The Term Interpretation Notes
The Term Interpretation Notes
The Term Interpretation Notes
The term interpretation means To give meaning to. Interpretation of statues to render
justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act
and give meaning to each word of the Statute.
The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in
a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together.
The maxim A Verbis legis non est recedendum means that you must not vary the words of
the statute while interpreting it.
Object of Interpretation/ Necessity of Interpretation:
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature
conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.
Statutory Interpretation is there to help judges with general words Parliament has passed, as
some words can have different meanings. It also help under following heads:
Words very often have more than one meaning i.e. they can be ambiguous
A broad term may be used in a statute which can give rise to confusion and uncertainty
There may be errors or omissions when the statute is drafted
New developments in society can make the words used in a statute out of date and they may
no longer cover the current situation rule courts will give words their plain meaning, even if
the result is not very sensible.
Words are an imperfect means of communication
What role does the court play in the interpreting a statute?
Every judge has the possibility of deliberating, and then interpreting the law which may be
placed before him/her for a final judgment. Judges are often guided by history of course, but
in every case the final decision is theirs to make. Either to remain with the status quo or come
up with a landmark decision/interpretation at a particular moment. Of course, if the new
interpretation appears to be somewhat radical, it has the possibility of being questioned by the
higher courts too. There is always that possibility. But even the higher court is a court. So in
answer to your question, the court does play a major role in the interpretation of legislation.
In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar, the Supreme Court of India held that if two
interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be
preferred.
Conditions for statutory interpretation:
Firstly a court will give the everyday meaning to the words, notwithstanding that it may lead
to an absurdity. The golden rule may be used where the literal rule leads to an obvious
absurdity, and lastly the mischief rule may be applied to ascertain the purpose for which the
legislation was enacted, by going beyond the actual words used in the legislation. Courts are
in a most difficult position in this regard as they do not pass the legislation which they are
required to interpret and the court will strive for a sensible meaning to the statute where at all
possible.
The following presumptions apply when interpreting statute:
They are presumed not to bind the Constitution;
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They do not operate retrospectively in respect to substantive law (as opposed to
procedural law);
They do not interfere with legal rights already vested;
They do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts;
They do not detract from constitutional law or international law.
These are presumptions that may be rebutted by clear words.
Statutes imposing taxation or penal in nature are subject to strict construction, and ambiguity
is resolved in favour of the subject.
A number of rules of statutory rules of interpretation appear below.
Usage: The process of statutory interpretation may include the application of the common law
rules of construction noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis and expressio unis exclusio alterius.
Rules of Statutory Interpretation:
Parliament passes statutes and judges must interpret and apply them in court. Where the
meanings of words are unclear, judges will apply one of the various rules of interpretation.
There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logical
interpretation.
Literal interpretation
Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera
legis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is
clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute. The idea behind
such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making body must know what it
intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the safest rule
because the legislatures intention can be deduced only from the language through which it
has expressed itself.
The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need
not probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the
language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as
litera legis or litera script.
Golden Rule
Maxwell says that the application of Golden Rule of Construction, and its limits, can be seen
in the area devoted to construction with reference to the consequences, and construction to
avoid inconvenience and injustice, and to prevent evation He illustrated the application of the
rule in various cases relating to criminal, civil, labour, revenue taxation and administration
branches of law. In Free Lanka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ranasinghe. (1964) AC 541 a Statute
made it felony 'to break from prison". Held it would not apply to a prisoner who escaped
while the prison was on fire. Since his act was, not to recover liberty, but to save his life.
Similarly a statute which made 'an act' criminal in unqualified terms was understood as not
applying where the act done was excusable or justifiable on grounds generally recognized by
law.
The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary
meaning. This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation.
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In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh, the Election tribunal set aside the election of the
appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 on the grounds that the
appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The
appellant contended that the excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not
employed by him. The Supreme Court followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7)
and termed the excess employees as volunteers.
In Madan mohan v K.Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and
stringent provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act.
In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, it was held that according to the
fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by
chapter, section by section and then word by word.
In Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, the supreme court validated 14
( 2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and provided the benefit of eviction on account of
non payment of rent. The Supreme Court adopted grammatical interpretation.
The 'Golden rule' could, thus, be explained as follows:
1. It is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning of an Act when the meaning can be
fairly gathered from the words used, that is to say, if one construction would lead to an
absurdity while another will give effect to what common sense would show, as obviously
intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if the
same words used in the same section, and even the same sentence, have to be construed
differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the courts sometimes even to modify the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words, if by doing so absurdity and inconsistency can
be avoided.
