Transcript of Norman Dodd Interview
Transcript of Norman Dodd Interview
Transcript of Norman Dodd Interview
with
G. Edward Griffin
Alan Gaither was, at that time, President of the Ford Foundation. Mr. Gaither had sent for me when I
found it convenient to be in New York, asked me to call upon him at his office, which I did. On arrival,
after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither said, "Mr. Dodd, we have asked you to come up here today because
we thought that, possibly, off the record, you would tell us why the Congress is interested in the
activities of foundations such as ourselves."
Before I could think of how I would reply to that statement, Mr. Gaither then went on to say, "Mr.
Dodd, all of us who have a hand in the making of policies here, have had experience operating
under directives, the substance of which is, that we use our grant-making power so as to alter life
in the United States that it can be comfortably merged with the Soviet Union."
Warning! You are about to enter the Reality Zone -- a place were truth is
stranger than fiction -- where knowledge is king -- where myths are
shattered and deception exposed.
It is a place where the lessons of
history are found, and where true-life adventures reveal the hidden nature
of man.
If you proceed, you will not be able to return to the twilight zone from
which you came.
1 2 3 4 5.
Welcome to the Reality Zone. I am Ed Griffin. The story we are about to
hear represents a missing piece in the puzzle of modern history. We are
about to hear a man tell us that the major tax-exempt foundations of
America, since at least 1945, have been operating to promote a hidden
agenda.
That agenda has nothing to do with the surface appearance of
charity, good works or philanthropy.
This man will tell you that the real objective has been to influence
American educational institutions and to control foreign policy agencies of
the Federal government. The purpose of the control has been to condition
Americans to accept the creation of world government. That government is
to be based on the principle of collectivism, which is another way of
saying socialism; and, it is to be ruled from behind the scenes by those
same interests which control the tax-exempt foundations.
In later years there was a resurgence of interest in Mr. Dodd's story, and
we released the videotape to the public in 1991. And so, what now follows
is the sound track taken from the full, unedited interview, broken
occasionally only for a tape change, or to omit the sound of a passing
airplane. It stands on its own as an important piece in the puzzle of
modern history.
[begin interview]
Griffin: Mr. Dodd, let's begin this interview by a brief statement, for
the record, telling us who you are, what your background is, and your
qualifications to speak on the subject.
Dodd: Well, Mr. Griffin, as for who I am, I am just as the name implies -- an individual born in New
Jersey and educated in private schools, eventually in a school called Andover, Massachusetts, and then
Yale University.
And, running through my whole period of being brought up, growing up, I
have been an emphaticable [sic] reader, and I have had one major interest
and that was this country, as I was led to believe that it was originally
founded.
I entered the world of business knowing absolutely nothing about how that
world operated. And, I realized that the only way to find out what that
world was, and consisted of, would be to become part of it. And I then
acquired some experience in the manufacturing world, and in the world of
international communications, and finally chose banking as the field I
wished to devote my life to.
I was thirty at the time, and I had no more right to have an answer to that
question than the man in the moon. However, I did manage to say to my
superiors, "Gentlemen, you take this experience as proof of something that
you do not know about banking."
And you better go find out what that
something is, and act accordingly.
Four days later, I was confronted by these same superiors, with a statement
to the effect that, Norm, you go find out. And I really was fool enough
to accept that assignment, because it meant that you were going out to
search for something, and nobody could tell you what you were looking for.
I felt so strongly on the subject that I consented to it.
I was relieved of all normal duties inside the bank and, two and a half
years later, I felt that it was possible to report back to those who had
given me this assignment. So, I rendered such a report and, as a result of
the report I rendered, I was told the following:
"Norm, what you are
saying is, we should return to sound banking."
And I said, Yes, in
essence, that's exactly what it is that I am saying.
Whereupon, I got my first shock, which was a statement from them to this
effect: "We will never see sound banking in the United States again." And
they cited chapter and verse, to support that statement.
