GN CAses

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189280
April 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00495MIN
dated August 29, 2008, which affirmed with modification the conviction of accused-appellant Alberto
Deligero y Bacasmot for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant was charged with qualified rape in an Information dated December 16, 2002, to
wit:
The undersigned accuses ALBERTO DELIGERO Y BACASMOT, grandfather of herein complainant,
of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That sometime on December 15, 2000 and any time thereafter, and until July 2002, at x x x, Butuan
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
the use of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
his own granddaughter, one AAA,2 a minor, 15 years of age, against her will.3
On September 9, 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 to the offense charged. Thereafter,
trial ensued. The prosecution presented complainant AAA and Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Edgar S.
Savella of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Caraga Regional Office. We quote with
approval the summary of the testimonies of the witnesses by the Court of Appeals:
AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the court a quo. She
was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her.
Appellant is AAAs granduncle, being the brother of her paternal grandfather. Appellant had eight (8)
children from his estranged wife who lived in another barangay. AAA fondly calls appellant "Papa." In
the early part of 2000, appellant resided with AAAs family for about four (4) months. After building
his own house, appellant moved in to his new house. AAA also transferred to appellants new house.
AAAs parents were promised by appellant that he would send AAA to school. AAA recalled that she
lived with appellant for about three (3) years and during those years, AAA claimed to have been
raped by appellant many times.
Sometime on December 15, 2000, while inside the bedroom of appellants house, AAA was
awakened from her sleep when she felt appellant inside her "malong" which she used as blanket.
Appellant, who was already naked, held AAAs hands and mounted her. While on top of AAA,
appellant threatened AAA not to tell her parents because he would kill her. Appellant then inserted
his penis into her vagina. AAA felt appellants penis penetrating her four (4) times. AAA could not
offer any resistance because of the threat earlier made by appellant. She felt pain and noticed that
her vagina bled.
AAA further testified that her parents later on came to know of her defilement when appellant started
telling the people in the neighborhood that she was pregnant. At the instance of her father, AAA and
appellant were invited to the police station to be investigated. They then proceeded to the National
Bureau of Investigation, Caraga Regional Office, where AAA executed her sworn statement on
October 7, 2002. In the said sworn statement, AAA narrated that when the rumors of her pregnancy
had spread in the neighborhood, appellant instructed her to admit that it was her boyfriend, Boyet,
who was responsible for her pregnancy. Fearing for her and her familys lives, AAA claimed that she
was forced to admit that it was Boyet who got her pregnant. However, the truth was that it was
appellant who got her pregnant.
Dr. Edgar S. Savella, medico-legal officer of NBI Caraga Regional Office testified that when he
examined AAA, the latter was already pregnant. He found no laceration in AAAs hymen. He
explained that 60% of rape victims have distensible hymen, which means that no laceration can be
found in the hymen. A distensible hymen admits a 2.5 cm tube, which is the average size of an adult
male organ in full erection. So, if an object with a 2.5 cm diameter is inserted into the vagina with
distensible hymen, the hymen will not break. When asked during cross-examination whether it was
possible that the sexual act could be consensual in the absence of laceration, Dr. Savella explained
that it is the type of hymen that determines such possibility.
For the defense, appellant testified that AAAs father is his nephew, being the son of his brother.
Appellant disclosed that sometime on June 2000, he lived with AAAs family and stayed with them for
about four (4) months. During his four (4) month stay with AAA and her family, he slept in the sala of
the family house with AAA. He claimed that since the sala was at the first floor of the house and the
bedrooms were at the second floor, AAAs parents and siblings would often see him and AAA
sleeping together. Oftentimes when he and AAA would sleep together at the sala, appellant testified
that they shared only one (1) "malong," which they used as a blanket. After four (4) months,
appellant transferred to his new house which he built fronting the house of AAA and her family.
Appellant further testified that when he moved in to his new house, AAA moved in with him as well.
Appellant claimed that from that time on, he and AAA were already living together as husband and
wife. The alleged amorous relationship between him and AAA was known to the public, particularly
their neighbors.
Sometime on June 14, 2002, AAAs mother came and fetched AAA. AAA then worked at a videoke
bar. After three (3) months, AAA went home to her family but stayed there for one (1) night only.
Appellant testified that AAA went back to his house and confided that she would be getting married.
AAA told appellant that shell be marrying her boyfriend, Boyet, a "tricykad" driver. In the course of
their conversation, AAA confided also to appellant that her menstrual period had been delayed.
Afterwhich, appellant informed AAAs father that [his] daughter could be pregnant. Instead, he was
arrested and was then brought to the police station to be investigated.
At the police station, AAA allegedly admitted that it was Boyet who got her pregnant. Appellant
claimed that there were people at the police station who witnessed AAAs declaration. Together with
AAAs mother, appellant then brought AAA to a public hospital to have her medical examination.
On cross-examination, appellant claimed he courted AAA, which the latter accepted. During his four
(4) month stay with AAAs family, he had sexual intercourse with AAA when they both slept together
at the sala. When asked whether they exchanged letters professing their love for each other,
appellant answered in the affirmative. The latter testified that when he visits Gingoog City, he would
send letters to AAA. On the other hand, AAA allegedly wrote him letters as well. However, appellant
disclosed that he tore the letters sent to him by AAA because the latter requested him to do so for
fear that her father would discover the said letters.
To bolster his claim that he and AAA were lovers, appellant testified that he intended to marry AAA.
He even made AAA as one of his beneficiaries in his Social Security Service retirement plan.
Appellant also claimed that AAAs father could have been impelled by revenge in filing the case
against him. According to appellant, AAAs father harbored ill-feelings towards him because he
reported to his previous employer that AAAs father sold four (4) hectares of land owned by the said
employer without the latters knowledge.
Corroborating appellants testimony that he and AAA were living together as husband and wife was
Rudy L. Escatan (hereafter referred to as Rudy). Rudy testified that he knew appellant and AAA
because both were his neighbors. During those times that AAA lived with appellant, Rudy would
often see appellant and AAA together. Both acted as husband and wife. Further, Rudy testified that
he saw appellant and AAA kissing each other numerous times.5(Citations omitted.)
On September 20, 2006, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in
relation to Article 266-B, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.
He is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA instead of death by lethal
injection, which penalty has been abolished.
Further, he is ordered to pay private complainant and her family the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
In the service of his sentence, he shall be credited with the full time benefit during which time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment if he agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, if not only 4/5 as provided under Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
He shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, Panabo City, Davao del Norte. 6
According to the trial court, the testimony of AAA was straightforward. Accused-appellant failed to
show any ill motive on the part of AAA to impute such a grave offense against her granduncle. The
trial court was not convinced with the sweetheart theory advanced by accused-appellant, and
observed that the latter did not admit that he and AAA were lovers when they were brought to the
police substation in Butuan City. Accused-appellant instead insinuated at that time that a certain
Boyet could have impregnated AAA.
Pursuant to the ruling of this Court in People v. Mateo,7 the Court of Appeals conducted an
intermediate review of the decision of the trial court. On August 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision affirming with modification the findings of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 1, Butuan City, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for the crime of simple rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case No. 9740, with no possibility for
parole. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000,00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.8
While the Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact by the trial court, it held that the crime
committed by accused-appellant was only simple rape. Primarily, the Court of Appeals held that the
unauthenticated photocopy of AAAs baptismal certificate was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA.
Furthermore, while it was alleged in the Information that accused-appellant is AAAs grandfather,
what was proven during the trial was that he was AAAs granduncle, being the brother of AAAs
paternal grandfather.
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court through a Notice of Appeal. 9
On February 22, 2010, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation 10 stating that he will no longer file a
supplemental brief as all relevant matters have already been taken up in his Appellants Brief with
the Court of Appeals. Thus, he brings before us the same Assignment of Errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE DESPITE ITS INCREDIBILITY.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.11
Accused-appellant anchors his prayer for acquittal on the following points, which, according to him,
are undisputed: (1) accused-appellant was unarmed; (2) there was no proof of great disparity in
terms of physical strength or capacity between accused-appellant and AAA; and (3) AAA never put
the slightest resistance against accused-appellant.12
We find accused-appellants contentions too feeble to warrant a reversal of his conviction.
Accused-appellants being unarmed is inconsequential considering the circumstances of the instant
case. We have previously held that "in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father,
stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation."13 Accused-appellant, AAAs granduncle, is certainly a person having moral influence
and ascendancy over AAA. AAA would surely observe the deference accorded by her own parents to
accused-appellant, her fathers uncle. Indeed, AAA herself fondly called accused-appellant as
"Papa," showing that she more or less treated him like her own father.
Neither is it required that specific evidence be presented to prove the disparity in physical strength
between AAA and accused-appellant. As argued by the prosecution, accused-appellant is a grown
man who is used to hard work and manual labor as a farmer and a chainsaw operator, while AAA is
a very young girl when she was allegedly raped and when she testified. It was the trial court which
had the opportunity to observe the physical disproportion between them and considered the same in
finding accused-appellant guilty. Accordingly, it is not for this Court to reverse the findings of fact of
the trial court on this matter.
Accused-appellants assertion that "there is nothing in the record that would show that accusedappellant verbally threatened the complainant in order to accomplish the x x x bestial acts" 14 is
downright misleading. AAA clearly stated in her testimony that accused-appellant threatened to kill
her:
Q What was his position when he was inside your "malong" that woke you up?
A He was holding my hands and he was on top of me.
Q What was he wearing while he was inside your "malong" holding your hands and he was on top of
you?
A He was already naked.
Q And when he laid on top of you what else did he do?
A He told me not to tell my parents what he was doing to me.
Q You said he raped you, how did he rape you?
A He laid himself on top of me and threatened me not to tell my parents what happened because if I
would, he will kill me.15
Accused-appellant likewise points out that there was no laceration of the hymen of AAA according to
the medical evidence presented by the prosecution. Certainly, accused-appellant cannot use this
evidence to assert that he never had carnal knowledge of AAA, as he had already admitted the
same in his assertion of his sweetheart theory. Accused-appellant even admitted in open court that
he was the father of AAAs baby.16
Moreover, this medical finding does not prove that the sexual intercourse between accusedappellant and AAA was consensual. Prosecution witness Dr. Savella, who made the above medical
finding, had adequately explained that the absence of laceration was not due to the absence of force
during the intercourse, but because of the type of hymen of the subject. This echoes the observation
in People v. Llanto,17 where this Court noted several extreme cases of distensible or elastic hymen
remaining intact in spite of sexual contact:
It is possible for the victims hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. x x x.
Likewise, whether the accuseds penis fully or only partially penetrated the victims genitalia, it is still
possible that her hymen would remain intact because it was thick and distensible or elastic.
We stated in People v. Aguinaldo that the strength and dilability of the hymen varies from one
woman to another such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse,
or on the other hand, may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse
can ensue. In some cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman has given birth.
(Citations omitted.)
Furthermore, an examination of the testimony of AAA shows that the alleged rape had not been
attended by a huge physical struggle that would have caused injuries to AAA. Instead, accusedappellant apparently subdued AAA by threatening to kill her. The lack of injuries, therefore, is
consistent with the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution.
This Court has likewise repeatedly held that the sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily admits
carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. In People v. Mirandilla, Jr., 18 we held that "this admission
makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that
needs convincing proof; after the prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the
burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was
consensual."
In the case at bar, accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden. The testimony of the
54-year old Rudy Ecatan, which was presented by the defense to prove that accused-appellant and
his 13-year old grandniece were lovers, is unconvincing and relies too much on his hasty
conclusions rather than factual observations. Ecatan, who admitted that he was very close to
accused-appellant,19 believes that accused-appellant and AAA were lovers just because the former is
the father of AAAs child. The trial court was quick to discover that even this "knowledge" about the
paternity of the child was hearsay:
Q What can you say to the charge against Alberto Deligero?
A It is a lie, sir.
Q Why do you say that it is a lie?

A Because the girl had delivered a baby.
Court:
Q Who is the father of the baby?
A Alberto.
Q How did you know that?
A I know about this because they are our neighbors.20
Ecatans reliance on hearsay was further shown by his unawareness of the true blood relationship
between AAA and accused-appellant:
Q How is Alberto related to AAA?
A They are saying that Alberto is the grandfather of AAA.
Q Is it true that Alberto Deligero is really the grandfather of AAA?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because their family names are the same?
A Yes, sir.21
Accused-appellants indecisiveness with his defense shows as well that he was being less than
truthful. During the initial investigation, he claimed that a certain Boyet was AAAs boyfriend and
was the father of AAAs child. During the trial, however, after AAA denied knowing any person named
Boyet, accused-appellant now claims that he and AAA were lovers.
1wphi1
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of
Ecatan and accused-appellant, on one hand, and that of AAA, on the other, concluded that it was
AAA who was telling the truth. We have repeatedly held that factual findings of the trial court,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are "entitled to great weight and respect, if not
conclusiveness, for we accept that the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the
facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their
respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the
offenses charged. The direct appreciation of testimonial demeanor during examination, veracity,
sincerity and candor was foremost the trial courts domain, not that of a reviewing court that had no
similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified." 22 Thus, where the accused-appellant, as in
the case at bar, fails to show that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked a material
fact that otherwise would change the outcome, or misappreciated a circumstance of consequence in
their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and of their respective versions, this Court is
constrained to affirm such uniform factual findings.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
The Court of Appeals modified the Decision of the trial court and adjudged accused-appellant to be
liable only for simple rape, ruling that the unauthenticated photocopy of AAAs baptismal certificate
was not sufficient to prove the age of AAA. The Court of Appeals furthermore ruled that while it was
alleged in the Information that accused-appellant is AAAs grandfather, what was proven during the
trial was that he was AAAs granduncle, being the brother of AAAs paternal grandfather.
We agree with the modification of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, we note that even if the correct
blood relationship of being AAAs granduncle was alleged in the Information, and the age of AAA was
proven by sufficient evidence, accused-appellant would still be liable for simple rape. The
granduncle, or more specifically the brother of the victims grandfather, is a relative of the victim in
the fourth civil degree, and is thus not covered by Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1).
Finally, this Court finds it appropriate to hold accused-appellant liable to AAA for exemplary
damages. In People v. Rante,23 the Court held that exemplary damages can be awarded, not only in
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
exhibited an extremely appalling behavior in forcing himself upon his thirteen-year old grandniece,
threatening to kill her, and even persisted in humiliating her by depicting her as a girl with very loose
morals. Accordingly, "to set a public example and serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and
corrupt the youth,"24 we hereby award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to AAA in
accordance with Article 222925 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00495MIN dated
August 29, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In addition to the amounts awarded by
the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant Alberto Deligero y Bacasmot is further ordered to
pay P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of 6o/o per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 191396
April 17, 2013

