Lola v. Skadden Arps
Lola v. Skadden Arps
Lola v. Skadden Arps
143845
Lolav.Skadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom
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UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS
FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT
____________________
AugustTerm,2014
(Argued:May29,2015
Decided:July23,2015)
DocketNo.143845cv
____________________
DAVIDLOLA,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,
PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
SKADDEN,ARPS,SLATE,MEAGHER&FLOMLLP,TOWERLEGAL
STAFFING,INC.,
DefendantsAppellees.
____________________
Before:POOLER,LOHIER,DRONEY,CircuitJudges.
DavidLola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,appeals
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fromtheSeptember16,2014opinionandorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
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fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Sullivan,J.)dismissinghisputative
collectiveactionseekingdamagesfromSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom
LLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.forviolationsoftheovertimeprovisionofthe
FairLaborStandardsAct,29U.S.C.201etseq.(FLSA),arisingoutofLolas
workasacontractattorneyinNorthCarolina.Weagreewiththedistrictcourt
that:(1)state,notfederal,lawinformsFLSAsdefinitionofpracticeoflaw;and
(2)NorthCarolina,astheplacewhereLolaworkedandlived,hasthegreatest
interestinthislitigation,andthuswelooktoNorthCarolinalawtodetermineif
LolawaspracticinglawwithinthemeaningofFLSA.However,wedisagreewith
thedistrictcourtsconclusion,onamotiontodismiss,thatbyundertakingthe
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documentreviewLolaallegedlywashiredtoconduct,Lolawasnecessarily
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practicinglawwithinthemeaningofNorthCarolinalaw.
Vacatedandremanded.
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D.MAIMONKIRSCHENBAUM,Joseph&
KirschenbaumLLP(DeniseA.Shulman,onthe
brief),NewYork,NY,forPlaintiffAppellantDavid
Lola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarly
situated.
BRIANJ.GERSHENGORN,Ogletree,Deakins,
Nash,Smoak&Stewart,P.C.(StephanieL.
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Aranyos,onthebrief)NewYork,N.Y.for
DefendantsAppelleesSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher
&FlomLLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.
POOLER,CircuitJudge:
DavidLola,onbehalfofhimselfandallotherssimilarlysituated,appeals
fromtheSeptember16,2014opinionandorderoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Sullivan,J.)dismissinghisputative
collectiveactionseekingdamagesfromSkadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom
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LLPandTowerLegalStaffing,Inc.forviolationsoftheovertimeprovisionofthe
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FairLaborStandardsAct,29U.S.C.201etseq.(FLSA),arisingoutofLolas
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workasacontractattorneyinNorthCarolina.Weagreewiththedistrictcourts
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conclusionthat:(1)state,notfederal,lawinformsFLSAsdefinitionofpractice
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oflaw;and(2)NorthCarolina,astheplacewhereLolaworkedandlived,has
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thegreatestinterestinthislitigation,andthuswelooktoNorthCarolinalawto
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determineifLolawaspracticinglawwithinthemeaningofFLSA.However,we
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disagreewiththedistrictcourtsconclusion,onamotiontodismiss,thatby
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undertakingthedocumentreviewLolaallegedlywashiredtoconduct,Lolawas
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necessarilypracticinglawwithinthemeaningofNorthCarolinalaw.Wefind
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thatacceptingtheallegationsaspleaded,Lolaadequatelyallegedinhis
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complaintthathisdocumentreviewwasdevoidoflegaljudgmentsuchthathe
wasnotengagedinthepracticeoflaw,andremandforfurtherproceedings.
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BACKGROUND
LolacommencedthisFLSAcollectiveactionagainstSkadden,Arps,Slate,
Meagher&FlomLLPandTowerLegalStaffingInc.Inhisfirstamended
complaint,LolaallegedthatSkadden,aDelawarelimitedliabilitypartnership,is
basedinNewYorkCity.HeallegesthatTowerisaNewYorkcorporationthat
providesattorneysandparalegalsonacontractbasistovariouslawfirmsand
corporatelawdepartments.LolaallegesthatSkaddenandTower(together,
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Defendants)werejointemployerswithinthemeaningofFLSA.
Lola,aNorthCarolinaresident,allegesthatbeginninginApril2012,he
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workedforDefendantsforfifteenmonthsinNorthCarolina.Heconducted
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documentreviewforSkaddeninconnectionwithamultidistrictlitigation
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pendingintheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheNorthernDistrictofOhio.
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LolaisanattorneylicensedtopracticelawinCalifornia,butheisnotadmittedto
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practicelawineitherNorthCarolinaortheNorthernDistrictofOhio.
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LolaallegesthathisworkwascloselysupervisedbytheDefendants,and
hisentireresponsibility...consistedof(a)lookingatdocumentstoseewhat
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searchterms,ifany,appearedinthedocuments,(b)markingthosedocuments
intothecategoriespredeterminedbyDefendants,and(c)attimesdrawingblack
boxestoredactportionsofcertaindocumentsbasedonspecificprotocolsthat
Defendantsprovided.Appxat2028.LolafurtherallegesthatDefendants
providedhimwiththedocumentshereviewed,thesearchtermshewastousein
connectionwiththosedocuments,andtheprocedureshewastofollowifthe
searchtermsappeared.Lolawaspaid$25anhourforhiswork,andworked
roughlyfortyfivetofiftyfivehoursaweek.Hewaspaidatthesamerateforany
hoursheworkedinexcessoffortyhoursperweek.Lolawastoldthathewasan
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employeeofTower,buthewasalsotoldthatheneededtofollowanyprocedures
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setbySkaddenattorneys,andheworkedunderthesupervisionofSkadden
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attorneys.Otherattorneysemployedtoworkonthesameprojectperformed
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similarworkandwerelikewisepaidhourlyratesthatremainedthesameforany
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hoursworkedinexcessoffortyhoursperweek.
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Defendantsmovedtodismissthecomplaint,arguingthatLolawasexempt
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fromFLSAsovertimerulesbecausehewasalicensedattorneyengagedinthe
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practiceoflaw.Thedistrictcourtgrantedthemotion,finding(1)state,not
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federal,standardsappliedindeterminingwhetheranattorneywaspracticing
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lawunderFLSA;(2)NorthCarolinahadthegreatestinterestintheoutcomeof
thelitigation,thusNorthCarolinaslawshouldapply;and(3)Lolawasengaged
inthepracticeoflawasdefinedbyNorthCarolinalaw,andwasthereforean
exemptemployeeunderFLSA.Lolav.Skadden,Arps,Slate,Meagher&Flom,LLP,
No.13cv5008(RJS),2014WL4626228(S.D.N.Y.Sept.16,2014).Thisappeal
followed.
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DISCUSSION
Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsdismissalofacomplaintforfailureto
stateaclaim,acceptingallfactualallegationsinthecomplaintastrueand
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drawingallreasonableinferencesinplaintiffsfavor.Freidusv.BarclaysBank
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PLC,734F.3d132,137(2dCir.2013).
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PursuanttoFLSA,employersmustgenerallypayemployeesworking
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overtimeoneandonehalftimestheregularrateofpayforanyhoursworkedin
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excessoffortyaweek.29U.S.C.207(a)(1).However,employeesemployedina
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bonafide...professionalcapacityareexemptfromthatrequirement.Id.
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213(a)(1).Thestatutedoesnotprovideadefinitionofprofessionalcapacity,
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insteaddelegatingtheauthoritytodosototheSecretaryoftheDepartmentof
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Labor(DOL),whodefinesprofessionalemployeestoincludethose
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employeeswhoare:
(1)Compensatedonasalaryorfeebasisatarateofnot
lessthan$455perweek...;and
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29C.F.R.541.300.Theserequirements,however,donotapplytoattorneys
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engagedinthepracticeoflaw.29C.F.R.541.304(d)(Therequirementsof
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541.300andsubpartG(salaryrequirements)ofthispartdonotapplytothe
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employeesdescribedinthissection.).Instead,attorneysfallunder29C.F.R.
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541.304,whichexemptsfromtheovertimerequirement:
(2)Whoseprimarydutyistheperformanceofwork:
(i)Requiringknowledgeofanadvancedtypeina
fieldofscienceorlearningcustomarilyacquiredbya
prolongedcourseofintellectualinstruction;or
(ii)Requiringinvention,imagination,originality
ortalentinarecognizedfieldofartisticorcreative
endeavor.
Anyemployeewhoistheholderofavalidlicenseor
certificatepermittingthepracticeoflawormedicineor
anyoftheirbranchesandisactuallyengagedinthe
practicethereof[.]