This came to me as an extraordinary shock because the men who made this
statement were men who were deemed as the most prominent bankers in the
country. The bank of which I was a part was spoken of a Morgan bank.
Coming from men of that caliber, a statement of that kind made a tremendous
impression on me.
Well, he says, "the directors have never been able to get your report to
them out of their minds and, as a result, they have decided that you, as an
individual, must begin at once, and you must re-organize this bank in
keeping with your own ideas." He then said, "Now, can I tear up your
letter?
And inasmuch as what had been said to me, what he was offering me, at the
age of (by then) thirty-three, was about as fine an opportunity for service
to the country as I could imagine. I said, Yes. And they said they
wished me to begin at once, and I did.
Then, I got my second shock, which was the discovery that the doors of
every bank in the United States were closed to me and I never could get a
job, as it were, in the bank. So I found myself for the first time since I
graduated from college, out of a job.
From then on, I followed various branches of the financial world, ranging
from investment counsel, to membership in the stock exchange. I finally
ended up as an advisor to a few individuals who had capital funds to look
after.
I have had that interest and you know how it is, if you generate a specific
interest, you find yourself gravitating toward persons with similar
interests. Ultimately, I found myself kind of at the center of the world
of dissatisfaction with the direction in which this country was headed.
And, I found myself in contact with many individuals who, on their own, had
done a vast amount of studying and research in areas which were part of the
problem.
Griffin: What point in your career did you become connected with the Reece
Committee?
Dodd:
Griffin:
Dodd:
1953.
Griffin:
Can you tell us what the Reece Committee was attempting to do?
Dodd: Yes, I can tell you. It was operating and carrying out instructions
embodied in a Resolution passed by the House of Representatives, which was
to investigate the activities of foundations as to whether or not these
activities could justifiably be labeled un-American -- without, I might
add, defining what they meant by un-American. That was the Resolution
and the committee had, then, the task of selecting a counsel, and the
counsel, in turn, had the task of selecting a staff; and, he had to have
somebody who would direct the work of that staff, and that was what they
meant by the Director of Research.
Griffin: What were some of the details, the specifics, of what you told
the committee at that time?
Dodd: Well, Mr. Griffin, in that report, I specifically -- number one -defined what was, to us, meant by the phrase un-American.
And, we
defined that, in our way, as being a determination to effect changes in the
country by un-Constitutional means.
Griffin:
Dodd: That affect was to orient our educational system away from support
of the principles embodied in the Declaration of Independence, and
implemented in the Constitution; and to educate them over to the idea that
the task now was to effect an orientation of education away from these
briefly stated principles and self-evident truths.
And, thats what had been the effect of the wealth which constituted the
endowments of those foundations - foundations that had been in existence
over the largest portion of the span of fifty years -- and holding them
responsible for this change. What we were able to bring forward was -what we had uncovered was -- the determination of these large endowed
foundations, through their trustees, actually to get control over the
content of American education.
Dodd: Rowan Gaither was, at that time, President of the Ford Foundation.
Mr. Gaither had sent for me, when I found it convenient to be in New York.
He asked me to call upon him at his office, which I did.
Upon arrival, after a few amenities, Mr. Gaither said, "Mr. Dodd, we have
asked you to come up here today, because we thought that, possibly, off the
record, you would tell us why the Congress is interested in the activities
of foundations such as ourselves."
And, before I could think of how I would reply to that statement, Mr.
Gaither then went on, and voluntarily stated, "Mr. Dodd, all of us who have
a hand in the making of policies here, have had experience either with the
OSS during the war, or with European economic administration after the
war. We have had experience operating under directives. The directives
emanate, and did emanate, from the White House.
Now, we still operate
under just such directives. Would you like to know what the substance of
these directives is?"
I said, Yes, Mr. Gaither, I would like very much to know. Whereupon, he
made this statement to me, "Mr. Dodd, we are here to operate in response to
similar directives, the substance of which is that we shall use our grantmaking power so to alter life in the United States, that it can be
comfortably merged with the Soviet Union."
