Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20761

July 27, 1966

LA MALLORCA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL., respondents.
G. E. Yabut, R. Monterey and M.C. Lagman for petitioner.
Ahmed Garcia for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
La Mallorca seeks the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23267-R,
holding it liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay to respondents Mariano Beltran, et al.,
P6,000.00 for the death of his minor daughter Raquel Beltran, plus P400.00 as actual damages.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals, briefly are:
On December 20, 1953, at about noontime, plaintiffs, husband and wife, together with their
minor daughters, namely, Milagros, 13 years old, Raquel, about 4 years old, and Fe, over 2
years old, boarded the Pambusco Bus No. 352, bearing plate TPU No. 757 (1953
Pampanga), owned and operated by the defendant, at San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for
Anao, Mexico, Pampanga. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages
containing their personal belonging. The conductor of the bus, who happened to be a halfbrother of plaintiff Mariano Beltran, issued three tickets (Exhs. A, B, & C) covering the full
fares of the plaintiff and their eldest child, Milagros. No fare was charged on Raquel and Fe,
since both were below the height at which fare is charged in accordance with the appellant's
rules and regulations.
After about an hour's trip, the bus reached Anao whereat it stopped to allow the passengers
bound therefor, among whom were the plaintiffs and their children to get off. With respect to
the group of the plaintiffs, Mariano Beltran, then carrying some of their baggages, was the
first to get down the bus, followed by his wife and his children. Mariano led his companions
to a shaded spot on the left pedestrians side of the road about four or five meters away from
the vehicle. Afterwards, he returned to the bus in controversy to get his other bayong, which
he had left behind, but in so doing, his daughter Raquel followed him, unnoticed by her
father. While said Mariano Beltran was on the running board of the bus waiting for the
conductor to hand him his bayong which he left under one of its seats near the door, the bus,
whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving forward, evidently to
resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not given the driver the
customary signal to start, since said conductor was still attending to the baggage left behind

by Mariano Beltran. Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a complete stop, it had
travelled about ten meters from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano Beltran immediately jumped from the
running board without getting his bayong from the conductor. He landed on the side of the
road almost in front of the shaded place where he left his wife and children. At that precise
time, he saw people beginning to gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on the
ground, her skull crushed, and without life. The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which she rode earlier together with her parents.
For the death of their said child, the plaintiffs commenced the present suit against the
defendant seeking to recover from the latter an aggregate amount of P16,000 to cover moral
damages and actual damages sustained as a result thereof and attorney's fees. After trial on
the merits, the court below rendered the judgment in question.
On the basis of these facts, the trial court found defendant liable for breach of contract of carriage
and sentenced it to pay P3,000.00 for the death of the child and P400.00 as compensatory damages
representing burial expenses and costs.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract
in the case, for the reason that when the child met her death, she was no longer a passenger of the
bus involved in the incident and, therefore, the contract of carriage had already terminated. Although
the Court of Appeals sustained this theory, it nevertheless found the defendant-appellant guilty
of quasi-delict and held the latter liable for damages, for the negligence of its driver, in accordance
with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. And, the Court of Appeals did not only find the petitioner liable,
but increased the damages awarded the plaintiffs-appellees to P6,000.00, instead of P3,000.00
granted by the trial court.
In its brief before us, La Mallorca contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in holding it liable
for quasi-delict, considering that respondents complaint was one for breach of contract, and (2) in
raising the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 although respondents did not appeal
from the decision of the lower court.
Under the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we have to sustain the judgement holding
petitioner liable for damages for the death of the child, Raquel Beltran. It may be pointed out that
although it is true that respondent Mariano Beltran, his wife, and their children (including the
deceased child) had alighted from the bus at a place designated for disembarking or unloading of
passengers, it was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle (which was still at a
stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was left under one of the seats of the bus. There can be
no controversy that as far as the father is concerned, when he returned to the bus for
hisbayong which was not unloaded, the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the
petitioner remained subsisting. For, the relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his
baggage from the car.1 The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who was already
led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety
under the contract of carriage also persisted.

