Barricades were used to force a halt while the tank's gearsmen engaged
a turn, whereupon infantry would approach from the rear and stuff
charges beneath its tracks. By contrast, the Highlanders' three lead
companies infiltrated all the way to the railway line at the north-east end
of Bourlon. Such dynamic progress was enabled by bypass of principal
German strongpoints.
The Suffolks were less fortunate and stopped up against a fiendish
network of machine-gun positions, pre-registered mortar killing areas
and mobile squads of aggressive infantry. By 1700hrs, they had withdrawn
to the start line. One company of Highland Light Infantry with battalion
headquarters failed to join the others and became cut off in the southeast side of Bourlon. They were going to have to spend the night there.
At 1615hrs, Plunkett's desperate band finally threw the last of the
German attacks off the northern end of Bourlon Wood. That night,
2nd/Scots Guards and two companies of 40th Division's 11 th/King's Own
Royal Lancaster Regiment were brought up to replace the day's losses.
BEGINNING OF THE END

Haig was losing patience. He could not fathom IV Corps' inability to
achieve its objectives. Byng was given 2nd and 47th (2nd London)
Divisions and told to take personal control. Up until now Woollcombe
had largely been left to his own devices. Third Army's contribution was
allocation and management of resources. It is not clear what more Byng
69
--...
German trench
German comms trench
Wire belt
Approximate front line 27 Nov
German machine-gun nest
Sunken road
O.5km
German Gruppe Caudry

Under command of 3rd Guards Division
A 1st Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 46, 119th
Infantry Division
1st Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 46 plus 2nd and
3rd Battalion Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 46, all
119th Infantry Division
Infantry Regiment No. 58, 119th Infantry Division
German Gruppe Arras
D 2nd Battalion Lehr Regiment and entire Grenadier
Regiment No.9, both 3rd Guards Division
1st and 2nd Battalion Guards Fusilier Regiment, 3rd
Guards Division
1st and 2nd Battalion 1st Reserve Ersatz Regiment,
221 st Infantry Division
Counterattacking units
G Elements of Grenadier Regiment No.9, 3rd Guards
Division
~\
i-i-+
3rd Battalion 1st Reserve Ersatz Regiment, 221 st Infantry "
'I-'I-'l-'l-iDivision
xXxxxxxxxxxx'f..
Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 60, 221 st Infantry Division
2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 58, 119th Infantry
Division
2nd Battalion Infantry Regiment No. 46, 119th Infantry
Division
British IV Corps
187th Brigade - Brigadier-General Taylor
A 5th Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
B 5th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment
C 5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment (attached from
185 Brigade)
186th Brigade - Brigadier-General Bradford
D 5th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment
E 6th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment
F 7th Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment
G 7th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment (attached from
185th Brigade)
Guards Division
2nd Guards Brigade - Brigadier-General Sergison Brooke
H 2nd Battalion Irish Guards
I
1st Battalion Coldstream Guards
J
3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards
K 1st Battalion Scots Guards
3rd Guards Brigade - Brigadier-General Lord Seymour
L 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards
M 1st Battalion Welsh Guards
OPPOSITE
1. 0620hrs: an ineffective
barrage, plus the failure to

silence the machine guns,
ensures the assault battalions
of 187th Bde encounter
unsuppressed defences.
2. 0800hrs: Bradford's Dukes
get embroiled east of Bourlon,
requiring assistance from the
supporting 7th Dukes.
3. 0800hrs: the right half of
186th Bde encounters difficulty
getting through the wood.
The 5th Bn is stretched thin
to maintain contact with 2nd
Guards Bde on their right.
Yorkshires attached from 185th
Bde are pushed in to plug gaps.
4. 0900hrs: the 2nd Bn Irish
Guards find their objectives in
the north-east corner of Bourlon
Wood. A counterattack by a
Grenadier Regt No. 9 battalion
forces a general withdrawal.
5. 0930hrs: in Fontaine, the
Grenadiers have bypassed many
Germans, reaching the village
centre by 0715hrs. German
infantry soon reemerge, creating
a bloody street battle.
6. 0700hrs: C Coy of 1st Bn
Scots Guards is pushed out of
Cantaing to protect the southern
flank of 2nd Guards Bde. They
are decimated immediately by
overlapping machine-gun fire.
7. 0930hrs: the Coldstreams have
penetrated furthest, capturing
the railway station, but the
German counterattack renders
their exposed dispositions
untenable, and they join the
general withdrawal.
8. 1000hrs: having split 3rd
Guards Bde's reserve battalion
of Grenadiers between the three
battalions in contact, Feilding
now uses the 1st Bn Welsh
Guards to secure the front line.
9. 1000hrs: Taylor uses his
reserve battalion of West Yorks
to shore up his positions holding
the high ground above Bourlon.
The final attempt to capture
Bourlon and its wood fails.
RIGHT The sunken road

from Cantaing, from where
C Company, 1st Battalion Scots
Guards, advanced towards
Fontaine. (Author's collection)
and his staff could contribute, save lobbying higher command for even
more manpower. More conspicuous in its absence during this operation
was the intelligence effort. 15 With Rupprecht pumping reserves into the
Cambrai sector as preparation for operational (as opposed to local)
counterattack, it suited him that the British should be hurling
themselves at Bourlon Ridge in such costly fashion. With all Elles' tanks
now withdrawn for refit, cavalry being pressed into the infantry role and
the drained 62nd Division sent back into the line to replace a virtually
obliterated 40th Division, it must have been evident that Operation GY
was on its last legs. All one can say in their defence is that withdrawal
(which was the only other realistic option) would have meant it had all
been in vain. The beguiling question being: surely one last push could
carry the day? This attitude is understandable. Plunkett and the trapped
Highlanders in Bourlon would certainly have agreed.
It was settled. Third Army started cultivating plans for an attack on
27 November. In the meantime, 40th Division's last uncommitted
battalion, 13th East Surreys, were going to attempt a relief of the
Highland Light Infantry first thing in the morning; an unenviable
mission. Fear of fratricide precluded bombardment and there were no
tanks. Relying on speed and stealth, their dawn dash succeeded in
reaching the Highlanders' battalion headquarters but it stirred up a
hard-hitting counterattack. There was no way that the force by the
railway would be reached and it was just as well that nobody died trying
- ammunition expended, they had surrendered at 0930hrs. The Surreys'
commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, combined effort with
the remaining Highlanders (whose own Colonel had been killed that
morning), organized a defence and fought skilfully through the day.
The indefatigable Plunkett spent another day in action, repelling
repeated attempts by 3rd Guards Division to rout him. Such laconic
reportage conceals so much; the incredible reserves of stamina and
courage required to sustain this baneful existence in a fringe of
woodland. Generalleutnant von Lindequist commanding 3rd Guards
sent a frustrated signal to von Moser reading: 'In spite of all endeavours,
the British cannot be driven out of the wood'. For the men 62nd
Division relieved that night, 23 November must have seemed a lifetime
ago. Warden remained in Bourlon - extrication being too perilous.
15 Third Army reported the arrival of 119th, 214th and 3rd Guards Divisions three days after they first went into
action at Cambrai.
71
Fontaine as viewed from the

start line of the 3rd/Grenadier
Guards. Machine-gun fire from
La Folie Wood was so fierce that
only seven men out of the two
lead companies reached the
church visible on the right.
Attacking through Bourlon Wood,

the Irish Guards reported it 'alive
with concealed machine guns'
that had to be cleared by bomb
and bayonet. This is one of them.
(Regimental Collection, Irish
Guards)
26 November was set aside for a euphemistic 'recuperation', giving

