Recent Juris Labor

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March
2015)
Law
RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

Under Section 64 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995 (RA 8024), the liability of the
principal/employer and the recruitment placement agency on any and all claims
under this Rule shall be joint and solidary. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may
be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. Hence, Petra Agency/Royal
Dream International Services/Consolacion "Marla" Nahas were held jointly and
severally ordered to pay complainant Olarte her unpaid salaries. MA.
CONSOLACION M. NAHAS, doing business under the name and style
PERSONNEL EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNICAL RECRUITMENT AGENCY vs.
JUANITA L. OLARTE, G.R. No. 169247, June 2, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The contract was already perfected on the date of its execution, which occurred
when Abosta and Hilario agreed on the object and the cause, as well as on the rest
of the terms and conditions therein. Naturally, contemporaneous with the perfection
of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, a breach
of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Also, the POEA
Standard Contract must be recognized and respected. Thus, neither the manning
agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without
a valid reason. ABOSTA SHIP MANAGEMENT and/or ARTEMIO CORBILLA vs.
WILHILM M. HILARIO, G.R. No. 195792, November 24, 2014, C.J. Sereno
LABOR STANDARDS
WAGES
The employers argument is a vain attempt to circumvent the minimum wage law
by trying to create a distinction where none exists. There is no substantial
distinction between deducting and charging a facilitys value from the employees
wage. Hence, the legal requirements for creditability apply to both. These
requirements are (a) proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily
furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily
accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities must be charged at fair
and reasonable value. OUR HAUS REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs. ALEXANDER PARIAN, JAY C. ERINCO, ALEXANDER CANLAS, BERNARD
TENEDERO AND JERRY SABULAO, G.R. No. 204651, August 6, 2014, J. Brion
An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the
employees return of its properties. The return of the property owned by their
employer Solid Mills became an obligation or liability on the part of the employees
when the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus, respondent Solid Mills has
the right to withhold petitioners wages and benefits because of this existing debt or
liability. EMER MILAN, RANDY MASANGKAY, WILFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO
DAVID, BONIFACIO MATUNDAN, NORA MENDOZA, ET AL. vs. NATIONAL
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LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG,

G.R. No. 202961, February 04, 2015, J. Leonen
BENEFITS
When an employees injury was the result of the accidental slippage in handling of
the 200-kilogram globe valve, such employee is eligible for disability benefits under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed between his employer and its union.
CARLO F. SUNGA vs. VIRJEN SHIPPING CORPORATION, NISSHO ODYSSEY
SHIP MANAGEMENT PTE. LTD., and/or CAPT. ANGEL ZAMBRANO, G.R. No.
198640, April 23, 2014, J. Brion
The records would reveal that Remedios Yap failed to prove by substantial evidence
that the death of her husband occurred during the term of his employment contract
and that the cause of death was work-related. There is no established link
connecting Dovee Yaps accidental slip to the lung cancer and pneumonia that killed
him. Neither can it be said that Dovee Yaps working conditions increased the risk of
contracting the disease for which he died. In order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer
to be entitled to death compensation from the employer, it must be proven that the
death of the seafarer (1) is work-related; and (2) occurred during the term of his
contract. REMEDIOS O. YAP vs. ROVER MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION,
MR. RUEL BENISANO and/or UCO MARINE CONTRACTING W.L.L., G.R. No.
198342, August 13, 2014, J. Peralta
The nature of employment can possibly aggravate a pre-existing illness. However,
the causation between the nature of employment and the aggravation of the illness
must still be proven before compensation may be granted. For illness to be
compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and
only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a
reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to
lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he
might have had. FLOR G. DAYO vs. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 210660, January 21, 2015, J. Leonen
As in Dumadag, Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the
conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding
opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down
in Vergara: The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide
that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the
vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the companydesignated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
company-designated physicians assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and
binding on them. Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a
third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done
in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail
of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the companydesignated doctors certification is the final determination that must prevail.
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VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR ERICKSON MARQUEZ vs.

RAMON A. GEPANAGA JR., G.R. No. 206285, February 04, 2015, J. Mendoza
The law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is
that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which
constitutes permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability
benefit would be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the
employee in making ends meet at the time when he is unable to work. MAUNLAD
TRANS., INC./CARNIV AL CRUISE LINES, INC., and MR. AMADO L. CASTRO,
JR. vs. RODOLFO CAMORAL, G.R. No. 211454, February 11, 2015, J. Reyes
SERVICE CHARGE
PPHI did not violate Article 96 of the Labor Code when they refused the Unions
claim for service charges on the specified entries/transactions. Article 96 of the
Labor Code provides for the minimum percentage distribution between the
employer and the employees of the collected service charges, and its integration in
the covered employees wages in the event the employer terminates its policy of
providing for its collection. This last paragraph of Article 96 of the Labor Code
presumes the practice of collecting service charges and the employers termination
of this practice. When this happens, Article 96 requires the employer to incorporate
the amount that the employees had been receiving as share of the collected service
charges into their wages. In cases where no service charges had previously been
collected (as where the employer never had any policy providing for collection of
service charges or had never imposed the collection of service charges on certain
specified transactions), Article 96 will not operate. NATIONAL UNION OF
WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES, PHILIPPINE
PLAZA CHAPTER vs. PHILIPPINES PLAZA INC., G.R. No. 177524, July 23,
2014, J. Brion
SEPARATION PAY
Pursuant to the aforementioned rulings, Camilon is clearly not entitled to separation
pay. Camilon was holding a position which involves a high degree of responsibility
requiring trust and confidence as it involves financial interests of the school. She
was guilty of gross and habitual negligence in failing to regularly pre-audit the
report of the school cashier, check the entries therein and keep custody of the petty
cash fund. Had she been assiduously doing her job, the unaccounted school funds
would have been discovered right away. Hence, she should not be granted
separation pay. To rule otherwise would be to reward Camilon for her negligent acts
instead of punishing her for her offense. This is in line with the Courts ruling in Reno
Foods, Inc. vs. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa-Katipunan that separation pay
is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employees fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code,
as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. It
is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause. IMMACULATE
CONCEPCION ACADEMY/DR. JOSE PAULO E. CAMPOS vs. EVELYN E.
CAMILON, G.R. No. 188035, July 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
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In the absence of a specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of separation

pay on top of the retirement pay, the employee is entitled to both. Retirement
benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive. Retirement benefits are a
form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and are earned
under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company policies. On the
other hand, separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time
of his severance from employment. Moreover, the release and quitclaim signed by
the employee cannot be used by the employer to legalize the denial of the former's
rightful claims. Under prevailing jurisprudence, a quitclaim cannot bar an employee
from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES,
INC. AND REMEGIO M. RAMOS vs. MARINA L. ANGUS, G.R. No. 185449,
November 12, 2014, J. Del Castillo
RETIREMENT PAY
Filipinas was separated from service due to the compulsory retirement as stated in
the GCHS Retirement Plan. Filipinas felt aggrieved, hence she filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The Courts below and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of her
dismissal. The only dispute is the proper computation of her retirement pay. In this
regard, the Supreme Court ruled that for the computation of retirement benefits,
"one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing
one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for SIL. GRACE
CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOL, represented by its Principal, DR. JAMES TAN vs.
FILIPINAS A. LAVANDERA, G.R. No. 177845, August 20, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
The Court is not unaware of its rulings wherein it pronounced that retirement pay
and separation pay are not mutually exclusive (unless there is a specific prohibition
in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan against the payment of
both benefits); however, with Villenas entitlement to retirement pay not included as
an issue in an illegal dismissal case which had already been finally decided, it is
quite absurd for Villena to submit a contemporaneous claim for retirement pay on
the execution phase of these proceedings. On the other hand, with the award of the
other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager made by the CA in its
August 31, 2001 Decision lapsing into finality, the same had already become
immutable and unalterable; this means that they may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law. Thus, it was an error on the part of the CA to
still consider, rule upon, and vary the previous CA Ruling, i.e., August 31, 2001 CA
Decision, on the entitlement of Villena to the benefits of representation,
transportation, and cellular phone usage allowances. CONCEPCION A. VILLENA
vs. BATANGAS II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. AND GEORGE A. DIN, G.R.
No. 205735, February 04, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
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Tenazas, Endraca and Francisco filed an illegal dismissal complaint against the
respondents R. Villegas Taxi Transport and Romualdo Villegas. In their answer, the
respondents claims that Francisco is not their employee and denied having illegally
dismissed Tenazas and Endraca. When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was
held that the employer-employee relationship between respondents and Francisco
was not proven because upon the respondents denial of employer employee
relationship, it behooved Francisco to present substantial evidence to prove that he
is an employee before any question on the legality of his supposed dismissal
becomes appropriate for discussion. Francisco, however, did not offer evidence to
substantiate his claim of employment with the respondents. Also, the court ruled
that the complainants should be reinstated instead of being awarded of separation
pay because it is only where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option that
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should
be awarded as an alternative. BERNARD A. TENAZAS, JAIME M. FRANCISCO
and ISIDRO G. ENDRACA vs. R. VILLEGAS TAXI TRANSPORT and ROMUALDO
VILLEGAS, G.R. No. 192998, April 2, 2014, J. Reyes
Under Article 82 Field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who

regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch
office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. Based on the definition of field personnel
under Article 82, Macasio does not fall under the definition of field personnel.
First, Macasio regularly performed his duties at Davids principal place of business;
second, his actual hours of work could be determined with reasonable certainty;
and, third, David supervised his time and performance of duties. Since Macasio
cannot be considered a field personnel, then he is not exempted from the grant of
holiday, SIL pay even as he was engaged on pakyaw or task basis. Not being a
field personnel, The SC found the CA to be legally correct when it reversed the
NLRCs ruling dismissing Macasios complaint for holiday and SIL pay for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. With respect to the payment of 13th
month pay however, the SC found that the CA legally erred in finding that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in denying this benefit to Macasio.
The totality of the surrounding circumstances of the present case sufficiently points
to an employer-employee relationship existing between David and Macasio. First,
David engaged the services of Macasio. Second, David paid Macasios wages. Third,
David had been setting the day and time when Macasio should report for work. And
fourth, David had the right and power to control and supervise Macasios work as to
the means and methods of performing it. ARIEL L. DAVID, DOING BUSINESS
UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE YIELS HOG DEALER vs. JOHN G. MACASIO,
G.R. No. 195466,July 02, 2014, J. Brion
In concluding that Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes, the CA ratiocinated
that since the performance of his tasks is subject to company rules, regulations,
code of ethics, and periodic evaluation, the element of control is present. The Court
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disagrees. Not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship.