Well, parenthetically, Mr. Griffin, I nearly fell off the chair. I, of course, didn't, but my response to Mr.
Gaither then was, Oh, Mr. Gaither, I can now answer your first question. You've forced the Congress
of the United States to spend a hundred and fifty thousand dollars to find our what you have just told
me. I said, Of course, legally, you're entitled to make grants for this purpose. But, I don't think
you're entitled to withhold that information from the People of this country, to whom you're indebted
for your tax exemption. So why don't you tell the People of the country just what you told me? And
his answer was, We would not think of doing any such thing." So, then I said, Well, Mr. Gaither,
obviously, you forced the Congress to spend this money, in order to find out what you just told me.
Griffin: Mr. Dodd, you have spoken, before, about some interesting things
that were discovered by Kathryn Casey at the Carnegie Endowment. Would you
tell us that story, please?
Dodd: Sure, glad to, Mr. Griffin. This experience you just referred to,
came about in response to a letter which I had written to the Carnegie
Endowment Center, National Peace, asking certain questions and gathering
certain information.
minutes."
Well, my first reaction was they had lost their minds. I had a pretty good idea of what those minutes
would contain, but I realized that Dr. Johnson had only been in office two years, and the vice-presidents
were relatively young men, and counsel also seemed to be a young man. I guessed that, probably, they
had never read the minutes themselves.
And so, I said that I had somebody and I would accept their offer. I went back to Washington, and I
selected the member of my staff who had been a practicing attorney in Washington. She was on my
staff to ensure I did not break any Congressional procedures or rules. In addition to that, she was
unsympathetic to the purpose of the investigation. She was a level-headed and very reasonably
brilliant, capable lady, and her attitude toward the investigation was this: What could possibly be
wrong with foundations? They do so much good.
[Start of side 2]
We are now at the year nineteen hundred and eight, which was the year that the Carnegie Foundation
began operations. And, in that year, the trustees meeting, for the first time, raised a specific question,
which they discussed throughout the balance of the year, in a very learned fashion. And the question is
this: Is there any means known more effective than war, assuming you wish to alter the life of an entire
people? And they conclude that, no more effective means to that end is known to humanity, than war.
So then, in 1909, they raise the second question, and discuss it, namely, how do we involve the United
States in a war?
Well, I doubt, at that time, if there was any subject more removed from the
thinking of most of the People of this country, than its involvement in a
war. There were intermittent shows in the Balkans, but I doubt very much
if many people even knew where the Balkans were. And finally, they answer
that question as follows: we must control the State Department.
And then, that very naturally raises the question of how do we do that?
They answer it by saying, we must take over and control the diplomatic
machinery of this country and, finally, they resolve to aim at that as an
objective. Then, time passes, and we are eventually in a war, which would
be World War I. At that time, they record on their minutes a shocking
report in which they dispatch to President Wilson a telegram cautioning him
to see that the war does not end too quickly. And finally, of course, the
war is over.
At that time, their interest shifts over to preventing what they call a
reversion of life in the United States to what it was prior to 1914, when
World War I broke out. At that point, they come to the conclusion that, to
prevent a reversion, we must control education in the United States. And
they realize that is a pretty big task. To them it is too big for them
alone.
They then decide that the key to the success of these two operations lay in
the alteration of the teaching of American History. So, they approach four
of the then most prominent teachers of American History in the country -people like Charles and Mary Byrd. Their suggestion to them is this, Will
they alter the manner in which they present their subject And, they get
turned down, flatly.
So, they then decide that it is necessary for them to do as they say, i.e.
build our own stable of historians." Then, they approach the Guggenheim
Foundation, which specializes in fellowships, and say When we find young
men in the process of studying for doctorates in the field of American
History, and we feel that they are the right caliber, will you grant them
fellowships on our say so? And the answer is, Yes.
