Carroll v. United States: Held
Carroll v. United States: Held
Carroll v. United States: Held
United States
Held:
1. The legislative history of 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act,
November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 223, which makes it a misdemeanor for any
officer of the United States to search a private dwelling without a search warrant or to
search any other building or property without a search warrant, maliciously and
without reasonable cause, shows clearly the intent of Congress to make a distinction
as to the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in
the searching of automobiles or other road vehicles, in the enforcement of the
Prohibition Act.
(a) That the primary purpose is the seizure and destruction of the contraband liquor,
and the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and arrest of the transporter are merely
incidental.
(b) Hence, the right to search an automobile for illicit liquor and to seize the liquor, if
found, and thereupon to seize the vehicle also and to arrest the offender, does not
depend upon the right to arrest the offender in the first instance, and therefore it is not
determined by the degree of his offence -- whether a misdemeanor under 29, Title II
of the Act, because of being his first or second offence, or a felony because it is his
third, and the rule allowing arrest without warrant for misdemeanor only when the
offence is committed in the officer's presence, but for a felony when the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, is not
the test of the validity of such search and seizure.
(c) The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the vehicle, has
reasonable or probable cause for believing that contraband liquor is being illegally
transported in it.
(d) The language of 26 -- when an officer shall "discover " any person in the act of
transporting, etc. -- does not limit him to what he learns of the contents of a passing
automobile by the use of his senses at the time.
(e) The section thus construed is consistent with the Fourth Amendment..
6. Probable cause held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a highway
much used in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an automobile
upon the faith of information previously obtained by them that the car and its
occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal business of
"bootlegging."
7. When contraband liquor, seized from an automobile and used in the conviction of
those in charge of the transportation, was shown at the trial to have been taken in a
search justified by probable cause, held that the Court's refusal to return he liquor on
defendants' motion before trial, even if erroneous because probable cause was not
then proven, was not a substantial reason for . reversing the conviction.
8. The Court notices judicially that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and
that Detroit, and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the international
boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country
spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. Affirmed.
This is a writ of error to the District Court under Section 238 of the Judicial Code. The
plaintiffs in error, hereafter to be called the defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro,
were indicted and convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous
liquor, to-wit: 68 quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. The ground on which they assail the conviction is that the trial
court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles, one of whiskey and one of gin, found
by searching the automobile. It is contended that the search and seizure were in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence
was not proper. Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the
liquor seized be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This
motion was denied.
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal
prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car
was going westward on the highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16
miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as
follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand
Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two
defendants,
Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the
Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey.
The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end
of Grand Rapids to get the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters
of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they
could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would
deliver it the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an
Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified, a did Scully.
The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no
explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real
character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first
name when arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were
engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for
violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On
the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same
Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand
Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had
passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see
where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to
Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some two months later,
Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer,
were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll
met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to
Grand Rapids. The government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to
a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and
searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which
had been removed, 68 bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be
certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch whiskeys, and
the rest that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness
was called to prove the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be
whiskey and gin. When the defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett,
"Take the liquor and give us one more chance and I will make it right with you," and he
pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for $10. Peterson and another took the two
defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids, while Cronenwett, Thayer and
Scully remained on the road looking for other cars of whose coming they had
information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be coming
through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they
believed they were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest.
PAPA v. MAGO
Original action in the SC for prohibition and certiorari, praying for the annulment of the
order issued by respondent judge
Parties:
Petitioners:
Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of
Customs), Pedro Pacis (Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao
(Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of the Manila Police Department)
Respondents:
Remedios Mago
Hilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)
J. Zaldivar
November 4, 1966 having received information the day before that a certain
shipment of misdeclared and undervalued personal effects would be released from the
customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau
of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks allegedly carrying the goods. When
the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted
them in Ermita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were seized on
identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted
by the Collector of Customs
(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding
duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and
were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE (theres another involving illegal search and seizure): WON the
judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO. Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, to
(1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues,
fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws
(2) prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not
been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the
port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as
shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory,
shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid
the payment of duties thereon. (e.g. 40 pieces of ladies sweaters assessed in the
Statement when there actually 42 dozen; 100 watch bands were assessed but 2,209
dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The Court had held before (and did again in this case) that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out
of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4,
1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders
of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles
upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to
be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs
at the time the petition for mandamus was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore,
could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure
and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in De Joya v. Lantin: The owner of seized goods may
set up defenses before the Commissioner of Customs during the proceedings
following seizure. From his decision appeal may be made to the Court of Tax Appeals.