vs.
MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
For review is the November 26, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01984, which affirmed the August 19, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
Case Nos. 04-2962-CFM and 04-2963-CFM, wherein accused-appellant Marilyn Aguilar y
Manzanillo (Aguilar) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002."
On December 1, 2004, two separate Informations were filed against Aguilar in the Pasay City RTC,
Branch 116 charging her with violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. The pertinent portions of the Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 04-2962-CFM:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Marilyn Aguilar y
Manzanillo, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
her possession, custody and control of 0.31 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug.3
Criminal Case No. 04-2963-CFM:
That on or about the 30th day of November, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Marilyn Aguilar y
Manzanillo, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to another 0.45 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. 4
Aguilar pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned on January 10, 2005. 5 During the pre-trial
conference6 on February 16, 2005, Aguilar and her counsel admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the Letter Request for Drug Test, Initial Laboratory Report, Request for Laboratory
Examination, and photocopy of the marked money in evidence. Counsel for Aguilar also admitted
Aguilars identity as the one arrested by the police officers on November 30, 2004, as indicated in
the Informations. The parties also agreed that among the issues to be resolved by the RTC were the
validity of Aguilars arrest and the subsequent search of her person absent the necessary warrants.
Trial then ensued with the prosecution presenting Police Officer 2 (PO2) Roel Medrano, the poseurbuyer who was a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned at the Anti-Illegal Drugs,
Special Operation Task Force of the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio in Taguig, Manila. It
also presented Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Angel Timario, the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City who conducted the examination of the drugs. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense presented Aguilar herself and her niece, Gerolyn A. Lazaro
(Lazaro).
Version of the Prosecution
According to PO2 Medrano, a week prior to Aguilars arrest on November 30, 2004, he had already
received some phone calls from "concerned citizens"7 regarding the drug-dealing activities of one
"Baby Mata" at Pildera, Pasay City. PO2 Medrano verified the information by calling on Eva, his
informant, who was also a drug user. Eva confirmed that she personally knew Baby Mata, who was
her regular drug-supplier. PO2 Medrano thereafter learned of Baby Matas residence at Road IV
near the barangay hall, and that she was plying her trade at Road I. Although he placed Baby Mata
under surveillance, PO2 Medrano admitted that he did not actually see her selling drugs to
customers.8
On November 30, 2004, a team, led by Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Rey Millare, was formed to
conduct an entrapment operation against Aguilar. The team submitted a pre-operation report to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and PO2 Medrano was designated as the poseurbuyer. He was provided with twoP500.00 bills, the serial numbers of which he noted and thereafter
marked with "JG," the initials of P/Supt. Jose Gentiles, the Chief of the District Intelligence and
Investigation Branch. At around 6:20 in the evening, the team was in place at Pildera to conduct the
buy-bust operation. With Eva, PO2 Medrano went to Road I, where they saw Baby Mata talking to
someone. When the person left, Eva approached Baby Mata and after about five minutes, waved at
PO2 Medrano to come over. Eva introduced PO2 Medrano as a security guard and a fellow "scorer."
Baby Mata then asked how much PO2 Medrano wanted, to which he answered "isang bulig
lang,"9 which was half a gram of shabu, worth P1,000.00. Upon Baby Matas request, PO2 Medrano
gave her the two pre-marked P500.00 bills, which she took with her left hand. Baby Mata, with her
right hand, thereafter reached for a plastic sachet containing crystalline substance from the right
pocket of her jeans, and handed it to PO2 Medrano. After examining the sachet, PO2 Medrano
pocketed the shabu and pressed the call button of his mobile phone, to signal his team that the sale
had been consummated. PO2 Benedicto A. Mendoza (Mendoza), who was then only seven to eight
meters away, rushed towards them and arrested Baby Mata. The police officers immediately
introduced themselves as such, showed Baby Mata their identification cards, and apprised her of her
constitutional rights. PO2 Medrano confiscated the buy-bust money he earlier handed Baby Mata,
which were still in her left hand, and another sachet of shabu, which turned up after she was ordered
to empty her pockets. PO2 Medrano accordingly marked the two sachets of shabu with "RM-1" and
"RM-2" and thereafter brought Baby Mata to the Southern Police District Station at Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig.10
The seized items were brought by PO2 Medrano on the same day to the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. They were received and examined by P/Insp.Timario who made the
following findings, as embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-1171-04:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
A One (1) staple-sealed brown envelope with names and signatures containing two (2) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance having the following
markings and net weights:
A-1 - (RM-1 301104) = 0.45 gram
A-2 - (RM-2 301104) = 0.31 gram
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drugs.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the
tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A-1 and A-2 contain Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:
0120H 01 December 2004
EXAMINED BY:
(SGD.)
ANGEL C. TIMARIO
Police Inspector
Forensic Chemist11
Version of the Defense
Aguilar contradicted the prosecution and denied the charges against her. She claimed that on
November 30, 2004, at around 10:00 a.m., while she and her niece, Lazaro, were waiting for a
jeepney to Baclaran along NAIA Road, PO2 Medrano and PO2 Mendoza accosted and handcuffed
her without any explanation. When she asked why she was being apprehended, she was simply told
to explain at the station. Lazaro in the meantime remained quiet so as not to reveal her identity as
Aguilars companion. Aguilar was then boarded in a yellow car and while she was being driven
around Nayong Pilipino, PO2 Medrano allegedly told her that they needed money and requested for
her cooperation by giving up "Lilit,"12 a drug-pusher. At the station, the same police officers
demanded that she produce the amount of P100,000.00 and asked her to call her relatives for the
money.13
Aguilar argued that there could have been no buy-bust operation as she was already in detention at
the station at the time such operation was supposedly conducted. She averred that while she was
once a resident of Pasay City, she no longer lived there and that she would only go there to visit her
mother. As to her nickname, Aguilar explained that she had always been called as such. 14
Lazaro corroborated Aguilars testimony but could not provide certain details such as where the car
was headed or at which precinct Aguilar was taken when they received the call from the police
informing them of Aguilars arrest. She also said that Aguilar already resided in Bulacan and she was
known as "Baby Mata" because of her big eyes.15
Ruling of the RTC
On August 19, 2005, the RTC gave credence to the prosecutions version and found Aguilar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in both cases, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in x x x light of the foregoing premises and considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 04-2962-CFM, this Court finds the accused Marilyn Aguilar y
Manzanillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Violation of Section
11, sub-paragraph (3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and four
(4) months and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, plus costs; and
2) In Criminal Case No. 04-2963-CFM, this Court likewise finds the said accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00, plus costs.
The two (2) 0.31 and 0.45 gram of Methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu involved in these
cases are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the Government and ordered to be turned over to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper and appropriate disposition in
accordance with the provisions of the law.16
Aguilars denial and theory of frame-up, the RTC held, cannot be accepted over the prosecutions
case, which was not only clear and convincing, but also amply supported by the evidence.
Aguilar appealed17 the RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals and the case was docketed as CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01984.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Finding that the prosecution has proven Aguilars guilt of the two crimes beyond reasonable doubt,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision on November 26, 2009.
Issues
Aggrieved, Aguilar elevated18 the above ruling to this Court, assigning the same errors she assigned
before the Court of Appeals,19 viz:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, ARTICLE II OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND FRAME-UP.20
In the main, Aguilar argues that the RTC erred in convicting her as the prosecution failed to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In support of such assertion, Aguilar points out the fact that the
police officers failed to follow the protocol in the custody and control of seized items due to the
absence of an inventory and photographs of the confiscated drugs as required by Republic Act No.
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations.
Aguilar further posits that she should be acquitted because "without the instigation of the informant
the alleged transaction involving the sale of shabu would not have transpired." 21
This Courts Ruling
This Court has made an exhaustive review of the records of this case and has found no reason to
overturn the lower courts.
Aguilar was charged and convicted for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The pertinent provisions provide:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
xxxx
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous
drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate
(GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93,
Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00)
to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than
ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana
resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous
drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or
three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams
of marijuana.
Custody and Control of Evidence
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of
custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Implementing the above provision, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, states:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
(Emphasis supplied.)
While a testimony about a perfect and unbroken chain is ideal, such is not always the standard as it
is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain.22 A perusal of the law reveals, however,
that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in Section 21 will not render the arrest illegal or the
items seized inadmissible in evidence, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of such items
are preserved since they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 23
Despite the failure of the apprehending officers to make an inventory of and to photograph the items
seized from Aguilar, they were nevertheless able to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the evidence had been preserved, the chain of custody of such items, having been adequately
established in the case at bar. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
It was undisputed that at about 6:20 in the evening of November 30, 2004, PO2 Medrano bought a
sachet of shabu from accused-appellant which he paid with two (2) P500.00 marked bill[s]. PO2
Medrano placed the shabu in his pocket then executed the pre-arranged signal. After arresting
accused-appellant, PO2 Medrano seized the marked money from the formers left hand then frisked
accused-appellant and found another sachet of shabu. He marked the sachet of shabu he bought
"RM-1" and the one he found in accused-appellants pocket "RM-2". They brought accused-appellant
and the seized items to the headquarters. While accused-appellant was being booked, the team
prepared the request for laboratory examination. The request and the seized drugs were personally
brought by PO2 Medrano to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Quezon City that same evening. P/Insp.
Angel Timario received the request and specimens brought by PO2 Medrano. He weighed and
examined the contents of the sachets, confirming that the items were methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. His findings are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-1171-04. The
specimens which bore the markings "RM-1" and "RM-2" were identified by PO2 Medrano during
trial.24 (Citations omitted.)
Moreover, Aguilar was not able to show that there was bad faith or ill will on the part of the police
officers, or tampering with the evidence, thus the presumption that the integrity of the evidence was
preserved remains. The same applies to the presumption that the police officers properly discharged
their duties. Since Aguilar failed to overcome the foregoing presumptions, it cannot be disputed that
the drugs seized from her were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory and presented in
court during trial. The crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs was therefore
established by the prosecution.25
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt Established
Aguilar, having failed to convince this Court that the consistent findings of the lower courts are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable errors, then the hornbook doctrine that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the RTC, are binding, applies. 26
1. Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
To successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, this Court, in People v. Del
Rosario,27held:
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence." (Citations omitted.)
As the poseur-buyer, PO2 Medrano was able to positively identify28 Aguilar as the seller of the shabu
during his testimony. He also testified on the exchange of the marked money and shabu that he and
Aguilar had during their transaction. More importantly, the prosecution was able to present the very
same marked money and shabu, the corpus delicti, to the court as evidence.
2. Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
With respect to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, this Court finds that the
prosecution sufficiently established the following elements:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. 29
Aside from the shabu Aguilar sold to PO2 Medrano, another sachet of shabu was recovered in her
possession. Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to
possess, animus possidendi, sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of
such possession. The burden of evidence, thus, is shifted to the accused to explain the absence of
intent to possess.30 Aguilar miserably failed to discharge such burden.
Defenses of Denial and Frame-up
Time and again, this Court has looked at the defenses of denial and frame-up with disfavor. While
Aguilars niece, Lazaro, did testify in her defense, this Court, in agreement with the observation of
the Court of Appeals, cannot give such testimony full faith and credit as Lazaro herself declared that
she would testify on anything for her aunt31 and she came to court to help in the release of her
aunt.32 This admission of absolute willingness to make declarations in court for the singular purpose
of judicial proceedings to ascertain the truth and adversely affects the credibility of the witness.
The explanation of this Court in People v. Cruz33 with regard to the defenses of denial and frame-up
finds applicability in this case, given that Aguilar also accused the police officers of extorting money
from her, to wit:
Denial or frame-up is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted. It should not accord a redoubtable sanctuary to a person accused of drug dealing unless
the evidence of such frame up is clear and convincing. Without proof of any intent on the part of the
police officers to falsely impute appellant in the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and self-serving
claims of appellant that he had been framed up. Neither can appellants claim of alleged extortion by
the police operatives be entertained. Absent any proof, appellants assertion of extortion allegedly
committed by the police officers could not be successfully interposed. It remains one of those
standard, worn-out, and impotent excuses of malefactors prosecuted for drug offenses. What
appellant could have done was to prove his allegation and not just casually air it. (Citations omitted.)
Defense of Instigation
Aguilar further claims that the validity of the buy-bust operation is doubtful as she was instigated to
sell shabu to PO2 Medrano. In support, Aguilar quotes PO2 Medranos own testimony wherein he
agreed to the possibility that his informant may have instigated the sale. 34
In resolving issues involving the validity of a buy-bust operation, specifically the question of whether
the government had induced the accused to commit the offense as charged, this Court usually finds
it instructive to first distinguish between entrapment and instigation. This Courts distinction in the
recent case of People v. Legaspi,35 is elucidative, to wit:
Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its purpose
is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on the other
hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the offense. In such
a case, the instigators become co-principals themselves.
Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured
into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no
conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused
and the criminal offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public
officials furnished the accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was
aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is no instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of
decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. (Citations omitted.)
This Court recognizes instigation as a valid defense that can be raised by the accused. However, for
this defense to prosper, the accused must prove, with sufficient evidence, that the government
induced him or her to commit the offense.36 Aguilar claims that she was instigated by the informant to
sell shabu to PO2 Medrano. Her only evidence to support this claim was her interpretation of PO2
Medranos testimony.
This Court finds Aguilars defense of instigation unworthy of belief. It has been established that when
the accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up:
(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or
(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to
expose his criminal act; or
(3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted
in its commission.37 (Citation omitted.)
In Legaspi, we added: "[t]he foregoing are especially true in that class of cases where the offense is
the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnished evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the perpetrator, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the police officer." 38 The illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs belong to such class of cases and buy-bust operations employing
poseur-buyers are legally permissible to expose the offender and catch him in the act.
1wphi1
This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals pronouncement that "there was no showing that the
informant employed any act of inducement such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited
drugs or offers of exorbitant prices."39 Aguilar was never forced or coerced to sell the prohibited drug
to PO2 Medrano. In fact, PO2 Medrano did not even have to say anything as Aguilar immediately
asked him how much he wanted after he was introduced as a "scorer."40 When PO2 Medrano
mentioned the quantity he desired to purchase, Aguilar promptly took the marked money from him
and readily handed him the shabu. All these show that Aguilar had been habitually engaged in the
sale of drugs. Also, such circumstances not only authorized, but obligated the police officers to arrest
Aguilar, despite the lack of arrest warrant, as the crime was committed in their presence. 41
It is worthy to note that, aside from the fact that this defense was only brought up on appeal, it is
being submitted along with the defenses of denial and frame-up. Aguilar cannot logically claim on
one hand that she did not commit the acts constituting the charges against her, and at the same time
ask this Court to consider that while she may have committed the act, she had been instigated to
commit such crime. The defense of instigation is simply contradictory to the defenses of denial 42and
frame-up.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the November 26, 2009 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01984.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189351
April 10, 2013

