Yasay v. Recto
Yasay v. Recto
Yasay v. Recto
ISSUE: W/N contempt is criminal in character and their exoneration from a charge of contempt amounts
to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie
HELD: YES
In this case, the contempt is not civil in nature, but criminal, imposed to vindicate the dignity
and power of the Commission; hence, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie
from the order of dismissal of, or an exoneration from, a charge of contempt."
We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal
offense. The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an
appeal would not lie.
A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt.
Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a
party.
A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court.
"Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they
are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a
person to do the thing required." "In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an
aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected."
If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given
contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the
principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor.
"The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or
by the dominant purpose.
The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment,
and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial."
"But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal, for
instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining
the character of punishment to be administered."
At any rate, the SEC order directing respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in
contempt was highly improper. The Court of Appeals issued on July 8, 1996, a temporary
restraining order against the order of the SEC of June 28, 1996 directing the Interport Resources
Corporation to desist from holding the stockholders' meeting on July 9, 1996. The Court of Appeals
enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled stockholders' meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of
the SEC. More, the Court of Appeals in its final decision nullified the SEC's order. Hence, there was
no willful disobedience to a lawful order of the SEC. Respondents were not guilty of contempt.
While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to
punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of
contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal,
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that
they exercise.
Finally, the penalty imposed exceeded those authorized in the powers of the SEC in relation to the
1964 Revised Rules of Court as amended. If the contempt was committed against a superior court or
judge, the accused may be fined not exceeding thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) or imprisoned not
more than six (6) months, or both. The SEC suspended respondent Manalaysay from the practice of
law in the SEC, a power vested exclusively in the Supreme Court.