14dec Delcoure Dustin

Author(s)
Delcoure, Dustin E.
Title
The smooth operator: understanding cross-cultural interpersonal skills in special

operations
Publisher
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
Issue Date
2014-12
URL
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44548
This document was downloaded on March 13, 2015 at 07:59:56
NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
THE SMOOTH OPERATOR: UNDERSTANDING CROSSCULTURAL INTERPERSONAL SKILLS IN SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
by
Dustin E. Delcoure
December 2014
Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:
Third Reader:
Frank Barrett
George Lober
Anna Simons
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Reissued 24 Feb 2015 to correct graduation date.
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THE SMOOTH OPERATOR: UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CULTURAL
INTERPERSONAL SKILLS IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
6. AUTHOR(S) Dustin E. Delcoure
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Global SOF partnership is a major focus of U.S. Special Operations Command, and the United States
Army Special Operations Command recognizes its force as the best-suited element in the U.S. Army to
operate within the human domain. U.S. Army Special Forces are the militarys experts in unconventional
warfare. Accomplishment of these missions is heavily reliant on success at the cross-cultural, interpersonal
level. Each special operator, regardless of unit, needs to navigate organizational and cultural boundaries
effectively in order to achieve unity of effort and improve chances for mission success. This research
places emphasis on U.S. Army Special Forces specifically, and the USSOCOM force more generally.
Selection and training programs are discussed to illustrate current efforts to develop cross-cultural,
interpersonal skill sets, along with the potential to enhance them. This effort, drawn from interviews,
identifies themes advanced by deployed special operators. The conclusion provides recommendations for
training and sustainment of the requisite cross-cultural interpersonal skills needed for success, with the
intent of enhancing the individual operators ability to excel in complex interpersonal engagements.
14. SUBJECT TERMS cross-cultural interpersonal skills, influence, negotiation, mediation,
15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
psychology of negotiation, cross-cultural negotiation, emotional intelligence, rapport building,
123
Human Domain, Irregular Warfare, Unconventional Warfare, Special Warfare, social
movement theory, Special Operations, assessment and selection, leadership, interagency
16. PRICE CODE
coordination
17. SECURITY
18. SECURITY
19. SECURITY
20. LIMITATION OF
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CLASSIFICATION OF THIS
CLASSIFICATION OF
ABSTRACT
REPORT
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ABSTRACT
Unclassified
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UU
NSN 7540-01-280-5500
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
ii
THE SMOOTH OPERATOR: UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CULTURAL

INTERPERSONAL SKILLS IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Dustin E. Delcoure
Major, United States Army
B.A., Virginia Military Institute, 2002
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2014
Author:
Dustin E. Delcoure
Approved by:
Frank Barrett
Thesis Advisor
George Lober
Second Reader
Anna Simons
Third Reader
John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis
iii
iv
ABSTRACT
Global SOF partnership is a major focus of U.S. Special Operations Command,
and the United States Army Special Operations Command recognizes its force
as the best-suited element in the U.S. Army to operate within the human domain.
U.S. Army Special Forces are the militarys experts in unconventional warfare.
Accomplishment of these missions is heavily reliant on success at the crosscultural, interpersonal level. Each special operator, regardless of unit, needs to
navigate organizational and cultural boundaries effectively in order to achieve
unity of effort and improve chances for mission success.
This research places emphasis on U.S. Army Special Forces specifically,
and the USSOCOM force more generally. Selection and training programs are
discussed to illustrate current efforts to develop cross-cultural, interpersonal skill
sets, along with the potential to enhance them.
This effort, drawn from
interviews, identifies themes advanced by deployed special operators. The

conclusion provides recommendations for training and sustainment of the
requisite cross-cultural interpersonal skills needed for success, with the intent of
enhancing the individual operators ability to excel in complex interpersonal
engagements.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
A.
SUMMARY OF KEY SECTIONS ......................................................... 4
II.
OPERATIONAL UTILITY AND CURRENT TRAINING EFFORTS ................ 7

A.
VALUE OF THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR .............................. 7
1.
Global SOF Partnership .......................................................... 7
2.
Unconventional Warfare.......................................................... 7
3.
Foreign Internal Defense and Other Foreign Training .......... 8
4.
Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action .......................... 9
5.
U.S. Partnership Roles .......................................................... 10
B.
SELECTION, TRAINING, AND SKILLS MAINTENANCE ................. 11
1.
Special Forces Assessment and Selection ......................... 12
2.
Special Forces Qualification Course ................................... 14
a.
SFQC Phase I Review ................................................. 15
b.
SFQC Phase II Review ................................................ 15
c.
SFQC Phase III Review ............................................... 16
d.
SFQC Phase IV Review ............................................... 17
e.
SFQC Phase V Review ................................................ 17
3.
Pre-Mission Training ............................................................. 18
4.
Specialty Schools and Civilian Training .............................. 19
III.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..................................................................... 21
A.
THE CODING PROCESS .................................................................. 25
IV.
UNDERSTANDING SOF INTERPERSONAL ENGAGEMENTS .................. 27

A.
HUMAN BEHAVIORAL TRENDS ...................................................... 27
1.
Theme 1: Genuine Behavior ................................................. 27
2.
Theme 2: Gaining Perspective.............................................. 30
3.
Theme 3: Mutual Assistance................................................. 35
4.
Theme 4: Culturally Aware Behavior ................................... 39
5.
Theme 5: Building Social Capital ......................................... 43
B.
SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS ............................................................... 46
1.
Theme 6: Hanging Out: Informal Learning .......................... 46
2.
Theme 7: Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints ............... 52
3.
Theme 8: Multi-Group Coordination .................................... 54
C.
THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR ............................................... 59
1.
Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process................. 61
2.
Review of Successful Themes Applied to Process ............ 62
V.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 65

A.
SOF OR SF CROSS-CULTURAL INTERPERSONAL SKILLS
COURSE ............................................................................................ 66
B.
SFQC TRAINING ............................................................................... 68
C.
UNIT INTERNAL TRAINING .............................................................. 70
vii
D.
E.
1.
Language Training Options .................................................. 70
2.
Interface with Local Troubled Groups ................................. 71
3.
Land Owners, Businesses, and Government Agencies ..... 72
4.
Business Internships ............................................................ 73
5.
U.S.-Based Foreign Interface ................................................ 74
6.
Conventional Unit Interface .................................................. 74
7.
Voluntary Foreign Aid Missions ........................................... 75
8.
New Context for Formal Unit Functions .............................. 75
UNIT-FUNDED TRAINING ................................................................. 76
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 77
APPENDIX A.
ADDITIONAL CODING DATA ................................................ 79
APPENDIX B.
ADDITIONAL FIGURES .......................................................... 85
APPENDIX C.
RECOMMENDED READING .................................................. 87
APPENDIX D.
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................... 89
A.
RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY: .......................................... 97
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................... 99
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 103
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Special Forces Qualification Course Overview................................... 14

One-on-One Negotiation Chart. .......................................................... 57
Group Negotiation Chart..................................................................... 58
Multiple Simultaneous Negotiations.................................................... 59
Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process Map ......................... 61
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.
Table 3.
Table 4.
Table 5.
Table 7.
Table 8.
Table 9.
Table 10.
Table 11.
Table 12.
Table 13.
Table 14.
Table 15.
Summarized Subject Data .................................................................. 21

Theme Overview ................................................................................ 24
Coding Process Example (Theme 2) .................................................. 26
Story Data Overview........................................................................... 85
Complete Subject Data....................................................................... 86
Recommended Reading ..................................................................... 87
xi
xii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

18A
Special Forces officer
18B
Special Forces weapons NCO
18C
Special Forces engineer NCO
18D
Special Forces medical NCO
18E
Special Forces communications NCO
AOR
area of responsibility
ASOTC
Advanced Special Operations Training Course
ARI
Army Research Institute
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CG
commanding general
CN
counter narcotics
COIN
counterinsurgency
COM
chief of mission
CPT
captain
CT
counterterrorism
CTR
close target reconnaissance
DA
direct action
DEA
Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD
Department of Defense
DOS
Department of State
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID
foreign internal defense
FOB
forward operating base
HN
host nation
IA
interagency
JCET
Joint Combined Exchange for Training
JSOC
Joint Special Operations Command
JSOTF
Joint Special Operations Task Force

xiii
KLE
key leader engagement
LET
live environment training
LTC
lieutenant colonel
MAJ
major
MARSOC
Marine Special Operations Command
MLE
military liaison element
MOS
military occupational specialty
MTT
mobile training team
NCO
noncommissioned officer
NGO
non-governmental organization
NPS
NSW
Naval Special Warfare
ODA
Operational Detachment-Alpha
OCS
Officer Candidate School
PCS
primary change of station
POI
program of instruction
PMT
pre-mission training
ROTC
Reserve Officer Training Corps
SERE
survival, escape, resistance, and evasion
SF
Special Forces
SFAS
Special Forces Assessment and Selection
SFAUC
Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat
SFQC
Special Force Qualification Course
SMT
social movement theory
SOF
Special Operations Forces
SR
special reconnaissance
SWAT
special weapons and tactics
TF
task force
TSA
Transportation Security Administration
TSOC
Theater Special Operations Command

xiv
TQ
tactical questioning
UW
Unconventional Warfare
USG
United States Government
USASFC
United States Army Special Forces Command
USASOC
United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM United Stated Special Operations Command

VSO
Village Stability Operations
xv
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Most importantly, I owe a significant thanks to my beautiful wife, who is a
driven, humble, professional whom instinctively cares for others first. She is a
truly selfless lady and epitomizes the interpersonal skills outlined in this thesis.
I would next like to thank the special operators who shared personal
experiences for this research effort and the teammates, friends, and other SF
NCOs who deserve the reputation for which our organization is known.
I also owe a large debt of thanks to the men of 1st Special Warfare
Training Group (Airborne), the men of 1st Battalion, and most specifically to the
professionals from Special Forces Assessment and Selection.
I would also like to thank Frank Barrett, who sacrificed a great deal of time
to mentor me in the qualitative academic process used in this thesis. He taught
me how to appreciate real-world events at a depth I had not previously
understood. Without Franks tutelage, this project would not have been possible.
I owe a similar thanks to George Lober for his assistance as a mentor,
editor, and sounding board. He is one of very few men who genuinely deserve to
be called a poet, a scholar, and a true gentleman.
I would also like to thank Anna Simons for illustrating how to create an
academic document that resonates with the practitioner. Anna understands the
Special Forces culture more than any other lady, hands down.
I would also like to thank Doowan Lee for his service as a sounding board
and conduit to the USASOC community.
My transcriptionist Laura Hatcher also deserves special thanks. Lauras
accurate, timely, and efficient work was crucial to this project.
Last, Im indebted to my parents for teaching me the importance of these
skills early on by example, and to my Philippine parents for showing me the true
meaning of cross-cultural communication.
xvii
xviii
I.
INTRODUCTION
Special operators are often regarded as the smart, hard-hitting, precision

arm of the U.S. military; they think first, yet deliver a strong punch when
necessity dictates. Over the last ten years, Special Operations Forces (SOF)
teams have proved time and again their tactical superiority and adaptability under
the worst circumstances. There is little doubt these men can shoot, move, and
communicate with a high level of precision. Their skills are constantly enhanced
through never-ending training in shooting, breaching, tactical medicine,
communications, vehicle drills, planning, and the like. Proficiency in these skills is
maintained through assessment events before each deployment.
Intense training cycles are thus both necessary and relevant. However,
they bring to mind a serious question as SOF strives to maintain competent, wellrounded, adequately prepared operators. Are these training iterations satisfactory
in the context of preparing for current and future employment of SOF elements?
This thesis argues that they leave a crucial void in SOFs level of preparedness,
specifically in the realm of human interaction. SOF elements routinely deploy with
a complete array of tactical training, but little-to-no related preparation in the
realm of interpersonal skills and negotiation. For example, this author has spoken
with various Army Special Forces (SF) operators regarding their recent and
concurrent pre-mission training (PMT) for village or district stability operations
(VSO) in Afghanistan. VSO is an assignment quite overtly focused on effectively
influencing host-nation (HN) government, military, and civilian personnel; yet,
after ten years of counterinsurgency (COIN) practice, the common focus of PMT
remains advanced urban combat, tactical medicine, and vehicle operations.
In other words, SOF tends to train the least for what it uses the most. Let
us consider some factors that reinforce the legitimacy of these skills. Currently,
the primary focus for United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
is global SOF partnership. The United States Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC) stands as the lead element in developing an Army
1
warfighting function relevant to the human domain, while also enhancing its
capabilities in the execution of special warfare and the subset of unconventional
warfare (UW). Furthermore, members of the U.S. Army Special Forces
community have a time-tested history as UW practitioners. Special Forces
operators also serve as instructors or advisors who conduct other aspects of
military operations working with and through foreign partners. In this regard,
instead of taking a unilateral American approach, the United States Government
(USG) often employs SOF to work in this inter-cultural realm for a range of
reasons, from political sensitivity to economy of force. As such, the need for
operators to master cross-cultural interpersonal skills is driven by our nations
desire to employ SOF as an indirect approach to achieving national strategic
objectives.
Each of the aforementioned arguments supporting the use of SOF assets
in sensitive cross-cultural and interpersonal missions underscores the necessity
of selecting and training men who can hit with precision and aggression one
minute, yet turn the emotional dial and broker relations with friend or foe in the
next. SOF continually operates in over 70 foreign countries, navigating the
cultural and linguistic mazes associated with managing relations with myriad U.S.
partner organizations from agencies to NGOs. These dynamics illustrate the
value of enhancing SOFs cross-cultural interpersonal and negotiation skills.
These skills equip the SOF operator to more effectively influence others to
achieve his goals, whether those others refer to a partner unit or organization,
an agent at the rental car desk, or a vendor delivering gear or services the team
requires.
Each SF team, MARSOC team, Special Tactics team, or SEAL platoon
will possess a wide range of skills and personalities, with different individuals
best suited to different situations. Likewise, many of SOFs most respected and
combat-accomplished leaders are uncomfortable and/or under-qualified to sit for
tea with a village elder or chat with an ambassador. Most teams know exactly
who those individuals are and tend to steer them away from such engagements.
2
Appropriately designed and implemented training can increase an individuals

skills to a degree that he is capable of maintaining important cross-cultural
relationships for the duration of an assignment requiring interpersonal skills. This
thesis contends that such training is necessary for all special operators.
To demonstrate that a deliberate improvement in interpersonal skills is
worth the effort, the following example is offered from the authors personal
experience as a team leader:
At one point, the authors team was deployed overseas advising
two foreign infantry brigades and provincial police elements in the
conduct of COIN. In that context the team had various support
elements subordinate to the detachment. Operating across a large
area required a good deal of task organization; the NonCommissioned Officers (NCOs) carried the brunt of this workload
and were task-organized to work with U.S. partners and specific
Host Nation elements in executing the plan. In this capacity, one of
the NCOs was supervising a support element in coordinating
certain activities for his sector of the Area of Operations aligned
with a HN infantry battalion. This NCO was one of the most
tactically and technically savvy men on the team and had earned
the respect of the team sergeant and men on a preceding combat
deployment. He fit the SOF profile of an intelligent but aggressive
Soldier, with little patience for those who didnt measure up to his
standards. Within the team he was perceived as exceptionally
abrasive, a distinction he proudly embraced.
One evening when discussing with the author the work at hand, the
NCO commented that he wasnt gaining the level of performance
he expected from his support element. Further, he considered them
weak and soft, and believed he might achieve better results doing
the work himself. Having previously observed this NCOs work with
the same support element, the author speculated he was
intimidating them with his aggressive, intense approach, rather than
creating an opportunity for the young soldiers who comprised the
support element and looked up to this NCO to learn from him more
collegially. The author therefore suggested that the NCO step out of
normal character and approach these subordinates on a more
friendly and less directive level, as this might allow him to influence
their work to a greater extent. If after a couple days this approach
did not appear to be having the desired impact, the NCO would be
free to report those results and return to conducting business as he
saw fit.
3
The change in demeanor accrued immediate benefits. Upon the

NCOs return a few days later, he reported that this unfamiliar
advice had worked great and had initiated a positive turnaround in
his relationship with the support element.
This encounter suggests that even SOF operators perceived as lacking strong
interpersonal and cross-cultural skills are capable, when warranted and desired,
of changing their approach.
SOF needs professionals who are willing to work through organizational
cultural barriers. SOFs mission success critically depends on operators abilities
to transition along the spectrum of interpersonal presentationfrom aggressive,
directive interactions to carefully circumscribed diplomatic exchangesto a
degree sufficient to maintain relationships that directly enable various types of
cooperation and coordination.
This thesis is an attempt to provide hard-hitting, fast-moving operators
with another edge or tactic that can facilitate their success. In drawing upon real
examples, it is designed to offer a different approach to achieving mission
accomplishment.
A.
SUMMARY OF KEY SECTIONS

This research focuses on delivering a tangible, practical research product
in order to assist operators in the execution of full spectrum SOF operations.

