FULLTEXT

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144934

January 15, 2004

ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA,

petitioners,
vs.
FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her corespondents), and her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE
JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all surnamed DEL ROSARIO,
respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals
decision1, dated November 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60552, which
affirmed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 151-M-93. The RTC granted respondents
complaint for nullity of contract of sale and annulment of the transfer
certificates of title issued in favor of petitioners.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents Fidela (now deceased), Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr.,
Carlos, Juanito and Eloisa, all surnamed Del Rosario, were the registered
owners of Lot No. 1083-C, a parcel of land situated at Lolomboy, Bulacan.
This lot spanned an area of 15,029 square meters and was covered by TCT
No. T-50.668 (M) registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and Eloisa,
executed a Special Power of Attorney3 in favor of their mother and corespondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell, lease, mortgage, transfer and
convey their rights over Lot No. 1083-C.4 Subsequently, Fidela borrowed
P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987. To secure the loan,
she and Mariano Rivera agreed to execute a deed of real estate mortgage
and an agreement to sell the land. Consequently, on March 9, 1987, Mariano
went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to have three documents drafted: the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage5, a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell)6, and a
Deed of Absolute Sale.7
The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein
petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C for a

consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price was to be paid in three

installments: P250,000 upon the signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on
August 31, 1987, and P1,141,622.50 on December 31, 1987.8 It also
provided that the Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed only after the
second installment is paid and a postdated check for the last installment is
deposited with Fidela.9 As previously stated, however, Mariano had already
caused the drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan,
the said deed stipulated a purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a
certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.10 This deed, as we ll as
the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage11, was signed by
Marianos children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and
mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.12
The following day, Mariano Rivera returned to the office of Atty. Barangan,
bringing with him the signed documents. He also brought with him Fidela and
her son Oscar del Rosario, so that the latter two may sign the mortgage and
the Kasunduan there.
Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the Real Estate
Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature on all the three documents
in the office of Atty. Barangan on the said day, March 10, 1987. Mariano then
gave Fidela the amount of P250,000. On October 30, 1987, he also gave
Fidela a check for P200,000. In the ensuing months, also, Mariano gave
Oscar del Rosario several amounts totaling P67,800 upon the latters demand
for the payment of the balance despite Oscars lack of authority to receive
payments under the Kasunduan.13 While Mariano was making payments to
Oscar, Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano
to guarantee compliance with the Kasunduan.
When Mariano unreasonably refused to return the TCT,14 one of the
respondents, Carlos del Rosario, caused the annotation on TCT No. T-50.668
(M) of an Affidavit of Loss of the owners duplicate copy of the title on
September 7, 1992. This annotation was offset, however, when Mariano
registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on October 13, 1992, and afterwards
caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Recovery of Title on October 14,
1992. Thus, TCT No. T-50.668 (M) was cancelled, and in its place was issued
TCT No. 158443 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose
Rivera.15
Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the new owners of Lot
No. 1083-C, were also negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the
land of the latters tenurial right. When Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial
right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in
exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted.
Subdivision Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made on August 12,
1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No. 158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was
divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.16
To document their agreement with Feliciano Nieto, the Riveras executed a
Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil ng Karapatan sa Pagmamay-ari ng Bahagi ng Isang

Lagay na Lupa (Written Abdication of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of