the heavy artillery an opportunity to pulverize even more of the once
sleepy villages like Bourlon, Moeuvres and Fontaine. Hunkered down
in their malodorous dugouts, the stoic German infantry were suffering.
One candid junior officer's letter from Bourlon illuminates:
With the current weather conditions my platoon will soon have to fight
off a new enemy. Every night we are moved about in the snow and rain
and then spend the whole day squatting in our holes, nearly turning to
ice in wet clothes. If we are to stay any longer in this place, I pray that
we are sent some more schnapps at least. 16
Such parochial concerns were beyond the agenda of a high-level

conference taking place that morning at Graincourt. Haig, Byng and
Woollcombe arrived to discuss tomorrow's attack with Major-Generals
Braithwaite (commanding 62nd Division) and Feilding (commanding
the Guards Division). The plan was straightforward: 62nd would have
another crack at Bourlon with 20 refurbished tanks and the Guards
would take Fontaine with the assistance of another 12.
72
16 Tankschlacht be; Cambra; 1917, Reichsarchiv.
There was a tense atmosphere. Feilding judged his task to be

impossible and was saying so. He had seen what had happened to the
51st with 36 tanks. Moreover, Fontaine had since been reinforced.
Surely, he implored, it would be better to withdraw to Flesquieres Ridge
for the winter. His forceful case was deflected with platitudes and he
returned to his division forlorn. A light snow fell, muffling the incessant
thud and crump of preparatory shelling.
'A DIRTY AND A NOISY PLACE

WAS BOURLON'
Major-General Sir Geoffrey

Feilding (centre) with King
George V and Field Marshal Haig.
Adamant that his Guards
Division's attack against
Fontaine was futile, he
recommended withdrawal to
the Flesquieres Ridge - a view
that ultimately was vindicated.
(IWM Q 944)
Despite a full day to prepare, most of the attacking companies did not
receive their orders until midnight. There was no chance to survey
the ground or rehearse with tanks. Consequently, Feilding's plan was
necessarily orthodox - 2nd Guards Brigade was going take on Fontaine
with their left extreme (2nd/Irish Guards) actually inside Bourlon
Wood hoping to retake the north-east corner lost on 24 November. On
the right, he tasked 2nd/Scots Guards to sweep down from Cantaing.
3rd Guards Brigade was in reserve.
Events transpired much as Feilding predicted. Advancing at 0620hrs
under a creeping barrage, Ist/Coldstream Guards and 3rd/ Grenadier
Guards managed to get into Fontaine with the tanks from F and I
Battalion but street fighting is cruelly expensive; casualties soon
mounted. German defenders from 46th Regiment 'hunted the tanks
with enthusiasm'17 but they too suffered. F41, 'Fray Bentos' accounted
for 40 men before succumbing. Now also wise to German tactics, the
remainder survived. In the wood, the Irish Guards lost cohesion and
direction but arrived at their objective through pure obstinacy.
Emerging from the sunken road that leads out of Cantaing, the Scots
Guards were decimated by machine guns, just as their countrymen had
been the week before. SergeantJohn McAulay, who carried his wounded
commander 400m, delivered the lead company to safety. Where
objectives were achieved (in north Fontaine and in Bourlon Wood),
crushing counterattacks drove the Guards back. Reserves were pushed
into the line in response but Feilding saw no value in reinforcing failure.
It was over by 1000hrs. They withdrew and bedraggled survivors limped
back throughout the day.
The 62nd Division had a similarly unequal battle, attacking Bourlon
from the wood with 186th Brigade and from the south with 187th.
On both fronts, fighting was fierce. Nineteen tanks crossed the start
line in support, 11 on the left and eight on the right. Unlike Fontaine
very few got out, just five. German infantry drew them into murderous
ambushes utilizing stubby-barrelled 7.6cm assault guns and ball
charges. Bourlon was obscured by incessant German artillery
bombardment, including use of gas shells in the British rear. The Duke
of Wellington's battalions from 186th Brigade penetrated on a similar
axis to the Highland Light Infantry, silencing a howitzer battery with
the assistance of three C Battalion tanks. Better yet, Warden's East
Surreys were reached and could withdraw at last. The only evidence of
17 German dispatch quoted in Bour/on Wood, Jack Horstall and Nigel Cave.
73
Rupprecht's build-up did not go

entirely unnoticed - observers
spotted railway movement
and 'above normal' road traffic
around Cambrai - yet GHQ
intelligence summaries persisted
with the assessment that the
Germans were too exhausted
to mount an offensive. (IWM
Q 55403)
A German Albatross fighterbomber releases its payload

onto British positions. Extensive
use was made of marauding
ground attack aircraft during
the opening stages of the
30 November counterattack.
(lWM Q 49654)
the Highlanders was their corpses. 5th/King's Own Yorkshire Light

Infantry and 5th/Yorkshire and Lancashire Regiment of 187th Brigade
became separated, allowing the Germans to flank them from a wedge
in between. The pointlessness of this attack was manifestly clear by
mid-morning and Braithwaite ordered a withdrawal to prepare for the
habitual German counterattack, which was repulsed by 186th Brigade
that afternoon.
On hearing the news, Haig called a stop. The 2nd, 47th (London)
and 59th (2nd North Midland) Divisions were ordered forward, not
to attack but to relieve the 36th, 62nd and Guards respectively. These
shattered formations would remain in the vicinity as reserves while
Byng reorganized the front for winter. Precarious as it was, they opted to
hang onto the occupied areas of Bourlon for the time being as it was
imperative to screen preparations for a long-term defensive line on
Flesquieres Ridge (Feilding must have shook his head on discovering
that). Byng gave Woollcombe the freedom to mount local attacks up
the Canal du Nord if this could create a defensive advantage. He did
not exercise it.
RUPPRECHT'S TURN
74
These decisions were unbeknown to Rupprecht. That very day, he was in

conference with the German High Commander, General Ludendorff, to
discuss their long-awaited counterstroke. Forming two new Gruppen Lewarde north of Gruppe Arras and Busigny south of Gruppe Caudry Northern Army Group could concentrate an extra seven divisions on the
Cambrai front to augment those already committed to action. Echoing
British thinking earlier in the year, they opted for a northerly thrust to
cut the salient created by Byng's advance. The main effort was recapture
of the Siegfried Stellung front lines. Rupprecht issued his operation
order to von der Marwitz that night:
Banteux Ravine was the perfect

point to breach Third Army's line:
a natural defile on an axis that
exploited the IIINII Corps
boundary. The motorway
embankment now blocks its
western end. (Author's collection)
1. Attack on 30 November.
2 . Main blow by eastern Gruppen, general direction Metz [west],
capturing Flesquieres and Havrincourt Wood from the south in order
to take British in flank and rear.
3. Attack of Gruppe Arras to be delivered [after main stroke of eastern
Gruppen] from west of Bourlon towards the south. Recommended that
Gruppe Arras begin artillery fire and demonstrations as early as possible
in order to pin down enemy forces on its front. Etc ...
Rupprecht's greatest fear was a British advance in Masnieres - he had

