ORDER Enjoining Davis
ORDER Enjoining Davis
ORDER Enjoining Davis
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Ex p a r t e S t a t e o f Alabama ex r e l . Alabama P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e ,
Alabama C i t i z e n s A c t i o n Program, and John E. E n s l e n , i n h i s
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y as Judge o f Probate f o r Elmore County.
ORDER
I n an o p i n i o n i s s u e d on March 3, 2015, t h i s Court o r d e r e d
Judge Don D a v i s , t h e Probate Judge f o r M o b i l e County,
"to a d v i s e t h i s C o u r t , by l e t t e r b r i e f , no l a t e r
than 5:00 p.m. on Thursday, March 5, 2015, as t o
whether he i s bound by any e x i s t i n g f e d e r a l c o u r t
o r d e r r e g a r d i n g t h e i s s u a n c e o f any m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e
o t h e r t h a n t h e f o u r m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e s he was o r d e r e d
t o i s s u e i n S t r a w s e r [v. Strange { C i v i l A c t i o n No.
14-0424-CG-C, J a n . 26, 2015) ] . [^] "
On March 5, Judge D a v i s
filed
a mot i o n
s e e k i n g an 11-day
i n which he a s s e r t s t h a t he s h o u l d not be
the f e d e r a l
district
^The d e c i s i o n o f t h e f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n S t r a w s e r
was premised on i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n i n S e a r c y v. Strange.
[ C i v i l A c t i o n No. 14-0208-CG-N, Jan. 23, 2015]
F. Supp. 3d
(S.D. A l a . 2015).
1140460
c o u r t o r d e r p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d i n Strawser.^
Judge
Davis's
concern
t o be w i t h o u t
Because we f i n d
merit,
and f o r t h e
to this
We f a i l
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an o r d e r i n any case o t h e r than S t r a w s e r v. Strange
(Civil
Strawser
order
says.
As
t o the l a t t e r ,
t h e t a s k of
a l s o notes
t h a t he has asked
the f e d e r a l
The
f a c t o f t h i s r e q u e s t o f f e r s no b a s i s f o r d e l a y h e r e ; indeed,
the p r o s p e c t of such a s t a y by the f e d e r a l c o u r t i s c o m p a t i b l e
w i t h the a c t i o n of t h i s Court.
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Our
o p i n i o n of
March
serves
as
binding
statewide
precedent.
To ensure compliance w i t h t h a t p r e c e d e n t , we
entered
t h a t date
on
specifically
and
as p a r t of our
d i r e c t i n g Alabama p r o b a t e
o p i n i o n an
judges
marriage l i c e n s e s c o n t r a r y t o t h a t p r e c e d e n t .
no showing t h a t he was,
entered
federal
Strawser,
and
not
also
order
to issue
D a v i s has made
o r i s , the s u b j e c t of any p r e v i o u s l y
he makes no
than
the
one
issued i n
showing t h a t t h a t o r d e r has
any
c o n t i n u i n g , b i n d i n g e f f e c t on him as t o any m a r r i a g e - l i c e n s e
a p p l i c a n t s beyond the f o u r c o u p l e s who were the p l a i n t i f f s i n
that
case
requested.
any
other
and
who
a l r e a d y have
The i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y
couple
r e c e i v e d the
relief
they
of the f e d e r a l c o u r t o r d e r t o
i s evident
from
the
terms
of
the
order
itself:
"Probate Judge Don D a v i s i s hereby ENJOINED from
r e f u s i n g to i s s u e marriage l i c e n s e s t o p l a i n t i f f s
due t o the Alabama laws which p r o h i b i t same-sex
marriage.
I f P l a i n t i f f s take a l l steps that are
r e q u i r e d i n the normal c o u r s e o f b u s i n e s s as a
p r e r e q u i s i t e to i s s u i n g a marriage
license
to
o p p o s i t e - s e x c o u p l e s . Judge D a v i s may not deny them
a l i c e n s e on the ground t h a t P l a i n t i f f s c o n s t i t u t e
same-sex c o u p l e s o r because i t i s p r o h i b i t e d by the
S a n c t i t y of M a r r i a g e Amendment[, A l a . Const. 1901,
36.03,] and the Alabama M a r r i a g e P r o t e c t i o n A c t [ ,
A l a . Code 1975, 30-1-19,] o r by any o t h e r Alabama
law o r Order p e r t a i n i n g t o same-sex m a r r i a g e . "
1140460
{Capitalization i n original;
emphasis added.)
otherwise,
accordance
with
we
are l e f t
i t s plain
r e l i e f a g a i n s t Judge D a v i s
Strawser.
I n t h e absence o f a
t o read
meaning:
this
I t grants
language i n
inj unctive
Our r e a d i n g o f t h i s p l a i n language i s c o n f i r m e d by
the f a c t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s i n S t r a w s e r sought r e l i e f o n l y on
t h e i r own b e h a l f , n o t on b e h a l f o f any o t h e r s , and by t h e f a c t
that f e d e r a l j u r i s p r u d e n c e contemplates t h a t a f e d e r a l
decides
o n l y t h e case b e f o r e
Alabama P o l i c y
Institute.
So. 3d
(Part II.C.)
court
i t , see Ex p a r t e S t a t e ex r e l .
^As we n o t e d i n P a r t I I . C , "'"[a] d e c i s i o n of a f e d e r a l
d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge i s n o t b i n d i n g p r e c e d e n t i n e i t h e r a
d i f f e r e n t j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , t h e same j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t , o r
even upon t h e same judge i n a d i f f e r e n t case, " ' "
So. 3d a t
( q u o t i n g Camreta v. Greene,
U.S.