Land)17 on November 16, 1992. Four days later, they registered the
document with the Registry of Deeds. Two titles were then issued: TCT No. T161784 (M) in the name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq. m. of land, and TCT No. T161785 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera, over
the remaining 10,529 sq. m. of land.18
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint19 in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be rescinded for failure of the
Riveras to comply with its conditions, with damages. They also sought the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M), and the
reconveyance to them of the entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M)
restored.20
Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into a deed of sale
at the time of its execution and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken
belief that she was merely signing copies of the Kasunduan. According to
respondents, the position where Fidelas name was typed and where she was
supposed to sign her name in the Kasunduan was roughly in the same
location where it was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued that
given Fidelas advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time)21 and the
fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at the time of
signing, Fidela could have easily and mistakenly presumed that she was
merely signing additional copies of the Kasunduan.22 They also alleged that
petitioners acquired possession of the TCT through fraud and machination.
In their defense, petitioners denied the allegations and averred that the Deed
of Absolute Sale was validly entered into by both parties. According to
petitioners, Fidela del Rosario mortgaged Lot No. 1083-C to their predecessor
in interest, Mariano Rivera, on March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela
decided to sell the lot to petitioners for P2,161,622.50. When Mariano agreed
(on the condition that Lot No. 1083-C will be delivered free from all liens and
encumbrances), the Kasunduan was consequently drawn up and signed. After
that, however, Fidela informed Mariano of the existence of Feliciano Nietos
tenancy right over the lot to the extent of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano
continued to want the land, albeit on a much lower price of only P601,160, as
he had still to deal with Feliciano Nieto, the parties drafted the Deed of
Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to supersede the Kasunduan.
Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action had been barred
by laches or estoppel since more than four years has lapsed from the time the
parties executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time
respondents instituted their complaint on February 18, 1993.
Petitioners also filed a counterclaim asking for moral and exemplary damages
and the payment of attorneys fees and costs of suit.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 as null and
void;
2. Annulling TCT No. T-158443 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M) both in the
names of Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, all surnamed Rivera;
3. Declaring the plaintiffs to be the legitimate owners of the land covered by
TCT No. T-161785 (M) and ordering defendant Adelfa, Cynthia, and Jose, all
surnamed Rivera, to reconvey the same to the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel TCT No. T-161785 (M)
and to issue in its place a new certificate of title in the name of the plaintiffs as
their names appear in TCT No. T-50.668;
5. Declaring TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto as valid;
6. Ordering the defendant Riveras to pay the plaintiffs solidarily the following
amounts:
a) P191,246.98 as balance for the 4,500 square-meter portion given to
defendant Feliciano Nieto
b) P200,000.00 as moral damages
c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
d) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees
e) costs of the suit.
7. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant Riveras;
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and the crossclaim of defendant Feliciano
Nieto.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was
genuine, but found that Fidela never intended to sign the said deed. Noting
the peculiar differences between the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the trial court concluded that the Riveras were guilty of fraud in securing
the execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds.24 This
notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT No. T-161784 (M)
in the name of Feliciano Nieto since there was no fraud proven on Nietos
part. The trial court found him to have relied in good faith on the
representations of ownership of Mariano Rivera. Thus, Nietos rights,
according to the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent purchaser for
value.25

On the foregoing, the trial court rescinded the Kasunduan but ruled that the
P450,000 paid by petitioners be retained by respondents as payment for the
4,500 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 1083-C that petitioners gave to Nieto.26 The
trial court likewise ordered petitioners to pay P191,246.98 as balance for the
price of the land given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as
exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.27
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment was modified as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is
declared null and void only insofar as Lot No. 1083-C is concerned, but valid
insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid
insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is concerned and should not be annulled, and
increasing the amount to be paid by the defendants-appellants to the
plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500 square meters of land given to Feliciano
Nieto to P323,617.50.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
While this petition was pending, respondent Fidela del Rosario died. She was
substituted by her children, herein respondents.
In this petition, petitioners rely on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS,
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING LOT 1083-A IN FAVOR
OF THE PETITIONERS AND FELICIANO NIETO WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY A
PART AND PORTION OF THE EXISTING NORTH LUZON EXPRESSWAY
AND AS SUCH ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION,
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND
OTHER LAWFUL FEES WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT OF
THE COURT A QUO (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) AT THE TIME OF THE
FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT IN 1993 PURSUANT TO THE
SIOL29 DOCTRINE.
III

[THE] TRIAL COURT AWARDED RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY PRAYED