A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules, regulations,
and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee. As long as the level
of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the
assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not
amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee
relationship. In Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. National Labor Relations
Commission it was pronounced that the line should be drawn between rules that
merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result
without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those
that control or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of
such means. The first, which aim only to promote the result, create no employeremployee relationship unlike the second, which address both the result and the
means used to achieve it. ROYAL HOMES MARKETING CORPORATION vs. FIDEL
ALCANTARA, G.R. No. 195190, July 28, 2014, J. Del Castillo
KINDS OF EMPLOYMENT
PROBATIONARY
A probationary employee is one who is on trial by the employer during which the
employer determines whether or not said employee is qualified for permanent
employment. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to
choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment. In that sense, it is
within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or
fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct
of the former before hiring him permanently. While there is no statutory cap on the
minimum term of probation, the law sets a maximum trial period during which the
employer may test the fitness and efficiency of the employee. UNIVERSIDAD DE
STA. ISABEL vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR., G.R. Nos. 196280 &
196286, April 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
A probationary employee is one who is on trial by the employer during which the
employer determines whether or not said employee is qualified for permanent
employment. It is well settled that the employer has the right or is at liberty to
choose who will be hired and who will be denied employment. In that sense, it is
within the exercise of the right to select his employees that the employer may set or
fix a probationary period within which the latter may test and observe the conduct
of the former before hiring him permanently. While there is no statutory cap on the
minimum term of probation, the law sets a maximum trial period during which the
employer may test the fitness and efficiency of the employee. UNIVERSIDAD DE
STA. ISABEL vs. MARVIN-JULIAN L. SAMBAJON, JR., G.R. Nos. 196280 &
196286, April 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
Alcaraz filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. It is the
contention of the Aboott that the Alzaraz is merely a probationary employee. The
Supreme Court ruled that if the probationary employee had been fully apprised by
his employer of these duties and responsibilities, then basic knowledge and
common sense dictate that he must adequately perform the same, else he fails to
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pass the probationary trial and may therefore be subject to termination. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D. FEIST,
MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUT-MISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G.
ALMAZAR
vs.
PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, , G.R. No. 192571, April 22, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
The issue in this case is whether or not Mahilum, VP for sales and Marketing, is
considered as probationary employee. The court ruled that probationary
employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started
working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer
period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis
may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after
a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. PHILIPPINE SPRING
WATER RESOURCES INC., DANILO Y. LUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
JUVENSTEIN B. MAHILUM, G.R. No. 205278, June 11, 2014, J. Mendoza
REGULAR
Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to prove that they
did not commit illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon the employee to first establish
by substantial evidence the fact of his or her dismissal. It is likewise incumbent
upon the employees, however, that they should first establish by competent
evidence the fact of their dismissal from employment. It is an age-old rule that the
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and the proof should be clear,
positive and convincing. Mere allegation is not evidence. Let it be underscored that
the fact of dismissal must be established by positive and overt acts of an employer
indicating the intention to dismiss. In the case at bench, Noblejas was employed by
IMAPI as a training instructor/assessor for a period of three (3) months effective May
20, 2009. After the end of the 3-month period, he was rehired by IMAPI for the same
position and continued to work as such until March 16, 2010. There is no dispute
that the work of Noblejas was necessary or desirable in the business or trade of
IMAPI, a training and assessment center for seamen and officers of vessels.
Moreover, such continuing need for his services is sufficient evidence of the
necessity and indispensability of his services to IMAPIs business. Taken in this light,
Noblejas had indeed attained the status of a regular employee at the time he
ceased to report for work on March 17, 2010.Aside from his mere assertion, no
corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Noblejas to substantiate his
claim that he was dismissed from employment. On the contrary, it is rather the
apparent disinterest of complainant to continue his employment with respondent
company that may be considered a covert act that severed his employment when
the latter did not grant the litany of his demands. DIONARTO Q. NOBLEJAS vs.
ITALIAN MARITIME ACADEMY PHILS., INC., CAPT. NICOLO S. TERREI, RACELI
B. FERREZ and MA. TERESA R. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 207888, June 9, 2014, J.
Mendoza
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To repeat, Lopez is a regular and not a project employee. Hence, the continuation of
his engagement with Irvine, either in Cavite, or possibly, in any of its business
locations, should not have been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project
alone. As the records would show, it merely completed one of its numerous
construction projects which does not, by and of itself, amount to a bona fide
suspension of business operations or undertaking. CRISPIN B. LOPEZ vs. IRVINE
CONSTRUCTION CORP. and TOMAS SY SANTOS, G.R. No. 207253, August
20, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A regular employee is one who is either engaged to perform activities which are
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or those
casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether
continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is employed.
HACIENDA LEDDY/ RICARDO GAMBOA, JR. vs. PAQUITO VILLEGAS, G.R. No.
179654, September 22, 2014, J. Peralta
The respondents contend that the petitioners are temporary employees who are
employed merely for a fixed term and not regular employees. The Supreme Court
ruled that there are two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those who are
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer; and (2) those who have rendered at least one
year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activities in which
they are employed. While fixed term employment is not per se illegal or against
public policy, the criteria above must first be established to the satisfaction of this
Court. ROMEO BASAN, DANILO DIZON, JAIME L. TUMABIAO, JR., ROBERTO
DELA RAMA, JR., RICKY S. NICOLAS, CRISPULO D. DONOR, GALO FALGUERA,
AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 174365-66, February 04, 2015, J. Peralta
PROJECT EMPLOYMENT
In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word
project to prevent employees from attaining a regular status, employers claiming
that their workers are project employees should not only prove that the duration
and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but
also that there was indeed a project. Thus, if a garbage contractor terminates the
employment of its garbage truck drivers and paleros, which the former alleges were
project employees yet the contractor failed to show evidence to prove such
assertion, the presumption under Art. 280 of the labor code that the garbage truck
drivers and paleros are regular employees, and that their refusal to sign
employment contract stating that they were rehired for the duration of the
renewed service contract is not a valid ground for dismissal. OMNI HAULING
SERVICES, INC., LOLITA FRANCO and ANICETO FRANCO vs. BERNARDO
BON, et al., G.R. No. 199388, September 3, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
A careful look at the factual circumstances of this case leads us to the legal
conclusion that the respondents are regular and not project employees. The primary
standard in determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee and the employer's business or
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trade. This connection can be ascertained by considering the nature of the work
performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business, or the trade in
its entirety. Guided by this test, the Court concludes that the respondents' work as
janitors, service crews and sanitation aides, are necessary or desirable to the
petitioner's business of providing janitorial and manpower services to its clients as
an independent contractor. To be valid, an employee's dismissal must comply with
the substantive and procedural requirements of due process. Substantively, a
dismissal should be supported by a just or authorized cause. Procedurally, the
employer must observe the twin notice and hearing requirements in carrying out an
employee's dismissal. Having already determined that the respondents are regular
employees and not project employees, and that the respondents' belated
employment contracts could not be given any binding effect for being signed under
duress, the Court holds that illegal dismissal took place when the petitioner failed to
comply with the substantive and procedural due process requirements of the law.
FVR SKILLS AND SERVICES EXPONENTS, INC. (SKILLEX), FULGENCIO V.
RANA and MONINA R. BURGOS vs. JOVERT SEVA, et al., G.R. No. 200857,
October 22, 2014, J. Brion
Once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks;
and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee.
Petitioners successive re-engagement in order to perform the same kind of work
firmly manifested the necessity and desirability of their work in the usual business
of TNS as a market research facility. Undisputed also is the fact that the petitioners
were assigned office-based tasks from 9:00 oclock in the morning up to 6:00
oclock in the evening, at the earliest, without any corresponding remuneration. In
addition, the phrase because we need further time to determine your competence
on the job in the supposed project employment contract would refer to a
probationary employment. Such phrase changes the tenor of the contract and runs
counter to the very nature of a project employment. JEANETTE V. MANALO, et al.
vs. TNS PHILIPPINES and GARY OCAMPO, G.R. No. 208567, November 26,
2014, J. Mendoza
Sykes Asia terminated the services of the complainants. Hence, the latter filed
complaints for illegal dismissal. In ruling for Sykes Asia, the Supreme Court held that
complainant were just mere project employees, hence, their dismissal upon the
termination of the project is proper. Accordingly,, for an employee to be considered
project-based, the employer must show compliance with two (2) requisites, namely
that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking;
and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at the time they were
engaged for such project. MA. CHARITO C. GADIA, et al. vs. SYKES ASIA,
INC./ CHUCK SYKES/ MIKE HINDS/ MICHAEL HENDERSON, G.R. No. 209499 ,
January 28, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
SEASONAL
Petitioners failed to dispute the allegation that the respondent performed hacienda
work, such as planting sugarcane point and fertilizing. They merely alleged that
respondent was a very casual worker because she only rendered work for 16
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months. Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. It
was also consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular
employees when they are called to work from time to time. They are in regular
employment because of the nature of the job, and not because of the length of time
they have worked. However, seasonal workers who have worked for one season
only may not be considered regular employees. Thus, respondent is considered a
regular seasonal worker and not a casual worker as the petitioners alleged.
HACIENDA CATAYWA/MANUEL VILLANUEVA, et al. vs. ROSARIO LOREZO,
G.R. No. 179640, March 18, 2015, J. Peralta
JOB CONTRACTING
The CA correctly found that A.C. Sicat is engaged in legitimate job contracting. It
duly noted that A.C. Sicat was able to prove its status as a legitimate job contractor
for having presented the following evidence, to wit: a) Certificate of Business
Registration; b) Certificate of Registration with the Bureau of Internal Revenue; c)
Mayors Permit; wd) Certificate of Membership with the Social Security System;
e)Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment; f)
Company Profile; g) Certifications issued by its clients. Furthermore, A.C. Sicat has
substantial capital, having assets totaling P5,926,155.76. Too, its Agreement with
Fonterra clearly sets forth that A.C. Sicat shall be liable for the wages and salaries of
its employees or workers, including benefits, premiums, and protection due them,
as well as remittance to the proper government entities of all withholding taxes,
Social Security Service, and Medicare premiums, in accordance with relevant laws.
FONTERRA BRANDS PHILS., INC. vs. LEONARDO LARGADO AND TEOTIMO
ESTRELLADO, G.R. No. 205300, March 18, 2015, J. Velasco Jr
LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING
Generally, the contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor, unless such
contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital,
investment, tools and the like. However, where the principal is the one claiming that
the contractor is a legitimate contractor, said principal has the burden of proving
that supposed status. Thus, where the company insists that its service contractor is
a legitimate contractor, it is the company and not the workers, which must prove
the same. The company fails to overcome such presumption when it presents
financial documents which shows the financial capability of the contractor covering
the period when the company and the contractor executed a service contract, and
not to the decades prior to the contract, during which the contractor had already
provided workers to the company. In addition, the workers are employees of the
company when the latter exercises the power of control over the workers as
manifested by the power to transfer employees from one work assignment to
another. The workers performance of work necessary and related to the companys
business operations for a long period of time also proves the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. AVELINO S. ALILIN, et al. vs. PETRON
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 177592, June 9, 2014, J. Del Castillo
DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT
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JUST CAUSES
It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that
determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence." In this
case, while Esteban's position was denominated as Sales Clerk, the nature of her
work included inventory and cashiering, a function that clearly falls within the
sphere of rank-and-file positions imbued with trust and confidence. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be work related such as would
show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer and
it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. In this case, the Court finds that the acts
committed by Esteban do not amount to a willful breach of trust. She admitted that
she accessed the POS system with the use of the unauthorized "123456" password.
She did so, however, out of curiosity and without any obvious intention of
defrauding the petitioner. As professed by Esteban, "she was acting in good faith in
verifying what her co-staff told her about the opening of the computer by the use of
the "123456" password, x xx. She even told her co-staff not to open again said
computer, and that was the first and last time she opened said computer. BLUER
THAN BLUE JOINT VENTURES COMPANY/MARY ANN DELA VEGA, vs. GLYZA
ESTEBAN, G.R. No. 192582, April 7, 2014, J. Reyes
Serious dishonesty is punishable by dismissal. Less serious dishonesty is punishable
by suspension for six months and one day to one year for the first offense and
dismissal for the second offense. Simple dishonesty is punishable by suspension of
one month and one day to six months for the first offense, six months and one day
to one year for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. Falsification
of a document cannot be classified as serious since the information falsified had no
direct relation to her employment. Whether or not she was suffering from
hypertension is a matter that has no relation to the functions of her office. LIGHT
RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES
A. ROBLES vs. AURORA A. SALVAA, G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014, J.
Leonen
The Court has held that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other
illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be
presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further
sea duties. This is in view of Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC which states that
"(t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed
as work-related." Concomitant with such presumption is the burden placed upon the
claimant to present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at
least increased the risk of contracting the disease. In the case at bar, Jarin was able
to prove that his rheumatoid arthritis was contracted out of his daily duties as Chief
Cook onboard M.T. Erik Spirit where he was also tasked to carry heavy things.
TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TEEKA Y SHIPPING LIMITED and ALEX
VERCHEZ vs. EXEQUIEL O. JARIN, G.R. No. 195598, June 25, 2014, J. Reyes
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Misconduct is defined as improper and wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of

some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To
be a just cause for terminating an employee, the employer must prove the
following: 1) it is of a grave and aggravated character; (2) it relates to the
performance of the employees duties; and (3) show that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer. As such, there must be substantial
evidence to prove that the employee acted in malicious and contemptuous manner
with the intent to cause damage to the employer. Otherwise, the penalty imposed,
albeit a suspension, is illegal. COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA vs.
ENGR. DEBORAH P. TARDEO, G.R. No. 190303, July 9, 2014, J. Perez
In order to sustain the respondents dismissal, FLPE must show, by substantial
evidence, that the following are extant: 1) the existence of the subject company
policy2) the dismissed employee must have been properly informed of said policy
3) actions or omissions on the part of the dismissed employee manifesting
deliberate refusal or wilful disregard of said company policy and 4) such actions or
omissions have occurred repeatedly. However, FLPE failed to establish that such a
company policy actually exists, and if it does truly exist, that it was, in fact, posted
and/or disseminated accordingly. Neither is there anything in the records which
reveals that the dismissed respondents were informed of said policy. The company
vehemently insists that it posted, announced, and implemented the subject
Safekeeping Policy in all its retail stores, especially the one in Alabang Town Center.
It, however, failed to substantiate said claim. It could have easily produced a copy
of said memorandum bearing the signatures of Dela Cruz and Malunes to show that,
indeed, they have been notified of the existence of said company rule and that they
have received, read, and understood the same. FLPE could likewise have simply
called some of its employees to testify on the rules existence, dissemination, and
strict implementation. But aside from its self-serving and uncorroborated
declaration, and a copy of the supposed policy as contained in the October 23, 2003
Memorandum, FLPE adduced nothing more. FLP ENTERPRISES, INC. FRANCESCO SHOES /EMILIO FRANCISCO FAJARO vs. MA JOERALYN DELA
CRUS AND VILMA MALUNES, G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014, J. Peralta
There is a difference between the criteria for determining the validity of invoking
loss of trust and confidence as a ground for terminating a managerial employee on
the one hand and a rank-and-file employee on the other. However the question of
whether she was a managerial or rank-and file employee does not matter if not only
is there basis for believing that she breached the trust of her employer, her
involvement in the irregularities attending to petitioners finances has also been
proved. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES vs. NOWELLA REYES, G.R. No.
208321, July 30, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The failure of the school physician to perform his duties such as failure to conduct
medical examination on all students for two (2) to five (5) consecutive years , lack of
medical records on all students; and students having medical records prior to their
enrollment constitute gross neglect, hence his dismissal is legal. DR. PHYLIS C.
RIO vs. COLEGIO DE STA. ROSAMAKATI and/or SR. MARILYN B. GUSTILO,
G.R. No. 189629, August 6, 2014, J. Perez
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Misconduct or improper behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment,

