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Ottoman Empire

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The passage provides an overview of the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire from 1299 to 1923, including its territorial expansion over three continents and eventual dissolution following World War 1.

At its height between the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottoman Empire spanned three continents, controlling much of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia, and North Africa.

The Ottoman Empire began extending its rule over the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean after the death of its founder Osman I. Key battles and conquests against the Byzantines, Serbians, and others paved the way for its expansion into Europe in the late 14th and 15th centuries.

Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire or Ottoman State (Ottoman Turkish: ‫ت علّیه عثمانّیه‬ ْ ‫ دول‬Devlet-i
Âliye-yi Osmâniyye,[4] Modern Turkish: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu or Osmanlı Devleti), also
known by its contemporaries as the Turkish Empire or Turkey (see the other names of
the Ottoman State), was an Islamic empire that lasted from 1299 to November 1, 1922[5]
(as an imperial monarchy) or July 24, 1923[6] (de jure, as a state). It was succeeded by the
Republic of Turkey,[7] which was officially proclaimed on October 29, 1923.

At the height of its power (16th–17th century), it spanned three continents, controlling
much of Southeastern Europe, Western Asia and North Africa.[8] The Ottoman Empire
contained 29 provinces and numerous vassal states, some of which were later absorbed
into the empire, while others gained various types of autonomy during the course of
centuries. The empire also temporarily gained authority over distant overseas lands
through declarations of allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph, such as the
declaration by the Sultan of Aceh in 1565; or through the temporary acquisitions of
islands in the Atlantic Ocean, such as Lanzarote (1585).[9]

The empire was at the centre of interactions between the Eastern and Western worlds for
six centuries. With Constantinople as its capital city,[10][11] and vast control of lands
around the eastern Mediterranean during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (ruled
1520 to 1566), the Ottoman Empire was, in many respects, an Islamic successor to the
Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire.[12]

History
Rise (1299–1453)

With the demise of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rūm (circa 1300), Turkish Anatolia was
divided into a patchwork of independent states, the so-called Ghazi emirates. By 1300, a
weakened Byzantine Empire had seen most of its Anatolian provinces lost to ten Ghazi
principalities. One of the Ghazi emirates was led by Osman I (from which the name
Ottoman is derived), son of Ertuğrul in the region of Eskişehir in western Anatolia.
Osman I extended the frontiers of Ottoman settlement towards the edge of the Byzantine
Empire. He moved the Ottoman capital to Bursa, and shaped the early political
development of the nation. Given the nickname “Kara” (which means “black” in modern
Turkish, but alternatively meant “brave” or “strong” in old Turkish) for his courage,[13]
Osman I was admired as a strong and dynamic ruler long after his death, as evident in the
centuries-old Turkish phrase, “may he be as good as Osman.” His reputation has also
been burnished by the medieval Turkish story known as “Osman’s Dream”, a foundation
myth in which the young Osman was inspired to conquest by a prescient vision of empire
(according to his dream, the empire is a big tree whose roots spread through three
continents and whose branches cover the sky). In this period, a formal Ottoman
government was created whose institutions would change drastically over the life of the
empire. The government used the legal entity known as the millet, under which religious
and ethnic minorities were able to manage their own affairs with substantial
independence from central control.

In the century after the death of Osman I, Ottoman rule began to extend over the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Balkans. The important city of Thessaloniki was captured from
the Venetians in 1387, and the Turkish victory at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 effectively
marked the end of Serbian power in the region, paving the way for Ottoman expansion
into Europe. The Battle of Nicopolis in 1396, widely regarded as the last large-scale
crusade of the Middle Ages, failed to stop the advance of the victorious Ottomans. With
the extension of Turkish dominion into the Balkans, the strategic conquest of
Constantinople became a crucial objective. The Empire controlled nearly all of the
former Byzantine lands surrounding the city, but the Byzantines were temporarily
relieved when Tamerlane invaded Anatolia with the Battle of Ankara in 1402, taking
Sultan Bayezid I as a prisoner. Part of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans (such as
Thessaloniki, Macedonia and Kosovo) were temporarily lost after 1402, but were later
recovered by Murad II between the 1430s and 1450s.

The capture of Bayezid I threw the Turks into disorder. The state fell into a civil war
which lasted from 1402 to 1413, as Bayezid’s sons fought over succession. It ended when
Mehmed I emerged as the sultan and restored Ottoman power, bringing an end to the
Interregnum. His grandson, Mehmed the Conqueror, reorganized the state and the
military, and demonstrated his martial prowess by capturing Constantinople on May 29,
1453, at the age of 21. The city became the new capital of the Ottoman Empire, and
Mehmed II assumed the title of Kayser-i Rûm (Roman Emperor). However, this title was
not recognized by the Greeks or Western Europe, and the Russian Czars also claimed to
be the successors of the Eastern Imperial title. To consolidate his claim, Mehmed II
aspired to gain control over the Western capital, Rome, and Ottoman forces occupied
parts of the Italian peninsula, starting from Otranto and Apulia on July 28, 1480. But after
Mehmed II’s death on May 3, 1481, the campaign in Italy was cancelled and the Ottoman
forces retreated.

Growth (1453–1683)

This period in Ottoman history can roughly be divided into two distinct eras: an era of
territorial, economic, and cultural growth prior to 1566, followed by an era of relative
military and political stagnation.

Expansion and apogee (1453–1566)

Mehmed II enters Fall of Constantinople.

The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 cemented the status of the Empire as
the preeminent power in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. During this
time, the Ottoman Empire entered a long period of conquest and expansion, extending its
borders deep into Europe and North Africa. Conquests on land were driven by the
discipline and innovation of the Ottoman military; and on the sea, the Ottoman navy
aided this expansion significantly. The navy also contested and protected key seagoing
trade routes, in competition with the Italian city states in the Black Sea, Aegean and
Mediterranean seas and the Portuguese in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The state also
flourished economically thanks to its control of the major overland trade routes between
Europe and Asia.[14] This lock-hold on trade between western Europe and Asia is
frequently cited[by whom?] as a primary motivational factor for Isabella I of Castile to fund
Christopher Columbus’s westward journey to find a sailing route to Asia.

The Empire prospered under the rule of a line of committed and effective sultans. Sultan
Selim I (1512–1520) dramatically expanded the Empire’s eastern and southern frontiers
by defeating Shah Ismail of Safavid Persia, in the Battle of Chaldiran.[15] Selim I
established Ottoman rule in Egypt, and created a naval presence on the Red Sea. After
this Ottoman expansion, a competition started between the Portuguese Empire and the
Ottoman Empire to become the dominant power in the region.[16]

Selim’s successor, Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–1566), further expanded upon


Selim’s conquests. After capturing Belgrade in 1521, Suleiman conquered the southern
and central parts of the Kingdom of Hungary (while the western, northern and
northeastern parts weren’t conquered)[17][18] and established Ottoman rule in the territory
of present-day Hungary (except western parts) and other Central European territories,
after his victory in the Battle of Mohács in 1526. (See also: Ottoman–Hungarian Wars).
He then laid siege to Vienna in 1529, but failed to take the city after the onset of winter
forced his retreat.[19] In 1532, another planned attack on Vienna with an army thought to
be over 250,000 strong was repulsed 97 kilometres (60 mi) south of Vienna, at the
fortress of Güns. After further advances by the Ottomans in 1543, the Habsburg ruler
Ferdinand officially recognised Ottoman ascendancy in Hungary in 1547. During the
reign of Suleiman, Transylvania, Wallachia and, intermittently, Moldavia, became
tributary principalities of the Ottoman Empire. In the east, the Ottomans took Baghdad
from the Persians in 1535, gaining control of Mesopotamia and naval access to the
Persian Gulf. By the end of Suleiman’s reign, the Empire’s population reached about
15,000,000 people.[20]

Battle of Mohács (1526) and the Ottoman conquest of Hungary.

Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha defeated the Holy League of Charles V under the command
of Andrea Doria at the Battle of Preveza in 1538.