to operate under the assumption that cessation of Byng's effort was
temporary. The plan was developed with his Gruppe commanders over
the next 24 hours.
Gruppe Busigny, under Generalleutnant von Kathen, would attack
with three fresh divisions - 183rd, 208th and 34th - between Banteux
and Vendhuille. The 183rd was in the line on 20 November but largely
bypassed to the north. Von Watter's Gruppe Caudry was to their north,
with 28th, 220th, 30th and 107th Divisions. Only the latter had yet been
in action at Cambrai. These were the 'eastern' Gruppen described in the
above operations order. Having penetrated as far as Havrincourt and its
wood, they planned to swing north, rolling up Third Army's front and
meeting von Moser's Gruppe Arras on its way south with 119th, 214th,
221st and 49th Reserve Divisions. With the exception of 221st and
49th Reserve, this Gruppe had previously been committed to battle. The
absence of 3rd Guards betrays their exhaustion.
Rupprecht was right to have been patient. Although Byng also had
three rested divisions now in the line (four if you count 55th Division
in VII Corps area at the southern end of Rupprecht's breach), the
Germans had overwhelming superiority on their primary axis over a
depleted III Corps. Crucially, Second Army now enjoyed the firepower
of 1,200 artillery pieces.
28 November brought milder weather and with it mist, concealing
much of German preparation from the prying eyes of the Royal Flying
Corps. Nevertheless, such a massive build-up, being less calculated than
Byng's in the run-up to GY, did not escape notice. VII Corps were
especially jumpy. Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas D'Oyly Snow had
signalled his concerns to Byng as long ago as 25 November. These
75
observations were not ignored but, when von Moser opened a gas and
high-explosive barrage of Bourlon Wood on 28 November, it merely
encouraged the perception that this was the threatened sector.
Third Army were also reading GHQ intelligence summaries assessing
German strength as too low to permit large-scale attack. Indisputably,
complacency prevailed. No Army-level warning order was issued to
reserves or front-line positions.
Anyhow, 55th Division in the line at Banteux made preparations to
resist any offensive. Its commander, Major-General Jeudwine ordered
the creation of a backstop strongpoint in Villers Guislan and prepared
pre-emptive artillery missions for the morning of 30 November. At
much the same time on the evening of 29 November as Byng was
holding a dinner to celebrate his promotion to substantive General,
the 5th/South Lancashire Regiment of 166th Brigade holding Banteux
Ravine received a signal: 'In the event of attack you will hold the line at
all costs. There is to be no retirement to any second line. Warn all ranks
18
to be specially alert.'
ANGRIFFSCHLACHT
When the blow fell, chaos spread like a contagion. Gruppe Busigny
opened a barrage at 0600hrs that was deceivingly sporadic - probably
designed to confuse the British whether or not they were under attack.
Building rapidly in intensity, the first groups of assaulting infantry
came on in rushes shortly after 0700hrs. The Germans spearheaded
their offensive with Sturmbataillone - Gruppe Busigny using the 3rd
Jager Battalion. Retreating infantry reported a proliferation of light
machine guns and some flame-throwers. Banteux Ravine was overrun
in short order, its Vickers emplacements pummelled by a flurry of
mortar shells that Stosstruppen scuttled under as if invulnerable. Aircraft
buzzed and swooped like hungry gulls. The German onslaught
bypassed pockets of resistance; a policy that bred the term 'infiltration'
tactics. Mist added to the confusion in scenes richly reminiscent of
20 November: distress flares arcing haphazardly into the dawn,
forward positions failing to answer field telephones, erroneous and
contradictory reports.
The 183rd Division drove hard down the boundary between 55th
and 12th Divisions and these two formations bore the brunt. The right
ofJeudwine's command (164th Brigade) was spared all but the barrage.
His centre brigade, 165th, marked the southern end of Rupprecht's
offensive and its northernmost battalion, 6th/King'S Regiment,
fought all day to anchor the line. 166th Brigade, whose front included
Banteux Ravine, was washed away. Gfits three battalions in the line, only
10th/King's repulsed the attacks long enough to make a second stand
in the support line. 5th/North Lancashire and 5th/South Lancashire
were enveloped; in the latter 'barely a man survived' .19
Jeudwine kept his cool, reinforcing the anchor with reserve battalions
and creating improvised fighting units from road building parties. He
76
18 BritiSh official history, The Battle of Cambrai 1917, Captain Wilfred Miles.
19 Ibid.
even mounted a counterattack against German second echelon columns.

The 12th Division was disadvantaged straight away because the
deluge of German infantry on the Banteux axis flowed into its flanks,
cutting off forward positions. The 35th Brigade was manning a frontage
of 3km and its commander, Brigadier-General Vincent, had no contact
with his forward battalions from the start. Shelling had cut his telephone
lines. Brigade headquarters was in the village of Villers-Guislan and
leading German infantry units from 34th Division arrived there as early
as 0730hrs. Hence Vincent found himself fighting before he even knew
what had befallen his command. Shepherding a motley group of clerks,
staff officers and sappers, he conducted a fighting withdrawal towards
Gauche Wood. Soon evicted from that refuge by artillery, 'Vincent's
Force' (as it came to be known) worked its way to some high ground
farther west, collecting more stragglers in the process.
Meanwhile, his battalions were being wiped out. The reserve
battalion, 7th/Suffolks, was being attacked east of Gonnelieu at the
same time as his forward elements, 5th/Royal Berkshires and
7th/Norfolks. Theirs is a familiar tale of desperate resistance. War
diaries speak of the battalions doing 'great execution' with their small
arms but 35th Brigade was undermanned and spread far too thin to
stem the tide of an entire division. All three commanding officers were
among the dead and missing.
The slopes around Gonnelieu and Villers-Guislan were also home
to a large number of artillery batteries. Displaying a stubbornness that
cost many a gunner his life that morning, field and heavy batteries
alike engaged the oncoming infantry over open sights, reaping a terrible
harvest. Removing breeches and sights at the last safe moment, they then
fought as infantry.
None of this prevented Gruppe Busigny from capturing
Gouzeaucourt, 5km behind British lines, at about 1000hrs. Unfortunately,
the doggedness of so many individuals - long after the collapse of formal
command and control structures - was not part of Rupprecht and von der
Marwitz' narrative. Perhaps they should have recalled the exploits of
Major Krebbs et ale British and German troops are not so different. It had
been a long morning for everybody. Already his men were tiring and they
paused in the centre of Gouzeaucourt to gorge themselves on a captured
supply convoy.
For all his earlier complacency, Byng displayed laudable sangfroid
and reacted decisively. Tank battalions being entrained at Flins were
ordered to get as many into action as possible. The Guards Division was
placed under command of III Corps but its 1st Brigade made straight
for Gouzeaucourt. Sensing that the German thrust was directed at
Metz, Kavanagh's Cavalry Corps was ordered to support VII Corps by
counterattacking from the south-west in order to cut off its p.ead.
Both attacks were delivered in stereotypical fashion. The 5th Cavalry
Division made a bid for Villers-Guislan. The 8th Hussars from Ambala
Brigade joined the 12th Hussars of 5th Brigade in a dashing gallop
for Gauche Wood. Driven back by machine-gun fire, they dismounted
along with Hodson's Horse and pressed home another audacious attack,
this time consolidating on Chapel Hill. For their part, the 1st Guards
Brigade arrived west of Gouzeaucourt at 1230hrs. Passing retreating
stragglers, 'the advance over the downland of the three battalions in
77
LEFT Stosstruppen training with