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Id.541.304(a)(1).WhileitisundisputedthatLolaisanattorneylicensedto
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practicelawinCalifornia,thepartiesdisputewhetherthedocumentreviewhe
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allegedlyperformedconstitutesengaginginthepracticeoflaw.
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I.
Practiceoflaw.
Lolaurgesustofashionanewfederalstandarddefiningthepracticeof
lawwithinthemeaningofSection541.304.Wedeclinetodosobecausewe
agreewiththedistrictcourtthatthedefinitionofpracticeoflawisprimarilya
matterofstateconcern.Lola,2014WL4626228,at*4(citationomitted).
InKamenv.KemperFinancialServices,Inc.,500U.S.90(1991),theSupreme
Courtexaminedwhether,inanactionbasedonafederalstatute,federalcommon
lawshouldincorporatestatelaw.There,theissuewaswhetherthecontoursof
thedemandfutilityrequirementoftheInvestmentCompanyActof1940mustbe
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discernedbyreferencetostatelaworbyreferencetofederallaw.Id.at9798.The
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KamenCourtexplainedthatacourtshouldendeavortofilltheintersticesof
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federalremedialschemeswithuniformfederalrulesonlywhentheschemein
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questionevidencesadistinctneedfornationwidelegalstandards,orwhen
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expressprovisionsinanalogousstatutoryschemesembodycongressionalpolicy
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choicesreadilyapplicabletothematterathand.Id.at98(citationomitted).
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Otherwise,theCourtcontinued:
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wehaveindicatedthatfederalcourtsshould
incorporatestatelawasthefederalruleofdecision,
unlessapplicationoftheparticularstatelawinquestion
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wouldfrustratespecificobjectivesofthefederal
programs.Thepresumptionthatstatelawshouldbe
incorporatedintofederalcommonlawisparticularly
stronginareasinwhichprivatepartieshaveentered
legalrelationshipswiththeexpectationthattheirrights
andobligationswouldbegovernedbystatelaw
standards.
Id.(internalcitation,quotationmarksandalterationsomitted).
Applyingtheseprinciples,theSupremeCourtexplainedthatwhereagap
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inthefederalsecuritieslawsmustbebridgedbyarulethatbearsonthe
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allocationofgoverningpowerswithinthecorporation,federalcourtsshould
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incorporatestatelawintofederalcommonlawunlesstheparticularstatelawin
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questionisinconsistentwiththepoliciesunderlyingthefederalstatute.Id.at
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108(emphasisomitted).Thus,theKamencourtconcludedthatthescopeofthe
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demandrequirementmustbedeterminedbythelawofthestateof
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incorporation.Id.at108.
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DeSylvav.Ballentine,351U.S.570(1956),isalsoinstructiveindetermining
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whetherstateorfederallawshoulddefinethesweepofafederalright..InDe
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Sylva,theSupremeCourtexaminedthequestionofwhetheranillegitimatechild
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wasachildwithinthemeaningoftheCopyrightAct.Notingthat[t]hescope
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ofafederalrightis,ofcourse,afederalquestion,butthatdoesnotmeanthatits
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contentisnottobedeterminedbystate,ratherthanfederallaw,id.,thecourt
alsoobservedthat[t]hisisespeciallytruewhereastatutedealswithafamilial
relationship;thereisnofederallawofdomesticrelations,whichisprimarilya
matterofstateconcern.Id.TheCourtthenreliedonstatelawtodefinechild
withinthemeaningofthefederalCopyrightAct.Id.at581.
Justasthereisnofederallawofdomesticrelations,herethereisno
federallawgoverninglawyers.Regulatingthepracticeoflawistraditionallya
stateendeavor.Nofederalschemeexistsforissuinglawlicenses.Asthedistrict
courtaptlyobserved,[s]tatesregulatealmosteveryaspectoflegalpractice:they
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settheeligibilitycriteriaandoverseetheadmissionprocessforwouldbe
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lawyers,promulgatetherulesofprofessionalethics,anddisciplinelawyerswho
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failtofollowthoserules,amongmanyotherresponsibilities.Lola,2014WL
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4626228,at*4.TheexemptioninFLSAspecificallyreliesontheattorney
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possessingavalidlicense...permittingthepracticeoflaw.29C.F.R.
