PNB Vs Manila Surety
PNB Vs Manila Surety
PNB Vs Manila Surety
L-20567
November 18, 1948, P106,382.01. Thereafter, for unexplained reasons, the Bank ceased to
collect, until in 1952 its investigators found that more moneys were payable to ATACO from the
Public Works office, because the latter had allowed mother creditor to collect funds due to
ATACO under the same purchase order to a total of P311,230.41.
Its demands on the principal debtor and the Surety having been refused, the Bank sued both in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover the balance of P158,563.18 as of February 15,
1950, plus interests and costs.
On October 4, 1958, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants, Adams & Taguba Corporation and Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc., to pay plaintiff, Philippines National Bank, the sum of P174,462.34 as of February
24, 1956, minus the amount of P8,000 which defendant, Manila Surety Co., Inc. paid
from March, 1956 to October, 1956 with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from
February 25, 1956, until fully paid provided that the total amount that should be paid by
defendant Manila Surety Co., Inc., on account of this case shall not exceed P75,000.00,
and to pay the costs;
2. Orderinq cross-defendant, Adams & Taguba Corporation, and third-party defendant,
Pedro A. Taguba, jointly and severally, to pay cross and third-party plaintiff, Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., whatever amount the latter has paid or shall pay under this
judgment;
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as the claim for 17% special tax is concerned; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendants Adams & Taguba Corporation and Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
From said decision, only the defendant Surety Company has duly perfected its appeal. The
Central Bank of the Philippines did not appeal, while defendant ATACO failed to perfect its
appeal.
The Bank recoursed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered an adverse decision and modified
the judgment of the court of origin as to the surety's liability. Its motions for reconsideration
having proved unavailing, the Bank appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals found the Bank to have been negligent in having stopped collecting from
the Bureau of Public Works the moneys falling due in favor of the principal debtor, ATACO, from
and after November 18, 1948, before the debt was fully collected, thereby allowing such funds
to be taken and exhausted by other creditors to the prejudice of the surety, and held that the
Bank's negligence resulted in exoneration of respondent Manila Surety & Fidelity Company.
This holding is now assailed by the Bank. It contends the power of attorney obtained from
ATACO was merely in additional security in its favor, and that it was the duty of the surety, and
not that of the creditor, owed see to it that the obligor fulfills his obligation, and that the creditor
owed the surety no duty of active diligence to collect any, sum from the principal debtor,
citing Judge Advocate General vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-10671, October 23, 1958.
This argument of appellant Bank misses the point. The Court of Appeals did not hold the Bank
answerable for negligence in failing to collect from the principal debtor but for its neglect in
collecting the sums due to the debtor from the Bureau of Public Works, contrary to its duty as
holder of an exclusive and irrevocable power of attorney to make such collections, since an
agent is required to act with the care of a good father of a family (Civ. Code, Art. 1887) and
becomes liable for the damages which the principal may suffer through his non-performance
(Civ. Code, Art. 1884). Certainly, the Bank could not expect that the Bank would diligently
perform its duty under its power of attorney, but because they could not have collected from the
Bureau even if they had attempted to do so. It must not be forgotten that the Bank's power to
collect was expressly made irrevocable, so that the Bureau of Public Works could very well
refuse to make payments to the principal debtor itself, and a fortiori reject any demands by the
surety.
Even if the assignment with power of attorney from the principal debtor were considered as
mere additional security still, by allowing the assigned funds to be exhausted without notifying
the surety, the Bank deprived the former of any possibility of recoursing against that security.
The Bank thereby exonerated the surety, pursuant to Article 2080 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2080. The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their
obligation whenever by come act of the creditor they cannot be subrogated to the rights,
mortgages and preferences of the latter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellant points out to its letter of demand, Exhibit "K", addressed to the Bureau of Public
Works, on May 5, 1949, and its letter to ATACO, Exhibit "G", informing the debtor that as of its
date, October 31, 1949, its outstanding balance was P156,374.83. Said Exhibit "G" has no
bearing on the issue whether the Bank has exercised due diligence in collecting from the
Bureau of Public Works, since the letter was addressed to ATACO, and the funds were to come
from elsewhere. As to the letter of demand on the Public Works office, it does not appear that
any reply thereto was made; nor that the demand was pressed, nor that the debtor or the surety
were ever apprised that payment was not being made. The fact remains that because of the
Bank's inactivity the other creditors were enabled to collect P173,870.31, when the balance due
to appellant Bank was only P158,563.18. The finding of negligence made by the Court of
Appeals is thus not only conclusive on us but fully supported by the evidence.
Even if the Court of Appeals erred on the second reason it advanced in support of the decision
now under appeal, because the rules on application of payments, giving preference to secured
obligations are only operative in cases where there are several distinct debts, and not where
there is only one that is partially secured, the error is of no importance, since the principal
reason based on the Bank's negligence furnishes adequate support to the decision of the Court
of Appeals that the surety was thereby released.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs against appellant Philippine
National Bank.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Barerra, JJ., took no part.