a medium 17cm Minenwerfer.
Man-hauled into battle by a crew
of four, these weapons provided
indirect fire support to the
assault squads. Live training
enabled them to bring the
rounds in incredibly close to
friendly troops (lWM Q 23754)
perfect order was a heartening sight' .20 Recapture of the town was
equally efficient and, within half an hour, they were preparing defences
on its eastern flank.
Gruppe Caudry's drive for Metz enjoyed all the same advantages of
surprise and concentration of force but the ground was not as kind. No
sooner had they crossed the St Quentin Canal north of Banteux, they
ran into 36th and 37th Brigades of 12th Division rooted to the very same
network of fortified farm buildings that had delayed III Corps on 20
November: Bleak House, Le Pave, Pam Pam, Le Quennet and Bonavis.
Here too, the defenders sold themselves dear, counterattacking as soon
as any opportunity arose. However, 28th and 220th Division were at
full strength and rested, whereas the defending battalions were heavily
depleted. This was their undoing. Eventually, the strongly defended
farms were bypassed, leaving defenders to cause as much trouble as
possible until ammunition was expended. Survivors fell back on the
thick (German-built) defences around La Vacquerie, which became a
rallying point for all manner of British forces. Stretching the range of
supporting artillery, even determined, assault-trained infantry could not
get into it. German accounts express disappointment at this, blaming
the seemingly superhuman steadfastness of its defenders.
28th Division's left flank had fared better, essentially forming part
of Gruppe Busigny's capture of Gonnelieu. Their inclination to press
north of the town and onto Villers-Plouich may well have flanked
La Vacquerie had it not been for the arrival of the Light Infantry of
60th Brigade - 20th Division's reserve - who became embroiled as the
melee drifted into its flank. Their comrades farther forwards clashed
with Gruppe Caudry's 220th Division, making for Couillet Wood. 59th
and 61st Brigades were prejudiced by forward slope positions, enabling
German aircraft and artillery to batter them with ease. Study of the
detail would be repetitive. Suffice it to say that 10th/King's Royal Rifle
Corps (59th Brigade) limped into La Vacquerie that night with 20 men.
On the north side of his frontage, von Watter was issued a cruel
reminder of how easy it had been to block Byng at Masnieres and
Marcoing. Fittingly, it came from the very same division that he had
thwarted - 29th. At 0900hrs, 107th Division emerged from Siegfried II
78
20 British Official History, The Battle of Cambra; 1917, Captain Wilfrid Miles.
OPPOSITE
1. The Germans intend to cut
off the British-held salient at its
southern end and then roll it up
northwards towards Flesquieres.
The main effort is in the area of
Banteux to Villers-Guislan, with
a second focal point in the
ground west of Bourlon Wood.
2. The German attacks on the
BanteuxNillers-Guislan front
meet initial success, forcing a
British retirement of two to three
miles. The British rally on a line
roughly parallel with the railway
east of Gouzeaucourt.
3. The attacks north of Bonavis
overrun British forward positions
but fail to provoke a full retreat.
4. The attackers astride the
boundary between Gruppen Arras
and Caudry make no headway.
The British machine-gunners
decimate assaulting infantry
in the low ground south-west
of Fontaine-Notre-Dame.
5. The fighting near the Canal du
Nord is equally bitter. Unable to
breakthrough, von Moser keeps
pressing until the 7 December
British withdrawal to a
consolidated line.
6. Von Kathen's Gruppe Busigny
resumes the offensive down in
Gouzeaucourt on 1 December.
The effort is blunted by
counterattacks from the Guards
and two divisions of the Cavalry
Corps. Gauche Wood is
recaptured but the Germans
hold onto Villers-Guislan.
7. Fighting also continues around
Marcoing and Masnieres that
day and again on 3 December.
Eventually, it is decided that the
British 29th Division positions
north of the St Quentin canal
are untenable. They are
withdrawn as part of the general
retirement conducted between
4 and 7 December.
80
into a murderous fire. None of their regiments made it to within 400m

of 86th Brigade's line. The gravest threat developed from another
quarter. 61st Brigade's collapse south of Les Rues Vertes presented 30th
Division with an opportunity to trap the British on the north side of
the canal. Major-General de Lisle was powerless to influence events;
29th Division's headquarters had been overrun by Gruppe Busigny's
uppercut at 0845hrs and he was on the run. Predictably for 30
November, their salvation fell to a miniscule party of defenders led by
Captain Gee, an 86th Brigade staff officer. He won a Victoria Cross for a
catalogue of adventures, driving the lead assault force out of the village
and silencing a machine gun they left there to pin him down. By the
time the 99th Regiment (30th Division lead) could respond in force,
Gee had created a stalwart redoubt. The 88th Brigade in divisional
reserve established even stronger defensive positions south of Marcoing
Copse, which it used as the springboard for a series of counterattacks
through the day.
Cantaing and Fontaine were excused the worst of the fighting as
they lay between the two principal German axes. Two diversionary
attacks were made by 119th Division's 46th and 58th Regiments (who
had been fighting since 21 November) at 0900hrs and 1100hrs. Both
were stopped in their tracks by 176th Brigade of 59th Division holding
that line. Akin to Masnieres, there was a cruel justice in the erstwhile
defenders of Fontaine emerging to die in the same manner as their
Scottish victims.
In Bourlon Wood, 30 November dawned with a gas barrage.
Thudding into the ground like duds, the shells vented phosgene, a
heavier-than-air choking agent that smells of fresh-cut hay. Inhabiting
the wood was the right-hand brigade of 47th Division, the 141st. Drifting
downhill, the phosgene settled so densely in the area of 19th/London
Regiment that only 70 men remained fit for duty. At midday, forward
positions were attacked by the extraordinarily resilient 3rd Guards
Division regiments. In a work of fiction they might finally have
vanquished the wood but this is reality. They were hurled back.
Instead, von Moser's Gruppe Arras delivered its 'hammer blow'
farther west, massing three divisions - 214th, 221st and 49th Reserve to sweep down onto Graincourt on a 4km frontage. Standing in their
way were three brigades of British infantry: 140th Brigade from 47th
Division, occupying the left side of Bourlon Wood below the village;
99th Brigade from 2nd Division, east of the Canal du Nord in the old
Siegfried Stellung support line; 6th Brigade, left flank of 2nd Division
west of the canal below Moeuvres. Approximately 12,000 infantrymen
against a British force of about 3,000.
They came on in similar fashion to the eastern Gruppen: rushes of
Stosstruppen preceding a congestion of infantry. However, unlike
Banteux, there were no covered approaches and Byng had predicted
attack on this front. The heavy batteries put in place to support his
Bourlon Wood operation were still in position. The massive available
firepower exacted a grave price. In scenes comparable to Verdun,
shrapnel and high explosive tore into the packed ranks with a brutal
indifference. Enfilading machine guns worked from both flanks, one
eight-gun Vickers detachment firing 70,000 rounds. The 92nd Regiment
were labouring towards the Anneux Sugar Factory:
Gruppe Arras attacked astride

the dry Canal du Nord. A pair of
imposing lock gates are in the
distance. Spare a thought for
the amount of backbreaking
spadework required to build
that sandbag bridge in the
foreground. (Regimental
Collection, Irish Guards)
Vickers machine gun sections [in Bourlon Wood] formed an immense

wall offire. The enemy was not disposed to leave this powerful
strongpoint. Beside machine guns, there were sharpshooters whose single
shots [fired] at the line of the regiment as soon as a head was visible. 21
Grit and sheer volume of manpower carried the Germans forwards. A