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541.304(a)(1).TheregulationshistoryindicatesthattheDOLwaswellawarethat
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suchlicenseswereissuedbythestates.SeeWageandHourandPublicContracts
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Divisions,U.S.DepartmentofLabor,ReportandRecommendationsofthe
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PresidingOfficeratPublicHearingsonProposedRevisionsofRegulations,Part
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541,at77(1949)(notingthattheexemptionforattorneyswasbasedinparton
theuniversalrequirementoflicensingbythevariousjurisdictions).Inrejecting
aproposaltoexemptlibrariansfromtheovertimerules,theDOLnotedthat
statesdonotgenerallylicensethepracticeoflibraryscience,sothatinthis
respect...theprofessionisnotcomparabletothatoflawormedicine.Id.A
similardistinctionwasdrawninadiscussionofextendingtheexemptionto
architectsandengineers:
Thepracticeoflawandmedicinehasalonghistoryof
statelicensingandcertification;thelicensingof
engineersandarchitectsisrelativelyrecent.Whileitis
impossibleforadoctororlawyerlegallytopracticehis
professionwithoutacertificateorlicense,many
architectsandengineersperformworkinthesefields
withoutpossessinglicenses,althoughfailuretoholda
licensemaylimittheirpermissibleactivitiestothoseof
lesserresponsibilities.
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Id.Wethusfindnoerrorwiththedistrictcourtsconclusionthatweshouldlook
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tostatelawindefiningthepracticeoflaw.
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II.
Choiceoflaw.
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Weturntothequestionofwhichstateslawtoapply.Wherejurisdiction
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isbasedontheexistenceofafederalquestion...wehavenothesitatedtoapply
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afederalcommonlawchoiceoflawanalysis.Barkanicv.Gen.Admin.ofCivil
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AviationofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,923F.2d957,961(2dCir.1991).The
federalcommonlawchoiceoflawruleistoapplythelawofthejurisdiction
havingthegreatestinterestinthelitigation.InreKoreag,ControleetRevisionS.A.,
961F.2d341,350(2dCir.1992).Here,therearefourpossibleforumstates:North
Carolina(whereLolaworkedandlived);Ohio(wheretheunderlyinglitigationis
venued);California(whereLolaisbarred);andNewYork(whereSkaddenis
located).
[W]henconductingafederalcommonlawchoiceoflawanalysis,absent
guidancefromCongress,wemayconsulttheRestatement(Second)ofConflictof
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Laws.EliLillyDoBrasil,Ltdav.Fed.ExpressCorp.,502F.3d78,81(2dCir.2007).
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TheRestatementprovidesinrelevantpartthat:
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Thevalidityofacontractfortherenditionof
servicesandtherightscreatedtherebyaredetermined,
intheabsenceofaneffectivechoiceoflawbythe
parties,bythelocallawofthestatewherethecontract
requiresthattheservices,oramajorportionofthe
services,berendered,unless,withrespecttothe
particularissue,someotherstatehasamoresignificant
relationshipundertheprinciplesstatedin6tothe
transactionandtheparties,inwhich[]eventthelocal
lawoftheotherstatewillbeapplied.
Restatement(Second)ofConflictofLaws196(1971).Here,theserviceswere
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renderedinNorthCarolina.Moreover,asthestatewhereLolaresides,North
CarolinapossessesastronginterestinmakingsureLolaisfairlypaid.Wefindno
errorinthedistrictcourtsdecisiontoapplyNorthCarolinalaw.
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III.
DefinitionofpracticeoflawunderNorthCarolinalaw.
NorthCarolinadefinesthepracticeoflawinitsGeneralStatutes,Section
842.1,whichprovidesthat:
ThephrasepracticelawasusedinthisChapter
isdefinedtobeperforminganylegalserviceforany
otherperson,firmorcorporation,withorwithout
compensation,specificallyincluding...thepreparation
andfilingofpetitionsforuseinanycourt,including
administrativetribunalsandotherjudicialor
quasijudicialbodies,orassistingbyadvice,counsel,or
otherwiseinanylegalwork;andtoadviseorgive
opinionuponthelegalrightsofanyperson,firmor
corporation....
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N.C.Gen.Stat.842.1.NorthCarolinacourtstypicallyreadSection842.1in
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conjunctionwithSection844,whichdefinestheunauthorizedpracticeoflawas
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follows:
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Exceptasotherwisepermittedbylaw,...itshall
beunlawfulforanypersonorassociationofpersons
exceptactivemembersoftheBar,fororwithoutafeeor
consideration,togivelegaladviceorcounsel,[or]
performfororfurnishtoanotherlegalservices....