It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point
of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a reasonable
opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting
from a train, walks along the station platform is considered still a passenger.2 So also, where a
passenger has alighted at his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger,
has been shot, and he in good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve
his brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents. 3
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have followed the
father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the bus awaiting for the
conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he (the father) had to
jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus,
was run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had
exercised the "utmost diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to go
and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano Beltran and
family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are, therefore,
to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their contract of
carriage.
But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner
can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads
That aside from the aforesaid breach of contract, the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs'
daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their agent, necessary to transport
plaintiffs and their daughter safely as far as human care and foresight can provide in the
operation of their vehicle.
is clearly an allegation for quasi-delict. The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict, while
incompatible with the other claim under the contract of carriage, is permissible under Section 2 of
Rule 8 of the New Rules of Court, which allows a plaintiff to allege causes of action in the alternative,
be they compatible with each other or not, to the end that the real matter in controversy may be
resolved and determined.4
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was predicated when
it was alleged in the complaint that "the death of Raquel Beltran, plaintiffs' daughter, was caused by
the negligence and want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of

the defendants and their agent." This allegation was also proved when it was established during the
trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while there were
still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The
presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to the presumption that the
defendant employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of Appeals found, petitioner had
failed to overcome. Consequently, petitioner must be adjudged peculiarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.
The increase of the award of damages from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the Court of Appeals,
however, cannot be sustained. Generally, the appellate court can only pass upon and consider
questions or issues raised and argued in appellant's brief. Plaintiffs did not appeal from that portion
of the judgment of the trial court awarding them on P3,000.00 damages for the death of their
daughter. Neither does it appear that, as appellees in the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs have pointed
out in their brief the inadequacy of the award, or that the inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was
merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to the general
rule.5 Herein petitioner's contention, therefore, that the Court of Appeals committed error in raising
the amount of the award for damages is, evidently, meritorious.
1wph1.t

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by sentencing, the petitioner to
pay to the respondents Mariano Beltran, et al., the sum of P3,000.00 for the death of the child,
Raquel Beltran, and the amount of P400.00 as actual damages. No costs in this instance. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28014-15 May 29, 1970

SPOUSES MARCELO LANDINGIN and RACQUEL BOCASAS, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.

SPOUSES PEDRO GARCIA and EUFRACIA LANDINGIN, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. and MARCELO OLIGAN, defendants-appellants.
Gabriel A. Zabala for plaintiffs-appellees.
Vicente M. Erfe Law Office for defendants-appellants.

VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal on a question of law from the portion of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila ordering the defendants Pangasinan Transportation Co. (PANTRANCO) and Marcelo Oligan
to pay the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. D-1468
(L-28014) the sum of P6,500.00, and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1470 (L-28015) the sum of
P3,500.00.
The complaints in said Civil Cases Nos. D-1468 and D-1470 were filed by the spouses Marcelo
Landingin and Racquel Bocasas, and the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin,
respectively, for damages allegedly suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective
daughter, Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to the alleged negligence of the defendants
and/or breach of contract of carriage. In their complaints, plaintiffs averred, among others, that in the
morning of April 20, 1963, their above-mentioned daughters were among the passengers in the bus
driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by defendant PANTRANCO on an
excursion trip from Dagupan City to Baguio City and back, that the bus was open on one side and
enclosed on the other, in gross violation of the rules of the Public Service Commission; that
defendant PANTRANCO acted with negligence, fraud and bad faith in pretending to have previously
secured a special permit for the trip when in truth it had not done so; that upon reaching an uphill
point at Camp 8, Kennon Road, Baguio City, on the onward trip, defendant driver, through utter lack
of foresight, experience and driving knowledge, caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments;
that through the said defendant's fault and mishandling, the motor ceased to function, causing the
bus to slide back unchecked; that when the said defendant suddenly swerved and steered the bus
toward the mountainside, Leonila and Estrella, together with several other passengers, were thrown
out of the bus through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries as a result of which
Leonila and Estrella died at the hospital and the same day; and that in connection with the incident,
defendant driver had been charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight
physical injuries on account of the death of Leonila and Estrella and of the injuries suffered by four
others, although it may be said, by way of parenthesis, that this case is now pending appeal in a
higher court. The plaintiffs prayed for awards of moral, actual and exemplary damages in the total
sum of P40,000.00 in Civil Case No. D-1468, and in the total sum of P25,000.00 in Civil Case No. D1470 as well as attorney's fees in the amounts of P5,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively.
Defendants filed a joint answer to each of the two complaints alleging, among others, that at the time
of the accident, defendant driver was driving the bus at, the slow speed of about 10 kilometers per
hour; that while the said defendant was steering his bus toward the mountainside after hearing a