Chapter II reviews the value of cross-cultural interpersonal skills for U.S.
Army Special Forces and SOF as a whole by discussing the utility of such skills
within the scope of common missions and priorities for the way ahead. The latter
section examines current procedures for selecting, training, and maintaining
these skills within the context of the U.S. Army Special Forces, while also
outlining areas of potential enhancement.
Chapter III focuses on the methodology employed for this project and
explains how this thesis explores the problem set of poor cross-cultural
interpersonal skills in SOF. It outlines the process for dissecting a series of
4
successful and unsuccessful concrete, interpersonal engagements conducted by

SOF operators (SF, SEAL, Ranger, JSOC) working in 22 countries and the U.S.
on a wide range of missions. The specific methodology employed involves
analyzing operators responses in order to identify and correlating themes within
a series of firsthand interviews.
Chapter IV presents correlational, recurring themes derived from the
coding and analysis of operators vignettes. The intent is to leverage real-world
examples extracted from interviews to highlight commonalities within both the
broader context in which the individual scenarios took place, as well as within the
realm of human dynamics exhibited by the operators themselves under certain
circumstances. The final section of Chapter IV offers a process for noting and
responding to key behavioral and situational trends that dictate certain
adjustments in order for interpersonal success to be obtained in a cross-cultural
or inter-organizational environment.
Chapter V offers concluding comments and recommendations for
improving these skills within both the Special Forces community and SOF at
large.
Appendix A expands on examples of the coding process form Chapter III
by presenting similar data for the remaining themes identified during research.
Appendix B contains supplemental figures with complete data on interview
subjects and story outcomes.
Appendix C contains a brief recommended reading list for the topics
touched upon throughout this document.
Appendix D contains the academic literature review concerning the
underlying theory and research behind cross-cultural interpersonal skills or
negotiation and the research methodology.
II.
OPERATIONAL UTILITY AND CURRENT TRAINING

EFFORTS
This chapter illustrates the value of cross-cultural interpersonal skills to

Special Forces and SOF by identifying common missions and related core tasks.
It then reviews current efforts toward personnel selection, training, and skill
maintenance within Special Forces specifically.
A.
VALUE OF THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR

1.
Global SOF Partnership
USSOCOM is currently focusing long-term attention on building

international SOF relationships and depth of influence through global SOF
partnerships. This process will only intensify as the USSOCOM J7, Force
Management and Development, initiates Joint Collective Training venues through
exercises and training with partner nations. 1 As our force expands the global
SOF network with enhanced opportunities for training and forward deployed
service, the success of these macro-level partnerships will depend on the crosscultural interpersonal skills possessed by SOF professionals and employed at the
micro-level.
2.
Unconventional Warfare
Unconventional warfare (UW), the primary trade or bread and butter of

Army Special Forces, is defined by USASOC as follows:
Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable a
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow
a government or occupying power by operating through or with an
underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. 2
1 William R. McRaven, USSOCOM Commanders Training and Education Guidance, Fiscal

Years 2014-17, (MacDill AFB, FL: United States Special Operations Command, 2013).
2 United States Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022, Special Warfare 26, no. 2
(2013): 10.
As the definition suggests, most activities falling under the UW umbrella

involve operating with or through partners in order to manipulate foreign political
and human terrain in sensitive, high-risk environments. This thesis asserts,
however, that real influence cannot be bought, especially under conditions where
survival is at stake; rather, it is earned through genuine human trust. Social
movement theory (SMT), a crucial tool in executing successful UW, similarly
relies on building high leverage relationships throughout the target populace in
key nodes. SMT involves determining what groups impact critical swaths of a
given population, embedding with these groups, identifying an internal influencer,
gaining that influencers trust, and using that trust to garner support of the larger
entity. 3 Furthermore, SMT relies on strategic framing and messaging, both of
which require attaining the perspective of the target audience. As such,
successful UW necessitates direct interpersonal influence and the acquisition of
sufficient local perspective to impact decision-making on a wide scale. This will
not occur unless operators are adept at building cross-cultural interpersonal
relationships.
3.
Foreign Internal Defense and Other Foreign Training
Foreign
internal
defense
(FID)
and
foreign
training
supporting
counterterrorism (CT), or counter narcotics (CN), are routine SOF missions

conducted in many countries around the world. The operators interviewed for this
thesis alone have collectively conducted such missions in 19 separate countries.
With few exceptions, units executing these assignments work under the chief of
missions (COM) authority, or with his or her concurrence, and coordinate or
directly partner with various subordinate offices and agencies.
These missions compel operators to wear multiple hats, both literally and
figuratively, as they traverse the engagement spectrum from training or meeting
with locals to briefing an ambassador. To navigate this reality, SOF needs
3 Doowan Lee, DA3800: Seminar on Social Movements and Unconventional Warfare (lecture at
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, July 2013).
operators who can collaborate and influence within various domains. The
communication style used with a fellow HN operator may be inappropriate inside
the embassy gates, but encountering the juxtaposition of these contexts in a
single days work is likely, if not assured, for operators assuming these mission
sets. And while some of the most valuable lessons captured during research for
this thesis were gleaned through descriptions of failure in a combat environment,
historical and political sensitivities are unlikely to permit the same margin of error
with regard to interpersonal engagements that U.S. forces experienced in Iraq or
Afghanistan. Future cross-cultural scenarios will demand solutions informed by
both interpersonal and kinetic approaches.
4.
Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action
Some within the special operations community might consider special

reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) as core tasks void of any need for
interpersonal skills. Yet the 20 operators interviewed for this research from SF,
SEAL, Ranger, and JSOC organizations indicated otherwise. Every one
mentioned influencing HN or U.S. partners in the planning or execution of SR or
DA missions. Some operators facilitated the training and execution of police and
military missions in combat; others worked with partner nation organizations
focused on CT or CN work. These operators experiences suggest a broader
trend in which unilateral SOF operations are becoming less common.
When unilateral missions do occur, they are nevertheless increasingly
collaborative and routinely require the tailored application of interpersonal skills in
one or more phase. Some examples of these operations include Interagency (IA)
collaboration, joint coordination, mission infiltration, close target reconnaissance
(CTR), responding to compromised SR positions, and tactical questioning (TQ).
In each of these, effective communication is achieved through the combination of
an operators accurate reading of the interpersonal dynamics in the given
situation, and his subsequent application of an appropriate approach. For
example, the following experience illustrates a post-assault TQ where flexible
9
interpersonal skills made the difference between one Soldiers task achievement
and anothers failure. This situation occurred when a partner agency was no
longer able to support missions, requiring unit members to handle this task:
He [the Soldier conducting TQ] had a very good demeanor about it.
On occasion he would even [be] laughing at the guy [the captured
insurgent] and some of the answers he would be given, just basic
standard stuff. But another guy, different platoon, in his questioning
[was] just not very good, not naturally inclined to do well. Every
other answer that was given to him, [he] was like, You are lying.
Then he moves to the next question and continued to go, You are
lying. The guy who was not so good, he was trying to be the
dominant figure and [trying] to establish himself early on with who
he was questioning. It was almost counterproductive, whereas the
guy that was good at it was very nonchalant. He would put his dip
in, kind of have his nods up and just hang out with the guy. 4
In summary, the unsuccessful Soldier used a less flexible, more aggressive,
approach. Following a night tactical entry, such an approach exacerbated an
already elevated level of tension and further restricted the opportunity to
successfully extract necessary information. Conversely, the more successful
Soldier employed a calm, humorous approach in an effort to reduce the inherent
tension and develop a dialogue. His approach allowed a more friendly elicitation,
whereas the former Soldiers engagement was decidedly a form of interrogation.
Creating a space of reduced stress for dialogue, even in the tactical context, can
be crucial for success. Understandably, skills and abilities differ and some SOF
operators will adapt more readily to the demands of such interactions than
others. Nonetheless, these variances should not preclude SOF from offering
more opportunities for operators to understand the value in different approaches.
5.
U.S. Partnership Roles
Today, SOF rarely acts without involving various U.S. partners in some
capacity. Eighteen of the 20 operators interviewed in this thesis alone generated
113 examples of situations in which they were required to influence U.S.
4 Subject 15, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, August 15, 2013).
10
partners. Twenty-four of the 96 stories collected directly focused on U.S.

influence. Nine of these, more than 37 percent, reflect failed attempts. 72 stories
accounted for influence with foreign partners; 18 of these, or 25 percent, had a
negative outcome. Remarkably, this demonstrates a higher rate of failure in
interpersonal negotiations involving other U.S. partners than those involving
foreign partners.
Common examples of engagements requiring SOF operators to influence
other Americans include interactions with conventional forces, government
agencies, political offices, non-government organizations (NGO), and civilians in
academia and business, among others. The situation usually dictates that
operators enter the others space: SOF conduct missions in conventional
commanders Area(s) of Responsibility (AOR), serve in military liaison elements
(MLE) on temporary duty (TDY), conduct training on Joint Combined
Exchange(s) for Training (JCET) under COM authority, or are detailed to various
IA or joint staff positions. SOFs wide range of partner organizations necessitate
that SOF elements be capable of projecting their needs flexibly and in a manner
that aligns with the partner or partners at hand.
B.
SELECTION, TRAINING, AND SKILLS MAINTENANCE

Special Forces and SOF at large are well known for their stringent training
qualifications. At times this reputation helps to establish initial credibility with

partners. As an adaptive, results-driven organization, SOF constantly seeks to
enhance its methods of selecting, training, and maintaining the force. In light of
this cultural emphasis on continual process improvement, the next section will
review current Special Forces selection and training methodologies related to the
cross-cultural interpersonal realm so as to highlight successful practices and
identify opportunities for improvement. 5
5 The following information was accurate as of October 2013. The Special Forces Assessment
and Selection (SFAS) process outlined was initiated in February of 2012.
11
1.
Special Forces Assessment and Selection
Also known as SFAS, this 19-day course is designed to assess whether

volunteers have the mental and physical capability to both complete the Special
Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) and to subsequently serve in the Special
Forces Regiment. 6 SFAS uses the Assessment Center Method to select
personnel based on specified role requirements. 7 This method is tied to original
research on assessment and selection conducted by the Office of Strategic
Studies. 8 The SFAS Assessment Center determines the knowledge, skills, and
abilities candidates must possess to complete training and serve at the unit level.
The Center also defines corresponding intellectual and physical baselines, and
then identifies psychological tests, individual events, and job-related team
scenarios to use as the platform for analysis. This entire process constantly
evolves to increase the accuracy of assessments and to reduce candidates
abilities to game the course by using information garnered from previous
attendees.
Within this process, candidates are evaluated based on the whole man
concept, a set of Army Special Operations attributes drawn from surveys of
senior leaders in the SF regiment and historical SF models. The heart of this
process is Team Week, involving a series of job-related tasks that combine
physical and cognitive challenges in a leaderless environment.
The hierarchical nature of the military tends, over time, to encourage its
members, toward polarized roles: individuals either take charge, or subordinate
themselves to leadership. But this dichotomy does not always maximize group
6 Data in this selection was collected during a visit to Camp Mackall for the SFAS class held in
October of 2013. Comments were drawn from notes made during observation of training and
interface with cadre. This trip was conducted strictly to collect factual information concerning
current execution of SFAS and the SFQC.
7 William C. Byham, The Assessment Center Method and Methodology: New Applications and
Technologies, Development Dimensions International Monograph (1986), accessed November
20, 2013, https://www.ddiworld.com/DDIWorld/media/whitepapers/AssessmentCenterMethods_mg_ddi.pdf?ext=.pdf.
8 United States, Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the
Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1958), 2657.
12
dialogue and input. On a 12-man SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), the

opinion of every individual counts; the smaller, flatter organizational construct
means that each man is responsible for contributing thoughtful analysis and input
to team decisions. As such, Team Week introduces a leaderless environment to
highlight how well individuals work in a flattened democratic setting, while also
facilitating better identification of the emotionally intelligent leaders and team
players. The question underlying Team Week is this: with no rank or position
provided beyond a random roster number, can men rise to the occasion under
physical and mental duress, build camaraderie with their peers, and influence
their decision-making? Activities are monitored by fellow candidates, multiple
cadre, and the participants themselves, allowing for a comprehensive 360degree analysis.
Such an inclusive approach to analysis is a recent development involving
constant changes and inputs. The assessed events are largely designed and
managed by SF NCOs, who comprise most of the SFAS team. Team Week
promotes the selection of candidates with a higher baseline level of individual
competence, upon which further training and exposure can build. The primary
trait requiring improvement, both at selection and beyond, is the cross-cultural
aspect of interpersonal skills. Despite the relative effectiveness of SFAS in
selecting qualified SF candidates, the SFAS process continues to focus on
assessing interpersonal competence as defined within the U.S. Armys cultural
domain. Psychological research indicates, howeveras Chapter IV of this
document
affirmsthat
cross-cultural
interpersonal
engagements
are
consistently characterized by a higher level of complexity than intra-cultural

events. This points to an inherent but equally correctable weakness in the SFAS
methodology.
13
2.
Special Forces Qualification Course
Figure 1 below outlines the six major phases of training within the SFQC. This
section will briefly describe efforts to build cross-cultural interpersonal skills in
phases that apply.
Figure 1.
Special Forces Qualification Course Overview 9
Of note, instructors in all phases of training can access the collective

ratings and evaluations of each student, such that positive or negative trends in
behavior observed by cadre and peers can be addressed. This practice
underscores a key area of focus for SF NCOs running the course, which is
monitoring students interactions with fellow trainees, cadre (civilian or military),
and role players. In this vein, student peer evaluations are conducted at several
9 Slide provided by 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), Camp Mackall,
November 26, 2013.
14
junctures throughout training. These assist in identifying individuals who may

have issues serving on an SF team or in the SOF operational realm at large.
a.
SFQC Phase I Review
Several phases of the course place attention on interpersonal skills.

Phase I, Course Orientation and History, offers two forms of exposure. First,
students act as foreign guerrilla role players for the culmination exercise known
as Robin Sage or Phase IV. Here, a student ODA in Phase IV is paired with a
group of Phase I students acting as guerillas, and the Phase IV student ODA is
tasked to conduct a U.S.-supported insurgency campaign to overthrow the
foreign guerillas corrupt regime. This requires Phase I students to act as
insurgents in a fictitious country while being advised by a student ODA. Roleplaying characters possessing different cultural norms challenges Phase I
students to gain the perspective of the same stakeholders they will need to
influence when they return to this exercise as ODA participants in Phase IV. By
observing the group dynamics and cross-cultural interpersonal communication
techniques employed by the student ODA with which they are matched, Phase I
students also glimpse what will be expected of them as they progress in the
course, and they can learn from other students successes and failures. Later in
Phase I, students receive initial classes on negotiation and mediation.
Collectively, therefore, this phase provides exposure to a simulated foreign
culture and baseline negotiation theory.
b.
SFQC Phase II Review
Phase II, Individual Training, includes the Level C (High Risk) Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Course. Focusing on war as well as
peacetime captivity and hostage detention, this course provides instruction on
how to assess and influence a captor under a range of operational
circumstances. As such, this phase delivers ample opportunity for the practical
exercise of interpersonal and negotiation skills, building on the exposures of
Phase I. This is a valued learning opportunity, but also involves a witting partner.
15
c.
SFQC Phase III Review
Phase III focuses on producing SFQC graduates trained in one of five

initial Special Forces military occupational specialties (MOS): SF officer (18A),
SF weapons NCO (18B), SF engineer NCO (18C), SF medical NCO (18D), and
SF communications NCO (18E). As such, the courses included in this phase are
primarily geared toward teaching the unique technical skills required for those
respective jobs. Two examples that place some emphasis on interpersonal
competence are the 18A and 18D courses.
The 18A course focuses specific effort towards enhancing students skills
through negotiation and elicitation training, delivering briefings to senior leaders,
and participating in practical training exercises. The interagency perspective is
introduced through a trip to various organizations in the national capital region.
Through these activities, individuals in the 18A MOS receive more extended
exposure to the role of interpersonal relations in their future work. This is a critical
distinguishing factor in their SFQC experience, as SF officers will be expected to
serve as ambassadors of their units, garnering support for their ODAs with
foreign counterparts and U.S. partners alike.
The 18D course also includes an interpersonal component because
medical practitioners must be prepared to employ with ease various
communication styles and techniques while under duress, in order to accurately
assess, diagnose, and treat a patient. Classes are provided on how to present a
calming demeanor and ask questions that will elicit the best possible information
for medical decision-making. These skills are rehearsed throughout training as
medics treat fellow students or guerrillas during Robin Sage and in other SFQC
exercises. Once in the field, 18Ds go beyond honing their interpersonal abilities
through caring for their American teammates; they tend to also become involved
in treating HN locals. This involvement opens 18Ds to greater cross-cultural
exposure and experience, often contributing positively to their communication
abilities on an interpersonal level.
16
The enhanced interpersonal and cross-cultural training received by 18As

and 18Ds is important to the conduct of their individual job responsibilities, and
this training pays additional dividends at the unit level. However, operational
exigency often dictates that ODAs operating abroad must at times do without all
twelve men, meaning that any operator may be called upon to represent the ODA
in a sensitive interpersonal or cross-cultural engagement. SF, therefore, must
train for the reality that all its members will need serviceable interpersonal skills.
d.
SFQC Phase IV Review
Phase IV, or Robin Sage, sends students into a fictitious country,

Pineland, to conduct a U.S.-supported insurgency campaign. Aside from building
and training a local guerrilla force, students interface with rural farmers and local
citizens who serve as the supporting auxiliary and underground political network.
In this context, both locals and guerrilla role players take on the cultural norms of
Pineland. This becomes a test of the students ability to culturally adjust, to
correctly interpret nuances in facial expressions or body language, and to
understand how failure to do so can have negative consequences. In this regard,
Robin Sage is designed to represent a contained environment in which students
learn to build rapport and influence others, so as to accomplish a larger mission.
This training helps to deliver tangible lessons learned that can later be applied to
real-world, high-stakes challenges on an operational deployment.
e.
SFQC Phase V Review
Phase V consists of language and cultural training aligned with the

operational area of responsibility of the SF Group in which each student will
serve. This phase offers four to six months of exposure to one or more of the
potential cultures with which a students unit might be partnered. Learning the
language and interacting with native-born instructors introduces students to the
perspective(s) of potential foreign partners. Language skills offer a high return on
investment if practiced and used regularly, yet maintaining these skills can be
difficult to integrate into the already-high operations tempo of SF professionals.
17
Nonetheless, language and cross-cultural skills may be poised to take on greater

importance. Looming fiscal constraints throughout the U.S. military could
precipitate a funding climate reminiscent of the 1990s, when special operators
received minimal funding for lodging, interpreters, or equipment for partners.
These conditions may increasingly require units to rely on their own language
and cross-cultural interpersonal skills as vehicles for creating influence. While not
altogether negative for instance, a greater reliance on these skills positively
reinforces the importance of gaining trust on a personal level, rather than through
material means alone these emerging budgetary circumstances and their likely
operational consequences strongly underscore the urgent need to strengthen
SOF interpersonal and cross-cultural capabilities.
3.
Pre-Mission Training
As mentioned earlier, SF units in their stateside deployment preparation

tend to train the least on the skills that are most used downrange. Title X SOF
training activities like JCETs, designed specifically to provide SOF elements with
exposure to foreign environments, are valuable in helping operators maintain
related skills and knowledge between active deployments. 10 However, JCETs
and similar training exposures are insufficient to the initial task of developing the
necessary level of individual cross-cultural interpersonal skills, and cannot stand
in for such skill emphasis in pre-mission training (PMT).
Operators interviewed for this thesis repeatedly noted a very limited
amount of exposure to training in cross-cultural interpersonal skills prior to
deployments. The most commonly mentioned PMT venue for exercising such
skills was the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) Course, which
focuses on training operators in the unique skills required to conduct Direct
Action in an urban environment. This training module holds clear relevance and
value to SOF mission sets, but is a less than ideal as a venue for training
10 Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School, 10 USC Section 2011, Special
Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Forces, accessed July 5, 2013,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2011.
18
operators on successful influence-based operations down range. Granted,