vs.
LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Before the Court, appellant seeks to appeal the Decision1 dated July 27, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 03435 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lolita Quesido y
Badarang, which affirmed the Decision2dated May 7, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 06-248672. The trial court convicted appellant Lolita
Quesido y Badarang of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposed upon her the penalty of life
imprisonment as well as a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
The prosecution's version of the events leading to appellant's arrest and detention was summed as
follows in its appellee's Brief:
About a week before the arrest of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2006, the District AntiIllegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force, Manila Police District (DAID-SOTG) received a report
from an anonymous caller, regarding the rampant use and selling of dangerous drugs of one alias
"Len-Len'' at Muslim and Quinta Market areas in Quiapo, Manila. This information was relayed by
Col. Ortilla, the Chief of DAID-SOTG, to P/Insp. Julian Olonan. The latter, who was designated as
the team leader, instructed SPO1 Federico Chua (SPO1 Chua), SPO1 Cabangon and PO2
Cabungcal to conduct surveillance, after which, the three (3) police officers proceeded to the target
area. Upon confirmation, they secured an informant who could directly make a purchase from the
target.
On November 28, 2006, before the actual buy-bust operation, the team conducted a briefing. SPO1
Chua was designated as the poseur-buyer while PO3 Jimenez and several others were back-up
operatives. The team leader P/Insp. Julian Olonan, gave SPO1 Chua two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills,
as the buy-bust money. SPO1 Chua in turn marked the said bills with the letter "x" at the upper
portion for identification purposes. Thereafter, the operation was coordinated with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the team, together with the informant, proceeded to the
target area to conduct the buy-bust operation.
At the target area, SPO1 Chua and the informant proceeded to a nearby shanty where they are
supposed to buy the illegal drug. Near the shanty, they met with "Len-Len", the target person. At that
point, the informant told "Len-Len", "bosing kukuha ko". The latter responded, "aalis ako si Baby na
bahala sa inyo". The two then proceeded to the shanty where this certain "Baby", who was later
identified as the accused-appellant, came out. The informant then talked to "Baby" and said, "kukuha
kami". She then replied, "asan ang pera?". Afterward, SPO1 Chua handed the two (2) premarked P100.00 bills to "Baby". Upon receipt of the said money, "Baby" pulled out three (3) pieces of
plastic sachets with white crystalline substance from her pocket, out of which only one (1) was given
to the poseur-buyer. When the same was handed to SPO1 Chua, he made a miss call to his
companions, which was the pre-arranged signal that the sale was consummated. Thereafter, he
introduced himself as a police officer and told her the offense she committed as well as the reason
why she is being arrested. At the time when accused-appellant was being arrested, she became
hysterical and started shouting as if she wanted to free herself. Fearing that they might be mobbed,
SPO1 Chua held her arms and, with the assistance of the back-up operatives, moved her away from
the place because the crowd was starting to approach them. In fact, a commotion took place during
the arrest. At that time, the accused-appellant threw the other plastic sachets which were in her
possession. Unfortunately, the police officers failed to recover them because accused-appellant
started shouting which attracted a lot of people.
Accused-appellant was then brought to the DAID office on board a private jeep. She was turned
over, together with the confiscated item, to the investigator. Meanwhile, the confiscated item was
submitted to the crime laboratory with the corresponding request for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination of the subject specimen ultimately yielded positive results to the tests for
shabu.3 (Citations omitted.)
In her defense, appellant narrated a different version of the story which basically states that at
around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 2006, she was at home when two persons entered the
same and then invited her to go with them to the police station. 4 Thereafter, she complied because
she was already handcuffed by them.
Appellant was prosecuted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 as indicated in
the Information5 dated December 4, 2006, the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about November 28, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without
being authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing ZERO POINT ZERO TWO EIGHT (0.028) gram of white crystalline substance, known as
"SHABU" containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the aforementioned charge upon her arraignment on January 16,
2007.6 At the conclusion of the pre-trial conference, both parties agreed to dispense with the
presentation of prosecution witness Police Senior Inspector Elisa G. Reyes (PSI Reyes), Forensic
Chemical Officer of the Manila Police District (MPD), and simply stipulated on the content of her
testimony.7 The prosecution proceeded to present as its witnesses Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Federico Chua and Police Officer (PO) 3 Renato Jimenez. On the other hand, the defense
presented appellant as its sole witness whose testimony merely consisted of a denial of the charge
against her.
In its Decision dated May 7, 2008, the trial court found appellant guilty of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and held:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Lolita Quesido y Badarang GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos; and the cost of suit.
Let a commitment order be issued for the immediate transfer of the custody of accused to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City, pursuant to SC OCA Circulars Nos. 4-92-A and
26-2000.
The plastic sachet with shabu (Exh. "C"), a dangerous drug, is hereby confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the PDEA for proper disposal thereof. 8
Appellant challenged her conviction with the Court of Appeals but her appeal was turned down by
the appellate court in its Decision dated July 27, 2009, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the trial
court and disposed of the case in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated May 7, 2008, in Criminal
Case No. 06-248672, of the RTC, Branch 35, Manila, finding herein accused-appellant Lolita
Quesido y Badarang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.9
Hence, appellant, through counsel, filed the present appeal which submits a lone assignment of
error for consideration:
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165.10
In the instant petition, appellant argues that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the
procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 9165 and she insists that the chain of custody for the
supposed seized drug was not properly established.
The argument does not merit consideration.
The relevant procedural rule referred to by appellant is Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, which provides the procedure for the handling of seized or confiscated illegal drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
a copy thereof.
Nonetheless, despite the apparent mandatory language that is expressed in the foregoing rule, we
have always reiterated in jurisprudence that non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily
render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 11
Furthermore, Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
9165 recognizes instances when non-compliance with the aforementioned rule of procedure may be
justified:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
(Emphasis supplied.)
The procedure discussed above highlights the significance of preserving the chain of custody of
illegal drugs used as evidence in a criminal prosecution. Section 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board
(DDB) Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines "chain of custody" as "the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who
held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were
made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition."
In Malillin v. People,12 we expounded on the rationale for the chain of custody rule:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)
In People v. Remigio,13 we restated the enumeration of the different links that the prosecution must
prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court.
In the case at bar, we find that the procedural guidelines laid out in Section 21(1), Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 were not strictly complied with. In spite of this, we can still conclude that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly
preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule.
A review of the testimony of SPO1 Chua, the arresting officer, would reveal that the first crucial link in
the chain of custody was substantially complied with, thus:
COURT:
xxxx
Q After the sale was consummated, you said you executed a pre-arranged signal?
A Yes, sir.
Q By means of your cellphone?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q By means of a miss call?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And then what happened?
A After releasing the miss call I immediately arrested Lolita Quesido.
Q How did you arrest her?
A I introduced myself as a police officer, Your Honor.
Q After that what else did you do?
A I told her the offense she committed and the reason why she is being arrested, Your Honor.
Q What did you tell her exactly?
A I told her, "o pulis ito, hinuhuli kita sa pagbebenta ng shabu."
Q Then what else?
A She suddenly became hysterical, Your Honor.
Q How did you make the arrest?
A I held her arm, Your Honor.
Q What else did you do aside from holding her in her arm?
A After I have held her arm she became hysterical, I was trying to immediately remove her from that
place because there are a lot of people.
Q Why, did these people notice you?
A Yes, Your Honor, because she was becoming hysterical.

Q What was she doing?
A She was shouting, Your Honor.
Q What was she shouting?
A A shout resembling that she was resisting, Your Honor.
Q What specific words, you said she was shouting?
A She was shouting as if she wants to set herself free, Your Honor.
Q Precisely, was she shouting or not?
A She was shouting as if she was calling the attention of the people in the area, Your Honor.
Q What is it that she was shouting?
A She was asking for help, Your Honor.
Q What are the exact words she uttered?
A I cannot exactly recall, Your Honor, because I was bothered by the persons around us. My
reaction, Your Honor, was to get out of the area because I might be mobbed.
Q Why are these persons around, what are they doing?
A They were already approaching us, Your Honor, because that place is very troublesome and were
surrounded by bad elements.
Q Were you able to move her out of that place?
A I was able to place her out for about 5 to 7 meters when my companions arrived.
xxxx
Q At that time you already were able to recover the buy bust money?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q As well as the plastic sachet?
A The one that she gave to me, I was in possession of it, Your Honor.
Q From the place where you arrested the accused and up to the time that you reached the station or
headquarters, who was in possession of that last sachet?
A I was the one, Your Honor.
Q How did you keep it?
A I placed it in my pocket, Your Honor.
Q How about the buy bust money?
A Including the buy bust money, Your Honor.
Q Upon reaching the headquarters, what did you do?
A The small transparent plastic sachet before I turned that over to the investigator, I placed our
markings, Your Honor.
Q You said you marked it with the initial of the accused?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know that those were the initials of the accused?
A When we were at the office, Your Honor, we asked her of her full name which she gave it. 14
From the foregoing testimony, it appears that the arresting officer was justified in marking the seized
plastic sachet of shabu at the police station instead of at the scene of the buy-bust operation which
is what is required by proper procedure. Given the factual milieu, SPO1 Chua had no choice but to
immediately extricate himself and the appellant from the crime scene in order to forestall a
potentially dangerous situation.
After marking the seized illegal drug, SPO1 Chua turned it over to PO3 Jimenez, the investigating
officer, thereby completing the second link of the chain of custody. The testimony of PO3 Jimenez
attests to this act:
PROSECUTOR BAUTISTA
xxxx
Q Im not after the marked money, the specimen, the alleged transparent plastic sachet that was
bought by police officer Chua, if shown to you, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why?
A Because it was marked in my presence, sir.

Q What markings?
A "LQB", sir.
Q Im showing to you this plastic sachet, the white crystalline substance, please tell us if that is the
same plastic sachet you are referring to?
A This is the specimen, sir.15
Subsequently, PO3 Jimenez prepared a letter-request16 for the laboratory examination of the seized
illegal drugs which was transmitted along with the seized plastic sachet with white crystalline
substance to the Crime Laboratory Office of the MPD. Based on Chemistry Report No. D-13610617 issued by PSI Reyes, the specimen submitted for examination tested positive for the presence
of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The seized plastic sachet of shabu was then
presented in court by the prosecution and marked as Exhibit "C."
To reiterate, jurisprudence tells us that substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the
chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. 18 Verily, the
foregoing narrative clearly shows that the chain of custody rule was substantially complied with by
the law enforcement officers involved.
Furthermore, the testimonies of SPO1 Chua and PO3 Jimenez were properly given significant
probative weight by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Lapasaran,19 we elaborated on the importance of the credible testimony of police officers in the
prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs through the following:
Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs depends
largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is
fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses are
accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misappreciation of facts, or speculative, arbitrary,
and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a better
position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citation omitted.)
1wphi1
For her defense, appellant could only present a self-serving and unsubstantiated denial or claim of
frame-up. In Ampatuan v. People,20 we viewed this flimsy excuse with disfavor and held:
Further, the testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full
faith and credit, in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence,
when lined against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who
caught the accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In order to overcome the
presumption of regularity, jurisprudence teaches us that there must be clear and convincing
evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with
ill-motive. (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bar, appellant did not cast any allegation of, much less proved, any ill motive on the
part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation that ensnared her. Thus, in view of
the foregoing, this Court has no other recourse but to affirm her conviction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03435 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175327
April 3, 2013

