I. CASE: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS,

probate of his will was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
(probate court). The probate court then appointed retired Supreme Court Justice Arsenio P. Dizon
(Justice Dizon) and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon (petitioner) as Special and Assistant
Special Administrator, respectively, of the Estate of Jose (Estate). In a letter dated October 13,
1988, Justice Dizon informed respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR)
of
the
special
proceedings
for
the
Estate.
Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required estate tax
return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the claims against it, had
yet to be collated, determined and identified. Thus, in a letter dated March 14, 1990, Justice
Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty. Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of the
Estate the required estate tax return and to represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax
Clearance. Eventually, on April 17, 1990, Atty. Gonzales wrote a letter addressed to the BIR
Regional Director for San Pablo City and filed the estate tax return with the same BIR Regional
Office, showing therein a NIL estate tax liability
III ISSUES: There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:
First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces
of
evidence
which
were
not
formally
offered
by
the
BIR;
and
Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's determination of the
deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.
IV:

RULING

OF

THE

COURT:

The

Petition

is

impressed

with

merit.

Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases
filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases.
Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as
the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be formally offered before
the CTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. -- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which reiterated this Court's
previous rulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate on the admission and consideration of
exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many
of which were decided after Vda. de Oate, we held that courts cannot consider evidence which
has not been formally offered, nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that the doctrine
laid down in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon, this
Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no error when

he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of the case,
notwithstanding the fact that the same were not formally offered.
Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court
made reference to said doctrine in resolving the issues therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid
down in Vda. De Oate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:From the
foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally
offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an
exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. In
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that
the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as
an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party,
therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or
not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the
Rules
to
consider
the
same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 484], we
relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first,
the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oate is merely an exception to
the general rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only when there is strict compliance with
the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court should prevail. In this case, we find that these requirements have not been
satisfied. The assailed pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly
when Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct
testimony. He was also subjected to cross-examination and re-cross examination by petitioner.
But Alberto's account and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner did not sufficiently
describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by the BIR. In fact, petitioner
sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A. Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as
Alberto was incompetent to answer questions relative to the working papers. The lead examiner
never testified. Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly
recorded, the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not exist at all in the instant
case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial proceedings to
warrant the pronouncement that the same were duly incorporated in the records of the case. Thus,
we held in Ramos:
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in
question were presented and marked during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been
incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits
when
he
was
interrogated
by
respondents'
counsel...

But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that respondents' exhibits were marked
and admitted during the pre-trial stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted earlier.
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are
not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the
presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere procedural technicality which may be
disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the
truth of BIR's claims against the Estate. The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of
evidence, despite CTA's directives, is fatal to its cause. Such failure is aggravated by the fact that
not even a single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take
against
the
BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence . in the hearing of
February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear. The CTA denied petitioner's motion to
consider BIR's presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning to BIR that such presentation
would be considered waived if BIR's evidence would not be presented at the next hearing. Again,
in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's counsel failed to appear. Thus, in its Resolution dated
March 21, 1996, the CTA considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the
same Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner
complied but BIR failed to do so. In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified. Hence, in
this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha:
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to
enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to
its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to
review
documents
not
previously
scrutinized
by
the
trial
court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court in Constantino v. Court of
Appeals ruled that the formal offer of one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit
it within a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot admit an offer of
evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months because to do so would "condone an
inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would
encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the trial court had reasonable
ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary
or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal offer, petitioners
failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five months to lapse before finally
submitting it. Petitioners' failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of justice.

Having disposed of the foregoing procedural issue, we proceed to discuss the merits of the case.
Ordinarily, the CTA's findings, as affirmed by the CA, are entitled to the highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the lower courts committed
gross error in the appreciation of facts. In this case, however, we find the decision of the CA
affirming
that
of
the
CTA
tainted
with
palpable
error.
It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have been condoned. As a
mode of extinguishing an obligation, condonation or remission of debt is defined as:
an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces
the enforcement of the obligation, which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of
the same to which the remission refers. It is an essential characteristic of remission that it be
gratuitous, that there is no equivalent received for the benefit given; once such equivalent exists,
the nature of the act changes. It may become dation in payment when the creditor receives a
thing different from that stipulated; or novation, when the object or principal conditions of the
obligation should be changed; or compromise, when the matter renounced is in litigation or
dispute and in exchange of some concession which the creditor receives.
Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section 79 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) which provides for the allowable deductions from the gross
estate of the decedent. The specific question is whether the actual claims of the aforementioned
creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that
the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into by the
Estate
with
its
creditors.
"Claims against the estate," as allowable deductions from the gross estate under Section 79 of the
Tax Code, are basically a reproduction of the deductions allowed under Section 89 (a) (1) (C)
and (E) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise known as the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Philippine
tax laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States. Thus, pursuant to
established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing the
federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws
It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to whether the deductible
amount for a claim against the estate is fixed as of the decedent's death which is the general rule,
or the same should be adjusted to reflect post-death developments, such as where a settlement
between the parties results in the reduction of the amount actually paid. On one hand, the U.S.
court ruled that the appropriate deduction is the "value" that the claim had at the date of the
decedent's death. Also, as held in Propstra v. U.S., where a lien claimed against the estate was
certain and enforceable on the date of the decedent's death, the fact that the claimant
subsequently settled for lesser amount did not preclude the estate from deducting the entire
amount of the claim for estate tax purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the
general principle that post-death developments are not material in determining the amount of the
deduction.

On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that post-death settlement
should be taken into consideration and the claim should be allowed as a deduction only to the
extent of the amount actually paid. Recognizing the dispute, the Service released Proposed
Regulations in 2007 mandating that the deduction would be limited to the actual amount paid.
In announcing its agreement with Propstra the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held:
We are persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's decision...in Propstra correctly apply the Ithaca Trust
date-of-death valuation principle to enforceable claims against the estate. As we interpret Ithaca
Trust, when the Supreme Court announced the date-of-death valuation principle, it was making a
judgment about the nature of the federal estate tax specifically, that it is a tax imposed on the act
of transferring property by will or intestacy and, because the act on which the tax is levied occurs
at a discrete time, i.e., the instance of death, the net value of the property transferred should be
ascertained, as nearly as possible, as of that time. This analysis supports broad application of the
date-of-death valuation rule.
We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule, made pursuant to the ruling of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States. First. There is no law, nor do we
discern any legislative intent in our tax laws, which disregards the date-of-death valuation
principle and particularly provides that post-death developments must be considered in
determining the net value of the estate. It bears emphasis that tax burdens are not to be imposed,
nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes
being construed strictissimi juris against the government. Any doubt on whether a person, article
or activity is taxable is generally resolved against taxation Second. Such construction finds
relevance and consistency in our Rules on Special Proceedings wherein the term "claims"
required to be presented against a decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his
lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his death. Therefore, the claims existing at
the time of death are significant to, and should be made the basis of, the determination of
allowable
deductions.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated
April 30, 1999 and the Resolution dated November 3, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 46947 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Bureau of Internal Revenue's deficiency
estate tax assessment against the Estate of Jose P. Fernandez is hereby NULLIFIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.