FOR IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT REQUIRING THE
PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL
FEES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE RESPONDENTS
CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVER THE RES CONSIDERING THAT
FELICIANO NIETO IS AN AGRICULTURAL TENANT OF THE RICELAND IN
QUESTION.
V
RESPONDENTS[] MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION [IS] FOR RESCISSION OF
CONTRACT WHICH IS SUBSIDIARY IN NATURE[,] AND ANNULMENT OF
SALE[,] BOTH OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED UNDER
ARTICLES 1389 AND 1391 OF THE CIVIL CODE.30
Petitioners assignment of errors may be reduced into three issues: (1) Did the
trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency in
the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an
agricultural tenant is involved in the case? (2) Did the Court of Appeals
correctly rule that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid insofar as Lot 1083-A is
concerned? (3) Is the respondents cause of action barred by prescription?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not validly acquired
because the filing fees respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief
sought was reconveyance of land that was worth P2,141,622.50 under the
Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid filing fees
amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the
doctrine in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion31 and attach a
certification32 from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City.
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct
amount of docket fees when they filed the complaint. If the assessment was
inadequate, they could not be faulted because the clerk of court made no
notice of demand or reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also
add that since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket
fees in the lower court, they cannot raise the same on appeal.33
We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the
complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,34 this Court
ruled that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the
payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is
insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower
court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a

deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay the
deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees
as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that
the assessment was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of
docket fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with the
opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial region.
Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the instant case.
Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the
case because it involves an agricultural tenant. They insist that by virtue of
Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038,35 it is the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.36
Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged
in the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.37 However, the cause of action in this
case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable parties, for
rescission of the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the
TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano Nieto was impleaded merely as a
necessary party, stemming from whatever rights he may have acquired by
virtue of the agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding
TCT issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over
the case.
On the second issue, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
Deed of Absolute Sale is void only insofar as it covers Lot No. 1083-C, we find
that the said deed is void in its entirety. Noteworthy is that during the oral
arguments before the Court of Appeals, both petitioners and respondents
admitted that Lot No. 1083-A had been expropriated by the government long
before the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into.38 Whats more, this case
involves only Lot No. 1083-C. It never involved Lot 1083-A. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on Lot 1083-A, as it was never
touched upon in the pleadings or made the subject of evidence at trial.39
As to the third issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383,1389 and 139142 of the
New Civil Code. They submit that the complaint for rescission of the
Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for respondents failure to prove that
there was no other legal means available to obtain reparation other than to file
a case for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover, petitioners
contend that even assuming respondents had satisfied this requirement,
prescription had already set in, the complaint having been filed in 1992 or five
years after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March 10, 1987.
Respondents counter that Article 1383 of the New Civil Code applies only to
rescissible contracts enumerated under Article 1381 of the same Code, while

the cause of action in this case is for rescission of a reciprocal obligation, to

which Article 119143 of the Code applies. They assert that their cause of
action had not prescribed because the four-year prescriptive period is counted
from the date of discovery of the fraud, which, in this case, was only in 1992.
Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code
should be distinguished from rescission of contracts under Article 1383 of the
same Code. Both presuppose contracts validly entered into as well as
subsisting, and both require mutual restitution when proper, nevertheless they
are not entirely identical.44
In countless times there has been confusion between rescission under
Articles 1381 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Through this case we again
emphasize that rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 is
different from rescissible contracts under Chapter 6 of the law on contracts
under the Civil Code.45 While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the
original term used in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from which Article 1191
was based, was resolution.46 Resolution is a principal action that is based on
breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action
limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil
Code,47 which expressly enumerates the following rescissible contracts:
ART. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom
they represent suffer lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things
which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the
lesion stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other
manner collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into
by the defendant without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.
Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those situations
mentioned in Article 1381. Consequently, Article 1383 is inapplicable. Hence,
we rule in favor of the respondents.
May the contract entered into between the parties, however, be rescinded
based on Article 1191?
A careful reading of the Kasunduan reveals that it is in the nature of a contract
to sell, as distinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the title
to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while