SFAUC does provide some counterbalance to an otherwise heavily kinetic
training focus. In this sense it does address the concern that, if operators kinetic
training is not interspersed with instruction on soft power techniques (for
instance, negotiation or interpersonal communication styles and strategies), the
training that is received (in this case, kinetic) can become self-reinforcing, to the
detriment of other skill sets. For example, when units attempting to influence a
local populace or partner focus more on kinetic activity, this tendency inherently
reduces their focus on influencing local partners through less aggressive tactics.
This tendency can reinforce popular support for the opposition and/or diminish
the ability of the unit to establish long-term partnerships. Such circumstances can
initiate a spiral of increasing kinetic activity and decreasing attempts to pursue
more nuanced engagement styles. These operational consequences flow directly
from training that emphasizes certain skillsets over others; for this reason, while
the degree to which SFAUC does provide a venue for the exploration of
interpersonal skills in influencing partners cannot be dismissed, there is ample
room for its content to be reviewed and rebalanced.
To some extent, as well, PMT events like SFAUC are victims of their own
success. SFAUC is dynamic and entertaining and, by design, offers instant,
readily quantifiable feedback, whereas training on cross-cultural competence can
seem less uniformly engaging to individuals within SOF culture and generally
delivers more ambiguous results. These perceptions influence not only the
opinions of participants, but also leadership decisions on PMT events..
4.
Specialty Schools and Civilian Training
Special Forces and SOF, in general, have access to a full gamut of

specialized schools. Many of these training venues offer some focus toward
enhancing interpersonal skills and abilities. The Advanced Special Operations
Training Course (ASOTC) is arguably the best venue for honing these skills. But
it is important to note that operators are screened for this course, and assessed
during it, to ensure they have the requisite level of interpersonal ability to
19
complete training. Lack of those skills is also one of the most common reasons
for course failure.
At their own discretion, units sometimes send operators to a number of
other valuable courses in negotiation, mediation, elicitation, sales, interrogation,
persuasion, and the like. Attendance can be individual or can include entire
companies, and sometimes focuses on detachment level leadership and above.
Training may be held at the unit or offsite through civilian or academic
institutions. Some examples include courses with the Harvard University
Program on Negotiation, or interrogation and interview training by John Reid and
Associates. Despite the utility of the training, only a limited number of personnel
receive these opportunities. It is thus difficult to consider such venues an
opportunities for unit-wide enhancement of skills.
Correspondingly, operators who need interpersonal training the most will
often be the last to receive it. Consider how when a company or team has a seat
or two at a prestigious course, typically abrasive operators are not the first to be
chosen. Understandably, leaders hesitate to send less diplomatic personnel to
represent their organization at external training venues. Consequently, a
situational risk is incurred by limiting the interpersonal training of such individuals
and then sending them out on missions to encounter the same array of partners
as their highly trained, or naturally talented, fellow operators. This risk highlights
a paradox of value in sending the worst operator to some of the best training.
For example, this authors outlook changed after completing a negotiation
course held by the business school at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
With minimal exposure to theory and extensive practical exercise, the entire
group, including individuals who, arguably, were not interpersonally inclined, saw
a noticeable increase in their negotiation skill level. Theory set the conditions, but
the increase in skill level was largely due to students gaining a new respect for
obtaining the perspective of those they might need to influence, thanks to diverse
role-playing exercises. That training, the research undertaken for this thesis, and
this authors operational experience collectively indicate that placing emphasis on
cross-cultural interpersonal skills is an effort worth undertaking.
20
III.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter overviews the research method, offers reasoning for the
approach, and provides consolidated data concerning subjects and the
overarching process. The larger aim of this thesis is to present information
related to SOF cross-cultural and interpersonal skills and to validate their utility
through the experience of actual operators. As such, the author conducted
interviews with SOF operators (Army Special Forces, Army Ranger, and Navy
SEAL) to collect concrete, first-hand accounts illustrating successful and
unsuccessful
cross-cultural,
intra-cultural,
or
organizational
interpersonal
engagements or negotiations. Table 1 offers a summarized review of the subject

data.
SUMMARIZED SUBJECT DATA (ORGANIZATION, RANK, UNIT, AND EXPERIENCE)

SOF Organization
Rank and Total by
Recent Units of Service
Organization
U.S. Army Special Forces
16 (14 x MAJ, 1 x SFC, 1 x
USASFC(A) x 1, SOTD(A) x
st
CWO3)
1, SWTG(A) x 2, 1 SFG(A)
x 2,
th
th
5 SFG(A) x 5, 7 SFG(A) x
2,
th
10 SFG(A) x 2
th
U.S. Army Ranger
1 (1 x MAJ)
75 RGR(A) x 1
U.S. Navy SEAL
3 (3 x LCDR)
NSWG1 x 1, USSOCOM x 2
Article I.
Years of Service
Years in SOF
Deployments
Months Deployed
Average
Total
Average
Total
Average
Total
Average
Total
13.05
261
7.9
158
5.9
117
35.7
713.5
Reference Appendix C for source data concerning individual experience.
Table 1.
Summarized Subject Data
The 20 operators listed above collectively provided more than 30 hours of

interview material, which yielded over 500 pages of transcripts. Based on
transcript analysis conducted by the author, these operators shared 96
interpersonal experiences from deployments to 23 different countries. These
experiences included deployments for combat, foreign training missions, SOF
21
duties associated with embassy assignments, and other related work. Due the
fact a high number of subjects had experience in Iraq; there is the possibility that
research results were influenced by an Iraq effect.
However, since this
research was focused on the collective analysis of all the events experienced by
subjects, regardless of location, analysis of a potential Iraq effect extends
beyond the scope of this thesis. Table 2 below provides a list of each country and
its associated number of engagements.
COUNTRY DATA OVERVIEW

Country of Engagement
Iraq
Afghanistan
Philippines
Malaysia
United States
Bosnia
Bangladesh
Middle East Undisclosed
Mali
Belize
Indonesia
Africa Undisclosed
Somalia
Nepal
Thailand
Colombia
Mexico
Guatemala
Korea
Papua New Guinea
Persian Gulf Undisclosed
United Arab Emirates
Azerbaijan
Total Engagements
Table 2.
Engagements
42
13
13
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
96
Country Data Overview
22
This data was collected and analyzed using a combination of the critical
incident interview and grounded theory methodologies. 11 Using the critical
incident interview method, the author asked each participant to share both
successful and unsuccessful negotiation experiences where the participant either
influenced or failed to influence another human. Its important to note up front
that the category successful or unsuccessful was not imposed by the
researcher; rather, the research attempted to discover the phenomenological
experience of the interaction and sought to look across cases to glean themes
that were common across experiences, to allow the participant to consider when
they successfully (or not) influenced another. The participants disclosed 27
negative and 69 positive influence incidents experienced in the 23 countries
listed above. These incidents served as a method for theoretical sampling and
constant comparison to generate theory. 12 Upon completion of the critical
incident interviews, the stories themselves became the focus of analysis and the
author compared those experiences that interviewees deemed successful
against unsuccessful engagements throughout the entire data set. It is important
to note that the interviewees, not the researcher, determined whether
experiences were labeled as successful or unsuccessful. This thesis is not an
objective
assessment
of
engagements.
Rather,
it
is
built
on
the
phenomenological experiences of the operators themselves who in retrospect

assessed their own experiences as successful or unsuccessful.
Following the canons of grounded theory outlined by Glazer and Strauss,
the author coded the transcripts using constant comparison, inquiring into what
the data suggested, and determining what theoretical categories emerged.13
Such a close review of the data did not seek to validate a preconceived
11 Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code

Development (Thousand Oaks; Sage Publications, 1998), 99-127; Norman K. Denzin and
Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
1994), 273-284.
12 Denzin and Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 273-284.
13 Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1967).
23
hypothesis, but to surface themes. The initial coding of each incident was done
line by line. The process was facilitated through the use of NVivo, a computer
program for qualitative research and coding.
The method began with the researcher reading each transcript and coding
actions or events based on their content. The initial process rendered over 300
codes.
Codes were tracked for presence (or absence) across all of the
interviews, grouped into like families, and connected with an overarching theme
presented in contextual form. Themes are labeled by their family name for quick
reference. The research identified eight major themes from 20 subjects across
the 96 engagements. Table 3 below indicates these major themes and the
frequencies at which they appeared within the 23 source documents.
THEME OVERVIEW
Theme
Family
Source Documents
Events Coded
1.
Genuine Behavior
23
321
2.
Gaining Perspective
23
299
3.
Mutual Assistance
15
43
4.
Culturally Aware Behavior
17
80
5.
Building Social Capital
21
115
6.
Hanging Out: Informal
22
281
21
128
17
51
Learning
7.
Overcoming Bureaucratic
Constraints
8.
Multi-Group Coordination
Table 3.
Theme Overview
The themes identified above are presented in the next chapter, along with
supporting analysis and direct quotes from the interviews. Themes are applied
24
within a collective process map that will aid in their implementation at the
interpersonal level and help explain how the themes are intertwined, and at times
mutually supportive. The intent of extracting trends is to identify and isolate
tendencies often unnoticed in the larger context of these interpersonal
engagements experienced by operators. Evidence correlating these themes
exists in both successful and unsuccessful cases, often with a higher presence in
the former, versus a lower presence or complete absence in the latter.
A.
THE CODING PROCESS

This section elaborates on how each trend was constructed from a series
of similarly coded events, with trends then grouped into families and ultimately
developed into contextual themes. The initial process involved coding
approximately 500 pages of transcripts, which rendered over 300 separate
codes. These codes and their corresponding passages were then reviewed and
organized into related overarching groups.
Next, the codes were reviewed again within their specific groups and
compared against other passaged. This process then delivered a family label
that characterized several passages and codes.
Lastly, the information was
consolidated into a contextual definition that illustrates the overall recurring

theme identified within that individual family. The family name was specifically
used as a quick point of reference for each theme and as the label level applied
in the process map.
To facilitate a more nuanced understanding of this methodology, the
theme of gaining perspective is outlined in Table 4. That family name was
assigned because each of these codes contained some form of reference to
perspective. Examples of perspective-taking included subjects offering their own
perspective as analysis of a success or failure, taking a partners perspective
after a failure, listening or asking questions to gain a partners perspective during
an engagement, or citing the relevance of the big picture to their perspective of
25
a single event occurring within the context of a broader relationship or sustained

interaction.
Coding Process Example (Theme 2)

The Family
Gaining Perspective
Codes within the Family

Appealing to others
perspective(s)
Misleading information
Area familiarization
Misunderstanding perspective
Asking questions
Ombudsman concept
Assessing the situation
Open-minded approach
Closed-minded approach
Outside perspective
Concern over perception of
Partner connectivity with populace
action
Partner embarrassed
Conflicting allegiance(s)
Perspective justification
Conflicting interest(s)
Perspective of partners
Frustration in understanding
Perspective-taking
environment
Preconceived notions
Introspective thought
Self-appraisal
Knowing your strengths
Understanding larger context
Lack of knowledge on country
Understanding options
team structure
Understanding partners motivation
Lacking perspective
Understanding environment
Listening
Western viewpoint
Meeting expectations
The information above was analyzed to create the following contextual theme.
The Theme: Taking a partners perspective or broadening/challenging ones ownand related
actions that aid in creating perspective, such as asking questions, listening, or developing
dialoguecollectively serve as a major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements, and
as a learning tool to understand failed encounters. This was identified by every operator in all 23
source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking
questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach. Reference term is
Gaining Perspective.
Table 4.
The next chapter will present this themes and supporting quotes from
participants.
26
IV.
UNDERSTANDING SOF INTERPERSONAL ENGAGEMENTS

This chapter focuses on the themes derived from the research outlined in
Chapter III. Before discussing the themes identified during the research process,
however, it is important to define the term negotiation as it applies within the
context of this thesis.
For the purposes of the research presented and analyzed in this
document, the term negotiation refers to discussions undertaken to reach an
agreement. 14 Such discussions could include scheduling a doctors appointment,
buying a car, choosing a restaurant for dinner with your spouse, procuring a team
mission, handling a tribal dispute, changing international nuclear regulations, or
any another such exchange taking place for the purpose of arriving at a mutually
agreeable outcome. This definition includes any interpersonal engagements that
involve influencing the decision-making of others, and is not limited to strictly high
stakes scenarios.
A.
HUMAN BEHAVIORAL TRENDS

This section outlines human behavioral trends in the context of
interpersonal engagements.
1.
Theme 1: Genuine Behavior
Theme 1: Success in handling interpersonal engagements or

influencing partners is heavily reliant on the presence of real or perceived
genuine human concern and interest. This was identified by every operator
in over 50 codes ranging from humility, compassion and appreciation to
respect, genuine interest, giving, and helping. Reference term is Genuine
Behavior.
Humans innately seek some form of evidence that others have their best
interest in mind; this applies even more readily when it is necessary to influence
their decision-making, especially when personal risk is involved. Research for
14 Google, Definition of Negotiation, accessed November 18, 2013,
https://www.google.com/search?q=definition+of+negotiation&ie=utf-8&oe=utf8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a.
27
this thesis found clear indications that a genuine level of interest in a partner,
such that he or she even sees you as a friend, is the most important factor in
creating real trust and influence.
The following anecdotes illustrate how operators experienced return on
investment for genuine behavior. The first example is offered by an operator
whose duties in Iraq often required influencing locals to take personal risk in
support of the mission. In one case, the unit needed facial recognition on a high
level insurgent target, and the units experience had decidedly indicated that
money was not the answer.
Let me just say you can pay someone lots and lots of money and at
the end of the day what is going to end up happening isthey get
out there and they realize that the money is not enough for what I
[the operator] am risking right now. There needs to be another
motivator. 15
In his story, the operator recalls spending an unusually great amount of
time with one local, often six or seven hours in a single meeting. This degree of
shared time and experience created an authentic bond Sincere human
connectivity became the driving factor behind success in influencing the local to
obtain facial recognition of a high level insurgent leader. He recalled:
we had a really good relationship. He genuinely could see that
there was a relationship, and that there was a friendship. The
perception was there that we had a good relationship. He was the
guy that [sic] we were able to send in with minimal money, to get
the video footage. He got it. I mean he got lucky with the pat down
but even he came back and was like, You know I wouldnt do this
except you and I are such good friends. 16
Another incident depicts an occasion when an operator in Iraq was
developing relations in a tribal area to facilitate sectarian cooperation within the
nascent government. A friend of the primary local group was killed in Baghdad
15 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 20, 2013).
16 Ibid.
28
and the units interpreters recommended the operator attend the funeral. The
operators initial reaction was to refuse.
I said, There is no way in hell that I am stepping foot in a mosque.
Period. End of story. Like, I cant go into a mosque.
Yet, after the interpreters reassured the operator his guest attendance would be
safe, the operator agreed. The interpreters advised that the operators presence
would be well received by the local partners. The engagement resulted in the
following:
So I went to the mosque. . . . It built that much friendship between
us because it was completely unexpected. Like there had never
been a non-Muslim . . . [who] took the time to actually care about
this guy even though I hadnt personally met him. 17
When operators were perceived as caring individuals the relationship
sometimes developed into friendships. In the following example, an operator
developed a close friendship with a HN colonel. The initial relationship began
with periodic casual visits over cigarettes and tea The colonels niece was later
hit by a stray insurgent round, resulting in injuries that required specialized
surgical attention in order for her to survive. After the operator weighed all
options for procuring such care, to include calling his U.S. congressman, the
young girl was eventually treated successfully. The kind efforts of this operator
then served as a catalyst and a benefit. The HN colonel practiced a unique local
religion with just over a million followers. Coincidentally, his sister was married to
the head cleric for this religious group. Shortly after his niece was saved, the
colonel called and said the cleric would like to meet him and extend thanks for
the kind act. The colonel and his extended family escorted the operator and his
men to the meeting. Upon introduction, the cleric, who spoke excellent English,
candidly raised some concerns he shared with the U.S. regarding a neighboring
country. He then mentioned that more than once a year his religious order made
a pilgrimage into the neighboring country, in costume, with approximately a half
17 Subject 6, sergeant first class, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 31,
2013).
29
million followers. The cleric then offered the use of his pilgrimage as a
mechanism for entering this country. The operator summed up the event with the
following comments.
The point is that just drinking chai with [the cleric] and just being
personableall ends up with, we have a clandestine infil
platform that really anyone can use. built on that one case of
having rapport and smoking cigarettes with a guy. The thing that
[concerns] me about the whole thing was what I should have done,
and what I wanted to do, but what I dont think I am allowed to do,
is [send him] emails. I think that I made a friend, but on a
professional level because I think that there is important work that
could go through [him] later down the road. 18
Developing trust can offer unpredictable success.. Understanding
scenarios like the one above requires taking a walk in someone elses shoes and
seeing what factors influence their decision-making.
2.
Theme 2: Gaining Perspective
Theme 2: Taking a partners perspective or broadening/challenging

ones own and related actions that aid in creating perspective, such as
asking questions, listening, or developing dialogue collectively serve as a
major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements. This was
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents with over 30
subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking questions,
listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach.
Several successful negotiation stories involved the theme of taking the
perspective of the other. For example, the following comments by a U.S. SOF
operator reference an incident when his men caught a partner unit syphoning fuel
from his mens boats. The U.S. SOF unit was training and operating with a
partner SOF maritime unit in an effort to identify insurgent activity within an
expansive network of small islands.
So [the incident became] a leadership issue . . . like, Hey put
yourself in their shoes. They are poor. They are going to try to find
a way to make money. That doesnt make it right. We think like
30
Americans. We go over there or whenever we deploy we have all

our resources we need. I [told the unit], It is not the same for them.
They are scrapping to make ends meet. 19
Despite this operators ability to appreciate his partners perspective the men in
his unit were reluctant to continue training with the partner force following this
incident. This points to the importance of prior training in interpersonal skills like
perspective-taking, in order that they not appear too risky or unfamiliar for
operators to consider implementing downrange.
The following anecdote likewise recounts an awkward scenario stemming
from an operators dearth of cultural knowledge and failure to gain perspective.
Early in a deployment the operator determined that the partner force commander
enjoyed bird hunting. Originating from an agrarian American state where bird
hunting was popular, the operator thought bird hunting a promising foundation
upon which to begin building a friendly relationship, so he accepted an invitation
to go hunting. Prior to the hunt, the partner force colonel had jokingly mentioned,
If it flies, it dies. The operator and some of his men then joined the hunt. Each
group separated to locate its own prey. The colonel had men flushing birds and
was clearly doing very well. Being competitive, the operator felt compelled to
bring in a few birds of his own. After shooting only one pigeon, the target prey,
the operator noticed a small yellow bird perched in a tree nearby, and quickly
shot it without being noticed. He thought this would be an entertaining addition to
his otherwise meager catch. The group then gathered to end the hunt. The
colonel proudly displayed 20 or so pigeons, and his subordinates displayed their
respective hauls. The operator then presented his unusual kill and encountered
this reaction:
The team sergeant drops a couple of birds and I drop one pigeon
and then I am like, Oh, and the big victory! and I flopped this guy
down, and right then, like there are ten little Iraqi privates and other
junior officers standing around the colonel, and this other major and
they are just like . . . Oh yeah. About that . . . I was like, Whats
the matter? You said if it flies it dies. [The colonel] is like, [Steve],
31
this is the national songbird of Iraq. Volumes of poems have been

