Taylor v. United States, The Et Al - Document No. 5
Taylor v. United States, The Et Al - Document No. 5
Taylor v. United States, The Et Al - Document No. 5
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The Plaintiff, Ruben Dwayne Taylor (hereafter, the “Plaintiff”), brought this pro se
action seeking to recover damages, alternatively, on a claim that his civil rights have been
violated and/or on the basis of the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organizations (RICO)
Act. The Plaintiff has also applied in this action to proceed without payment of filing fees under
28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 United States Code §636(b)(1)(B), and
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Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(b) and (e), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all
pretrial matters in such pro se cases and submit findings and recommendations to the District
Court.
PRO SE COMPLAINT
The Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction.
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F. 2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.
2d 1147 (4th 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Hughes v. Rowe, supra. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se
complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction means only
that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff
could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may
not construct the plaintiff’s legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.
1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of
§1915 SCREENING
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 a District Court may dismiss a pleading by an indigent and/or
pro se litigant upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be
made where the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992). Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless
legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Allison v.
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Kyle, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 1995). The court may dismiss a claim as "factually frivolous" under
§1915(e) if the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, supra. In making this
determination, the court is not bound to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s
allegations, but rather need only weigh the plaintiff’s factual allegations in his favor. Id.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint in this action is substantially the same as that filed in Taylor v. Womble,
et al., 3:03-3469-CMC-JRM (D.S.C. 2003). That case ended on February 7, 2005, with
judgment entered against the Plaintiff without issuance or service of process. The Plaintiff did
not file any appeal from the dismissal, and the judgment has now become final.
The Plaintiff complains of various South Carolina state court foreclosures and
debt-collection proceedings. He seems to allege that in these cases he was denied jury trials and
also denied representation by a non-lawyer. Alternatively, he suggests that all the Defendants
have conspired to transform South Carolina state courts into corrupt organizations.
More than twenty of the Defendants in this action are named as members of the South
Carolina Bar. Four of the twenty lawyers were parties defendant in the prior case. Most of them
represented opposing parties in the state court actions. The Plaintiff also names South Carolina
judges, former Governor Hodges and State Senator McConnell as attorneys. The incumbent
Richland County Treasurer, together with his predecessor, are sued. The remaining parties
The Plaintiff’s pleading is difficult to construe. His description of fourteen (14) previous
cases is fairly straightforward. That recitation, however, is then obscured by passages such as
the following:
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Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.) provides the following
Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for
the relief the pleader seeks.
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Disregard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) can result in dismissal with prejudice. See Michaelis v.
Nebraska State Bar Association, 717 F. 2d 437 (8th Cir. 1983). In Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R. D.
497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977), the Honorable John Sirica, United States District Judge for the District
prejudice:
The pleading filed by the plaintiff in this case is indeed a confused and rambling
narrative of charges and conclusions concerning numerous persons,
organizations and agencies. The complaint contains an untidy assortment of
claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully
distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments.
Nor has the plaintiff alleged with even modest particularity the dates and places
of the transactions of which he complains. It belabors the obvious to conclude
that the complaint filed in this action falls far short of the admittedly liberal
standard set in F.R. Civ. P. 8(a).
A careful review has been made of the Complaint in search of any meritorious claim
upon which this Court might grant relief that was not decided adversely in the Plaintiff’s prior
Over one hundred and twenty five years ago, the United States Supreme Court
summarized the doctrine of res judicata declaring that a final judgment becomes:
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). The Supreme Court restated this same
definition in the 1983 case of Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). The judicial
policies of economy, finality, and comity, which among others are served by the doctrine of res
judicata, require no further exposition in this Report. They are well settled in American
jurisprudence.
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The Fourth Circuit has on many occasions affirmed the elements governing prior
adjudication: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) an identity of the cause of
action in both the earlier and the later suit; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the
two suits. Andrews v. Daw, 201 F. 3d 521 (4th Cir. 2000); Jones v. SEC, 115 F. 3d 1173 (4th Cir.
19970; Vara Enterprises, Inc., v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough, 81 F. 3d 1310 (4th Cir.