sound coming from under the rear end of the bus, Leonila and Estrella recklessly, and in
disobedience to his shouted warnings and advice, jumped out of the bus causing their heads to hit
the road or pavement; that the bus was then being driven with extraordinary care, prudence and
diligence; that defendant PANTRANCO observed the care and diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the accident as well as in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly of
defendant driver; and that the decision convicting the said defendant was not yet final, the same
having been appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was still pending.
By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. On October 17, 1966, the court a quo
rendered its decision therein in which it made the following findings; that upon reaching the fatal spot
at Camp 8, a sudden snapping or breaking of metal below the floor of the bus was heard, and the
bus abruptly stopped, rolling back a few moments later; that as a result, some of the passengers
jumped out of the bus, while others stepped down; that defendant driver maneuvered the bus safely
to and against the side of the mountain where its rear end was made to rest, ensuring the safety of
the many passengers still inside the bus; that while defendant driver as steering the bus towards the
mountainside, he advised the passengers not to jump, but to remain seated; that Leonila and
Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but that they panicked and jumped out; that the
malfunctioning of the motor resulted from the breakage of the cross-joint; that there was no
negligence on the part of either of the defendants; that only the day before, the said cross-joint was
duly inspected and found to be in order; and that defendant PANTRANCO had exercised the
requisite care in the selection and supervision of its employees, including the defendant driver. The
court concluded that "the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about
by some extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees."
One would wonder why in the face of such factual findings and conclusion of the trial court, the
defendants, instead of the plaintiffs, should come to this Court on appeal. The answer lies in the
dispositive portion of the decision, to wit:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders
judgment: (a) Absolving the defendants from any liability on account of negligence on
their part and therefore dismissing the complaints in these two cases; (b) However,
as stated above, the Court hereby orders the defendant Pantranco to pay to the
plaintiffs spouses Marcelo Tandingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468
the amount of P6,500.00; and the amount of P3,500.00 to the spouses Pedro Garcia
and Eufracia Landingin in Civil Case No. D-1470, not in payment of liability because
of any negligence on the part of the defendants but as an expression of sympathy
and goodwill. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to what impelled the court below to include item (b) in the dispositive portion of its decision, can
be gathered from the penultimate paragraph of the decision, which reads:
However, there is evidence to the effect that an offer of P8,500.00 in the instant
cases without any admission of fault or negligence had been made by the defendant
Pantranco and that actually in Civil Case No. D-1469 for the death of Pacita
Descalso, the other deceased passenger of the bus in question, the heirs of the
decease received P3,000.00 in addition to hospital and medical bills and the coffin of

the deceased for the dismissal of the said case without Pantranco accepting liability.
There was as a matter of fact during the pre-trial of these two cases a continuing
offer of settlement on the part of the defendant Pantranco without accepting any
liability for such damages, and the Court understood that the Pantranco would be
willing still to pay said amounts even if these cases were to be tried on the merits. It
is well-known that the defendant Pantranco is zealous in the preservation of its public
relations. In the spirit therefore of the offer of the defendant Pantranco aforesaid, to
assuage the feelings of the herein plaintiffs an award of P6,500.00 for the spouses
Marcelo Landingin and Racquel Bocasas in Civil Case No. D-1468 whose daughter
Leonila was, when she died, a third-year Commerce student at the Far Eastern
University, and P3,500.00 for the spouses Pedro Garcia and Eufracia Landingin in
Civil Case No. D-1470 whose daughter Estrella was in the fourth year High at the
Dagupan Colleges when she died, is hereby made in their favor. This award is in
addition to what Pantranco might have spent to help the parents of both deceased
after the accident.
Defendants-appellants complain that having found them to be absolutely free from fault or
negligence, and having in fact dismissed the complaints against them, the court should not have
ordered them to assume any pecuniary liability. There would be merit in his argument but for the fact
that defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was guilty of breach of contract of carriage. It will be noted
that in each of the two complaints it is averred that two buses including the one in which the two
deceased girls were riding, were hired to transport the excursionist passengers from Dagupan City
to Baguio City, and return, and that the said two passengers did not reach destination safely.
As a common carrier, defendant-appellant PANTRANCO was duty bound to carry its passengers
"safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances." (Article 1755, Civil Code.) Did defendantappellant PANTRANCO measure up to the degree of care and foresight required it under the
circumstances? We think not. The court below found that the cross-joint of the bus in which the
deceased were riding broke, which caused the malfunctioning of the motor, which in turn resulted in
panic among some of the passengers. This is a finding of fact which this Court may not disturb. We
are of the opinion, however, that the lower court's conclusion drawn from that fact, i.e., that "the
accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God brought about by some extraordinary
circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or its employees," is in large measure
conjectural and speculative, and was arrived at without due regard to all the circumstances, as
required by Article 1755. In Lasam vs. Smith (45 Phil. 660), this Court held that an accident caused
by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito. The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that
"the passenger has neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier." (Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75.)
When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that it
acted negligently (Article 1756). This presumption is only rebutted by proof on the carrier's part that it
observed the "extraordinary diligence" required in Article 1733 and the "utmost diligence of very
cautious persons" required in Article 1755 (Article 1756). In the instant case it appears that the court
below considered the presumption rebutted on the strength of defendants-appellants' evidence that
only the day before the incident, the crossjoint in question was duly inspected and found to be in