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Id.844;seeN.C.StateBarv.Lienguard,Inc.,No.11cvs7288,2014WL1365418,
at*67(N.C.Super.Ct.Apr.4,2014).
TheNorthCarolinaGeneralStatutesdonotclarifywhetherlegal
servicesincludestheperformanceofdocumentreview.Nevertheless,theNorth
CarolinaStateBarissuedaformalethicsopinionsheddinglightonwhatismeant
bylegalservices.1Thequestionconsideredintheethicsopinionwas:Maya
lawyerethicallyoutsourcelegalsupportservicesabroad,iftheindividual
providingtheservicesiseitheranonlawyeroralawyernotadmittedtopractice
intheUnitedStates(collectivelyforeignassistants)?Initsopinion,theBars
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EthicsCommitteeopinedthat:
Alawyermayuseforeignassistantsforadministrative
supportservicessuchasdocumentassembly,
accounting,andclericalsupport.Alawyermayalsouse
foreignassistantsforlimitedlegalsupportservicessuch
asreviewingdocuments;conductingduediligence;
draftingcontracts,pleadings,andmemorandaoflaw;
andconductinglegalresearch.Foreignassistantsmay
notexerciseindependentlegaljudgmentinmaking
decisionsonbehalfofaclient....Thelimitationsonthe
typeoflegalservicesthatcanbeoutsourced,in
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Theethicsopiniontechnicallyreferredonlytolegalsupportservices.
NothingintheopinionorintherelevantNorthCarolinacaselawsuggeststhat
thereisanymeaningfuldifferencebetweenlegalservicesandlegalsupport
services.
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conjunctionwiththeselectionandsupervisory
requirementsassociatedwiththeuseofforeign
assistants,insuresthattheclientiscompetently
represented.SeeRule5.5(d).Nevertheless,when
outsourcinglegalsupportservices,lawyersneedtobe
mindfuloftheprohibitionsonunauthorizedpracticeof
lawinChapter84oftheGeneralStatutesandonthe
prohibitiononaidingtheunauthorizedpracticeoflaw
inRule5.5(d).
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N.C.StateBarEthicsCommittee,2007FormalEthicsOp.12(Apr.25,2008).
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reviewisconsideredlegalsupportservices,alongwithdraftingcontracts,
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pleadings,andmemorandaoflaw[,]andconductinglegalresearch;(2)the
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ethicsopiniondrawsaclearlinebetweenlegalsupportservices,likedocument
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review,andadministrativesupportservices,likedocumentassembly,
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accounting,andclericalsupport;and(3)byemphasizingthatonlylawyersmay
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undertakelegalwork,theethicsopinionmakesclearthatdocumentreview,like
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otherlegalsupportservices,constitutesthepracticeoflawandmaybelawfully
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performedbyanonlawyeronlyifthatnonlawyerissupervisedbyalicensed
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attorney.Lola,2014WL4626228,at*1112(alterationintheoriginal).Thus,the
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districtcourtconcluded,anylevelofdocumentreviewisconsideredthepractice
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oflawinNorthCarolina.Id.at12.Thedistrictcourtalsoconcludedthatbecause
Thedistrictcourtfoundthat(1)underNorthCarolinalaw,document
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FLSAsregulatoryschemecarvesdoctorsandlawyersoutofthesalaryandduty
analysisemployedtodiscernifothertypesofemployeesfallwithinthe
professionalexemption,afactintensiveinquiryisatoddswithFLSAs
regulatoryscheme.Id.at*13.
Wedisagree.Thedistrictcourterredinconcludingthatengagingin
documentreviewperseconstitutespracticinglawinNorthCarolina.Theethics
opiniondoesnotdelveintopreciselywhattypeofdocumentreviewfallswithin
thepracticeoflaw,butdoesnotethatwhilereviewingdocumentsmaybe
withinthepracticeoflaw,[f]oreignassistantsmaynotexerciseindependent
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legaljudgmentinmakingdecisionsonbehalfofaclient.N.C.StateBarEthics
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Committee,2007FormalEthicsOp.12.Theethicsopinionstronglysuggeststhat
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inherentinthedefinitionofpracticeoflawinNorthCarolinaistheexerciseof
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atleastamodicumofindependentlegaljudgment.2
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Wereitanoption,wemighthaveoptedtocertifythequestionofhowto
definepracticeoflawtotheNorthCarolinacourts.SeeAGIAssocs.LLCv.City
ofHickory,N.C.,773F.3d576,579n.4(4thCir.2014)(Alackofcontrolling
precedentonthestateruleofdecisioncanmeritcertificationoftheissuetothe
stateshighestcourt.TheStateofNorthCarolina,however,hasnocertification
procedureinplaceforfederalcourtstocertifyquestionstoitscourts.).
