SEC.

22- EX POST FACTO LAW AND

BILL OF ATTAINDER
U.S v. CONDE
FACTS:
That on the 30th day of December,
1915, the alleged offended persons
Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco
executed and delivered to the defendants
a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact
that the former had borrowed from the
latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by
virtue of the terms of said contract, the
said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia
Lianco obligated themselves to pay to
the defendants interest at the rate of
five per cent (5%) per month, payable
within the first ten days of each and every
month, the first payment to be made on
the 10th day of January, 1916. There were
other terms in the contract which,
however, are not important for the
decision in the present case.
CONTENTION OF APPELLANTS: That the
contract upon which the alleged
usurious interest was collected was
executed BEFORE Act No. 2655 was
adopted and at that at the time said
contract was made (December 30, 1915),
there was no usury law in force in the
Philippine Islands, hence NO RETRO
EFFECT and would impair obligations and
contracts.
TRIAL COURT: At the time of the execution
of contract there was no usury law in force
in the Phils. but, inasmuch as the
defendants had collected a usurious rate
of interest after the adoption of the Usury
Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No.
2655), they were guilty of a violation
of that law and should be punished in
accordance with its provisions.
HELD:
The law, we think, is well established that
when a contract contains an obligation to
pay interest upon the principal, the
interest thereby becomes part of the
principal and is included within the
promise to pay. In other words, the
obligation to pay interest on money due

under a contract, be it express or implied,

is a part of the obligation of the contract.
Laws adopted after the execution of a
contract, changing or altering the
rate of interest, cannot be made to
apply to such contract without
violating the provisions of the
constitution
which
prohibit
the
adoption of a law "impairing the
obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12
Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
NOTE: That law must govern and control
the contract in every aspect in which it is
intended to bear upon it, whether it affect
its validity, construction, or discharge. Any
law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intention of the
parties, necessarily impairs the contract
itself. If a law impairs the obligation of
a contract, it is prohibited by the
Jones Law, and is null and void. The
laws in force in the Philippine Islands prior
to any legislation by the American
sovereignty, prohibited the Legislature
from giving to any penal law a
retroactive effect unless such law
was favorable to the person accused.
(Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new
liability or disability, or giving a new right
of action, MUST NOT BE CONSTRUED
AS HAVING A RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
ELEMENTARY RULE OF CONTRACTS:
the laws in force at the time the contract
was made must govern its interpretation
and
application.
Laws
must
be
construed PROSPECTIVELY AND NOT
RETROSPECTIVELY. If a contract is legal
at its inception, it cannot be rendered
illegal by any subsequent legislation. If
that were permitted then the obligations
of a contract might be impaired, which is
prohibited by the organic law of the
Philippine Islands.
EX POST FACTO LAWS, unless they are
favorable to the defendant, are
prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every
law that makes an action, done before the
passage of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action, is an ex post facto
law. In the present case Act No. 2655

made an act which had been done

before the law was adopted, a
criminal act, and to make said Act
applicable to the act complained of
would be to give it an ex post facto
operation. The Legislature is prohibited
from adopting a law which will make an
act done before its adoption a crime. A
law may be given a retroactive effect
in civil action, providing it is curative
in character, BUT EX POST FACTO
LAWS ARE ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED
UNLESS ITS RETROACTIVE EFFECT IS
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT.

demanded an indemnity bond in the

amount of P11,000.

Acts complained of by the defendants

did not constitute a crime at the time
they were committed.

Provided, however, That when the

plaintiff, or the person in whose favor
the writ of attachment runs, is the
Insular Government, or any officer
duly representing it, the filing of such
bond shall not be required, and in case
the sheriff or attaching officer is sued for
damages as a result of the attachment, he
shall be represented by the AttorneyGeneral and if held liable therefor, the
actual damages adjudged by the court
shall be paid by the Insular Treasurer out
of such funds as may be appropriated for
the purpose.