gap was found between the 99th and 140th Brigades, which Stosstruppen
ferreted into, flanking 6th/London Regiment. That battalion was
overwhelmed and their neighbours, the 5th Battalion, were compelled
to withdraw to an oblique position along the west side of Bourlon Wood.
Immediate counterattack by 8th and 15th/London Regiment restored
order in the nick of time. Forward positions across 2nd Division's line
were destroyed or cut off and main defensive positions endured similar
pressure. The 1st/Royal Berkshire and 17th/Royal Fusiliers east of the
canal were pushed back until shored up by the timely arrival of 99th
Brigade's reserve 23rd/Royal Fusiliers. West of the Canal, 6th Brigade
had 13th/Essex Regiment forwards. Here the gulley formed by the dry
lock bed shielded the attacking 226th Reserve Regiment from the worst
of enfilade fire and they wrestled for an improvised strongpoint
constructed around lock gates (Lock Number 5). The 13th/Essex lost
the gates but the Germans could progress no farther. West of the canal,
1st/King's Regiment clung all day to their patch, assisted by a mix of
reserve units and 56th Division's machine guns.
Engulfed by the German advance, the survivors of one company from
13th/Essex made a unanimous decision to fight to the death rather than
surrender. This staggering level of commitment is perhaps difficult to
emp~thize with today but it reflects the fatalism engendered by
exposure to the horrors of trench warfare. Life was cheap.
As night fell on 30 November, RuppreCht's offensive was already
losing momentum. Consoling himself with the observation that 'if the
success is not so great as we hoped, it has nevertheless given the British
a blow'22, he prepared a renewed effort on the morrow. Gruppe Arras
was mired in the Moeuvres-Bourlon gap and one of its divisions, 221st,
21 Angriffschlacht bei Cambrai, 92nd Infantry Regiment Official History.
22 British Official History, The Battle of Cambrai 1917, Captain Wilfrid Miles.
81
84
ANGRIFFSCHLACHT - STOSSTRUPPEN ON CANAL
suppressing rather than destroying enemy positions. The
DU NORD, 1 DECEMBER 1917 (pages 82-83)

German assault troops from 73rd Hanoverian Infantry
Regiment's Sturmbataillone (operating as part of 49th
Reserve Infantry Division) attacking 13th Battalion Essex
Regiment (6th Brigade, 2nd Division) at 0730hrs, 1
Stosstruppen are carrying just enough equipment to sustain
December 1917. This sector of the battlefield ran astride

the Canal du Nord. Instead of fighting from perpendicular
opposing trenches, the combatants duelled and scrapped
up the old Siegfried Stellung support line parallel to Gruppe
Arras' axis. This created an environment well suited to the
aggressive and dynamic 'infiltration' tactics being applied
by the spearheading Stosstruppen.
The basic grouping within assault companies was the
18-man section, divided into two squads of nine - the
assault Gruppe. The primary weapon for close-quarter
combat was the grenade, carried in Hessian sacks under the
arms (1). Sections were also scaled for a Maxim 08/15 light
machine gun, which provided intimate suppressive fire (2).
Orchestration was the essence of it. Such small units
were able to make headway because their attacks were
coordinated with judicious application of firepower. Inherent
limitations in communication were overcome by making
support assets organic. Sturmbataillone were equipped with
flamethrowers, mortars, stubby direct-fire assault guns and
twice the usual allocation of Maxim medium machine guns.
Field artillery perfected the 'lightning barrage', firing less
accurate unregistered shells but with the aim of simply
(3) trench system. A flurry of grenades will cover the rush by

men armed with bayonets and sharpened entrenching tools
(4). Meanwhile, the second squad is attempting to bypass
the point of resistance protected by the battalion's integral
mortars (5). The British Lewis gun that poses the greatest
threat to that manoeuvre is being neutralized by first
squad's Maxim 08/15 (6). Such dynamic synchronization
was achieved by perilous training that majored on teaching
troops to anticipate; hence extra ammunition is being
offered to the gun group before they have called for it (7).
Nevertheless, the narrow battlefield levelled the odds.
In his memoir, Storm of Steel, 73rd Hanoverian Regiment
Sturmkompanie commander Ernst Junger describes his
experience of this attack: 'The British resisted manfully.
Every traverse had to be fought for. The black balls of
Mills bombs crossed in the air with our own long-handled
grenades. Behind every traverse we captured we found
corpses or bodies still twitching We too suffered losses.
A piece of iron crashed to the ground, which a fellow was
unable to avoid; and he collapsed to the ground, while
his blood issued on to the clay from his many wounds.'
(Illustration by Peter Dennis)
them without undue encumbrance. Shovels are universal;

reflecting the imperative for consolidation once the
advance had culminated.
Here the first squad is working its way down the barricaded
Most cavalry fighting to

recapture Villers-Guislan did so
dismounted but the 2nd Lancers
charged in a bid to flank Villers
Ridge from the south. They
routed some Germans in
Napoleonic fashion before the
reminiscence was interrupted
by machine-gun fire, halting the
advance. (Regimental Collection,
Irish Guards)
was already a spent force. There was nothing more to do up there except
push on metre by metre. Eastern Gruppen had 9th Bavarian Reserve
and 185th Divisions to commit. They would continue on the primary
axis beyond Gouzeaucourt, supported by subsidiary attacks on Couillet
Wood (9th Reserve), Gauche Wood (208th and 183rd) and La
Vacquerie (34th). Pressure would be maintained on Masnieres-Les Rue
Vertes but Fontaine and Cantaing were out of it. 119th and 3rd Guards
Divisions were now totally incapable of offensive operations.
Byng was not planning on waiting for the strike. He backstopped
Moeuvres-Bourlon with 62nd Division (back in action yet again)
and ordered dawn counterattacks: the Guards towards Gonnelieu and
Cavalry against Gauche Wood. Thirty-nine tanks from H, B and A Battalions
mustered in support. GHQreacted by warning off Flanders-based divisions
for relocation to the threatened Cambrai sector. The 5th Division's
redeployment to Italy was frozen in order to free up rail capacity.
Byng's Z-Hour pre-empted Rupprecht's by two hours. Hence, when
the Guards Division moved with 20 H Battalion tanks towards
Gonnelieu, they encountered German infantry forming up - Bavarian
infantry regiments with 4th Sturmbataillone attached - in what was
effectively a meeting engagement. The 3rd Guards Brigade
(4th/Grenadier Guards and 1st/Welsh Guards) were driven out of
Gonnelieu but had succeeded in spoiling the German attack. Here the
Guards fell back to the western outskirts. However, farther south the
3rd/Coldstream and 2nd/Grenadiers of 1st Guards Brigade had carried
the ridge running from Gonnelieu down to Gauche Wood using their
tanks to great effect. Here the operation tied in neatly with 5th Cavalry
Division's dismounted attack on Gauche Wood by the 18th Lancers
and Indians of Ambala Brigade. Three tanks even made it back into
Villers-Guislan for a short time. Unfortunately for the Cavalry, it was
inconclusive on their right flank, where a mixture of tanks, dismounted
and mounted cavalry manoeuvred around unsuccessfully in a bid to
retake Villers-Guislan from the south. Lacking artillery, they could not
suppress accurate German machine-gun fire. 2nd Lancers charged with
valour Uumping wire like huntsmen would a hedge) but to no avail.
They lost momentum and were pinned down, exposed.
It kept attacking regiments occupied
though and only at La Vacquerie were the
Germans able to mount their operation
unmolested. Battle raged all day, involving the
remnants of 60th Brigade and 1st/Grenadier
Guards. The battered hamlet assumed a
symbolic quality, attracting the effort of
German units that ought to have bypassed. It
was a vicious affair. Fortunes shifted but by
nightfall, the British held the Siegfried
Stellung front-line positions 500m to the east.
Les Rues Vertes and Masnieres took
another hammering. Gruppe Caudry's 30th
Division focused on seeking to isolate 29th
Division north of the St Quentin Canal once
more. Thus 86th Brigade (holding the bend
in the canal) bore the brunt of it. They
85
InChY-en-Arto~
...
Tadpole
-- __ .oe;,e,
.,
_German front line 7 December 1917