Under Selim and Suleiman, the Empire became a dominant naval force, controlling much
of the Mediterranean Sea.[21] The exploits of the Ottoman admiral Barbarossa Hayreddin
Pasha, who commanded the Ottoman Navy during Suleiman’s reign, led to a number of
military victories over Christian navies. Among these were the conquest of Tunis and
Algeria from Spain; the evacuation of Muslims and Jews from Spain to the safety of
Ottoman lands (particularly Salonica, Cyprus, and Constantinople) during the Spanish
Inquisition; and the capture of Nice from the Holy Roman Empire in 1543. This last
conquest occurred on behalf of France as a joint venture between the forces of the French
king Francis I and those of Barbarossa.[22] France and the Ottoman Empire, united by
mutual opposition to Habsburg rule in both Southern Europe and Central Europe, became
strong allies during this period. The alliance was economic and military, as the sultans
granted France the right of trade within the Empire without levy of taxation. In fact, the
Ottoman Empire was by this time a significant and accepted part of the European
political sphere, and entered into a military alliance with France, the Kingdom of England
and the Dutch Republic against Habsburg Spain, Italy and Habsburg Austria.

As the 16th century progressed, Ottoman naval superiority was challenged by the growing
sea powers of western Europe, particularly Portugal, in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean
and the Spice Islands. With the Ottomans blockading sea-lanes to the East and South, the
European powers were driven to find another way to the ancient silk and spice routes,
now under Ottoman control. On land, the Empire was preoccupied by military campaigns
in Austria and Persia, two widely separated theatres of war. The strain of these conflicts
on the Empire’s resources, and the logistics of maintaining lines of supply and
communication across such vast distances, ultimately rendered its sea efforts
unsustainable and unsuccessful. The overriding military need for defence on the western
and eastern frontiers of the Empire eventually made effective long-term engagement on a
global scale impossible.

Revolts and revival (1566–1683)

The effective military and bureaucratic structures of the previous century also came under
strain during a protracted period of misrule by weak Sultans. But in spite of these
difficulties, the Empire remained a major expansionist power until the Battle of Vienna in
1683, which marked the end of Ottoman expansion into Europe.

European states initiated efforts at this time to curb Ottoman control of overland trade
routes[citation needed]. Western European states began to circumvent the Ottoman trade
monopoly by establishing their own naval routes to Asia. Economically, the huge influx
of Spanish silver from the New World caused a sharp devaluation of the Ottoman
currency and rampant inflation. This had serious negative consequences at all levels of
Ottoman society.

The expansion of Muscovite Russia under Ivan IV (1533–1584) into the Volga and
Caspian region at the expense of the Tatar khanates disrupted the northern pilgrimage and
trade routes. A highly ambitious plan to counter this conceived by Sokullu Mehmet
Pasha, Grand Vizier under Selim II, in the shape of a Don-Volga canal (begun June
1569), combined with an attack on Astrakhan, failed, the canal being abandoned with the
onset of winter. Henceforth the Empire returned to its existing strategy of utilising the
Crimean Khanate as its bulwark against Russia.[23] After burning Moscow in 1571, the
Crimean khan Devlet I Giray, supported by the Ottomans, developed a plan for the full
conquest of the Russian state[citation needed]. The next year, the invasion was repeated but
repelled at the Battle of Molodi. The Crimean Khanate remained a significant power in
Eastern Europe and a threat to Muscovite Russia in particular until the end of the 17th
century.[24]
In southern Europe, a coalition of Catholic powers, led by Philip II of Spain, formed an
alliance to challenge Ottoman naval strength in the Mediterranean Sea. Their victory over
the Ottoman fleet at the Battle of Lepanto (1571) was a startling blow to the image of
Ottoman invincibility. However, historians today stress the symbolic rather than the
strictly military significance of the battle, for within six months of the defeat a new
Ottoman fleet of some 250 sail including eight modern galleasses[25] had been built, with
the harbours of Constantinople turning out a new ship every day at the height of the
construction. In discussions with a Venetian minister, the Turkish Grand Vizier
commented: “In capturing Cyprus from you, we have cut off one of your arms; in
defeating our fleet you have merely shaved off our beard”.[25] The Ottoman naval
recovery persuaded Venice to sign a peace treaty in 1573, and the Ottomans were able to
expand and consolidate their position in North Africa.[26]

The Battle of Keresztes (1596) was part of the Long War (1593–1606) between the
Ottoman and Habsburg empires which ended with Ottoman victory, resulting in the
Peace of Zsitvatorok in 1606.

By contrast, the Habsburg frontier had settled into a more or less permanent border,
marked only by relatively minor battles concentrating on the possession of individual
fortresses. The stalemate was brought about by a stiffening of the Hapsburg defenses[27]
and also reflected simple geographical limits: in the pre-mechanized age, Vienna marked
the furthest point that an Ottoman army could march from Constantinople during the
early-spring to late-autumn campaigning season. It also reflected the difficulties imposed
on the Empire by the need to maintain two separate fronts: one against the Austrians (see:
Ottoman wars in Europe), and the other against a rival Islamic state, the Safavids of
Persia (see: Ottoman wars in Near East).

Second Siege of Vienna in 1683.

On the battlefield, the Ottomans gradually fell behind the Europeans in military
technology as the innovation which fed the Empire’s forceful expansion became stifled
by growing religious and intellectual conservatism.[28] Changes in European military
tactics and weaponry in the military revolution caused the once-feared Sipahi cavalry to
lose military relevance. The Long War against Habsburg Austria (1593–1606) created the
need for greater numbers of infantry equipped with firearms. This resulted in a relaxation
of recruitment policy and a significant growth in Janissary corps numbers. This
contributed to problems of indiscipline, lack of effectiveness, and outright rebelliousness
within the corps, which the government wrestled with but never fully solved during (and
beyond) this whole period. The development of pike and shot and later linear tactics with
increased use of firearms by Europeans proved deadly against the massed infantry in
close formation used by the Ottomans. Irregular sharpshooters (Sekban) were also
recruited for the same reasons and on demobilisation turned to brigandage in the Jelali
revolts (1595–1610) which engendered widespread anarchy in Anatolia in the late 16th
and early 17th centuries.[29] With the Empire’s population reaching 30,000,000 people by
1600, shortage of land placed further pressure on the government.[30]
However, the 17th century was not simply an era of stagnation and decline, but also a key
period in which the Ottoman state and its structures began to adapt to new pressures and
new realities, internal and external.

The Sultanate of women (1648–1656) was a period in which the political influence of the
Imperial Harem was dominant, as the mothers of young sultans exercised power on
behalf of their sons. This was not wholly unprecedented; Hürrem Sultan, who established
herself in the early 1530s as the successor of Nurbanu, the first Valide Sultan, was
described by the Venetian Baylo Andrea Giritti as “a woman of the utmost goodness,
courage and wisdom” despite the fact that she “thwarted some while rewarding others”.
[31]
But the inadequacy of Ibrahim I (1640–1648) and the minority accession of
Mohammed IV in 1646 created a significant crisis of rule which the dominant women of
the Imperial Harem filled.[32] The most prominent women of this period were Kösem
Sultan and her daughter-in-law Turhan Hatice, whose political rivalry culminated in
Kösem’s murder in 1651.

The Ottoman army battling the Habsburgs in Slovenia during the Great Turkish War of
1662–1699.

This period gave way to the highly significant Köprülü Era (1656–1703), during which
effective control of the Empire was exercised by a sequence of Grand Viziers from the
Köprülü family. On September 15, 1656 the octogenarian Köprülü Mehmed Pasha
accepted the seals of office having received guarantees from the Valide Turhan Hatice of
unprecedented authority and freedom from interference. A fierce conservative
disciplinarian, he successfully reasserted the central authority and the empire’s military
impetus. This continued under his son and successor Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed (Grand Vizier
1661–1676).[33] The Köprülü Vizierate saw renewed military success with authority
restored in Transylvania, the conquest of Crete completed in 1669 and expansion into
Polish southern Ukraine, with the strongholds of Khotin and Kamianets-Podilskyi and the
territory of Podolia ceding to Ottoman control in 1676.[34]

This period of renewed assertiveness came to a calamitous end when Grand Vizier Kara
Mustafa Pasha in May 1683 led a huge army to attempt a second Ottoman siege of
Vienna. The final assault being fatally delayed, the Ottoman forces were swept away by
allied Habsburg, German and Polish forces spearheaded by the Polish king Jan
Sobieski[35] at the Battle of Vienna.