So, under that condition, eventually they assemble twenty (20), and they
take these twenty potential teachers of American History to London. There,
they are briefed in what is expected of them -- when, as, and if they
secure appointments in keeping with the doctorates they will have earned.
That is the story that ultimately grew out of, and of course, was what
could have been presented by the members of, this Congressional Committee,
and the Congress as a whole, for just exactly what it said. But, they
never got to that point!
Griffin: This is the story that emerged from the minutes at the Carnegie
Foundation?
Dodd:
That's right.
Griffin:
Dodd:
And so?
Griffin:
And Kathryn Casey brought all of these back, in the form of
dictated notes, or verbatim readings, of the minutes?
Dodd:
On dictaphone belts.
Griffin:
Dodd: I don't know. If they are, they're somewhere in the archives, under
the control of the Congress, the House of Representatives.
Dodd:
No.
Griffin:
Dodd: Three maybe. Myself, my top assistant, and Kathryn. Yeah, I might
tell you this experience, as far as its impact on Kathryn Casey is
concerned. Well, she was never able to return to her law practice. If it
hadn't been for Carroll Reece's ability to tuck her away in a job with the
Federal Trade Commission, I don't know what would have happened to
Kathryn.
Ultimately, she lost her mind as a result of it.
It was a
terrible shock to her. It is a very rough experience for her to encounter
proof of this kind.
Griffin:
Mr. Dodd, can you summarize the opposition to the Committee, the
Dodd: Well, it began right at the start of the week of the operating
staff, Mr. Griffin. It began on the day on which the Committee met for the
purpose of consenting to, or confirming, my appointment to the position of
Director of Research. Thanks to the abstention by the minority members of
the Committee from voting, that is, the two Democratic members that is
why, technically, I was unanimously appointed.
Griffin:
Dodd: Not at this particular point, Sir. Mr. Reece ordered Counsel and
myself to visit Wayne Hayes. Wayne Hayes was the ranking minority member
of the Committee, as a Democrat. So, we -- Kathryn and I -- had to go down
to Mr. Hayes office, which we did. Mr. Hayes greeted us with the flat
statement, directed primarily to me, I am opposed to this investigation.
I regard it as nothing but an effort on the part of Carroll Reece to gain a
little prominence. So, I'll do everything I can to see that it fails.
Well, I have a strange personality, in the sense that a challenge of that
nature interests me.
Our Counsel withdrew. He went over and sat on the couch in Mr. Reece's office, and pouted. I, sort of,
took up this statement by Mr. Hayes as a challenge, and set myself a goal of winning him over to our
point of view.
I started by noticing that, on his desk, there was a book. The book was of the type and there were
many in those days -- that would be complaining about the spread of communism, and Hungary. That
type of book.
This meant to me that, at least Hayes had read the book. So, I brought up the subject of the spread of
the influence of the Soviet World. For two hours, I discussed this with Hayes and, finally, he ended up
by rising from his desk and saying, "Norm, if you will carry this investigation toward the goal that you
have outlined to me, I will be your biggest supporter."
I said, Mr. Hayes, I can assure you. I will not double-cross you. Subsequently, Mr. Hayes sent word
to me that he was in Bethesda Naval Hospital, with an attack of ulcers. He asked if would I come and
see him. Which I did. He then said, "Norm, the only reason I've asked you to come out here is that I
just want to hear you say, again you will not double-cross me." I gave him that assurance, and that was
the basis of our relationship.
Meanwhile, Counsel took the attitude expressed in these words, Norm, if
you want to waste your time with 'this guy' (as he called him), then you
can go ahead and do it, but don't ever ask me to say anything to him, under
any conditions, on any subject.
Well, that was our relationship for about three months. Eventually, I had
occasion to add to my staff. As a result of adding to my staff a topflight intelligence officer, both the Republican National Committee and the
White House resorted to stopping me from continuing this investigation in
the direction Carroll Reece had personally asked me to go.