written about this birds beautiful song. The prophet loves this bird.
I mean I was like, Dude, I couldnt [have embarrassed myself] any
worse if I tried to. Know your culture. 20
Fortunately, the operator was able to overcome his error through future positive
efforts, but his experience reveals the complexity of cross-cultural perspectivetaking.
In the next example of perspective-taking, and specifically listening, the
SF officer in question was deployed to the Philippines for Counterinsurgency
(COIN) and partnered with a general officer commanding the local Task Force.
I would say probably the largest in that I had with [the General]
was that I listened to him. . . . [H]e told me, [Bill], you are different
than anybody else. You know? You dont think you are smarter
than me. He said a lot of the American units that come in there,
which are sadly ODAs, . . . try to advise me and tell me that they
are smarter than me. . . . I have blown these captains off for years
down here because they want to come in here and tell me how to
do things. . . . I have been doing this for longer than these guys are
old. He is like, Just listen. And I did. I just listened to him.
[Eventually] he got to the point where he asked me, What do you
think about this? He was like, We are going to do this. What do
you think? I would give my opinion and he would be like, Alright.
Sounds good. Sometimes [my advice] had influence and
sometimes it wouldnt. Well, he started using me as a sounding
board; I was advising, officially advising at that point. 21
Conversely, a failure to listen can have both short- and long-term negative
impacts. The following incident occurred when an Infantry officer (later SF)
dismissed advice from his Iraqi partners. He was told it would be a poor idea to
conduct partnered missions into certain areas, and that doing so would create
undue risk for his partners. The excerpt below explains the hard lesson learned.
They were right. In fact we pushed it one time, and I didnt listen to
them, and we had one of our [partner force] lieutenants get shot in
the face, like point blank. The guy walked out of the house and shot
21 Subject 4, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, July 30, 2013).
32
him right square in the face, blew his brains out. That is why we
are, like, we need to listen to these people. 22
This operator became open minded about listening after this event. Such
pre-SOF learning experiences are common, and occurred in 19 of 96 of the
storiesor 20 percentreferenced in this research.
Another approach to preventing such blunders as those described above
is to ask questions. One operator employed this tactic to provide his team with a
refined perspective on their role as partners. During the teams previous
deployment, its missions had been very unilateral in terms of their planning and
execution. Partners had been treated as a means for executing missions, not as
a consulted party to mission purpose or design. To foster a higher level of
partnership, this new team leader started asking questions. For example, he
asked if all members of the partner force could drive. Most of them were from
rural homes without cars. What would happen if the few trained drivers were
injured? This process of asking questions and looking deeper into the root cause
of issues took place in numerous instances and helped the operators team
rationalize the value of teaching partners to take the lead.
Yes, and it wasnt just [with our partners]that was something that
we really worked on in the detachment as well because the
detachment was like, Why are we doing this? Last trip we didnt do
any of this. This is stupid. Why dont we just go? We know where
we are going. We got to start peeling back the layers, and the
detachment started seeing okay, there is something to doing some
additional analysis. So it wasnt just the Iraqis [who] learned from it,
my detachment learned from it significantly. 23
A key aspect of learning from failure when it does happen is self-appraisal.
As such, 15 out of the 20 operators interviewed engaged in some form of selfappraisal, reflecting on their performance. One illustrative example is the
following anecdote offered by an operator concerning an initial encounter with a
key partner force leader. Upon initial deployment into the country, the operator
22 Ibid.
33
attended a meeting with the local mayor, his staff, and the general commanding
the police forces for the larger surrounding area. The operator had never met
these individuals, was not known to the group as the new SF team leader, and
wore civilian clothes. During the meeting the general lied about insurgents
captured by his units and alleged lack of activity from the SF team.
As these untruthful comments continued, the operator became very angry.
He had received information prior to the meeting that indicated this general had
nefarious connections, and his lies validated the operators initial bias. After the
meeting, the operator hailed an interpreter and instructed him to approach the
general, introduce him by name as the new SF team leader, and say that he did
not appreciate the lies offered in the meeting, and would make it his personal
mission in country to destroy the generals power and influence in the area. The
general was stunned. The operator denied permission for a reply, reiterated his
intentions and left.
Throughout the deployment, the general constantly undermined the
success of that operators team. The generals actions included imprisoning and
abusing members of the teams partner police unit before execution of planned
operations, or assigning them to duties not related to the units role. The operator
later returned to the same area on a subsequent deployment to find that the
general had been promoted and was now in direct higher command of the teams
partner unit. The new conditions were such that the general was the primary
senior partner for the team and the approving authority for its operations. The
general continued to hamper the teams operations.
Concurrently, given the generals initial questionable reputation, the
operators team had been collecting information on his activities and reporting it
through the operators daily situation reports. This reporting resulted in higher
U.S. command requesting a consolidated packet on the generals suspected
nefarious collusions. The operator assumed this would result in the generals loss
of authority. Instead, the general was moved to a new area populated by a rival
sectarian group and used his position to justify increased sectarian violence. The
34
operators actions during his initial meeting with the general resulted in total loss
of rapport for two consecutive deployments and impacted not only his unit, but
also other units and local civilians in more than one area of operations. The
following comments by the operator reveal his self-reflection over that initial
decision to confront the general:
Really it all comes down to the very first meeting. Had I just known
in my heart of hearts that I wanted to rip this guys throat out, but
kept that to myself, played nice with him, sat down and had some
tea with the [expletive] guy and been like, Hey, look. I know you
said these things [lies about insurgents captured and the SF teams
activity, etc.], but I dont think they are true. Where did you get your
information? How can we change this situation? How can I make
you comfortable with me? If I had built rapport with that guy as
much as I wanted to kill him, it would have, in the end, caused me
less heartache for sure; it would have caused the FID force that
was accessible to us, and I know then that just from the ability of
my guys to train a FID force up and the ability of us as a team to
use them, I think it would have been a phenomenal force at a time
when it was super needed in [that area]. 24
3.
Theme 3: Mutual Assistance
Theme 3: Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with

partners, to include acting as a mediator between partners to enhance their
mutual support, facilitates a higher level of collective understanding and
positively impacts an individuals ability to influence others. This was
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents and includes over
30 subordinate codes such as mutual learning, creating common ground,
reciprocal value, and shared concerns. Reference term is Mutual
Assistance.
In the situation below, mutual assistance was a catalyst for success and
also reiterates the value of sincerity in generating meaningful influence. An SF
team was negotiating for use of a HN home in support of a clandestine operation.
The best option was a home currently occupied by a local business owner and
his extended family. Despite being offered a large sum of money, the owner
hesitated. The owners father had a garden on the property, and the father spent
a good deal of time maintaining it. The father was not supportive of his son
35
leasing the home because his cherished pastime would be impacted and the
plants would likely die. The operator identified the problem and offered this
solution.
Once we told him that we were not going to destroywe had no
intent on destroying the gardensthat satisfied him to some
degree, but his emphasis was on how [were] they going to be
maintained. So we allowed him to come in and do that on his own.
So once we made him understand that we were willing to allow him
access to that area, he was more open to us securing the property,
and he basically told his son that he gave his blessing and his son
was okay, even more excited about doing business with us
because he was able to see my interaction with his father and that
we were sort of accepting of his fathers wishes. 25
In this instance, money was not an adequate form of influence. Instead, the team
showed concern for the owners father and respect for his role as leader of the
family. Garnering the fathers approval resonated with the son, further solidifying
the sons relationship with the SF team.
A key aspect of mutual assistance involves how actions are perceived. In
the following example, an operator became the conduit between his unit and a
local mayor regarding any activities they conducted in the surrounding
community.
Yes, and you know, [I] just kind of felt like it was one of those things
where as long as you treated that person like they were another
human being, instead of a tool for you to be using to go out in town,
then you could pretty much get away with whatever you needed
[In] the initial relationship when we came to meet, he came onto the
base, and we just got to talking, so there was no agenda
initiallyno one had me going in to talk to this guy in order to
develop this relationship so that we could go out in town. It was just
we got to talking, I could tell that this was some guy of importance,
so I just started making the friendship. 26
At the time, recent bombings in the area had injured U.S. forces, restricted
movement in the local community and caused related concerns with the mayor.
36
This serendipitous initial meeting turned into a friendship and later became useful
for overcoming the issue of movement within the community.
In many cases, mutual assistance arises through identifying common
ground. Identifying with people on some level can serve as an access point to
influence. For instance, an artillery officer (now SF) describes how he found
common ground in discussing religion with Afghan partners.
And, [when the Afghans said] You know more about my faith than I
do, that seemed to make a difference. It was just like telling them
basic stories about Moses coming out of Egypt and Abraham
before that and this or that. They loved that stuff being able to trace
it all the way down. Just that little bit of knowledge and saying it
wasnt something that I believed, because I dont necessarily see it
as all the same faith, but I was saying that at the time to say, Hey
we are all cut from one skin. We are all from one cloth here. We are
all from the same faith base. I respect that, you guys respect what I
have got going on. 27
Because the operator often held Bible studies and served as the de facto
chaplain for the group, he ended up having the following encounter:
The senior [Afghan] in the camp ended up coming and talking to
me about it and how, There is greater respect for you, Mr. [Robert],
because you are the religious head of this entire base. That
seemed to make a significant difference with how I was seen from
the Afghans and what they saw as, Oh, he has a lot more clout
than we thought he had, which was kind of a fascinating picture.
He might not be in charge of the guns, but he is in charge of the
God thing.
Subsequently, the SF team running the camp began to seek this individuals
assistance for certain issues involving the partner force.
Similarly, a situation in the Philippines demonstrates how common ground
can reach beyond differences. A partner force general suggested to an operator
that they host a local viewing of a boxing match with Manny Pacquiao. The
primary idea was to invite enemies from the local insurgent group. Initially, the
operator questioned the idea, but the general insisted it would work because
37
Manny was a national hero. His fame transcended religious and culture barriers,
forming a national rallying point. The combined planning effort resulted in the
following success:
No kidding, like everybody from the insurgent camp walked through
the jungle, like lines of people with guns and everything and they
set down their guns at the front of this camp and watched the
Manny [Pacquiao] fight with the locals from the village where the
team lived. Like no kidding, 150 people. They [sat] and [watched]
the fight like nobody cared about who was American and who was
Filipino, who was bad and who was good. The campthe bad
camp and our camp, the good camp, like no kidding, setting down
our differences for two and a half hours and coming together, like,
no kidding, drinking beer and watching a Manny [Pacquiao] fight in
a bamboo hut in the middle of [nowhere]. Like we were everybodys
best friends. 28
Such common ground offers an access point to influence groups that do not
normally interact.
For example, in the following anecdote, an operator had assisted two
separate locals, an Iraqi and a Kurd, in reenergizing their respective businesses.
One local made concrete barriers, while the other contracted crane work for
construction. Recently they had each attempted expansion into the others
business realm, and the resulting friction drove both men to begin undermining
the others success to the point the operator had to bring them in and mitigate
potential violence.
Well, we kept it as justI kept it light. Kind of kept it friendly. They
immediately walked in the room and it was, Captain, I am not
talking to this man. He is a Kurd. The Kurd is like, I will shoot you
right now and this conversation will be over with. Instead of like,
Hey, guys, dont talk that way, [I responded with] more of a
laughey, jokeyThis is why I like you guys. You guys are funny.
You are more like each other than you can possibly imagine. 29
The operator lowered tension with some humor, and then explained how each
individual was controlling a different business that offered opportunities for
38
mutual support. This approach allowed them to see one another as

complementary, rather than as historical enemies. After this, the two men agreed
to divide and conquer, with one focusing on concrete and the other on crane
work, so that each would send the other business in his area of expertise.
In this final example, a Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operator sought
advice from an SF team nearby.
I just wanted to see how they did business and it was just such a
better working relationship. I dont think they were living with their
guys, but for some reason there just seemed to be some sort of
glue there. I think it was because they included more of the mission
planning with the Iraqi guys. There wasnt as much force feeding,
whereas I would go down and lay down the map like, This is what
we are doing. I think there was a little bit more like dialogue on
their part to kind of make the Iraqis feel more part of the game. 30
The following anecdote captures the benefit of this kind of inclusion in
fostering a partnership.
So we were living on the base camp with the [Iraqi] battalion, and
as the battalion did things, if the battalion commander and his staff
were a part of anything, then we were involved in that. Now the
maintenance of the camp, so eating, defenses, engagement with
the locals right around the camp, all of that we were fully a part
of. 31
By participating in these activities, the operators team conveyed a willingness to
develop the partnership beyond purely its own interests.
4.
Theme 4: Culturally Aware Behavior
Theme 4: Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an

effective conduit to creating genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing
successful relationships. This was identified by 19 operators and contains
20 subordinate codes such as cultural challenges, cultural difference,
sectarian rivalry, and authority reinforcement. Reference term is Culturally
Aware Behavior.
39
Cultural knowledge and associated behavior, or its absence, can affect an

operators ability to influence a partner. However, interviews undertaken for this
thesis reveal that cultural expertise is relatively less important if an operator can
demonstrate a genuine interest and shared concern for locals. The following
example from Iraq highlights the importance of shared concern:
They had no issues with [us not growing mustaches] just because
they knew Americans dont like growing mustaches because it isnt
the 1970s. They were fine with that. It wasnt the big insult that a lot
of people think it is. Or not eating food because people think if you
dont eat this, they will assume you think they are gross, or they will
take it as an insultbut the more important thing is, it is not the
cultural awareness, it is just proper respect. If you are going to go
and do a mission with somebody, you should probably get to know
them. 32
In a larger sense, though, cultural awareness offers a conduit to the perspective
of partners. Without it, actions can be misunderstood. In the case below, an
Infantry officer (now SF) used a young English-speaking Iraqi enlisted soldier as
an interpreter. In doing so, he had inadvertently created a situation in which a
low-ranking soldier was passing instructions to senior leadership. When a new
Iraqi commander took over, this difference in rank was not well received, and the
new Iraqi commander quietly transferred the enlisted English-speaking soldier to
other duty. The Infantry officer was frustrated after having spent nine months
working closely with the old commander and this particular interpreter.
Compounding this situation was the fact that the new commander had been
inserted based on political connections. The new commander demonstrated little
tactical aptitude and never went on operations, yet demanded the respect due
his rank and position. Under the guise of discussing operations, the Infantry
officer decided to explain his need for the young interpreter. He initially
approached the matter with a polite tone. However, his underlying bias for the old
commander, and his issues with the questionable performance and background
40
of the new one, surfaced. Here is what took place shortly after their conversation
began:
[He] starts yelling at me because I am a captain, and he is a
lieutenant colonel. He could have been just appointed lieutenant
colonel; I [had] no idea if this guy [had] even been in the military. So
he starts yelling at me and giving me a hard time, at which point I
totally lose my cool, if you can believe that, and I start yelling back
at him. It gets to the point where I am yelling stuff at him, and I am
not really sure what the interpreter is translating literally to him, to
the point where this new battalion commander says, I quit, I am
done. He threw his hat on the floor and [yelled] something at me in
Arabic and he is like, I am leaving. So he goes outside and he is
going out the gate to leave. Well, now part of my force is now in a
mutiny, and they are leaving with him. I am like, well, this isnt good.
So I probably have 50 guys [who] are throwing their uniforms down
and going to go out the gate
You know, it was like the situation wasnt as important as the face
and the honor and whatever else was happening because he
expected respect because of his position, instead of having earned
it like the other officers. The problem was, that is a
misinterpretationbecause [as Americans] when we place honor
on guys, it is because of action and personality and stuff like that,
whereas with them, honor comes because of position. We had a
difference of view, so it waslater on farther down the line I
understood. At the time I didnt, but like I said, I was 24 years old. 33
This situation resulted in a loss of rapport that resonated for the rest of the
rotation, despite the commander returning after a week and attempting to have
the U.S. officer fired..
On a positive note, the experience had considerable impact on the U.S.
officers approach, as he notes below:
But, as I gotolder and more mature and had to go back a second
time, I realized that there is more to the game [than] I realized the
first time. Everything had to happen right now, and everything was
important right now, my first time there; whereas, when I got back
the second time in 2008, I realizedthere is a lot more political
33 Subject 2, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, June 6, 2013).
41
maneuvering and a lot smoother way to get what I want without

having to get into [these] blow up scenarios. 34
Overall, respect and hierarchy within the Iraqi culture were important, but
the large issue was the operators individualist approach to a collectivist-oriented
partner. Such adjustments are critical to strategic success in engaging and
influencing partners; negative results on even a single tactical SOF mission, as a
result of a lack of cultural knowledge, could mean expulsion from the country, as
the following operator feared while in a politically sensitive country:
In this particular countryyou are doing everything you can just to
stay there. You are walking on eggshells. So I always had that in
the back of my mind anytime I had a meeting with those guys
because you just dont want to say the wrong thing. Obviously, if
you [anger them], it is game over. 35
A related concern mentioned in over half the interviews was sectarian
rivalry or violence. SOF routinely either partner with rival groups within a given
foreign defense structure, or deal with similar divisions in the local populace. This
can present complex challenges in building trust or serving as a mediator. For
example, the following situation occurred during a training mission in Mali, where
a long time rivalry exists between black Malians and Tuareg Malians. A SOF
team was training Tuaregs in a camp dominated by black Malians when tensions
broke out.
Before arriving, the team had been told that U.S.-supplied equipment held
on the base would be provided to the Tuaregs after they completed their training.
This was conveyed to the Tuaregs as a form of motivation. However, the team
quickly determined the Tuaregs didnt have enough basic gear to complete the
planned training. Many didnt even have shoes or uniforms, much less the correct
web gear to hold weapon magazines. This prompted a request to the embassy
for an immediate draw of the gear to support training. It was approved, and the
team coordinated for the issuing of the gear. However, the supply warehouse
34 Ibid.
42
was run by black Malians. They demanded the Tuaregs sign receipts for the gear
and return it after the training. The black Malians began yelling at the Tuaregs,
accusing them of intending to sell the gear on the black market, whereas the
Tuaregs argued that as fellow service members, they should be issued the same
equipment as the blacks. This argument erupted into a near disaster, and the
operators team had to step in to prevent an escalation:
We stopped everything, pulled everybody back, we tried to iron
everything out, went over and talked to the base commander with
the [Tuareg] unit commander, tried to figure out what the hell is
going on. Basically [the situation] just evolved [into], Hey, this is a
Tuareg unit, [training on a base with a] black Mali commander with
all his nugs at the base, and here is your [Taureg] equipment, but
you [the Taureg commander] are going to give it back to me [after
training] You have got the Tuaregs basically like rising up starting
to revolt, and this is a bullshit type thing where it almost comes to
blows at the warehouse, like people fighting. 36
Ultimately, the operator brought the Tuareg unit commander and black
base commander together in one room and asked them both to offer their
perspective. After they each voiced their concerns, the commanders were able to
reach an agreement so that the equipment was issued and training continued.
5.
Theme 5: Building Social Capital
Theme 5: Managing relationships that result in influence requires