The alliance of the Holy League pressed home the advantage of the defeat at Vienna and
15 years of see-sawing warfare culminated in the epochal Treaty of Karlowitz (January
26, 1699) which ended the Great Turkish War and for the first time saw the Ottoman
Empire surrender control of significant European territories (many permanently),
including Ottoman Hungary.[36] The Empire had reached the end of its ability to
effectively conduct an assertive, expansionist policy against its European rivals and it
was to be forced from this point to adopt an essentially defensive strategy within this
theatre.
Only two Sultans in this period personally exercised strong political and military control
of the Empire: the vigorous Murad IV (1612–1640) recaptured Yerevan (1635) and
Baghdad (1639) from the Safavids and reasserted central authority, albeit during a brief
majority reign.[37] Mustafa II (1695–1703) led the Ottoman counter attack of 1695–6
against the Habsburgs in Hungary, but was undone at the disastrous defeat at Zenta
(September 11, 1697).[38]

Stagnation and reform (1683–1827)

Stagnation of the Ottoman Empire

King Charles XII of Sweden fled to the Ottoman Empire following his defeat against the
Russians at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. A guest at the Topkapı Palace for nearly five
years, he persuaded the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III to declare war on Russia, which
resulted in the Russo-Turkish War of 1710–1711 that ended with an Ottoman victory.

During the stagnation period much territory in the Balkans was ceded to Austria. Certain
areas of the Empire, such as Egypt and Algeria, became independent in all but name, and
subsequently came under the influence of Britain and France. In the 18th century,
centralized authority gave way to varying degrees of provincial autonomy enjoyed by
local governors and leaders. A series of wars were fought between the Russian and
Ottoman empires from the 18th to the 19th century.

The long period of Ottoman stagnation is typically characterized by historians as an era


of failed reforms. In the latter part of this period there were educational and technological
reforms, including the establishment of higher education institutions such as Istanbul
Technical University; Ottoman science and technology had been highly regarded in
medieval times, as a result of Ottoman scholars’ synthesis of classical learning with
Islamic philosophy and mathematics, and knowledge of such Chinese advances in
technology as gunpowder and the magnetic compass. By this period though the
influences had become regressive and conservative. The guilds of writers denounced the
printing press as “the Devil’s Invention”, and were responsible for a 43-year lag between
its invention by Johannes Gutenberg in Europe in 1450 and its introduction to the
Ottoman society with the Gutenberg press in Constantinople that was established by the
Sephardic Jews of Spain in 1493. Sephardic Jews migrated to the Ottoman Empire as
they escaped from the Spanish Inquisition of 1492.

The Tulip Era (or Lâle Devri in Turkish), named for Sultan Ahmed III’s love of the tulip
flower and its use to symbolize his peaceful reign, the Empire’s policy towards Europe
underwent a shift. The region was peaceful between 1718 and 1730, after the Ottoman
victory against Russia in the Pruth Campaign in 1711 and the subsequent Treaty of
Passarowitz brought a period of pause in warfare. The Empire began to improve the
fortifications of cities bordering the Balkans to act as a defence against European
expansionism. Other tentative reforms were also enacted: taxes were lowered; there were
attempts to improve the image of the Ottoman state;[clarification needed] and the first instances of
private investment and entrepreneurship occurred.

Ottoman military reform efforts begin with Selim III (1789–1807) who made the first
major attempts to modernize the army along European lines. These efforts, however,
were hampered by reactionary movements, partly from the religious leadership, but
primarily from the Janissary corps, who had become anarchic and ineffectual. Jealous of
their privileges and firmly opposed to change, they created a Janissary revolt. Selim’s
efforts cost him his throne and his life, but were resolved in spectacular and bloody
fashion by his successor, the dynamic Mahmud II, who massacred the Janissary corps in
1826.

Serbia gained its autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in two uprisings in 1804 (led by
Đorđe Petrović – Karađorđe) and 1815 (led by Miloš Obrenović), although Turkish
troops continued to garrison the capital, Belgrade, until 1867.[39] In 1821, the Greeks were
the first to declare war to the Sultan. Through the rebellion that originated in Moldavia,
as a diversion, and followed by the main revolution in the Peloponnese, the latter, along
with the northern part of the Gulf of Corinth became the first parts of the Ottoman empire
to be completely liberated in 1829. Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Montenegro followed
in the 1870s.

Decline and modernization (1828–1908)

Ottoman decline (loss of huge territories) is typically characterized by historians also as


an era of modern times. The Empire lost territory on all fronts, and there was
administrative instability because of the breakdown of centralized government, despite
efforts of reform and reorganization such as the Tanzimat. During this period, the Empire
faced challenges in defending itself against foreign invasion and occupation. The Empire
ceased to enter conflicts on its own and began to forge alliances with European countries
such as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Russia. As an example, in the
1853 Crimean War the Ottomans united with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, the Second French Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia against the Russian
Empire. The Crimean War caused an exodus of the Crimean Tatars. Of total Tatar
population 300,000 of the Tauride Province about 200,000 Crimean Tatars moved to the
Ottoman Empire in continuing waves of emigration.[40] Towards the end of the Caucasian
Wars many Circassians fled their homelands in the Caucasus and settled in the Ottoman
Empire. Since the 19th century, an exodus by the large portion of Muslim peoples (who
are termed “Muhacir” under a general definition) from the Balkans, Caucasus, Crimea
and Crete,[41] took refuge in present-day Turkey and moulded the country’s fundamental
features.[42]

Mahmud II started the modernization of Turkey by preparing the Edict of Tanzimat in


1839 which had immediate effects such as European style clothing, uniforms, weapons,
agricultural and industrial innovations, architecture, education, legislation, institutional
organization and land reform.
During the Tanzimat period (from Arabic Tanzîmât, meaning “reorganization”) (1839–
1876), a series of constitutional reforms led to a fairly modern conscripted army, banking
system reforms, and the replacement of guilds with modern factories. In 1856, the Hatt-ı
Hümayun promised equality for all Ottoman citizens irrespective of their ethnicity and
confession, widening the scope of the 1839 Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane. The Christian millets
gained privileges, such as in the Armenian National Constitution (Ottoman Turkish:
Nizâmnâme-i Millet-i Ermeniyân) of 1863, which was the Divan approved form of the
Code of Regulations composed of 150 articles drafted by the Armenian intelligentsia, and
the newly formed Armenian National Assembly.[43]

The reformist period peaked with the Constitution, called the Kanûn-ı Esâsî (meaning
“Basic Law” in Ottoman Turkish), written by members of the Young Ottomans, which
was promulgated on November 23, 1876. It established the freedom of belief and equality
of all citizens before the law. The Empire’s First Constitutional era (or Birinci Meşrûtiyet
Devri in Turkish), was short-lived; however, the idea behind it (Ottomanism), proved
influential as a wide-ranging group of reformers known as the Young Ottomans,
primarily educated in Western universities, believed that a constitutional monarchy
would provide an answer to the Empire’s growing social unrest. Through a military coup
in 1876, they forced Sultan Abdülaziz (1861–1876) to abdicate in favour of Murad V.
However, Murad V was mentally ill, and was deposed within a few months. His heir-
apparent Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) was invited to assume power on the condition that
he would declare a constitutional monarchy, which he did on November 23, 1876.
However, the parliament survived for only two years. The sultan suspended, but did not
abolish, the parliament until he was forced to reconvene it. The effectiveness of the
Kanûn-ı Esâsî was then largely minimized.

The rise of nationalism swept through many countries during the 19th century, and the
Ottoman Empire was not immune. A burgeoning national consciousness, together with a
growing sense of ethnic nationalism, made nationalistic thought one of the most
significant Western ideas imported to the Ottoman empire, as it was forced to deal with
nationalism both within and beyond its borders. There was a significant increase in the
number of revolutionary political parties. Uprisings in Ottoman territory had many far-
reaching consequences during the 19th century and determined much of Ottoman policy
during the early 20th century. Many Ottoman Turks questioned whether the policies of the
state were to blame: some felt that the sources of ethnic conflict were external, and
unrelated to issues of governance. While this era was not without some successes, the
ability of the Ottoman state to have any effect on ethnic uprisings was seriously called
into question.
Punch cartoon from June 17, 1876. Russian Empire preparing to let slip the Balkan
“Dogs of War” to attack the Ottoman Empire, while policeman John Bull (UK) warns
Russia to take care. Supported by Russia, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the
Ottoman Empire the following day.

In 1821 the First Hellenic Republic became the first Balkan country to declare its
independence from the Ottoman Empire. It was officially recognized by the Porte in
1829, after the end of the Greek War of Independence.