vs.
EDMUNDO VITERO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Before Us is the appeal from the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00070, affirming the Decision dated October 9, 2003 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13, Ligao City,3 in Criminal Case Nos. 4242-47, -which found accused-appellant
Edmundo Vitero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape as defined by Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (a),4 in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5(1 )5 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353. In lieu of the death penalty originally imposed by the RTC, the
Court of Appeals sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346.6
Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of rape in six Informations filed before the RTC on
March 21, 2001, which uniformly read:
That sometime in the month of April, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of his own daughter, 13-year-old AAA7, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.8
When arraigned on June 14, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all six rape charges.
The six rape cases against accused-appellant were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, the victim herself; BBB, the mother of AAA; and
Doctor Lea Remonte (Dr. Remonte), Ligao Municipal Health Officer. It also submitted as
documentary evidence the Marriage Certificate of accused-appellant and BBB, the Birth Certificate
of AAA, and the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Remonte.
The defense, for its part, called to the witness stand accused-appellant himself; Ireneo Vitero
(Ireneo), accused-appellants uncle;9 and Vilma Prelligera (Vilma), accused-appellants sister.
The RTC rendered a Decision on October 9, 2003. According more weight and credibility to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as compared to those of the defense, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his minor daughter, AAA. However, the
RTC held that the prosecution was only able to prove one of the six counts of rape against accusedappellant. Thus, the RTC decreed:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, judgment is rendered finding the accused EDMUNDO
VITERO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the crime of RAPE for one (1) count as
such crime is defined and punished by Article 266-A, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a, in relation to
Article 266-B, fifth paragraph, sub-paragraph 1, The Revised Penal Code, As Amended by Republic
Act No. 8353, and this Court hereby imposes on him the supreme penalty of DEATH. As his civil
liability, he shall pay the victim AAA the amount of 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, the amount of
50,000 pesos as moral damages, and the amount of 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages. He shall
pay the costs of suit.
For the other remaining five (5) counts of rape, finding reasonable doubt, this Court finds the
accused-appellant EDMUNDO VITERO NOT GUILTY, and hereby ACQUITS him of such criminal
charges.
Elevate the entire record[s] of the six (6) above-entitled cases to the Honorable Supreme Court for
automatic review and judgment by such Court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of The Revised Penal
Code, As Amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.10
The entire records of the cases were brought before us, but we transferred the same to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution11 dated August 24, 2004, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.12
The Court of Appeals summarized the evidence of the prosecution, to wit:
Edmundo Vitero, accused, and BBB were married on April 5, 1984. Out of the marriage, they begot
six (6) children, four (4) girls (AAA, the eldest, CCC, DDD and EEE) and two (2) boys (FFF and
GGG). In September 1996, accused and BBB separated. She left the conjugal home bringing with
her CCC, EEE, and GGG and established her own residence at Barangay XXX, Polangui, Albay.
AAA, DDD and FFF were left to the custody of the accused. They transferred to the house of the
parents of the accused at Barangay XXX, Ligao City, Albay. The said house, a one-storey structure
has two (2) rooms. One room was occupied by the parents of the accused while the other was
occupied by accused and his three children.
Sometime in the month of April 19[9]8, at around 7 oclock in the evening, AAA, then already thirteen
(13) years old, having been born on April 30, 1985, was sleeping in their room with the accused, her
sister DDD, and her brother FFF. AAA slept in the extreme right portion of the room, immediately
beside the wall separating their room from that of her grandparents. To her left was the accused
followed by DDD and FFF.
AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When she opened her eyes,
she saw her own father mounting her. After stripping AAA naked, accused brought out his penis and
inserted it into AAAs vagina and made a pumping motion. At the same time, he was kissing her lips
and neck and fondling her breasts. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She started to cry, but
he was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise. She tried to resist his lewd desires, but her
efforts were in vain. She did not shout for help because she feared accused who had a 20-inch knife
beside him might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself and went back to sleep.
Because of the harrowing experience she suffered from the hands of her own father, AAA was not
able to sleep anymore. AAA did not report her ordeal to her grandparents for fear they would only
scold her.
Sometime in 1998, between the months of May and September, appellant brought AAA to the house
of his sister Salvacion at Lian, Batangas.
Meantime, HHH, AAAs maternal grandfather, visited his daughter BBB, and showed to her an
anonymous letter stating that AAA had been raped by [her] father. Thereafter, BBB went to see
Salvacion, her sister-in-law in her house at Lian, Batangas to look for AAA, but she did not find her.
She, however, got word that AAA had already gone home. Frustrated and weary, BBB went back to
Bicol and looked for AAA in her grandparents house at Barangay XXX, Ligao City, Albay, but the
house was empty. BBB learned that AAA had been brought back to Lian, Batangas.
She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas in November 2000. BBB asked
AAA if she was indeed raped by her father. AAA disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times
while they were still living in her grandparents house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and
her siblings were already sleeping in their room. Upon learning of her suffering, she brought AAA
with her to Guinobatan, Albay. They reported the incident to the Ligao Police Station and with the
help of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), they went to see a doctor for
AAAs medical examination.
On November 17, 2000, Dr. Lea F. Remonte, the City Health Officer of Ligao City, examined AAA.
Her Medico-Legal Certificate revealed the following findings:
Genitalia: Normal external genitalia, nulliparous introitus, scanty pubic hair over mons pubis.
- Labia minora protruding beyond labia majora.
- Hymen not intact, presence of healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position.
- Vagina admits examining finger with ease.
- No discharge nor blood noted upon withdrawal of the examining finger.
- Patient was on her 5th day of menstruation when the examination was done (Exhibit "C," p.
7, Records)
Dr. Remonte testified that sexual intercourse is the number one cause of hymenal laceration. 13
The evidence for the defense, on the other hand, was recapitulated as follows:
Accused Edmundo vigorously denied the allegations against him. He testified that from 1996 to
2000, he was employed as a construction worker in Manila. However, upon his return to Albay, he
learned that he was criminally charged with raping his own daughter AAA. He further stated that
such charge was fabricated by his wife. According to him, AAA was not working as house help in
Batangas. She just stayed where his sister resides.
For his part, Ireneo Vitero corroborated the testimonies of the accused. He testified that in 1996,
while working in Manila, accused stayed in his house for two (2) weeks. In fact, it was he who
recommended the accused to his friend who was a construction foreman. It was only in 2000, when
he returned to Albay.
His sister Virginia attested that in 1996, accused left Albay as she was the one who financed his fare
in going to Manila.14
In its Decision dated July 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction of the
RTC. However, the penalty was modified because of Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-appellant was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts Decision is quoted hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated October 9, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 13, Ligao City,
finding appellant Edmundo Vitero guilty of the crime of qualified rape is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. In
lieu of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. As his civil liability, he shall
pay the victim AAA the amount of 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, the amount of 50,000 pesos as
moral damages and the amount of 25,000 pesos as exemplary damages. He shall pay the cost of
suit.
Costs de officio.15
Undeterred, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal 16 and brought his case before us.
Both plaintiff-appellee17 and accused-appellant18 filed their respective Manifestations stating that they
were no longer filing supplemental briefs and were adopting the briefs they submitted to the Court of
Appeals.
Accused-appellant seeks his acquittal on the sole ground that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT Accused-appellant essentially argues that AAAs testimony was "highly
incredible and illogical"19 as she had ample opportunity to ask for help. According to AAA herself, at
the time of the alleged rape, her siblings were sleeping right beside her and accused-appellant in the
room, while her grandparents were right in the next room.20 Accused-appellant also highlights AAAs
delay in reporting the purported rape and instituting a criminal case against him, and further implies
that AAA might have some sinister or ulterior motive in falsely charging him with rape. Moreover,
accused-appellants alibi that he was living and working in Manila from 1996 to 2000 was
corroborated by two witnesses.21
There is no merit in the instant appeal. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and the
appellate courts.
Accused-appellant was charged with qualified rape, defined and punishable under the following
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353: Article 266-A. Rape,
When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw-spouse of the parent of the victim.
The elements of the crime charged against accused-appellant are: (a) the victim is a female over 12
years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force,
threat, or intimidation.22
There is no dispute that the first two elements exist in this case. Documentary and testimonial
evidence, including accused-appellants own admission, establish that AAA is the daughter of
accused-appellant and BBB and she was born on April 30, 1985. This means that AAA was almost or
already 13 years old when she was raped in April 1998.
As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was duly
proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAAs testimony. AAA was able to describe in detail
how accused-appellant mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her
will, one night in April 1998. The RTC described AAAs testimony to be "frank, probable, logical and
conclusive,"23 while the Court of Appeals declared it to be "forthright and credible"24 and "impressively
clear, definite, and convincing."25 Relevant herein is our pronouncements in People v.
Manjares26 that:
In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, as in this case. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape
case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly
declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a
story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the
family including herself to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the
straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.
x x x When the issue focuses on the credibility of the witnesses or the lack of it, the assessment of
the trial court is controlling because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness and the latters
demeanor, conduct, and attitude especially during the cross-examination unless cogent reasons
dictate otherwise. Moreover, it is an established rule that findings of fact of the trial court will not be
disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted which would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the
case. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
We reiterate that the rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the
witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored
on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is truer if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, as in the case at bar, said findings are generally binding upon us. We find no reason to depart
from the general rule.
Accused-appellants attempts at damaging AAAs credibility are unpersuasive. AAAs account that
accused-appellant was able to have carnal knowledge of her in April 1998 was corroborated by the
results of Dr. Remontes physical examination of AAA, showing hymenal laceration at 5 oclock
position, indicating sexual intercourse.
That AAA did not shout for help should not be taken against her. In People v. Sale, 27 we rejected a
similar argument raised by the accused-appellant therein, thus:
Third. Accused-appellant likewise found it suspicious why the private complainant did not shout for
help while she was being raped considering that the bunkhouse where the alleged rapes occurred is
quite near several offices and buildings where people also stay during the night. According to
accused-appellant, the act of complainant in not shouting for help while she was being molested is
not consistent with common experience as she should have shouted for help as she knew fully well
that there were people nearby.
Again, the argument of accused-appellant deserves scant consideration. Different people react
differently to different situations and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when
one is confronted with a frightful experience. While the reaction of some women, when faced with
the possibility of rape, is to struggle or shout for help, still others become virtually catatonic because
of the mental shock they experience. In the instant case, it is not inconceivable or improbable that
[private complainant], being of tender age, would be intimidated into silence by the threats and
actions of her father. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
We have also previously pronounced that in incestuous rape cases, the fathers abuse of the moral
ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latters will thereby forcing her to do
whatever he wants. Otherwise stated, the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to
cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.28 Even so, it is notable in this case that
accused-appellant did not only use his moral ascendancy and influence over AAA as her father, he
employed actual force and intimidation upon her. AAA recounted on the stand that accused-appellant
"boxed" her on her right shoulder, near her armpit. When AAA tried to push accused-appellant away
from her and to turn her body away from him, accused-appellant pulled her back. Additionally,
accused-appellant had a 20-inch knife close by as he was sexually molesting AAA.
AAAs delay in reporting the rape is understandable. As we declared in People v. Sinoro 29:
At the outset, we note that the initial reluctance of a rape victim to publicly reveal the assault on her
virtue is neither unknown nor uncommon. It is quite understandable for a young girl to be hesitant or
disinclined to come out in public and relate a painful and horrible experience of sexual violation. x x
x.
Indeed, the vacillation of a rape victim in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair
her credibility as a witness. Delay in reporting the crime neither diminishes her credibility nor
undermines her charges, particularly when the delay can be attributed to a pattern of fear instilled by
the threats of one who exercises moral ascendancy over her. (Citations omitted.)
As for AAA, not only was her rapist her own father, but she was also living amongst her fathers
relatives. AAA was even brought far away from her hometown in Albay and made to stay with
accused-appellants sister in Batangas, isolating her from people and places she had known all her
life. It was only when BBB finally found AAA in 2000 and took AAA with her did AAA felt safe enough
to narrate to BBB what accused-appellant did to her two years ago.
In contrast, accused-appellants defenses, consisting of mere denial and alibi, fail to persuade us. As
we explained in People v. Ogarte30:
This Court has uniformly held, time and again, that both "denial and alibi are among the weakest, if
not the weakest, defenses in criminal prosecution." It is well-settled that denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law.
In People v. Palomar, we explained why alibi is a weak and unreliable defense:
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also
because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify falsely.
x x x.
We have also declared that in case of alibi, the accused must show that he had strictly complied with
the requirements of time and place: In the case of alibi, it is elementary case law that the
requirements of time and place be strictly complied with by the defense, meaning that the accused
must not only show that he was somewhere else but that it was also physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
1wphi1
Accused-appellants alibi is that he was continuously living and working in Metro Manila from 1996 to
2000. Even when accused-appellant presented two corroborating witnesses, we are not convinced.
Vilma could only testify on giving accused-appellant the money which he used to go to Metro Manila
in 1996. Ireneo admitted that accused-appellant did not live permanently at his house in Metro
Manila, and accused-appellant would usually visit only during weekends. Moreover, the RTC
observed that:
The defense witnesses could not identify the names of the construction companies that hired the
accused Edmundo Vitero, their exact addresses, much less identified the names of his co-workers.
As can be seen of record, nobody among his working companions testified in court to vouch for his
physical presence at any time at any of the construction working sites in Metro Manila. The
whereabouts of the accused Edmundo Vitero while working as a construction worker in Metro Manila
was not catalogued with certainty. Whatever period of time he might have spent in Metro Manila as a
construction worker is unclear.
The accused Edmundo Vitero admitted that he worked in Metro Manila as a construction laborer
an employment that was irregular. As a laborer whose work was irregular, he had gaps in his
employment. He could leave his irregular employment that was obviously temporary at any time he
wanted to proceed elsewhere including to his grandfathers house in barangay XXX, Ligao City.31
Hence, even if it were true that accused-appellant had been living and working in Metro Manila from
1996 to 2000, it does not exclude the possibility that he went home for visits to his grandparents
house in Ligao City, Albay, in the course of the four years. What is needed is clear and convincing
proof that in April 1998, when AAA was raped, accused-appellant was actually in Metro Manila.
However, accused-appellant presented no such evidence.
After affirming that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, we move
on to determining the proper penalties to be imposed.
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, accused-appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, we specify that accusedappellant will not be eligible for parole. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 explicitly provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended. (Emphasis ours.)
We also modify the amount of damages awarded to conform with recent jurisprudence. Accusedappellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.32 The amounts of damages thus awarded are
subject further to interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until they are
fully paid.33
1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00070 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Edmundo Vitero is GUILTY of qualified rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
pe1petua without eligibility of parole and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts ofP75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The amounts of
damages awarded are subject further to interest of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until they are fully paid.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 197363
June 26, 2013

vs.
ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Accused-appellant ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO (Zafra) is now before Us on review after the Court
of Appeals, in its June 29, 2010 Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR.-H. C. No. 01921, affirmed with
modification the January 20, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
159, in Criminal Case No. 122297-H, wherein he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
8353.3
On December 19, 2001, an Information4 was filed before the RTC, charging Zafra with the crime of
qualified rape of his minor daughter. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
On or about December 14, 2001, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, who is then a father of the complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had sexual intercourse with one AAA5, 17 years old, a minor, against her will and
consent.
Zafra pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment on February 4, 2002. 6 Thereafter, the
parties held their pre-trial conference, wherein they stipulated on the facts that AAA was the
daughter of Zafra, and that she was only 17 years old on December 14, 2001. 7
The contradicting versions of the parties, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
Version of the Prosecution
AAA testified that her father, Zafra, started molesting her when she was around 13 or 14 years old.
He used to insert his finger in her vagina and mash her breasts, which progressed into actual sexual
intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her mother knew what her father was doing to
her but did nothing to stop it. Aside from her best friend in school, AAA told no one about her ordeal
for fear of her father, that her mother would not side with her, and that rumors about her would
spread. Sometime in November 2001 however, she moved to her aunts house, after she was again
raped by Zafra.8
On December 14, 2001, her brother went to her aunts house to tell AAA that Zafra had some chores
for her. AAA followed her brother to their house, where she found Zafra, who asked her to fix the
beddings and wash the dishes. When her brother left the house, Zafra instructed AAA to get his dirty
clothes in his room. AAA did as she was told, but Zafra went inside the room and locked the door just
as she was about to go out. At this point, AAA dropped the dirty clothes and ran towards the door but
Zafra grabbed her and made her lie on the bed. AAA struggled but her protests were met with slaps
and punches. Zafra then removed both their lower garments, spat on his hand, put the saliva on his
penis, and then inserted his finger into AAAs vagina. Thereafter, Zafra inserted his penis in AAAs
vagina and held her breast. After Zafra ejaculated, he wiped his penis with a towel. AAA in turn
wiped the semen off her abdomen, and while she was dressing up, Zafra warned her against telling
anybody of what happened. AAA immediately picked up the dirty clothes on the floor and went out
the room.9
After having lunch with her mother, who arrived while she was doing the laundry, she returned to her
aunts house. At her aunts house, her mother asked her "inulit na naman ng tatay mo, ano?" 10 to
which, she replied yes. Her mother told her that they would file a complaint, then went back to their
house, got the linen in her fathers room, then soaked it in water. Just as AAA was about to leave her
aunts house, her mother arrived and asked her where she was headed. AAA said she was going to
file a complaint against her father. AAAs mother accompanied her but was prodding her not to file
any complaint. AAA however proceeded to file the complaint, and was subjected to a medical
examination on the same day.11
After examining AAA, Dr. Voltaire P. Nulud in his Medico-Legal Report No. M-3278-01 12 concluded as
follows:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of physical trauma.
Version of the Defense
Zafra denied the charge against him and claimed that it was filed as an act of retaliation by his wife.
Zafra said that he and his wife fought about one of the rooms he was renting out because he would
not acquiesce to renting it out to his sister-in-law and parents-in-law free of charge. In the meantime,
Zafra learned that AAA was not attending school. This prompted him to scold her, but because his
parents-in-law protected her, Zafra went to the extent of driving AAA and his parents-in-law out of the
house. When this happened, Zafras wife threatened to send him to jail. In fact, she had him arrested
twice on drug charges but he was released for lack of evidence for the first charge, and on bail for
the second charge. A few days later, he was again arrested, this time, on a rape charge against his
daughter.13
As proof of his defense, Zafra presented letters from AAA wherein she admitted to fabricating the
charge against her father because he and her mother fought, and because he drove all of them out
of his house. She also admitted therein to having worked at a beer house and prostituting herself. 14
Ruling of the RTC
On January 20, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, giving credence to the prosecutions version,
found Zafra guilty of qualified rape of his minor daughter, and sentenced him to death, in this
manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROMAN ZAFRA Y SERRANO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape Under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
as Amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.15
Zafra appealed16 to the Court of Appeals, imputing error on the part of the RTC for relying on AAAs
inconsistent testimony and thereafter convicting him despite the prosecutions failure to rebut the
presumption that he is innocent.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 29, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision, modifying the amount of moral
damages awarded and the imposable penalty, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated January 20, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 in Criminal Case No. 122297-H which found Roman
Zafra y Serrano guilty of raping his own minor daughter is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA WITHOUT
ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. The
award of MORAL DAMAGES is also INCREASED from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.17
Issues
Undaunted, Zafra is now before this Court,18 with the same19 assignment of errors he presented
before the Court of Appeals, viz:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS HIGHLY INCONSISTENT AND UNREALISTIC TESTIMONY.
II
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN HIS FAVOR.
III
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY AS CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 20
As stipulated by the parties during the pre-trial, Zafra does not contest the facts that AAA is his
biological daughter and was only 17 years old on December 14, 2001, the time the last rape
occurred. What Zafra challenges is his conviction in light of the evidence the prosecution submitted
during his trial.
Zafra attacks the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. He claims that during AAAs testimony, she
was so confused that she contradicted her own statements. Zafra also emphasizes the fact that prior
to December 14, 2001, AAA acted as if nothing had happened at all. Zafra claims that the fact that
she did not stay away from him despite the alleged incidents of rape belie her claim of sexual abuse.
In support of his argument, Zafra points out the fact that AAA did not sustain any external physical
marks, as shown by the medico-legal findings, despite her testimony that on December 14, 2001,
Zafra punched her thighs whenever she resisted him. 21
Ruling and Discussion
The present appeal is devoid of merit.