--Britishfrontline20November1917
-Britishfrontline7December1917
2 miles
I---------r,-----',
2km
86
resisted but at such cost that Brigadier-General Lucas opted to withdraw

from the rubble of Masnieres that night.
Day two had assumed the character of two exhausted boxers in
a sweaty embrace. Neither protagonist possessed the wherewithal to
craft anything decisive anymore; up on the Canal du Nord, they had
spent the last 48 hours hurling hand grenades at each other with no
demonstrable gain. Admitting that night that the offensive had 'run
itself out', von der Marwitz pressed Rupprecht to shelve extravagant
notions of envelopment and devote his attentions to fashioning an
advantageous line for the winter.
Technically, 2 December was set aside for rest but this was ignored by
von Watter - who attacked Marcoing - and von Moser who gave 2nd
Division another shove south of Moeuvres. Neither made headway. On
reflection, Rupprecht conceded that his designs had 'miscarried' and
Marcoing under German

bombardment on 3 December.
Rupprecht was determined to
push III Corps back from the
St Quentin Canal and made life
miserable for the 29th Division
until they acquiesced two days
later. (Regimental Collection,
Irish Guards)
endorsed von der Marwitz' emphasis. Haig and Byng reached an

identical consensus. Early on 3 December, the two commanders
appraised current dispositions and drafted the following telegram to
the War Cabinet in London:
The present line could be held, but in view of the enemy's present activity
it would use up troops, which, in view ofyour instructions and the
manpower situation, I do not feel justified in devoting to it. 23
They would withdraw to the Flesquieres line. A battle that had opened
so suddenly a fortnight before now closed over the course of a week with
a series of sporadic, localized contests for good ground.
Byng had been utilizing every available respite to improve Third
Army's winter line and by 3 December it was in a fit state to be
occupied. The withdrawal was executed with precision - the British
have a peculiar talent for retreating in good order. At each stage
rearguards were left behind to create an impression of activity so it
would come as a surprise to the Germans opposite. But they too had a
hand in the way it transpired.
Continued pressure encouraged III Corps to abandon La Vacquerie
by 6 December; before dawn on 4 December, 29th Division were west
of St Quentin Canal and joined the main withdrawal thereafter.
The Bourlon and Cantaing front was pulled back gradually from
4 December, 47th Division bidding a wry farewell to Bourlon Wood
by laying booby traps. Covering positions were used as an interim step
and the line had been finalized by 7 December. The guns did not fall
silent but 'such fighting as took place ... during the remainder of the
month may be regarded as incidental to active trench warfare.'24
23 British Official History, The Battle of Cambra; 1917, Captain Wilfrid Miles.
24 Ibid.
87
AFTERMATH
RECRIMINATION
he disappointment did not take long to find its voice. A War
Cabinet in London that had celebrated such incredible gains on
20 November was anxious for Haig's account of how it had all
unravelled so spectacularly ten days later. Tales of routed British troops
discarding weapons demanded explanation. Reports were exacted from
every command level, culminating in Parliamentary debate. Eventually,
an independent inquiry was commissioned by the War Cabinet to be led
by the eminent military authority General Smuts. It is beyond the scope
of this study to chart the debate in detail but the principal conclusions
warrant summary.
Rupprecht's counterattack had not been a surprise; all reasonable
precautions had been taken. Of the three principal thrusts - Bourlon,
Masnieres and Gonnelieu - the third was the smallest. 'No one
down to and including corps commanders was to blame ... There
had been surprising breakdown of the defence on the right of [Byng's]
battle front.' The collapse was attributed to poor training of new drafts
coupled with inexperience of junior officers and NCOs. In response,
the Government informed Parliament that it was 'detrimental to
the public interest to have a public discussion of the breakdown which
undoubtedly occurred' .25
This misrepresentation of the facts can be traced directly back to
Third Army's testimony. It was Byng and his staff that singled out junior
ranks; a generalization which, given the evidence, appears profoundly
iniquitous. Examination of his original report shows how he censured
the Machine Gun Corps for lacking 'staunchness', claiming a dearth of
esprit de corps. His biographer insists the observations have been taken
out of context, explaining that Byng was criticizing training standards,
not the men. In part the opinion can also be explained by various
misrepresentations in the chain of reporting beneath him (accounts of
retreating rabbles were exaggerated).
However, irrespective of emphasis, Byng's characteristic solidarity
with his soldiers is absent. His testimony declined to accept personal
responsibility for the training standards of Third Army and failed to
stress the sacrifice of gallant souls who fought to the death.
Furthermore, he was patently disingenuous about preparations for
German counterattack and its eventual emphasis. Byng had ample
latitude to account for the reverse without going on the attack.
Weak GHQ intelligence reporting, overwhelming German numerical
superiority at decisive points, a precedent of recent German offensive
88
25 The Enquiry Report, including this Hansard entry, is in the National Archives - WO 32/50958.
focus on Bourlon and bad weather are all reasonable grounds for a
defence. Instead it fell to Haig to display magnanimity.
Whatever view may be held on the foregoing ['staunchness' of infantry],
I feel, after careful consideration that all blame for the mishap ... must
rest on my shoulders. It was I who decided on the 22nd that Bourlon
Wood should be attacked ... The occupation of this position at once
increased our front and threw extra work on our troops. As events on
the 30th show, many of the men were very tired and unable to resist the
enemy's blow, as I believe they could have done had they been fresher. 26
Haig's humility aside, this analysis is nearer the mark. Of course, the
55th, 12th and 20th Divisions had not been engaged at Bourlon Wood
but they had been in the line for a long time, they were undermanned
and most of Third Army's resources were committed to the Bourlon
sector. Most poignant of all is the German analysis, which abounds with
references to Britain's robust and determined infantrymen frustrating
progress of Rupprecht's offensive on all fronts.
ELUSIVE EXPLOITATION
In that vein, the Germans had their own disappointments to contend
with. The great strides of 30 November - showcasing their latest
offensive doctrine - were not sufficient to realize Rupprecht's
operational intent. His subsidiary axes had been checked at enormous
human cost and negligible territorial gain. The official post mortem
criticized von der Marwitz for diffusing the attacking divisions across too
wide an area. Ludendorff surmised that even the 'fresh' divisions were
tired. On balance, they are being hard on themselves as 30 November
was a counterattack, not a planned offensive. Thrown together in haste
amid the fury of British efforts to capture Bourlon Ridge, it lacked
the detailed planning that foresight would have afforded. Given these
restraints, the scale and ferocity achieved was remarkable.
Conversely, Operation GYenjoyed meticulous preparation, genuine
surprise and unprecedented initial success. Hence the subsequent
failure to exploit has attracted the bulk of conjecture and historical
analysis of Cambrai. Contemporary assessment was overshadowed by
the Smuts Enquiry but post-operational reports make interesting
reading. There are recurring references to overloaded or overextended
communications networks and unfamiliarity with 'open warfare' once
troops found themselves beyond the Siegfried Stellung. Lack of infantry
reserves - one of the most popular explanations in modern books - does
not feature directly. Instead, they cite overcrowding of artillery, cavalry
and logistics units on the narrow front as responsible for impeding
V Corps' access to the battlefield. It was held 32km away.
Intimidated by the formidableness of the Siegfried Stellung, Byng
dedicated a greater proportion of forces (particularly tanks) to the
initial assault than ultimately proved necessary, creating a steady
attenuation of effort as the day wore on. Had too many tanks been held
26 National Archives - WO 158/52.
89
90
in reserve, they might not have created these openings in the first place
but, in retrospect, one can see that excessive emphasis was placed on
infantry consolidation. It is unfair to insist that commanders should
have identified this at the time - consolidation was an essential
discipline in trench warfare - but it is evident how much it diluted
Byng's combat power at Cambrai.
The effect of all this was that follow-on forces ended up with
unrealistic objectives. The 62nd Division is a case in point. Two brigades
were responsible for the break-in and then consolidated in the support
line beyond Havrincourt, leaving just one brigade (186th) to clear
Graincourt and the vital approaches to Bourlon Ridge. The 6th and
12th Divisions were tasked with little more than building defensive
flanks around III Corps.
Then there is topography. The St Quentin Canal proved to be a
significant obstacle. Despite the fact that a 2km stretch of Siegfried II
remained undefended through the afternoon of20 November, III Corps
could not get enough forces over the canal to penetrate it. Security
measures had precluded extensive air reconnaissance and serviceable
crossings were not identified. Consequently, the 29th Division could
project only small and irregular groups. These were manageable even
for the modest German scratch force holding the far bank. When Fuller
had conceived his original raid, Cambrai was selected precisely because
the St Quentin Canal would isolate the area and protect his southeastern flank. The sword proved double edged.
Kavanagh's Cavalry Corps often draws criticism for not being
vigorous or imaginative enough in moving forwards. Assembly areas
were too far back. There is probably some truth in this but (mistakenly
perhaps) they took their cue from the corps headquarters to which they
were attached. Inherent limitations of battlefield communications
rendered that process convoluted and tardy; messages from units in
contact literally took hours to get back, often on foot. Contradictory
content was assured because the reports had originated in the fog of
battle for villages like Flesquieres.
Arguably more relevant is cavalry'S unsuitability for exploitation
operations in the first place. Mounted action both on 20 November and
1 December was expensive in horses and men. For all their mobility,
there was no protection. Proposed exploitation routes outranged
supporting artillery and, had tanks been available, they would never
have kept pace. Armoured car detachments and motorcycle machinegun companies might have had more utility but they too were unable to
hold ground physically.
Most World War I exploitation debates eventually bump up against
the interior lines advantage enjoyed by defenders. Eingreifentaktik
misfired at Cambrai but it did not fail. The British are a self-critical race
and aversion to accepting the superiority of their enemies is a common
trait. As demonstrated earlier in respect of Flesquieres, von der Marwitz'
divisions fought hard. Within 24 hours, reserves were flowing into the
front at a rate Byng could not hope to compete with and the offensive
spirit displayed by these units was just the precursor to Rupprecht's
30 November 'hammer blow'.
Thus it follows that Haig's decision to press with GYafter 21 November
was a costly act of folly. As his earlier confession of culpability infers, this
placed Herculean demands on the troops' stamina. However, Haig's