The Tanzimat reforms did not halt the rise of nationalism in the Danubian Principalities
and the Principality of Serbia, which had been semi-independent for almost six decades;
in 1875 the tributary principalities of Serbia, Principality of Montenegro and the United
Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia unilaterally declared their independence from
the Empire; and following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, independence was
formally granted to all three belligerent nations. Bulgaria also achieved virtual
independence (as the Principality of Bulgaria) whose volunteers had participated in the
Russo-Turkish war on the side of the rebelling nations.

The Vilayet of Bosnia and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar were partially occupied by the forces
of Austria-Hungary following the Congress of Berlin in 1878, but they nominally
remained as Ottoman territories (Bosnia and Herzegovina until the Bosnian crisis in
1908, Novi Pazar until the First Balkan War in 1912), with the continuing presence of
Ottoman soldiers.

Cyprus was rented to the British in 1878 in exchange for Britain’s favours at the
Congress of Berlin.

Egypt, which had previously been occupied by the forces of Napoleon I of France in
1798 but recovered in 1801 by a joint Ottoman-British force, was occupied in 1882 by
British forces on the pretext of bringing order; though Egypt and Sudan remained as
Ottoman provinces de jure until 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central
Powers of World War I, and Britain officially annexed these two provinces and Cyprus as
a response. Other Ottoman provinces in North Africa were lost between 1830 and 1912,
starting from Algeria (occupied by France in 1830), Tunisia (occupied by France in 1881)
and Libya (occupied by Italy in 1912.)
The Armenians, who were granted their own constitution and national assembly with the
Tanzimat reforms, began pressing the Ottoman government for greater autonomy after
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878.[44] A number of
Armenian uprisings and attacks took place in the cities of Anatolia, leading Sultan Abdul
Hamid II to establish the Hamidiye regiments in eastern Anatolia, formed mostly of
irregular cavalry units of recruited Kurds.[45] From 1894–96 anywhere between 100,000
to 300,000 Armenians living all throughout the empire were killed in what became
known as the Hamidian massacres.[46] Armenian militants seized the Ottoman Bank
headquarters in Constantinople in 1896 to bring European attention to the massacres,
although they failed in this endeavor.

Economically, the Empire had difficulty in repaying the Ottoman public debt to European
banks, which caused the establishment of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman
Public Debt. By the end of the 19th century, the main reason the Empire was not entirely
overrun by Western powers came from the Balance of Power doctrine. Both Austria and
Russia wanted to increase their spheres of influence and territory at the expense of the
Ottoman Empire, but were kept in check mostly by the United Kingdom, which feared
Russian dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Dissolution (1908–1922)

The Second Constitutional Era (Turkish: İkinci Meşrûtiyet Devri”) began after the Young
Turk Revolution (July 3, 1908) with the sultan’s announcement of the restoration of the
1876 constitution and the reconvening of the Ottoman Parliament. It marks the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. This era is dominated by the politics of the
Committee of Union and Progress (Turkish: İttihâd ve Terakkî Cemiyeti), and the
movement that would become known as the Young Turks (Turkish: Jön Türkler).
Profiting from the civil strife, Austria-Hungary officially annexed Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1908, but pulled its troops out of the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, another
contested region between the Austrians and Ottomans, in order to avoid a war. During the
Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912) in which the Ottoman Empire lost Libya, the Balkan
League declared war against the Ottoman Empire, which lost its Balkan territories except
East Thrace and the historic Ottoman capital city of Edirne (Adrianople) during the
Balkan Wars (1912–1913). Some 400,000 Muslims, out of fear for Greek, Serbian or
Bulgarian atrocities, left with the retreating Ottoman army.[47] The Baghdad Railway
under German control became a source of international tension and played a role in the
origins of World War I.[48]

First World War

Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) at the trenches of Gallipoli in 1915.

The Young Turk government had signed a secret treaty establishing the Ottoman-German
Alliance in August 1914, aimed against the common Russian enemy but aligning the
Empire with the German side. The Ottoman Empire entered World War I after the
Goeben and Breslau incident, in which it gave safe harbour to two German ships which
were fleeing British ships. These ships then – after having officially been transferred to
the Ottoman Navy, but effectively still under German control – attacked the Russian port
of Sevastopol, thus dragging the Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers, in
which it took part in the Middle Eastern theatre. There were several important Ottoman
victories in the early years of the war, such as the Battle of Gallipoli and the Siege of
Kut; but there were setbacks as well, such as the disastrous Caucasus Campaign against
the Russians. The United States never declared war against the Ottoman Empire.[49]

Armenia

Armenians from Kharpert being marched out under Turkish guard.

In 1915, as the Russian Caucasus Army continued to advance in eastern Anatolia with the
help of Armenian volunteer units from the Caucasus region of the Russian Empire,[45] and
aided by some Ottoman Armenians, the Ottoman government decided to issue the Tehcir
Law which started the deportation of the ethnic Armenians, particularly from the
provinces close to the Ottoman-Russian front, resulting in what became known as the
Armenian Genocide.[50][51][52] Through forced marches and massacres, the Armenians
living in eastern Anatolia were uprooted from their ancestral homelands and sent
southwards to the Ottoman provinces in Syria and Mesopotamia. Estimates vary on how
many Armenians perished during the Armenian Genocide but scholars give figures
ranging from 600,000 (according to Western scholars)[53] to up to 1.5 million (according
to the Armenians.)[54][55]

Arab Revolt

The Arab Revolt which began in 1916 turned the tide against the Ottomans at the Middle
Eastern front, where they initially seemed to have the upper hand during the first two
years of the war. When the Armistice of Mudros was signed on October 30, 1918, the
only parts of the Arabian peninsula that were still under Ottoman control were Yemen,
Asir, the city of Medina, portions of northern Syria and portions of northern Iraq. These
territories were handed over to the British forces on January 23, 1919. The Ottomans
were also ordered to evacuate the parts of the former Russian Empire in the Caucasus (in
present-day Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) which they had gained towards the end of
WWI, following Russia’s retreat from the war with the Russian Revolution in 1917.

Defeat

The Empire was defeated in 1918 and did not take part in the Paris Conference that
produced the Treaty of Versailles. The helpless sultan was forced in 1920 to sign the
Treaty of Sèvres, by which the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was finalized. The
new countries created from the former territories of the Ottoman Empire currently
number 40 (including the disputed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.)

The occupation of Constantinople along with the occupation of Smyrna mobilized the
establishment of the Turkish national movement, which won the Turkish War of
Independence (1919–1922) under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.[56] The
Sultanate was abolished on November 1, 1922, and the last sultan, Mehmed VI Vahdettin
(reigned 1918–1922), left the country on November 17, 1922. The new independent
Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNA) was internationally recognized with the
Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. The GNA officially declared the Republic of
Turkey on October 29, 1923. The Caliphate was constitutionally abolished several
months later, on March 3, 1924. The Sultan and his family were declared personae non
gratae of Turkey and exiled.

Fall of the Empire

Departure of Mehmed VI, last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 1922.

The Fall of the Ottoman Empire can be attributed to the failure of its economic structure;
the size of the Empire created difficulties in economically integrating its diverse regions.
[citation needed]
Also, the Empire’s communication technology was not developed enough to
reach all territories. In many ways, the circumstances surrounding the Ottoman Empire’s
fall closely paralleled those surrounding the Decline of the Roman Empire, particularly in
terms of the ongoing tensions between the Empire’s different ethnic groups, and the
various governments’ inability to deal with these tensions. In the case of the Ottomans,
the introduction of increased cultural rights, civil liberties and a parliamentary system
during the Tanzimat proved too late to reverse the nationalistic and secessionist trends
that had already been set in motion since the early 19th century.