order. It does not appear, however, that the carrier gave due regard for all the circumstances in
connection with the said inspection. The bus in which the deceased were riding was heavily laden
with passengers, and it would be traversing mountainous, circuitous and ascending roads. Thus the
entire bus, including its mechanical parts, would naturally be taxed more heavily than it would be
under ordinary circumstances. The mere fact that the bus was inspected only recently and found to
be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is shown that the particular
circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.
In the premises, it was error for the trial court to dismiss the complaints. The awards made by the
court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of contracts of carriage.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is modified as
indicated above, and defendant-appellant PANTRANCO is ordered to pay to plaintiffs-appellees the
amounts stated in the judgment appealed from, as damages for breach of contracts, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaints. Costs against defendantappellant PANTRANCO.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16086

May 29, 1964

M. RUIZ HIGHWAY TRANSIT, INC. and MARTIN BUENA, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GUILLERMO MONSERRAT and MARTA CONSIGNADO, respondents.
T. F. Cachero for petitioners.
Godofredo C. Montesines for respondents.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In the Laguna court of first instance, the spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Marta Consignado sued
M. Ruiz Highway Transit, Inc., and Martin Buena to recover damages for the death of their four-year
old daughter Victoria.

In the morning of May 22, 1954, said child and her parents were paying passengers in a bus of
defendant transportation company driven by co-defendant Buena, bound for Antipolo, Rizal. In Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, while the bus was running, a rear tire exploded, blasting a hole in the very place
where Victoria was standing in front of her mother. As a result, the child fell through the hole, and
died that same morning from injuries sustained in the fall.
1wph1.t

The court of first instance dismissed the complaint on the ground that (1) the accident was not due to
negligence of the carrier, but was an act of God; and (2) even if negligence was attributable to
defendants, their liability had been discharged, as evidenced by Exhibits 2 and 3 quoted in the
footnote. 1
On appeal by plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, upon the finding that (1)
defendants failed to prove the extraordinary diligence required of carriers; and (2) Exhibits 2 and 3
did not effect a waiver of plaintiffs' right to damages. Said appellate court, therefore, required
defendants to pay plaintiffs P6,000.00 as indemnity for the child's death; P2,000.00 as moral
damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees, with interest from the date of its decision, (minus the
P150.00 that had been given to plaintiff Guillermo Monserrat, thru Exhibit 3).
In their petition for review by certiorari, the carrier and the driver raise the following issues: (1)
whether in a contract of carriage breached by the passenger's death, his parents may be granted
moral damages; and (2) whether the sum of P6,000.00 may be awarded as death indemnity for a
child passenger. In their brief, they pose the following questions in addition to the above issues; (3)
was there a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation company;
(4) have petitioners rebutted the presumption that they have been negligent; (5) was the bus
crowded; (6) was the bus running fast when the tire exploded; (7) what caused the bursting of the
tire; (8) was the bus floor weak; (9) was the blow-out of the tire caso fortuito; and (10) was
petitioners' liability cancelled by Exhibits 2 and 3?
The alleged lack of a contract of carriage between the deceased child and petitioner transportation
company, if true, is a complete defense against claimants' cause of action. However, the issue is
now inarguable, it being partly factual, on which the appellate court made its finding.
Respondents and the child were paying passengers in the bus; petitioners were duty bound to
transport them, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons (Art. 1755, New Civil Code).
Therein they failed. The child died because the floor of the bus gave way; this reinforces the
presumption that petitioners had neglected to provide a safe conveyance (Art. 1756, New Civil
Code). Evidence of the required extraordinary diligence was not introduced to rebut the presumption.
On the contrary, the appellate court found that the bus was overcrowded and overspeeding, and the
floor thereof was weak persuasive indications of negligence; and reasoned out that the tire
exploded due to one or a combination of the following: "The tire was not strong and safe; the air
pressure was not properly checked; the load was heavy; the excessive speed of the bus must have
overstrained the tire; and the high velocity generated heat in the tire which could have expanded the
already compressed air therein."2

