The Case For TAA
The Case For TAA
The Case For TAA
February 2015
For professional investors
617-531-9773
www.thinknewfound.com
info@thinknewfound.com
617-531-9773
thinknewfound.com
info@thinknewfound.com
These variables mean that the order of market returns is perhaps more
important than the long-term average in determining investment
outcomes. In the short-term, markets can, and will be turbulent: The
annual returns for the S&P 500 Index, on average, differ from the longrun average by 14%. The result? An historical 27% probability that $1
invested in the S&P 500 Index would be worth less than $1, in realterms, ten years later. For example, in the graph below, we can see that
$1 invested in almost anytime from 1965 1973 stood a good chance
of being worth less than $1 a decade later. These are material risks that
can steer everyday investors off-course. Nor do they even account for
the emotional turmoil (and thus worse decision making) caused by
market volatility.
The traditional remedy for these concerns has been diversification, but
as we will see in the next section, the concept on its own is by no
means a panacea.
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Annualized Return
S&P 500
Annualized Volatility
60/40
paying an insurance premium for ten years for one year of protection. In
the long run, the thesis of diversification is that the asymmetric trade-off
between premium paid versus risk mitigation works out in the favor of
long-term total return.
From this perspective and at this point in market history, there are three
primary issues facing diversification going forward.
1) The Premium is Getting More Expensive
One of the unique realities of the last 20 years has been the bull
market in U.S. Treasuries due to declining interest rates. This
trend has created an environment whereby our risk mitigator was
also a tremendous return generator. This made a 60/40 portfolio
an incredibly attractive investment profile.
However, this reality was not always the case. Older investors
will remember a very different interest rate environment whereby
the use of the risk mitigator within the portfolio came with a hefty
premium. From 1963 to late 1981, a constant maturity index of
10-year U.S. Treasuries had an annualized loss of 3.15%.
Diversification was certainly not free.
Annualized Return & Volatility (1/1963 - 9/1981)
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
-2%
-4%
-6%
Annualized Return
S&P 500
Annualized Volatility
60/40
18%
With a few simplifying
assumptions, it can be
demonstrated that the expected
return of a constant-maturity
bond index is equal to current
on-the-run bond yields; we see
this theoretical relationship play
out in the high degree of
correlation between the starting
period bond yields and forward
10-year annualized returns for 10year U.S. Treasuries.
16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
Conclusion
While a well-diversified, strategic asset allocation should serve as the
basis for any investors investment policy, current economic and market
conditions may lead to the decreased effectiveness of diversification as
a risk mitigation tool. Low, and potentially rising, interest rates make
traditional diversifiers expensive, and rising and unstable correlations
mean that a static allocation is less likely to deliver a consistent risk
profile. We believe that a tactical asset allocation approach that can
dynamically react to emerging risks in the market can supplement
traditional versions of diversification and deliver a more consistent risk
profile. By smoothing out volatility (and the emotional reaction to it),
TAA may enable investors to carry more risk generating assets within
their portfolio, which can lead to increased total return over their
investment lifecycle.
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