To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods
would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff
and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive
appellate jurisdictions. Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the
Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not
to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance
should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for
the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the
Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First
Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Ratio: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not
fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1
The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized
for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly
difficult for want of a specific description of the place, things, and persons to be
searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still,
however, there must be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search.
One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at
checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against
unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a
routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe that
either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged
down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leaves does not
constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was
no tip or confidential information that could have backed up their search, as
jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become sufficient to
constitute probable cause.
2
It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was
underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere
seizure without further search.
Consented search
At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking
that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
Asuncion vs. CA
Following reports from a confidential informer, the Chief of the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol at Barangay Taong with specific
instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a
certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. While patrolling at midnight of December 6,
1993, along Leoo Street, the informant pointed a gray Nissan car and told the
policemen that the occupant thereof had shabu in his possession. They immediately
flagged down the car and the driver turned out to be herein petitioner known as Vic
Vargas in the movies. A consented search in his vehicle was conducted which yielded
a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be shabu. Another plastic
packet containing the same type of substances suspected to be shabu was taken from
his underwear when he was frisked at the police headquarters. When charged, the
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of regulated drugs
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act , R.A. 642. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts ruling. On petition for review before the Supreme Court, petitioner
questions the constitutionality of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence
against him.
The Supreme Court held that the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly
bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle
-petitioners vehicle was flagged down by the apprehending officers upon
identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the
petitioners automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate
action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue
of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said
search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL. NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO
ARCA, and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY,
FACTS:
- Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing
vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus
respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.
- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony
Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats
were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
The Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and
therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the
vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine
Navy to take the boats in custody. Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ
upon the filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two
vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ
Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge
Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction there under issued.
ISSUE: WON a police officer can search without warrant
HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for
violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant
could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with
powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard.
Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without
a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed
an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention
during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in
flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their
pcs. of luggage were retrieved. They requested from the suspects permission to
search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag of Peter.
During the investigation, a total of 56 paper tea bags with white crystalline powder
were found and tested and was found out that it was metamphetamine.
She also reported the make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded.
Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to the Philippine
Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Pat. Kimay, who must have
intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also reported that the taxicab described
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure made against is illegal
by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt. Obrera instructed him to move out
and proceed to the Police Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military
Academy. From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera
that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for Manila.
Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the report. There, he went
up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw Balingan on the third or fourth seat
behind the driver's seat. In the luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage
earlier described by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the
Lakandula burned area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 a.m., the bus
moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay,
who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong
HELD: The search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant, is not an
absolute rule. There are at least 3 well-recognized exceptions: [1] a search incidental
to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view.
The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as
regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the
search on appellant and his co-accused. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought."
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the
trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would
attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based
on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. . The discharge of accused
Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part: Sec.
9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case,the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state.
People vs. Balingan [GR 105834, 13 February 1995]
Facts:
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police
Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the
information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to Manila with a bag filled with
marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera
formed a surveillance team to monitor Balingan's movements. The team as deployed
at different places in Baguio City, including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus
stations. Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at
Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street.
Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage with orange or yellow
belts.
tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the
bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt. Obrera and
Pat. Ong arrived at the Checkpoint less than a minute after the bus did and
immediately boarded it. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong
identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her
luggage, she did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the
luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found suspected
marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera. Thereupon,
Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and
furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Lt. Obrera asked Pat. Ong to
fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper, so that she
would be the one to bring out Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained
inside the bus holding the confiscated luggage while the other passengers
alighted from the bus. After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out
of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in
jail. On 24 October 1988, Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989,
Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. Balingan appealed.
Issue: Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police
surveillance pursuant to an informants tip, is valid.
the area except on mercy missions to transport sick soldiers and workers to the
hospital and when used to buy food supplies for the men inside the camp.[3]
Held: The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules
governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
Private respondents then filed a complaint [4] for injuction and damages, with an
application for temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial court, Branch 8, of
Baguio and Benguet. They alleged that the truck had been seized without prior
investigation to determine the existence of probable cause .
Held: The evidence was not obtained in violation of the provision of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor did its use violate the
privilege of the accused against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
Police went to petitioner's home on January 28, 1964, to question him about a murder.