thinking was predicated on the perceived strategic necessity of offensive
operations; with Russia defeated, Italy in disarray, the United States
gearing up and the French still recovering from the summer 'mutiny', the
onus rested on him. By throwing a handful of divisions at Bourlon Ridge,
he preoccupied the entire Northern Army Group. Doubtless, this was
small comfort for the men dying in there but such is the cold arithmetic
of grand strategy.
THE BIRTH OF ARMOURED WARFARE

Operation GY was probably destined to be strategically inconclusive. A
more constructive application of hindsight is to examine its tremendous
significance to the conceptual development of armoured warfare.
Unsurprisingly, it will always best be remembered as the first application
of massed armour; the tank's debut as an operational asset. This is true.
Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, in 1917 the Mark IV tank
was still defined as much by its limitations as its capabilities. Obstacle
crossing, wire crushing and direct fire support to infantry were there in
abundance but so too were ponderous manoeuvrability, poor protection
and firepower hamstrung by limited target acquisition. Decisive
shortcomings in all three core areas of tank design. Albeit an impressive
technology at the time, there was a long way to go.
Cambrai was seminal because the plan also embraced such a high
degree of coordination. Different arms sought to complement each other
by playing to strengths. In theory, this was nothing new on a battlefield
but here it was realized with the orchestration of some groundbreaking
technologies: fighter ground attack, tanks and unregistered artillery.
Doctrine for tank/infantry cooperation had been supported by training.
Signals and logistics components were augmented by wireless and sledge
tanks. All these enhancements enabled an offensive operation to be
launched against prepared defences with complete surprise, heralding
the potential for operational manoeuvre and shock action. In the
conceptual domain, it is possible to acknowledge the German
contribution too: the Gruppe system, a decentralized command culture
that bred initiative; Stosstruppen tactics espousing discrete application of
firepower and envelopment. In this vein, Cambrai was a truly auspicious
occasion and can justly be labelled the birth of armoured warfare.
Notwithstanding a tendency
to sound wise after the event,
Colonel J. F. C. Fuller went on
to become one of the foremost
exponents of armoured
manoeuvre warfare. He was
widely read by the architects
of 1930s German offensive
doctrine, later known as
blitzkrieg. (Tank Museum
1380/A6)
91
THE BATTLEFIELD
TODAY
or much the same reason as Cambrai was desirable to the offensive

planners of Third Army, it lends itself well to physical exploration.
In view of the fact that its rolling countryside had not been
churned into a desolate quagmire, the ground you survey now is not
at all dissimilar from that which was fought over back in 1917. Woods
have maintained their original dimensions and urban development
in the area has been limited - only the A26 Autoroute has altered the
topography. The Canal du Nord is now full of water (though with the
disruption caused by two world wars this did not occur until 1963).
Cambrai is a pleasant town but short on hotels. The obvious place to
stay is Hotel Beatus, owned by the author of Following the Tanks, Philippe
Gorczynski. Instrumental in the recovery ofD51 'Deborah' at Flesquieres
in 1999, he will certainly be able to answer most specific questions you
have about the battle. Many tourists also make it a day trip from an
established base at Arras, which is only about half an hour's drive away.
I would highly recommend the purchase of both 'Battleground
Europe' series guidebooks on Cambrai by Jack Horsfall and Nigel Cave
(see Further reading). The discerning enthusiast will also benefit from
the French 1:25,000 IGN map of Cambrai Ouest (Series Blue, number
2507E). The maps in this book will provide more than enough
information for a general reference but access to original mapping will be
required if you are looking to study the actions of individual battalions.
Original trench positions are not readily evident except in some of
the woods although squat concrete bunkers still demarcate the Siegfried
Stellung around Flesquieres and Banteux. It is not hard to work out
where the lines were from general mapping; sighting principles
whittle down the options. However, more obvious landmarks are a better
place to start.
Akin to most of Cambrai's
landmarks, the lock on the
St Quentin Canal east of
Masnieres is largely unchanged.
This feature of the battlefield
makes for a particularly fulfilling
visit. (Author's collection)
92
British infantry killed by shellfire.