must: (a) be serious; (b) relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c)
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. In
this case, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind of fight between
Del Rosario and Gamboa is prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct, the same
could not be considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario's dismissal
from the service. The gravity of the fight, which was not more than a verbal
argument between them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest's public
image. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. vs. MA. CONCEPCION M. DEL ROSARIO,
G.R. No. 157633, September 10, 2014, J. Bersamin
The principle in employee dismissals that it is the employers burden to prove that
the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Temic failed to discharge this
burden of proof in Cantos case. TEMIC AUTOMOTIVE (PHILIPPINES), INC.vs.
RENATO M. CANTOS, G.R. No. 200729, September 29, 2014, J. Brion
The respondent contends that she was illegally dismissed by the petitioner. The
Supreme Court ruled that Article 282 of the Labor Code allows an employer to
dismiss an employee for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. It has been
held that a special and unique employment relationship exists between a
corporation and its cashier. Truly, more than most key positions, that of a cashier
calls for utmost trust and confidence, and it is the breach of this trust that results in
an employers loss of confidence in the employee. P.J. LHUILLIER, INC. and
MARIO RAMON LUDENA vs. FLORDELIZ VELAYO, G.R. No. 198620,
November 12, 2014, J. Reyes
To terminate the employment of workers simply because they asserted their legal
rights by filing a complaint is illegal. It violates their right to security of tenure and
should not be tolerated.
In this case, Elena failed to pinpoint the overt acts of respondents that show they
had abandoned their work. There was a mere allegation that she was forced to
declare them dismissed due to their failure to report back to work for a considerable
length of time but no evidence to prove the intent to abandon work. It is the
burden of the employer to prove that the employee was not dismissed or, if
dismissed, that such dismissal was not illegal. Unfortunately for Elena, she failed to
do so. STANLEY FINE FURNITURE, ELENA AND CARLOS WANG vs. VICTOR T.
GALLANO AND ENRIQUITO SIAREZ, G.R. No. 190486, November 26, 2014, J.
Leonen
Alcon and Papa were dismissed by Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation for
allegedly having sexual intercourse inside company premises during work hours. In
upholding that their dismissal is valid, the Court held that whether aroused by lust
or inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts should be carried out at such place,
time and circumstance that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not
offend public decency nor disturb the generally held or accepted social morals.
Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults do not have a
place in the work environment. These circumstances, by themselves, are already
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punishable misconduct. IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

vs. RAMONCHITO T. ALCON and JOANN S. PAPA, G .R. No. 194884, October
22, 2014, J. Brion
The refusal of an employee to issue a public apology to his superior due to a
pendency of criminal action arising therefrom shall not constitute insubordination if
the employee honestly believed that the public apology shall incriminate him. JOEL
N. MONTALLANA vs. LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE MANILA, SR. IMELDA A.
MORA, and ALBERT D. MANALILI, G.R. No. 208890, December 08, 2014, J.
Perlas-Bernabe
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of
employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors
should be present: 1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and 2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship.
There is no abandonment in this case. The intervening period when Fuentes failed
to report for work, from his prison release to the time he actually reported for work,
was justified. Since there was a justifiable reason for Fuentes's absence, the first
element of abandonment was not established. PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY
AGENCY, INC. vs. CELSO E. FUENTES, G.R. No. 169303, February 11, 2015,
J. Leonen
It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was
for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. Maersk, A.P. Moller, and
Agbayani maintain that Avestruz was dismissed on the ground of insubordination,
consisting of his repeated failure to obey his superiors order to maintain cleanliness
in the galley of the vessel as well as his act of insulting a superior officer by words
or deeds. Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee,
necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employees assailed
conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge. In this case, the contents of Captain Woodwards e-mails do not establish
that Avestruzs conduct had been willful, or characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude. Conversely, apart from Captain Woodwards e-mails, no other
evidence was presented by the petitioners to support their claims. MAERSKFILIPINAS CREWING, INC., A.P. MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE.LIMITED, AND
JESUS AGBAYANI vs. TORIBIO C. AVESTRUZ, G.R. No. 207010, February 18,
2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the
employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the
Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an
authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of
employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full backwages are mandated
under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was
unjust, separation pay may be granted.
ZENAIDA PAZ
vs. NORTHERN
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TOBACCO REDRYING CO., INC., AND/OR ANGELO ANG, G.R. No. 199554,
February 18, 2015, J. Leonen
Sanchez was dismissed due to theft. She alleged that she was illegal dismissed for
there was not intent to gain on her part. The court ruled that Court finds that
Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and disobedience of
Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of
dishonesty, i.e., theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x xx or its
attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-employees, doctors, visitors,
[and] customers (external and internal) with termination from employment. Such
act is obviously connected with Sanchezs work, who, as a staff nurse, is tasked with
the proper stewardship of medical supplies. ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, INC.
vs. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015, J.
Perlas-Bernabe
Based on the mystery guest shopper and duty managers reports, respondent
was dismissed from employment. The Court held that infractions which respondent
committed do not justify the severe penalty of termination from service. For willful
disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the employees assailed conduct
must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude;
and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
The Court ruled that alleged infractions do not amount to such a wrongful and
perverse attitude. THE COFFEE BEAN and TEA LEAF PHILIPPINES, INC. and
WALDEN CHU vs. ROLLY P. ARENAS, G.R. No. 208908, March 11, 2015, J.
Brion
Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if
proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. The
misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must,
nevertheless, be in connection with the employees work to constitute just cause for
his separation. But where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for
termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.
HOCHENG PHILIPPINES CORPORATION vs. ANTONIO M. FARRALES, G.R. No.
211497, March 18, 2015, J. Reyes
AUTHORIZED CAUSES
The Court does not agree with the rationalization of the NLRC that if it were true
that her position was not redundant and indispensable, then the company must
have already hired a new one to replace her in order not to jeopardize its business
operations. The fact that there is none only proves that her position was not
necessary and therefore superfluous. What the above reasoning of the NLRC failed
to perceive is that of primordial consideration is not the nomenclature or title given
to the employee, but the nature of his functions. It is not the job title but the actual
work that the employee performs. Also, change in the job title is not synonymous to
a change in the functions. A position cannot be abolished by a mere change of job
title. In cases of redundancy, the management should adduce evidence and prove
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that a position which was created in place of a previous one should pertain to
functions which are dissimilar and incongruous to the abolished office. For a valid
implementation of a redundancy program, the employer must comply with the
following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE
at least one month prior to the intended date of termination (2) payment of
separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher (3) good faith in abolishing the
redundant position; and,(4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what
positions are to be declared redundant. SPI TECHNOLOGIES INC., ET AL VS
VICTORIA MAPUA, G.R. No. 191154, April 7, 2014, J. REYES
Redundancy does not need to be always triggered by a decline in the business.
Primarily, employers resort to redundancy when the functions of an employee have
already become superfluous or in excess of what the business requires. Thus, even
if a business is doing well, an employer can still validly dismiss an employee from
the service due to redundancy if that employees position has already become in
excess of what the employers enterprise requires. From this perspective, it is
illogical for employer to terminate the petitioners employment and replace them
with contractual employees. The replacement effectively belies employers claim
that the petitioners positions were abolished due to superfluity. Redundancy could
have been justified if the functions of the petitioners were transferred to other
existing employees of the company. EUGENE S. ARABIT, et al., vs. JARDINE
PACIFIC FINANCE, INC. (FORMERLY MB FINANCE), G.R. No. 181719, April
21, 2014, J. Brion
The separation of NPC employees affected by its reorganization and privatization
was a foregone conclusion. In recognition of this, the EPIRA gave the assurance that
these employees shall receive the separation pay and other benefits due them
under existing laws, rules or regulations or be able to avail of the privileges under a
separation plan which shall be one and one-half month salary for every year of
service in the government. The employees separation being an unavoidable
consequence of the mandated restructuring and privatization of the NPC, the
liability to pay for their separation benefits should be deemed existing as of the
EPIRAs effectivity, and were thus transferred to PSALM pursuant to Section 49 of
the law. NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION (NPC DAMA),
represented by its President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES &
WORKERS UNION (NEWU) - NORTHERN LUZON, REGIONAL CENTER, ZOL D.
MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., and NECITAS B.
CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National Power
Corporation vs. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL
POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as
Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), ROLANDO S.
QUILALA, as President - Officer-in-charge/CEO of National Power
Corporation and Member of National Power Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ,
JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR.,
GREGORY L. DOMINGO, NIEVES L. OSORIO and POWER SECTOR ASSETS and
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT (PSALM), G.R. No. 156208, June 30, 2014, J.
Brion
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The burden of proving that the termination of services is for a valid or authorized
cause rests upon the employer. In termination by retrenchment, not every loss
incurred or expected to be incurred by an employer can justify retrenchment. The
employer must prove, among others, that the losses are substantial and that the
retrenchment is reasonably necessary to avert such losses. In this case, while
[MCCI] may have presented its Financial Statements, [MCCI], nevertheless, failed to
establish with reasonable certainty that the proportion of its revenues are largely
expended for its elementary and high school personnel salaries, wages and other
benefits. MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE EMPLOYEES UNION (MCCEU)/RUMOLO S.
BASCAR, et al., vs. MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE, INCORPORATED, G.R. No.
187621, September 24, 2014, J. Reyes
It is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a complaint, such as the petitioner
Manarpi is, for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of
his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employers charge of abandonment.
An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to
have abandoned his work. In this case, petitioner did not abandon her work but was
told not to report for work anymore after being served a written notice of
termination of company closure on July 27, 2000. Further, if the business closure is
due to serious losses or financial reverses, the employer must present sufficient
proof of its actual or imminent losses; it must show proof that the cessation of or
withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in character. A written notice to
the DOLE thirty days before the intended date of closure is also required and must
be served upon each and every employee of the company one month before the
date of effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the necessary arrangement.
Such requirements were not complied with by the respondent company thereby
proving that the petitioner was illegally dismissed. ESSENCIA Q. MANARPIIS vs.
TEXAN PHILIPPINES, INC., RICHARD TAN and CATHERINE P. RIALUBIN-TAN,
G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015 J. Villarama, Jr.
The notice requirement was also complied with by PEPSI-COLA when it served
notice of the corporate rightsizing program to the DOLE and to the fourteen (14)
employees who will be affected thereby at least one (1) month prior to the date of
retrenchment. PURISIMO M. CABAOBAS, et al. vs. PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS,
PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 176908, March 25, 2015, J. Peralta
DUE PROCESS
The Labor Code and its IRR are silent on the procedural due process required in
terminations due to disease. Despite the seeming gap in the law, Section 2, Rule 1,
Book VI of the IRR expressly states that the employee should be afforded procedural
due process in all cases of dismissals. MARIO A. DEFERIO vs. INTEL
TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES, INC. and/or MIKE WENTLING, G.R. No. 202996,
June 18, 2014, J. Brion
By pre-judging respondents case, petitioners clearly violated her right to due
process from the very beginning, and from then on it could not be expected that she
would obtain a fair resolution of her case. In a democratic system, the infliction of
punishment before trial is fundamentally abhorred. What petitioners did was clearly
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illegal and improper. MARIO A. DEFERIO vs. INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES,