Zafra was charged with Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Said provisions
read:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Credibility of AAA
Zafra is trying to discredit AAA by enumerating several points against her, to wit:
1. Zafra claims that AAAs inconsistent and contradictory testimony is a clear indication that
she merely concocted her story of rape.22
This Court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of
emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing
the credibility of a witness.23 The inconsistencies Zafra are referring to are frivolous matters,
which merely confused AAA when she was being questioned. Those matters are
inconsequential and do not even pertain to AAAs ordeal. Thus, such trivial and insignificant
discrepancies, which in this case were immediately clarified upon further questioning, will
warrant neither the rejection of her testimony nor the reversal of the judgment. 24
2. Zafra insists that AAAs actions, of not immediately reporting that she was raped and
returning to their house, belie her claim of sexual abuse. 25
It is not uncommon for a rape victim to initially conceal the assault against her person for
several reasons, including that of fear of threats posed by her assailant. A rape charge only
becomes doubtful when the victims inaction or delay in reporting the crime is unreasonable
or unexplained.26 In the case at bar, AAA testified that she did not immediately report the
crime because she was afraid of her father, that her mother would not side with her even
though she was aware of what Zafra was doing to her, and the rumors that might spread
once word of what her father had been doing to her comes out. It must be noted that AAA
was only a young girl when Zafra started molesting her. It is but natural that she factor in her
decisions how her father and mother would react. Furthermore, it is settled jurisprudence
that delay in filing a complaint for rape is not an indication of falsehood, viz:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or
to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not
sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated.
Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and
pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims.27 (Citations omitted.)
Anent AAAs behavior after the rapes, suffice it to say that there is no one standard reaction that can
be expected from a victim of a crime such as rape. Elucidating on this point, this Court, in People v.
Saludo,28 held:
Not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others may be
shocked into insensibility. And although the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged
sexual assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of
rape, it is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims,
as not every victim can be expected to act conformably with the usual expectation of mankind and
there is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
experience, each situation being different and dependent on the various circumstances prevailing in
each case. (Citations omitted.)
3. Zafra avers that AAAs allegation that he punched her several times on her thighs is contradictory
to the medico-legal findings, which showed no external physical marks of trauma on AAA. 29
"Not all blows leave marks."30 The worst blow was that inflicted on AAAs psyche and dignity, which
may have left an indelible though invisible mark. Thus, the fact that Dr. Nulud found no external
physical signs of injury on AAAs thighs, contrary to her statement that she was hit there by Zafra,
does not invalidate her claim that Zafra raped her that day and that he punched her thighs whenever
she resisted. Expounding on a similar argument, this Court, in People v. Rabanes, 31 held:
While the victim testified that she was slapped many times by the accused-appellant, which caused
her to become unconscious, the doctor found no trace or injury on her face. The absence of any
injury or hematoma on the face of the victim does not negate her claim that she was slapped. Dr.
Lao also testified that if the force was not strong enough or if the patients skin is normal, as
compared to other patients where even a slight rubbing of their skin would cause a blood mark, no
hematoma will result. But, even granting that there were no extra-genital injuries on the victim, it had
been held that the absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate the commission of
the crime of rape. The same rule applies even though no medical certificate is presented in
evidence. Proof of injuries is not necessary because this is not an essential element of the crime.
(Citations omitted, emphases added.)
It has been ruled, in a long line of cases,32 that "absence of external signs of physical injuries does
not negate rape."33 The doctrine is thus well entrenched in our jurisprudence, and the Court of
Appeals correctly applied it.34
This Court has been regular in its declaration that "inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do
not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the
essential fact of the commission of rape."35 Thus, Zafras attempt to discredit AAAs testimony that he
raped her on December 14, 2001 must ultimately fail for his failure to show solid grounds on which to
impeach it. Besides, the task of evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is
best left to the RTC, which had the opportunity to scrutinize the witnesses directly during the trial,
viz:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are
important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are
potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take
advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate
court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk
that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As
correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any
degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by
him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness
may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his
manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony.
Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things
cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate
court.36 (Citations omitted.)
Defenses of Improper Motive
And Denial
Zafras denial is coupled with the attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed this
case because he scolded her and because of his quarrel with his wife and in-laws.
AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill motives. It is highly
unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge. 37 In
the case, for instance, of People v. Melivo,38 wherein the accused claimed that the complainant, his
16-year old daughter, together with her mother, concocted the charge of rape in retaliation against
his maintaining a mistress, and because his daughter bore a grudge against him, 39 this Court therein
held:
These allegations, we stated earlier, are not enough to overcome the fact that the consequences of
filing a case of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about filing
charges against her assailant. It takes much more for a sixteen year old lass to fabricate a story of
rape, have her private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of a public trial and endure a
lifetime of ridicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for the most of his
remaining life to jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame. (Citation
omitted.)
Moreover, Zafras claim that his wife wanted him in jail is contrary to AAAs testimony that her own
mother, Zafras wife, tried to dissuade her from filing this case against him.
Zafras defense of denial must necessarily fail. It is a well-settled doctrine that such defense will only
prosper upon the presentation of clear and convincing evidence substantiating it. Otherwise, it is a
self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law, and which cannot prevail over the positive,
candid, and categorical testimony of the complainant. 40
Defense of Retraction
Courts look upon retractions with considerable disfavor because they are generally unreliable. To
explain the rationale for rejecting recantations, this Court, in People v. Alejo, 41 quoting Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, held:
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate
the original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon
retractions of testimonies previously given in court. x x x. The reason is because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that they will later be repudiated
and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule for courts to
reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had
given them later on changed their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Further propounding on retractions, usually contained in affidavits of desistance, we said in People v.
Alcazar42:
We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite
incredible that after going through the process of having the [appellant] arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare that after a careful deliberation
over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given
probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice
simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule would make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses,
usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. (Citation omitted.)
In the case at bar, AAAs retractions were not even in an Affidavit of Desistance. They were written
on mere scraps of paper, and in different handwritings. This Court agrees with both lower courts that
if the notes were genuine, they should have been authenticated according to the rules on evidence.
If it were true that AAA wanted to withdraw the case against her father, she should have approached
the prosecutor and expressed her desire to do so. Moreover, she should have taken the witness
stand once more to attest to her alleged letters. It is worthy to note that in her alleged recantations,
AAA enumerated, as reasons for her filing this complaint, the same exact defenses Zafra presented
before the court.
1wphi1
Proper Penalty
Zafra, in his last assigned error, avers that assuming he was guilty, the penalty imposed upon him
was wrong as the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of his relationship to AAA.
He claims that aside from AAAs testimony that Zafra is her father, the RTC had no other basis in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of relationship. 43
First of all, Zafra must be reminded that one of the facts he stipulated on during the pre-trial was his
relationship with AAA, i.e., he admitted that AAA is his daughter.44 Second, the birth certificate, which
was submitted to the court was not only proof of AAAs minority, but was also proof of her filiation.
Lastly, this objection was never brought up during the trial of the case. In fact, Zafra constantly
referred to AAA as his daughter during his testimony.45
As the rape was qualified by the circumstances of AAAs minority and Zafras paternity, the RTC was
correct in imposing the penalty of death under Article 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code. However,
as the Court of Appeals stated, Republic Act No. 9346, 46 which took effect on June 24, 2006,
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Under this Act, the proper penalty to be imposed upon
Zafra in lieu of the death penalty is reclusion perpetua,47without eligibility for parole.48
While the Court affirms the award of civil indemnity and moral damages, each in the amount
of P75,000.00, the Court increases the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00,49 and further subjects the indemnity and damages awarded to interest at the rate of
six percent per annum from the date of finality of this judgment 50 until fully paid, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01921, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant ROMAN ZAFRA y SERRANO
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, in lieu of death, without eligibility for parole. He is ordered to pay the victim AAA SeventyFive Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183091
June 19, 2013

vs.
BERNESTO DELA CRUZ @ BERNING, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Before this Court is an appeal of the December 28, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-I-I.C. No. 01972 affirming with modification the July 5, 2003 Judgment 3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon in Crim. Case No. 6852-G, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Bernesto deIa Cruz @ Berning finding appellant Bemesto deIa Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
On March 19, 2001, an information for the crime of rape with homicide was filed against appellant, to
wit:
That on or about the 27th day of May 2000, at Sitio [XXX], Municipality of San Narciso, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellant,
armed with a bladed weapon, with lewd design, by means of force, violence, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
AAA4, a married woman, against her will and consent; and that on the same occasion and by reason
thereof, said appellant with intent to kill and taking advantage of his superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack and behead with said weapon the said [AAA] and
further inflicting upon the latter wounds on various parts of her body, thereby causing her death. 5
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.6 Trial ensued thereafter.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[AAA] left her house in Sitio [XXX], San Narciso, Quezon at 6:30 a.m. of May 27, 2000 to gather gabi
in the nearby mountain farm about 50 meters away. When she did not return by 9:00 a.m., [BBB],
[AAA]s sister, went to look for her. Along the way, [BBB] found the gabi gathered by [AAA]. Then she
spotted Bernesto de la Cruz, undressed except for his blood-drenched briefs. He was cutting
minongga tree branches and covering something with them. He was also rubbing coconut husks on
his body. Upon the sight of [BBB], Bernesto ran down the mountain slope towards his house,
throwing the bolo he was using. It was after he had gone that [BBB] found the headless body of
[AAA], covered by minongga tree branches. [AAA]s head lay a few meters away from her body.7
In her post mortem examination8 of the body of the deceased, Dr. Adoracion Florido, the Medical
Officer III of San Narciso Municipal Hospital, Quezon, made the following findings:
1. Whole head and neck was cut
2. Lacerated wound, 4 cm. armpit (L)
3. Lacerated wound, 6 cm. clavicular area (R)
4. Lacerated wound, 5 cm. hand dorsum (R)
Vaginal Examination:
- Old laceration at 3, 6, 9, oclock position
Laboratory examination:
- Positive for spermatozoa
Dr. Florido stated that AAA had been raped due to the presence of spermatozoa in her vaginal
secretion within more or less twenty-four hours prior to her examination and that AAA had passed
away ten hours prior to the examination.9
In his defense, appellant denied the prosecutions allegations. He maintained that he had been
working in his farm in Sitio Mabilog, Quezon from 6:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon after which he went home.
On his way, he met BBB who asked if he had seen AAA. He denied having seen AAA. He was fully
dressed when the conversation occurred.10
After considering the evidence presented by both parties, the RTC noted the lack of eyewitnesses to
the crime. However, it stated that the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant by
circumstantial evidence. It pointed to the confluence of evidence presented before it: BBB saw
appellant who was undressed and bloodied and cutting minongga branches to cover up the body of
her sister. BBB also saw appellant running away from the scene upon being discovered. Appellant
was found in possession of the bolo owned by the victim which he used to cut the minongga
branches and which in turn were used to cover the body of AAA. The RTC, thus, rendered the July 5,
2003 Judgment finding appellant guilty of rape with homicide, stating:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds BERNESTO DELA CRUZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and further amended by R.A. 8353 and renumbered
as Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to DEATH.
He is further ordered to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of [AAA] and
the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages.11
On automatic review, the Court of Appeals in its December 28, 2007 Decision affirmed the RTCs
Judgment with modification as to the award of damages. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found BBB
to be a credible witness. It said that the minor inconsistencies in her testimony and the testimony of
the other witness presented were not significant enough to warrant the acquittal of the appellant. In
any event, it stated that appellants bare denial of his guilt against the positive testimony and
categorical assertions of the prosecutions witnesses proved to be worthless since it was
uncorroborated.12 The Court of Appeals thus stated:
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ alias BERNING shall suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA without
eligibility for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law;
2. BERNESTO DELA CRUZ alias BERNING is ORDERED to pay to the HEIRS OF [AAA],
represented by her husband, [CCC], the sums of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; P50,000.00 as civil indemnity of rape; andP50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The rest of the decision stands.13
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on January 30, 2008.14
After appellants confinement was confirmed, both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
appellant manifested that they would adopt the pleadings filed in the Court of Appeals in lieu of
supplemental briefs.15
We affirm the December 28, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification on the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages.
Appellant was charged and convicted of the complex crime of rape with homicide. The felony of rape
with homicide is a special complex crime, that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. 16 As provided in
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The Court has acknowledged the difficulty in proving cases of rape with homicide, to wit:
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left
to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the
crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is
herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also
allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the
culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being
drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in
issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be
clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would
ultimately lead to setting a felon free.17 (Citations omitted.)
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there was
overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented to point that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of committing the crime of rape with homicide. As we have stated before, circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to establish the complicity of the perpetrators crime when these are
credible and sufficient, and could lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed
the complex crime of rape with homicide.18 As the Court of Appeals stated:
The Prosecution presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused, and no other, had raped and killed [AAA]. The following are the circumstantial
evidence, to wit:
1. [BBB] went to the mountain farm to look for [AAA] and in the process saw the accused
from 10 arms-stretches away covering the victims body with tree branches;
2. The accused was then holding a bolo and clad only in his bloodied briefs while covering
the headless body of the victim with tree branches;
3. The victims head was found 5 meters away from her body;
4. The victims body was exposed, with her undergarments missing;
5. After medical examination, the victims vagina tested positive for the presence of
spermatozoa;
6. [AAA] also suffered 3 hack wounds, one of which was found to have been inflicted before
the victim expired;
7. The accused threw the bolo he used in cutting tree branches, which, when recovered, was
determined to be the bolo brought by [AAA] from her house; and
8. He left the victims body and ran down the mountainous terrain. 19
To an unprejudiced mind, the above circumstances form a solid unbroken chain of events which ties
appellant to the crime beyond reasonable doubt. BBB saw appellant at the scene of the crime; he
was wearing bloodied underwear; he was wielding a bolo owned by AAA, cutting branches which he
used to cover something; on seeing BBB he threw the bolo away and ran; when BBB checked what
the appellant was trying to hide, she discovered it to be the headless body of AAA; AAAs
undergarments had been removed; upon medical examination spermatozoa was found in her
genitalia; and AAA was hacked several times before she was beheaded.
With respect to the appellants contention that the witnesses presented were not credible, we
reiterate the jurisprudential principle affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of witnesses especially if the factual findings are affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The trial judge can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and detect if they were lying.20
In People v. Dion21 we stated that:
Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the
victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victims credibility
becomes the primordial consideration. It is settled that when the victims testimony is straightforward,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any
material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof. Inconsistencies in the victims testimony do not impair her
credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of
the commission of rape. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses' credibility is given great
weight and is even conclusive and binding. x x x. (Citations omitted, emphasis added.)
Given that in the present case, the courts a quo have sufficiently addressed the question on the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB and appellant does not present to this Court any
scintilla of evidence to prove that the testimony of the witness was not credible, the Court must
uphold the identical assessment of the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In any event, the
alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses did not detract from BBB's
credibility as a witness.
1wphi1
However, in line with current jurisprudence, we modify the awards for civil indemnity and exemplary
damages. Civil indemnity shall be increased to P100,000.00.22 We also increase the award of moral
damages to P75,000.00.23Lastly, respecting exemplary damages we decrease the same
to P30,000.00.24
In conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 25
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The December 28, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01973 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Bemesto
de la Cruz@ Berning is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of [AAA] civil indemnity of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI 00,000.00), moral damages of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00), and exemplary damages of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). All monetary awards
for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6o/o per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200882
June 13, 2013