In the course of their inquiry, he showed them three guns, and he agreed to take a lie
detector test on February 2. The test was inconclusive on the murder, but, during its
course, petitioner admitted a theft. In petitioner's absence, two other policemen came
to the house and questioned petitioner's wife to check petitioner's story and
corroborate his admission of the theft. Unaware of the visit of the other officers who
had been shown the guns and knowing little about the murder weapon, the police
asked about any guns there might be in the house, and were shown four by
petitioner's wife which she offered to let them take. After one policeman first declined
the offer, they took the guns, along with various articles of petitioner's clothing his wife
made available to them. On February 19, petitioner was arrested in his house for the
murder, and, on that date, a warrant to search petitioner's automobile was applied for
by the police chief and issued by the Attorney General (who had assumed charge of
the investigation and was later the chief prosecutor at the trial), acting as a justice of
the peace. The car, which, at the time of the arrest, was parked in petitioner's
driveway, was subsequently towed to the police station, where, on February 21 and on
two occasions the next year, it was searched. Vacuum sweepings from the car as well
as from the clothing were used as evidence at the trial, along with one of the guns
made available by petitioner's wife. Following the overruling of pretrial motions to
suppress that evidence, petitioner was convicted, and the State Supreme Court
affirmed.
Syllabus
Held:
1. The warrant for the search and seizure of petitioner's automobile did not satisfy the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth, because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate."
2. The basic constitutional rule is that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and well
defined exceptions," and, on the facts of this case, a warrantless search and seizure
of the car cannot be justified under those exceptions.
(a) The seizure of the car in the driveway cannot be justified as incidental to the arrest,
which took place inside the house. Even assuming, arguendo, that the police could
properly have made a warrantless search of the car in the driveway when they
arrested petitioner, they could not have done so at their leisure after its removal.
(b) Under the circumstances present here -- where the police for some time had
known of the probable role of the car in the crime, petitioner had had ample
opportunity to destroy incriminating evidence, the house was guarded at the time of
arrest and petitioner had no access to the car -- there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless search even had it been made before the car was taken to
the police station, and the special exceptions for automobile searches in Carroll v.
United States and Chambers v. Maroney are clearly inapplicable.
(c) Under certain circumstances, the police may, without a warrant seize, evidence in
"plain view," though not for that reason alone, and only when the discovery of the
evidence is inadvertent. That exception is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case,
where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant, knew in advance the
car's description and location, intended to seize it when they entered on petitioner's
property, and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved.
3. No search and seizure were implicated in the February 2 visit when the police
obtained the guns and clothing from petitioner's wife, and hence they needed no
warrant. The police, who exerted no effort to coerce or dominate her, were not
obligated to refuse her offer for them to take the guns, and, in making these and the
other items available to the police, she was not acting as the instrument or agent of
the police. Reversed and remanded.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU
FACTS: Mari Musa was found guilty of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 41
PEOPLE vs. FLORENCIO DORIA and VIOLETA GADDAO
Facts:
Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest was valid. (Valid, as regards Dorias arrest.)
Decision: Florencio Doria was convicted and Violeta Gaddao was aquitted.
RD:
The warrantless arrest of Doria is lawful since he was caught in the act of
committing an offense. A person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
The warrantless search and arrest of Gaddao is unlawful. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime; in fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could her arrest be justified under "Personal knowledge" of facts because it
must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested.
Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as
the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs.
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa
Facts:
An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs
were being conducted at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela
Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas
immediately proceed to the said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped
through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking suspected marijuana.
They enter the house and introduce themselves as police officers and confiscated the
tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested the
two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by the NBI, the tea
bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes were
charged with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged.
Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She
insists that the trial court should not regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible
because he does not have personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest
and search making his testimony a hearsay.
Issue:
emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the
Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing
Martis packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks)
dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box
and of the contents thereof, after signing a Receipt acknowledging custody of the
said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch
as the latters stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti
appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accuseds
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having
come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the
accuseds rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties.
Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of
P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing 30 days work; for a total of
P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to
set it aside. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolicos dismissal from her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of
the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Waterous act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers
is contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a persons
right to privacy of communication.
Held: In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person
from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of
communication, and Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its
regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample
opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation. Although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she
was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors
memorandum spoke of evidence in [Waterous] possession, which were not,
however, submitted. What the evidence other than the sales invoice and the check
were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolicos dismissal then was grounded on mere
team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were
afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence,
at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio
Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and
elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the
Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and
"molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a
C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then
present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found.
As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by
the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the
courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner
of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy"
therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide
(Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de
Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise
stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9
December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de
Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him
to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue:
Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of
the December 1989 coup detat.
Held:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior
to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to
break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this
case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for
and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that
on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.