RULING: COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

CONCEPCION v. GARCIA
FACTS:
On August 9, 1929, the Government
instituted a civil action in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, against
Florencio Reyes, former chief of the
stamp division in the Bureau of Posts, for
the purpose of recovering the sum of
P212,349.42, the value of stamps alleged
to have been misappropriated by him. In
connection with the complaint in said case
the Government obtained an attachment
against the defendant, by virtue whereof
the respondent, in the capacity of deputy
sheriff, levied upon certain household
effects as the property of the defendant.
On September 20, 1929, the present
petitioner, Dominga Concepcion, the
wife of Reyes, presented in writing to
the
sheriff
a
third-party
claim
asserting ownership in the household
effects which had been taken upon
attachment, all pursuant to section
442 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Upon receiving this claim the respondent
Garcia demanded that the Government
should give bond to secure him against
liability from said claim; and inasmuch as
the estimated value of the property was in
the amount of P5,500, the respondent

THE AMENDMENT. At the request of the

Attorney-General the period for the giving
of this bond was extended until October
10, 1929, and before this date arrived
the Legislature enacted a statute (Act No.
3531) adding an amendment, in the form
of a proviso, to both sections 442 and 451
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This proviso
has the same wording in the additions to
each of the provisions mentioned, to the
following effect:

This Act was approved on September 28,

1929, and it was therefore in full effect
upon October 10, 1929, when the
period expired within which the bond
demanded by the sheriff should have
been
given.
However,
under
the
authority of the amendment above
mentioned, the respondent deputy
sheriff maintained the attachment,
and he now admittedly has the
attached property in his possession.
CONTENTION:
The
present
petition
seeks to compel the respondent, by
mandamus,
to
surrender
the
property, consisting of the household
effects described in the petitioner's
third-party claim" and that, if the Act
should be interpreted as applicable
thereto, it should be held unconstitutional.
In this connection it is claimed that, if the
Act be interpreted as applicable to the
subject
matter
of
the
aforesaid
attachment, it would thereby be given
an ex post facto effect inconsistently with
that portion of section 3 of our organic law

which prohibits the enactment of ex post

facto laws.
HELD:
The criticism directed to the statute is not
well founded. Act No. 3531 is an Act
dealing exclusively with remedies and
modes of procedure. Such an Act is
repugnant
to
no
constitutional
provision, and its legality is beyond
question.
A person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of
any other than the existing rules of
procedure. Statutes making the changes
in the remedy or procedure are laws
within
the
discretion
of
the
lawmaking power, and are valid so
long as they do not deprived the
accused of any substantial right, or
conflict with specific and applicable
provisions of the Federal Constitution
(6 R.C.L., p. 294).
EX POST FACTO NOT USED IN CIVIL LAWS.
Moreover, the term "ex post facto," as
applied to statutes, in section 3 of
our organic law, is a technical term,
used only in connection with crimes
and penalties. The term is never used to
indicate the obnoxious character of
statutes dealing retroactively with civil
rights. Of course retroactive statutes
dealing with civil rights may also be
unconstitutional if they impair the
obligations of contracts or deprive a
person of a vested right, but this
remedial Act is not subject to
criticism on this ground. As was said in
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs.
Municipality of Taal, "The Act in
question is not an ex post facto law, as it
is not penal in its nature.
WELL-SETTLED: It has long been settled
that the phrase "ex post facto laws" is
not applicable to civil laws, but to
penal and criminal which punish a
party for acts antecedently done
which were not punishable at all, or
not punishable to the extent or in the
manner prescribed. In short ex post

facto laws relate to penal and

criminal proceedings, which impose
punishment or forfeitures, and not to
civil proceedings, which affect private
rights retrospectively."
There is an additional obstacle to the
granting of the writ of mandamus in this
case. This is found in the circumstance
that, under section 442 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the sheriff is not under
legal duty to surrender attached
property when no bond is given. On
the contrary, said section leaves the
officer entirely free to hold the property or
not, and merely leaves him at liberty, in
the ordinary case where the Government
is not a party, to surrender the property if
the bond indicated in that section be not
given. It results that the sheriff is
under no legal duty to surrender the
property, and the enactment with
respect to the giving of bond was
made exclusively for his protection.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: the sheriff is content
to hold the property in reliance upon the
protection given by the amendment.
RULING: DISMISSED.

NASI-VILLAR v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
About the month of January 1993, in the
Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Province of
Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
aforenamed
accused,
conspiring
together, , did then and there recruit Nila
Panilag
for
employment
abroad
demand and receive the amount
ofP6,500.00 Philippine Currency [sic] as
placement fee[,] the said accused being a
non-licensee or non-holder of authority to
engage in the recruitment of workers
abroad to the damage and prejudice of the
herein offended party.
RTC: GUILTY
CA: AFFIRMED.
HELD:

CONTENTION: Petitioner alleges that the

Court of Appeals erred in failing to
consider that R.A. No. 8042 cannot be
given retroactive effect and that the
decision of the RTC constitutes a
violation
of
the
constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto law.
Since R.A. No. 8042 did not yet exist in
January 1993 when the crime was
allegedly committed, petitioner argues
that law cannot be used as the basis of
filing a criminal action for illegal
recruitment.
What was applicable in 1993 is the
Labor Code, where under Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 39, the violation of the
Code is penalized with imprisonment of
not less than four (4) years nor more
than eight (8) years or a fine of not
less than P20,000.00 and not more
thanP100,000.00 or both. On the other
hand, Sec. 7(c) of R.A. No. 8042 penalizes
illegal recruitment with a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine not less
than P200,000.00
nor
more
than P500,000.00. Thus, the penalty of
imprisonment provided in the Labor Code
was raised or increased by R.A. No.
8042. Petitioner concludes that the
charge and conviction of an offense
carrying a penalty higher than that
provided by the law at the time of its
commission constitutes a violation of the
prohibition against ex post factolaw
and the retroactive application of
R.A. No. 8042.
OSG: The allegations in the Information
clearly charge petitioner with illegal
recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code,
and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the same
Code.

The
allegations in
the
Information clearly charge petitioner with
illegal recruitment as defined in Art. 38, in
relation to Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code,
and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the same
Code.
The petition is denied. We find no
reversible error in the decision arrived at
by the Court of Appeals.

IN THE CASE AT BAR: Prosecution had

proved BRD that acts constituting the
offense defined in Art. 38, in relation to
Art. 13(b) and punished by Art. 39 of the
Labor Code, as alleged in the body of the
Information. To prove illegal recruitment,
two elements must be shown, namely: (1)
the person charged with the crime must
have undertaken recruitment activities, or
any of the activities enumerated in Article
34 of the Labor Code, as amended; and
(2) said person does not have a license or
authority to do so.15 Art. 13(b) defines
"recruitment and placement" as "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising, or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not; Provided that any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons, is considered engaged in
recruitment and placement." The trial
court found these two elements had been
proven in the case at bar. Petitioner has
not offered any argument or proof that
countervails such findings.
The basic rule is that a criminal act is
punishable under the law in force at the
time of its commission. Thus, petitioner
can only be charged and found guilty
under the Labor Code which was in
force
in
1993
when
the
acts
attributed to her were committed.
Petitioner was charged in 1998 under an
Information that erroneously designated
the offense as covered by R.A. No. 8042,
but alleged in its body acts which are
punishable under the Labor Code. As it
was proven that petitioner had committed
the acts she was charged with, she was
properly convicted under the Labor
Code, and not under R.A. No. 8042.
There
is
no
violation
of
the
prohibition against ex post facto law
nor a retroactive application of R.A.
No. 8042, as alleged by petitioner. An ex
post facto law is one which, among others,
aggravates a crime or makes it greater
than it was when committed or changes
the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the

crime when committed.16 Penal laws and

laws which, while not penal in nature,
nonetheless have provisions defining
offenses and prescribing penalties for their
violation operate prospectively. Penal laws
cannot be given retroactive effect, except
when they are favorable to the accused.
R.A. No. 8042 amended pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code and
gave a new definition of the crime of
illegal recruitment and provided for
its higher penalty.
NOTE: There is no indication in R.A. No.
8042 that said law, including the penalties
provided therein, would take effect
retroactively. A law can never be
considered ex post facto as long as it
operates
prospectively
since
its
strictures would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its
enactment.18 Neither did the trial court
nor the appellate court give R.A. No. 8042
a retroactive application since both courts
passed upon petitioner's case only under
the aegis of the Labor Code. The
proceedings before the trial court and the
appellate court did not violate the
prohibition against ex post facto law nor
involved a retroactive application of R.A.
No. 8042 in any way.
RULING: DENIED.

SALVADOR v. MAPA
FACTS:
On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V.
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc FactFinding Committee on Behest Loans
which reads [among others]:
WHEREAS, there have been allegations
of loans, guarantees, and other forms
of financial accommodations granted,
directly or indirectly, by governmentowned
and
controlled
bank
or
financial institutions, at the behest,
command, or urging by previous
government
officials
to
the
disadvantage and detriment of the