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Althoughthepartiesdonotcite,andourresearchdidnotreveal,acase
directlyonpoint,twodecisionsoftheNorthCarolinacourtsthatrelied,inpart,
ontheexerciseoflegaljudgmenttosupportafindingofunauthorizedpracticeof
lawalsosupportsuchaconclusion.Lienguard,2014WL1365418,at*911(lien
filingserviceengagedinunauthorizedpracticeoflawinpreparingclaimsof
lien);LegalZoom.com,Inc.v.N.C.StateBar,No.11cvs15111,2014WL1213242,at
*12(N.C.Super.Ct.Mar.24,2014)(notingthatthescrivenersexceptiontothe
unauthorizedpracticeoflawallowsunlicensedindividuals[to]record
informationthatanotherprovideswithoutengagingin[theunlicensedpractice
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oflaw]aslongastheydonotalsoprovideadviceorexpresslegaljudgments).
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Moreover,manyotherstatesalsoconsidertheexerciseofsomelegal
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judgmentanessentialelementofthepracticeoflaw.See,e.g.,InreDisciplineof
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Lerner,197P.3d1067,106970(Nev.2008)(exerciseoflegaljudgmentona
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clientsbehalfkeytoanalysisofwhetherapersonengagedintheunauthorized
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practiceoflaw);Peoplev.Shell,148P.3d162,174(Colo.2006)([O]neofthe
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touchstonesofColoradosbanontheunauthorizedpracticeoflawisan
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unlicensedpersonofferingadviceorjudgmentaboutlegalmatterstoanother
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personforuseinaspecificlegalsetting);Or.StateBarv.Smith,942P.2d793,800
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(Or.Ct.App.1997)(Thepracticeoflawmeanstheexerciseofprofessional
judgmentinapplyinglegalprinciplestoaddressanotherpersonsindividualized
needsthroughanalysis,advice,orotherassistance.);InreDiscipio,645N.E.2d
906,910(Ill.1994)(Thefocusoftheinquiryintowhetherpersonengagedin
unauthorizedpracticeoflawis,infact,whethertheactivityinquestionrequired
legalknowledgeandskillinordertoapplylegalprinciplesandprecedent.);In
reRowe,80N.Y.2d336,34142(1992)(authoringanarticleonthelegalrightsof
psychiatricpatientswhorefusetreatmentdidnotconstitutethepracticeoflaw
because[t]hepracticeoflawinvolvestherenderingoflegaladviceandopinions
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directedtoparticularclients).
ThegravamenofLolascomplaintisthatheperformeddocumentreview
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undersuchtightconstraintsthatheexercisednolegaljudgmentwhatsoeverhe
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allegesthatheusedcriteriadevelopedbyotherstosimplysortdocumentsinto
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differentcategories.Acceptingthoseallegationsastrue,aswemustonamotion
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todismiss,wefindthatLolaadequatelyallegedinhiscomplaintthathefailedto
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exerciseanylegaljudgmentinperforminghisdutiesforDefendants.Afair
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readingofthecomplaintinthelightmostfavorabletoLolaisthatheprovided
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servicesthatamachinecouldhaveprovided.Thepartiesthemselvesagreedat
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oralargumentthatanindividualwho,inthecourseofreviewingdiscovery
documents,undertakestasksthatcouldotherwisebeperformedentirelybya
machinecannotbesaidtoengageinthepracticeoflaw.Wethereforevacatethe
judgmentofthedistrictcourtandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwith
thisopinion.
CONCLUSION
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Forthereasonsgivenabove,thejudgmentofthedistrictcourtisvacated,
andthismatterremanded.
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CHIEF JUDGE
CLERK OF COURT
DC Docket #: 13-cv-5008
DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)
DC Judge: Sullivan
CHIEF JUDGE
CLERK OF COURT
DC Docket #: 13-cv-5008
DC Court: SDNY (NEW YORK CITY)
DC Judge: Sullivan
_____________________
(VERIFICATION HERE)
________________________
Signature