Ottoman descendants during and after the exile

In 1974, descendants of the dynasty were granted the right to acquire Turkish citizenship
by the Grand National Assembly, and were notified that they could apply. Mehmed
Orhan, son of Prince Mehmed Abdul Kadir of the Ottoman Empire, died in 1994, leaving
the grandson of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II, Ertugrul Osman, as the eldest surviving
member of the deposed dynasty. Osman for many years refused to carry a Turkish
passport, calling himself a citizen of the Ottoman Empire. Despite this attitude, he put the
matter of an Ottoman restoration to rest when he told an interviewer “no” to the question
of whether or not he wished the Ottoman Empire to be restored. In fact, he was quoted as
saying that “democracy works well in Turkey.” He returned to Turkey for the first time
since the exile in 1992, and became a Turkish citizen with a Turkish passport in 2002.[57]
On 23 September 2009, Osman died at the age of 97 in Istanbul, being the last surviving
heir to the deposed Ottoman throne. At the end of the Empire, he was 4th in line to the
throne as Imperial Highness Prince Shehzade Ertugrul Osman Effendi, and with his death
the last of the line born under the Ottoman Empire was extinguished. In Turkey, Osman
was known as “the last Ottoman”.[58] Bayezid Osman, the second son of the Sultan
Abdülmecid I’s younger grandson, Ibrahim Tevfik, is now the current eldest surviving
member of the former ruling dynasty.[59]

Economy
Ottoman government deliberately pursued a policy for the development of Bursa, Edirne
(Adrianople) and Constantinople, successive Ottoman capitals, into major commercial
and industrial centres, considering that merchants and artisans were indispensable in
creating a new metropolis.[60] To this end, Mehmed and his successor Bayezid, also
encouraged and welcomed migration of the Jews from different parts of Europe, who
were settled in Constantinople and other port cities like Salonica. In many places in
Europe, Jews were suffering persecution at the hands of their Christian counterparts. The
tolerance displayed by the Ottomans was welcomed by the immigrants. The Ottoman
economic mind was closely related to the basic concepts of state and society in the
Middle East in which the ultimate goal of a state was consolidation and extension of the
ruler’s power, and the way to reach it was to get rich resources of revenues by making the
productive classes prosperous.[61] The ultimate aim was to increase the state revenues as
much as possible without damaging the prosperity of subjects to prevent the emergence
of social disorder and to keep the traditional organization of the society intact.

Bankalar Caddesi (Banks Street) in Galata was the financial center of the Ottoman
Empire. The Ottoman Central Bank is the first building at right.

The organization of the treasury and chancery were developed under the Ottoman Empire
more than any other Islamic government and, until the 17th century, they were the leading
organization among all of their contemporaries.[62] This organization developed a scribal
bureaucracy (known as “men of the pen”) as a distinct group, partly highly trained ulema,
which developed into a professional body.[62] The effectiveness of this professional
financial body stands behind the success of many great Ottoman statesmen.[63] The
economic structure of the Empire was defined by its geopolitical structure. The Ottoman
Empire stood between the West and the East, thus blocking the land route eastward and
forcing Spanish and Portuguese navigators to set sail in search of a new route to the
Orient. The Empire controlled the spice route that Marco Polo once used. When Vasco da
Gama bypassed Ottoman controlled routes and established direct trade links with India in
1498, and Christopher Columbus first journeyed to the Bahamas in 1492, the Ottoman
Empire was at its zenith, an economic power that extended over three continents. Modern
Ottoman studies think that the change in relations between the Ottomans and central
Europe was caused by the opening of the new sea routes. It is possible to see the decline
in the significance of the land routes to the East as Western Europe opened the ocean
routes that bypassed the Middle East and Mediterranean as parallel to the decline of the
Ottoman Empire itself. The Anglo-Ottoman Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Balta
Liman that opened the Ottoman markets directly to English and French competitors,
would be seen as one of the staging posts along this development.

By developing commercial centres and routes, encouraging people to extend the area of
cultivated land in the country and international trade through its dominions, the state
performed basic economic functions in the Empire. But in all this the financial and
political interests of the state were dominant. Within the social and political system they
were living in Ottoman administrators could not have comprehended or seen the
desirability of the dynamics and principles of the capitalist and mercantile economies
developing in Western Europe.[64]

State
The state organisation of the Ottoman Empire was a very simple system that had two
main dimensions: the military administration and the civil administration. The Sultan was
the highest position in the system. The civil system was based on local administrative
units based on the region’s characteristics. The Ottomans practiced a system in which the
state (as in the Byzantine Empire) had control over the clergy. Certain pre-Islamic
Turkish traditions that had survived the adoption of administrative and legal practices
from Islamic Iran remained important in Ottoman administrative circles.[65] According to
Ottoman understanding, the state’s primary responsibility was to defend and extend the
land of the Muslims and to ensure security and harmony within its borders within the
overarching context of orthodox Islamic practice and dynastic sovereignty.[citation needed]

The “Ottoman dynasty” or, as an institution, “House of Osman” was unprecedented and
unequaled in the Islamic world for its size and duration.[66] The Ottoman dynasty was
ethnically Turkish in its origins, as were some of its supporters and subjects, however the
dynasty immediately lost this “Turkic” identification through intermarriage with many
different ethnicities.[67] On eleven occasions, the sultan was deposed because he was
perceived by his enemies as a threat to the state. There were only two attempts in the
whole of Ottoman history to unseat the ruling Osmanlı dynasty,[citation needed] both failures,
which is suggestive of a political system that for an extended period was able to manage
its revolutions without unnecessary instability.[vague]

The highest position in Islam, caliphate, was claimed by the sultan which was established
as Ottoman Caliphate. The Ottoman sultan, pâdişâh or “lord of kings”, served as the
Empire’s sole regent and was considered to be the embodiment of its government, though
he did not always exercise complete control. The Imperial Harem was one of the most
important powers of the Ottoman court. It was ruled by the Valide Sultan. On occasion,
the Valide Sultan would become involved in state politics. For a period of time the
women of the Harem effectively controlled the state in what was termed the “Sultanate of
Women”. New sultans were always chosen from among the sons of the previous sultan.
The strong educational system of the palace school geared towards eliminating the unfit
potential heirs, and establishing support amongst the ruling elite for a successor. The
palace schools, which would also educate the future administrators of the state, were not
a single track. First, the Madrasa (Ottoman Turkish: Medrese) was designated for the
Muslims, and educated scholars and state officials in accordance with Islamic tradition.
The financial burden of the Medrese was supported by vakifs, allowing children of poor
families to move to higher social levels and income.[68] The second track was a free
boarding school for the Christians, the Enderûn, which recruited 3,000 students annually
from Christian boys between eight and twenty years old from one in forty families among
the communities settled in Rumelia and/or the Balkans, a process known as Devshirmeh
(Devşirme).[69]

Though the sultan was the supreme monarch, the sultan’s political and executive
authority was delegated. The politics of the state had a number of advisors and ministers
gathered around a council known as Divan (after the 17th century it was renamed the
“Porte”). The Divan, in the years when the Ottoman state was still a Beylik, was
composed of the elders of the tribe. Its composition was later modified to include military
officers and local elites (such as religious and political advisors). Later still, beginning in
1320, a Grand Vizier was appointed in order to assume certain of the sultan’s
responsibilities. The Grand Vizier had considerable independence from the sultan with
almost unlimited powers of appointment, dismissal and supervision. Beginning with the
late 16th century, sultans withdrew from politics and the Grand Vizier became the de
facto head of state.[62]

Throughout Ottoman history, there were many instances in which local governors acted
independently, and even in opposition to the ruler. After the Young Turk Revolution of
1908, the Ottoman state became a constitutional monarchy. The sultan no longer had
executive powers. A parliament was formed, with representatives chosen from the
provinces. The representatives formed the Imperial Government of the Ottoman Empire.

The rapidly expanding empire used loyal, skilled subjects to manage the Empire, whether
Albanians, Phanariot Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, Bosniaks, Hungarians or others. The
incorporation of Greeks (and other Christians), Muslims, and Jews revolutionized its
administrative system.[70]

This eclectic administration was apparent even in the diplomatic correspondence of the
Empire, which was initially undertaken in the Greek language to the west.[67]

The Tughra were calligraphic monograms, or signatures, of the Ottoman Sultans, of


which there were 35. Carved on the Sultan’s seal, they bore the names of the Sultan and
his father. The prayer/statement “ever victorious” was also present in most. The earliest
belonged to Orhan Gazi. The ornately stylized Tughra spawned a branch of Ottoman-
Turkish calligraphy.

Society
One of the successes of the social structure of the Ottoman Empire was the unity that it
brought about among its highly varied populations through an organization named as
millets. The Millets were the major religious groups that were allowed to establish their
own communities under Ottoman rule. The Millets were established by retaining their
own religious laws, traditions, and language under the general protection of the sultan.
Plurality was the key to the longevity of the Empire. As early as the reign of Mehmed II,
extensive rights were granted to Phanariot Greeks, and Jews were invited to settle in
Ottoman territory. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire’s relatively high degree of tolerance
for ethnic differences proved to be one of its greatest strengths in integrating the new
regions but this non-assimilative policy became a weakness after the rise of nationalism.
The dissolution of the Empire based on ethnic differentiation (balkanization) brought the
final end which the failed Ottomanism among the citizens and participatory politics of the
first or the constitutional Era had successfully addressed.