As with my title on Vimy Ridge,
it is important for the violence
and suffering of war to have the
last word. (lWM Q 23887)
Bourlon Wood is instantly evocative, especially at the right time of

year. When mist clings to undergrowth astride the muddy sunken lanes,
you half expect a column of grimy Welsh infantry to squelch and jostle
past you. Some shell holes are still in evidence but Plunkett's hunting
lodge is no more. Moving south, the ground around Fontaine and
Cantaing remains faithful to its past. A wander along the tree line of
La Folie Wood will send shivers down your spine - the machine guns
were masterfully sighted to dominate Fontaine's southern approaches in
enfilade. Flesquieres is an illuminating stop too; the significance of its
reverse slope beyond will demand no explanation.
It is well worth taking some time to tackle the St Quentin Canal on
foot. F22's bridge at Masnieres has been replaced by a more modern
structure but the locks farther east have hardly changed at all. Again, few
demands are placed on the imagination to hear the din and rattle of
small-arms fire reverberating across the placid grey water. Le Quennet
and Le Pave Farms are to be found up on Bonavis Ridge and, if
struggling to identify old German trench positions, the support line
ran along the south side of Lateau Wood there very close to the road.
You are now also firmly on the axis of Rupprecht's eastern Gruppen.
Investigation of 55th Division's positions in Banteux Ravine (known now
as Vallee de Villers-Guislan) adds value to comprehension of the events
on 30 November. Unfortunately, the Autoroute embankment at the
western end has dammed it where 166th Brigade put their Vickers guns;
the rest of the defile is intact. Beyond the Autoroute towards Gonnelieu
and Villers-Guislan, you can imprint images of advancing German
infantry onto the open farmland.
As with most World War I battlefields, you will come across
cemeteries constantly. There is an official memorial to the campaign
on the N30 Bapaume-Cambrai road. These modest resting places are
always a sobering interface with the cost of war. Total British casualties
at Cambrai were 47,596 with about one-third of that figure killed or
missing. For their part, the Germans suffered up to 53,000 casualties.
Statistics like these are difficult to relate to. In this instance the
combined figure would fill a national sports stadium - just one sheaf of
the terrible human harvest reaped by that deplorable war. By studying
military history we honour the myriad endeavours and sacrifices that
captivate us. Nonetheless, the wretched fate of so many young men must
always be borne in mind. One should not allow the tranquil sense of
order at those cemeteries to belie the sordid manner of their passing.
93
FURTHER READING
Primary sources
Cambrai enjoys a wealth of source material, most of it held at the

National Archives (Public Records Office) at Kew in London. Its
collection of War Office files contains copies of all the operations
orders, post-operation reports and war diaries from Third Army down to
each battalion. It also holds copies of the War Cabinet commissioned
official enquiry. Details of how to access this material are found on the
website www.nationalarchives.gov.uk.
The Tank Museum Library at Bovington holds copies of Tank Corps
unit war diaries and operations orders. You will also discover a
miscellany of personal letters, journals, maps and sketches to embellish
official documents. Amongst them is Elles' original Special Order
Number 6. A limited selection of translated German primary source
material complements the collection. Log onto www.tankmuseum.co.uk
and follow the links to 'Library'. Imperial War Museum London
(www.iwm.org.uk) is best on trench maps but the Tank Museum Library
does have a few documents of interest.
Aside from the material at the Tank Museum, German primary
sources are extremely difficult to find. Allied bombing in World War II
destroyed the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam. Bavarian sources survived by
virtue of being held in Munich but very few Bavarian units served
at Cambrai.
Secondary sources
The official histories relating to Cambrai are as follows:
Britain Miles, Captain Wilfred, History of the Great War - Military Operations France and
Belgium 191 7 - The Battle of Cambrai London, 1948
Germany Struss, Hauptman Dr Georg, Die Tankschlacht bei Cambrai 1917 Berlin, 1929
The following selection of books offers an informative examination of the battle itself:
Cooper, Bryan, The Ironclads of Cambrai Cassell: London 1967
Gibot, Jean-Luc, and Gorcynski, Philippe, Following the Tanks Cambrai Arras, 1999
Horsfall, Jack, and Cave, Nigel, Cambrai - The Right Hook Leo Cooper: London, 1999
Horsfall, Jack, and Cave, Nigel, Cambrai - Bourlon Wood Leo Cooper: London, 2002
Moore, William, A Wood Called Bour/on: The Cover-Up After Cambrai 1917 Leo Cooper:
London, 1988
Smithers, A. J., Cambrai - The First Great Tank Battle 191 7 Leo Cooper: London, 1992
For a broader perspective on related topics:
Fletcher, David, The British Tanks 1915-19 The Crowood Press: Marlborough, 2001
Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western Front Yale University Press: London, 1994
Holmes, Richard, Tommy Harper Collins: London, 2004
Junger, Ernst, Storm of Steel Penguin: Harmondsworth, 2004
Keegan, John, The First World War Alfred A. Knopf: London, 2000
Williams, Jeffery, Byng of Vimy Leo Cooper: London, 1982
94
Cambrai
1917
Accounts of history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command

strategies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing
forces throughout the crucial stages of each campaign
The birth of armoured

warfare
The battle of Cambrai saw the
first use of armoured vehicles
in the role for which they had
been conceived - operational
shock action. In November
1917, the British Third Army
massed sufficiently large
numbers of tanks to overwhelm
3-dimensional 'bird's-eye view' maps
the German lines across a

broad front. The use of silent
Full colour battlescenes
registration of artillery and

employment of aircraft in the
close air support role ushered
in a new age of warfare and
modern combined arms
techniques. Although the
battle ended in a stalemate,
the lessons learned helped
develop the tactics that would
be used so successfully to win
Photographs
the war in 1918.
Maps
US $18.95 / $24.95 CAN

IS B N 978-1-84603-147-2
5 1 895
OSPREY
PUBLISHING
www.ospreypublishing.com
781846 031472

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Cambrai 1917

The birth of armoured warfare

PETER DENNIS was

Alexander Turner Illustrated by Peter Dennis

First published in Great Britain in 2007 by Osprey Publishing,

2007 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

FOR A CATALOGUE OF ALL BOOKS PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY AND

In describing military formations the text of this narrative conforms

Imperial War Museum Collections

F. H. Jackson) stuck on Hindenburg Support Line west of Ribecourt

Air defence artillery

Key to unit identification

Peter Dennis, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT

The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence

Origins of the campaign

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 35

Recrimination Elusive exploitation The birth of armoured warfare

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 92

British front line

Eventual consolidated line

Exploitation route for cavalry corps

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

The bloody morass of Flanders

This aerial photograph illustrates

'an adjunct to infantry attack'. Unfortunately for its advocates, this

Sourlon Village viewed from

Coincidentally, the lobbying effort was assisted by yet another

General the Honourable Sir Julian Byng

General Sir Julian Byng. He was

It is no coincidence that an operation as seminal as Cambrai had Byng

A Royal Engineer by background, Elles was one of many 'Sappers' to be

Kronprinz Rupprecht of Bavaria.

General von der Marwitz

Byng's counterpart at Cambrai was General Johannes von der Marwitz,

General von der Marwitz,

flame-thrower. The essence of

German Siegfried Stellung

were formed to spread best practice. Officers and non-commissioned

In defence, the regiment was given a portion of the division's

By late 1917, British artillery

Indeed, modern artillery owes much to that frenetic period of

This fearsome wire entanglement

Originally, this reflected a shortage of 6-pdrs but Females proved their

The Tank Corps soon generated

communication was impossible except by hand signal. Lacking any

Note: Vital as they were, space precludes detailing formation

87th Infantry Brigade - Brig. Gen. C. H. T. Lucas

THIRD ARMY - Gen. Hon Sir J. H. G. Byng

36th (Ulster) Division - Maj. Gen. O. S. W. Nugent

29th Division - Maj. Gen. Sir H. de Beauvoir de Lisle

1st Cavalry Division - Maj. Gen. R. L. Mullens

2nd Cavalry Brigade - Brig. Gen. D. J. E. Beale-Brown

Units in action from 23 November:

18th Battalion London Regiment (London Irish Rifles)

55th (West Lancashire) Division - Maj. Gen. H. S. Jeudwine

XIII CORPS - Gruppe Caudry - Gen.Lt. von Watter

Gen.Maj. von Hanstein

54th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. von Watter

107th Infantry Division - Gen.Maj. Havenstein