building upon how a partner is perceived by others in the organization or
community as well as by himself or herself. This was identified by all 20
operators and contains 30 subordinate codes such as adaptability,
boosting partner ego, humor, selling, and building others social capital.
Reference term is Building Social Capital.
. One common tool for success is building others social capital. One way
an operator and his team accomplished this was to hold a SWAT Olympics for
several local police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams with whom they
worked in Iraq.
43
When the winning SWAT [team] went home, they had a parade for
themand all these peoplewere all there, and they had this huge
parade. So it built a lot of pride in that SWAT [unit]. So that was
beneficial, I think. That was like an extra-curricular activity that had,
like, very beneficial second and third order effects. 37
While broad ramifications are possible through building social capital, the
approach can be as successful on an individual level by giving credit to others. In
the following case, an operator had worked slowly to influence his HN partner to
implement a legitimate process for requesting warrants prior to operations.
Initially the commander was reluctant to do so, but he had recently come around
to the operators point of view. Then shortly after his acquiescence, a national
conference was held of all SWAT unit leaders. The operator advised the
commander that not only should he showcase the warrant process, but that he
would receive credit for it at the conference. This advice produced the following
results:
When we got back to our area, I could do no wrong because he
knows that him [sic] being important is both good for him and good
for our mission. He saw thatI was willing not to take the credit
and give it to him. In everyone elses eyes, he is this visionary that,
like, has a way forward, and he is truly [inaudible] with respect to
the law. In which case, he would be a lot more lenient to anything
that I would suggest that we should go and do. 38
The same American operator also emphasized the work required to help a
HN partner.
But there is a lot of work behind doing something for people,
whether that is your friends and you are helpingI had one
[expletive] friend that was driving me nuts, he would ask me a
hundred times to help him do his backyard, but he was a good
friend and he deserved it, so I would go over there and bust my ass
to help him out. Same thing with this [HN partner]. It was like it was
hard work to be this guys friend. 39
38 Subject 2, major, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author, June 6, 2013).
39 Ibid.
44
Influencing others calls for a degree of adaptability, which is often required

when working in a country team environment.
But it still gave me exposure to [the fact that] not everyone thinks
like a SOF guy or DoD guy. Everyone has their different upbringing,
especially the State folks[who are] totally risk adverse [sic], dont
want to kill anyone. It seems like a different day of the week you
might be dealing with a different personality in the same guy. So it
is just kind of being able to read what day it is and know when you
can be tough and up front, or when you might need to compromise
a little bit. I dont know what it is that makes you recognize those
things, but I think it is just having the abilityI guess it is flexibility
basicallyin your own personality that makes it work. 40
Emotional control also plays a part in building social capital and can
require acting or role-playing, as the following anecdote illustrates.
Leaders in the operators partner unit had a warrant issued for their arrest
and their pay was stopped. This situation required that the operator and his
partners visit a judge at the provincial headquarters. During the meeting, the
discussion deteriorated quickly, resulting in a shouting match between the judge
and the operators partners. Thinking creatively, the operator joined in the
argument, yelling in support of these men before turning to them and saying,
Hey guys, just step outside. This is ridiculous. I am losing my temper. Once the
men left, the operator confided to the judge that he had only been acting to show
support for his partners. He conveyed that he understood the judges
perspective, and asked if they could work out a solution. The tactic garnered the
following results:
I kind of worked with the judge there to come up with whatever the
resolution was. The judge was so excited just to be in on this trick
that I had played on my guys that he listened to reason. You know
what I mean? Then when the judge realized I was just playing this
trick, he was like, that is awesome. I am in on this secret. Just by
letting him feel [that] he was in power, he kind of listened to reason,
and he let my guys go. 41
45
By validating the judges status, the operator helped resolve the situation. He
identified the issue driving both his partners and the judge. When the judge saw
that his U.S. partners respected him, he was willing to listen and create a
solution.
As the previous example indicates, humor is important and five operators
mentioned its value in either deflating tension or creating common ground. One
operator observed this application on the target after a raid.
Yes. I think so. I think in that particular incident, the local nationals
[were] laughing as well, you know, and it wasI dont know exactly
what question he was asking at the time, but it kind of like
diffuseshe [the Soldier conducting TQ] was able to diffuse the
situation. It has got to be kind of an emotional event to have a strike
force landing on your house and terrorizing you for like three hours,
trying to figure stuff out, but [the Soldier] kind of like understood that
and used [humor] as an advantage or diffuse, [sic] instead of just
making it worse. 42
Such micro-techniques reinforce the five larger human behavior themes identified
in this section as necessary for influence. In the next section, the focus turns to
themes predicated upon situational dynamics.
B.
SITUATIONAL DYNAMICS
Situational dynamics refers to circumstances in specific settings and
situations that may impact an individuals ability to leverage influence. For

instance, U.S. SOF often debate how much time should be invested with
partners, how that time should specifically be spent, if it should be all work and
no play, whether first impressions matter, and the like. Therefore, the first
commonly occurring theme is one that tests military culture to some degree, but
remains a crucial factor when it comes to successful influence.
1.
Theme 6: Hanging Out: Informal Learning
Theme 6: Learning about others through hanging out beyond work

is a significant catalyst for successful cross-cultural interpersonal
46
influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators and contains 18

subordinate codes such as playing sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol,
and living with partners, among others. Reference term is Hanging Out.
Hanging out refers to a form of informal learning or learning by
serendipity and has been documented in the literature on situational learning and
communities of practice. 43 One difficulty with hanging out is the perception its a
recreational activity, as opposed to a productive work effort. In the military, workrelated travel perceived to be more social than productive is often referred to as a
boondoggle. Yet the interviews collected for this thesis suggest that few
instances of successful partner influence occurred without some social factor,
while social-interaction was conspicuously absent from almost every failure. It is
difficult to understand someones perspective, build common ground, or be seen
as having genuine interest without socializing with that individual. For example,
the operator below comments on how socializing impacted his ODAs ability to
develop relationships in Iraq.
It is not just get in and get the information, finish the patrol, go back
to the FOB [Forward Operating Base]. I think that [hanging out] was
an extremely key component of being able to develop relationships
with [our Iraqi partners], having an interpersonal discussion with
them, just hanging out, even if there is nothing going on, even if
they are not doing anything and we are not doing anything. Still
going over there without a specific question to ask, without a
specific thing you want them to do and continuing to maintain and
build that relationship. 44
A different operator in Iraq noted the value that perceived friendship holds
over material support.
The only influencing that you had to do was [maintain] almost a
buddy relationship with them. Like they knew that if we were
friends, then we could still continue to do missions. How you
maintained the friendship wasnt giving them money or fuel or
anything like that, it was just hanging out with them. Notand I
dont mean that for going to the range and shooting and training
43 Frank J. Barrett, Yes to the Mess: Surprising Leadership Lessons from Jazz (Boston: Harvard
Business Review Press, 2012), 93-118.
47
but spending time with them after that. We would go over there with
them and just sit down and watch some of their TV shows, or we
would throw in one of our movies So it was more like bro time if
you want to call it that, just bullshit. 45
The SF operators interviewed for this thesis relied heavily on socializing to
build trust and influence with their partners. Those who spoke of long-term
partnerships in Iraq all noted a return on investment after socializing with
partners, as did the operator below regarding partnerships in the Philippines:
There wasnt a language barrier, and I think that went a long way.
We just seemed to get along so much easier than, saywith the
Iraqis and Afghans. You know, I guess it is probably because at the
end of the day, we are just willing to go back, have a warm beer
and barbeque some fish heads and whatnot. You know, I think that
is good. I mean that has always been the glue that has held a SOF
unit together or a platoon together. So same sort of thing there. 46
The above Philippine example reveals several trends found throughout the
interviews. Operators were consistently drawn to English speaking partners and
tended to hang out with them more, which equated to better relationships.
Typically, non-English speaking partners experienced less social-interaction after
work, which led to less valuable relationships. In turn, those who were often the
more difficult partners to influence received less time and attention.
Language barriers aside, humans are generally less drawn to those who
do not share their interests. However, the value of pursuing mutual interests
notwithstanding, SOF typically chooses partners for a purpose, so SOF bears the
weight of bridging the relational gap.
This same disparity, however, also occurs with U.S. partners and requires
awareness in order to seize an opportunity. For example, one operator
interviewed used the hanging out approach to garner support from an agency
partner during an embassy rotation. Upon arrival, the operators small
detachment had little influence or ability to weigh-in on decisions. Thus, he had to
48
find an opportunity to gain indirect influence through other power brokers in the
embassy. An agency official mentioned a favorite TV series that was not locally
available. The operator mentioned his interest also in this show and offered to
bring in some episodes for viewing over lunch. He then used their viewings as an
opportunity to build a casual friendship. As the relationship developed, the
operator was able to use these TV sessions to garner support for his mission.
I had a way in because most of our conversations were quick back
and forth, but if I could get in his office and sit there for a half hour
longer straight, then I could actually start to talk about different
programs I wanted to do. You know, I became a trusted friend, and
I had something that he wanted. So even if it was something so
trivial as a TV show in the middle of the day, it worked out. But at
the end, that is U.S. to U.S. relationship [sic], but that is how a lot of
stuff is done. 47
Based on interviews conducted for this thesis, an absence of socialization
with U.S. partners was identified as a primary contributor to the higher rate of
failure with U.S. partners.
Another common route to success is meal sharing and 15 of 20 operators
mentioned it 40 times in their efforts to build or maintain a partnership.
That approach actually was taken well becauseso [the HN
partner] basically opened up and it was not just taking one event, it
was taking every day I met him like at least five times. I met with
him for lunch, breakfast, dinnerthen, of course, when he would go
out, I would go out with him too.
Sometimes this high level of persistence and complete side-by-side
involvement with partners was required to yield the most positive returns. But, as
the following excerpt indicates, even periodic barbeques or parties can help to
establish and increase influence.
The celebration that we had at Ramadan was a single day, but it
was an entire day of us hanging out with them, not doing anything
except cooking, having meals, playing volleyball, but that one day I
think reinforced what we were doing prior to that day. I think we
49
could have done ten different operations, but it wouldnt have been
as effective as that one party that we had. 48
As noted in the above reference to volleyball, sports also provided a good
opportunity for common ground and socialization. Nine operators of the 20
interviewed mentioned this sports approach. One operator recalled that on a
combat deployment, the teams relationship with its partners was initially
tenuous. However, when the operators team noticed their partners engaged in a
soccer game and offered to join in, the relationship between the units improved
significantly. This created a deeper partnership:
when you knew they didnt want to go out on that mission
because you just came in 30 minutes before you got to leave, they
would still pull something together because it wasnt so much that
they were going out because it was the job, it was because they
were going out because you were going out. So there is this kind of
loyalty that had been developed. You are going out with friends
somehow. 49
Despite the positive gains derived through soccer, though, the operators
team became overly aggressive on the field on one occasion, fouling their
partners and pushing the boundaries of trust:
From there the relationship was hurt because it was almost like we
hadyou know, you dont beat up on your friendswell, even
though they are not technical [sic] your friends, but you know what I
mean. So then you go and ask for their help to go out on a mission
and they were very, very hesitant. 50
After this dynamic was recognized, the operator and his unit made a concerted
effort to deescalate behavior on the field to recreate their former friendly
environment. This was successfully accomplished and the situation between the
units improved.
49 Subject 17, lieutenant commander, U.S. Navy SEALs (interview with author, August 20,
2013).
50 Ibid.
50
The topic of drinking alcohol with partners is sensitive.
With few
exceptions, the U.S. military frowns on consumption of alcohol while overseas on

official orders. Furthermore, many of the countries SOF elements operate in are
Muslim. Even so, research conducted for this thesis indicates that it has a place
within SOF partnership missions. Ten operators mentioned that drinking alcohol
with partners offered value. Partner units or unit leaders often drank; in fact,
sometimes not taking a drink was the more awkward choice. Below an operator
describes a senior American involved in a SOF Key Leader Engagement (KLE)
in a Muslim country who refused to drink, despite a prior warning that such a
refusal could be perceived as offensive.
He didnt drink, and I just remember meeting with the KLE people a
few times after that and they kept saying stuff like, Hey, he didnt
like what we were setting up for him? It was like, No, he really did
like it, I think he was just sick. You know, you have got to make up
some bullshit or whatever. So I dont know, you just got to know the
culture for some of these meetings. 51
Another operator shared an example about the amount of effort that
developing partnerships takes. When partnered with an Iraqi Commando
battalion, his team focused strongly on partnership at all command and staff
levels. Team leaders partnered with unit leaders while the other men partnered
with staff and company level leaders. But this went beyond purely work
encounters. The Americans worked out in the same gym, ate the same meals,
and spent significant amounts of down time with their partners. At first the
Americans were frustrated at giving up personal time. Later they saw the fruits of
their labor and grew to understand how this interaction served as a catalyst for
influence.
My guys ended up doing that to the point where at the end they
were, Hey sir, we are having a little dinner. Can you come to that
too? The company commander would like you to come there as
well. I would like you to be there. Sure, no problem. But they got
it at the end. Everyone was like, yes, this is now living with [our]
counterparts. This is how it is supposed to be. It isnt just we will
51 Ibid.
51
call you when a mission is ready, and then we will all go together. It
is you develop the intel, we are here to help you, lets live together
as best we can, lets all go fight together. That is the way to do it.
Yes, we spent a ton of time together. A ton. 52
Spending time with partners creates opportunities for men to get to know
one another on a more sincere level, largely through exchanges that occur
informally, and the spatial conditions that facilitate these interactions for SOF
operators are much more personal than those associated with conventional
forces..
2.
Theme 7: Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints
Theme 7: Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely

encountered within U.S. systems and those of international partners will
reduce barriers to effective influence. This theme was identified by all 20
operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as transitioning units,
lack of continuity, and pressure from Higher. Reference term is
Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints.
The operators interviewed for this thesis mentioned multiple occasions,
especially in Iraq, in which they found it difficult to explain to their U.S. chain of
command the expenditure of resources necessary to build relations with Iraqi
partners. One reason cited for the difficulty was the need to quantify success by
the number of missions undertaken and insurgents killed, and this need often
constrained the operators abilities to build legitimate partnerships. The following
account of a discussion between a team leader and his company commander
illustrates this dilemma.
I mean, I was literally on phone callsI got phone calls from my
Company Commander saying, Why havent you guysyou guys
havent done any hits in like three nights. What [expletive] is going
on? [S]ir, I just spent an entire day at the Iraqi National Police
Headquarters talking to one of their commanders about the locals
in the area and [current enemy activity]. I said, Isnt that what we
are here to do? He is like, No, we are here to kill people. 53
52
The operator attempted to justify time spent with partners as necessary to

understanding the intelligence picture. He characterized the time spent as crucial
to developing a trust that ensured partners performed to a certain level on
missions. A further issue arose when the operator was forced by his chain of
command to conduct missions, despite his concerns regarding their value. As
this situation evolved, the partner force leader questioned the legitimacy of such
missions, making it awkward for the operator to ask his counterpart for
assistance in executing them.
Relying on HN partners and interaction with locals to build an intelligence
picture, not to mention a level of trust on missions, is an underlying requirement
for SF. It is important for SOF leaders to understand and value the time and effort
it takes to build that level of influence. For instance:
I think it is justso many of us get caught up in what we are doing
and, you know, like I want to have the A+ product for my boss,
rather than I will give him a B+ product, but I am going to spend
some time to really know what the hell is going on here, so [that]
internally I really understand this place, rather than presenting [him]
with this superficial product that makes [him] think I might
understand it. Just prioritizing and managing times, I think, because
in the endyou gainit can only go so far, right? You cant just eat
goat meat to winning [sic] a war, but you have toif you want to
have an understanding of the people and the culture and what the
hell is going on, like the truth on the ground, you have to take some
of that time to go and do that. 54
This outlines a regrettably common habit among junior officers who may resign
themselves to presenting a less than fully accurate picture in order to meet
command expectations.
In one case, an operators team needed to work with the Department of
State (DOS) to achieve the mission. However, it was a clandestine mission, and
he was constrained by not being able to disclose the teams primary purpose,
even to a senior U.S. leader. Instead, as instructed by his command, the operator
provided a mission overview that was intended to be sufficiently plausible to
53
garner the redirection of resources from other efforts. However, the plan
presented was limited in scope and seemed to describe duties similar to those
already performed by the DOS. Thus, DOS leadership questioned the operators
true reason for being there, which led to the following outcome:
Again, the line that I was supposed to give him was that we were
doing what was our operational deception plan, [ but] he wasnt
very supportive of our activities there. The conversation turned
somewhat hostile inthat he understood that the military and
interagency relationship was one of necessity in Iraq; he was
accepting that we were going to be in the area, and he knew that
he couldnt stop us from doing anything, but he just was not going
to facilitate our activities through the course of his activities as
well. 55
The issue was resolved when the operator had individuals from his headquarters
fly in and provide the DOS with a full classified brief on their mission.
However, bureaucratic constraints can also coalesce to create favorable
or enhanced conditions for partnership building, even if unintentionally. In one
such case, an operators team conducted a JCET in Mexico and was required to
live in a small closed compound with its partner unit due to political concerns.
we were forced to live in barracks alongside the Mexicans; we
were forced to not leave the compound. So what ended up being a
directive against my teams ability to conduct operations or training
in this case, ended up being a very good way to build and maintain
rapport with these guys because we were with them 24/7. 56
Most often, though, problems are created or accentuated when operators receive
pressure from their headquarters that do not take into account realities on the
ground.
3.
Theme 8: Multi-Group Coordination
Theme 8: Employment as a SOF operator requires the ability to

simultaneously manage relationships and influence with multiple
54
organizations and individuals. This theme was identified by 17 operators in

one code. Reference term is Multi-Group Coordination.
Operators acknowledged being engaged in, and responsible for, a wide
range of tasks and relationships, including embassy duty, foreign military
advisory training,
unilateral and bilateral operations,
advising of
local
governments and civilians, interagency coordination, and Department of Defense