INC. and/or MIKE WENTLING LIBCAP MARKETING CORP., JOHANNA J. CELIZ,
and MA. LUCIA G. MONDRAGON vs. LANNY JEAN B. BAQUIAL, G.R. No.
192011, June 30, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The petitioner alleges that the respondent was not illegally dismissed. The Supreme
Court ruled that a valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the
valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged
employee at least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices
must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.
The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employers decision." Aside
from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to
be heard." SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES,
G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014, J. Leonen
Illegally suspended employees, similar to illegally dismissed employees, are entitled
to moral damages when their suspension was attended by bad faith or fraud,
oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy.
In this case, PAL complied with procedural due process as laid out in Article 277,
paragraph (b) of the Labor Code. PAL issued a written notice of administrative
charge, conducted a clarificatory hearing, and rendered a written decision
suspending Montinola. However, we emphasize that the written notice of
administrative charge did not serve the purpose required under due process. PAL
did not deny her allegation that there would be a waiver of the clarificatory hearing
if she insisted on a specific notice of administrative charge. With Montinola unable
to clarify the contents of the notice of administrative charge, there were
irregularities in the procedural due process accorded to her. Moreover, PAL denied
Montinola substantial due process. NANCY S. MONTINOLA vs. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, G.R. No. 198656, September 8, 2014, J. Leonen
RELIEF FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
Since the decision is immediately executory, it is the duty of the employer to
comply with the order of reinstatement, which can be done either actually or
through payroll reinstatement. As provided under Article 223 of the Labor Code, this
immediately executory nature of an order of reinstatement is not affected by the
existence of an ongoing appeal. The employer has the duty to reinstate the
employee in the interim period until a reversal is decreed by a higher court or
tribunal.
The Court points out that reinstatement and backwages are two separate reliefs
available to an illegally dismissed employee. The normal consequences of a finding
that an employee has been illegally dismissed are: first, that the employee becomes
entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights; and
second, the payment of backwages covers the period running from his illegal
dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. These two reliefs are not inconsistent with
one another and the labor arbiter can award both simultaneously.
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In the instant case, the grant of separation pay was a substitute for immediate and
continued re-employment with the private respondent Bank. The grant of separation
pay did not redress the injury that is intended to be relieved by the second remedy
of backwages, that is, the loss of earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed
employee during the period between dismissal and reinstatement. Put a little
differently, payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that
was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal; separation pay, in contrast, is oriented
towards the immediate future, the transitional period the dismissed employee must
undergo before locating a replacement job. WENPHIL CORPORATION vs. ALMER
R. ABING and ANABELLE M. TUAZON, G.R. No. 207983, April 7, 2014, J.
Brion
An employee refusing a valid management prerogative cannot file a complaint for
illegal dismissal and shall not be entitled to monetary awards. RUBEN C.
JORDAN vs. GRANDEUR SECURITY & SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 206716, June
18, 2014, J. Brion
The employer is obliged to reinstate and to pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until its reversal by the higher Court; and that
because he was not reinstated either actually or by payroll, he should be held
entitled to the accrued salaries. Hence, petitioner is entitled for accrued salaries
from the time of the issuance of the order of reinstatement by LA Quinones until
such order was reversed. CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR. vs. ATENEO DE NAGA
UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL TABORA, and MR. EDWIN BERNAL, G.R. No. 175293,
July 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
Not all quitclaims are per se in valid or against public policy. A quitclaim is invalid or
contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on their face. In instances of invalid quitclaims, the
law steps in to annul the questionable waiver.
Indeed, there are legitimate waivers that represent the voluntary and reasonable
settlements of laborers claims that should be respected by the Court as the law
between the parties. Where the party has voluntarily made the waiver, with a full
understanding of its terms as well as its consequences, and the consideration for
the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a
valid and binding undertaking, and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind. A waiver is essentially contractual.
In the Courts view, the requisites for the validity of Michaels quitclaim were
satisfied. Firstly, Michael acknowledged in his quitclaim that he had read and
thoroughly understood the terms of his quitclaim and signed it of his own volition.
Secondly, the settlement pay was credible and reasonable considering that Michael
did not even assail such amount as unconscionably low, or even state that he was
entitled to a higher amount. Thirdly, that he was required to sign the quitclaim as a
condition to the release of the settlement pay did not prove that its execution was
coerced. And, lastly, that he signed the quitclaim out of fear of not being able to
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provide for the needs of his family and for the schooling of his children did not
immediately indicate that he had been forced to sign the same. RADIO MINDANAO
NETWORK, INC. vs. MICHAEL MAXIMO R. AMURAO III, G.R. No. 167225,
October 22, 2014, J. Bersamin
Paragraph 3, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in any event, the decision
of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as
the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending
appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer
shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of
the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory.
In the instant case, Paz obtained a favorable ruling from the LA in the complaint for
illegal dismissal case he filed against PAL but the same was reversed on appeal by
the NLRC. Also, PAL was under rehabilitation receivership during the entire period
that the illegal dismissal case was being heard. A similar question is now being
raised, i.e., whether the Paz may collect reinstatement salaries which he is
supposed to have received from the time PAL received the LA decision, ordering his
reinstatement, until the same was overturned by the NLRC. It is clear from the
records that PAL failed to reinstate the Paz pending appeal of the LA decision to the
NLRC. A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in
reinstating the Paz was not due to the unjustified refusal of PAL to abide by the
order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC. vs. REYNALDO V. PAZ, G.R. No. 192924, November 26, 2014,
J. Reyes
The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle
of immutability of final judgments.
However, in this case, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April 30, 2010 Decision
of the Labor Arbiter became final on June 11, 2013, contrary to its own finding that
it became final and executory on April 26, 2013. This led to its erroneous
computation of the additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo, as well as
reckoning the date of the 12% legal interest. Following the teaching of Nacar v.
Gallery Frames that the computation of the monetary consequences (back wages
and separation pay) of the illegal dismissal decision should be reckoned from its
finality, the additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo should be
computed from May 1, 2010 to April 26, 2013. Further, the payment of legal interest
of 12% per annum should also be from April 26, 2013 up to June 30, 2013.
Thereafter, in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Boards
Circular No. 799, series of 2013, the legal interest computed from July 1, 2013 until
the monetary awards were fully satisfied will be 6% per annum. METROGUARDS
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SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS BEEGUARDS

CORPORATION) AND MS. MILAGROS T. CHAN vs. ALBERTO N. HILONGO, G.R.
No. 215630, March 09, 2015, J. Villarama, Jr.
BACKWAGES
The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle
of immutability of final judgments. Thus, in the present case, a re- computation of
backwages until actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments. CONRADO A. LIM vs. HMR PHILIPPINES, INC.,
TERESA SANTOS-CASTRO, HENRY BUNAG AND NELSON CAMILLER, G.R. No.
201483, August 4, 2014, J. Mendoza
The Labor Arbiter, finding that illegal dismissal has been committed by the
petitioner (the decision being affirmed by the Supreme Court), ordered the recomputation of the award in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court ruled that
re-computation of awards issued by the Labor Arbiter is only a necessary
consequence of illegal dismissal cases and it does not violate the principle of
immutability of judgement. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation
of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of
the principle of immutability of final judgments. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN,
INC.,
CESAR
DUQUE/JUAN
LLAMAS
AMOR/DOMINADOR
REYES
vs. FLORENTINO FERNANDEZ AND HEIRS OF NILDA FERNANDEZ, G.R. No.
211228, November 12, 2014, J. Reyes
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
The temporary inactivity or floating status of security guards should continue only
for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for
constructive dismissal. The failure of the security agency to give the security guard
a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for
constructive dismissal. Moreover, Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates the
reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. Reinstatement is the general rule,
while the award of separation pay is the exception. EMERITUS SECURITY AND
MAINTENANCE SYSTEMS, INC. vs. JANRIE C. DAILIG, G.R. No. 204761, April
2, 2014, J. Carpio
Respondent Torres was employed by Chiang Kai Shek College as a grade school
teacher. She was found guilty of leaking a copy of a quiz given to Grade 5 students.
As a result, the school terminated her employment. Respondent then pleaded that
she instead be suspended and allowed to finish the school year and thereafter she
will voluntarily resign. The school acceded to her request. After the school year,
however, the respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal against the school. She
argues that the situation she was put through amounts to constructive dismissal. In
ruling in favor of the school, the Supreme Court held that academic dishonesty is
the worst offense a teacher can make because teachers caught committing
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academic dishonesty lose their credibility as educators and cease to be role models
for their students. More so that under Chiang Kai Shek College Faculty Manual,
leaking and selling of test questions is classified as a grave offense punishable by
dismissal/termination. The school gave due investigation and the respondent was
given a chance to defend herself, hence her termination is proper. The school
should not be punished for being compassionate and granting respondents request
for a lower penalty. CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE and CARMELITA ESPINO vs.
ROSALINDA M. TORRES, G.R. No. 189456, April 2, 2014, J. Perez
Petitioner questions the decision of the CA holding that private respondent was
constructively dismissed. The SC however ruled that constructive dismissal have
been defined as a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution
in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The test of constructive dismissal
is whether a reasonable person in the employees position would have felt
compelled to give up his position under the circumstances. It is an act amounting to
dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. Constructive dismissal is, therefore, a
dismissal in disguise.
As may gleaned from the records, what transpired on July 20, 2007 was not merely
an isolated outburst on the part of petitioner. The latters behavior towards his
employees shows a clear insensibility rendering the working condition of private
respondent unbearable. Private respondent had reason to dawdle and refuse to
comply with the summons of petitioner out of severe fear that he will be physically
harmed. In fact, the same was clearly manifested by his immediate reaction to the
situation by going to the Valenzuela Police to report the incident. MCMER
CORPORATION, INC., MACARIO D. ROQUE, JR. AND CECILIA R. ALVESTIR vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELICIANO C. LIBUNAO, JR.,
G.R. No. 193421, June 4, 2014, J. Peralta
When another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the employer
claims has been abolished, while the employee who had to vacate the same is
transferred against her will to a position which does not exist in the corporate
structure, there is evidently a case of illegal constructive dismissal. GIRLY G. ICO
vs. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, INC., MONICO V. JACOB and PETER
K. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 185100, July 9, 2014, J. DEL CASTILLO
It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of
the six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive dismissal, without
looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the security guards failure
to assume another post. This is especially true in the present case where the
security guards own refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was
not given an assignment within the six-month period. The security agency, Exocet,
should not then be held liable. EXOCET SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES
CORPORATION AND/OR MA. TERESA MARCELO vs. ARMANDO D. SERRANO,
G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014, J. Velasco, Jr.
The Court subscribes to the uniform rulings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the
CA that Villareal was constructively and illegally dismissed. When Villareal was
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relieved from duty, he was placed on floating status, thus, the employer should
prove that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of
work can be assigned. Peak failed to discharge the burden of proving that there
were no other posts available for Villareal after his recall from his last assignment.
Worse, no sufficient reason was given for his relief and continued denial of a new
assignment. PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION and/or EL TIGRE SECURITY and
INVESTIGATION
AGENCY
vs. HEIRS OF NESTOR B. VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 184618, November 19, 2014,
J. Del Castillo
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, an
employee who is unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to (1) reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and, (2) full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. The
award of separation pay must be deleted because, separation pay is only granted as
an alternative to reinstatement. Villareals backwages must be computed from the
time of his unjustified relief from duty up to his actual reinstatement. PEAK
VENTURES CORPORATION and/or EL TIGRE SECURITY and INVESTIGATION
AGENCY vs. HEIRS OF NESTOR B. VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 184618, November
19, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Respondents contract was not renewed after she was diagnosed with cancer. The
Court held that she was a regular employee and was illegally dismissed. She was
entitled to security of tenure and could be dismissed only for just or authorized
causes and after the observance of due process. Under the four-fold test, the
control test is the most important. The line should be drawn between rules that
merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result
without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those
that control or fix the methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of
such means. Respondent proved that petitioner had control over her work as
indicated in her contract. The manner of petitioner, informing respondent that her
contract would no longer be renewed, is tantamount to constructive dismissal. FUJI
TELEVISION NETWORK, INC. vs. ARLENE s. ESPIRITU, G.R. No. 204944-45,
December 03, 2014, J. Leonen
Temporary "off-detail" or "floating status" is the period of time when security guards
are in between assignments or when they are made to wait after being relieved
from a previous post until they are transferred to a new one. It takes place when the
security agency's clients decide not to renew their contracts with the agency,
resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts are
less than the number of guards in its roster. It also happens in instances where
contracts for security services stipulate that the client may request the agency for
the replacement of the guards assigned to it even for want of cause, such that the
replaced security guard may be placed on temporary "off-detail" if there are no
available posts under the agency's existing contracts. During such time, the security
guard does not receive any salary or any financial assistance provided by law. It
does not constitute a dismissal, as the assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties, so long as such
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status does not continue beyond a reasonable time. When such a "floating status"
lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have been
constructively dismissed.
In this case, respondents themselves claimed that after having removed Tatel from
his post at Bagger Werken on August 24, 2009 due to several infractions committed
thereat, they subsequently reassigned him to SKI from September 16, 2009 to
October 12, 2009 and then to IPVG from October 21 to 23, 2009. Thereafter, and
until Tatel filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal six (6) months later, or on
May 4, 2010, he was not given any other postings or assignments. While it may be
true that respondents summoned him back to work through the November 26, 2009
Memorandum, which Tatel acknowledged to have received on December 11, 2009,
records are bereft of evidence to show that he was given another detail or
assignment. As the "off-detail" period had already lasted for more than six (6)
months, Tatel is therefore deemed to have been constructively dismissed. VICENTE
C. TATEL vs. JLFP INVESTIGATION SECURITY AGENCY, INC., JOSE LUIS F.
PAMINTUAN, AND/OR PAOLO C. TURNO, G.R. No. 206942, February 25,
MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
While the adoption and enforcement by Mirant of its Anti-Drugs Policy is recognized
as a valid exercise of its management prerogative as an employer, such exercise is
not absolute and unbridled. In the exercise of its management prerogative, an
employer must therefore ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on workrelated activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the
corresponding penalties, when prescribed, commensurate to the offense involved
and to the degree of the infraction. The Anti-Drugs Policy of Mirant fell short of these
requirements. MIRANT (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION AND EDGARDO A.
BAUTISTA vs. JOSELITO A. CARO, G.R. No. 181490, April 23, 2014, J.
Villarama, Jr.
Respondent proposed year-end commissions for herself and special incentive plan.
At the end of the year, however, she resigned and filed complaint for payment of
bonus and incentive compensation as proposed. The Court ruled that she was
entitled to such. By its very definition, bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the
giver and thus, is not demandable. However, in this case, petitioners had already
exercised the management prerogative to grant the bonus or special incentive since
there was no refusal of her proposal and the management even bargained with the
respondent. MEGA MAGAZINE PUBLICATIONS, INC., JERRY TIU, AND SARITA
vs. YAPvs.MARGARET A. DEFENSOR, G.R. No. 162021, June 16, 2014, J.
Bersamin
It is the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations
necessary or proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain
disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to assure that the same be
complied with. At the same time, it is one of the fundamental duties of the
employee to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the
employer, and willful or intentional disobedience thereof, as a general rule, justifies
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rescission of the contract of service and the peremptory dismissal of the employee.
Quebral cannot feign ignorance of the policy limiting to patients the privilege of the
use of validated parking tickets. First, it is written on the parking ticket itself.
Having used said parking tickets many times, it was incumbent upon him to read
the terms and conditions stated thereon. And second, even assuming he was not
able to read said policy, the Court agrees with petitioner that this only serves as a
testament of his inefficiency in his job as he is not aware of his employers policies
despite being employed for 7 years. ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER vs. DANIEL
QUEBRAL and ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS (SLMCEA-AFW), G.R. No. 193324, July 23,
2014, J. Villarama Jr.
Article 283 of the Labor Code allows an employer to dismiss an employee due to the
cessation of operation or closure of its establishment or undertaking. The decision
to close ones business is a management prerogative that courts cannot interfere
with. However, despite this management prerogative, employers closing their
businesses must pay the affected workers separation pay equivalent to one-month
pay or to at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
G.J.T. Rebuilders decision to close its establishment is a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. G.J.T. Rebuilders closed its machine shop, believing that
its former customers seriously doubted its capacity to perform the same quality of
service after the fire had partially damaged the building where it was renting space.
Nevertheless, G.J.T. Rebuilders failed to sufficiently prove its alleged serious
business losses. Thus, it must pay respondents their separation pay equivalent to
one-month pay or at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. G.J.T. REBUILDERS MACHINE SHOP, GODOFREDO TRILLANA, AND
JULIANA TRILLANA, vs. RICARDO AMBOS, BENJAMIN PUTIAN, AND RUSSELL
AMBOS, G.R. No. 174184, January 28, 2015, J. Leonen
The petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral conduct
since she and the father of her child have no impediment to marry each other.
There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual
conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried
persons; that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy
enshrined in the Constitution. Further, the petitioners dismissal is not a valid
exercise of SSCWs management prerogative. SSCW, as employer, undeniably has
the right to discipline its employees and, if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid
cause to do so. However, as already explained, there is no cause to dismiss the
petitioner. There being no valid basis in law or even in SSCWs policy and rules,
SSCWs dismissal of the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid
exercise of management prerogative. CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS vs. ST.
SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE WESTGROVE and/or SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB,
G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015, J. Reyes
SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION (P.D. 626)
SSS LAW (R.A. 8282)
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The companydesignated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the