Griffin: Was their objection because of what you were doing, or because of
the fact that you were doing it outside of the official auspices of the
Committee?
Dodd: No. The objection was, as they put it, my devotion to what they
called "anti-Semitism." That was a cooked-up idea. In other words, it
wasn't true at all. But, any way, that's the way they expressed it.
Griffin:
Dodd:
Excuse me.
Why?
Griffin:
Dodd:
Well, they could say it, Mr. Griffin.
But, they had to have
something in the way of a rationalization of their decision to do
everything they could to stop completion of this investigation, given the
direction that it was moving. That direction would have been exposure of
this Carnegie Endowment story, and the Ford Foundation, and the Guggenheim,
and the Rockefeller Foundation -- all working in harmony toward the control
of education in the United States.
Well, to secure the help of the White House in the picture, they got the White House to cause the liaison
between the White and the Hill -- a major person -- to go up to Hayes and try to get him, as it were,
actively to oppose what the investigation was engaged in.
Hayes, then, very kindly, would listen to this visit from this major person. Then he would call me and
say, Norm, come up to my office. I have a good deal to tell you.
I would go up. He would tell me he just had a visit from this major person, and he wants me to break
up this investigation. So then I said, Wayne, what did you do? What did you say to him? He said, I
just told him to get the hell out. And he did that three times. I got pretty proud of him, in the sense
that he was, as it were, backing me up. We finally embarked upon hearings at Hayes request. Hayes
wanted to get them out of the way, before he went abroad in the summer.
Griffin: Why were the hearings finally terminated?
Committee?
Dodd:
Griffin:
The hearings.
such a
became
in the
called
Mr. Reece took this as proof that he couldn't continue the hearings. He actually invited me to
accompany him when he went down to Hayes office and, in my presence, with the tears rolling down
his face, Hayes apologized to Carroll Reece for all he'd done, and his conduct. He apologized to me. I
thought that would be enough, and Carroll would resume. He never did.
Griffin: This charge of anti-Semitism is kind of intriguing to me.
was the basis of that charge? Was there any basis for it at all?
What
Dodd: The basis used by the Republican National Committee was that the
intelligence officer I had taken on my staff -- when I oriented this
investigation to the exposure of, and proof of, a conspiracy -- was known
to have a book, and that book was deemed to be anti-Semitic.
It was
Griffin:
Dodd:
Griffin:
Lee Loraine.
Do you recall?
Dodd: The book they referred to was called Waters Flowing Eastward.
was a very strong castigation of the Jewish influence in the world.
It
Griffin: What were some of the other charges made by Mr. Hayes, against
Mr. Reece?
Dodd: Just that Mr. Reece was utilizing this investigation for his own
prominence inside the House of Representatives. That was the only charge
Hayes could think up.
Griffin: How would you describe the motivation of the people who created
the foundations -- the big foundations -- in the very beginning? What was
their motivation?
Dodd: Their motivation was, well, let's take Mr. Carnegie, as an example.
His publicly declared and steadfast interest was to counteract the
departure of the colonies from Great Britain.
He was devoted just to
putting the pieces back together again.
Griffin:
Would that have required the collectivism to which they were
dedicated?
Dodd: No. No. No. These policies are the foundations' allegiance to
these un-American concepts;
these policies are all traceable to the
transfer of the funds over into the hands of Trustees, Mr. Griffin. Those
Trustees were not the men who had a hand in the creation of the wealth that
led to the endowment, or the use of that wealth for what we would call
public purposes.
Griffin:
Griffin:
How have the purpose and direction of the major foundations
changed, over the years, up to the present? What are their purposes and
directions today?
Griffin:
Dodd:
[end interview]
If you are a subscriber to the Audio Archives, you are entitled to make as
many duplicate copies as you wish -- to share with your friends.
please
ask
for
our
free
http://www.realityzone.com/
1-800-595-6596.
1-800-595-6596
Object 4