(DoD) internal coordination. In the example below, an NCO operator visited a
partner nation Secretary of Defense when his teams gear was held up at
customs in a smaller country.
I remember being in his office thinking to myselfand he talked
about [General Schoomaker] he was like, Oh yes, I am friends with
[Schoomaker] do you know him? but I remember thinking to
myselfat the time our Secretary of Defense was Rumsfeld, and I
[thought] myself, this is like being in Rumsfelds office. Like, this
seems odd. Like it was just a matter ofit was sitting in his office,
drinking some tea, talking about what the team is doing in his
country and basically [reminding] him of who we are. 57
By comparison, in the example below, an operator identifies issues that
arose from various U.S. organizations coordinating with the same HN
headquarters, often including the same commanding general.
Now this is where you come into saturation of the environment
where you have 100 AmericansI am exaggeratingbut you have
multiple Americans trying to talk to the same people in authority
and people who can make decisions. So you have multiple
Americans trying to influence them, and now you are trying to
deconflict with what they are doing, with what you are trying to do,
and then this guy doesnt want to sit down and meet with
Americans all day, so sometimes you are there in the same room at
the same time with different objectives. 58
In yet another case, an operator found himself serving as a conduit among
U.S. interagency, military, and government entities, entirely aside from his duties
with his HN partner.
57 Subject 10, chief warrant officer three, U.S. Army Special Forces (interview with author,
August 9, 2013).
55
That same country was a heavy interagency environment, so a lot

of dynamics between State [DOS], the Theater Special Operations
Command [TSOC)], CIA, and the Task Forcereally, just
understanding the different culturesand I was in a pretty good
position because it just seemed like the TSOC had a very vague
mission that no one understood what they were there for. The
Agency and State didnt really get along, so, like, I just always saw
myself as kind of the intermediary between the rest of the folks
[and] the Agency. I was just kind of like a broker. 59
As these brief examples suggest, operators can assume they will need to
work with a wide range of partners.
To illustrate better the environment in which operators are expected to
perform successfully, the next section will offer a series of negotiation diagrams.
The negotiation process is often complex, even in a one-on-one event.
For example, in a one-on-one negotiation, both parties at a minimum have
to consider impacts on multiple levels and, in many cases, actual negotiations
take place at each respective level. It is vital to understand all of the levels within
your partners immediate organization, how and why they impact his decisionmaking, or even how these levels can be used to mislead someone. For
example, a partner might claim his decision-making is constrained by another
element, such as his headquarters, when really he is only using a falsehood to
achieve his goal. To facilitate an understanding of these dynamics, Figure 2
below offers a visual representation of a one-on-one negotiation.
56
Figure 2.
One-on-One Negotiation Chart. 60
In the next figure we see a group negotiation, perhaps between different

HN partners, local tribes, or elements in an embassy. In this case the dynamics
of one-on-one negotiation are still applied within the larger context, as indicated
below in Figure 3.
60 Author-developed adaptation of a chart presented in the following article and lecture: James P.
Ware, Bargaining Strategies: Collaborative versus Competitive Approaches (Boston: Harvard
Business School Publishing, 1980), 6; Susan Hocevar, MN3118: Negotiation for Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (lecture at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, April 2013).
57
Figure 3.
Group Negotiation Chart. 61
Figure 4 below represents multiple simultaneous negotiations taking place

during a SOF mission.
61 Authors enlarged version of Figure 3 depicting individual negotiation dynamics.
58
Figure 4.
Multiple Simultaneous Negotiations62
Operating in the realm of negotiation and mediation with mixed

organizations and cultures offers ample room for failure. A primary means of
achieving success with all partners foreign and American is through interpersonal
relationships. Personal relationships are necessary to ensure that individual and
unit level competencies are recognized and fully employed. Maximizing an
operators ability to execute at the cross-cultural interpersonal level will provide
that opportunity.
The following section will present a process map. The process map
collects the themes discussed above and captures the ways they mutually
support one another. The map depicts how, collectively, the themes can assist
SOF Operators in gaining influence.
C.
THE INTERPERSONAL OPERATOR

The aim of this thesis has been to deconstruct cross-cultural interpersonal
engagements to highlight tendencies that impact both success and failure. The
62 Authors enlarged version of Figure 4 depicting group negotiation dynamics.
59
themes are distinct, but operate together to support success. For example, when
training a partner unit in India, one might make use of the themes in the following
manner: agree to have tea with a partner after training, which constitutes a form
of hanging out; discuss family, to show genuine behavior; ask about unit
concerns, to gain perspective; offer to assist with a future unit plan in return for
jungle training, as mutual assistance; introduce partner leaders to a senior U.S.
diplomat, to build their social capital; and mention any problems requiring
discussion with subtlety, in keeping with collectivist cultural behavior.
Figure 6 illustrates how effective influence can be executed at the crosscultural or organizational interpersonal levels while applying positive themes. A
list of the positive themes applied here is provided below the figure for ease of
reference.
60
1.
Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process
Figure 5.
Cross-Cultural Interpersonal Influence Process Map

61
2.
Review of Successful Themes Applied to Process
a.
Genuine Behavior
Success in handling interpersonal engagements or influencing partners is

heavily reliant on the presence of real or perceived genuine human concern and
interest. This was identified by every operator in over 50 codes ranging from
humility, compassion and appreciation to respect, genuine interest, giving,
helping, and the like.
b.
Gaining Perspective
Taking a partners perspective, or broadening/challenging ones own

perspectivealong with related actions that aid in creating perspective, such as
asking questions, listening, or developing dialoguecollectively serve as a major
positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements and also aid as a learning
tool to understand failed encounters. This theme was identified by every operator
in all 23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including
perspective-taking, asking questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an
open-minded approach.
c.
Mutual Assistance
Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with partners, to include

acting as a mediator between partners to enhance their mutual support,
facilitates a higher level of collective understanding and positively affects an
individuals ability to influence others. This was identified by every operator in all
23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes such as mutual learning,
creating common ground, reciprocal value, and shared concerns.
d.
Culturally Aware Behavior
Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an effective means

to create genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing successful relationships.
62
This was identified by 19 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as

cultural
challenges,
cultural
difference,
sectarian
rivalry,
and
authority
reinforcement.
e.
Managing relationships that result in influence requires using a range of

effective approaches to create perceived mutual interest and find common
ground. This was identified by all 20 operators and contains 30 subordinate
codes such as adaptability, confidence, humor, selling, and building others social
capital.
f.
Hanging Out
Learning about others through hanging out beyond work is a significant

catalyst for successful cross-cultural interpersonal influence. This theme was
identified by all 20 operators and contains 18 subordinate codes such as playing
sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol, and living with partners, among others.
g.
Overcoming Bureaucratic Constraints
Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely encountered within our own

systems and those of our partners will reduce a significant barrier to effective
influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators and contains 20
subordinate codes such as transitioning units, lack of continuity, and pressure
from higher authorities.
h.
Multi-Group Coordination
Employment as a SOF operator requires the ability to simultaneously

manage relationships and exercise influence with multiple organizations and
individuals. This theme was identified by 17 operators in one code.
63
64
V.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
These tangible examples and related overarching trends have been

presented to emphasize why SF and SOF need to focus on improving crosscultural interpersonal skills. With the changing face of conflict and the formidable
goal of building a global SOF partnership, operators will continue to work in
complex environments where these skills are required for success. These
environments demand operators who can navigate myriad foreign and
organizational cultures to influence U.S. and foreign partners.
The need to improve both cross-cultural interpersonal skills and intracultural skills, a less complex variant, was presented in this thesis through the
real-world experiences offered by 20 currently serving operators. During a total of
96 interpersonal engagements, these men acknowledged failing 28 percent of
the time. U.S. partnered engagements failed at a rate of 37 percent and foreign
engagements at a rate of 25 percent. These outcomes were largely driven by the
following
eight
themes:
genuine
behavior,
gaining
perspective,
mutual
assistance, culturally aware behavior, building social capital, hanging out,

overcoming bureaucratic constraints, and multi-group coordination. But the
identification of these themes is the simple part: there are no shortcuts to
acquiring these skills, no magic way to change the interpersonally challenged
individual on a team from a bull to a canary in the china shop. Nonetheless,
certain organizational and individual adjustments can assist operators who aspire
to positive change in these areas.
In that spirit, this chapter offers some initial suggestions to improve crosscultural interpersonal skills. Some apply directly to U.S. Army Special Forces, but
most apply to SOF at large. Suggestions are offered in specific sections that
focus on schoolhouse-supported training, initial SF training, unit-internal
activities, and unit funded training.
65
Training in cross-cultural interpersonal skills applies most directly to the

development of a global SOF partnership, operations in the human domain, and
the conduct of most SF missions, including UW. Likewise, most of an SF teams
time is spent with HN elements. The further that a partners cultural norms
diverge from those of the U.S., the more time it takes to gain perspective, build
common ground, engage in genuine behavior, and attain influence..
A smaller cultural gap with inter-organizational American partners makes it
feasible to garner greater returns with less exposure time. The problem is that
units rarely engage in interagency partnership building and maintenance outside
of actual deployments. When operators do not interact with U.S. partners until
deployed, and then only intermittently to meet specific needs, mission success
may be impacted for all U.S. parties involved. In other words, SOF needs
increasedand
normalized
(i.e.,
routinely
conducted
outside
of
active
engagement in conflict) intra-cultural exposure with other U.S. organizations as

well. This assertion is supported by the higher rates of failure, as revealed by this
research, between U.S. partners than between SOF and foreign partners. In
addition, increased interaction between SOF and other USG agencies will
reinforce the success of all interagency bodies in their respective foreign
partnerships.
The recommendations to follow will be broad in scope and not strictly
cross-cultural. The intent is to improve operators abilities to function
interpersonally across the full spectrum of partner cultures, foreign and
organizational.
A.
SOF OR SF CROSS-CULTURAL INTERPERSONAL SKILLS COURSE

The widely recognized need for cross-cultural interpersonal skills in SOF
aids in justifying the creation of a focused training venue and conduit for related
expertise. Both SOF and SF currently have specialty courses that teach
everything from Intelligence to advanced urban tactics; many of these selective
training opportunities require either a recommendation or the fulfillment of certain
66
prerequisites in order for an individual to attend, and while all the targeted skill
sets they address are important, no single area of competency touches as many
aspects of a special operators job as cross-cultural interpersonal skills.
Influencing others is the primary avenue to success in SOF and especially SF.
Because cross-cultural interpersonal skills directly enable SOF to engage in its
signature indirect approach, including the application of other specialty skills, a
SOF-supported training venue on cross-cultural interpersonal skills would
enhance mission success both by directly addressing a critical training deficiency
and by reinforcing the value obtained from other specialty schools.
The process of developing a thorough cross-cultural and interpersonal
skills course for SOF could begin with a USASOC level course run by the 1st
Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). It could be established and
conducted by a small core of one or two officers and no more than 10 NCOs.
Instructors would be selected on a voluntary basis from SOF units and would
also include civilian experts, interagency partners, or academics. Likewise, the
student population could be broadly representative of SOFs real-world partners:
training would be open to any qualified SOF MOS within the community, as well
as foreign SOF students, interagency partners, and NGOs. A diverse
participation base would add value to the learning experience and create
professional networking opportunities.
Assigned personnel would then be sent to reputable civilian-military
training venues to learn alongside and interface with leading professionals in the
field of influence. This could include visits to various units and U.S. country
teams to further study where problems occur most frequently, with whom and
why. The initial intent would be to build a shared baseline of knowledge and
develop a supportive professional network. The core participants, acting as
ambassadors, would then export their experiences and contacts to similar
programs and relevant individuals within their own networks. A panel of experts
emerging from this collaboration would then be tasked with creating a five to 10day program of instruction. This curriculum would include instruction in
67
negotiation, mediation, rapport building, and other cross-cultural or organizational

interpersonal skills, with emphasis on planning and conducting practical
exercises gleaned from real-world SOF missions. Cases presented could
resemble those offered in this thesis, updated through communication with units,
partners, or embassies. Lessons learned in individual vignettes would be
discussed, reinforced with theory, and implemented in subsequent practical
exercises, including a culminating field training exercise at the courses
conclusion.
At a minimum, this type of intensive, scenario-based training would offer
exposure to complex issues concerning various HN partners and country team
members. NGOs, foreign businesses, conventional units, or government
agencies could also be included. Attendees would rotate through a series of
assigned roles in which they would practice negotiation or mediation. The course
could also feature guest instructors from similar programs around the country.
Guest students could be invited directly from organizations outlined in scenarios.
To maximize the training value of course expenditures, the team of instructors
could offer similar training events at the unit level, or could operate as a mobile
training team (MTT). Further course enhancements would include a certification
process for instructors at the unit level. Ideally, this element would also partner
with SFAS and the SFQC in development and implementation of testing and
training options in this realm.
B.
SFQC TRAINING
Chapter II illustrated what the SFQC already does to select and train
cross-cultural interpersonal skills. Recommendations in this section are intended

to supplement those efforts. It is important to establish conditions early in the
course that reinforce the importance ofand maximize the opportunity for
acquiring cross-cultural interpersonal skills during Phase I. Potential SF
operators need to understand up front how this skill set translates to their future
work. Providing contextual examples of positive and negative applications from
68
previous and current missions would expose SFQC candidates to the wide range
of individuals with whom operators work, along with the various challenges
associated with adapting to those different interpersonal dynamics. Such a class
might include asking candidates about their personal experience with other units
or HN forces, as well as their experiences dealing with U.S. of HN civilians.
Discussion would focus on why things happened and how they could have
occurred differently. This would allow for group learning through shared personal
experience, and would further the concept of fostering dialogue with partners in
place of purely transmitting information. Likewise, instructors could share their
own stories about how certain skills translated to success or failure and how their
lessons learned have shifted their expectations of what traits are essential in a
competent teammate.
After justifying and personalizing the importance of the skill set,
presentations could be offered on mediation and negotiation theory. These could
include an organizational and cultural review of a U.S. country team, since this is
a common partnership. Instruction would review both the common usage of
cross-cultural interpersonal skills
in
daily
tasks,
as
well
as
potential
complications, such as backside negotiations, that influence a partners actions.

Other training would introduce a range of possible partner perspectives and
identities and would explore how those could influence decision-making. This
would include a review of negotiation preparation and one or more role-playing
scenarios, placing candidates in a partners historical and cultural shoes to
more fully appreciate differences in approach, as well as what is required from
the U.S. side to impact a partners problem solving process. Candidates could
then be given negotiation scenarios to prepare and execute on another day or
time, perhaps more than once. Additional scenarios could be inserted into the
SFQC at other points in training; for example, in the 18C course, students might
negotiate for the purchase of goods or transportation. In the 18D course they
might have to handle a patients family member after an error in some medical
procedure. At language school, they might mediate a land dispute between
69
families in opposing tribes. These additional, MOS-specific applications would aid

in steadily building SFQC candidates knowledge base and broadening their
perspectives regarding other organizations and cultures through role-playing.
As an additional or separate option, students could be asked to perform
tasks on their own time during training away from Camp Mackall. For example,
they could negotiate the purchase of a specific car or attend foreign social
functions during language school. In short, before exiting the SFQC, new
operators need to understand why these efforts are worth their time. Crosscultural interpersonal skills will not be developed beyond an individuals natural
ability if they are not justified, taught, and practiced to a degree that provides
sustained value at the unit level.
C.
UNIT INTERNAL TRAINING

1.
Language Training Options
Language is an important discriminator between SF and other SOF units.

Beyond facilitating communication, language skills enhance interpersonal
relations. By learning a language, the operator naturally develops a greater
appreciation for the culture. Learning and speaking another language also
provide a ready platform for discovering common ground and for conveying
interest in gaining and understanding, a partners perspective.
Applied in this context, language skills reinforce SOFs ultimate success in
developing
global
partnerships.
One
option
for
building
cross-cultural
interpersonal skills while simultaneously developing language and cultural

knowledge and building contacts for the global SOF network is through live
environment training (LET). SOF could also increase tie-ins with the global SOF
network by arranging homestays with personnel from partner units. Current LET
guidance from the commanding general (CG) of U.S. Army Special Forces
Command
(USASFC)
already
calls
70
for
LETs
to
leverage
homestay
opportunities. 63 Offering this as an option rather than a mandate would enhance

the utility of the current policy.
Although any form of language training contributes to cross-cultural
interpersonal skills and improves the ability of an operator to influence others, it
is also important to noteas the research for this thesis revealsthat personnel
can and have achieved successful influence with foreign partners without the aid
of language skills. In such cases, influence was instead attained through
implementing the positive behaviors presented in this thesis. Consequently, it will
not be effective to rely on language training as the sole measure of ensuring that
SF personnel have the requisite level of cross-cultural interpersonal skills. Similar
findings were also reported in the 2007 Army Research Institute (ARI) study
entitled Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders.64 The ARI research
indicated that general cross-cultural competence was as important, or possibly
more important, than language skills and regional knowledge. 65 In short,
language offers high utility, but needs to be employed in conjunction with the
other skills identified in this thesis for effective influence to be achieved.
2.
Interface with Local Troubled Groups
In the context of SOF missions, operators are often required to serve as

mediators between various sectarian groups that have long-standing issues with
one another. Within the U.S., there are numerous opportunities for training in
similar scenarios that could also benefit the civilian community. For instance,
operators could meet members from rival gangs to learn what motivates
individual or group action, or exacerbates tension. In some cases, this might
seem difficult, but would not be more dangerous than many missions units
regularly undertake. As an example, the Defense Analysis program at NPS has
63 Christopher K. Haas, USASFC(A) Command Language Program, Live Environmental Training

