Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp., Inc., 7 SCRA 276, February 27, 1963
Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp., Inc., 7 SCRA 276, February 27, 1963
Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp., Inc., 7 SCRA 276, February 27, 1963
the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila
Electric Co., 31 Phil. 47).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention of offended party in criminal action against
the carriers driver; Claim for civil indemnity only against the driver.If the offended
party, through a private prosecutor, was allowed to intervene in the criminal action
against the common carriers driver, the claim could have been against the
common driver but not against the common carrier who was not a party therein.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Acquittal of common carriers driver on reasonable
doubt; Civil action for damages against driver or carrier allowed.If in a criminal
action the common carriers driver is acquitted on reasonable doubt, a civil action
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278
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp., Inc.
for damages against him may be instituted for the same act or omission (Rule 107,
par. [d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the rule as against him, a fortiori it must
in the case of his employer.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lilio L. Amora and Peter L. Amora for plaintiffs-appellants.
Filemon B. Barria for defendant-appellee.
DIZON,J.:
In a complaint for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol by
appellants, the spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and Perpetua Besas and their minor
son, Jovito, against appellee, the Bohol Land Transportation Co., a domestic
corporation engaged in business as a common carrier in said province, they alleged,
in substance, that, in the afternoon of November 27, 1958, Jovito Bernaldes and his
brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellees passenger trucks (B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with
plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, bound for Tagbilaran of the same
province; that on the way the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio Balitbiton,
municipality of Garcia-Hernandez, of the said province, resulting in the death of
Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on two grounds, namely, that
the cause of action alleged therein was barred by a prior judgment, and that it did
not state a cause of action.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was established that in Criminal Case No.
2775 of the same court, Leonardo Balabag, driver of the bus involved in the
accident, was charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence but was
acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable
doubt, and that appellees, through Attys. Amora and Tirol, intervened in the
prosecution of said case and did not reserve the right to file a separate action for
damages.
Relying on the case of Maria C. Roa vs. Segunda de la Cruz, et al., G.R. No. L-13134,
promulgated February
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provisions of the Civil Code, and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it
being entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, the same may be
instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the result of the
latter. (Visayan Land Transportation Co. vs. Mejia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-8830, L-883739, 52 O.G. p. 4241)..
The civil action instituted against appellee in this case is based on alleged culpa
contractual incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes
and his brother Jovito to their place of destination, whereas the criminal action
instituted against appellees driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil
liability of the
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280
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp., Inc.
latter arising from his criminal negligence. In other words, appellants action
concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common carrier, regardless of the
liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case. Therefore, as held in
Parker, et al. vs. Panlilio, et al., (G.R. No. L-4961, March 5, 1952), the failure, on the
part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity against the
carrier can not in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a
separate action against the latter based on its contractual liability, or on culpa
aquiliana, under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. As a matter of fact, such
reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action to be
independent and separate from the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that
the duty of the offended party to make such reservation applies only to defendant in
the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable (Chaves, et al. vs. Manila
Electric, 31 Phil. 47).
True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene whether
properly or improperly we do not here decide in the criminal action against
appellees driver, but if that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their
claim for civil indemnity, the claim could have been only against the driver but not
against appellee who was not a party therein. As a matter of fact, however, inspite
of appellees statements to the contrary in its brief, there is no showing in the
record before Us that appellants made of record their claim for damages against the
driver or his employer; much less does it appear that they had attempted to prove
such damages. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision
concerning the civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be
due to the fact that the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil
indemnity.
Lastly, as appellees driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages against him may be instituted for the same act or omission (Rule 107, par.
[d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in
the case of his employer.
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