The lifestyle of the Ottoman Empire was a mixture of western and eastern life. One
unique characteristic of Ottoman life style was it was very fragmented. The millet
concept generated this fragmentation and enabled many to coexist in a mosaic of cultures.
The capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople also had a unique culture, mainly
because prior to Ottoman rule it had been the seat of both the Roman and Byzantine
Empires. The lifestyle in the Ottoman court in many aspects assembled ancient traditions
of the Persian Shahs, but had many Greek and European influences. The culture that
evolved around the Ottoman court was known as the Ottoman Way, which was
epitomized with the Topkapı Palace. There were also large metropolitan centers where
the Ottoman influence expressed itself with a diversity similar to metropolises of today:
Sarajevo, Skopje, Thessaloniki, Dimashq, Baghdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Makkah and
Algiers with their own small versions of Ottoman Provincial Administration replicating
the culture of the Ottoman court locally. The seraglio, which were the non-imperial
places, in the context of the Turkish fashion, became the subject of works of art, where
non-imperial prince or referring to other grand houses built around courtyards.

Slavery in the Ottoman Empire was a part of Ottoman society.[71] As late as 1908 women
slaves were still sold in the Empire.[72] During the 19th century the Empire came under
pressure from Western European countries to outlaw the practice. Policies developed by
various Sultans throughout the 19th century attempted to curtail the slave trade but, since
slavery did have centuries of religious backing and sanction, they could never directly
abolish the institution outright — as had gradually happened in Western Europe and the
Americas.

The exact population of the Ottoman Empire is a matter of considerable debate, due to
the scantness and ambiguous nature of the primary sources. The following table contains
approximate estimates. The figures from 1831 onwards are official census results, but the
censuses did not cover the whole population. For example, the 1831 census only counted
men and did not cover the whole empire.

Year Population

1520 11,692,480[73]

1566 15,000,000[74]

1683 30,000,000[75]
1831 7,230,660[73]

1856 35,350,000[73]

1881 17,388,604[73]

1906 20,884,000[73]

1914 18,520,000

1919 14,629,000

Culture
The Ottoman Empire had filled roughly the territories around the Mediterranean Sea and
Black Sea while adopting the traditions, art and institutions of cultures in these regions
and adding new dimensions to them. Many different cultures lived under the umbrella of
the Ottoman Empire, and as a result, a specifically “Ottoman” culture can be difficult to
define, except for those of the regional centers and capital. However, there was also, to a
great extent, a specific melding of cultures that can be said to have reached its highest
levels among the Ottoman elite, who were composed of myriad ethnic and religious
groups. This multicultural perspective of “millets” was reflected in the Ottoman State’s
multi-cultural and multi-religious policies. As the Ottomans moved further west, the
Ottoman leaders absorbed some of the culture of the conquered regions. Intercultural
marriages also played their part in creating the characteristic Ottoman elite culture. When
compared to the Turkish folk culture, the influence of these new cultures in creating the
culture of the Ottoman elite was very apparent.

Selimiye Mosque was the masterpiece of Mimar Sinan, chief architect of Sultans Selim I,
Suleiman the Magnificent, Selim II and Murad III.

“Ottoman architecture” was influenced by Persian, Byzantine Greek and Islamic


architectures. The Ottoman architecture are a continuation of the pre-Islamic Sassanid
architecture. For instance, the dome covered square, which had been a dominant form in
Sassanid became the nucleus of all Ottoman architecture.[76][77] During the Rise period the
early or first Ottoman architecture period, the Ottoman art was in search of new ideas.
The growth period of the Empire become the classical period of architecture, which
Ottoman art was at its most confident. During the years of the Stagnation period,
Ottoman architecture moved away from this style however.

During the Tulip Era, it was under the influence of the highly ornamented styles of
Western Europe; Baroque, Rococo, Empire and other styles intermingled. Concepts of
Ottoman architecture mainly circle around the mosque. The mosque was integral to
society, city planning and communal life. Besides the mosque, it is also possible to find
good examples of Ottoman architecture in soup kitchens, theological schools, hospitals,
Turkish baths and tombs.

Safranbolu was inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1994 due to its well-
preserved Ottoman residential architecture.

Examples of Ottoman architecture of the classical period, aside from Istanbul and Edirne,
can also be seen in Egypt, Eritrea, Tunisia, Algiers, the Balkans and Hungary, where
mosques, bridges, fountains and schools were built. The art of Ottoman decoration
developed with a multitude of influences due to the wide ethnic range of the Ottoman
Empire. The greatest of the court artisans enriched the Ottoman Empire with many
pluralistic artistic influences: such as mixing traditional Byzantine art with elements of
Chinese art.[78]

“Ottoman Turkish language” was a variety of Turkish, highly influenced by Persian and
Arabic. Ottomans had three influential languages; Turkish, Persian, Arabic but they did
not have a parallel status. Throughout the vast Ottoman bureaucracy and, in particular,
within the Ottoman court in later times, a version of Turkish was spoken, albeit with a
vast mixture of both Arabic and Persian grammar and vocabulary. If the basic grammar
was still largely Turkish, the inclusion of virtually any word in Arabic or Persian in
Ottoman made it a language that was essentially incomprehensible to any Ottoman
subject who had not mastered Arabic, Persian or both.

The two varieties of the language became extremely differentiated and this resulted in a
low literacy rate among the general public (about 2–3% until the early 19th century and
just about 15% at the end of 19th century). Consequently, ordinary people had to hire
special “request-writers” (arzıhâlcis) in order to be able to communicate with the
government. The ethnic groups continued to speak within their families and
neighborhoods (mahalles) with their own languages (e.g., Jews, Greeks, Armenians, etc.)
In villages where two or more populations lived together, the inhabitants would often
speak each other’s language. In cosmopolitan cities, people often spoke their family
languages, some Ottoman or Persian if they were educated, and some Arabic if they were
Muslim. In the last two centuries, French and English emerged as popular languages,
especially among the Christian Levantine communities. The elite learned French at
school, and used European products as a fashion statement. The use of Turkish grew
steadily under the Ottomans, but, since they were still interested in their two other official
languages, they kept these in use as well. Usage of these came to be limited, though, and
specific: Persian served mainly as a literary language, while Arabic was used solely for
religious rites. At this time many famous Persian poets emerged.

Topkapı Palace was the official and primary residence of the Ottoman Sultans from 1465
to 1856, the year when Sultan Abdülmecid I moved to the Dolmabahçe Palace.

“Ottoman classical music” was an important part of the education of the Ottoman elite, a
number of the Ottoman sultans were accomplished musicians and composers themselves,
such as Selim III, whose compositions are still frequently performed today. Ottoman
classical music arose largely from a confluence of Byzantine music, Arabic music, and
Persian music. Compositionally, it is organised around rhythmic units called usul, which
are somewhat similar to meter in Western music, and melodic units called makam, which
bear some resemblance to Western musical modes. The instruments used are a mixture of
Anatolian and Central Asian instruments (the saz, the bağlama, the kemence), other
Middle Eastern instruments (the ud, the tanbur, the kanun, the ney), and — later in the
tradition — Western instruments (the violin and the piano). Because of a geographic and
cultural divide between the capital and other areas, two broadly distinct styles of music
arose in the Ottoman Empire: Ottoman classical music, and folk music. In the provinces,
several different kinds of Folk music were created. The most dominant regions with their
distinguished musical styles are: Balkan-Thracian Türküs, North-Eastern (Laz) Türküs,
Aegean Türküs, Central Anatolian Türküs, Eastern Anatolian Türküs, and Caucasian
Türküs. Some of the distinctive styles were: Janissary Music, Roma music, Belly dance,
Turkish folk music.

“Ottoman cuisine” refers to the cuisine of the capital — Constantinople, and the regional
capital cities, where the melting pot of cultures created a common cuisine that all the
populations enjoyed. This diverse cuisine was honed in the Imperial Palace’s kitchens by
chefs brought from certain parts of the Empire to create and experiment with different
ingredients. The creations of the Ottoman Palace’s kitchens filtered to the population, for
instance through Ramadan events, and through the cooking at the Yalıs of the Pashas, and
from there on spread to the rest of the population. Today, Ottoman cuisine lives in the
Balkans, Anatolia and the Middle East, “common heirs to what was once the Ottoman
life-style, and their cuisines offer treacherous circumstantial evidence of this fact”.[79] It is
typical of any great cuisine in the world to be based on local varieties and on mutual
exchange and enrichment among them, but at the same time to be homogenized and
harmonized by a metropolitan tradition of refined taste.[79]

Numerous traditions and cultural traits of this previous empire (in fields such as
architecture, cuisine, music, leisure and government) were adopted by the Ottomans, who
elaborated them into new forms and blended them with the characteristics of the ethnic
and religious groups living within the Ottoman territories, which resulted in a new and
distinctively Ottoman cultural identity.