vs.
ABEL DIAZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
This an appeal from the Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.H.C. No. 03691 denying the appeal of the accused-appellant Abel Diaz and affirming the
Decision2 dated November 12, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 65 in
Criminal Case No. 12650, which found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant in the trial court reads:
That on March 30, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock [sic] in the morning at Tarlac City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of [Mara],3 17 years old, against her will and consent, and
through force and intimidation.4
The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned. 5 Pre-trial was conducted
and, thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution established that the offended party, 17-year old Mara, and the accused-appellant
were neighbors as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. Mara
was living alone in a studio-type unit beside the house of her elder sister, Ditse, while the accusedappellant lived five houses or some 30 meters away. He was familiar to her as he used to bring her
to school in the tricycle he was driving at that time. He also had previously made cable TV
installation in her unit.6
At early dawn of March 30, 2003, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top of
her. While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room
and allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused-appellant as the intruder. Startled, she
pushed the accused-appellant away and shouted "Umalis ka sa harap ko! Go away!" but she was
not able to free herself as he held her hands and he was straddling her. She called Ditse but the
accused-appellant boxed her stomach and told her not to make any noise or else he would stab her.
Because of the pain caused by the punch, Mara almost lost consciousness but she continued to
struggle. Despite her resistance, however, the accused-appellant was able to raise her loose shirt
and removed her panty. She continued to resist the accused-appellants advances but the latter
boxed her thighs, numbing her legs. Weakened by her struggle, the accused-appellant was able to
penetrate her. The dastardly deed done, the accused-appellant stood up, wore his pants and left. 7
Her ordeal left Mara very weak and she could only cry in her bed feeling sorry for herself. After a few
minutes, she regained some strength and immediately went to the house of Ditse to inform the latter
about what happened to her.8
Ditse called their eldest sister, Ate, at her residence in V Village, Tarlac City. When Ate arrived, she
accompanied Mara and Ditse to the police station to report the incident. Thereafter, they went to the
Tarlac Provincial Hospital where Mara was examined. The medical examination of Mara showed that
she had multiple "hematoma" or bruises in the neck and lower jaw. She also had a bruise in the front
portion of her thigh. She also suffered abrasions in her genitalia which, according to the examining
doctor, meant that there was sexual intercourse within the past 24 hours. Another proof of recent
intercourse was the presence of sperm cells in her vagina.9
In his defense, the accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that, in the
evening of March 29, 2003, he attended the birthday party of a neighbor in the same X Compound
where he and Mara were both residing at that time. He drank liquor with three other men at the party.
They were drinking until around 1:00 in the morning of the following day when, after consuming their
fourth bottle of Emperador brandy, he went home as he was already groggy and had vomited. Upon
reaching his house and after being let in by the daughter of his live-in partner, he had coffee and
threw up again.10 He then washed his face and went to bed to rest.11 He woke up at around 6:00 in
the morning, had breakfast, took a bath, drove his tricycle, and plied his ordinary route until around
5:00 in the afternoon. When he returned home from driving, he was told that Ditse wanted to see
him. When he went to Ditses place, Ditse told him that Mara was raped and that he was the culprit.
The police soon arrived and brought the accused-appellant to the police station where a sample of
his pubic hair was taken and he was made to face Mara. He was then allowed to go home. On the
following day, he again plied his route. The next day, he went to his mothers house at Luisita
Homesite in San Miguel, Tarlac City and stayed there until his arrest in December 2003. 12
After weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court found Maras testimony
categorical, spontaneous and consistent. It was supported by the physical evidence, particularly the
result of her medical examination on the same day of the incident complained of. No ill motive on her
part was shown and she courageously and willingly recounted her harrowing experience in public
during the trial of the case. In contrast, the trial court found the testimony of the accused-appellant
"deceptive, evasive, hollow and deep in half-truths." His alibi his claim that he was in his room
sleeping at the time Mara was raped did not preclude the possibility of his presence at the place of
the crime at the time of its commission.13 Thus, in a Decision dated November 12, 2008, the trial
court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed
against Mara. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Abel Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
He is further ordered to pay complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P50,000.00 actual damages and to pay the costs.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals upon filing of the notice of appeal
in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 20-2005 issued on April 19, 2005. 14
The accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. For him, the trial court gave
undue credence to the testimony of Mara. In particular, her identification of him was contrary to
human experience as she admitted that her room was dark and she was not wearing her eyeglasses
at the time of the alleged assault.15
The accused-appellant also claimed that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. For him,
the prosecution failed to prove the element of force or intimidation as there was an absence of any
"real apprehension of dangerous consequences or serious bodily harm that would overpower the
mind of the victim and prevent her from offering resistance." While claiming that she was verbally
threatened of being stabbed, Mara admitted that she did not see any knife in his possession. Mara
also failed to make an outcry during the two hours that the accused-appellant allegedly stayed in her
room.16
The Court of Appeals rejected the contentions of the accused-appellant. Mara positively identified
the accused-appellant as her assailant. While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming
from outside illuminated her room sufficiently and enabled her to see her assailants face. She also
demonstrated that the fact that she was not wearing her grade 1.25 eyeglasses could not have
materially affected her ability to identify the accused-appellant.17
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the prosecution clearly established the element of force
or intimidation. Mara testified that the accused-appellant repeatedly hit and forcibly held her. The
punches to her stomach and thighs caused her pain, weakened her and almost made her lose
consciousness. Her injuries in the neck, thigh and genital areas, visible hours after the incident,
proved that violent force was used on her. Rather than negating the element of force or intimidation,
the "invisible knife" the threat of infliction of further bodily harm, added to Maras helpless state and
facilitated the accused-appellants evil design.18
According to the Court of Appeals, Maras testimony that the accused-appellant stayed for two hours
in her room did not make her credibility doubtful. It was a mere estimate and could not be expected
to be accurate with rigorous exactitude. Besides, the precise duration or the exact time or date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the felony. Rape is no respecter of time and
place.19
Thus, in a Decision dated March 31, 2011, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the accusedappellant and affirmed the Decision dated November 12, 2008 of the trial court which found the
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. The
decretal portion of the Decision dated March 31, 2011 reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the RTC of Tarlac City dated November 12,
2008 in Criminal Case No. 12650 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.20
This appeal is the accused-appellants last-ditch attempt to secure an acquittal. Unfortunately, both
the law and the evidence are against him.
Under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed "by a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat, or intimidation." The trial and the appellate
courts were unanimous in finding that, beyond reasonable doubt, the accused-appellant forcibly held
Maras hand while straddling her, punched her in the stomach when she cried for help, continuously
threatened to stab her as she resisted his advances, punched her thighs to weaken her, and had
sexual intercourse with her. Justice therefore demands the denial of his appeal.
Moreover, even if we consider the grounds raised by the accused-appellant, his appeal still fails.
The appeal of the accused-appellant boils down to a question of credibility of the prosecutions
primary witness, the private complainant Mara. As a rule, however, credibility is the sole province of
the trial court.21 It is well-settled that:
When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive
effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. x x x. 22 (Citation
omitted.)
In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial
courts findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 23 On the one
hand, this judicial deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact-finding trial judges
have the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe first-hand the
details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and the drama during the trial.
On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this Court of the limitations of its review in
appealed cases this Court stands outside the trial court, is far-removed from the witness stand,
and relies solely on the records of the case.
Acutely aware of the Courts position as the last resort of litigants, we have nevertheless carefully
sifted through the records of this case but found nothing that indicates to us that the trial and the
appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the
outcome of the case. Thus, we uphold the Court of Appeals ruling that Mara made a clear and
positive identification of the accused-appellant as her sexual assaulter. The records bear this out. 24
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution sufficiently proved the element of force
or intimidation which attended the sexual assault against Mara. It cannot be denied that the
accused-appellant forcibly held, repeatedly punched and violently ravished Mara. The injuries which
she sustained in the neck, thigh and genital areas, documented in the medico legal-report of the
examination conducted on the very same day her person was violated, trump accused-appellants
contrary claim. Weak and in pain, the repeated threats of being stabbed coupled with the blows
already inflicted on her, certainly intimidated Mara and created a numbing fear in her mind that her
assailant was capable of hurting her more and carrying out his threats.
1wphi1
We also affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that Maras credibility was not eroded by her
testimony that the accused-appellant tarried for two hours in her room. The Court of Appeals said it
well: when one is being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be
reasonably expected to keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last
minute.25 Indeed, for a woman undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the
accused-appellant, every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow
crawl that she would rather forget. In addition, the precise duration of the rape is not material to and
does not negate the commission of the felony. Rape has no regard for time and place. 26 It has been
committed in all manner of situations and in circumstances thought to be inconceivable.
As regards his defenses, the accused-appellants denial and alibi crumble in the face of his positive
identification by Mara. In particular, his alibi is worthless as his presence at a mere 30 meters away
from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission definitely does not constitute a physical
impossibility for him to be at Maras room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is in fact an
implied admission that there is facility of access for the accused-appellant to be at the place where
the crime happened when it happened.
As to the award of damages, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, instead of "actual
damages" referred to in the RTC Decision, is proper but the award of P75,000.00 moral damages
should be reduced to P50,000.00 to conform to current case law.27 Moreover, P30,000 exemplary
damages should be awarded to Mara, who was still a minor when she was raped by the accusedappellant, to set a public example and serve as deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the
youth and to protect the latter from sexual assault. 28
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.29
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated March 31, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03691 affirming the Decision dated November 12, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65 in Criminal Case No. 12650 which found the accusedappellant Abel Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision dated November 12, 2008 is
hereby modified to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Abel Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape as defined and penalized in Article 266-A (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is further ORDERED to pay complainant the amounts of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00
moral damages, and P30,000.00 exemplary damages.
He is further ORDERED to pay legal interest on the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188310
June 13, 2013

vs.
MERCIDITA T. RESURRECCION, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
On appeal is the Decision1 dated January 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02530, which affirmed the Decision2 dated August 28, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 135, of the City of Makati in Criminal Case Nos. 06-993 and 06-994, finding accusedappellant Mercidita T. Resurreccion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs, thus, violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Informations against accused-appellant read:
Criminal Case No. 06-993
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of five hundred (Php500.00) pesos, in violation of the above-cited law.3
Criminal Case No. 06-994
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006 in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, direct custody and
control of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram,
zero point zero two (0.02) gram, zero point zero two (0.02) gram, zero point zero two (0.02) gram,
zero point zero two (0.02) gram, zero point zero two (0.02) gram, totaling zero point twenty-four
(0.24) grams which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4
When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 5
The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer (PO) 2 Julius B. Lique6 (Lique), a member of
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (SAID-SOTF), Makati Police Station;
and Jefrey Esperat Abellana7(Abellana), an operative from the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council
(MADAC). In addition, the prosecution offered the following object and documentary evidence: (a)
Affidavit of Arrest8 dated May 17, 2006 of PO2 Lique; (b) Sinumpaang Salaysay9 dated May 17, 2006
of Abellana; (c) Request for Laboratory Examination10 dated May 16, 2006 of suspected shabu
contained in 13 heat-sealed plastic sachets marked "JBL" and "MERCY-1" to "MERCY-12," prepared
by Police Senior Inspector (PSINSP) Joefel F. Siason (Siason), Team Leader of the Makati City
SAID-SOTF; (d) Physical Science Report No. D-375-06S11 dated May 16, 2006 of the Southern
Police District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Office, stating that the aforesaid
specimens submitted for chemical analysis tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride;
(e) Pre-Operational Report/Coordination Sheet12 dated May 16, 2006 of PSINSP Siason, revealing
that accused-appellant was the subject of a surveillance and buy-bust operation conducted by a
team composed of PSINSP Siason, PO2 Lique, PO1 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra), Abellana, and
Norman Bilason (Bilason); (f) Certificate of Coordination13 dated May 16, 2006 issued by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) certifying that the Makati City SAID-SOTF coordinated
with PDEA as regards the buy-bust operation against accused-appellant; (g) Spot Report 14 dated
May 16, 2006 of the Makati City SAID-SOTF detailing the results of the buy-bust operation; (h)
Acknowledgement Receipt15 dated May 16, 2006 of the Makati City SAID-SOTF certifying the turnover of possession of the specimens confiscated from accused-appellant from PO2 Lique to PO2
Rafael Castillo (Castillo); (i) MADAC Certification16 dated May 17, 2006 affirming that accusedappellant was included in the watch list of personalities suspected of selling prohibited drugs in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City; (j) Photocopies of three One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills used in
the buy-bust operation; and (k) thirteen heat-sealed plastic sachets of suspected shabu and a plastic
film canister confiscated from accused-appellant.18
The prosecutions evidence supported the following version of events:
After receiving information that accused-appellant was illegally peddling shabu near a small bridge
along P. Binay St. in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City, the Makati City SAID-SOTF constituted a team
to conduct a buy-bust operation. PSINSP Siason headed the team composed of PO2 Lique, PO1
Esguerra, Abellana, Bilason, plus a police informant. PO2 Lique acted as the poseur-buyer. He used
the marked bills as the buy-bust money which were pre-marked "JBL." After all the preparations, the
team executed the said operation.
At around six oclock in the evening of May 16, 2006, the team proceeded to the area where
accused-appellant was reportedly often seen. The team then spotted accused-appellant
approaching a store. The informant introduced PO2 Lique to accused-appellant as his friend who
wanted to buy shabu. PO2 Lique then handed the marked bills to accused-appellant who handed to
PO2 Lique in exchange a heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu. PO2 Lique held accusedappellants right shoulder to signal the consummation of the transaction. Abellana immediately came
to PO2 Liques aid in apprehending accused-appellant. PO2 Lique introduced himself as a police
officer, apprised accused-appellant of her constitutional rights, and thereafter ordered accusedappellant to empty her pockets. When accused-appellant refused, PO2 Lique himself frisked
accused-appellants pockets and found and confiscated a small film canister containing 12 more
heat-sealed plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
PO2 Lique marked all the seized items from accused-appellant at the place of her arrest. The sachet
of suspected shabu sold to PO2 Lique was marked with "JBL," the canister with "MERCY," and the
other 12 confiscated sachets of suspected shabu with "MERCY 1" to "MERCY
12." Accused-appellant was then brought to the Makati City Police Station. PO2 Lique turned over all
the items seized from accused-appellant to the duty investigator, PO2 Castillo. PSINSP Siason
requested in writing that the 13 sachets of suspected shabu be chemically examined by the PNP
Crime Laboratory Office. The contents of all the sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.
Accused-appellant19 and her 17-year old daughter, Cristine Joyce Resurreccion (Cristine),20 testified
for the defense.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was a stay-at-home mother while her husband worked
as a jeepney driver. At around 6:45 in the evening of May 16, 2006, accused-appellant and five of
her eight children were at home. Accused-appellant was about to change her clothes after washing
the laundry, when several men with guns, who later turned out to be police officers, arrived looking
for shabu. Accused-appellant told the police officers that there was no such thing in their house.
However, a police officer forcibly handcuffed accused-appellant. The police officers turned the
pockets of accused-appellants shorts inside-out but did not find anything illegal. The police officers
were only able to find Forty Pesos (P40.00) and a bracelet in accused-appellants possession.
Accused-appellants children, frightened when the police officers barged into their house, were
crying and embracing their mother.
The police officers brought accused-appellant outside and boarded her into a blue Revo. While
accused-appellant was inside the vehicle, another man approached the police officers and handed
them a wrapped item. The police officers were forcing accused-appellant to admit ownership of the
wrapped item, but accused-appellant resisted. The police officers made accused-appellant alight
from the vehicle. One of them brought out something from the wrapped item and put it on top of the
vehicle. The police officers wanted accused-appellant to admit she owned these things but accusedappellant maintained that she did not.
The men tightened accused-appellants handcuffs, hurting her. They again boarded accusedappellant on the Revo and brought her to police headquarters. At the headquarters, the police
officers asked for accused-appellants personal information (such as her name and address). The
police officers next asked accused-appellant if the evidence on hand were really taken from her; and
accused-appellant answered that the items were not hers. Lastly, accused-appellant was asked to
take off her earrings, ring, and bracelet, and together with her Forty Pesos (P40.00), put them in one
plastic bag.
Accused-appellant was detained for one night. The following day, she was brought for inquest.
Meanwhile, with her father out of the house and her mother arrested on the night of May 16, 2006,
Cristine called her uncle (her fathers brother) for help. Her uncle came over to the house to help
look for accusedappellant. Cristine and her uncle asked around at Makati City Hall where accusedappellant could be and a janitor told them that those arrested for selling illegal drugs are brought to
the MADAC office at J.P. Rizal. When Cristine and her uncle arrived at Precinct 1, J.P. Rizal,
accused-appellant was not there. Cristine and her uncle waited until Cristine was finally able to see
accused-appellant.
In its Decision promulgated on August 28, 2006, the RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The trial court gave full weight and credence to the
evidence presented by the prosecution and disregarded accused-appellants defenses of denial and
frame-up. The verdict reads:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the guilt of accused MERCIDITA RESURRECCION y TORRES for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, with
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, she is hereby sentenced:
1. In Criminal Case No. 06-993, to suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine P500,000.00; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 06-994, to suffer imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and to pay a fineP300,000.00.
3. To pay the costs.21
Consequently, accused-appellant was committed to the custody of the Correctional Institution for
Women in Mandaluyong City.22
Accused-appellant appealed her conviction before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated
January 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC judgment.
Hence, the instant appeal.
No supplemental briefs were filed by the parties before the Court. Hence, the Court will consider the
very same arguments raised in the parties briefs before the Court of Appeals.
Accused-appellant assigned the following errors on the part of the RTC:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN
TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
The Court sustains accused-appellants conviction.
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in
court of the substance seized as evidence.24
With respect to illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its elements are the following: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such