1996); Young-Henderson v. Spartanburg Area Mental Health Center, 945 F. 770 (4th Cir. 1991);
Preclusion by way of collateral estoppel must also be considered in this context, since
there is not the complete identity of parties required by res judicata. Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147 (1979). Collateral estoppel – as claim preclusion – applies when the same cause of
action is brought in later litigation. This doctrine precludes assertion of any claim that was
actually adjudicated or that might have been presented. Vara Enterprises, Inc., v. Nelson,
Both these doctrines bar the Plaintiff from: (1) renewing the claims made in his prior
action against the defendants named therein; and (2) making his prior claims against the new
Defendants. In Taylor v. Womble, et al., supra, the Plaintiff’s claims against South Carolina
state court judges were dismissed on the basis of their judicial immunity. Quasi-judicial
immunity was applied to bar suits against such officials as the Richland County Clerk of Court.
Members of the South Carolina General Assembly, as well as the Governor of South Carolina,
were held immune from suit in the exercise of their official duties. Actions to collect taxes and
other court decisions were found not to be subject to review in this Court under the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine.1 Finally, it was held that the various private actors, such as banks and
automobile repair firms – including the attorneys named as defendants – were not amenable to
suit in this court because their alleged conduct did not occur under color of state law. None of
these legal principles have changed since the dismissal of Taylor v. Womble, et al, supra, two
months ago.
The Plaintiff has moved this Court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. §1915. The decision to permit a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §1915 rests in the sound
A district court has discretion to grant or deny an in forma pauperis petition filed under
§1915. Graham v. Riddle, 554 F. 2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977). This discretion, however, is
limited to a determination of “the poverty and good faith of the applicant and the
meritorious character of the cause in which the relief was asked.” Kinney v. Plymouth
Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46, 35 S. Ct. 236, 238, 59 L. Ed. 457 (1915). “In the
absence of some evident improper motive the applicant’s good faith is established by the
presentation of any issue that is not plainly frivolous.” Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S.
674, 78 S. Ct. 974, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (1958).
Dillard v. Liberty Loan Corp., 626 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1980). See also Liles v. South
Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 414 F.2d 612, 613 (4th Cir 1969); U. S. v. Gregg, 393 F.2d 722,
The Plaintiff’s Affidavit is incomplete, lacking the second page and any signature.
Although this defect could be cured, such action would be futile. Under Ellis, “good faith”
allows only for the presentation of issues that are not plainly frivolous. This action is plainly
duplicative of Taylor v. Womble, supra, and is barred by res judicata. Two United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal have affirmed the authority of district courts to dismiss duplicative cases as
1
- This doctrine derives from two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co, 263 U.S. 413, 66 L. Ed.
362, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303
(1983). See Allstate Insurance Company v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F. 3d 813 (4th Cir. 2000) for recent
application of the doctrine in the Fourth Circuit.
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“frivolous” under the provisions of (former) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), now codified as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). See Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F. 2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1988); Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F. 2d
1019 (5th Cir. 1988).2 Therefore, it is recommended that the Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed in
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore recommended that the within Complaint be dismissed without prejudice or,
in the alternative, that the Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied. The
Respectfully Submitted,
s/Joseph R. McCrorey
United States Magistrate Judge
April 19, 2005
Columbia, South Carolina
2
– The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cited Aziz with approval in an unpublished
opinion, Cottle v. Bell, 229 F. 3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000), 2000WL 1144623 (4th Cir. (N.C.)).
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The petitioner is hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation must
be filed within ten (10) days of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time
calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days
for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto,
and the case file will be delivered to a United States District Judge fourteen (14) days after this Report and
Recommendation is filed. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a
final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-271 (1976).
During the ten-day period, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific,
written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to
consider any objections. Any written objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782
F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992). Failure to file specific, written objections shall constitute a waiver of a
party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the
United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3
(4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and
Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation,
that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to
which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's
Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if
objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See
also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.)(party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue
to which it did not object in the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, supra, the
Court stated that general, non-specific objections are not sufficient:
A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the
same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on
any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate
judge] useless. * * * This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources
rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. * *
* We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district
court's determination without explaining the source of the error.
Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the
appellant, who proceeded pro se in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not
specifically raise in his objections to the district court:
Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I
object' preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess
what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's]
report.
See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989)("no de novo review if objections are untimely
or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir.
1984)("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger de novo review").
This notice apprises the petitioner of the consequences of a failure to file
specific, written objections. See Wright v. Collins, supra; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15,
16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections
addressed as follows:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201