Religion
Before adopting Islam — a process that was greatly facilitated by the Abbasid victory at
the 751 Battle of Talas, which ensured Abbasid influence in Central Asia — the Turkic
peoples practiced a variety of shamanism. After this battle, many of the various Turkic
tribes — including the Oghuz Turks, who were the ancestors of both the Seljuks and the
Ottomans — gradually converted to Islam, and brought the religion with them to Anatolia
beginning in the 11th century.

The Ottoman Empire was, in principle, tolerant towards Christians and Jews (the “Ahl
Al-Kitab”, or “People of the Book”, according to the Qu’ran) but not towards the
polytheists, in accordance with the Sharia law. Such tolerance was subject to a non-
Muslim tax, the Jizya.

Under the millet system, non-Muslim people were considered subjects of the Empire, but
were not subject to the Muslim faith or Muslim law. The Orthodox millet, for instance,
was still officially legally subject to Justinian’s Code, which had been in effect in the
Byzantine Empire for 900 years. Also, as the largest group of non-Muslim subjects (or
zimmi) of the Islamic Ottoman state, the Orthodox millet was granted a number of special
privileges in the fields of politics and commerce, in addition to having to pay higher taxes
than Muslim subjects.[80],[81]

The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II allowed the local Christians to stay in Constantinople
after conquering the city in 1453, and to retain their institutions such as the Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate.

In 1461 Sultan Mehmed II established the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople.


Previously, the Byzantines considered the Armenian Church as heretical and thus did not
allow them to build churches inside the walls of Constantinople. In 1492, when the
Muslims and Sephardic Jews were expelled from Spain during the Spanish Inquisition,
the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II sent his fleet under Kemal Reis to save them and granted
the refugees the right to settle in the Ottoman Empire.

The state’s relationship with the Greek Orthodox Church was largely peaceful, and
recurrent oppressive measures taken against the Greek church were a deviation from
generally established practice. The church’s structure was kept intact and largely left
alone but under close control and scrutiny until the Greek War of Independence of 1821–
1829 and, later in the 19th century, the rise of the Ottoman constitutional monarchy,
which was driven to some extent by nationalistic currents, tried to be balanced with
Ottomanism. Other Orthodox churches, like the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, were
dissolved and placed under the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate; until
Sultan Abdülaziz established the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 and reinstated the
autonomy of the Bulgarian Church.

Similar millets were established for the Ottoman Jewish community, who were under the
authority of the Haham Başı or Ottoman Chief Rabbi; the Armenian Orthodox
community, who were under the authority of a head bishop; and a number of other
religious communities as well.
Law
The Ottoman legal system accepted the religious law over its subjects. The Ottoman
Empire was always organized around a system of local jurisprudence. Legal
administration in the Ottoman Empire was part of a larger scheme of balancing central
and local authority.[82] Ottoman power revolved crucially around the administration of the
rights to land, which gave a space for the local authority develop the needs of the local
millet.[82] The jurisdictional complexity of the Ottoman Empire was aimed to permit the
integration of culturally and religiously different groups.[82] The Ottoman system had
three court systems: one for Muslims, one for non-Muslims, involving appointed Jews
and Christians ruling over their respective religious communities, and the “trade court”.
The entire system was regulated from above by means of the administrative Kanun, i.e.
laws, a system based upon the Turkic Yasa and Töre which were developed in the pre-
Islamic era. The kanun law system, on the other hand, was the secular law of the sultan,
and dealt with issues not clearly addressed by the sharia system.

These court categories were not, however, wholly exclusive in nature: for instance, the
Islamic courts — which were the Empire’s primary courts — could also be used to settle
a trade conflict or disputes between litigants of differing religions, and Jews and
Christians often went to them so as to obtain a more forceful ruling on an issue. The
Ottoman state tended not to interfere with non-Muslim religious law systems, despite
legally having a voice to do so through local governors. The Islamic Sharia law system
had been developed from a combination of the Qur’ān; the Hadīth, or words of the
prophet Muhammad; ijmā’, or consensus of the members of the Muslim community;
qiyas, a system of analogical reasoning from previous precedents; and local customs.
Both systems were taught at the Empire’s law schools, which were in Constantinople and
Bursa.

Tanzimat reforms, had a drastic effect on the law system. In 1877, the civil law
(excepting family law) was codified in the Mecelle code. Later codifications covered
commercial law, penal law and civil procedure.

Military
The first military unit of the Ottoman State was an army that was organized by Osman I
from the tribesmen inhabiting western Anatolia in the late 13th century. The military
system became an intricate organization with the advance of the Empire. The Ottoman
military was a complex system of recruiting and fief-holding. The main corps of the
Ottoman Army included Janissary, Sipahi, Akıncı and Mehterân. The Ottoman army was
once among the most advanced fighting forces in the world, being one of the first to
employ muskets and cannons. The Ottomans began using falcons, which were short but
wide cannons, during the Siege of Constantinople (1422). The Ottoman cavalry depended
on high speed and mobility rather than heavy armour, using bows and short swords on
fast Turkoman and Arabian horses (progenitors of the Thoroughbred racing horse);[83][84]
and often applied tactics similar to those of the Mongol Empire, such as pretending to
retreat while surrounding the enemy forces inside a crescent-shaped formation and then
making the real attack. The decline in the army’s performance became evident from the
mid 17th century and after the Great Turkish War. The 18th century saw some limited
success against Venice, but in the north the European-style Russian armies forced the
Ottomans to concede land. The modernization of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century
started with the military. In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II abolished the Janissary corps and
established the modern Ottoman army. He named them as the Nizam-ı Cedid (New
Order). The Ottoman army was also the first institution to hire foreign experts and send
its officers for training in western European countries. Consequently, the Young Turks
movement first began when these relatively young and newly trained men returned with
their education.

The Ottoman Navy vastly contributed to the expansion of the Empire’s territories on the
European continent. It initiated the conquest of North Africa, with the addition of Algeria
and Egypt to the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Starting with the loss of Algeria (1830) and
Greece (1821), Ottoman naval power and control over the Empire’s distant overseas
territories began to decline. Sultan Abdülaziz (reigned 1861–1876) attempted to
reestablish a strong Ottoman navy, building the largest fleet after those of Britain and
France. The shipyard at Barrow, United Kingdom built its first submarine in 1886 for the
Ottoman Empire.[85] However, the collapsing Ottoman economy could not sustain the
fleet’s strength for too long. Sultan Abdülhamid II distrusted the admirals who sided with
the reformist Midhat Pasha, and claimed that the large and expensive fleet was of no use
against the Russians during the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). He locked most of the
fleet inside the Golden Horn, where the ships decayed for the next 30 years. Following
the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress sought to
develop a strong Ottoman naval force. The Ottoman Navy Foundation was established in
1910 in order to purchase new ships through public donations.

The Ottoman Air Force

The Ottoman Air Force was founded in June 1909, making it one of the first combat
aviation organizations in the world. The Ottoman Empire started preparing its first pilots
and planes, and with the founding of the Hava Okulu (Air Academy) in Constantinople
on July 3, 1912, the Empire began to tutor its own flight officers. The founding of the Air
Academy quickened advancement in the military aviation program, increased the number
of enlisted persons within it, and gave the new pilots an active role in the Armed Forces.
In May 1913 the world’s first specialized Reconnaissance Training Program was
activated by the Air Academy and the first separate Reconnaissance division was
established by the Air Force. In June 1914 a new military academy, Deniz Hava Okulu
(Naval Aviation Academy) was founded. With the outbreak of World War I, the
modernization process stopped abruptly. The Ottoman Air Force fought on many fronts
during World War I, from Galicia in the west to the Caucasus in the east and Yemen in
the south.