Policy (Ft. Bragg: United States Army Special Forces Command [Airborne], 2013), 1.
64 Allison Abbe, Lisa Gulick, and Jeffrey Herman, Cross Cultural Competence in Army Leaders:
A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation (Arlington: United States Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2007), 34.
65 Ibid.
71
worked with local law enforcement in Salinas, California, suggesting COIN

practices that the Salinas Police Department might implement to reduce gang
issues. Another option could be working with an American Indian Tribe to reduce
community conflict, improve civil services, or provide some other benefit. The key
in designing any such program would be to explore options for interacting with
different cultures or subcultures present in the U.S. These experiences would
provide near-term, inexpensive opportunities to experience difficult and
unpredictable interpersonal situations, negotiate or mediate with marginalized or
disenfranchised groups, and employ the positive skills offered in this thesis.
3.
Land Owners, Businesses, and Government Agencies
Similar to SFQC instructors working with locals to plan and execute Robin
Sage, operators could develop relationships with various land or business
owners in the interest of supporting future training. This might include asking
teams to form relationships with local offices of government agencies such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). SOF commonly
coordinate with the FBI for law enforcement and justice concerns overseas, work
with the DEA on CN-related missions, or plan commercial travel with weapons
through the TSA. Such opportunities could allow operators to navigate new
organizational cultures. The time invested and relationships built would develop
long-term partnerships and understanding of how and why others do business.
The expanded network and common ground established would reduce unknowns
and enhance partnership on later deployments. Experience gained would offer
valuable lessons without compromising mission success on a deployment.
Lastly, such exposure could serve as an incentive for operators who have an
interest in transitioning to these organizations after they retire or leave the
service.
72
4.
Business Internships
Business exposure through internships also presents an opportunity to

develop the cross-cultural interpersonal skills identified in this thesis. This
presents a unique chance for SOF personnel to operate in a new realm and
broaden their skills, knowledge, and contacts. Likewise, companies can learn
from exposure to SOF methods of planning. Internships could be arranged on a
longer-term basis, such as for one- or two-year primary change of station (PCS)
moves, enabling SOF to work with select industry partners. Alternatively, units
could coordinate with key businesses in their respective areas for internships of a
shorter duration.
One SF group is, in fact, already actively pursuing this type of personal
and professional development for its operators. Subordinate battalions each
select key businesses near their location for potential interface. The units then
develop relationships and design short-term internships for select personnel.
Typically, both parties benefit from this exchange of organizational cultures and
expertise. Failure does not impact the mission or political conditions as it might
overseas; however, any skills, knowledge, or network reach-back that are
acquired do generate long-term utility for operators and their units.
Aside from enhancing the interpersonal skills addressed in this thesis,
these venues would could create post-military career opportunities and grow
SOFs reputation in key sectors of business. SOF units which deal frequently
with businesses for such purposes as contracting equipment or training in the
U.S. or overseas, or managing economic development supporting COIN can
likewise benefit from increased encounters with private sector partners, which
enhance the participating units understanding of corporate decision-making,
finance, logistics, and other key organizational functions, all while developing a
critical capability in the human domain.
73
5.
U.S.-Based Foreign Interface
Most large cities throughout the U.S. have neighborhoods or even

commercial areas populated by people from various foreign cultures. In some
cases these might even include refugees. Finding time to meet these people,
either through local assistance groups or just by visiting the area, could offer
positive returns. These could include purely informal visits by operators when off
duty. At the very least, such venues offer an avenue for practicing language and
learning about the history, culture, and perspectives of different groups with
whom operators might later work. Practice in this context would also be far less
threatening, politically or personally, than a similar experience in a sensitive
deployed environment.
6.
Conventional Unit Interface
It comes as little surprise that research for this thesis revealed a higher
failure rate between SOF and U.S. partners than between SOF and foreign
partners. Many of these failed exchanges were between SOF and conventional
units working in the same area. Intentionally approaching potentially contentious
U.S. partners beforeor outside the context ofdeployments offers interorganizational interpersonal lessons and provides a better learning platform
without the risk of mission failure. Such relationship building also presents
potential for an array of tangible long-term benefits.
Many SOF personnel have difficulty operating with conventional partners.
Rightly or wrongly, there is a pervasive belief among special operators that
conventional units think of them as cowboys and have trouble understanding
SOFs way of doing business. Initiating some form of ongoing partnership with
conventional units might aid in closing that cultural gap on both sides. This does
not necessarily require mandated, unit-wide training events with other U.S. units,
but could include relationship-building practices as simple as dropping in on
neighboring units to make introductions and discuss any appropriate questions
either unit may have about the others activities. These efforts can create space
74
for an ongoing dialogue about how and why SOF conducts business differently
than conventional units, and how a SOF units activities can integrate with a
neighboring units own work.
7.
Voluntary Foreign Aid Missions
In the corporate world, some organizations allow a temporary leave of

absence for one to two months so that employees can do volunteer work abroad.
Certain political conditions and related constraints may not allow for this in SF.
However, the concept is worth reviewing and considering as a form of permissive
temporary duty for personnel so inclined. Ideally, such individuals could go to a
country in their units area of assignment and use their target language. As
another benefit, interested operators could attend these events with family
members. The USSOCOM Preservation of the Force Task Force is focused on
relieving stress placed on marriages and families after years of combat
deployments. Supporting such opportunities would serve this purpose and
simultaneously develop cross-cultural interpersonal skills, language capability,
and cultural knowledge at the operator level.
8.
New Context for Formal Unit Functions
Like many military units, SF often holds Christmas balls or other annual
formal unit functions. Units should consider holding these events in business or
embassy attire and not just always in uniform. Operators are often asked to
perform missions that require interfacing with embassies or related civilian
government offices. Existing SF formals or other unit celebrations can be usefully
leveraged to accustom operators to the most basic elements of civilian
engagement, beginning with attire and ceremonial formalities within American
culture, before a mission requires familiarity with such conventions. Units might
even consider funding a single suit for operators not already owning proper
civilian business attire, or coordinating with local mens clothiers to host
occasional dress for success events to help inform operators on this subject.
75
For better or worse, appearance can help establish initial common ground.
Dressing in appropriate civilian attire under certain circumstances is no different
than growing a beard or wearing traditional dress in Afghanistan. If operators fail
this first test of cultural appropriateness, that failure can preclude them from
advancing a relationship to the level at which they are able to employ other
cross-cultural interpersonal skills.
D.
UNIT-FUNDED TRAINING
The current era portends reduced funding for unique civilian specialty
schools. SOF should still seek to extract useful skills and techniques from
experienced organizations outside its realm whenever possible, and SOF units
should continue to periodically send operators to various civilian training venues
to
learn
negotiation,
sales
techniques,
cross-cultural
assimilation
and
interpersonal skills. These venues should not be limited to one or two select
options. Units need to survey the full spectrum of training possibilities and
sample various options, including those available through universities and private
companies, to help diversify their operators frames of reference.
Many business firms send senior leaders to courses offering relevant skill
sets. By attending the same courses, operators could gain a wider perspective of
how someone can successfully or unsuccessfully employ the skills presented.
For example, an operator recently mentioned that he attended a course
conducted by the Harvard Program on Negotiation. The instruction was useful,
but the greatest value was gained in observing and interacting with civilian
executives or automotive union representatives. They attacked problems in a
different way, which offered him a perspective beyond normal SOF exposure.
The military and SOF often use the phrase train as you fight. SOF
operates with a minimal footprint in politically sensitive and culturally varied
locations solving ambiguous problems through an indirect approach. Crosscultural interpersonal exposure to the other techniques mentioned in this thesis,
beyond any second or third order benefits, would enable SOF to train as it fights.
76
E.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has argued that influencing others is a keystone of success for
SOF. Operators are continuously in relationships and partnerships with myriad

organizations, both U.S. and foreign, regardless of mission type or location. The
SOF community, and USASOC specifically, endeavors to conduct strategic
influence through a global SOF partnership, to serve as the U.S. Armys experts
in the human domain, to execute UW and to achieve success by, with, and
through partnerships with foreign forces. Accomplishing these missions and
optimizing SOFs success relies heavily on cross-cultural interpersonal skills. The
first-hand examples of operator experience presented in this thesis reinforce that
message with a 28 percent failure rate at the interpersonal level. Applying the
interpersonal lessons and concepts proposed here may help to raise the bar and
create new opportunities. The SOF mission depends on it; the operators deserve
it.
77
78
APPENDIX A.
ADDITIONAL CODING DATA
Tables 5-11 below provide a collective overview of the codes and families
used to develop each theme indicated within this thesis.
Coding Process for Theme 1

The Family
Genuine Behavior

Action legitimizes forces
Action not words
Appreciation for partner
Appreciative partner
Caring actions
Compassionate effort
Deepened friendship
Desired long-term contact
Distanced friendship
Earning respect
Family
Feeling obligation to return help
Frustration about being able to
help
Generous offer
Genuine Care
Genuine friendship
Genuine interest
Genuine interest in work at
hand
Giving not just taking
Giving others credit
Giving respect
Going to bat for partner
Good relationship enables
critique
Help offering
Humility
Importance of religious
Knowledge
Importance of religious role
Justifying concern
Kind gestures
Making partner feel comfortable
Non-appreciative partner
Offering a solution
Partner gains credit
Perceived alliance
Perceived care
Personal exposure
Personal fascination with partner
Personal loyalty
Request for help
Residual care
Respect
Saving face
Setting aside differences
Showing empathy
Sincere effort
Surging influence collectively
Taking the blame
Treating as equals
Trust
Trust built
Trust issues
Unlimited compassion
Value of friendship
The Theme: Success in handling interpersonal engagements or influencing partners is highly
reliant on the presence of real or perceived genuine human concern and interest. This was
identified by every operator in over 50 codes ranging from humility, compassion, appreciation,
respect, genuine interest, giving, helping, and the like. Reference term is Genuine Behavior.
Table 5.
79

The Family
Gaining Perspective

Appealing to others
perspective(s)
Misleading information
Area familiarization
Misunderstanding perspective
Asking questions
Ombudsman concept
Assessing the situation
Open-minded approach
Closed-minded approach
Outside perspective
Concern over perception of
Partner connectivity with populace
action
Partner embarrassed
Conflicting allegiance(s)
Perspective justification
Conflicting interest(s)
Perspective of partners
Frustration in understanding
Perspective-taking
environment
Preconceived notions
Introspective thought
Self-appraisal
Knowing your strengths
Understanding larger context
Lack of knowledge on country
Understanding options
team structure
Understanding partners motivation
Lacking perspective
Understanding environment
Listening
Western viewpoint
Meeting expectations
The Theme: Taking a partners perspective or broadening/challenging ones own and related
actions that aid in creating perspective, such as asking questions, listening, or developing
dialogue collectively serve as a major positive catalyst during interpersonal engagements, and
as a learning tool to understand failed encounters. This was identified by every operator in all 23
source documents with over 30 subordinate codes, including perspective-taking, asking
questions, listening, self-appraisal, and having an open-minded approach. Reference term is
Gaining Perspective.
Table 6.
80

The Family
Mutual Assistance

Bond through hardship
Common Ground
Compromising to find a solution
Connecting partners
Creating common ground
Emotional connection through
hardship
Face to face solution
Hand in hand with partner
Hitting partner targets
Mediation effort
Mutual friendships
Mutual learning
Mutual likability
Reciprocal care
Reciprocal negativism
Reciprocal value
Retaliator exclusion
Shared struggle
Sharing
Sharing concerns
Values partnership
The Theme: Offering mutual assistance or shared involvement with partners, to include acting as
a mediator between partners to enhance their mutual support, facilitates a higher level of
collective understanding and positively impacts an individuals ability to influence others. This was
identified by every operator in all 23 source documents with over 30 subordinate codes such as
mutual learning, creating common ground, reciprocal value, and shared concerns. Reference
term is Mutual Assistance.
Table 7.

The Family
Culturally Aware
Behavior

Cultural similarity
Cultural misinterpretation
Cultural knowledge deficit
Cultural flexibility
Cultural difference
Cultural context
Cultural challenge
Collectivist cultural indications

Military culture
Foreign military culture
Face importance
Misunderstanding face
Compromised authority
Authority reinforcement
The Theme: Maintaining cultural knowledge and flexibility serves as an effective conduit in
creating genuine interest and shared value, reinforcing successful relationships. This was
identified by 19 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such cultural challenges, cultural
difference, sectarian rivalry, and authority reinforcement. Reference term is Culturally Aware
Behavior.
Table 8.
81

The Family

Cultural similarity
Cultural misinterpretation
Cultural knowledge deficit
Cultural flexibility
Cultural difference
Cultural context
Cultural challenge
Collectivist cultural indications

Military culture
Foreign military culture
Face importance
Misunderstanding face
Compromised authority
Authority reinforcement
The Theme: Managing relationships that result in influence requires taking an approach that
builds upon how a partner is perceived by others in the surrounding organization or community as
well as themselves. This was identified by all 20 operators and contains 30 subordinate codes
such as adaptability, boosting partner ego, humor, selling, and building others social capital.
Reference term is Building Social Capital.
Table 9.

The Family

Attempt to dialogue
Distance makes difficult
Drinking with partners
Extracurricular activity
Frequency of contact
Informal channels
Language value
Little interaction
Living with partners
Hanging Out
Meal sharing
Pleasure based actions
Relaxing opportunity
Social activities
Sports
Strength of personal relationship
Value of hanging out
Value of meal sharing
Valued socializing
The Theme: Learning about others through hanging out beyond work is a significant catalyst for
successful cross-cultural interpersonal influence. This theme was identified by all 20 operators
and contains 18 subordinate codes such as playing sports, sharing meals, drinking alcohol, and
living with partners, among others. Reference term is Hanging Out.
Table 10.
82

The Family

Bypassing HN leadership for a
solution
Command pressure
Constraints of low rank or
experience
Lack of continuity
Less bureaucratic constraints
Limited time and manning
No career risk
Outside prescribed duties
Overcome bureaucratic
constraints
Overcoming
Bureaucratic
Constraints
Partner bureaucratic constraints

Partner requests return
Political barriers to helping partners
Political constraints
Pressure from higher
Rank constraints
Relationships overcome
bureaucratic constraints
Results of bureaucratic constraints
Shifting U.S. priorities
Transitioning Units
Turnover Issues
The Theme: Overcoming bureaucratic constraints routinely encountered within our own system
and that of our partners will reduce a large barrier to effective influence. This theme was identified
by all 20 operators and contains 20 subordinate codes such as transitioning units, lack of
continuity, and pressure from higher authority. Reference term is Overcoming Bureaucratic
Constraints.
Table 11.

The Family
Multi Group
Coordination
Deconflicting Between Partners

Multi Group Coordination
Mixed Groups
The Theme: Employment as a SOF operator requires ability to simultaneously manage
relationships and influence with multiple organizations and individuals. This theme was identified
by 17 operators in one code. Reference term is Multi-Group Coordination.
Table 12.
83
84
APPENDIX B.
ADDITIONAL FIGURES
This appendix offers additional supporting tables beyond those provided in

the main text. The table below presents a review of data associated with the 96
stories collected of interpersonal engagement experiences by SOF operators.
STORY DATA OVERVIEW

Story Type
Number of Stories % of All Stories
Foreign Engagements
72
75
U.S. Engagements
24
25
Positive Outcome (Foreign Partner)
54
75
Positive Outcome (U.S. Partner)
15
62.5
Positive Process Positive Outcome
63
65.6
Negative Process Positive Outcome
6
6.3
Total Positive Outcome
69
71.9
Negative Outcome (Foreign Partner)
18
25
Negative Outcome (U.S. Partner)
9
37.5
Positive Process Negative Outcome
1
1
Negative Process Negative Outcome
26
27
Total Negative Outcome
27
28
Pre SOF Engagements
19
19.8
Iraq Engagements
42
43.7
Afghanistan Engagements
13
13.5
Other Country Engagements
41
42.7
Total Engagements
96
N/A
Engagements occurred in 23 total countries including 3 in the U.S.
See Table 4 for details concerning engagements per country.
Table 13.
Story Data Overview
The following table presents a comprehensive list of subject data. No real

names were used in this document in order to preserve anonymity of the
subjects.
85
SUBJECT DATA FOR 20 OPERATORS INTERVIEWED

SOF Organization
Rank and Total by
Recent Units of Service
Organization
U.S. Army Special Forces 16 (14 x MAJ, 1 x SFC, 1 USASFC(A) x 1, SOTD(A)
x CWO3)
x 1, SWTG(A) x 2, 1st
SFG(A) x 2,
5th SFG(A) x 5, 7th SFG(A)
x 2,
10th SFG(A) x 2
U.S. Army Ranger
1 (1 x MAJ)
75th RGR(A) x 1
U.S. Navy SEAL
3 (3 x LCDR
NSWG1 x 1, USSOCOM x
2
Rank
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
SFC
LCDR
MAJ
MAJ
CW3
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
LCDR
MAJ
LCDR
MAJ
MAJ
MAJ
Years of
Service
10
11
12
19
12
12
12
16
12
17
15
10
12
11
14
12
11
11
11
21
Years of Service
Average
Total
13.05
261
Years in SOF
Deployments
Months Deployed
4
5
6
5
6
12
12
10.5
12
14
7
5.5
4.5
5
14
6
11
5
6
8
4
4
4
6
2
5
11
3
7
13
5
4
6
6
15
4
4
5
4
5
29
36
29
42
29.5
29
49
10
39.5
64
48
24
42
31
60
31
33
20
29
38.5
Years in SOF
Deployments
Averag Tota Average
Total
e
l
7.9
158
5.9
117
Table 14.
Complete Subject Data
86
Months Deployed
Average
Total
35.7
713.5
APPENDIX C.
RECOMMENDED READING
READING RECOMMENDATIONS
Author
Overview
Title
How to Win Friends and
Influence People
Dale Carnegie
Global Dexterity: How to

Adapt your Behavior
across Cultures Without
Losing yourself in the
Process
The Cultural Intelligence
Difference
Andy Molinsky
Say Anything to
Anyone: 5 Keys to
Successful CrossCultural Communication
In the Midst of Wars: An
Americans Mission to
Southeast Asia
The Ugly American
David Livermore
Gayle Cotton
Edward Lansdale
Eugene Burdick
William Lederer
A Bell for Adano
John Hersey
Appreciative Inquiry: A
Positive Approach to
Building Cooperative
Capacity
Primal Leadership:
Learning to Lead with
Emotional Intelligence
Getting to Yes:
Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In
Frank Barrett
Ronald Fry
Daniel Goleman
Richard Boyatzis
Annie McKee
Roger Fisher
William Yury
Bruce Patton
Confidential
John Nolan
Defense is from Mars

State is from Venus:
Improving
Communications and
Promoting National
Security
Rickey Fife
Table 15.
The title says it all. Written in the

30s, but the techniques are
justified and work well.
Explains how to identify minimal,
reasonable efforts to adapt and
work with other cultures.
Tips to assessing and improving

your ability to effectively
navigate other cultures.
Good examples on how to
analyze and adapt to a situation
to achieve success with other
cultures
Tangible examples of influence
from possibly the best military
advisor in history.
Tangible story explaining how
Americans are often perceived
overseas and why that happens.
Tangible story about an Army
Major in WWII who earns the
respect of a small Italian town.
Demonstrates effective influence
and advising.
How to use questions effectively
in creating capacity and
developing organizational
change.
How to understand and apply
the foundational principles of
Emotional Intelligence.
Good foundational book on
negotiation. Yury co-founded
Harvards Program on
Negotiations.
Effective elicitation techniques
that sometimes aid in influence.
Understanding organizational
cultural differences between
DOD and DOS. PDF available
via Google search.
Recommended Reading
87
88
APPENDIX D.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the interest of exploring the value in identifying specific recurring

interpersonal skills of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators, we can turn to
related research on the psychology of negotiations, cross-cultural behavior, and
interpersonal behavior. Additional specific research reviews and offers instruction
in skills that practitioners commonly employ in successful negotiations or rapport
building. Numerous authors and experts have suggested that by learning and
adopting specific behaviors, most people can acquire the skills necessary for
successful rapport building or negotiation; these skills include mimicry, posture,
attitude, neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) and understanding perspective,
among others. 66 Many of these skills seem reasonably simple to understand and
apply when one is merely reviewing them, but they can be difficult to employ or
detect when they are applied in daily encounters. This raises the question of
whether people have a genetic predisposition for these skills, whether they can
be inculcated through practice and exposure, or whether some combination of
the aforementioned avenues is most accurate. As an example, in The Tipping
Point, Malcolm Gladwell suggests that select individuals referred to as
connectors, mavens, and salespeople have special traits that enable them to
collectively influence social change. 67
This leads to two questions of primary concern. Does conclusive research
validate the possibility of a predisposed ability in these areas? Furthermore, to
what extent can we identify recurring skills or attributes through the analysis of
concrete encounters and use them to leverage improved capability in members
66 Dale Carnegie, How to Win Friends and Influence People (New York: Pocket Books, 1936);
Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New
York: Penguin Books, 1991); Nicholas Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds
(New York: Workman Publishing, 2002); Michael Brooks, Instant Rapport (New York: Warner
Books, 1989); Tom Hopkins, Selling for Dummies (New York: Hungry Minds, Inc., 2001); and
David Lieberman, Get Anyone to do Anything and Never Feel Powerless Again (New York: St.
Martins Press, 2000).
67 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 2002).
89
of the SOF force who lack a biological predisposition? This research effort
suggests that these skills can be identified and recommendations for
improvement can be developed to the extent they pose no risk to mission
success. A review of the corresponding psychological research indicates the
presence of additional, often more complex dynamics that can influence the
outcome of interpersonal engagements, thereby requiring more complex
behavioral manipulation beyond a simple overlay of certain skills. 68
The understanding of individual interpersonal skills has a long history
within the field of psychology. Negotiation and mediation, or arbitration, have
been the principal tools for exploring related behaviors. Early studies on
negotiation focused specifically on individual differences between involved
parties on each side and how these might determine outcomes. Some instances
highlighted the significance of individual differences, but they were inadequate for
defining the true outcome of a scenario due to other environmental factors, such
as the context for the scenario in question. 69
Further studies concerning behavioral decision research (BDR) explored
how negotiators and their opponents often deviate from what is perceived to be
the rational thought process accorded to the situation. This research indicates
that creating accurate descriptions of opponents has value over an assumption of
their rational thought process.. In support of these findings, BDR argues that
cognitive heuristics often lead to diversion from the rational thought process.70
This applies most appropriately in the cultural context, where definitions of
rational behavior may not align. Success or failure is often tied to culturallyshaped behavior. As Gladwell illustrates in Blink, people can be conditioned to
make effective or destructive snap decisions or assessments. 71
68 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 279314.