2. The Court should not be astute to defeat the provision of the Act whose meaning is, on the
face of it, reasonably plain. Of course, this does not mean that an Act or any part of it can be
recast. It must be possible to spell the meaning contended for, out of the words actually used.
3. Unless the words are without meaning or absurd, it would be safe to give words their
natural meaning because the framer is presumed to use the language which conveys the
intention and it would not be in accord with any sound principle of construction to refuse to
give effect to the provisions of a statute on the very elusive ground that to give them their
ordinary meaning leads to consequences which are not in accord with the notions of propriety
or justice entertained by the Court.
Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation
Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following
circumstances it is not possible:Logical defects
A) ambiguity
B) inconsistency
C) incompleteness or lacunae
D) unreasonableness
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Logical interpretation
If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which
validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting.
It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish.
The purpose of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parliament.
The mischief rule
The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydons case. If there are two
interpretations possible for the material words of a statute, then for sure and true
interpretation there are certain considerations in the form of questions.
The following questions must b considered.
1. What was the common law before making the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide a remedy?
3. What is the remedy resolved by the parliament to cure the disease of the common wealth?
4. The true reason of the remedy.
The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The mischief
rule says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be followed.
Differences between the Literal Rule and Golden Rule:
The most common rule of statute interpretation is the literal rule, derived from the Sussex
Peerage Case (1844). According to this rule, the words in a statute must be given their plain,
ordinary and literal meaning.
However, the literal rule sometimes causes absurdities; such as in Whiteley v. Chappell
(1868), where a defendant was found not guilty of impersonating any person entitled to
vote because they had impersonated a dead person.
As a result of these problems, the courts developed the golden rule; which was first expressed
in the case of Grey v. Pearson (1857). The golden rule states that the grammatical and
ordinary sense of words may be modified so as to avoid [an] absurdity or inconsistency, but
no farther.
The golden rule has two forms: wide and narrow. The wide rule, as demonstrated by the
decision in Re Sigsworth [1935] that a son who murdered his mother could not inherit her
estate, allows an obnoxious result to be avoided even where the wording of a statute has only
one true meaning.
The narrow rule is much more restrictive however, and is only used where there is ambiguity
or absurdity in the law itself. For example, in R v. Allen (1872) the Act outlawing bigamy
gave rise to impossibility. The court therefore interpreted the bigamy legislation so as to
imply commission if a person underwent the marriage ceremony while already married,
rather than having to be married twice at the same time; an impossibility due to the wording
of the marriage law.
The Miscellaneous interpretation.
There are various kinds of miscellaneous interpretations. Viz,
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The legislative intent is to be gathered by reading the statute as a whole. (1980. 4 S.C.C.
136)
Courts must interpret words & their meanings so that public good is promoted & misuse
of power is interdicted. (1981. 1 S.S.C. 314)
(a) The dictionary meaning of a term may be resorted to when the definition clauses not
conceptually defined the expression. (1979 2 S.C.C. 354)
(b) However a resort to the dictionary meaning is not necessary when the meaning of a word
can be gathered from the context & from the relevant regulations. (1979 2 S.C.C. 339)
Provisions of the fundamental rights of the constitution must be liberally & widely
construed. (1981.1. S.C.C. 608)
There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. (1980 4 S.C.C. 697)
The constitution should not be interpreted with a doctrine approach. (1981 1 S.C.C. 166).
What is the difference between interpretation and construction?
1. Interpretation is representation of something or a specific view towards something, while
construction solely means building or making up something.
2. Interpretation is the way in which someone explains or understands an event,
information, someone's actions etc. In this sense, construction may be called a process of
forming something from knowledge or ideas.
Harmonious Construction.
The Supreme Court held in Re Kerala Education Bill that in deciding the fundamental rights,
the court must consider the directive principles and adopt the principle of harmonious
construction so two possibilities are given effect as much as possible by striking a balance.
In Qureshi v State of Bihar, The Supreme Court held that while the state should implement
the directive principles, it should be done in such a way so as not to violate the fundamental
rights. In Shajahan v Mrs. Kamala Narayana, the Supreme Court held that harmonious
interpretation of the legislation is justified if it makes effective use of any other provision in
the same or another enactment.
In Bhatia International v Bulk Trading SA, it was held that if more than one interpretation is
possible for a statute, then the court has to choose the interpretation which depicts the
intention of the legislature.
Acts in Pari material
When a statute is ambiguous, the intention of the legislature may be gathered from statutes
relating to same subject. The definitions cannot be generally imported.
Other external aids include interpretation of later Acts with the help of earlier Acts and words
and expressions used in different Act.
INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES
General principle
The rule that a statute enacting an offence or imposing a penalty in strictly construed is now
only of limited application and it serves in the selection of one when two or more
construction are reasonably open.
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The rule was originally evolved to mitigate the rigor of monstrous sentences for trivial
offences and although that necessity has now almost vanished, the difference in approach
made to a penal statute as against any other statute stick persists.
According to Lord Esher, the settled rule of construction of penal section is that if there is
reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt
that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision,
the court must lean toward that construction which exempts the subject from the penalty
rather than the one which imposes penalty.
There are two elements of crime; the Actus Reus and the mens rea.
In Noakes v Dancaster Amalgamated collieries ltd, Maxwell cited that where to apply words
literally would defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly
unreasonable result. Then the court must do some violence to the words and so achieve that
obvious intention and produce a rational construction.
But the full bench rejected the argument of futility based on Noakes V Dancaster
amalgamated colliery ltd in tolarams case. On appeal the Supreme Court held that court is
not competent to stretch the meaning of the expression used by the legislature in order to
carry out the intention of the legislature- Mahajan.J .
Even if one were to disregard the rule of construction based on futilities the only reasonable
way of construction is provided by ensuring that the language is not stretched and rule of
strict construction is not violated.
In M.V.Joshi v M.V Shimpi, it was held that it is now well settled that in the absence of clear
compelling language, the provision should not be given a wider interpretation.
A penal statute must be construed according to its plain, natural and grammatical meaning. (R
v Hunt 1987)
In deciding the essential ingredients of the offence, substance and reality of the language and
not its form will be important. When the intention is not clearly indicated by linguistic
construction then regard must be given to the mischief at which the act is aimed.
Rule of construction in penal statutes does not prevent the court from interpreting a statute
according to its current meaning and applying the language to cover developments in science
and technology not known at the time of passing the statute.
In R v Ireland (1987), Psychiatric injury caused by silent telephone calls was held to amount
to assault and bodily harm under the person Act, 1861 in the light of the current scientific
appreciation of the link between the body and psychiatric injury.
In applying and interpreting a penal statute, public policy is also taken into consideration. In
R v Brown, the House of Lords held that consensual sadomasochistic homosexual encounters
which occasioned actual bodily harm to the victim were assaults.
Following are some of the propositions important in relation to strict construction of penal
statutes.
1. if the scope of prohibitory words cover only some class of persons or some well
defined activity, their scope cannot be extended to cover more on consideration of
policy or object if the statute.
2. Prohibitory words can be widely construed only if indicated in the statute. On the
other hand if after full consideration no indication is found the benefit of construction
will be given to the subject.
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3. If the prohibitory words in their own signification bear wider meaning which also fits
in with the object or policy of the statute.
Mens rea in statutory offences.
This principle is expressed in the maxim Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea which
means that the existence of a guilty intent is an essential ingredient of a crime at common
law.
Mens Rea is the state of mind stigmatized as wrongful by the criminal law.
Crimes involving mens rea are of two types.
a. crimes of basic intent ( does not go beyond Actus Reus)
b. Crimes of specific intent (foresight of its consequence and has a purposive element).
c. Words such as voluntarily, knowingly, dishonestly, fraudulently are used to
signify the state of mind.]
The modern tendency is in favour of the view that principles of construction do not vary with
statutes.
The juristic parlance today uses the expression that a proper construction should be made
whether the statute is penal or fiscal.
Normally the words used in the statute are to be construed in their ordinary meaning.
However such approach always does not meet the ends of fair and a reasonable construction.
Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of words may not provide proper
construction.
That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory
provision as observed by Halsbury, the words should be
construed in the light of their context rather than what may be either their strict etymological
sense or their popular meaning apart from the context.
Thus one has to analyze the different parts of a statute and consider what effect they may
have on interpretation.
Effect of repeal
The general rule of construction is that when any Central Act is not expressed to come into
operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day it receives
presidential Assent.
According to the General Clauses act, 1897, when this act or regulation made after the
commencement of this act repeals any enactments hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then
unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not:a. revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect
b. affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or
suffered there under
c. affect any rights, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under any
enactment so repealed
d. effect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any enactment so repealed
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e. affect ant investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right,
privilege, obligation liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as foresaid; and such
investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued or punishment
may be imposed as if the repealing Act or regulation had not been passed.
6.A Repeal of an act making textual amendment in act or regulation
Where any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any
enactment by which the text of any central act or regulation was amended by the express
omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then unless a different intention appears the
repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment.
Revival of repealed enactments
In any central acts or regulation made after the commencement of this act, it shall be
necessary, for the purpose of reviving, either wholly or partially repealed, expressly to state
the purpose