Philippines government and the Filipino

people.
EXPANDED FUNCTIONS: WHEREAS, among
the underlying purposes for the creation of
the Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans is to facilitate the collection
and recovery of defaulted loans owing
government-owned
and
controlled
banking and/or financing institutions.
Several loan accounts were referred to the
Committee for investigation, including the
loan
transactions
between
Metals
Exploration
Asia,
Inc.
(MEA),
now
Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the
Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP).
After examining and studying the
documents relative to the loan
transactions,
the
Committee
determined that they bore the
characteristics of behest loans, as
defined under Memorandum Order No. 61
because the stockholders and officers
of PEMI were known cronies of then
President Ferdinand Marcos; the loan
was under-collateralized; and PEMI was
undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted.
Specifically, the investigation revealed
that in 1978, PEMI applied for a foreign
currency loan and bank investment on its
preferred shares with DBP. The loan
application was approved on April 25,
1979 per Board Resolution (B/R) No. 1297,
but the loan was never released because
PEMI failed to comply with the conditions
imposed by DBP.
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador,
Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee,
and
representing
the
Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) a sworn complaint for
violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, against the
respondents Placido I. Mapa, Jr., among
others.
OMBUDSMAN dismissed complaint on the
ground of prescription.

It bears to stress that Section 11 of R.A.

No. 3019 as originally enacted, provides
that the prescriptive period for
violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019)
is ten (10) years. Subsequently, BP 195,
enacted on March 16, 1982, amended the
period of prescription from ten (10) years
to fifteen (15) years.
Moreover as enunciated in [the] case of
People vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241,
the computation of the prescriptive period
of a crime violating a special law like R.A.
3019 is governed by Act No. 3326 which
provides, thus:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run
from the day of the commission of the
violation of law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of the judicial
proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted
when the proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting
jeopardy.
NOTE: The aforesaid principle was further
elucidated in the cases of People vs.
Sandiganbayan, and People vs. Villalon,
where the SC pronounced that when
the transactions are contained in
public documents and the execution
thereof gave rise to unlawful acts,
the violation of the law commences
therefrom. Thus, the reckoning period
for purposes of prescription shall begin to
run from
the
time
the
public
instruments came into existence.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: the subject financial
accommodations were entered into by
virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized
contracts, board resolutions, approved
letter-request) during the period of 1978
to 1981 and for purposes of computing the
prescriptive period, the aforementioned
principles in the Dinsay, Villalon and
Sandiganbayan
cases
will
apply.
Records show that the complaint was
referred and filed with this Office
on October 4, 1996 or after the lapse

of more than fifteen (15) years from

the violation of the law. [Deductibly]
therefore, the offenses charged had
already prescribed or forever barred
by Statute of Limitations.
It
bears
mention
that
the
acts
complained of were committed before
the issuance of BP 195 onMarch 2,
1982. Hence, the prescriptive period in
the instant case is ten (10) years as
provided in the (sic) Section 11 of R.A.
3019, as originally enacted.
CONTENTION:
Presidential
Ad
Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans was created
on October 8, 1992under Administrative
Order
No.
13. Subsequently,
Memorandum
Order
No.
61,
dated November 9, 1992, was issued
defining the criteria to be utilized as a
frame of reference in determining behest
loans. Accordingly, if these Orders are
to be considered the bases of
charging respondents for alleged
offenses committed, they become expost facto laws which are proscribed
by the Constitution.
ISSUE: whether Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex
post facto laws.
HELD:
We cannot sustain the Ombudsmans
declaration that Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 violate
the prohibition against ex post facto laws
for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a
person for an act done prior to their
issuance and which was innocent when
done.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed.
To justify nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful or arguable implication; a
law shall not be declared invalid unless
the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt.
KINDS OF EX POST FACTO. An ex post
facto law has been defined as one

(a) which makes an action, done

before the passing of the law and
which was innocent when done,
criminal
and
punishes
such
action; or
(b)
which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than it was when
committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment
and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or
(d)
which alters the legal rules of
evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law
required at the time of the
commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant.
[22]

This Court added two (2) more to the list,

namely:
(e) that which assumes to regulate civil
rights and remedies only but in effect
imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right
which when done was lawful; or
(f) that which deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to

which he has become entitled, such as the

protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty

NOTE: The constitutional doctrine

that outlaws an ex post facto law
generally
prohibits
the
retrospectivity of penal laws.
ADMIN ORDER NOT A PENAL LAW.
Not
being
penal
laws,
Administrative Order No. 13 and
Memorandum
Order
No.
61
cannot be characterized as ex
post
facto laws. There
is,
therefore, no basis for the
Ombudsman to rule that the
subject
administrative
and
memorandum orders are ex post
facto.
RULING: PETITION GRANTED.