69 Ibid., 281.
70 Ibid., 282.
71 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking within Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and
Company, 2005).
90
Perspective is very difficult to grasp, especially when multiple interacting

perspectives are in play. Understanding perspective is a significant dynamic
identified by numerous research efforts as crucial to success in interpersonal
engagements. 72 Related studies on two-party negotiations indicate that
participants display a variety of consistent behaviors, such as failing to see the
opponents perspective, making false assumptions, and failing to realize the true
flexibility of the situation and the possibility of mutual benefit. 73 Some negotiators
have been consistently found to act in a less objective, more motivationallybiased manner. This motivational bias is known as egocentrism; the more each
party possesses this trait, the more difficult an outcome of agreement becomes.
Situations characterized by increased ambiguity show higher levels of
egocentrism, whereas scenarios possessing greater symmetry, as in scenarios
where the parties possess some understanding of each other, reveal fewer signs
of egocentrism. In addition, when negotiators have a more accurate perspective
of their opponent, they become more objective in their efforts to resolve the
issue. 74
Mental models also play a role in understanding how perspective, or the
lack thereof, can impact a negotiation. A mental model is one individuals
perception of the entire process and the perceived outcomes. 75 For example,
studies show that regardless of the scenario, participants assume that their goals
are in direct opposition to those of their negotiating counterparts, even in
scenarios where shared interests also exist. Understanding other possible
scenarios through the use of compared analogies showed success against the
pure experience of sequential scenarios. Participants were then able to adapt
72 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 279314; Bond and Smith, CrossCultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 205-235; Dale Miller and William Turnbull,
Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes, Annual Review of Psychology 37 (1986): 236-237;
Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 491-515; Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruitt,
Negotiation and Mediation, Annual Review of Psychology 43 (1992): 551-552.
73 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 282.
74 Ibid., 284-285.
75 Ibid., 287.
91
these analogies to better understand future scenarios and apply lessons.

Similarly, people tend to exaggerate differences between themselves and their
opponents based on mental models. Actions also differ based on an
understanding of participant roles, such as friend or businessperson. 76 The
process of Appreciative Inquiry (AI), developed to enhance organizational
collaboration, reinforces the value of understanding perspective through asking
questions to identify common, positive ground and clarify a path forward. 77
Cross-cultural behavior makes each of these issues more complicated.
Cultural differences are perhaps the most frequently discussed theme among the
many challenging elements of cross-cultural negotiation. For instance, cultural
differences can refer to the diverging worldviews of individualist cultures like the
United States and collectivist cultures like the Philippines. In cross-cultural
negotiations involving one party from each cultural type, the individualist places a
higher value on solving the issue at hand, while the collectivist places more value
on maintaining positive relations. 78 The collectivist prioritizing of relationship
maintenance often involves indirect communicationsometimes perceived by
individualists as deceptionand is the source of what we know as saving
face.79
Other
relevant
dimensions
of
cross-cultural
negotiation
are
communication context (unmentioned contextual value of conversation versus

direct meaning of words used), power distance (position within a hierarchy), and
time concept (polychromic versus monochromic). 80 Each of these variables
requires an astute interpersonal navigator to detect and be prepared to adjust
their own mental models to the environment. Typically, countries fall on opposite
ends of the spectrum in more than one category of cross cultural negotiation,
76 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 279314; Bond and Smith, CrossCultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 205-235.
77 Frank J. Barrett and Ronald E. Fry, Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to Building
Cooperative Capacity (Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute Publications, 2008).
78 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 279314; Bond and Smith, CrossCultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 205-235; Thompson, Wang and Gunia,
Negotiation, 491-515.
79 Ibid.
80 Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, Negotiation, 297-98.
92
thereby creating multiple opportunities for failure within a given scenario. These
dynamics are also measured through a system known as self-concept clarity
(SCC), a scale on which individuals from collectivist cultures are hypothesized to
demonstrate lower values than those from individualist cultures, in which SCC is
prized and pervasively articulated. 81
These dynamics reinforce the idea that cross-cultural negotiation varies
widely from same-culture scenarios. Research indicates that intercultural
negotiations resulted in lower mutual value than those with intra-cultural groups.
Participants identified this issue as a result of less accurate understanding of
each others priorities. This can be attributed to the previously mentioned
concerns of perspective and mental models. Some studies suggest prescriptive
advice, such as being prepared to assume other mental models. However, others
questioned the ability of most people to separate from cultural grounding and
change behavior to the extent required to make their situational outcome
successful. In Global Dexterity, Andy Molinsky acknowledges this difficulty and
identifies six key areas where cultural clashes can occur. 82 He then suggests a
reasonable process for adopting minimal behavioral change to assimilate without
losing ones own cultural identity. 83 Similarly, even within the specific field of
cross-cultural psychologywhich, both notably and similarly to traditional
psychology, is dominated by Americansthere is an ongoing awareness of the
potential influence of culture on research. 84 To confront these issues, this
specialized field focuses on universals, which are demonstrated psychological
principles that have survived the test of cross-cultural analysis. 85
One related study concerning universals theorizes that a specific set of
five dimensions can be used to assess and compare perceived personalities
81 Bond and Smith, Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 205-235.
82 Andy Molinsky, Global Dexterity: How to Adapt Your Behavior Across Cultures Without Losing
Yourself in the Process (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2013), 48-50.
83 Ibid., 5-182.
84 Bond and Smith, Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 205-235.
85 Ibid.
93
from varied cultures. The five dimensions include extroversion, agreeableness,

conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience. 86 Different
cultures weigh the relative importance of each quality differently, which confirms
the value of objectivity in dealing with other cultures. Further studies addressed
the decision-making skills of managers within collectivist versus individualist
cultures. 87 These studies found collectivists more apt to work well in teams and
to consult leaders. Conversely, the individualists focused less on teamwork and
were less likely to consult a supervisor.
Similar to the notion of mental models, outcomes in interpersonal actions
have a high correlation to the expectations of the parties involved. 88 For
example, people having phone discussions with women whom they believed to
be attractive consistently assessed them as more sociable than those who were
believed unattractive. 89 In short, humans show a pattern of ability to conform
their behavior to achieve expected results, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Negotiations offer similar results, where action begets action. An opponent
believed to be competitive, for example, begets more competition, which
reinforces the cycle. 90 Although this appears commonly in research, it should be
understood that disconfirming prophecies also exist; the outcomes are based on
perceptions and expectations of each party and their reactions to the behavior of
the other. 91
Integrative negotiation techniques further explore the value of perception.
When negotiating, a participant often incorrectly perceives what the other person
wants, resulting in less than optimal outcomes for both. 92 This reconfirms that
perspective and objectivity allow for more effective and integrated solutions.
86 Ibid., 216.
87 Bond and Smith, Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 221.
88 Miller and Turnbull, Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes, 236-237.
89 Ibid., 236.
90 Ibid., 237.
91 Ibid., 243.
92 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 491-515.
94
Interpersonal relations have been assessed in terms of various forms of

influencing factors. One commonly cited combination of tactics for success is
behavioral synchronization and body mimicry. 93 Mimicry is another subtle form of
placing oneself in the same interpersonal plane as another and working through
body movement, tone of voice and nature of language. 94 On a different note,
emotions also play a part in negotiation. Thompson, Wang, and Gunias research
indicates that one side is not affected by emotion of the other unless they have
motivation to be so influenced. 95 These observations were focused on
negotiations, whereas other observations focused strictly on relationship building
were consistent in finding success with a friendly approach versus an angry or
aggressive one. 96
Collective identity is also an avenue of influence. People consistently
identify more closely with others within their own perceived group, because this is
seen as good for the collective in some fashion. 97 Collectivists focus on relational
trust and value versus the actual profit or individual form of gain received from
the
outcome. 98
Collectivist
sensitivity
to
out-group
negotiation
is,
correspondingly, higher than that of an individualist. 99 Negotiation is sometimes

assumed to be more successful for the party that retains information. However,
research has indicated dyads that share information concerning the discussion
will also have higher outcomes. 100
93 Ibid., 499.
94 Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds; Carnegie, How to Win Friends and
Influence People; Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 491-515
95 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 499.
96 Boothman, How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds; Carnegie, How to Win Friends and
Influence People.
97 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 502.
98 Thompson, Wang and Gunia, Negotiation, 502; Michele Gelfrand, Miriam Erez, and Zeynep
Aycan, Cross-Cultural Organizational Behavior, Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 579514.
99 Ibid., 570.
100 Carnevale and Pruitt, Negotiation and Mediation, 551-552.
95
In conclusion, successful management of interpersonal engagements

requires not only precise knowledge of various behavioral dynamics, but also the
ability to maintain a high level of objectivity as well as some level of behavioral
control. Further studies of real-world interpersonal engagements conducted by
special operators, in combination with psychological data concerning the training
and selection of these men, will assist in better understanding the dynamics
driving such scenarios. A refined appreciation for the interpersonal subtleties in
action within a specialized SOF sample populace will ultimately improve
operators abilities to influence their counterparts, likely reducing risk while
increasing mission success. This effort is further legitimized by research that
identifies the successful interpersonal traits of contemporary special operators, or
suggests some measure of implementation to influence force-wide effectiveness
in related scenarios. Similarly, within SF, current selection procedures are heavily
focused on eliminating those who do not already possess requisite baseline
capabilities for training, as opposed to identifying and developing potential. 101 As
a result, the process is disinclined to select in for certain skills or nascent
abilities and does not currently have a procedure for measuring cross-cultural
interpersonal skills. 102 The process does effectively identify a baseline presence
of emotional intelligence or interpersonal skills. Although necessary and readily
applicable, this baseline primarily reflects a candidates ability to work effectively
within a cohort of like personnel, and is insufficient for predicting or nurturing a
capacity for handling the cross-cultural engagements required within this
occupational realm.
101 Major, U.S. Army Medical Corps, Special Forces Group Psychologist and former 1st SWTG
(A) psychologist (phone discussion with author concerning ability to psychologically assess SF
st
operators with interpersonal skills, February 21, 2012); Captain R., 1 SWTG (A) psychologist
(email to author concerning interpersonal skills evaluation within Special Forces Assessment and
Selection, March 13, 2013).
102 Executive summary of individual criteria and ratings for U.S. Army SFAS (email to author
from SFAS commander, February 18, 2013).
96
A.
RESEARCH DESIGN/METHODOLOGY:
For this thesis, the investigation into the human dynamics pertinent to
interpersonal success as a Special Forces (SF) operator pursued a process

known as thematic analysis, as described by Dr. Richard Boyatzis in
Transforming Qualitative Information. This process allowed a methodological
approach to qualitative data collection, which facilitated analysis in both
qualitative and quantitative forms. Because this specific use of thematic analysis
endeavored to analyze situations encountered by experienced operators, it lent
itself towards an inductive approach.
The inductive approach was used to collect information provided by
experienced SF operators at a specified level of detail, which facilitated the
maximum extraction of correlative data for further analysis. When outlining
effective methods for an inductive approach, Boyatzis recommends use of the
critical incident interview (CII). 103 The CII is an interview method that extracts an
extremely rich, detailed type of data that can then be used to gain insight into
human experiences. This information is collected in a journalistic form, almost
analogous to a movie script, in order to reduce the likelihood of excluding or
distorting the experience due to bias or opinion of the person being
interviewed. 104 While the applicability of this technique to SF personnel
interviews concerning operational experiences seems readily apparent, to date
no interviews have been found that extracted information at the level of detail
required for such in-depth analysis.
CII products were used during this thesis for the analysis and extraction of
themes. From these the intent was to derive a code for defining the interpersonal
operator. At the most basic level, CII data was collected from scenarios in which
personnel performed successfully, as well as from those in which they were
unsuccessful. The latter category presents a unique challenge due to perceived
103 Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information, 99-127.
104 Ibid.; Richard E. Boyatzis, The Competent Manager: A Model for Effective Performance (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982), 50-53.
97
exposure risk. Interviews from each subset, successful and unsuccessful, were
analyzed for presence of themes within their own cohort. This series of themes
was then compared across subsamples. Correlation facilitated the demonstration
of overarching themes with certain characteristics present in successful
scenarios. Those that existed across all samples were further reviewed for the
development of labels, definitions, indicators of presence and differentiation
demonstrating level of commonality within each subsample. 105 Common themes
across the subsets were used to develop a code. Once refined, this code
endeavored to illustrate the traits possessed by an SF operator adept in
interpersonal engagements.
Understandably, this process leaves some room for question due to the
authors perceived ability to collect information that aligns with the research
hypothesis. To assist in validating the process, CIIs were recorded via audio
device and transcribed verbatim for review of precise interview material.
Additionally, the author received training in conducting the CII process by
working alongside another trained practitioner, further helping to ensure the
thoroughness, validity and objectivity of the information
105 Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information, 29-53.
98
LIST OF REFERENCES
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Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation. ARI Study
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Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Barrett, Frank J. Yes to the Mess: Surprising Leadership Lessons from Jazz.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012.
Barrett, Frank J. and Ronald E. Fry. Appreciative Inquiry: A Positive Approach to
Building Cooperative Capacity. Chagrin Falls, OH: Taos Institute
Publications, 2005.
Bazerman, Max, Jared Curhan, Don Moore, and Kathleen Valley. Negotiation.
Annual Review of Psychology 51 (2000): 279314.
Bond, Michael and Peter Smith. Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational
Psychology. Annual Review of Psychology 47 (1996): 205235.
Boothman, Nicholas. How to Connect in Business in 90 Seconds or Less. New
York, NY: Workman Publishing, 2002.
Boyatzis, Richard E. The Competent Manager: A Model for Effective
Performance. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1982.
Boyatzis, Richard E. Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis
and Code Development. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998.
Brooks, Michael. Instant Rapport. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1989.
Byham, William C., The Assessment Center Method and Methodology: New
Applications and Technologies, Development Dimensions International
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Carnevale, Peter and Dean Pruitt. Negotiation and Mediation. Annual Review of
Psychology 43 (1992): 551552.
Carnegie, Dale. How to Win Friends and Influence People. New York, NY:
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Denzin, Norman K., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Handbook of Qualitative Research.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994.
99
Fisher, Roger and William Ury. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991.
Gladwell, Malcolm. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big
Difference. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2002.
Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. New York,
NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2005.
Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory:
Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago, IL: Aldine Publishing
Company, 1967.
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Haas, Christopher K. USASFC(A) Command Language Program, Live
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Forces Command (Airborne), 2013.
Hopkins, Tom. Selling for Dummies. New York, NY: Hungry Minds, Inc., 2001.
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Accessed July 5, 2013. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/2011.
Lieberman, David J. Get Anyone to Do Anything and Never Feel Powerless
Again. New York, NY: St. Martins Press, 2000.
McRaven, William R. USSOCOM Commanders Training and Education
Guidance, Fiscal Years 201417. MacDill AFB, FL: United States Special
Operations Command, 2013.
Miller, Dale and William Turnbull. Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes.
Annual Review of Psychology 37 (1986): 236237.
Molinsky, Andy. Global Dexterity: How to Adapt Your Behavior across Cultures
without Losing Yourself in the Process. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
Review Press, 2013.
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Cultural Differences. Accessed November 20,
2013. http://homepages.rpi.edu/~verwyc/oh5.htm.
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Thompson, Leigh, Jiunwen Wang, and Brian Gunia. Negotiation. Annual

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101
102
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THE SMOOTH OPERATOR: UNDERSTANDING CROSS-CULTURAL

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This effort, drawn from

interviews, identifies themes advanced by deployed special operators. The

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OPERATIONAL UTILITY AND CURRENT TRAINING EFFORTS ................ 7

UNDERSTANDING SOF INTERPERSONAL ENGAGEMENTS .................. 27

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 65

ADDITIONAL CODING DATA ................................................ 79

ADDITIONAL FIGURES .......................................................... 85

RECOMMENDED READING .................................................. 87

Special Forces Qualification Course Overview................................... 14

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Summarized Subject Data .................................................................. 21

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Special Forces officer

Special Forces weapons NCO

Special Forces engineer NCO

Special Forces medical NCO

Special Forces communications NCO

Advanced Special Operations Training Course

Army Research Institute

Central Intelligence Agency

close target reconnaissance

Drug Enforcement Administration

Federal Bureau of Investigation

foreign internal defense

forward operating base

Joint Combined Exchange for Training

Joint Special Operations Command

Joint Special Operations Task Force

key leader engagement

live environment training

Marine Special Operations Command

military liaison element

military occupational specialty

mobile training team

Naval Postgraduate School

Naval Special Warfare

Officer Candidate School

primary change of station