,
n.7, 131 S.
Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011), q u o t i n g i n t u r n 18 J . Moore e t a l . ,
Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 134.02 [1] [d] , pp. 134-26 (3d ed.
2011)), much l e s s upon a defendant sued by new p l a i n t i f f s i n
a d i f f e r e n t case. The p r i n c i p l e quoted above from the U n i t e d
S t a t e s Supreme Court d e c i s i o n i n Camreta was m a n i f e s t l y
r e f l e c t e d i n o r d e r s e n t e r e d on t h i s date by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s
D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e M i d d l e D i s t r i c t of Alabama, i n which
t h a t c o u r t chose t o s t a y i t s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a case s i m i l a r
to Strawser and s t a t e d t h a t " [t] h i s c o u r t i s n o t bound by
Searcy."
Hard v. B e n t l e y
(Case No. 2:13-cv-00922-WKW;
5
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p a r t i e s b e f o r e them o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o the o t h e r p a r t i e s i n
the
case/
Notwithstanding
enj o i n e d by
the
plain
d e s c r i p t i o n of
the
activity
f e d e r a l court
order
the
Strawser
following
case,
language
Judge
Davis
somehow was
questions
intended
to
whether
e n j o i n him
r e l a t i o n t o p e r s o n s o t h e r t h a n the f o u r c o u p l e s who
o b t a i n e d a judgment a g a i n s t him
{M.D.
sued
the
in
and
Ala.}.
1140460
"This i n j u n c t i o n b i n d s Judge Don D a v i s and a l l h i s
o f f i c e r s , agents, s e r v a n t s and employees, and o t h e r s
i n a c t i v e c o n c e r t o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h any of them,
who would seek t o e n f o r c e the m a r r i a g e laws of
Alabama which p r o h i b i t o r f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e same-sex
marriage."
The
apparent
c l a r i f y who
purpose
of
this
latter
passage
was
to
a c t i o n t h a t o r d e r r e q u i r e s of those persons.
The q u e s t i o n of
previous
to i s s u e marriage l i c e n s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y
plaintiffs."
The
"to
subsequent r e f e r e n c e t o p e r s o n s who
[the]
"would
employees, e t c . , t o the
extent
"to
[the] p l a i n t i f f s . "
We
are
f u r t h e r confirmed
i n our
in
jurisprudence
adjudicates
notes
and
contemplates
the
5,
that
supra,
a
that
federal
o b l i g a t i o n s , i f any,
of
as
federal
court
district
court
defendant
or
defendants o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o the p l a i n t i f f o r p l a i n t i f f s i n
the case b e f o r e the c o u r t .
Dep't of Defense.
34
F.3d
See a l s o M e i n h o l d v. U n i t e d S t a t e s
1469,
7
1480
(9th C i r . 1994)
("An
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i n j u n c t i o n 'should be no more burdensome t o the defendant than
necessary
to
provide
complete
relief
to
the
plaintiffs.'
61 L. Ed. 2d 176
T h i s i s not a c l a s s a c t i o n ,
Meinhold
(1979) .
...
reinstated.
...
Beyond r e i n s t a t e m e n t
.. . , DOD
and
t o be
s h o u l d not be
c o n s t r a i n e d from a p p l y i n g i t s r e g u l a t i o n s t o M e i n h o l d and a l l
o t h e r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l . " (emphasis a d d e d ) ) ; Zepeda v. U n i t e d
S t a t e s Immicr. & N a t u r a l i z a t i o n Serv. . 753 F.2d
C i r . 1983)
the
rights
Mathis
persons
Indep. Sch.
not
not attempt
before
D i s t . , 491
the
F.2d
719,
to
727
(9th
determine
92,
93
(5th C i r .
v.
1974)
i t s regulation against
reaches
further
than
anyone
is
other
necessary"
than
[the
(emphasis
added)).
As we
a c t e d t o ensure s t a t e w i d e compliance
o r d e r l y and u n i f o r m manner.
has
w i t h Alabama law i n an
We have b e f o r e us i n t h i s case a
1140460
State.
Moreover, as
we
noted
i n the o p i n i o n ,
Alabama's
c o u r t has j u r i s d i c t i o n
over a l l p r o b a t e
enable i t t o address t h a t d i s a r r a y .
judges
to
The i n c l u s i o n o f Judge
D a v i s , a l o n g w i t h a l l the o t h e r p r o b a t e judges i n t h i s S t a t e ,
as a respondent subj e c t t o t h i s C o u r t ' s March 3 o r d e r as t o
future
marriage-license
applicants
is
necessary
and
i s added t o
this
provides
licenses."
that
Judge
Davis
S e c t i o n 30-1-9, A l a . Code
"may"
issue
"marriage
To t h e e x t e n t he e x e r c i s e s t h i s a u t h o r i t y , he must
1140460
Stuart,
P a r k e r , Murdock,
concur.
Shaw, J . , d i s s e n t s .
10
Main,
Wise,
and
Bryan,
1140460
SHAW, J u s t i c e ( d i s s e n t i n g ) .
As e x p l a i n e d
i n my
dissent
Alabama P o l i c y I n s t i t u t e ,
So. 3d
i n Ex p a r t e
State
ex r e l .
has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s case; t h e r e f o r e , I d i s s e n t .
11