seafarers fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240
days, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. If he fails to do so and the seafarers
medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled. This definite assessment of the seamans permanent
disability must include the degree of his disability, as required by Section 20B of the
POEASEC. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC. and HOLLAND AMERICA LINE vs.
GENEROSO E. SIBUG, G.R. No. 201072, April 2, 2014, J. Villarama, Jr.
"It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that
determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence." In this
case, while Esteban's position was denominated as Sales Clerk, the nature of her
work included inventory and cashiering, a function that clearly falls within the
sphere of rank-and-file positions imbued with trust and confidence.
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be work related
such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer and it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently
In this case, the Court finds that the acts committed by Esteban do not amount to a
willful breach of trust. She admitted that she accessed the POS system with the use
of the unauthorized "123456" password. She did so, however, out of curiosity and
without any obvious intention of defrauding the petitioner. As professed by Esteban,
"she was acting in good faith in verifying what her co-staff told her about the
opening of the computer by the use of the "123456" password, x xx. She even told
her co-staff not to open again said computer, and that was the first and last time
she opened said computer." BLUER THAN BLUE JOINT VENTURES
COMPANY/MARY ANN DELA VEGA, vs. GLYZA ESTEBAN, G.R. No. 192582,
April 7, 2014, J. Bienvenido L. Reyes
Definitely, the Labor Arbiters award of loss of earning is unwarranted since Chin
had already been given disability compensation for loss of earning capacity. An
additional award for loss of earnings will result in double recovery. In a catena of
cases, the Court has consistently ruled that disability should not be understood
more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of
work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or
any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do.
Disability, therefore, is not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness." What is
compensated is ones incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of his earning
capacity. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION vs. OSCAR D. CHIN, JR.,,
G.R. No. 199022, April 7, 2014, J. Roberto A. Abad
In resolving the issue of whether the COLA and/or the BEP should be paid separately
from the basic salary to the employees of LBP as of July 1, 1989, Court should look
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into the very provisions of the SSL. From the foregoing provision, it is immediately
apparent that the SSL mandates the integration of all allowances except for the
following:
1. Representation and transportation allowances;
2. Clothing and laundry allowances;
3. Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels;
4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel;
5. Hazard pay;
6. Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad;
7. And such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM.
Since the COLA and the BEP are among those expressly excluded by the SSL from
integration, they should be considered as deemed integrated in the standardized
salaries of LBP employees under the general rule of integration.
Thus, theres no other conclusion than to deny the payment of the COLA on top of
the LBP employees basic salary from July 1, 1989 because (1) it has not been
expressly excluded from the general rule on integration by the first sentence of Sec.
12 of the SSL and (2) as explained, the COLA is not granted in order to reimburse
employees for the expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAVID G. NAVAL, JR., G.R. No. 195687,
April 7, 2014, J. Velasco
What is important is that the employee was unable to perform his customary work
for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability, and not the
actual injury itself. Undoubtedly, the illness of the employee which incapacitated
him to work more than 120 days after repatriation is considered as work-related
which entitles him to disability benefits. Indeed, the fact that a certification
declaring the employee as fit to work contrary to a prior finding of tuberculosis can
be considered as a ploy to circumvent the law intended to defeat the employees
right to be compensated for a disability which the law considers as permanent and
total. BARKO INTERNATIONAL, INC./CAPT. TEODORO B. QUIJANO AND/OR
FUYO KAIUN CO. LTD. vs. EBERLY S. ALCAYNO, G.R. No. 188190, April 21,
2014, J. Reyes
The Court has held that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other
illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be
presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further
sea duties. This is in view of Section 20(B)(4) of the POEA-SEC which states that
"(t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed
as work-related." Concomitant with such presumption is the burden placed upon the
claimant to present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at
least increased the risk of contracting the disease. In the case at bar, Jarin was able
to prove that his rheumatoid arthritis was contracted out of his daily duties as Chief
Cook onboard M.T. Erik Spirit where he was also tasked to carry heavy things.
TEEKAY SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., TEEKA Y SHIPPING LIMITED and ALEX
VERCHEZ vs. EXEQUIEL O. JARIN, G.R. No. 195598, June 25, 2014, J. Reyes
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Alberto suffered hypertension and filed claim for disability benefit, sickness
allowance, and reimbursement for medical expenses. The Labor Arbiter granted his
claims except for the reimbursement. Certification acknowledging receipt of
sickness allowance equivalent and payment in full of his medical treatment was
made by petitioner. The NLRC ordered the deduction of the expenses paid from the
peso equivalent of the total monetary award. The Court held that there was abuse
of discretion on the part of NLRC. As a matter of law, the benefit of medical
treatment at the employers expense is separate and distinct from the disability
benefits and sickness allowance to which the seafarer is additionally entitled.
Accordingly, any amount that the respondents may have expended for Albertos
medical treatment should not be deducted from the monetary award that consisted
only of the disability benefits and attorneys fees. THE LATE ALBERTO B. JAVIER,
as substituted by his surviving wife, MA. THERESA M. JAVIER, and children,
KLADINE M. JAVIER, CHRISTIE M. JAVIER, JALYN M. JAVIER, CANDY GRACE M.
JAVIER and GLIZELDA M.JAVIER vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,
INC. and/or NORTHERN MARINE MANAGEMENT, LTD., G.R. No. 204101, July
02, 2014, J. Brion
A seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability
benefits only if any of the following conditions are present: (a) The companydesignated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea
duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no
indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total
disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had
lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician; (c)
The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the
120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his physician of choice and the
doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion; (d)
The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently
disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his
employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The
company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently
disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company-designated
physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related
under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under
Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g)
The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled
but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The
company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his
usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. Furthermore, the onus probandi falls
on the seafarer to establish or substantiate his claim that he is entitled to disability
benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence. He has to prove causation between
the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the risk of contracting the
illness was increased by his working condition. Otherwise, for lack of factual and
legal basis, he will not be entitled to any claim. ALONE AMAR P. TAGLE vs.
ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT, PHILS., INC., ANGLO-EASTERN
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CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) and CAPT. GREGORIO B. SIALSA, G.R. No.

209302, July 9, 2014, J. Mendoza
Under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, for an occupational disease and the resulting
disability or death from it to be compensable, all of the following conditions must
first be satisfied: 1) The seafarers work must involve the risks described herein; 2)
The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the described
risks; 3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it; and 4) There was no notorious negligence on
the part of the seafarer. In the case at bar, the third condition is absent. Hence, the
claim of previous contracts with the same employer as long enough to expose the
employee to work-related risks to trigger a disease, in the absence of the respective
dates and durations of those, created a possibility that he acquired his disease at
some other time when he was not on board and working in any of the employers
vessels. Moreover, while it is provided for in the law that it is the companydesignated physician who declares the fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a
work-related injury/illness or the degree of the seafarers disability, a finding by the
doctor of choice of the employee in contrast with that made of the companydesignated physician, necessitates the appointment of a third doctor whose
decision shall be final and binding. Otherwise, the assessment of the companydesignated physician as to the seafarers health should stand. Also, for work-related
illnesses acquired by seafarers from the time the 2010 amendment to the POEA-SEC
took effect, the declaration of disability should no longer be based on the number of
days the seafarer was treated or paid his sickness allowance, but rather on the
disability grading he received, whether from the company-designated physician or
from the third independent physician, if the medical findings of the physician
chosen by the seafarer conflicts with that of the company-designated doctor.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, EDUARDO U. MANESE and
NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE vs. HENRY M. SIMBAJON, G.R. No. 203472, July 9,
2014, J. Brion
Under the POEA-SEC, it is the company-designated physician who declares the
fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a work-related injury/illness or the degree
of the seafarers disability. While a seafarer is not precluded from seeking a second
opinion on his medical condition or disability, a finding by his doctor of choice in
contrast with that made of the company-designated physician, necessitates the
appointment of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding. Such
disagreement should have been referred to a third doctor jointly by the employer
and the seafarer. In the case at bar, the non-referral cannot be blamed on the
employer. Since it was the seafarer who consulted another doctor without informing
his employer, he should have actively requested that the disagreement be referred
to a final and binding third opinion. In the absence of any request from him, the
employer-company cannot be expected to respond. As such, in the absence of a
third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between the doctors, the
assessment of the company-designated physician as to the seafarers health should
stand. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES
LIMITED vs. CRISANTE C. CONSTANTINO, G.R. No. 180343, July 9, 2014, J.
Brion
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Rosemarie Esmarialino filed an application for the Employees Compensation Death

