The Supreme Court ruled that Sicam was jointly liable with Agencia for the loss of jewelry pawned by Lulu Jorge. While Agencia was incorporated, evidence showed Sicam owned the pawnshop and all receipts bore Sicam's name, so the court pierced the corporate veil to find Sicam liable. The court also found the robbery was not a fortuitous event absolving Sicam of liability, as Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the pawnshop, leaving the vault unprotected. Sicam admitted the vault was open at the time of the robbery, proving negligence, and robbery was already common so could have been foreseen and prevented through proper security measures.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sicam was jointly liable with Agencia for the loss of jewelry pawned by Lulu Jorge. While Agencia was incorporated, evidence showed Sicam owned the pawnshop and all receipts bore Sicam's name, so the court pierced the corporate veil to find Sicam liable. The court also found the robbery was not a fortuitous event absolving Sicam of liability, as Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the pawnshop, leaving the vault unprotected. Sicam admitted the vault was open at the time of the robbery, proving negligence, and robbery was already common so could have been foreseen and prevented through proper security measures.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sicam was jointly liable with Agencia for the loss of jewelry pawned by Lulu Jorge. While Agencia was incorporated, evidence showed Sicam owned the pawnshop and all receipts bore Sicam's name, so the court pierced the corporate veil to find Sicam liable. The court also found the robbery was not a fortuitous event absolving Sicam of liability, as Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the pawnshop, leaving the vault unprotected. Sicam admitted the vault was open at the time of the robbery, proving negligence, and robbery was already common so could have been foreseen and prevented through proper security measures.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sicam was jointly liable with Agencia for the loss of jewelry pawned by Lulu Jorge. While Agencia was incorporated, evidence showed Sicam owned the pawnshop and all receipts bore Sicam's name, so the court pierced the corporate veil to find Sicam liable. The court also found the robbery was not a fortuitous event absolving Sicam of liability, as Sicam failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the pawnshop, leaving the vault unprotected. Sicam admitted the vault was open at the time of the robbery, proving negligence, and robbery was already common so could have been foreseen and prevented through proper security measures.
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1/ 2
Sicam v. Jorge, G.R. No.
159617, August 8, 2007
Facts: From September to October 1987, Lulu Jorge, respondent, pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam, to secure a loan in the amount of 59,500. On October 19, 1987, the pawnshop was robbed, and whatever cash and jewelry inside the vault were taken away. Petitioner Sicam sent a letter to Lulu informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery incident. On November 2, 1987, Lulu wrote a letter stating that all jewelry were deposited with Far East Bank when the robbery occured. Lulu, also, requested that the jewelry be returned, but Sicam failed to return the jewelry. Lulu filed a complaint against Sicam with the Regional Trial Court. Issue: Whether or not Sicam is jointly and severally liable with Agencia, for the loss of the pawned items in their possession? Held: Yes. The Court Ruled that CA correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction and adjudged the Sicam liable together with the corporation. The rule is that the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced when made as a shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues. Evidence showed that at the time when Lulu pawned her jewelry, the pawnshop was owned by Sicam. All the pawnshop receipts issued to Lulu, all bear the words "Agencia de R. C. Sicam," despite that pawnshop being incorporated. As to the second issue, Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. No sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that there was any security guard at all.
Sicams admission that the vault was open at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop was open, the combination was already off. Instead of taking the precaution to protect them, they let open the vault, providing no difficulty for the robbers to cart away the pawned articles. In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their pawnshop as earlier discussed.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987 Constantino C. ACAIN, Petitioner, Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court (Third Special Cases Division), Virginia A. Fernandez and Rosa DIONGSON, Respondents