possession.25
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the foregoing elements of the crimes charged against accused-appellant.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the weight and credence accorded by the trial court to witnesses
testimonies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. As the Court explained in People v.
Naelga26:
At the outset, it should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the
credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court
has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the
assessment of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight
and influence which the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted. This rule is
consistent with the reality that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. Thus, factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not
conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. (Citations
omitted.)
In this case, the vivid and detailed testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO2 Lique and MADAC
operative Abellana were not only credible by themselves, but were corroborated by numerous
documentary and object evidence. The sum of the evidence for the prosecution shows that following
the conduct of a surveillance, the Makati City SAID-SOTF planned and executed a buy-bust
operation against accused-appellant on May 16, 2006. During the operation, accused-appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto selling 0.02 grams of shabu for Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and
possessing a total of 0.24 grams of shabu, without any legal authority to do so.
Accused-appellant is trying to make an issue of the alleged inconsistency between PO2 Liques
sworn affidavit and his testimony before the RTC. In his sworn affidavit, PO2 Lique averred that
accused-appellant voluntarily emptied her pockets and handed over to the police the canister
containing the 12 heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu. When he testified before the trial court, PO2
Lique narrated that accused-appellant had refused to obey the order for her to empty her pockets so
that PO2 Lique himself checked accused-appellants pockets wherein he found the said canister,
which he immediately confiscated. The inconsistency is trifling and does not affect any of the
elements of the crime charged. Regardless of who emptied accused-appellants pockets, the
important fact was that the canister was actually found inside accused-appellants pockets and in her
possession. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not
upon the basic aspect of the crime do not diminish the witnesses credibility. More so, an
inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a
conviction.27
The Court similarly views accused-appellants defenses of denial and frame-up very doubtful. The
testimonies of police officers who conducted the buy-bust are generally accorded full faith and credit,
in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of public duties. Hence, when lined
against an unsubstantiated denial or claim of frame-up, the testimony of the officers who caught the
accused red-handed is given more weight and usually prevails. In order to overcome the
presumption of regularity, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not
properly perform their duties or that they were prompted with ill motive, 28 none of which exists in this
case.
Moreover, the prosecution had duly established the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from
the time they were seized from accused-appellant, kept in police custody, transferred to the
laboratory for examination, and presented in court, in substantial compliance with Section 21(1) of
Republic Act No. 9165.
Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, PO2 Lique categorically testified that all the items
seized from the possession of accused-appellant were photographed, inventoried, and marked at
the place where she was apprehended, thus:
Q What happened after you discovered that aside from the one sold to you she [accused-appellant]
has several plastic sachets, what did you do with all those items that you recovered and given to
you?
A I marked them at the scene, sir.
Q The one sold to you what markings did you put on it?
A JBL, sir.
xxxx
Q What about the other plastic sachets that you said were inside the plastic film container at the
time, what markings did you put on them?
A I marked them Mercy-1, Mercy-2, Mercy-3, Mercy-4 to Mercy-12, sir.
Q Did you also mark the plastic container?
A Yes, sir.
Q What markings did you put?
A Mercy, sir.
xxxx
Q After you marked and recovered the money and arrested the accused what did you do with the
accused?
A After that we brought the suspect and the evidence confiscated to our office, sir.
xxxx
Q When you recovered those items allegedly taken from the accused did you take any photographs
of those items?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q What is your proof that you took photographs of those items?
A None yet, they are not yet developed, sir.29
Although no photograph of the seized items was submitted in evidence, the same does not render
void and invalid the confiscation and custody of the seized items as long as their integrity and
evidentiary value had been properly preserved by the apprehending officers, 30 as in this case.
Lastly, the Court sustains the penalties imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
1wphi1
Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that the penalty for illegal possession of
shabu, with a total weight of 0.24 grams, is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same.
Thus, in Criminal Case No. 06-994, the penalties imposed upon accused-appellant of imprisonment
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as
maximum, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), are in order.
The penalty for illegal sale of shabu, regardless of the quantity and purity involved, under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, shall be life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Hence, in Criminal
Case No. 06-993, the sentence imposed upon accused-appellant of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), are also correct.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accused-appellant Mercidita T.
Resurreccion is DENIED and the Decision dated January 27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02530 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200329
June 5, 2013

vs.
RICARDO PIOSANG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
For Our resolution is the appeal of the Decision1 dated April 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04303, which affirmed with modifications the Decision 2 dated November 26, 2009
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-82565,
finding accused-appellant Ricardo Piosang, alias Ricric, guilty of raping AAA, 3 a minor.
Upon the sworn complaint of AAAs mother, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City filed with the RTC an
Information dated January 8, 1999, charging accused-appellant with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
thru force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
sexual abuse upon the person of one AAA a minor 4 years of age by then and there inserting his
penis into the vagina of said complainant and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her.4
When arraigned on April 24, 2000, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty."5
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of (1) AAA,6 the victim; (2) BBB,7 the mother of
AAA; (3) CCC,8 another minor who witnessed the rape; (4) DDD,9 mother of CCC; and (5) Police
Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.) Mary Ann Gajardo (Gajardo),10 Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who appeared on behalf of Dr.
Tomas Suguitan, the physician who conducted the physical examination of AAA.
The defense, for its part, called to the witness stand accused-appellant 11 himself and his mother
Remedios Piosang12 (Remedios). The testimony of another defense witness, Lorna Montero, was
stricken out from the record for her failure to appear for the continuation of her cross-examination
despite notice.
The RTC rendered its Decision on November 26, 2009 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of raping AAA and imposing upon him the following penalties:
WHEREFORE, finding accused RICARDO PIOSANG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape under Article 266-A par. 1, Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) Article III of
R.A. 7610, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further
ordered to pay private complainant AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and the costs of suit.13
Accused-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The prosecutions version of events, as determined by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On July 8, 1998, AAA was playing with some friends when then eleven-and-a-half-year-old CCC, her
neighbor, called and asked her to play computer with him at the house of herein accused-appellant,
RICARDO PIOSANG or "RICRIC" on instructions of the latter. At the invitation, AAA readily joined
CCC, and together with accused-appellant proceeded to his house.
On the way, however, AAA and CCC were suddenly pushed inside accused-appellants comfort
room, which was built separately from the house. Inside, accused-appellant whipped out a "bente
nueve" or fan knife and pointed it to CCC, telling the two children to keep quiet, otherwise, he will kill
them. After accused-appellant had barred the door shut, he instructed CCC to hold AAA from behind,
which CCC obeyed by clutching AAA on her stomach. Accused-appellant removed his short pants,
then applied something reddish on his penis and, while AAA was standing atop the toilet bowl being
held by CCC from the back, inserted the same into her vagina and made pumping motions while
standing. The victim AAA could only cry.
After having satiated his carnal desires against AAA, accused-appellant once again pointed the knife
at CCC and told him to likewise insert his penis into AAAs private part. CCC pretended to do what
he was told, and while doing so, the latter masturbated and, when he ejaculated, wiped the semen
on the helpless AAAs mouth. Thereafter, he reiterated his threats to kill them if they told anyone of
what happened, and then let them go home. Before AAA went out of the comfort room, however,
accused-appellant gave her a five-peso coin to buy candy, which she threw away.
AAA did not reveal what happened to her on that fateful day. Months later, however, or on
September 23, 1998, while AAA and her mother, BBB, were playing, BBB told her daughter not to let
anyone touch her private part. After being silent for a moment, AAA suddenly blurted out, "Mama,
bastos si Kuya Ric Ric and Kuya CCC," because, according to AAA, they inserted their penises into
her vagina. At this revelation, BBB confronted CCCs mother, DDD, who made her son disclose what
truly happened to AAA. CCC tearfully narrated what accused-appellant did on July 8, 1998 and that
he threatened to kill both him and AAA if they reported the matter.
Upon medical examination, AAA was found to have "shallow healed lacerations at 3 and 8 oclock
positions" on her genital area, and that she was in non-virgin state physically.14 (Citations deleted.)
The Court of Appeals likewise summarized the evidence for the defense:
In defense, accused-appellant completely denied the charges and claimed that he was at home on
the day in question, letting his hair dry at the garage of their house, when a neighbor named
MARIETTA told him that DDD, CCCs mother was looking for him. Accused-appellant then
proceeded to DDDs house where he heard CCC crying and saying, "thats enough, thats enough, I
will not do it again." Accused-appellant then deemed it best not to continue on, so he went home. A
few minutes later, DDD arrived and called on accused-appellant, to which the latters mother replied
that they will just follow ("Susunod na lang kami"). Accused-appellant and his mother went to the
house of AAA and BBB, where CCC admitted having raped AAA, as a result of which, DDD hit him
repeatedly. Accused-appellant even suggested bringing AAA to be examined by a doctor.15 (Citations
omitted.)
In its Decision dated April 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the RTC
judgment and decreed thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, ordering accused-appellant RICARDO PIOSANG to pay the victim civil indemnity
of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of P30,000.00. The rest of
the Decision stands.16
Hence, accused-appellant comes before us on appeal with the same lone assignment of error he
raised before the Court of Appeals:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.17
Accused-appellant denies raping AAA and points to CCC, instead, as the perpetrator. Accusedappellant calls attention to CCCs initial refusal to reveal the incident when confronted by the latters
mother, DDD. Remedios even testified seeing a furious DDD whipping CCC after CCC admitted to
raping AAA. In addition, accused-appellant points out that he would not have suggested to AAAs
parents that AAA be physically examined by a doctor if he was actually the one who raped AAA.
Lastly, accused-appellant insists that an Atty. Labay of the Office of the Vice Mayor, Quezon City,
contacted him by telephone offering to settle the case in exchange for money, thus, supporting
accused-appellants claims of innocence and of an attempt to cover-up CCCs guilt for the crime
charged.
Accused-appellants appeal essentially challenges the findings of fact of the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, giving more weight and credence to the evidence of the prosecution as compared
to those of the defense.
Accused-appellants appeal has no merit.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court. As a general rule, on the question
whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial courts choice is
generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to
conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand as they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh
conflicting testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. 18 There is no cogent
reason for us to depart from the general rule in this case.
AAA, who was six years old by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively, and
categorically identified accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and
replete with details of the rape.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that
rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are
inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability
but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.19Considering her tender age, AAA
could not have invented a horrible story. As aptly found by the RTC and we quote:
The offended party testified in a straightforward manner and positively identified the accused in open
court as the very person who inserted his penis into her vagina. Her candid narration of the dastardly
act done upon her by the accused has the earmark of truth and sincerity. Her testimony was taken
on three (3) different dates but not once did she waiver in pointing to the accused as the person who
inserted his penis into her vagina. She even clarified that CCC only pretended to put his penis into
her vagina when he was ordered by the accused to do so. x x x.
The court finds no reason why private complainant would impute against accused so grave a charge
if it were not true. The tender age of the offended party and her candidness in narrating her debasing
experience are badges of truth and sincerity. For her to fabricate the facts of rape and to charge the
accused falsely of a crime is certainly beyond her mental capacity. x x x. 20
And although AAAs testimony was already convincing proof, by itself, of accused-appellants guilt, it
was further corroborated by the testimony of CCC, who personally witnessed the rape, and by the
medico-legal findings which reported healed lacerations on AAAs genital area and AAAs non-virgin
physical state.21
In contrast, accused-appellant averred that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the
time of AAAs rape. We have oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the
accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on
one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover,
for the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the
offense was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.23 In the case at bar, AAA was raped in the detached comfort room of accusedappellants house on July 8, 1998, at which time, accused-appellant claimed that he was in the
garage of the very same house. Obviously, accused-appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the
locus criminis at the time of commission of the crime.
Accused-appellants theory that he was falsely charged with rape because the actual rapist, CCC,
was a minor and could not be held criminally liable, is baseless and illogical. We stress that AAA
clearly testified that it was only accused-appellant who inserted his penis into AAAs vagina and that
CCC merely pretended to have also done so. Accused-appellant failed to impute any ill motive on
the part of AAA to single him out from all other neighbors and untruthfully charge him with the rape.
As we held in People v. Agcanas 24:
Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters.
We likewise give scant consideration to accused-appellants averments that he advised BBB to have
AAA examined by a doctor to determine what really happened and that a certain Atty. Labay
(presumably acting on behalf of BBB) offered to settle the case in exchange for money, since these
were solely based on his testimony, thus, completely unsubstantiated and self-serving.
The crime of rape is now defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7659 and 8353, 25 to wit:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
xxxx
5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old.
We elucidated in People v. Dollano, Jr.26 that:
Rape under paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned article is termed statutory rape as it departs from
the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own
on account of her tender years. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
1wphi1
AAA was born on July 21, 1994, as evidenced by the Certification from the Civil Registrars Office,
so she was almost four years of age when the crime was committed. 27 Resultantly, accusedappellant was charged and proven guilty of statutory rape.
1wphi1
Following Republic Act No. 9346, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed
upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, but we specify that it is
without the eligibility of parole. The Court of Appeals also properly awarded in AAAs favor the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. An award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of
rape, and moral damages may be automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of
mental and physical suffering.28 Exemplary damages are also called for, by way of public example,
and to protect the young from sexual abuse.29
We additionally order the accused-appellant to pay interest of six percent (6o/o) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until the amount of damages thus awarded is fully paid. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated April 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04303 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (
1) accused-appellant RICARDO PIOSANG is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without the eligibility of parole; and (2) that said accused-appellant is additionally ordered to pay the
victim interest of six percent ( 6o/o) per annum from the finality of this judgment until the amount of
damages thus awarded is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200165
January 30, 2013