Footnotes

1. ^ Finkel, Caroline, Osman’s Dream, (Basic Books, 2005), 57; “Istanbul was only adopted as the city’s official name
in 1930..”.
2. ^ http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne ;
ARTICLE 91
All grants of patents and registrations of trade-marks, as well as all registrations of transfers or assignments of patents
or trade marks which have been duly made since the 30th October, 1918, by the Imperial Ottoman Government at
Istanbul or elsewhere..
3. ^ The Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) afforded a small existence to the Ottoman Empire. The abolishment of the
Ottoman Sultanate on November 1, 1922 did not end the Ottoman State, but only the Ottoman dynasty. The official
end of the Ottoman State was declared through the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). It recognized the new
“Ankara government”, and not the old Constantinople-based Ottoman government, as representing the rightful owner
and successor state. The Constantinople-based government was practically headless after the sultan left the capital.
The TBMM declared the successor state to be the “Republic of Turkey” (October 29, 1923).
4. ^ Ottoman banknote with Arabic script
5. ^ The Sultanate was abolished on November 1, 1922. Mehmed VI, the last Ottoman Sultan, departed from
Constantinople on November 17, 1922.
6. ^ With the Treaty of Lausanne (signed on July 24, 1923) the new Turkish State (still not a Republic, which was
proclaimed later on October 29, 1923) headquartered in Ankara is internationally recognized as the successor to the
Ottoman State.
7. ^ Full text of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)
8. ^ From the article on the Ottoman Empire in Oxford Islamic Studies Online
9. ^ Turkish Navy Official Website: “Atlantik’te Türk Denizciliği”
10. ^ Glasse, Cyril, New Encyclopedia of Islam, (Rowman Altamira, 2003), 229.
11. ^ Finkel, Caroline, Osman’s Dream, (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 57.
12. ^ Brown, Leon Carl, Imperial Legacy, (Columbia University Press, 1997), 1.
13. ^ (Turkish) Sultan Osman I, Turkish Ministry of Culture website
14. ^ Karpat, Kemal H. (1974). The Ottoman state and its place in world history. Leiden: Brill. pp. 111. ISBN 90-04-
03945-7.
15. ^ Savory, R. M. (1960). “The Principal Offices of the Ṣafawid State during the Reign of Ismā’īl I (907-30/1501-24)”.
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 23 (1): 91–105. doi:10.2307/609888.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0041-977X%281960%2923%3A1%3C91%3ATPOOTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B.
16. ^ Hess, Andrew C. (January 1973). “The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginning of the Sixteenth-
Century World War”. International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1): 55–76. doi:10.2307/162225.
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-7438%28197301%294%3A1%3C55%3ATOCOE%28%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23.
17. ^ Encyclopaedia Britannica
18. ^ Encyclopaedia Britannica
19. ^ Imber, 50.
20. ^ L. Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, 206
21. ^ Mansel, 61
22. ^ Imber, 53.
23. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.64–65.
24. ^ The Crimean Tatars and their Russian-Captive Slaves. Eizo Matsuki, Mediterranean Studies Group at Hitotsubashi
University.
25. ^ Kinross, 272.
a b

26. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.67.


27. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.71
28. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.96.
29. ^ Inalcik, An Economic And Social History Of The Ottoman Empire, Vol 1 1300–1600 p.24.
30. ^ L. Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, 281
31. ^ Leslie P. Peirce, The imperial harem: women and sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire and Morality tales: law and
gender in the Ottoman court of Aintab.
32. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.74–75.
33. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.77–81.
34. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.80–81.
35. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.81–82.
36. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.84.
37. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.73.
38. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.83–84.
39. ^ Berend, Tibor Iván, History derailed: Central and Eastern Europe in the long nineteenth century, (University of
California Press Ltd, 2003), 127.
40. ^ “Hijra and Forced Migration from Nineteenth-Century Russia to the Ottoman Empire”, by Bryan Glynn Williams,
Cahiers du Monde russe, 41/1, 2000, pp. 79–108.
41. ^ By the early 19 century, as many as 45% of the islanders may have been Muslim.
th

42. ^ Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922, Princeton, N.J: Darwin
Press, c1995
43. ^ Barsoumian, Hagop. “The Eastern Question and the Tanzimat Era” in The Armenian People From Ancient to
Modern Times, Volume II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century. Richard
G. Hovannisian (ed.) New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 198. ISBN 0-3121-0168-6.
44. ^ See Hovanissian, Richard G. “The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1914” in The Armenian
People From Ancient to Modern Times, Volume II, pp. 203–238.
45. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica: Armenian massacres (Turkish-Armenian history)
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46. ^ Akcam, Taner. A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility. New York:
Metropolitan Books, 2006 p. 42 ISBN 0-8050-7932-7
47. ^ Greek and Turkish refugees and deportees 1912–1924. Universiteit Leiden.
48. ^ Jastrow, Morris, The War and the Bagdad Railroad (1917) ASIN B0006D8OSQ
49. ^ Spencer Tucker, ed. Encyclopedia of World War I (2005) p 1080
50. ^ Balakian, Peter. The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response. New York: Perennial,
2003. ISBN 0-0601-9840-0
51. ^ Walker, Christopher J. “World War I and the Armenian Genocide” in The Armenian People From Ancient to
Modern Times, Volume II, pp. 239–273.
52. ^ Akcam. A Shameful Act, pp. 109–204.
53. ^ Toynbee, Arnold J., The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16: Documents presented to
Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs By Viscount Bryce. New York and London:
G.P.Putnam’s Sons, for His Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1916, p. 650.
54. ^ Charny, Israel et al. A Letter from The International Association of Genocide Scholars. International Association of
Genocide Scholars. June 13, 2005. Accessed September 12, 2009.
55. ^ See Marashlian, Levon. Politics and Demography: Armenians, Turks, and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire.
Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1991.
56. ^ Mustafa Kemal Pasha’s speech on his arrival in Ankara in November 1919
57. ^ “Political Obituaries: Ertugrul Osman”. The Daily Telegraph. 2009-09-27.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/6237121/Ertugrul-Osman.html. Retrieved 2009-10-26.
58. ^ “’Last Ottoman’ dies in Istanbul”. BBC. 2009-09-24. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8273396.stm. Retrieved
2009-09-24.
59. ^ “Atatürk hayatımızı kurtardı (in Turkish)”. Vatan. 2009-10-03.
http://haber.gazetevatan.com/Ataturk_hayatimizi_kurtardi/262639/1/Gundem. Retrieved 2009-10-26.
60. ^ Halil İnalcık, Studies in the economic history of the Middle East : from the rise of Islam to the present day / edited
by M. A. Cook. London University Press, Oxford U.P. 1970, p. 209 ISBN 0197135617
61. ^ Halil İnalcık, Studies in the economic history of the Middle East : from the rise of Islam to the present day / edited
by M. A. Cook. London University Press, Oxford U.P. 1970, p. 217 ISBN 0197135617
62. ^ a b c
Antony Black (2001), “The state of the House of Osman (devlet-ı al-ı Osman)” in The History of Islamic
Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present, p. 199
63. ^ Halil İnalcık, Donald Quataert (1971), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, p. 120
64. ^ Halil inalcik, Studies in the economic history of the Middle East : from the rise of Islam to the present day / edited
by M. A. Cook. London University Press, Oxford U.P. 1970, p. 218 ISBN 0197135617
65. ^ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition p.38.
66. ^ Antony Black, ibid, page 197
67. ^ Donald Quataert, 2
a b

68. ^ Bernard Lewis, Istanbul and the civilization of the Ottoman Empire, p151
69. ^ Kemal H Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis, p204
70. ^ The History of Turkish-Jewish Relations
71. ^ Supply of Slaves
72. ^ Islam and slavery: Sexual slavery
73. ^ a b c d e
M. Kabadayı, Inventory for the Ottoman Empire / Turkish Republic 1500–2000
74. ^ L. Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, 206
75. ^ L. Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, 281
76. ^ Von Gabriel Piterberg, An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play, pp.98–103, Books.Google.de
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78. ^ Eli Shah. The Ottoman Artistic Legacy
79. ^ Bert Fragner, “From the Caucasus to the Roof of the World: a culinary adventure”, in Sami Zubaida and Richard
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Tapper, A Taste of Thyme: Culinary Cultures of the Middle East, London and New York, p. 52
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Peninsula”, Sean Krummerich, Loyola University New Orleans, The Student Historical Journal, volume 30 (1998–99
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83. ^ Milner The Godolphin Arabian pp. 3–6


84. ^ Wall Famous Running Horses p. 8
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