Benefits before the SSS. She contends there is a causal connection between
Leukemia to her late husbands job as a security guard. SSS denied her claim. Such
denial was affirmed by ECC and CA. In affirming the ruling of the CA, the Supreme
Court held that the principles of presumption of compensability and aggravation
found in the old Workmens Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the
present compensation scheme. The new principle being applied is a system based
on social security principle thus, the introduction of proof of increased risk. Since
Rosemarie failed to present evidence which would indicate the connection between
Leukemia and her husbands job, her application necessarily fails. ROSEMARIE
ESMARIALINO vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM and JIMENEZ PROTECTIVE and SECURITY AGENCY, G.R.
No. 192352,July 23, 2014, J. Reyes
In Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc., this Court categorically
declared that the petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption
provision mentioned in Section 20(B)(4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without
solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or work-aggravation of his illness,
the Court cannot provide him relief. The disputable presumption provision in Section
20(B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to
present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of
the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to
be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered
was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his employment
contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent
company. On that note, we emphasize that making factual findings based only on
presumptions and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases is an
erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. This Court has ruled
in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., citing Government Service
Insurance System v. Cuntapay, that claimants in compensation proceedings must
show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and
the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required otherwise, the resulting
conclusion would proceed from deficient proof. JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG vs.
UNITED PHILIPPINES LINES, INC, ET AL, G.R. No. 198388, July 28, 2014, CJ.
Sereno
Section 20(E) of the POEA-SEC is clearly states that a seafarer who knowingly
conceals and does not disclose past medical condition, disability and history in the
pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and
shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. This may also be a valid
ground for termination of employment and imposition of the appropriate
administrative and legal sanctions. Thus, for knowingly concealing his diabetes
during the PEME, petitioner committed fraudulent misrepresentation which under
the POEA-SEC unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability
compensation or illness benefit. STATUS MARITIME CORPORATION, MS. LOMA
B. AGUIMAN, FAIRDEAL GROUP MANAGEMENT S.A., and MT FAIR JOLLY vs.
SPOUSES MARGARITO B. DELALAMON and PRISCILA A. DELALAMO., G.R.
No. 198097, July 30, 2014, J. Reyes
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The mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the
payment of permanent total disability benefits. Hence, the NLRC could not have
gravely abused its discretion in not granting Pellazar permanent total disability
benefits based on this as the entitlement to disability is governed not by the period
of disability per se but by the specific provisions of the law and contract.
Since there is a conflict in the assessment of the company-designated physicians
and Dr. Sabados certification in relation to Pellazars fitness or unfitness to work,
the matter should have been referred to a third doctor for final determination as
required by the POEA-SEC and the parties CBA. Since Pellazar was responsible for
the non-referral to the third doctor because of his failure to inform the manning
agency that he would be consulting Dr. Sabado, he should suffer the consequences
of the absence of a binding third opinion. Thus, the NLRC was well within the bounds
of its jurisdiction, in upholding the disability assessment of Drs. De Guzman and
Banaga as against Pellazars physician of choice.Since the company-designated
physicians gave Pellazar only a Grade 10 disability - and not a permanent total
disability - he cannot be entitled to the full disability benefits. OSG
SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA, INC et al vs. JOSELITO B. PELLAZAR, G.R. No.
198367, August 6, 2014, J. Brion
It is settled that when the death of a seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act
on his own life, and it is directly attributable to the seaman, such death is not
compensable. The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes the
employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule,
however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can
successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act. Wallem were able to prove that Hernani
committed suicide, Hernanis death is not compensable and his heirs are not
entitled to any compensation or benefits. WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC.et
al vs. DONNABELLE PEDRAJAS et al, G.R. No. 192993, August 11, 2014, J.
Peralta
When a seafarer claims disability due to injuries incurred during work, and the
findings of his physician disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated
physician as to the degree of his injury, a third doctor may be agreed jointly
between the employer and the seafarer and the third doctors decision shall be final
and binding on both parties. However where there was no third doctor appointed by
both parties whose decision would be binding on the parties, it is up to the labor
tribunal and the courts to evaluate and weigh the merits of the medical reports of
the company-designated doctor and the seafarers doctor. Clearly, the findings of
the company-designated doctor, who, with his team of specialists which included an
orthopedic surgeon and a physical therapist, periodically treated the seafarer
Dalusong for months and monitored his condition, deserve greater evidentiary
weight than the single medical report of Dalusongs doctor, who appeared to have
examined Dalusong only once.
In addition, just because the seafarer is unable to perform his job and is undergoing
medical treatment for more than 120 days does not automatically entitle the
seafarer to total and permanent disability compensation. If the 120 days initial
period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires
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further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be
extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
When the company-designated physician gave Dalusong a final, permanent partial
disability grading beyond the 120-day period but before the 240 day maximum,
then Dalusong is not entitled to permanent disability benefits. RICARDO A.
DALUSONG vs. EAGLE CLARC SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., et al., G.R. No.
204233, September 3, 2014, Acting C.J. Carpio
After the expiration of respondents contract, he informed the company of his illness
but was not given any doctors referral. He was diagnosed initially with pneumonia
and asthma then with tuberculosis. The Court denied his disability benefit claim for
non-compliance with the three-day rule on post-employment medical examination
and because respondents illness is not compensable. The Court held that POEA
Contracts provisions must be applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the
seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into
effect. This exhortation cannot, however, be taken to sanction the award of
disability benefits and sickness allowance based on flimsy evidence and/ or even in
the face of an unjustified non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement
under the POEA Contract. INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC. vs.
VICTOR M. CREER III, G.R. No. 181921, September 17, 2014, J. Del Castillo
Libang was employed as Cook on board M/V Baltimar Orion. While on board, he
experienced illness which was found to be due to high blood pressure and high
blood sugar. He was repatriated. In the medical certificate of the companydesignated physician, he was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension which
could be pre-existing. Another doctor diagnosed his illness as secondary
Impediment Grade VI. The Court found him to be entitled to disability benefit. Given
the failure of the first doctor to fully evaluate petitioners illness, he was justified in
seeking the medical expertise of his physician of choice.The alleged concealment by
petitioner of his hypertension during his pre-employment medical examination was
also unsubstantiated, but was a mere hearsay. PEDRO LIBANG, JR. vs.
INDOCHINA SHIP MANAGEMENT INC., MR. MIGUEL SANTOS, and MAJESTIC
CARRIERS, INC., G.R. No. 189863, September 17, 2014, J. Reyes
A seafarer must prove that his illness is an occupational disease to claim disability
benefits. He cannot merely cling to his allegations that the conditions in the engine
room aggravated his illness but must present substantial evidence to prove the
same. JEBSEN MARITIME INC., APEX MARITIME SHIP MANAGEMENTCO. LLC.,
AND/OR ESTANISLAO SANTIAGO vs. WILFREDO E. RAVENA, G.R. No.
200566, September 17, 2014, J. Brion
Vicmars officers initially failed to remit the SSS contributions and payments of
respondents such that respondents were denied benefits under the SSS Law which
they wanted to avail of. It was only under threat of criminal liability that Vicmars
officers subsequently remitted what they had long deducted from the wages of
respondents. Such officers are criminally liable under R.A. 8282. The elements of
criminal liability under Section 22 (a) are: 1) The employer fails to register its
employees with the SSS; 2) The employer fails to deduct monthly contributions from
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the salaries and/or wages of its employees; and 3) Having deducted the SSS
contributions and/or loan payments to SSS, the employer fails to remit these to the
SSS. ROBERT KUA, CAROLINE N. KUA, and MA. TERESITA N. KUA vs.
GREGORIO SACUPAYO and MAXIMINIANO PANERIO, G.R. No. 191237,
September 24, 2014, J. Perez
Dr. Cruz, the company physician, gave Rosales a partial permanent disability
assessment but a private physician gave him a permanent total disability
assessment. Under these circumstances, the assessment of the companydesignated physician is more credible for having been arrived at after months of
medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private
physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical
records. INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED, et.al vs. BENJAMIN I.
ROSALES, G.R. No. 195832, October 01, 2014, J. Brion
Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the
2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor
whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarers personal
doctor disagrees with the company-designated physicians fit-to-work assessment.
Jurisprudence provides that the seafarers non-compliance with the said conflict
resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the
company-designated physician. In light of the contrasting diagnoses of the
company-designated physician and Hipes personal doctor, Hipe filed his complaint
before the NLRC but prematurely did so without any regard to the conflict-resolution
procedure under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Thus, consistent with
Jurisprudence, the fit-to-work certification of the company designated physician
ought to be upheld. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE
LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., G.R. No. 204699,
November 12, 2014, J. Perlas- Bernabe
The entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is
governed by the medical findings, by law and by the parties contract. Section 20B19 of the POEA-SEC laid out the procedure to be followed in assessing the
seafarers disability in addition to specifying the employers liabilities on account of
such injury or illness. The same provision also provides that the seafarer is not
irrevocably bound by the findings of the company-designated physician as he is
allowed to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. In case of
disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and the
seafarers private physician, the parties shall jointly agree to refer the matter to a
third doctor whose findings shall be final and binding on both. The disagreement
between the findings of the company-designated physician and Belmontes private
doctor was never referred to a third doctor chosen by both CFSCMI and Belmonte,
following the procedure spelled out in Section 20(B), paragraph 3 of the POEA-SEC.
Considering the absence of findings coming from a third doctor, the Court holds that
the certification of the company-designated physician should prevail. The Court
does so for the following reasons: first, the records show that Belmonte only
consulted the private physician after his complaint with the LA has been filed;
second, the medical certificate was issued after a one-day consultation; and third,
the medical certification was not supported by particular tests or medical
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procedures conducted on Belmonte that would sufficiently controvert the positive

results of those administered to him by the company-designated physician.
CATALINO B. BELMONTE, JR vs. C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC et al,
G.R. No. 209202, November 19, 2014, J. Reyes
There being no assessment, Michaels condition cannot be considered a permanent
total disability. Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when declared
by the company physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration
of either fitness to work or permanent disability.
A seafarers inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to
determine fitness or unfitness to work despite the lapse of 120 days will not
automatically bring about a shift in the seafarers state from total and temporary to
total and permanent, considering that the condition of total and temporary disability
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
The Court agrees with New Filipinos stance that Michael was indeed guilty of
medical abandonment for his failure to complete his treatment even before the
lapse of the 240 days period. Section 20(D) of the POEA-SEC instructs that no
compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or
intentional breach of his duties. Michael was duty-bound to complete his medical
treatment until declared fit to work or assessed with a permanent disability grading.
NEW FILIPINO MARITIME AGENCIES INC., ST. PAUL MARITIME CORP., and
ANGELINA T. RIVERA vs. MICHAEL D. DESPABELADERAS, G.R. No. 209201,
November 19, 2014, J. Mendoza
Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. It is of no
consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The law does not
require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he was unable
to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent
total disability. In the instant petition, Dr. Alegres January 20, 2007 report
addressed to PTCI clearly indicated that the petitioners persistent back pains
remained unresolved. Hence, the continuation of physical therapy and an increased
Gabapentin dose were recommended. Petitioner Garillo is therefore, entitled to
permanent disability benefits. ALO. EYANA vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC., ALAIN A. GARILLOS, CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC. (U.S.A.),
G.R. No. 193468, January 28, 2015, J. Reyes
For the death of a seafarer to be compensable, the same must occur during the
term of his contract of employment. Absent such fact, his death will not be
compensable. WALLEM SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC. and WALLEM SHIP
MANAGEMENT, LTD. vs. HEIRS OF THE LATE PETER PADRONES, G.R. No.
138212, March 16, 2015, J. Peralta
The petitioner suffered stroke during the course of his employment. He then filed a
complaint for payment of disability benefit. The Supreme Court ruled that Section
20(B) of the POEA contract provides that entitlement to disability benefits requires
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that the seafarers disability be work-related and that it occur during the contracts
term. The POEA contract defines work-related illness as any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of
this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. The POEA contract also
states that illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this contract are disputably
presumed
as work
related.
JOEL
B.
MONANA
vs. MEC
GLOBAL
SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION AND HD HERM
DAVELSBERG GMBH, G.R. No. 196122, November 12, 2014, J. Leonen
There are three (3) requirements necessary for the complete termination of the
employment contract: 1] termination due to expiration or other reasons/causes; 2]
signing off from the vessel; and 3]arrival at the point of hire. In this case, there was
no clear showing that Caseas signed off from the vessel upon the expiration of his
employment contract, which was in February or April 2005. He did not arrive either
in Manila, his point of hire, because he was still on board the vessel MV Haitien Pride
on the supposed date of expiration of his contract. It was only on August 14, 2006
that he signed off from MV Haitien Pride and arrived in Manila on August 30, 2006.
APQ SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., LTD., and APQ CREW MANAGEMENT USA, INC.,
vs. ANGELITO L. CASEAS, G.R. No. 197303, June 4, 2014, J. Mendoza
It is recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally
resulting in wear and tear of the human body. It is also settled that the
cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and other heart ailments are
compensable. As such, when a seaman has long been in the employ on an
employer, no other conclusion can be arrived at other than his years of service
certainly taking a toll on his body. Hence, he could not have contracted his illness
elsewhere except while working for such employer. MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK
MARINE, INC. and/or MOL TANKSHIP MANAGEMENT (ASIA) PTE LTD. vs.
JUANITO G. BENGSON*, G.R. No. 198528, October 13, 2014, J. Del Castillo
As stated in Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC, the seafarers beneficiaries may
successfully claim death benefits if they are able to establish that the seafarers
death is (a) work-related and (b) had occurred during the term of his employment
contract. The first requirement is complied with if the seafarer incurred an injury
when he figured in an accident while performing his duties. In such case, the injury
is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought,
the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may
be had for injury independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease. With respect
to the second requirement, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the
general rule is that the seafarers death should occur during the term of his
employment, the seafarers death occurring after the termination of his
employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or
illness constitutes an exception thereto. The basis of such is the liberal construction
of the afore-mentioned law as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who
stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarers
death, notwithstanding its evident work-connection. ANITA N. CANUEL, for
herself and on behalf of her minor children, namely: CHARMAINE,
CHARLENE, and CHARL SMITH, all surnamed CANUEL vs. MAGSAYSAY
MARITIME
CORPORATION,
EDUARDO
U.
MANESE,
and
KOTANI
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SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, G.R. No. 190161, October 13, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe

Even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. Thus, the
biological mother of a deceased employee who was legally adopted and whose
adopter had died during the adoptees minority, is entitled to the death benefits
under R.A. No. 8282 or the Social Security System (SSS) of the Social Welfare
Legislation (PD 626) as a secondary beneficiary being an independent parent The
death of the adopter during the adoptees minority resulted in the restoration of the
biological mothers parental authority over the adopted child. BERNARDINA P.
BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, J. Velasco
Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the
same kind of work, or work of similar nature, that he was trained for or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment
could do. In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but
rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity.
As Daraug was never actually incapacitated, it would be highly unjust if he would be
awarded the disability benefits which the law accords only to the deserving and
utterly unfair to KGJS if they would be made to pay. ROMMEL B. DARAUG vs.
KGJSFLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC., KRISTIAN GERHARDJEBSEN
SKIPSREDER, MR. GUY DOMINO A. MACAPAYAG and/or M/V "IBIS ARROW,",
G.R. No. 211211, January 14, 2015, J. Mendoza
It has been settled that in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the
employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. Once it is
established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract,
the employer is liable. However, if he died after he pre-terminated the contract of
employment, pursuant to Section 20 (A) of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract, the terms and conditions contained in the contract of employment ceased
to have force and effect, including the payment of death compensation benefits to
the heirs of a seafarer. Perforce, the same is true especially when there is no
evidence to show that the illness was acquired during the term of his employment
with petitioners and neither were there indications that he was already suffering
from an ailment at the time he pre-terminated his employment contracts. Even
more, granting that petitioners were made aware of the seamans prior heart
ailment, the fact still remains that he died after the effectivity of his contract. ONE
SHIPPING CORP., AND/OR ONE SHIPPING KABUSHIKI KAISHA/JAPAN vs.
IMELDA C. PEAFIEL, G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015, J. Peralta
Section 20 of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, provides that the
employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once
it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract.
However, the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that
the seamans death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or
willful act. UNICOL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., LINK MARINE PTE. LTD.
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AND/OR VICTORIANO B. TIROL, III vs. DELIA MALIPOT, IN BEHALF OF

GLICERIO MALIPOT, G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015, J. Peralta
Accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that
does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably
anticipated; an unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake,
negligence, neglect or misconduct. Accident is that which happens by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and
unforeseen.To stress, to be entitled to the compensation under Section 21(a) of the
CBA, a seafarer must suffer an injury as a result of an accident. But there is no proof
that Perez met an accident and was injured, that he met an unintended and
unforeseen injurious occurrence while on board the Rio Grande. C.F. SHARP
CREWMANAGEMENT, INC. AND REEDEREI CLAUS PETER OFFEN vs.
CLEMENTE M. PEREZ, G.R. No. 194885, January 26, 2015, J. Villarama Jr.
The Dela Torre was repatriated and immediately underwent treatment and
rehabilitation at the company-designated facility, Marine Medical Services of the
Metropolitan Medical Center, exceeding the 240 days allowed to declare him either
fit to work or permanently disabled. Under Section 32 of the POEA SEC, only those
injuries or disabilities classified as Grade 1 are considered total and
permanent. . The Court held that the POEA SEC must be read in harmony with the
Labor Code and the AREC. Although Dela Torre was given a Grade 11 disability
rating the assessment may be deemed tentative because he continued his physical
therapy sessions beyond 240 days. Yet, despite his long treatment and
rehabilitation, he was eventually unable to go back to work as a seafarer, which fact
entitled him under the Dutch CBA to maximum disability benefits. SEALANES
MARINE SERVICES, INC./ARKLOW SHIPPING NETHERLAND AND/OR
CHRISTOPHER DUMATOL vs. ARNEL G. DELA TORRE, G.R. No. 214132,
February 18, 2015, J. Reyes
GSIS LAW (R.A. 8291)
It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic
workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the
complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness
is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is
exposed to. In the case at bar, aside from Joses general allegations proving the
stressful duties of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that
her respiratory disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was aggravated by her
working conditions. The records do not support the contention that she had been
exposed to voluminous and dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture
of her working environment. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs.
JOSE M. CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that respondents illnesses,
hypertension and Glaucoma, not being work-connected, cannot entitle her to
disability retirement benefit. The SC however ruled that hypertension is a listed
occupational disease, such being the case it is not necessary that there be proof of
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causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondents
disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of
causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits. As to her glaucoma, the SC ruled that since there
appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, the
Court concluded that respondents glaucoma developed as a result of her
hypertension. Such being the case, the latter is likewise compensable under the
New GSIS Act. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. AURELIA Y.
CALUMPIANO, G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
Dennis willfully caused his death while Apolinario's evidence fell short of substantial
evidence to establish its counterdefense of insanity. In other words, Apolinario's
complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency
of his evidence to support his claim of insanity. POEA-SEC requires the employer to
prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also
that the seafarer willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness
may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counterdefense. Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the
seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness required to be
proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other
words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness. AGILE MARITIME
RESOURCES INC., ATTY. IMELDA LIM BARCELONA and PRONAV SHIP
MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. APOLINARIO N. SIADOR, G.R. No. 191034, October
01, 2014, J. Brion
The CA correctly ruled that Montierros condition cannot be deemed a permanent
total disability. The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal
Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar, by
explaining: Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more
than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the
principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of
his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a
result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the
company-designated physician to issue a final assessment. Applying the 240-day
rule to this case, we arrive at the same conclusion reached by the CA. Montierros
treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It ended on 3 January
2011, when the company doctor issued a Grade 10 final disability assessment.
Counting the days from 4 June 2010 to 3 January 2011, the assessment by the
company doctor was made on the 213 th day, well within the 240-day period. The
extension of the period to 240 days is justified by the fact that Dr. Alegre issued
an interim disability grade of 10 on 3 September 2010, the 91 st day of Montierros
treatment, which was within the 120-day period. NORIEL R. MONTIERO vs.
RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS. INC., G.R. No. 210634, January 14,
2015, C.J. Sereno
LABOR RELATIONS LAW
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CERTIFICATION ELECTION
Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the certification election is the sole
concern of the workers, and the employer is deemed an intruder as far as the
certification election is concerned. Thus, the petitioner lacked the legal personality
to assail the proceedings for the certification election, and should stand aside as a
mere bystander who could not oppose the petition, or even appeal the Med-Arbiters
orders relative to the conduct of the certification election. As the Court has
explained in Republic v. Kawashima Textile Mfg., Philippines, Inc., except when it is
requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition
for certification election such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely
investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will
represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The
choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees the
employer cannot have any partisan interest therein it cannot interfere with, much
less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it not even
a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification
election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality
to block the certification election. The employers only right in the proceeding is to
be notified or informed thereof. HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, J. Bersamin
UNION REGISTRATION
Arguing that respondent is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation with respect to the
minimum requirement of the law as to union membership, petitioner prays for the
reversal of the decision of the CA and the cancellation of respondents Union
Certificate of Registration. The SC however ruled that it does not appear in Article
234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in the organizational meeting must
comprise 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit. In fact, even the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code does not so provide. It is
only under Article 234 (c) that requires the names of all its members comprising at
least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it
seeks to operate. Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the
employees membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated
in the organizational meeting. Here, considering that there are 119 union members
which are more than 20% of all the employees of the bargaining unit, and since the
law does not provide for the required number of members to attend the
organizational meeting, the 68 attendees which comprised at least the majority of
the 119 union members would already constitute a quorum for the meeting to
proceed and to validly ratify the Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is,
therefore, no basis for petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the cancellation
of respondent's union registration. TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS and SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA NG
TAKATA (SALAMAT), G.R. No. 196276, June 4, 2014, J. Peralta
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
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Money-claim underpayment of retirement benefits involves an issue arising from the