vs.
REYNALDO NACUA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
Before Us for review is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEBCR-H.C. No. 00896, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated March 17, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58 of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-77272, finding
accused-appellant Reynaldo Nacua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article 2, Section 5
of Republic- Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On September 16, 2005, Police Officer (PO) 3 Cirilo R. Luague (Luague) and POl Julius B. Anifion
(Anifion) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Cebu City executed and filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cebu a Joint Affidavit3 charging accused-appellant and his common-law wife,
Teresita Villanueva-Nacua (Teresita), of selling and delivering methamphetamine hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, at their residence at 0475 Dela Rama Compound, D. Jakosalem Street, Sitio Taup,
Barangay Cogon Ramos, Cebu City.
According to their Joint Affidavit, PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion were instructed to conduct a
surveillance of the house of accused-appellant and Teresita (Nacua couple) based on information
from a "police asset" that the said couple was illegally trading shabu. The surveillance commenced
on August 26, 2005. PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion, with the help of their informant, executed a "testbuy" operation on September 2, 2005, during which, PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion bought and
received from the Nacua couple a sachet of suspected shabu. The police officers immediately
submitted the sachet and its contents for forensic examination at the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory Office (RCLO), Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.4 Per the PNP-RCLO
Chemistry Report No. D-1306-20055 dated September 2, 2005, the specimen submitted by PO3
Luague and PO1 Anion, weighing 0.02 grams, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
On the strength of the Joint-Affidavit of PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion and PNP-RCLO Chemistry
Report No. D-1306-2005 dated September 2, 2005, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Renero L. Agustin, Sr.
(Agustin) applied for a court warrant to search the residence of the Nacua couple for more evidence.
RTC-Branch 7 of Cebu City granted P/Insp. Agustins application and issued Search Warrant No.
1535-09-1605-7 on September 16, 2005, authorizing the search of the residence of the Nacua
couple at "Rm. No. 2, 2nd Flr., 0475 Dela Rama Cmpd., D. Jakosalem St., Sitio Taup, Brgy. Cogon,
Ramos, Cebu City" and seizure of "[u]ndetermined quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, locally known as Shabu."6
On September 21, 2005, PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion, together with Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Elmo Y. Rosales (Rosales) and PO1 Julius S. Regis (Regis), implemented the search warrant at the
house of the Nacua couple. Also present at the house during the search were Barangay Councilor
Omar D. Durano, Sr. and Barangay Tanod Carlito Murillo. In the course thereof, the police officers
found and seized the following items at the house of the Nacua couple:
a. One pc weighing scale
b. One plastic pack containing fourteen pcs plastic packs
c. Six pcs drug/clip separators
d. Six pcs plastic packs with left-over of white substance, now submitted to the PNP crime
laboratory for examination
e. One pc small rolled tin foil
f. Two pcs safety pins
g. Twelve pcs small plastic packs
h. One pc gillete razor blade
i. One pc glass tube tooter
j. One pc small lamp
k. Two pcs medical scissors
l. One pc nail pusher
m. One pc big rolled tin foil
n. One pc memo pad
o. One pc medical forcip
p. One white floor tile

q. Two pcs lighters (disposable) color red and white color
r. Two pcs lighters (disposable) white and silver
s. Seven pcs small packs with white substance believed to be shabu now submitted to the
PNP Crime laboratory for examination
t. One pc five hundred peso paper bill
u. Three pcs one hundred peso paper bill7
Consequently, the police officers immediately arrested the Nacua couple.
The PNP-RCLO, after forensic examination of the specimens submitted to it, particularly, the seven
heat-sealed plastic packs containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 0.17 grams
and six plastic packs containing traces of white crystalline substance, issued Chemistry Report No.
D-1415-2005 dated September 21, 2005 reporting that all the specimens tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.8
SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, PO1 Anion, and PO1 Regis executed a Joint Affidavit 9 on September
22, 2005 recounting how they implemented the search warrant and arrested the Nacua couple the
day before, on September 21, 2005.
Teresita was able to post bail for her release on October 6, 2005, 10 but accused-appellant remained
in police custody.
On November 8, 2005, Teresita executed a Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss 11 arguing that if
it were true that the police officers, during their surveillance, already saw her and accused-appellant
selling plastic packs of white crystalline substance, then said police officers could have arrested her
and accused-appellant right there and then for committing a crime in flagrante delicto; that the
allegations of a test-buy conducted on September 2, 2005 were a fabrication and should not be
given weight without the affidavit of the informer/poseur-buyer and the marked money; that she was
wrongly described as having shoulder-length hair when she actually had longer hair and referred to
as "Cita" instead of her real nickname "Tessie" in the Joint Affidavit dated September 16, 2005 of
PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion; and that her residence and accused-appellant was located at 70-E
Mango Avenue, Cebu City, not Dela Rama Compound, D. Jakosalem Street, Sitio Taup, Barangay
Cogon Ramos, Cebu City. In the end, Teresita asserted that the complaint against them failed to
establish the elements of the charge of sale of prohibited drugs, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment for the
same.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City, after its preliminary investigation, issued a
Resolution12 dated November 8, 2005 finding probable cause to indict the Nacua couple for violation
of Article 2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said Office reasoned that the purpose of a "test-
buy operation" is different from a "buy-bust operation;" and that "[t]he former is conducted for the
purpose of applying for a search warrant, and the latter is conducted when it is difficult to locate the
residence of the accused or when his identity or name cannot be determined with absolute
certainty."
The Information against the Nacua couple, filed before RTC-Branch 58 of Cebu City on November 8,
2005, reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of September 2005, at about 4:35 oclock P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, and without authority
of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic packet of white crystalline substance, weighing 0.02 gram, locally known as
shabu, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 13
On July 25, 2006, the RTC issued Warrants of Arrest for Teresita and accused-appellant, and an
Order for the detention of accused-appellant at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) of
Cebu City during the pendency of the case.14
The Warrant of Arrest for Teresita was returned unserved and she was considered to be at-large.
Nonetheless, the case proceeded against accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on September 4, 2006. 15 After the pre-trial
conference conducted on September 22, 2006, 16 trial proper ensued.
The prosecution called to witness stand PO1 Anion, 17 PO3 Luague,18 and SPO1 Rosales;19 but
dispensed with the testimony of Jude Daniel Mendoza, a forensic officer, since the parties already
stipulated as to the subject of his testimony.20 The documentary and physical evidence for the
prosecution, all admitted by the RTC in its Order21dated December 18, 2007, consisted of (1) the
Letter-Request dated September 2, 2005 for forensic examination of the white crystalline substance
contained in a small heat-sealed plastic pack marked "RN;" 22 (2) the PNP-RCLO Chemistry Report
No. D-1306-2005 dated September 2, 2005;23 (3) the Blotter Report dated September 2, 2005;24(4)
the sachet of shabu;25 and (5) the Search Warrant No. 1535-09-1605-7 dated September 16, 2005. 26
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
The chief of office of the concerned police officers received information from a "confidential agent" or
informant that the Nacua couple was engaged in the illegal drug trade. This information was relayed
to SPO1 Rosales who, in turn, instructed his team members, namely, PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion,
to conduct a surveillance of the house of the Nacua couple. PO3 Luague and PO1 Anion
specifically conducted surveillance on August 26, 28, and 30, 2005, observing that youngsters
frequent the residence of the Nacua couple.
On September 2, 2005, SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, and PO1 Anion conceptualized a "test-buy"
operation in furtherance of their investigation and for the purpose of procuring a search warrant from
a court. Two P100.00 bills were used as "test-buy" money. Together with their informant, PO3
Luague and PO1 Anion entered the house of the Nacua couple. After PO1 Anion gave the money
to accused-appellant, the latter asked Teresita to bring out the shabu. Accused-appellant then
handed the sachet of suspected shabu to PO1 Anion. Without arresting the Nacua couple, PO3
Luague, PO1 Anion, and the informant left the house of the said couple. The police officers
proceeded to their police station, where SPO1 Rosales marked the sachet of suspected shabu
received from the Nacua couple with the initials "RN" representing the name of accused-appellant
and prepared a letter-request for the forensic examination of the same. SPO1 Rosales then
designated PO1 Anion to turn over the specimen to the PNP-RCLO in Cebu City. On the same day,
it was confirmed that the crystalline substance contained in the heat-sealed sachet bought from the
Nacua couple was indeed shabu.
On the basis of the foregoing test-buy, Search Warrant No. 1535-09-1605-7 was issued by the RTC
on September 16, 2005, which was implemented on September 21, 2005, during the course of
which, accused-appellant and Teresita were arrested. The test-buy money was no longer recovered.
Accused-appellant27 offered his lone testimony, generally belying the charge against him. Accusedappellant claimed that he was a Jai-alai coordinator before his arrest and denied selling shabu at his
residence on September 2, 2005. He also insisted that for the past 20 years, he had been residing at
the house of Teresitas parents at 70-E Mango Avenue, Cebu City.
On March 19, 2008, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC decreed thus:
Accordingly, this court finds accused, Reynaldo Nacua, also known as Roque Reynaldo Nacua,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences him to suffer Life
Imprisonment.
Issue an alias warrant of arrest against Teresita V. Nacua, who was never arraigned as she had
remained at large.
The pack of shabu, Exh. "C," is confiscated in favor of the state for proper disposition. 28
On the same day, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal. 29 On April 24, 2008, the RTC issued
an Order committing the person of accused-appellant to the Bureau of Corrections. 30
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorneys Office, filed his Brief 31 before the Court of
Appeals, ascribing the following errors on the part of the RTC:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE SUSPECTED SHABU AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE NAGGING DOUBTS ON ITS IDENTITY FOR FAILURE
ON THE PART OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 21 OF RA 9165.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ALSO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED BY RELYING ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE RATHER
THAN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.32
Plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief, 33 countering that:
I
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
NON-OBSERVANCE OF PROCEDURE MANDATED BY RA 9165 IN THE CUSTODY AND
INVENTORY OF SEIZED ILLEGAL DRUGS IS NOT FATAL TO THE PROSECUTION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.34
In its Decision dated July 28, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
judgment, sentencing accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and
to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).35
Hence, this appeal.
In a Resolution36 dated February 22, 2012, the Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant manifested that he has already exhausted his arguments
before the Court of Appeals, thus, he would no longer file any supplemental brief, 37 while plaintiffappellee filed its Supplemental Brief38 on June 8, 2012.
In his Brief, accused-appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Aside from the testimonies of the police officers, no other credible evidence was
offered to substantiate the alleged sale of shabu. The consideration for the purported sale, an
essential element of the crime charged, was not at all proved as no "test-buy" money was recovered
from him and Teresita. In addition, the confidential agent or informant of the police, who purportedly
took part in the "test-buy" operation, was not identified and presented by the prosecution as a
corroborating witness. The testimony of said confidential agent or informant
was potentially relevant to accused-appellants defense and the non-presentation of said witness
effectively deprived accused-appellant of his constitutional right to examine his accuser.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails the total lack of compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, intended to safeguard the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu he purportedly sold and
delivered to the police officers during the purported "test-buy" on September 2, 2005.
Accused-appellant cites jurisprudence applying the chain of custody rule in dangerous and illegal
drugs cases, which require that the marking of the seized items must be done (1) in the presence of
the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon its confiscation, to truly ensure that the seized
items are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually offered in evidence. In his case,
accused-appellant points out, there was no proper marking, photography, or physical inventory of the
shabu which he allegedly sold and delivered to the police officers during the supposed "test-buy."
Also, the identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping of the alleged shabu, following its
forensic examination and pending its presentation in court, had never been disclosed. The
prosecution did not proffer any justifiable explanation for non-compliance with the aforementioned
requirements of the law and jurisprudence.
And while accused-appellant admits that he failed to present evidence of ill motive on the part of the
police officers for falsely testifying against him, accused-appellant argues that to require him to prove
his innocence is contrary to his fundamental right to be presumed as such.
Plaintiff-appellee avows that the prosecution had duly proven accused-appellants guilt. The
testimonies of the police officers deserve full faith and credit on the presumption that they had
regularly performed their duties. This presumption could only be overturned by clear and convincing
evidence that the public officer is: (1) not properly performing his duty, or (2) that he was inspired by
improper motive. Accused-appellant failed to show both.
Plaintiff-appellee also posits that Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is inapplicable in cases where
the arrest was not pursuant to a buy-bust operation. Even assuming that the said provision applies
to accused-appellants case, accused-appellant raised the issue of non-compliance with the same
only for the first time on appeal, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived such defense.
Plaintiff-appellee further argues that non- compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 does
not render void the items seized or confiscated as long as their integrity and evidentiary value has
been preserved, as in this case. The sachet of shabu received from the Nacua couple were clearly
marked with the initials "RN" before it was submitted for forensic examination, and retained the said
marking even after, thus, enabling PO1 Anion to identify and affirm that the sachet of shabu
presented in court was the same one bought and received from the Nacua couple during the "testbuy" on September 2, 2005.
Accused-appellants appeal is impressed with merit.
Sale or possession of a dangerous drug can never be proven without seizure and identification of
the prohibited drug. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Of paramount importance, therefore, in these cases is that the identity of
the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. 39
Given the unique characteristic of dangerous and illegal drugs which are indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily susceptible to tampering, alteration, or substitution, either by accident or
otherwise, there must be strict compliance with the prescribed measures to be observed during and
after the seizure of dangerous drugs and related paraphernalia, during the custody and transfer
thereof for examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court. 40 Such measures are
described with particularity under Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165, which read:
Section 21(1) of Rep. Act No. 9165
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
a copy thereof. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 21(a) of the IRR of Rep. Act No. 9165:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursor and
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
(Emphases supplied.)
Moreover, in People v. Coreche,41 the Court emphasized that the marking of the seized drugs must
be done immediately after they are seized from the accused and failure to do so suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and raises reasonable doubt as to the
authenticity of the corpus delicti, wit:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves
to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities
to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the
doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v. Casimiro,
we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts
doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These rulings are
refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the authenticity
of the drug specimen occasioned by the prosecutions failure to prove that the evidence submitted
for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant acquittal on
reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
In this case, there was a total disregard of the requirements of law and jurisprudence. The
prosecution even admits that the police officers acquired the sachet of shabu presented in court
against accused-appellant in a mere "test-buy" operation by SPO1 Rosales, PO3 Luague, and PO1
Anion. The police officers, after supposedly buying the sachet of shabu from the Nacua couple for
Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00), left the residence of the Nacua couple, without recovering the
marked money or effecting the couples arrest. The police officers brought the sachet of suspected
shabu all the way back to their police station, and only there marked the said item, without the
presence of the accused and/or other disinterested witnesses.
1wphi1
While the Court allows for relaxation of the rules in some cases, there must be compelling and
justifiable grounds for the same and it must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items have been properly preserved. However, such conditions are not present in the instant
case.
Firstly, the prosecution did not offer any explanation as to why the police officers failed to strictly
comply with the established procedure for the custody of the suspected shabu. The Court can only
surmise that the operation on September 2, 2005 was only meant to be a "test-buy," so that the
police officers could secure a search warrant for the house of the Nacua couple. There was no
original intention to arrest and charge the Nacua couple for the shabu purchase that day.
Surprisingly and inexplicably, however, the prosecution chose to indict the Nacua couple for the
"test-buy" conducted on September 2, 2005, rather than for the result of the search conducted on
September 21, 2005 at the house of the Nacua couple which purportedly yielded more shabu and
related paraphernalia and led to the arrest of the couple.
Secondly, the prosecution failed to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of
suspected shabu allegedly bought from the Nacua couple during the "test-buy" operation has been
properly preserved from the time said item was transmitted to the crime laboratory up to its
presentation in court. No evidence was offered to show as to how the said specimen was kept and
by whom after its forensic examination throughout its presentation in court.
With reasonable doubt as to the authenticity of the corpus delicti, the acquittal of accused-appellant
of the crime charged is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C.
No. 00896 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Nacua is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE Reynaldo Nacua
from custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court
compliance within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

April 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Q Why do you say that it is a lie?

Republic of the Philippines

April 17, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 189351

April 10, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

A Yes, Your Honor, because she was becoming hysterical.

A Because it was marked in my presence, sir.

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

Republic of the Philippines

June 26, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

The present appeal is devoid of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

June 19, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Republic of the Philippines

June 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Republic of the Philippines

June 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Republic of the Philippines

January 30, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

p. One white floor tile

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

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