in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is

not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.48 In a
contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive
condition,49 the failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but a
situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
acquiring an obligatory force.50
Respondents in this case bound themselves to deliver a deed of absolute sale
and clean title covering Lot No. 1083-C after petitioners have made the
second installment. This promise to sell was subject to the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition that petitioners pay P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and
deposit a postdated check for the third installment of P1,141,622.50.51
Petitioners, however, failed to complete payment of the second installment.
The non-fulfillment of the condition rendered the contract to sell ineffective
and without force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach contemplated
in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the obligors failure to comply with an
obligation already extant, not a failure of a condition to render binding that
obligation.52 Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but an event
that prevents the vendors obligation to convey title from acquiring binding
force.53 Hence, the agreement of the parties in the instant case may be set
aside, but not because of a breach on the part of petitioners for failure to
complete payment of the second installment. Rather, their failure to do so
prevented the obligation of respondents to convey title from acquiring an
obligatory force.54
Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to petitioners assertion,
we find that prescription has not yet set in. Article 1391 states that the action
for annulment of void contracts shall be brought within four years. This period
shall begin from the time the fraud or mistake is discovered. Here, the fraud
was discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is well
within the prescriptive period.
On the matter of damages, the Court of Appeals awarded respondents
P323,617.50 as actual damages for the loss of the land that was given to
Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages,
P50,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of suit. Modifications are in order,
however.
Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully causes injury
to property, or in cases of breach of contract where the other party acts
fraudulently or in bad faith.55 Exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good,56 when the party to a contract acts
in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.57 Attorneys fees
are allowed when exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a
suit is compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.58
While it has been sufficiently proven that the respondents are entitled to
damages, the actual amounts awarded by the lower court must be reduced
because damages are not intended for a litigants enrichment, at the expense

of the petitioners.59 The purpose for the award of damages other than actual
damages would be served, in this case, by reducing the amounts awarded.
Respondents were amply compensated through the award of actual
damages, which should be sustained. The other damages awarded total
P300,000, or almost equivalent to the amount of actual damages. Practically
this will double the amount of actual damages awarded to respondents. To
avoid breaching the doctrine on enrichment, award for damages other than
actual should be reduced. Thus, the amount of moral damages should be set
at only P30,000, and the award of exemplary damages at only P20,000. The
award of attorneys fees should also be reduced to P20,000, which under the
circumstances of this case appears justified and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED.
The Deed of Absolute Sale in question is declared NULL and VOID in its
entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondents P323,617.50 as actual
damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 98-111. Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofilea, with
Associate Justices Omar U. Amin and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring.
2 Id. at 158-189; Records, pp. 1080-1121.
3 Records, pp. 386-387.
4 Rollo, pp. 99-100.
5 Records, pp. 395-396.
6 Rollo, pp. 115-116; Records, pp. 11-12.
7 Records, p. 100.
8 Rollo, p. 100.
9 Annex "C", Id. at 115.
10 Annex "D", Id. at 117-118.
11 Records, pp. 395-396.

12 Rollo, pp. 100-101.

13 Rollo, pp. 101-102.
14 Id. at 165.
15 Id. at 102.
16 Id. at 103.
17 Records, pp. 211-214.
18 Rollo, p. 103.
19 Records, pp. 3-8.
20 Rollo, p. 103.
21 See Rollo, p. 428.
22 See Annexes "C" and "D", Id. at 115-118.
23 Rollo, pp. 188-189.
24 Records, p. 1104.
25 Id. at 1107-1108.
26 Id. at 1109.
27 Id. at 1121.
28 Rollo, p. 110.
29 Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13
February 1989, 170 SCRA 274.
30 Rollo, p. 66.
31 G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989, 170 SCRA 274.
32 Annex "V", Rollo, p. 370.
33 Rollo, p. 380.
34 Supra, note 31 at 285.
35 P.D. No. 316, "Prohibiting the Ejectment of Tenant-Tillers from their
Farmholdings Pending the Promulgation of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 27". P.D. 1038, "Strengthening the

Security of Tenure of Tenant-Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Private

Agricultural Lands".
36 Rollo, pp. 285-312.
37 Section 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure.
38 CA Rollo, pp. 219-251.
39 De Ysasi v. Arceo, G.R. No. 136586, 22 November 2001, 370 SCRA 296,
303, citing Lazo v. Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., No. L-27365, 30
January 1970, 31 SCRA 329, 334.
40 Art. 1383. The action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be instituted
except when the party suffering damages has no other legal means to obtain
reparation for the same.
41 Art. 1389. The action to claim rescission must be commenced within four
years.

42 Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin:
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect
of the consent ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other
incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.
43 Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also
seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter
should become impossible.