interpretation or implementation of a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement which according to Article 261 of the Labor Code falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, and not the Labor Arbiter. Said provision, however, excluded from this
original and exclusive jurisdiction, gross violation of the CBA, which is defined as
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of the
CBA. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF
SANTO TOMAS, G.R. No. 203957, July 30, 2014, J. Carpio
When the parties, however, agree to deviate there from, and unqualifiedly covenant
the payment of separation benefits irrespective of the employers financial position,
then the obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms should be carried
out to its full effect. If the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
prevail.
Clearly, the fact that the employer, with full knowledge of its financial situation,
freely and voluntarily entered into such collective bargaining agreement with its
employees, cannot be accepted as an excuse to clear itself of its liability to pay its
employees of separation benefits under such agreement. BENSON INDUSTRIES
EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP AND/OR VILMA GENON, et al. vs. BENSON
INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 200746, August 06, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
The schedule of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on Lipio and
Ignacio, Sr. did not conform to Article X, Section 4 of the June 1, 1997 collective
bargaining agreement. A collective bargaining agreement is a contract executed
upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with
respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment,
including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement. In the case at bar, Lipio and Ignacio, Sr. were selected for training
during the effectivity of the June 1, 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining
agreement. Therefore, Lipios and Ignacio, Sr.s training allowance must be
computed based on Article X, Section 4 and Article IX, Section 1(f) of the June 1,
1997 collective bargaining agreement. PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
(PHILEC) vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014, J.
Leonen
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
As there was no bad faith on the part of Shell in its bargaining with the union,
deadlock was possible and did occur. Thus, because of the unresolved issue on
wage increase, there was actually a complete stoppage of the ongoing negotiations
between the parties and the union filed a Notice of Strike. A mutual declaration
would neither add to nor subtract from the reality of the deadlock then existing
between the parties. Thus, the absence of the parties mutual declaration of
deadlock does not mean that there was no deadlock. At most, it would have been
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simply a recognition of the prevailing status quo between the parties. Further, there
was already an actual existing deadlock between the parties. What was lacking was
the formal recognition of the existence of such a deadlock because the union
refused a declaration of deadlock. TABANGAO SHELL REFINERY EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, G.R. No.
170007, April 7, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro
PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
The Court holds that as between the parties, Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code is
applicable. Said provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. The
observation that the matter of SSS contributions necessarily flowed from the
employer-employee relationship between the parties shared by the lower courts
and the CA is correct; thus, petitioners claims should have been referred to the
labor tribunals. In this connection, it noteworthy to state that the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages
governed by the Civil Code.
At the same time, it cannot be assumed that since the dispute concerns the
payment of SSS premiums, petitioners claim should be referred to the Social
Security Commission (SSC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8282. As far as SSS is concerned, there is no longer a dispute with
respect to petitioners accountability to the System; petitioners already settled their
pecuniary obligations to it. Since there is no longer any dispute regarding coverage,
benefits, contributions and penalties to speak of, the SSC need not be unnecessarily
dragged into the picture. Besides, it cannot be made to act as a colleting agency for
petitioners claims against [Lopez]; the Social Security Law should not be so
interpreted, lest the SSC be swamped with cases of this sort. AMECOS
INNOVATIONS, INC. AND ANTONIO F. MATEO vs. ELIZA R. LOPEZ, G.R. No.
178055, July 2, 2014, J. Del Castillo
The "reasonable causal connection rule," provides that if there is a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee
relations, then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts; and in the
absence thereof, it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. True, the
maintenance of a safe and healthy workplace is ordinarily a subject of labor cases.
More, the acts complained of appear to constitute matters involving employeeemployer relations since Adviento used to be the Civil Engineer of Indophil.
However, it should be stressed that Advientos claim for damages as can be gleaned
in his complaint is specifically grounded on Indophils gross negligence to provide a
safe, healthy and workable environment for its employees a case of quasi-delict.
Hence, the jurisdiction over the case is within the regular courts. INDOPHIL
TEXTILE MILLS, INC. vs. ENGR. SALVADOR ADVIENTO, G.R. No. 171212,
August 4, 2014, J. Peralta
The illegal dismissal case filed by Azuelo against Zameco II Electric Cooperative was
dismissed on the ground of lack of interest of the complainant to prosecute the
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case. Azuelo then filed another case for illegal dismissal which contains the same
allegations in the first complaint, hence, Azeco Cooperative filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata. In ruling against Azuelo the Court ruled that the
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the
merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. RICARDO N. AZUELO
vs. ZAMECO II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., G.R. No. 192573, October 22,
2014, J. Peralta
As a general rule, therefore, a claim only need to be sufficiently connected to the
labor issue raised and must arise from an employer-employee relationship for the
labor tribunals to have jurisdiction. In this case, respondent Solid Mills claims that its
properties are in petitioners possession by virtue of their status as its employees.
Solid Mills allowed petitioners to use its property as an act of liberality. Put in other
words, it would not have allowed petitioners to use its property had they not been
its employees. The return of its properties in petitioners possession by virtue of
their status as employees is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether
benefits can be released immediately. EMER MILAN, RANDY MASANGKAY,
WILFREDO JAVIER, RONALDO DAVID, BONIFACIO MATUNDAN, NORA
MENDOZA, ET AL. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SOLID
MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG, G.R. No. 202961, February 04, 2015, J.
Leonen
EFFECT OF NLRC REVERSAL OF LABOR ARBITERS ORDER OF
REINSTATEMENT
A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to
receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which reinstatement is
immediately executory. After the LAs decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the
employers duty to reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. The
employee, in turn, is not required to return the wages that he had received prior to
the reversal of the LAs decision.
By way of exception, an employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages
if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without
fault on the part of the employer and not when it was due to the employers
unjustified act or omission by filling several pleadings to suspend the execution of
the LAs reinstatement order and not notifying the petitioners of their intent to
actually reinstate them. FROILAN M. BERGONIO, et al. vs. SOUTH EAST ASIAN
AIRLINES and IRENE DORNIER, G.R. No. 195227, April 21, 2014, J. Brion
APPEAL
Princess Joy questions the decision of the CA setting aside the decision of the NLRC
on the ground that failure on the part of Petitioner to post a surety bond equal to
the monetary award of the Labor Arbiter, its appeal was not deemed perfected.
There being no perfected appeal, it opined, the labor arbiters judgment had
become final and executory. Ruling in favor of the Petitioner the SC held that the
Court takes a liberal approach on the appeal bond requirement in "the broader
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interest of justice and with the desired objective of deciding cases on the merits."
Thus, the Court finds the initial bond posted by Petitioner reasonable, considering
that it is questioning the unusually large amount of the awarded damages.
PRINCESS JOY PLACEMENT AND GENERAL SERVICES, INC. vs. GERMAN A.
BINALLA, G.R. No. 197005, June 4, 2014, J. Brion
While Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules
of Procedure of the NLRC require the party intending to appeal from the LAs ruling
to furnish the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has held
that the mere failure to serve the same upon the opposing party does not bar the
NLRC from giving due course to an appeal. Such failure is only treated as a formal
lapse, an excusable neglect, and, hence, not a jurisdictional defect warranting the
dismissal of an appeal. Instead, the NLRC should require the appellant to provide
the opposing party copies of the notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal. LEI
SHERYLL FERNANDEZ vs. BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE
JOSE, G.R. No. 205870, August 13, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable
to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision
of the LA, the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC nonetheless allows the reduction of
the bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction,
and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award. Thus, when the appellant employer prayed for the reduction of the bond in
view of serious liquidity problems evidenced by audited financial statements, while
simultaneously posting a surety bond which is more than 10% of the full judgment
award, the bond may be reduced and the appeal is considered perfected.
PHILIPPINE TOURISTERS, INC. and/or ALEJANDRO R. YAGUE, JR. vs. MAS
TRANSIT WORKERS UNION-ANGLO-KMU and is members, represented by
ABRAHAM TUMALA, JR., G.R. No. 201237, September 3, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe
In this case, it was not disputed that at the time CBIC issued the appeal bond, it was
already blacklisted by the NLRC. The latter, however, opined that MCCI should not
be faulted if the Bacolod branch office of the bonding company issued the surety
bond and that MCCI acted in good faith when they transacted with the bonding
company for the issuance of the surety bond.
Good faith, however, is not an excuse for setting aside the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement of the law. In Cawaling v. Menese, the Court categorically
ruled that the defense of good faith does not render the issued bond valid.
The condition of posting a cash or surety bond is not a meaningless requirement it
is meant to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the
money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the formers appeal. Such aim
is defeated if the bond issued turned out to be invalid due to the surety companys
expired accreditation. Much more in this case where the bonding company was
blacklisted at the time it issued the appeal bond. The blacklisting of a bonding
company is not a whimsical exercise. When a bonding company is blacklisted, it
meant that it committed certain prohibited acts and/or violations of law, prescribed
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rules and regulations. Trivializing it would release a blacklisted bonding company

from the effects sought to be achieved by the blacklisting and would make the
entire process insignificant. MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE EMPLOYEES UNION
(MCCEU)/RUMOLO S. BASCAR, et al., vs. MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE,
INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 187621, September 24, 2014, J. Reyes
It is clear that the NLRC in due observance of its own procedural rules- had amply
justified its dismissal of Ortiz's appeal in view of his numerous procedural
infractions, namely: (a) his failure to attach to his Memorandum of Appeal a
certificate of non-forum shopping in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC
Rules;(b) his filing of a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's March 24, 2008
Resolution beyond the 10 day reglementary period in violation of Section 15, Rule
VII of the NLRC Rules; and (c) his filing of a second motion for reconsideration in
violation of Section 15, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules. Time and again, this Court has
been emphatic in ruling that the seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration
within the 10-day reglementary period following the receipt by a party of any order,
resolution or decision of the NLRC, is a mandatory requirement to forestall the
finality of such order, resolution or decision. MICHELIN ASIA APPLICATION
CENTER, INC vs. MARIO J. ORTIZ, et al., G.R. No. 189861, November 19,
Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that in case the decision
of the Labor Arbiter, or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal
by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall
either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorneys fees. However, in line
with Sara Lee Case and the objective that the appeal on the merits to be threshed
out soonest by the NLRC, the Court holds that the appeal bond posted by the
respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 which is equivalent to around 20% of the
total amount of monetary bond is sufficient to perfect an appeal. With the
employers demonstrated good faith in filing the motion to reduce the bond on
demonstrable grounds coupled with the posting of the appeal bond in the requested
amount, as well as the filing of the memorandum of appeal, the right of the
employer to appeal must be upheld. ANDY D. BALITE, DELFIN M. ANZALDO AND
MONALIZA DL. BIHASA vs. SS VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., SUNG SIK
LEE AND EVELYN RAYALA, G.R. No. 195109, February 04, 2015, J. Perez
COURT OF APPEALS
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when,
inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence. The CA correctly granted respondents certiorari petition since
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that respondents were project
employees despite petitioners failure to establish their project employment status
through substantial evidence. OMNI HAULING SERVICES, INC., LOLITA FRANCO
and ANICETO FRANCO vs. BERNARDO BON, et al., G.R. No. 199388,
September 3, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
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In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when,
inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by
substantial evidence. Tested against these considerations, the Court finds that the
CA correctly granted respondents certiorari petition before it, since the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioners were regular employees of
Sykes Asia when the latter had established by substantial evidence that they were
merely project-based. MA. CHARITO C. GADIA, et al., vs. SYKES ASIA, INC.,
CHUCK SYKES, MIKE HINDS, MICHAEL HENDERSON, G.R. No. 209499,
January 28, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe
MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASES
The Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim and the Addendum (to Release, Waiver and
Quitclaim) executed has now therefore rendered this case moot and academic.
ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS vs. ISIDORO A. ANTE, RAUL CADDATU, NICANOR
B.PADILLA, JR., DANTE Y.CENIDO, and RHAMIR C. DALIOAN, G.R. No.
187240, October 15, 2014, J.Villarama Jr.
The issue in this case is whether or not the issue has become moot and academic
due to payment of award which constituted as compromise agreement. The Court
ruled that the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot despite petitioners
satisfaction of the judgment award, as the respondent had obliged himself to return
the payment if the petition would be granted. Verily in this case, petitioners
satisfied the judgment award in strict compliance with a duly issued writ of
execution and pursuant to terms fair to both parties. Thus, the equitable ruling
in Career Philippines would certainly be unfair to petitioners in this case as they still
have a remedy under the rules. The CA, therefore, was in error in dismissing the
petition for being moot and academic. SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT,
INC., ROLANDO B. MAGCALE, AND SEALION SHIPPING LIMITED UNITED
KINGDOM vs. MAURICIO G. PICAR, JR., G.R. No. 209383, March 11, 2015, J.
Mendoza
SUPERVENING CAUSE
Due to a bargaining deadlock with PHIMCO, PILA staged a strike. PHIMCO served
dismissal notices on the strikers for the alleged illegal acts they committed during
the strike. Consequently, PILA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. While it was still
pending, PILA found that seven others were not included in the case and thus, filed
another case for illegal dismissal. The Court held that the Court of Appeals validly
nullified its final and executory decision on the ground that there was a supervening
cause. The supervening cause was the decision of the Supreme Court in denying the
complaint for illegal dismissal. FLORENCIO LIBONGCOGON, FELIPE VILLAREAL
and ALFONSO CLAUDIO vs. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 203332,
June 18, 2014, J. Brion
PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS
The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the
time the cause of action accrued. This four-year prescriptive period, not the threePage 45 of 46

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year period for filing money claims under Article 291 of the Labor Code, applies to
claims for backwages and damages due to illegal dismissal. We find that Arriola s
claims for backwages, damages, and attorneys fees arising from his claim of illegal
dismissal have not yet prescribed when he filed his complaint with the NLRC. The
prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the
time the cause of action accrued. Since an award of backwages is merely
consequent to a declaration of illegal dismissal, a claim for backwages likewise
prescribes in four years. GEORGE A. ARRIOLA vs. PILIPINO STAR NGAYON,
INC. and/or MIGUEL G. BELMONTE, G.R. No. 175689, August 13, 2014, J.
Leonen
The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal stops the running of the prescriptive
period. However, when the complainant withdraws the case, he shall be considered
to have not filed any case at all and the statute of limitations shall apply. ONOFRE
V. MONTERO, et al., vs. TIMES TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and SANTIAGO
RONDARIS, MENCORPTRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA
and REYNALDO MENDOZA, G .R. No. 190828, March 16, 2015, J. Reyes
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Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SOLID MILLS, INC., AND/OR PHILIP ANG,

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

VERITAS MARITIME CORPORATION AND/OR ERICKSON MARQUEZ vs.

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

In the absence of a specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of separation

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Under Article 82 Field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

disagrees. Not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship.

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Misconduct is defined as improper and wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Misconduct or improper behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment,

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

punishable misconduct. IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

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illegal and improper. MARIO A. DEFERIO vs. INTEL TECHNOLOGY PHILIPPINES,

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

SECURITY AGENCY CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS BEEGUARDS

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

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The companydesignated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the

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Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) and CAPT. GREGORIO B. SIALSA, G.R. No.

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Rosemarie Esmarialino filed an application for the Employees Compensation Death

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Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

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procedures conducted on Belmonte that would sufficiently controvert the positive

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

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SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED, G.R. No. 190161, October 13, 2014, J. PerlasBernabe

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

AND/OR VICTORIANO B. TIROL, III vs. DELIA MALIPOT, IN BEHALF OF

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Recent Jurisprudence (April 2014 March

Money-claim underpayment of retirement benefits involves an issue arising from the