Petitioners venture to guess that it was due either to accidental puncture by a sharp instrument, as a
nail, or to latent defect in the tire. Evidence should have been but was not presented to
establish such defense.
Even conceding that the tire blow-out was accidental, we could still hold the carrier liable for failure
to provide a safe floor in the bus.
Exhibits 2 and 3 are not proof that petitioners have discharged their legal liability to claimants. What
is expressed there is the latter's belief clearly erroneous that petitioners are not liable to them
and acknowledgment of the voluntary help extended by petitioner transportation company. The belief
is baseless. That respondents entertained such an ill-founded impression is not to be wondered at.
They are ignorant, illiterate, indigent, and, at the time they signed Exhibits 2 and 3, thoroughly
confused and distracted by the death of their child.
The minimum death indemnity is P3,0003, although this Court has in various instances granted
P6,000.00. As for moral damages, the carrier is liable therefor to the parents of a child who meets
death while a passenger in any of the carrier's vehicles (Arts. 2206 and 1764, New Civil Code).
Since respondents are indigents, and have litigated as paupers, they should be allowed attorney's
fees of P500.00.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Labrador and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1

Exhibits 2 and 3, executed on the same morning the child died, say:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"We, spouses Guillermo Monserrat and Maria Consignado hereby say that on the 22nd day
of the month of May, 1954, we were riding in the truck of M. Ruiz Highway Transit, No. 102,
driven by Martin Buena. That due to unforeseen events, the left rear tire directly where we
were sitting burst and destroyed the floor of the truck which caused the death of our child.
Because what happened could not be attributed to anybody's fault and could be considered
as an act of God, we cannot claim and likewise do not claim anything before any court of
justice. Our only request is that the management of the truck give us a little help they may be
willing to extend to us.
"Party of the Second Part:
"In view of the statement of the Party of the First Part, we are agreeable to their request to
the amount within our means. ..."
(Signatures omitted)

"KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

"I, Guillermo Monserrat, certify that today, Saturday, May 22, 1954, I received from Mrs.
Maria Ruiz, owner of the M. Ruiz Transportation the amount of One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P150.00).
"I also certify that I am the father of the child Victoria Monserrat who died in the Truck No.
102 of M. Ruiz Transportation this day, Saturday, May 22, 1954, in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. "To
my entire satisfaction on account of the help given to me by the owner of the transportation, I
sign my name hereinbelow, in this town of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, this 22nd of May, 1954, in the
presence of these witnesses."
(Signature omitted)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22272

June 26, 1967

ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by
Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. Found guilty, he
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P6,000. Appeal from said conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.
1wph1.t

On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan,
Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from
Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in

self-defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez
further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against
defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both
plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the
latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final
judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila Railroad Co., 97 Phil.
884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. As this Court there found:
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection
with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is
clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the ManilaSan Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of duty
was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was therefore
under no obligation to safeguard the passengers of the Calamba-Manila train, where the
deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of
Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting
transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the
Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's assault can
not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of transportation by a servant or
employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in
whose hands the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words,
unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty of the guilty
employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike
the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of
passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the
passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It
is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting
effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force
majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present Civil
Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for a different result
in theGillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes

the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers,
by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence
or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond
the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and were taken from AngloAmerican Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its
drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is
within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of
employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the
assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The carrier's liability here
is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule based
on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As explained in Texas
Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43
LRA 84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter
alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from
the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the
carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the
servant's hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating
therewith the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as
between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or negligence
of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to select
and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due
regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their
total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the
defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against
the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered in the criminal case
wherein he was convicted by final judgment.

In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant.
This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been
the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000. As to other
alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that plaintiff's evidence thereon was not
convincing,8 should not be disturbed. Still, Arts. 2206 and 1764 awardmoral damages in addition to
compensatory damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental
anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it becomes the court's duty to
award moral damages.9 Plaintiff demands P5,000 as moral damages; however, in the circumstances,
We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient.
Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in plaintiff's favor to
P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest on both from the filing of the complaint on
December 6, 1961 until the whole amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.